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The Battle of the Ly s 1918
Givenchy and the River Law
Phil Tomaselli
First published in Great Britain in 2011 by Pen & Sword Military an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd 47 Church Street Barnsley South Yorkshire S70 2AS Copyright © Phil Tomaselli 2011 9781783468812 The right of Phil Tomaselli to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Typeset in 10pt Times Printed and bound in England by CPI UK Pen & Sword Books Ltd incorporates the Imprints of Pen & Sword Aviation, Pen & Sword Maritime, Pen & Sword Military, Wharncliffe Local History, Pen and Sword Select, Pen and Sword Military Classics, Leo Cooper, Remember When, Seaforth Publishing and Frontline Publishing. For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact PEN & SWORD BOOKS LIMITED 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England E-mail:
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Table of Contents
Battleground series: Title Page Copyright Page SERIES EDITOR ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION Chapter One - THE TROOPS AND THEIR DISPOSITIONS Chapter Two - 9 APRIL: THE BREAK-IN ON THE LAVENTIE FRONT Chapter Three - DEFENCE OF THE LAWE CROSSINGS Chapter Four - 10 APRIL: FORCING THE LAWE CROSSINGS Chapter Five - 11 APRIL: THE FALL OF VIEILLE CHAPELLE Chapter Six - 12 APRIL: THE BREAKTHROUGH CONTAINED – JUST Chapter Seven - THE LATER BATTLE Chapter Eight - TOURS Appendix I - BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE USEFUL SOURCES Index
SERIES EDITOR This latest addition to the Battleground Europe series is only the second to cover, in any great detail, the fighting of 1918. It covers the early stages of the Battle of the Lys and is centred on Givenchy, a seemingly insignificant place near the la Bassée Canal. Thus this book is not only about a relatively neglected part of the Great War but also set in an area that is well off the beaten track that most Great War enthusiasts tread. Both 1918 and the Battle of the Lys deserve much greater attention than has been their lot. 1918 was an extraordinary year in the history of the British army; at its beginning facing disaster in the face and at its end spearheading the triumph of the allied armies. 1918 showed how resilient this citizens’ army could be in defence and how effective it was in the offensive. Of the many battles that took place in that year, the Lys – one of the crucial ones – has been largely lost in what literature there is by the huge battles around the Somme; this is, at the least, unfortunate. Phil Tomaselli has produced a work that provides us with a powerful narrative of those few days of April 1918, when so much was at stake. He has illustrated the big story with accounts of small units and of the contribution to the fighting of extraordinary individuals (whilst the almost invisible allies in Great War narratives, the Portuguese, get at least something of their due). He takes us around the major parts of the battlefield. It has to be admitted that this is far from being the most beautiful part of France. Yet I have always found something rather special about what, for a better term, I know as French Flanders – flat, largely featureless, fields intersected with numerous drainage ditches; small, rather unexciting villages; an area dotted with evocative Commonwealth War Graves cemeteries and impressive memorials (Le Touret is a special favourite of mine). This somewhat uninspiring area, a permanent feature of the British line from the autumn of 1914 to war ’s end, and the men who fought there, are given much meaning by this book. Phil’s book goes, I hope, some way to putting the early days of the Battle of the Lys ‘on the map’ – a work that I hope will be continued by more books on the actions of the BEF in 1918 in Flanders, on the Somme and on the Aisne. Nigel Cave The Ngong Hills, Kenya, September 2010
A CK N OW L EDGEMEN TS The preparation of a book like this inevitably involves the help and assistance of a good many people, without whom it would have been a lot harder, if not impossible. In no particular order then, I’d like to thank: The staff at the National Archives and the Imperial War Museum, who are always professional, courteous and knowledgeable; Peter Donnelly at the Regimental Museum of the King’s Own Royal Lancaster Museum at Lancaster, who deserves special thanks for all the help he has given over the years; the staff at Liverpool Record Office for allowing me access to the invaluable Jeudwine papers; David List, military researcher par excellence, for acting as a sounding-board over the course of many researches; various members of the Western Front Association, especially in our local Wiltshire Branch, for sharing their enthusiasm and knowledge; Simon Fowler, friend and editor, who has acted as guide and mentor and who introduced me to Pen & Sword; Nigel Cave for his expert guidance and editorial assistance; Nina Staehle for her kind assistance with German translation; Dr John Salt for his French translations; Richard Davies and his ever-friendly staff at the Liddle Archive at Leeds University for their assistance and permission to use material; and the late Peter Pepper and Joyce Cooke for sharing memories of George Pepper and allowing me to use his photograph. Of course, the biggest and most special thanks go to my wife Francine (née Pepper) who began to investigate her grandfather ’s military career and suggested that I use her original research as the basis for this book. Her help and support, particularly in driving around the battlefield, identifying sites on the ground and locating source material, have been, as ever, invaluable.
Lance Corporal George Pepper. Though a Londoner, he was transferred into the 1/5th King’s Own Royal Lancasters in 1915 and served with them for the rest of the war.
This was very much a soldier ’s battle. There was very little useful input above brigade level, and very many of the decisions were made by junior officers and senior non-commissioned officers. Where possible, I have tried to use their own words, taken either from the War Diaries or from individual accounts. General Jeudwine of the 55th Division insisted that reports be written by the senior survivors of units as small as platoons, and these reports, written in the men’s own language and style, are an invaluable source. I feel moved, therefore, to dedicate this book to the brave men who fought in the battle, in particular George Pepper and his comrades in the 55th Division.
Troops of 51st Division digging a defensive position.
IN TRODUCTION The main body of this book deals with the three days that opened the southern sector of the battle of the Lys, the second German offensive of 1918 (named ‘the battle of Estaires’ by the Battlefield Nomenclature Committee), though I have stretched it into the fourth day, 12 April, because it makes narrative sense to do so. Though a German attack was expected, the scale and date of it were unknown. When it came, the brunt of the assault fell on the Portuguese Expeditionary Force holding the centre of the front, which collapsed like a house of cards. Four German divisions poured through the gap, creating a breach several kilometres wide and, by the end of the first day, nearly 10 kilometres deep. Only in the south, around Givenchy, did the British line hold firm. Elsewhere, in a series of desperate holding actions, assorted infantry battalions, engineer and tunnelling companies and groups of stragglers were rushed in to create temporary lines which flexed, bulged, fell back but never quite broke. This was truly an infantryman’s battle: a number of factors handicapped the artillery, there were no tanks and the Royal Air Force made little contribution. In many places responsibility devolved to company and platoon commanders to plug gaps as they opened and to mount local counter-attacks as the opportunity presented itself. When I started researching the First World War over twenty years ago there seemed to be little interest in the Givenchy area about the events that had happened there sixty years before. I am pleased to say this has changed and French local history societies in the area now put on exhibitions relating to the First World War and often involve the British in their activities. An excellent case in point is the inclusion of the King Edward’s Horse memorial in the annual 11 November commemorations at Vieille Chapelle, which were only resumed in 2001. In May 1940 British troops of the 2nd Division BEF fought a series of desperate rearguard battles across much of the old Lys battlefield. Once again they were defending La Bassée Canal, this time from German troops advancing from the south. Many of the villages and bridges mentioned in this book were fought over once again. With the exception of one incident, I have not mentioned the events of the 1940 campaign in this book, although some of the cemeteries and monuments from the Second World War are listed in the Tours section where they coincide with the routes of the walks or drives.
Vi s i ti ng the Battl e fi e l d The most useful map for visitors is no. 2 in the Serie Vert (Green) series, entitled Lille/Dunkerque, which covers the whole of the Lys battlefield area and is quite good enough to give an overall picture. For more detailed coverage the Serie Bleu (Blue) maps are useful; those covering the areas discussed in this book are nos 2404 O (Hazebrouck), 2404 E (Armentières), 2405 O (Bethune) and 2405 E (Lens). These will be needed to accompany the walking tours given in Chapter 9, or to do any walking exploration of your own. Travellers from the UK generally cross the Channel on the ferry or through the Channel Tunnel and arrive at Calais. The main road down to the battlefield is the A26 – E15, and the journey should
take just over an hour. The exit for Bethune is no. 6, which is just outside the town and will bring you to the south-west corner of the battlefield. With Ypres just an hour away to the north and the Somme battlefields an hour and a half to the south, the Lys battlefield is easily accessible from these better known areas. From Ypres take the N366 south to St Eloi, then take the right fork on to the N365 south, down the Messines Ridge through Wijtschate (referred to as Wytschaete by the British at the time and henceforth in this book), Mesen (Messines) and past the Ploegsteert Memorial to the Missing, where the missing from the northern sector of the Lys battlefield are commemorated. From Armentières the D945 will take you south-west along the southern bank of the Lys towards Estaires, the area defended by the 40th and 50th Divisions on 9 April. From just outside Estaires the D947 will take you south across the Portuguese area and down towards Neuve Chapelle and La Bassée. From Estaires the D945 south will take you down the west bank of the River Lawe to Bethune. From the Somme the route north is via the A1 – E15 motorway (this is a toll road) up to just north of Arras, where it becomes the Autoroute Du Nord. At Lens take the A21 west and at junction 10 join the N47 which will take you up to La Bassée and the southern sector of the battlefield. For the short-term visitor there are several small and cheap hotels around Bethune, Armentières and La Bassée, and bed and breakfast is available where you see the sign Chambres d’hôtes. For those planning to spend more than a day or two visiting the area, the generally excellent Gites de France organisation (website: http://www.gites-de-france.com/gites/uk/rural_gites) can be used to find good quality self-catering cottages or apartments at a reasonable price. There are currently eleven gites listed within 10 kilometres of Bethune, including some excellent ones (from personal experience) right in the heart of the battlefield. The French Tourism office in London is at: French Government Tourist Office Lincoln House 300 High Holborn London WC1V 7JH Tel: 09068 244 123 (lines open 9 am—5 pm Mon to Fri; calls charged at 60p a minute at all times) E-mail:
[email protected] Website: http://ur.france.com/home For the Bethune area a useful website is http://www.tourisme.fr/tourist-office/bethune.htm. Please remember that this is a working farming community and that car parking should be done carefully so as not to obstruct field entrances. Though the area did not suffer the huge volumes of long-term shelling that the Somme and Ypres did, explosive relics are still turned up from time to time. Please take care and do not handle anything that you are not sure of.
Pre vi ous Hi s tory of the Battl e fi e l d On the morning of 10 October 1914 German cavalry arrived in Richebourg but French troops,
supported by British reinforcements which arrived in the afternoon, prevented their advancing any further towards Bethune. There followed three days of intense fighting, including hand-to-hand combat among the houses, before the Germans were driven out. Givenchy was the focus of heavy fighting in December 1914, when British and Indian troops launched an attack to try to prevent German reinforcements being moved south to be used against the French near Arras. Indian troops from the Lahore Division captured two lines of German trenches but were counter-attacked and part of Givenchy village fell into German hands before they were finally driven out by two British battalions. Givenchy’s relative elevation (standing some 9 or 10 metres above the plain, with important lines of sight for artillery observation over the Allied lines) meant that shallow mining operations could be carried out and both sides dug tunnels under no-man’s-land and exploded charges beneath the other ’s defences. Several large craters dominated no-man’s-land around the village, with both sides running saps and posts out into them. The garrison of Givenchy always had to be on the watch for a surprise German assault, or for further enemy mining operations. In June 1916 tunneller William Hackett was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross after refusing to abandon an injured comrade when the tunnel they were working in was collapsed by a German mine. In March 1915 Neuve Chapelle was the scene of the first major British offensive since the opening moves of 1914. British and Indian troops took the village after four days of heavy fighting, but were unable to drive the enemy off the Aubers Ridge and advance on Lille. Further attacks on the position during the battles of Aubers Ridge and Festubert during 1915 resulted in heavy British casualties and little else. On 30 June 1916, in advance of the major attack to be launched on the Somme the next day, a diversionary attack was made from the lines near Richebourg St Vaast against a bulge in the German trenches known as the Boar ’s Head. Two battalions (12th and 13th) of the Sussex Regiment attacked the German trenches after several days of bombardment. The Germans knew they were coming (even putting up signs above their parapets asking ‘When are you coming, Tommy?’). It was a disaster. The Sussex battalions suffered some 1,100 killed and wounded without making any advance. Three weeks later a similar diversionary attack was launched against the village of Fromelles on the Aubers Ridge. Small-scale advances were made by the Australians in their first major action on the Western Front, but once again casualties were heavy, to no significant advantage. From mid-1916 onwards, however, this part of the front was considered quiet, so the untried Portuguese Expeditionary Force was sent there in 1917 and in March 1918 the 34th, 51st and 40th Divisions were posted into the area to rest and recuperate after their severe mauling on the Somme. The ground over which the battle of Lys was fought is flat and wet. There are no other words to describe it. Even the area around Ypres presents more subtle rises and falls in the terrain than the ground between Givenchy, Armentières and Robecq. Only Givenchy itself, standing on an extension of the Aubers Ridge, and rising some 9 or 10 metres above the surrounding terrain (30 metres as opposed to 20 or 21 metres locally above sea level), stands clear. This meant that Givenchy dominated the land behind the British lines and, if captured, would provide excellent artillery observation for the Germans right across the British lines to the north and south, and across the strategically important Bethune coalfields. It had to be held at all costs. Because the land was low-lying it rapidly became waterlogged in wet weather. General Jeudwine of the 55th Division wrote that without the river Lys exiting the plain to the north the whole area would be a lake. He also noted that ‘trenches or any shelter below the surface are an impossibility and breastworks standing up from the ground level are the only possible protection’. The water table is usually only a foot or two below the surface, and a complex web of shallow drainage ditches criss-
crosses the area, feeding into the streams and small rivers. The ditches had been kept clear and the drainage system generally well maintained by the British. The ditches could be used to provide cover for troops unable to throw up breastworks or to dig shallow trenches, but could equally well be used as a route forward for advancing soldiers. They were also an obstacle to a straightforward advance. For soldiers of both sides, even though the winter had been the driest in living memory, this was to be a cold and wet campaign. In a few sites the British had managed to build concrete dug-outs and machine-gun posts but these were cold and desolate places offering only limited protection from artillery. On at least two occasions shells landed underneath the pill-boxes, with the resulting explosions blowing the floor up to hit the roof, badly injuring those inside.
Taken from Le Plantin, Givenchy can be plainly seen on the slight ridge from which it dominates the surrounding area. The ground between was a killing ground as the Germans were forced to retreat across it, covered as it was by machine guns. Three water features dominate the southern sector of the battlefield. The southern boundary was La Bassée Canal itself, running more or less east—west and some 90 metres wide. In the vicinity of Givenchy the canal had been badly damaged and was pretty much drained, but it remained a formidable obstacle. To the west of the town it remained a working canal, with barges bringing up supplies into the vicinity of Robecq. The river Lawe, running south—north to the rear of the battle line, had been canalised in the previous century. Some 5 to 10 metres wide, the Lawe was crossed by numerous permanent bridges as well as by temporary structures built by the Royal Engineers. These were all fitted with explosive demolition charges. Other temporary swing and float bridges were ready to be moved up to allow the rapid movement of troops in either direction. The canal locks presented more of a problem, because the canal narrowed at them and the lock gates could be used to get across, but there does not seem to have been a plan to blow them up. The river Lys more or less marks the northern boundary of the battlefield covered in this book. Much wider than the Lawe, at
least 20 metres across, it presented a more formidable obstacle but was spanned, like the Lawe, by numerous permanent bridges, both road and rail, as well as by temporary swing and float bridges. These three watercourses dictated the Germans’ initial strategy. If crossings could not be captured within 24 hours, the advancing troops would be trapped in a salient. Armentières was the main town in the northern part of the battle area. Previously popular among the troops for its friendly estaminets and patisseries, it had been evacuated during the summer of 1917 because of prolonged and heavy gas attacks. The main square was known to the troops as ‘Eleven o’clock Square’ because the clock on the clock tower had stopped at that hour in 1914 when it was struck by a shell. Otherwise the Armentières sector had been quiet and the trench system was decayed. A series of isolated posts, lightly held and poorly wired, made up the main defences. The town was flattened during the Lys battle and rebuilt in the same style in the 1920s. The other main town in the area was Bethune, on the banks of La Bassée Canal a few kilometres behind the line. Still populated, it boasted ‘a first class restaurant, an excellent officers’ club, a well stocked Expeditionary Force Canteen and several cinemas’ as well as attractions of ‘a more dubious character ’. The centre of the Bethune coalfield, the town was to be a prime target in the southern part of the attack. Though it was shelled at long range and evacuated, it never fell and still retains many buildings from the period, including the bell tower in the main square, which was hit several times but remained standing. The landscape was dotted with numerous small villages and hamlets as well as isolated farms. Many of the farms took the form of a square built around a central courtyard, with living accommodation on one side and stables and other working or storage buildings forming the remaining three sides. Most were strongly built of brick, with a brick cellar beneath the house, and most had two storeys (the upper floor typically using the roof space), which meant these were ideal buildings for billets and headquarters and as the central bases for defensive positions. A typical farm could accommodate 200 men quite easily. Mesplaux Farm and many others across the battlefield took this form and were rebuilt in exactly the same place and style in the 1920s, and are still inhabited today. There were also many small cottages housing agricultural workers and coal miners. Though there had been comparatively heavy fighting in the area in 1914 and 1915, many buildings, even within the battle zone, were still standing to a height of two storeys. In Festubert the Royal Engineers had been able to construct within the walls of some of these buildings artillery observation posts of solid concrete, which were soon exposed as the artillery barrage stripped away their cover of bricks. After this, of course, they did not remain standing for long. Some houses in Festubert were even used for billeting troops. Modern roads follow almost exactly the same routes as they did in 1918, although in those days they would have been cobbled rather than tarmacked and in many cases are much wider today. Many of the tracks also remain and can be traced on both trench maps and modern maps. Partly because they needed a source of labour for the nearby Bethune coalfield and partly because of the overcrowding that was already affecting their refugee areas, the French Government had not evacuated the battlefield area. The local inhabitants ‘held on very tenaciously to their little farms and gardens and paid no attention to an occasional odd shell or two landing in the crops or hen coops’. Their presence made defending the area more difficult, as special authority was required to commandeer any buildings required for strongpoints. The presence of civilians within 2,000 metres of the front line no doubt helped provide diversions for the troops, with whom they seem to have had friendly relations, but when the crisis came the civilians crowded into the shelters. Troops moving up in support found the roads choked not only with fleeing Portuguese but with French men, women and children pushing handcarts loaded with the few precious belongings they had been able to save.
A battery position of 55th Division’s artillery built between cottages at The Tuning Fork with the locals hanging out their washing in between
There are more houses in the area today, and more are being built, though there is some continuity of style and every house is still built on an ever-so-slight rise (often less than a metre) above the surroundings. Villages and hamlets are in the same places but ribbon development has sprawled out along the roads leading into them. One noticeable difference is that there are far fewer hedges than there used to be. The original hedges were not particularly thick or tall and certainly offered no protection against bullets, but they did break up the landscape more and provided some cover from line-of-sight fire. The machine-gun barrage, firing along set bearings, was incredibly important in the defence of positions. The drainage ditches that criss-cross the landscape today seem to follow the layout of the original ones, and many were used as the basis for trench lines during the course of the fighting. Look at the amount of water in them – could you fight in them? Then think how vulnerable you would have been standing up above ground level with machine-guns firing all around you.
Chapter One
THE TROOPS AND THEIR DISPOSITIONS The British sector was held by General Sir Henry Horne’s First Army and the assault fell on its left flank and centre, held by XI Corps on the right (55th West Lancashire Division and the Portuguese 2nd Division, with 51st Highland Division in reserve) and XV Corps on the left (40th and 34th Divisions in the line, with 50th Division in reserve). With the exception of the 55th Division, which had been in the sector around Givenchy since February, the other British divisions had moved up only recently from the fighting in the Somme, where they had suffered heavy casualties. They had been sent to this ‘quiet’ sector to rest and reorganise and were still receiving fresh drafts of reinforcements from Britain even as battle was joined. Typical of these was the 34th Division, which had taken over the northern part of what became the battlefield area on 30 March. It had suffered grievous casualties in the Somme fighting and its infantry battalions were largely made up of replacement drafts. For example, 102 Brigade had lost all its commanding officers, 7 company commanders, 44 other officers and 1,422 other ranks, all of whom had been recently replaced, leaving units which had not trained together, did not know one another and had no experience of the ground they were to fight over. The 55th Division was a territorial unit that had served in France and Belgium since 1916 and had already seen action on the Somme, at Passchendaele and at Cambrai. Its men had moved into the sector in early February and their commanding officer, Major-General Sir Hugh Jeudwine, set about preparing them for the defence of this crucial area. Jeudwine was a martinet, but he had definite ideas of what was required and gave clear orders as to what was expected:
Lieutenant-General Sir Hugh Sandham Jeudwine, Commander of the 55th Division, whose detailed planning for the defence of their divisional area was crucial for the victory at Givenchy.
Infantry continued their training and, even in the line, every man in front or support line, was expected to fire at least five rounds a day if it was in any way possible ... every day the garrison of every post was tested and timed in getting from its mined dug-out or shelter, where it had one, to its fire trenches, and where the performance was unsatisfactory the test was carried out again and again ... [each] platoon was trained to be the fighting unit, competent to carry on on its own in any circumstances of defence or counter-attack... . A standing order was issued that every officer and man in the division was to put on his box respirator at 10 o’clock every day and wear it till 10.15 no matter what he was doing. Several exercises were carried out actually in the positions to be occupied, so that everybody, even the most junior of officers, knew not only the exact spot he was first to go to, but such details as what ammunition was to be carried, where reserve ammunition would be, what rations were to be taken, how communications ran, and how to obtain touch with the front line, what tools were to be taken and exactly how and with what stores each limbered wagon was to be packed. Especial attention was paid to getting men fit, but the most important training of all, and the one to which the greatest attention was given, was with the rifle, the bayonet and the Lewis gun ... every company was expected to have its 30 yard range if possible of 8 targets, and every man had to fire 10 rounds a day, no matter what his employment might be. Special attention was paid to rapid fire, and a battalion was expected to try to attain an average of 12-15 aimed rounds per man per minute. Bayonet courses were established close to billets. In Lewis gun training, particular
attention was devoted to remedying stoppages and [maintaining a] continuous supply of ammunition, so that fire should not be checked. Machine-gunners were trained on similar lines. The aim was to give every man skill with his own weapon so that he might have confidence in it and to develop to the utmost the volume of fire. This exacting training, and the familiarity that every man had with his post and his duty, was crucial and contributed hugely to the 55th Division’s successful defence of its lines during the battle. As early as 7 August 1914 Portugal had declared she would stand by her ancient treaty obligations to Great Britain, but until early 1916 her participation in the war had been limited to defending her colonies. However, when, at British prompting, the Portuguese authorities requisitioned some German ships lying in her ports, Germany formally declared war on Portugal on 9 March 1916 and Portugal immediately pledged to send troops to the Western Front. By July 1917 there were some 40,000 Portuguese soldiers in France; they were allotted the portion of the line south of Armentières, which was generally reckoned to be a quiet sector. Holding the low-lying ground that had previously been the Neuve Chapelle battlefield, where the front line had barely moved since 1915, was the Portuguese 2nd Division, with its headquarters at Lestrem. A large number of British liaison officers had been posted to join the Portuguese, whose low morale greatly worried the British – it had also been noted by German commanders, who deliberately made them the principal target of the attack.
Training on the Lewis Gun.
Portuguese troops newly arrived in France in 1916. By April 1918 virtually none had had any home leave and casualties had reduced some units to half-strength.
Two factors dominated German planning for the year 1918. In 1917 they had effectively knocked Russia out of the war and the Russians, under the new Bolshevik Government, had commenced peace talks at Brest-Litovsk, the treaty of which was signed in March. Long before then German divisions had begun to move west, to France, Belgium and Italy. Also in 1917 the United States had entered the war on the side of the Allies, and the Germans knew that the war had to be decided in the west before the tiny peacetime American army could be wound up into a military juggernaut and sent to France. Some American troops were already in Europe, but not in great enough numbers to make a difference in the spring. The first German offensive of the year was Operation Michael, which was to be launched over the old Somme battlefields in March. If this did not result in a major breakthrough, then it would be followed by further operations, Mars in the Arras area and Georgette (originally named George but renamed when it was scaled down) south of Armentières. Michael was launched on 21 March and rapidly gained ground against an over-extended British Fifth Army but after a few days the advance began to falter. Mars was launched against Arras on 28 March but made little progress, so the Germans turned to Georgette. The main thrust of the German attack was towards Bailleul and then on to Hazebrouck, with the objective of capturing the strategic rail junction there, which would severely disrupt British communications in the Ypres salient. General von Quast of the German Sixth Army was allocated eleven extra divisions for the assault. A frontal attack was to be made by four divisions against the Portuguese, with the aim of reaching and crossing the rivers Lys and Lawe by the end of the first day. The 1st and 8th Bavarian Reserve divisions of IV Corps were to attack the Portuguese 2nd Division south of Neuve Chapelle and to advance to the Lawe at La Couture. The 35th and 42nd Divisions of XIX Corps were to attack north of Neuve Chapelle and head for the Lawe near Lestrem and the Lys at Estaires, while the 10th Ersatz Division was to follow them before turning
north, bypassing Laventie and attacking the British 40th Division from the south. On the southern flank the 4th Ersatz Division was to capture Givenchy and advance along the northern bank of La Bassée Canal to create a secure flank for the whole operation. Great care went into Lieutenant-Colonel Bruchmuller ’s planning of the German artillery barrage that opened the battle. (He had also designed the barrage in the March offensive on the Somme.) Though he was given only nine days to prepare for it, the Germans had mapped the British and Portuguese defences in great detail and the barrage, a combination of gas and high explosives, was expertly placed. Several British accounts mention that the Germans took obvious care not to hit roads or bridges that they planned to use for their own advance. Communications seem to have been particularly badly damaged, especially in the Portuguese sector. The Germans made great use of stormtrooper tactics, pushing forward small detachments armed with light machine-guns who attempted to avoid centres of resistance by working round their flanks, leaving the defenders to follow-up troops.
The defences of the Portuguese 2nd Division, showing the lines of posts that were rapidly overrun by the German attackers on 9 April.
Light trench mortars were also moved forward quickly and captured Portuguese artillery was pressed into action, often firing at near point-blank range. In the open country intelligent use was made of snipers and light machine-gun teams, who crept forward through gaps in the British positions and opened fire from the flank and rear. At night extensive use was made of flares which, especially when fired from close to, or behind, British positions, scared the inexperienced troops. The emphasis was
on speed of advance and bicycle troops were already moving forward into open country shortly after the Portuguese line broke. Bridges mounted on lorries had also reached as far as the Lys by early afternoon on the first day and artillery was being fired at close range against British troops some 8 kilometres behind the original line at the same time. The need for speed did, on occasion, cause the Germans to take risks, with some units marching rapidly along what they assumed were open roads into machine-gun ambushes. Portuguese troops in their front line – a line of built up redoubts.
By 1918 the defensive system had evolved far beyond the original simple lines of trenches that had dominated the battlefields in 1915 and 1916. The original front-line trenches were still held, but with a much reduced force. Supporting them was a secondary line (which in the Lys area was often referred to as the ‘village line’) of machine-gun posts and defended localities (known as ‘keeps’), and behind that a series of defended positions (the ‘battle line’) linked by barbed-wire entanglements. The whole system could reach back a distance of up to 8 kilometres from the front-line trench and was designed to lure the enemy into a carefully planned killing ground. Unfortunately, even by April 1918 the defence lines were not complete. The defence of the area also depended upon troops being able to move up rapidly to their posts in both the village and battle lines at the start of an attack. The collapse of the Portuguese and the speedy German advance meant
that the secondary line was soon overwhelmed in most places, and the British troops rushed up to man the battle line were often sent to positions that they had not previously reconnoitred and sometimes without the numbers or weapons to defend them adequately. The Portuguese front line consisted of a series of posts in a continuous line of breastworks. The units in the front line were expected to put up sufficient resistance to break up an attack but the main defence was to come from a series of heavily defended posts surrounded by barbed wire and containing well dug-in machine-guns. Many of these posts consisted of concrete pill-boxes or heavily sand-bagged emplacements, but the nature of the ground meant that they were incapable of withstanding heavy artillery. It is clear that most of the second line was captured quickly, against little opposition, a situation not helped by the very low Portuguese morale. There were shortages of both officers and men, and home leave for the ordinary soldier was non-existent (though it continued for officers, who took full advantage of it). This was mainly the result of a shortage of sea transport rather than a deliberate policy. There was no shortage of rations, but these were provided (as were uniforms and equipment) by the British, who made no attempt to adapt the food to the Portuguese taste. General Gomes da Costa had already pointed out that his 2nd Division was well below strength, being 399 officers and 7,059 other ranks short on 30 March 1918. Many battalions were commanded by captains, companies by subalterns and platoons by sergeants. The established strength of a battalion was 37 officers, but one had as few as 13 (Infantry Battalion 12) while others had between 16 and 19 officers; even the most up-to-strength unit (Infantry Battalion 17) had only 30. Likewise the other rank strength of a battalion should have been 1083, but the strongest (Infantry Battalion 15) had 678 and the weakest (Infantry Battalion 10) had just 577.
German commanders made the Portuguese the principal target in the March offensive.
General Tamagnini, Commander of the Portugese Expeditionary Force in France. On 4 April the 7th Battalion was detailed to go back into the line at Ferme du Bois, but the men refused and a mutiny occurred. They did agree to be moved by lorry to Boeseghem overnight but next day they declined to be disarmed and a number of them occupied the village school and other buildings and refused to come out. General Tamagnini ordered up artillery and made it clear that he was prepared to use it. The men surrendered and were immediately disarmed, and the battalion was disbanded as an infantry unit, the men being sent south to be used as a labour battalion in the British section. On 6 April a ceremony was organised for the presentation of British awards to both officers and men, but hardly any of the recipients turned up. A British officer heard the following story from a senior officer, who remarked, beaming, ‘You must not repeat this story about our oldest allies.’ The Germans had raided the Portuguese lines, taken half a dozen prisoners and returned them to the British early in the morning, with the seat of their pants painted red and the message ‘We cannot understand why you have these as your Allies – they are too stupid to fight, too lazy to work and too dirty to keep as pets.’
Portugese troops marching up to the Front. The general state of the Portuguese was now of such concern that a conference was held at Lestrem on 8 April at which plans were drawn up for the complete withdrawal of the Portuguese 2nd Division from the line and its replacement by units of XI Corps in its northern sector and the 55th Division in the south. This replacement was scheduled to begin on 9 April and to be completed by the night of 10/11 April. The 2nd Division was to be held as a reserve, with individual units used for work on defences, as was usual with British units taken from the line. The first moves towards the replacement of the Portuguese began immediately, with the 166th Brigade of the 55th Division moving north across La Bassée Canal in the early hours of 9 April to support their comrades already dug in around Givenchy and Festubert.
Chapter Two
9 APRIL: THE BREAK-IN ON THE LAVENTIE FRONT The German artillery bombardment of gas and high explosive shells opened at 0415 hrs, hitting not only front-line emplacements but also artillery batteries, command centres and the road network to the rear. Because German positions on the Aubers Ridge directly overlooked the Portuguese positions, their guns were registered with deadly accuracy. A direct hit was scored on the Portuguese 2nd Division’s headquarters, wrecking the Chief of Staff’s room and narrowly missing General Gomes da Costa. The blast severely disorganised the working of the divisional staff, which had to be moved to dug-outs nearby. Communications with both forward units and British headquarters broke down almost immediately. A later report compiled by the British Military Mission to the Portuguese stated, ‘I am of the opinion that when the bombardment began, about 4 am, the garrisons of the trenches fired indiscriminately into the fog, with the result that, when the enemy attacked, many, if not most, of them had no ammunition left.’ At about 0730 hrs the German infantry assault began, striking hardest at the boundaries between the Portuguese brigades and their neighbouring British divisions. For an hour before the assault very heavy fire from Minenwerfers (trench mortars) had been directed at the attack points. Wearing their gas masks and with rifles slung, and under cover of a dense mist, the Germans advanced in three successive waves at a distance of 120 metres from each other. They came on behind a creeping barrage, which advanced 50 metres every four minutes. The wire had been pulverised and the emplacements levelled, so the first defence lines were quickly overcome by the attackers. Our first and second lines were completely destroyed by 7 am [...] the whole place had become a shapeless mass of earth from which, here and there, a leg, arm or head emerged. Those of the garrison who managed to escape took cover in the craters and folds in the ground between the front and second line, demoralised, of course, by the intensity of the bombardment. Strong columns of up to brigade strength penetrated the flanks of most of the Portuguese positions. In the northern sector parts of the Portuguese 4th (Minho) Brigade (with the 8th and 20th Battalions in the front line and the 3rd and 29th Battalions in reserve) did resist. The German 42nd Division, spearheaded by the 138th Infantry Regiment, faced stubborn opposition from soldiers of the 8th Battalion in Fauquissart. However, by 0725 hrs all the battalion’s communications had been destroyed and contact was lost with the men in the front line. The support company commander saw Germans in the British second line enfilading him with machine-guns, so retired by sections to Red House, where he was able to join up with the battalion commander, Major Xavier da Costa, who held the men together and led their fighting retreat, joining the 29th Battalion in the redoubts before the brigade
headquarters at Laventie. At 1100 hrs, though, Laventie was captured, and with it most of the soldiers of 4 Brigade. Major da Costa was eventually taken prisoner after being blinded and wounded three times. Only three men eventually reached Laventie itself out of his original party. The Portuguese 20th Battalion held out in the front line for over an hour, in spite of rumours reaching them that their own guns were to start shelling their position. Eventually, with their positions swept by machine-gun fire from no-man’s-land, they were forced to withdraw; discovering that the Germans were already in the second line on their left, they continued to retire. When they reached the Rue Bacquerot at 1100 hrs they had only six men left. Portuguese troops at Lewis gun practice. The Lewis gun was the light machine-gun used by both British and Portuguese troops.
Some messages did make their way back to the 2nd Divisional Headquarters: Artillery reported that an SOS had been sent up from FERME DU BOIS II, held by 17 Infantry Battalion. This was the last that was heard from this battalion and it appears probable that the entire battalion was taken or destroyed. Inf 2 holding NEUVE CHAPELLE I was also never heard of and there appear to be very few stragglers of
either of these two battalions. It is also probable that a number of both these battalions were destroyed by our own guns which were installed north and south of the main La Bassée Road. Though reports from the front line were scant it is clear that there was some spirited resistance in places. Second Lieutenant Costa Cabral of the 1st Battery, 5th Artillery Group, gathered together some men and, when stragglers told him there were advancing Germans nearby, took them forward to ‘engage them at the point of the bayonet’. They were not heard of again. German accounts indicated that there was some serious opposition around Richebourg l’Avoue and Neuve Chapelle, but on the whole they pressed forward almost unopposed. Bavarian Reserve Regiment 8 reported, ‘It was not until the third system was reached at 9 30 am that, in places, slight resistance was offered and the first prisoners captured.’ An officer of the Portuguese 4th Battery, 6th Group reported that, ‘At 9 am men of the 29th battalion passed by, barefoot and torn [they] said that supports were attacked at daybreak and that the captain had given the order “sauve qui peut”; the Germans, they said, had killed a lot of their officers.’ A general retreat ensued as the artillery batteries began to run out of ammunition and withdrew, taking the support troops with them, along with French civilian refugees. They clogged the roads and obstructed British units coming up into the battle zone. Major Draper RAF, commanding 208 Squadron at La Gorgue, reported, ‘A large number of French civilians were passing west through our camp, followed by considerable numbers of Portuguese troops in open disorder without either rifles or equipment and apparently unofficered’, and this was before the main German infantry assault had commenced. A gaping hole some 8 kilometres wide had been torn in the front.
9 Apri l : T he As s aul t on Gi ve nchy On the morning of 9 April 164 Brigade was holding Givenchy itself, with the 1/4th King’s Own Royal Lancasters on the right by the canal, the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires on the left flank down to Windy Corner, and the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers in reserve at Gorre, with two companies in the line at Windy Corner itself. Though there had been sounds of movement from behind the German lines for the last three days, vigorous and aggressive patrolling up to the German reserve line had not found any signs of an imminent attack. A and D Companies of the 4th Battalion, King’s Own Royal Lancasters held the outpost line from the most advanced post at Death and Glory Sap on the northern bank of La Bassée canal to Warlingham Crater, with the main line of defence from Bank Keep to Bayswater and Oxford Terrace. Two more companies, B and C, held the support line at Gunner Siding and the defended posts known as Orchard Keep and Mairie Keep, which were only a few hundred metres behind the outposts. The battalion headquarters were located in a pair of ruined houses on the west side of the Windy Corner—Pont Fixe road, about 200 metres south of Windy Corner. There were almost no shell-proof shelters in the battalion sector. At headquarters, however, a small concrete dug-out had just been completed by the Royal Engineers, which proved invaluable. According to the War Diary of the 1/4th King’s Own Royal Lancasters, ‘At 4 15 am on April 9th the enemy opened a heavy bombardment on gun lines, roads, Headquarters and back areas generally as far as Gorre, phosgene instead of mustard gas being employed.’ The experienced troops realised that the use of phosgene gas, which dispersed rapidly, instead of the heavier mustard gas, meant that an attack by enemy infantry was likely. Company Sergeant-Major J. Ireland of D Company, 1/4th Loyal North Lancs recalled:
The morning turned out very dull and heavy, with every prospect of a thick mist settling. About 4.45 am the SOS was signalled through from Piccadilly to Caledonia Road. Parties were immediately despatched from both sides of the trench and bombing blocks established. By this time, as anticipated, visibility was impossible beyond twenty yards. However, strict orders were given for every man to stick to his post and the trenches were manned by every available man
German troops emerge from the mist to be confronted by a few artillerymen. Drawn by Colonel Rettie of the 55th Divisional Artillery.
Dispositions of British troops around Givenchy and Le Plantin on 9th April. The thick mist reduced visibility to a maximum of 30 metres (some reports say as low as 10 metres) and there was virtually no wind to clear it. At about 0500 hrs a heavy artillery barrage of gas and high explosive shells was directed on the front and support lines, with the keeps receiving special attention. At 0600 hrs the barrage shifted on to the sapheads, the main line of resistance and all communications trenches. The German assault was made by three divisions, the 4th Ersatz, 43rd Reserve and 18th Reserve, with the 44th Reserve and 16th Divisions in support. German divisional orders captured later showed that Givenchy itself was not to be attacked directly, but was to be outflanked and isolated. There was to be no frontal attack across the craters, but machine-guns mounted at commanding points were to engage the defenders while the enveloping attacks were in progress. On the northern flank one regiment was to advance to the line Le Plantin South—Windy Corner, while on the southern another was to penetrate by way of Spoil Bank Keep and Orchard Keep to Ponte Fixe. When the northern force reached its objective, the line Le Plantin South—Windy Corner, one battalion was ordered to
turn northwards along the Festubert village line and clean it up in cooperation with an attack by one battalion of the Reserve Regiment. When those two objectives had been gained, the two forces were to join hands along the Windy Corner—Ponte Fixe road and then participate in a general advance towards Gorre. Cut off and isolated, the main Givenchy position was expected to fall without too much of a fight. Other captured papers revealed that the German troops had been told that the men of the 55th Division were second rate and exhausted, and that they had fled from the fighting at Cambrai in the previous year.
The defences of Givenchy village, showing clearly the heavily cratered ground which the Germans ignored by attacking on both flanks on 9 April. It is clear that in places the mist gave the Germans the chance to get close to the British wire and even through it before they were detected. In others they were not so lucky. At 0835 hrs the garrison of Moat Farm heard movement in the mist and issued a challenge, to which came the reply ‘Me Portuguese. Beaucoup bombard.’ Thinking they might be Portuguese miners who had been working on the defences, the garrison held their fire—until the mist lifted momentarily to reveal Germans in full pack. The order to fire was immediately given and both Vickers machine-guns, two Lewis guns and every rifle that could be brought to bear opened up into the mist. German assault troops did, however, manage to get through the forward defences between the canal and the craters and were soon into the communication and support trenches and pressing through south of the village towards Orchard Keep. Company Sergeant-Major R. Walker of B Coy, 1/4th KORL recalled: The first sign of the Bosche was approximately five hours after the barrage commenced. He followed this up very closely and immediately the barrage lifted over us at the [Company] Headquarters at the junction of Orchard Road and Orchard Crescent I, along with a few others, came out of the shelter and found the Germans in
the trenches. Owing to the weight of numbers he forced us back a few yards, this split our party up, some going down Bayswater and others further down Orchard Road. I was with the party in Orchard Road but eventually (after hearing that the bulk of my Company was in Bayswater and Cheyne Walk) I made my way there and rallied what men I could and formed a post. After this I, along with two other NCOs, collected some bombs and made our way up Bayswater and into Orchard Road. The first German we saw there was attending to one of our wounded. The wounded man told me that this Bosche had been with him ever since the Germans entered the trench; when the other Germans retired this particular one would not go back with the rest. He said he wanted to be taken prisoner as he was fed up. He could speak English a little. After this the two NCOs and myself made our way into Oxford Terrace and there met Lieutenant Schofield of the 2/5th LFs (who was afterwards awarded the VC). He told me that the Germans occupied our front line, so we got together a party of the LFs who had then come up to reinforce the King’s Own and bombed the trench occupied by the Bosche. Before many bombs had been thrown 123 Germans had surrendered to the bombers. This cleared the front line of Germans with the exception of two who we found in a sniper ’s post the next day, at the junction of Orchard Road and the front line. These two we utilised for carrying down wounded Germans, of whom there [were] a good many lying about, along with many dead. Lieutenant John Schofield was indeed awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. The citation reads: Second Lieutenant Schofield led a party of nine men against a strong-point and was attacked by about a hundred of the enemy, but his skilful use of men and weapons resulted in the taking of twenty prisoners. This officer, having made his party up to ten, then proceeded towards the front line, where he met large numbers of the enemy, on whom his party opened fire. He climbed on the parapet under point-blank machine-gun fire and by his fearless demeanour forced the enemy to surrender. As a result 123 of them, including several officers, were captured. He himself was killed a few minutes later. Lieutenant Schofield’s body was recovered and he is buried at Vieille Chapelle New Military Cemetery (Plot III, Row C, number 8). Having managed to infiltrate the British trenches, the advancing Germans closed in to attack Orchard Keep and the second Victoria Cross of the day was won here. Lance Sergeant C.J. Moon of 12 Platoon described the events: On the morning of April 9th 1918 no. 12 Platoon was holding Orchard Keep. An intense bombardment started at 4 am and lasted about four hours. [Second Lieutenant] Collin during this time had sent a runner down to [Company] Headquarters to seek information regarding the situation. The runner brought the news that the enemy had made an attack on the battalion front. The morning being very misty, the Bosche were upon us, in front of the wire and bombing from the communication trench, almost simultaneously with the delivery of the message. The platoon commander [Collin] gave the order for rapid fire and casualties were inflicted. The officer mounted the parapet and killed three of the enemy – shot with his revolver. Whilst this was taking place immediately on our front, a party of about fifty Germans passed down Orchard
Road on our right. During this local engagement our numbers had considerably diminished and, being heavily outnumbered, the platoon commander decided to withdraw for about a hundred yards just in front of Gunner Siding. Here we were reinforced by 9 Platoon and a few of B Company. A stand was made at this point, rapid fire was maintained and bombs were thrown. From this position Second Lieutenant Collin rushed out with two Mills Bombs in his hands to attack an enemy machine-gun team which had already got into position. He succeeded in killing four and wounding three of the team and putting the gun out of action. After accomplishing this feat, he returned to his men, placed a Lewis gun in position and directed fire upon the approaching enemy inflicting casualties. By this time it was obvious that the enemy attack had been broken and disorganised. We fell back on Gunner Siding and here a bombing party was organised and succeeded in bombing the enemy out of Gunner Siding into Orchard Road, and with the rifle fire bearing upon him from Marie Keep, Wolf Road and Gunner Siding they were compelled to retreat. Fire was directed on the retreating enemy and shortly afterwards the few remaining men of 12 Platoon went up to occupy Orchard Keep. At dusk a machine-gun team and a few isolated Germans came in and gave themselves up. Second Lieutenant Collin was also awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross: His citation reads: After offering a long and gallant resistance against heavy odds in the keep held by his platoon, this officer, with 5 only of his men remaining, slowly withdrew in the face of superior numbers, contesting every inch of the ground. The enemy were pressing him hard with bombs and machine-gun fire from close range. Singlehandedly Second Lieutenant Collin attacked the machine-gun and team. After firing his revolver into the enemy, he seized a Mills grenade and threw it into the hostile team, putting the gun out of action, killing 4 of the team and wounding two others. Observing a second hostile machine-gun in front, he took a Lewis gun, and selecting a high point of vantage on the parapet whence he could engage the enemy gun, unaided he kept the enemy at bay with fire until he fell mortally wounded. His heroic selfsacrifice was a magnificent example to all.
Second Lieutenant John Schofield, of the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers, was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for leading a counter-attack at Givenchy on 9 April 1918.
Map 1: Taken from a captured German map. Their plan to outflank and encircle Givency itself is quite clear. Like Lieutenant Schofield, Lieutenant Collin is buried at Vieille Chapelle New Military Cemetery (Plot III, Row A, number 11). Having passed through the lightly held front-line trenches the attackers worked up the support
trenches to attack the second line of defences, the keeps. Sergeant Whiteside was one of the men who drove the enemy back:
Second Lieutenant Joseph Henry Collin, of the 1/4th King’s Own Royal Lancasters, was awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross for his heroism at Givenchy on 9 April 1918. On the morning of this day 11 Platoon was holding Marie Redoubt. After a severe bombardment we were made aware that the enemy was attacking forward positions and had approached as far as Orchard Keep on our right. We first sighted the enemy approaching by way of Hatfield Road. Rifle and Lewis gun fire were opened on the enemy and casualties were inflicted. One German carrying a Lewis Gun was killed and the recaptured gun brought in. Between 2.30 and 3 pm we received a message from [Second Lieutenant] Thorp saying that the Germans were lying in front of Orchard Keep [and] asking us to direct fire in front of Orchard Keep. This order was immediately complied with and as a result the enemy were seen to retire in large numbers to their own position behind the craters. The day closed without further action on our part. Corporal Wyre was part of the garrison of Givenchy Keep: At about 8.20 am heavy machine-gun fire was heard coming from the direction of the front line, and shortly afterwards men could be seen in the mist approaching our position, but [they] disappeared again into the mist. A patrol was called for and I (then a Private) and CSM Cookson volunteered to go out and reconnoitre and find out who the men were in front, and on going out could distinguish the men with full packs on,
which we at once concluded were Germans. After engaging them with rifle fire we returned and reported to the officer, on which on them coming in sight again, the no. 4 platoon engaged them with heavy Lewis gun and rifle fire and completely disorganised them and drove off the attack.
German Stormtroops attacking out of the morning mist.
Sergeant Lawton of B Company, 1/4th KORL, was in the thick of it: By about 4.30 am the sky seemed to be full of shells and we began to prepare ourselves for work, as we had been expecting the enemy to attack us. After bombarding the back area with all calibre of shells they commenced to put them on our front line. I was in Orchard Terrace when he started, and it was terrific, the shells were dropping all around us and made it too hot for us to stop, so we moved further down into Bayswater, which was not being shelled so heavily. About 9 o’clock we got the order to stand to, as Jerry was in our barbed wire, and I looked over the top of the
trench and saw the enemy about fifty yards from us. What a crowd they was [sic], some crawling and crouching, they did not know they were so near to us and they offered such a splendid target. What few there was of us had a fine two hours’ shooting. My mate, who was a crack shot, used up about five rifles, then we heard that we were cut off from the rest of the battalion and that Jerry was behind us. The excitement was great as we were fighting back and front and in front seemed to be nothing but dead Germans. We captured nine Germans and brought one wounded one in. This wounded man was an officer, could speak good English and thanked us for being so kind to him. By this time the fog had lifted and his aeroplanes came over and started to bomb us while flying very low. The next thing we saw was the enemy retiring and they were as good a target as they had been in the morning—a blind man could have shot them. Then we moved back into our old line, or what was left of it. The shell holes were as big as mine craters, one could hardly realise it. We found that the enemy was still holding one or two of our posts, so a bombing party was organised from the Lancashire Fusiliers to bomb them out and this did well and at very little cost too, taking about 150 prisoners.
The flattened remains of Givenchy, with the mound of wreckage marking the site of the church clearly visible. The main defensive keeps were just to the right of the mound.
A view of La Bassee Canal just south of Givenchy, showing the lock, the partially drained canal and some buildings still standing in the front line. The War Diary for the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires records: 8.30 am SOS received by wire from the left front Company. The signal could not be seen owing to the heavy mist. Our TMs [trench mortars] put down a protective barrage on the crater line. Visibility was very poor; nothing could be seen at a distance greater than ten yards. 8.40 am Enemy were reported advancing on the flanks and against the front line. Givenchy Keep and Moat Farm were surrounded by the enemy, who broke in on the flanks. Enemy obtained a footing in the front line on the right. 8.50 am The enemy surrounded battalion headquarters and bombed the entrances. He was forced to retire from the entrances and posts were established to prevent a second attempt to rush headquarters. All signal lines held with the exception of A
Company. Visual communication was established with them when the mist cleared. Herts Keep heavily engaged the enemy in Hitchin Road and prevented his breaking in there. The enemy were reported in Ware Road. The machine-gun in Upper Cut was doing good work. 9.00 am The enemy had broken through on the left and our forward posts were captured. Moat Farm and Givenchy Keep still surrounded. SOS fired again. The enemy entered the concrete MG emplacement in New Cut. The mist was so thick and the barrage so heavy that isolated platoons and posts along the crater line were sometimes not even aware that a major battle was being fought around them. A platoon of 1/4th KORL held the sap at Warlingham Crater and had sent out a patrol on the previous evening, which had reported that everything was quiet. J. Jackson of 10 Platoon: At 3 am on the 9th the usual tea rations reached [us] and on settling down for what we thought a quiet snack, a tremendous rumble of gas shells started to roll over the back areas and main crossroads and for the second time that night we were ordered to stand to, with a few melodious words from the boys. The morning was very misty and the few wire stakes in front of us, which amazed one or two of the sentries the night before with an imaginary dance, could not be seen at all. Towards 4 am Fritz started his great destructive bombardment on all strongpoints, communication trenches and positions which he thought would delay his intended advance. The bombardment lasted some hours, holding us in the forward positions, not knowing anything of what was going on in the rear. Towards mid-day the enemy guns quietened down a little and the next news we heard was that C Company was cut off. The news puzzled us for the moment, but we could only hope for the best. Shortly after, our officer came with the news that the enemy had made an attack on us in the morning; this was the greatest surprise of all, as we knew nothing about it at all until noon, when we heard that the enemy had broken through on the left. Several of the enemy were then observed making their way to their own lines, then all that was left of the garrison opened rapid fire, inflicting heavy casualties on him. Owing to the trenches being so badly damaged, we had to evacuate for a few hours back to Piccadilly, though we returned to our former positions for the evening stand to. Because of the exposed nature of their positions and the rapid German advance through the Portuguese lines, the 55th Divisional artillery was badly shelled and was frequently too busy defending itself from German advance parties to offer much support, apart from firing a short but deadly barrage along the set SOS lines and on the enemy front-line trenches, but one advanced antitank gun did great service. Positioned forward on Givenchy Hill, this gun was damaged during the initial barrage: the seat was blown off and both the trail and the breech mechanism were damaged. Under the leadership of Sergeant Wilkinson, the crew took cover and then went back to the gun when the barrage lifted. The breech had to be opened with a pickaxe after every round, but some 150 rounds of shrapnel were fired at close range against Germans seen advancing through the mist. This caused enormous casualties. Eventually a shell jammed in the breech and could not be removed, so the crew took up their rifles and manned the trench. An attack from the flank nearly reached their position but
was driven off by a counter-attack section of the 1/4th King’s Own. The machine-gun post overlooking the craters near Sap I got word at 0800 hrs that the enemy was attacking on its right. At 0830 hrs a party of enemy troops was seen through the mist at a distance of just 25 metres; all were shot down. There were no support infantry in the trench and shortly Germans were seen working towards the post down the trench and along Ware Road. The NCO in charge of the post held off one party with grenades, while two of his men did the same on the other side. The NCO alone threw over ten boxes of grenades. At 1000 hrs a party of infantry arrived and helped to fill the machine-gun belts and to man the trench. The enemy, unable to advance, tried to pull back but the gun cut them down in their dozens as they fled. It also joined in shooting down men retreating from Windy Corner. In all, the gun fired over 7,500 rounds throughout the day.
These Gemans were killed by a shell explosion. Having temporarily driven off the attackers who had pretended to be Portuguese, the garrison of Moat Farm fired an SOS rocket, but the mist was so thick that the men in the post could not see the flare, let alone any watching artillery observers. Shortly afterwards enemy grenades were thrown into the strongpoint and a machine-gun opened up from close range. It was spotted on top of the cookhouse, being manned by two Germans, who were rapidly dispatched by rifle and revolver fire. A Lewis gun was then placed to cover the farm entrance and a runner was sent out to find headquarters and to report that the post was still holding out. The most advanced British position of all, Death and Glory Sap, was in a spoil bank on the edge of the canal, some 450 metres forward of the main defences, to which it was linked by a trench known as Cheyne Walk that ran along the canal bank to the lock at Cuinchy. Second Lieutenant R.S. Dane of the 1/4th KORL described what happened next:
At 4.15 on the morning of the 9th April I was awakened by the officer on duty who informed me it was time to stand to. Our Company Headquarters were in Cheyne Walk; my platoon being in Death and Glory Sap, I at once went up to them. By this time a great number of gas shells were going overhead and a very heavy mist made me feel rather anxious, but for five nights previous to this we had been on patrol into his reserve lines, so I did not think it likely he would attack. However, I ordered everything to be got in readiness and [because of] the gas blowing back to our own lines, we put on our respirators, which we kept on for three or four hours. I think at this period my greatest worry was that my breakfast would be spoilt. After posting double sentries, I told the remainder of the platoon to stand down. Leaving another officer, who was on duty, in the trench I went down to the SOS signal dug-out to take off my respirator and have a cigarette. I had not been down there more than ten minutes when an enemy MG opened on our parapet and I knew then that he had left his trenches and was crossing over. I little knew by this time he was fighting down by Windy Corner. Someone shouted down to me, ‘They are coming over Sir!’ I never moved so quickly in my life. I looked over our parapet and saw the enemy in our line. For the next two hours it was like being on a range. The other officer was killed early in the day. Previous to this we had tried to send up the SOS signal but, owing to the fog, it was impossible to be seen and, the signal wires being broken, we had to depend upon runners but they never reached their destination. Things went quite all right until the Bosche got in behind us, things then looked rather shaky. Thinking it was about time I had someone to help me (for I had lost several men), I asked for two volunteers to go down the canal bank to [Company or Battalion Headquarters]. This was a very dangerous job but I soon got two good men to take my message. They got through with their message and eventually I received reinforcements, but before this we had cleared the enemy out of Cheyne Walk and were killing them as fast as we could in front of Death and Glory Sap. Suddenly we heard someone shouting ‘Stop firing, you are killing your own men.’ I ordered the men to cease fire and my platoon sergeant went out with a party. I stood up on the parapet. Seventeen of the enemy surrendered, who he took prisoner, and also four of our own men who had been taken prisoner from Bayswater. From these men I obtained as much information as possible of what had been going on to the left. Reinforcements arrived for us at 1 am. As far as I could make out I thought the battle over. Leaving an officer in command I went down to see my [commanding officer]. After the mist cleared I examined our wire and we must have killed 200 Bosche. A very anxious period followed. At night I detailed a party to collect salvage. We remained in [Death and Glory] sap for three days after this. I think the 9th April was the best day’s sport I have had in this war.
No. 201712 Corporal W. Dawson was also in Death and Glory Sap during the German attack: It was a very foggy morning and we could see very little and we thought that everything was clear when the order was given to ‘Stand To’. My Platoon, which is 3 Platoon, was holding a well known sap called Death and Glory. At 9 am the first German was sighted and the order was given to open rapid fire, which every man did without hesitation, which must have been very destructive to the Germans. Whilst we was [sic] attending to our front, the Germans had broken through on the left through Willow Drain and worked their way up the communication trench, getting round us. The next thing they did was to ransack our dug-outs, relieving us of our rations, then they advanced up the trench unknown to us and started to send bombs at us and it was with great difficulty that we [threw] them back. During this time in action we suffered a number of casualties, including the officer in command. At 11 o’clock the fog lifted sufficiently to enable us to see our bag and the sight was great. A party of Germans was digging in front of our wire. They had a machine-gun and were getting it into position when Sergeant Birkett and Private Troughton went out on their own and captured the lot of them, also bringing in the machine-gun. In the afternoon, when the fog had cleared away, the company on our left had got stuck into the Germans and as they came out of Orchard Keep and across no-man’s-land they made fine targets for
our two Lewis guns. One had been posted in Willow Drain and the other in the sap and they must have got an awful toll. The retreat lasted until dark. Later on in the evening we received reinforcements and we strengthened our positions. The next item on the programme was to look for souvenirs, which seemed to be very plentiful. One souvenir in particular which we brought in was a drum, which is now used by the 1/4th King’s Own band. All through the night the Germans kept up a heavy bombardment. No doubt he expected that our Division would be relieved that night.
William Spence, Royal Artillery, who served throughout the battle with 55th Division’s Ammunition Column, moving shells to the gun batteries.
Part of the Moat Farm defences. The white concrete emplacement is the ammunition store.
The day ended with 164 Brigade still in possession of almost all its original positions apart from a few posts in the old front line and among the craters. Hundreds of prisoners had been taken, including all the members of a German regimental band, along with their instruments, who were caught up in the counter-attack at Windy Corner. Hundreds more Germans lay dead on the wire or in the trenches they had temporarily occupied. Sergeant Lawton of B Company, 1/4th KORL, recalled the small pleasures of that evening: Night is now upon us, we gather together what men of our [company] were left, seventeen men all told, and formed a bombing post in Orchard Road. Things have quietened down and we get time for a little rest and a smoke, which we thoroughly enjoy. The bit of good news is that the ration party is coming up with our food, it being twenty-four hours since we last had anything hot, the only thing we got was some potatoe [sic] biscuits off the Germans we captured. Then we have a little sleep while one or two keep a sharp look-out and so ended the most memorial [sic] day in my life, the things I saw and did on that day I shall never forget. Major-General Sir H. Jeudwine offered a wider view of the day’s events: The close of the day’s fighting found the division with the addition of 154 Brigade holding a front of about 11,000 yards from La Bassée Canal to the west of the Lawe Canal, 2,000 yards north-east of Locon, whence it was prolonged, though not continuously, by troops of the 51st Division. Some seven to eight hundred prisoners had been taken, and about seventy machine-guns. The slaughter of Germans had been enormous, and would have been greater but for the fact that till midday the thick mist screened the enemy from the fire of rifles, Lewis and machine-guns. The Official History attributed the day’s victory to ‘the temper and training of the men behind the guns and rifles ... so trained that the men could all use their weapons with effect’. Lance-Corporal W. Parkinson of B Company, 1/4th KORL, put the same idea slightly differently: ‘The line was saved round Givenchy by the men of our Division having a good knowledge of the ground they were holding. By taking advantage of a thick mist and their men not having an accurate knowledge of their points of attack, they [the Germans] lost the day.’
Fe s tube rt The left of the British line north of Festubert, known as the Old British (OB) line, was held by the 1/5th King’s Liverpool Regiment in a series of posts and emplacements linked by shallow trenches. At 0410 hrs the enemy opened an intense gas bombardment all along the defence lines, which continued until 0800 hrs, when it was noticed that gas shells were no longer being sent over, but the high explosive bombardment had, if anything, increased. There was a heavy ground mist that made
observation impossible. At about 0730 hrs the Germans attacked the line from the front and from the exposed left flank, where the Portuguese had retreated, and the two left flank companies were overwhelmed. A hurried defensive flank was thrown out towards the village line to the rear. South of the 1/5th Liverpools were the 1/7th Liverpools, dug into the OB line a couple of hundred metres in front of Festubert village itself, which was part of the village line. At 0910 hrs a runner reached them from the post at Prince’s Island with a verbal message, saying that the enemy was attacking, a similar message coming in code from the left front company. The garrisons of these trenches were overpowered, as were also those of George Street and Barnton Tee, as the Germans attacked from both flanks and took the position from the rear. Only five men were able to get back to the OB line. At about 0950 hrs the enemy advanced on the OB line, attacking both from the front and on each flank, the garrison again being taken by surprise because of the thick mist. The company commanders then ordered the remainder of the companies to withdraw to the village line at Festubert, where the houses formed the basis of a defensive position. This was done slowly, with a rearguard keeping the enemy back as A Company worked its way down Yellow Road trench and D Company down Barnton trench. By this time the barrage had lifted from the village line so it was possible to organise the defences there; A Company was placed in position to block Yellow Road while D Company was sent to defend the convent and Barnton Road defences.
Germans capturing a trench during their offensive. About noon it became obvious that enemy soldiers were advancing in force on Festubert, and rapid rifle and machine-gun fire was opened up. Through the thinning mist large parties of enemy troops could be seen in front of Yellow Road and Le Plantin South, endeavouring to get through the British
wire. Cries of ‘cease fire’ from the Germans only spurred the garrisons to increase their volume of fire, ‘and it could then be seen that, as far as a frontal attack was concerned, there was nothing to fear ’. Very few of the enemy approached the lines in front of Le Plantin North, and all those who did were shot down. Supporting platoons from the 6th King’s Liverpools arrived about noon and reinforced the garrison of Le Plantin North.
British dead, killed during the German offensive. In the meantime patrols sent out from Le Plantin South to get in touch with the units on the right had failed to return and at 1230 hrs it was reported that enemy had broken through between Le Plantin South and Windy Corner and were working round in rear of the former position. A bombing post
formed on the right was rushed by the enemy and immediately afterwards, under cover of a trench mortar bombardment, at least 200 Germans rushed the Le Plantin South position and forced the garrison to withdraw northwards, where a new position was established astride the road, forming a defensive flank on the right of Cheshire Road defences. Meanwhile headquarters staff, including cooks, spare signallers, pioneers and the like, had been ordered to take up a position behind some old breastworks in order to stop the enemy rolling up the village line. Two platoons of the 6th King’s Liverpools coming up in support were quickly pushed into a position facing south, joining up the village line from the northern point of Le Plantin South to the old breastworks on Route 20, thus forming a defensive flank to the south and west. This manoeuvre appeared to defeat the Germans, who were forced to withdraw towards La Bassée Canal. At about the same time the enemy attacked the Barnton locality but were driven off, leaving many prisoners in British hands.
Major William Eills of the Royal Field Artillery, who was killed on 9 April. He was described as ‘a first class man all round, always cheery under the worst conditions. His battery was devoted to him.’
As there was very little activity in the centre of the battalion position, a portion of the garrison was sent to replace part of the Le Plantin South garrison, with orders to retake the lost position. In the meantime, however, the commander of Le Plantin South, Captain J.W. Cook MC, assisted by Captain M.T. Leach MC, had organised a counter-attack and had succeeded in recapturing a portion of this position; the breastworks were quickly occupied by the newly arrived reinforcements. The Germans were found to be lying outside in large numbers and a rapid fire was opened on them as they retired in disorder, inflicting considerable casualties. Three captured German machine-guns were mounted on the parapet, which added greatly to the volume of fire. The next task was to clear the houses nearby, and Lieutenant-Colonel Potter, the Commanding Officer of the 7th King’s Liverpools, wrote, ‘This work was very efficiently done, headed by Captain Cook, and, on reaching the southernmost house, I ordered patrols to go forward to Windy Corner to clear up the situation.’ Returning patrols reported that the Lancashire Fusiliers were then in possession of Windy Corner and two platoons of the 6th King’s Liverpools then moved to link up Le Plantin South with Windy Corner, thus restoring the integrity of the whole line. Night patrols were then pushed out and it was reported that enemy soldiers were holding several strongpoints at the junctions of the OB line with Fife Road and Barnton Trench. Despite a concerted and well-planned attack, the Germans had barely advanced against the village line and, apart from the heavy losses caused to the 5th King’s Liverpools, had achieved little at enormous cost to themselves.
T he 55th Di vi s i on T hrows out a De fe ns i ve Fl ank The precipitate withdrawal of the Portuguese to the north of the 55th Divisional area exposed the division to an outflanking move and placed their artillery and communications under immediate threat. Major-General Jeudwine wrote later, A determined attempt was made to turn the left flank, but supports from the left brigade defeated this in its initial stage, and later the reserve brigade as it came up extended the bent-back flank to the westward at approximately right angles to the front, and withstood the continued German attempts at envelopment. The Left Brigade Headquarters [Gorre Chateau] soon came under rifle and machine-gun fire at fairly close range, but remained where it was throughout the day. Fleeing Portuguese entered this flank and about 200 of them, mostly unarmed, were rounded up and made to occupy part of the defences. But it required the persuasion of rifle and revolver applied alike to officers and men before their objections could be overcome. The flank was repeatedly attacked all day by the Germans, but they never penetrated it, though 166th Brigade Headquarters was constantly under rifle and machine-gun fire. Practically every rifle in the division – engineers, pioneers, gunners, trench mortars, and details of all sorts, including an entrenching battalion and tunnelling company— were absorbed into this line.
British soldiers killed by artillery fire during the Battle.
Colonel Rettie of 275 Brigade RFA was based in the Tuning Fork position behind Festubert (sonamed because the configuration of the roads there resembled the shape of a tuning fork) when the barrage commenced: Crash! 4.20 am 9th April – the hour had come. Hastily I drew on my best breeches, boots and jacket (I always wear my best clothes when there is the prospect of battle; one never knows what may happen, either to you or your kit), and put my head out of the dug-out, only to withdraw it quickly. Mixed up with a thick mist was undoubtedly gas. Luckily our dug-out is fairly gas-proof when you have stuffed up all the visible cracks and the ventilator. The Assistant Adjutant, who had been on telephone duty in the dug-out with me, rang up the Adjutant in the cellar, who informed us that all had got safely in there, including the civilians. It must have been rather a squash and difficult for the signallers to function; but that did not matter much, for soon all communications had gone. Every moment we expected our dug-out to be hit, the shells were falling so close all round; but the high building saved us and until it toppled down we were fairly safe from a direct hit. As all orders for this event had been issued long ago, there was nothing to be done; so I took the opportunity of shaving.
The extended flank thrown out by the 55th Division, showing the variety of units rushed into the line. It became clear early on that the Portuguese to the north of 165 Brigade were pulling back and as early as 0430 hrs two companies of the 1/6th Liverpools had been sent up to the Tuning Fork line, with a platoon being sent to secure Route A Keep. The men of 166 Brigade had only crossed over the canal from their previous positions there the day before, in anticipation of taking over part of the Portuguese sector. But the Germans believed they were still there and planned to keep them there by heavily shelling the canal bridges. When the order ‘Bustle’ reached them, the Liverpool Scottish set out from their billets around Mesplaux Farm to their battle positions. In spite of the barrage, the gas and the additional kit they were carrying, their mood was lightened somewhat by the sight of the Adjutant, Captain Roddick, taking a flier into a midden outside the farm! Sergeant S.E. Collins of 9 Platoon, Y Company, recalled: On the morning of 9th April 1918 our billets at Mesplaux Farm were subjected to
shell-fire. At about 4.30 am orders were given to proceed to our special positions, which were allotted to us in case of an offensive by the Germans. We had barely started on our way when Jerry sent over a number of heavy shells, which caused a number of casualties. Carrying on in good spirits we wended our way through the village of Le Hamel and there we had a much livelier time of it as the bombardment increased and an enormous number of gas shells landed round about us. This necessitated putting on box respirators, which consequently slackened our progress a good deal. After about five minutes we left the gas behind us. Carrying on, we reached the village of Loisne and once again we had to take the necessary precautions against gas. It was at this point that we were directed into a trench which lay about 1,500 yards in front of Loisne Chateau. Our original position was about 500 yards in front and over to the right but, owing to the retirement of the Portuguese, nobody was manning this next trench, so acting on the instructions of Lieutenant Monkhouse, who was in charge of our platoon, we decided to remain. At this time the bombardment was very severe and our trench was subjected to a heavy gas barrage that lasted about six hours. All this time a heavy mist was hanging around so consequently we could not see anything that was happening in front of us. The mist cleared at about 2 o’clock and then we found that we were actually in the front line with the enemy 600 yards away, which we surmised was Route A Keep. We immediately opened fire and good results were obtained as a number of the enemy were seen to be wounded. Night rolled on and we worked hard converting the trench into something like a fighting trench.
General von Ludendorf’s second German offensive in the direction of the Channel ports of Dunkirk, Calais and Boulogne, launched 9 April 1918. The broken line indicates where the attack was stopped 29 April.
In fact the heavy shells that Sergeant Collins noted caused a serious problem, as one of them effectively wiped out the platoon that was to have reinforced Route A Keep, leaving this key position garrisoned by only a handful of men of the 1/6th King’s Liverpools, who were unable to withstand the determined German attackers who entered the Keep through the rear and captured it. Y and Z Companies, their progress hampered by having to wear their gas respirators and interrupted both by the enemy barrage and by belts of British wire, cut across the fields to reach their posts in the Tuning Fork line, taking over part of the trench they found vacant north of Route A as well as their designated positions. The heavy barrage continued and the shallow trenches suffered badly, particularly when a German 14-inch gun was turned on them. Twice its shells narrowly missed battalion headquarters, which had been established in a fire bay in the trench. With no definite information coming through from brigade, and with rumours flying that the Portuguese had fled, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro made a personal reconnaissance and found Loisne Central unmanned and two unprotected artillery batteries still firing, with German troops only 320 metres away. He quickly moved Z Company into Loisne Central and brought up various platoons from the other companies to fill the gap. When Z Company made contact with the 1 /5th South Lancashires on their left, a dangerous gap in the line was closed. Corporal Kevan wrote later: On approaching Loisne Chateau things became a bit warmer, especially gas shells, which necessitated putting our gas masks on. There, guiding our platoon in, stood our RSM like the proverbial cucumber. Up to now, despite the heavy barrage prevailing, our casualties had been very slight, but now things became tropical and, having left the road by the Chateau, we advanced about 1,000 yards and entered a trench unoccupied with the exception of about two sections belonging to other units. Here we were ordered into the trench as the enemy had come right down behind us on the sector on our left and it was absolutely essential that this trench should be occupied to prevent the enemy enveloping the rest of the division. There we waited for the enemy to advance and, although the barrage was very heavy and our casualties considerable, the spirit was remarkable. I should have mentioned that a ground mist hung over everywhere until well after noon, making it very difficult to see what was happening round about. After an incessant bombardment for five or six hours the barrage lifted, when we started sniping and emptying Lewis gun magazines into Fritz, who showed no anxiety to get to close quarters on account of what he had received from the battalion in front of us and which had been taken to another position, leaving us in the front line.
Seaforth Highlanders defending in open country.
Lieutenant-Colonel Rettie, at his headquarters on the Tuning Fork line, had been anticipating a German attack from the north but later discovered one reason why this had not taken place: One reason for the non-arrival of the Boche, whom I had always expected to see trekking down on Loisne along this road from the north, was that at the road junction to the north of us, there was a battery of 276 Brigade, commanded by Captain S——. All his guns had been knocked out at an early stage of the proceedings and he had left, I think, one officer and twenty men. Suddenly through the mist appeared the Hun, and began cutting the wire around the battery which was in their line of advance. Captain S ——and his men turned on their Lewis guns and all available rifles. He told me afterwards he did not think that they hit very many, as the men shot rather wildly. Still, they made such a row
British soldier wearing a gas respirator during the Battle of the Lys.
British troops moving up to fill gaps in the line caused by the German break through.
German machine gunners setting up their weapon to cover a further advance of the infantry.
The 1/5th King’s Own Royal Lancasters were in reserve at la Tombe Willot, on the far bank of the River Lawe, when news of the breakthrough reached them. They advanced to plug the gap in the face of heavy artillery fire and gas. Second Lieutenant H.V. Tringham of B Company recalled: On the morning of the 9th April at about 7.30 am we were ordered to ‘stand to’ and be ready to move off at a moment’s notice. We moved down to the battalion parade ground and were then told to ‘stand by’, that what had been supposed to be an attack had proved to be only a raid on a large scale and that the division on our left had driven the enemy back. Breakfasts were being served when we received orders to move to our ‘Bustle’ positions at once. We moved off by platoons at 200 yards interval, but had soon to split up into half-platoons and then quickly into sections, owing to the heavy bombardment by the enemy. B Company moved up to Le Touret and held the horseshoe line of defences in that village, A Company moving forward to Le Touret North. Shortly after getting into position, heavy rifle fire and Lewis gun fire gave us the ‘cue’ that A Company was in the thick of it, but owing to the mist we could not see what had taken place. Shortly afterwards, a force of about three platoons of the enemy came forward to attack our right and D Company. We allowed them to advance as far as the Maison Rouge Road before we opened fire. Three or four only of the enemy were seen to get back. In the meantime we inflicted heavy casualties on their supports, who had been formed up in mass in a small wood.
German infantry await the signal to advance.
A British defensive position taken up on the boundary of a cemetery. A Company briefly managed to get in touch with the XI Corps Cyclists on their left holding the fortified village of La Couture, and sent back two runners saying so. But apart from the heavy firing heard coming out of the mist nothing more was heard of them – they were swamped by superior numbers and went down fighting. This left an ominous gap of over 900 metres in the British line between Le Touret, La Couture and the River Lawe. Here the mist favoured the defenders and the Germans appear to have concentrated on reducing the Cyclists garrison rather than pressing on to cross the river.
This allowed time for the Divisional Pioneers to move up, consisting of the 1/4th South Lancashires, along with 419 and 423 Field Companies, Royal Engineers, as well as some men from the 1/5th South Lancashire Regiment, and gradually an extended line was run out from the Tuning Fork line through Le Touret, and round Mesplaux Farm to the north, where it reached the Lawe Canal. This line was reinforced in the late afternoon by the 51st Division’s 1/4th Seaforth Highlanders. Several attempts were made by the Germans to break through but they were repeatedly beaten off. Second Lieutenant H. Gorless of D Company, 1/5th KORL, recalled the confused fighting: We dug a trench on the south side of the Rue De Bois, our left being just behind Le Touret village. We lined up with C Company on our right but, not being able to get in touch with anybody on our left, we swung a platoon round which then faced almost due north. The enemy made repeated attempts to attack but were repulsed on our front by rifle and Lewis gun fire and seemed to take shelter in the buildings of Le Touret. We were in various positions on the front as ordered by headquarters but never did we allow the Bosche to get near enough for hand-to-hand fighting and on many occasions did we inflict very heavy losses on him. By midnight the 55th Division found itself holding a front of some 10,000 metres. The divisional commanders could be very proud of their men: 164 Brigade had held the whole of its original line intact; 165 Brigade had held its second line and thrown out a flank of 1,800 metres; and 166 Brigade
had effectively plugged an ominous and threatening gap in the line. It was the 55th Division’s finest hour, and Givenchy was chosen as the site of their divisional memorial. Many years later LanceCorporal George Pepper, a Lewis gunner with the 1/5th KORL, who had fought on the Somme in 1916 and gone ‘over the top’ on the first day of Passchendaele, but never talked about the war, did tell his son one thing – that he had fought with his pals at La Bassée Canal.
German stormtroopers operating a Minenwerfer.
British Vickers Machine Gun team awaiting the advancing Germans during
Observing the enemy’s movements during the Battle of Lys.
A composite battalion moving up to block the German advance.
Chapter Three
DEFENCE OF THE LAWE CROSSINGS It had already been agreed with the Portuguese commanders that, because of their weak state and low morale, British troops would occupy the battle zone behind their positions and that the Portuguese should try only to hold the front line and forward zone. As soon as it became clear that a major offensive was under way, XI Corps ordered the 11th Cyclist Battalion to move forward and link up with the Portuguese defenders at La Couture while the 1st King Edward’s Horse went to the defences east of La Vieille Chapelle. These two units comprised the XI Corps mobile reserve and were specially held for such an event. The 11th Cyclist Battalion had been formed in May 1916 after the amalgamation of the 33rd, 35th and 38th divisional cycle companies. Frequently assigned for traffic control duties in the corps area, many of the men had some experience of trench warfare gained from serving in attachments to other regiments, but this was the first time they had served together in action as a battalion. King Edward’s Horse was a unique regiment. Formed originally as ‘The King’s Colonials’ during the Boer War, it recruited among men from the Dominions resident in Britain, though during the First World War many men enlisted directly from the Dominions. The men were organised into troops representing Australia and New Zealand, Canada, South Africa and British Asia, but the unit also accepted men who were working abroad so that there was ‘no ... portion of the Globe where English is spoken that had not a representative’. Sent to France in April 1915, King Edward’s Horse served as divisional cavalry and took part in the 1917 advance to the Hindenburg Line. It was frequently split into squadrons and assigned separately as conditions dictated. C Squadron was attached to the 51st Division and took part in the fighting for Pilckem Ridge during the battle of Passchendaele in November 1917. The regiment fought at Cambrai both as reconnaissance cavalry and as infantry. After a spell serving in Italy at the beginning of 1918, it returned to France to act as XI Corps troops. They went into action by lorry but their horses were still kept at the ready, and the men were eager to fight in the mounted role. At 0600 hrs on 9 April the men of the 11th Cyclist Battalion moved off on their bicycles, leaving them at Vieille Chapelle and then taking up a position in and around the main strongpoint at La Couture. They were supporting two companies of the 13th and one of the 15th Portuguese battalions, commanded by Captain Bento Roma. Private W.A. Tucker and his section took over a sand-bagged emplacement near the church and prepared their Lewis guns for defence: ‘No officer mentioned who or what might come, where we were, or what we were to do in any given circumstances. No officer knew.’ Apart from British artillery shells, some of which were falling among the cyclists, there was no sign of any support. Figures loomed out of the mist and were shot down before it was realised that they were retreating Portuguese. Soon gas shells fired from trench mortars began falling, a sure sign that the Germans were closing in.
During the late morning the Germans launched their attack after a heavy barrage. The Portuguese held up the attack for a short time, and Captain Roma led some of his troops forward in a bayonet charge against the enemy, but his men were knocked over by enemy fire, with many of the remaining Portuguese retiring in disorder. The 11th Cyclists’ War Diary recorded: ‘The enemy came on in a wave and reinforcements were sent for by the Cyclists who stuck to their position in the strongpoint being eventually surrounded due to the heavy and intense barrage which was impeding the speedy arrival of the reinforcements.’ As well as holding the main post at La Couture, the Cyclists threw out a line of posts southwards towards La Touret, where they were briefly in touch with A Company, 1/5th King’s Own Royal Lancasters. There was heavy fighting throughout the afternoon, especially around La Couture village itself. The Germans attacked the post methodically but were driven off and settled back to demolish the positions with artillery and Minenwerfer fire. When they finally entered the main post at 1630 hrs not a man was left alive. With their numbers rapidly diminishing, the Cyclists held on grimly, managing to keep in touch with B Squadron, King Edward’s Horse on their left and preventing the Germans from outflanking them. There was an ominous gap on their right caused by the destruction of A Company, 5th KORL in the late morning, but this was not exploited by the enemy and was eventually plugged by the 4th Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders, who created a tenuous line to the River Lawe, south of La Couture, in the mid-afternoon. Eventually, at 1800 hrs, those Cyclists that could be contacted were ordered to retire on Vieille Chapelle and recrossed the Lawe before returning to their billets at Hinges, where heavy shelling was taking place. A large number of their bicycles remained at Vieille Chapelle, and were captured by the enemy. Of the 17 officers and 499 other ranks of the 11th Cyclist Battalion who started out that morning, 9 officers and 234 other ranks became casualties during the day’s fighting. Lieutenant H.D. Collis, as the senior surviving officer, assumed command at the end of the day. Unknown to their comrades, some Cyclists were still holding out in posts around the village and continued to fight into the next day.
King Edward’s Horse in full ceremonial rig for the coronation of King George V.
The defences around the village of La Couture which were held by XI Corps Cyclists and some Portuguese troops on 9/10 April. Having received orders to man their battle posts at 0530 hrs, the troopers of King Edward’s Horse, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel James, were in position to the east of Vieille Chapelle by 0915 hrs, having had to move forward through the village, which was being heavily bombarded with both high explosives and gas. Chaos was caused by the inhabitants of the village: There were, however, in one or more of the houses, some of those misguided peasant women, who had bartered their modesty against milreis [Portuguese money]. The shells had terrified them beyond all human reasoning power. Torn between the terrors of the recurring barrage and the cupidity to save the tawdry accumulations of their sordid craft, they presented a picture of forlorn terror that would have moved the heart of the most stubborn moralist. Poor things; they were paying the price of their
degradation, for their late protectors were only concerned with their own safety. This section of the battle line had been well prepared earlier and there were some robust emplacements with strong belts of wire covering the approach roads to Vieille Chapelle from the east and around the village of Fosse. The main position, named Huit Maisons after the small hamlet in the centre, consisted of a shallow trench with heavily sand-bagged parapets standing a metre or so high on either side. A few concrete pill-boxes were built into the parapets and belts of wire were laid out on trestle mountings along the front. B Squadron under Major MacDonald spread out to man a line of defences from 275 metres east of the crossroads outside the village south down to the road at Rue de la Croix. Their frontage was some 700 metres. A Squadron under Major Furse moved some 350 metres further down the road and spread left through Huit Maisons towards the small village of Bout Delville (always called Bout Deville in British accounts). This was a front of about 825 metres. C Squadron, consisting of three troops and the Hotchkiss gun team of 4 Troop, numbering 70 other ranks and 5 officers, went into support some 450 metres behind A Squadron’s left. There appeared to be a big gap on the left. Major Furse recalled: 10 am. Portuguese began streaming back but British liaison officer with them informed me that enemy had not penetrated front line when he left. This was not correct information. Portuguese continued to pass back in panic, many having removed boots to run the faster. As they had abandoned arms I did nothing to stay them, being glad to have them clear of my front. A message also reached me from the Cyclists saying that they were in position. This was the only message that reached me from the Cyclists and it took nearly two hours to reach me, the men having recrossed the Lawe to bring it. At about noon both of Lieutenant-Colonel James’s sectors reported the enemy attacking and Major Furse expressed concern that there appeared to be no British troops on his left towards Bout Delville. An independent patrol was pushed forward to investigate and part of C Squadron, with the Hotchkiss gun, went to support A Squadron.
Colonel Lionel James DSO, who commanded the King Edwards Horse at the Lawe Crossings and later wrote their excellent Regimental History. Messages suggested that reinforcements from 152 Brigade would reach the cavalrymen by about 0130 hrs. The independent patrol returned with the news that there were German troops massing at Bout Delville and that Major Furse’s squadron was involved in heavy fighting. B Squadron on the right also reported that Major MacDonald and two officers and several other ranks were wounded but that they were holding out. In the light of the German advance from Bout Delville, Lieutenant-Colonel James moved C Squadron and a party of 15 artillerymen into the Fosse Bridgehead defences along with a platoon of Portuguese who had turned up with ‘the first Portuguese officer I had seen that day’.
The Rhodesian contingent of King Edwards Horse. Men who lived and worked abroad, not just within the Empire, flocked to join the regiment Some good news arrived at 1230 hrs when another patrol confirmed that the Durham Light Infantry had taken up positions in Le Marais on the left flank and on the banks of the Lawe (in fact the 8th Durhams had begun occupying the Le Marais posts as early as 0830 hrs). This was countered 15 minutes later when both sectors simultaneously requested reinforcements, as they were hard pressed. With the only possible reinforcements already tied up manning the Fosse Bridgehead, both squadrons were ordered to hold on at all costs. Strong parties of Germans could be seen massing at Bout Delville but without artillery support the British were unable to prevent this. At about this time the Germans captured Le Marais East Post and began attacking Le Marais South, where Lieutenant Robinson of the 8th Durhams managed to persuade some Portuguese Lewis gunners to stay and assist in the defence. At 1345 hrs two companies of the 5th Seaforth Highlanders finally arrived from 152 Brigade; one was sent to La Vieille Chapelle and the other, under Captain Sutherland, was rushed to assist Major Furse at the Huit Maisons position. The majority of the soldiers of 152 Brigade began digging in on the other side of the Lawe, though there was great confusion, as Lieutenant Sholto Douglas of the 6th Seaforths described: We were left without a map, we had no idea where we were because there were no main roads and the roads there were marked in Flemish ... and you can’t connect it with French names so we didn’t know where we were; we were not in touch on the left or the right, we were not in touch with the rear. The 1/5th Seaforth Highlanders’ War Diary noted: The shelling at this time was extremely heavy, but it was observed that practically no
shells hit the road, the majority landing in the fields on either side, thereafter companies were ordered to keep to the road as long as possible, thus, as it proved, avoiding the shelling and also avoiding the numerous dykes which would have had to be waded if the troops advanced across the open. With only one man wounded, A Company of the 5th Seaforths reached the Huit Maisons position and reinforced A Squadron, King Edward’s Horse at a critical moment. On the far left of the position enemy soldiers had broken through into the defences and were bombing out the King Edward’s Horse troopers. Captain Rice of the Horse organised a local counter-attack and drove the Germans out again. During the afternoon the worrying German build-up at Bout Delville continued, but a company of the 6th Gordon Highlanders arrived and was sent to reinforce Lieutenant Stein and the remains of B Squadron, who had been forced to retreat into the defences of Vieille Chapelle itself. One section of the Gordons took up position in the village itself and three more crossed the Lawe and dug in, covering the approaches to the bridgehead. A contemporary map of the positions held by King Edwards Horse on 9 April 1918, showing fields of fire. The KEH had only 89 men to hold the whole of the Les Huits Maisons defence line.
In the meantime the Germans, apparently avoiding the Fosse position, began threatening to make
advances from Bout Delville towards Le Marais. At a range of 1,400 metres the troopers of King Edward’s Horse engaged them but they were forced to husband their Hotchkiss gun ammunition because it was running short, and thus were unable to prevent the attack building up against the Durham Light Infantry post at Le Marais. At 1500 hrs a message reached Lieutenant-Colonel James from La Vieille Chapelle, asking for permission to withdraw; as his orders were that the bridgeheads were to be held at whatever cost, he refused. By 1600 hrs it was clear that the enemy had forced the Durham Light Infantry out of Le Marais, and long-range machine-gun fire began to reach the Fosse bridgehead. Colonel James was proud of his men and wrote of them: Few as the casualties were, these were accepted in the same manly spirit that was the mainspring of the Overseas Dominions from which they had sprung. Corporal Lucas, a bonnie Australian stripling, came smiling up to the Commanding Officer, staggering as he walked ‘May I go to the rear sir? I have stopped something!’ Indeed he had, a piece of HE [high explosive shell] had perforated his tin hat and buried itself in his scalp. He was helped to Tobin’s dressing station in a farmhouse of which the tiles were in a constant state of rattle. Then it was found that he also had gunshot wounds in both his arm and thigh. Sergeant Chadwick with others came walking in from Les Huit Maisons. In spite of pain from a shattered right hand the Sergeant was all smiles as he reported that, ‘the Boys are giving them hell in the open’.
British soldiers prepared to repel a German attack on a crossing of the Lys.
Though the German troops were supposed to be stormtroopers, the British were not always impressed by their quality: A couple of prisoners who were brought in were put through a perfunctory interrogation by the CO. They were quaint little men, and were immediately named ‘Tweedledum and Tweedledee’ by the Adjutant. They said that they belonged to a Jager battalion doing advanced guard to a division in attack. As soon as they realised that they were not to be immediately destroyed, they tumbled over one another to give information. They had been ‘instructed’ to the effect that their division was marching to the sea and they produced a map upon which Chocques-St Venant-Hazebrouck were marked as the extreme limits of the first day’s objective. At 1515 hrs a final message reached La Fosse from Vieille Chapelle when Lieutenant Pinckney of King Edward’s Horse came in with a message from Captain Christie, explaining that the situation was now desperate and again requesting permission to withdraw. I told this officer the new situation and where to report and gave him a last order to fall back if pressed to the shorter bridgehead at La Vieille Chapelle and to hold that to the end. This order I am proud to say was carried out and the last message from this bridgehead still held by the Highlanders and my men was sent off at 8 am on 11 April, 36 hours later. Lieutenant John William Pinckney of King Edward’s Horse was killed in the final fighting at Vieille Chapelle on 11 April and is buried in Bailleul Road East Cemetery (Section II, Row K, no. 2). In the Huit Maisons position the enemy had been attacking since late morning. Their first attempt to rush the emplacement was beaten off with machine-gun fire but soon they began working round both flanks. At about 1300 hrs they managed to get round the right flank, where orchards and hedges gave good cover, and into the trench, working up it using grenades to drive the King Edward’s Horse troopers back. There was fierce fighting at close range: Sergeant Chadwick killed a man with his revolver at less than two metres’ range and Lieutenant Giles was last reported firing his revolver into a mass of Germans. In fact, Giles, although seriously wounded, was not killed immediately. Private Smith, trying to escape from the Germans who had occupied the trench, persuaded them he was too weak to move when taken prisoner. He sneaked away and ‘saw a body move on the Parados. It was Mr Giles with his head wrapped up but evidently quite conscious. He asked me where I was going, I told him and he said I had no hope and had better go back to the farm and get help. I said, “No, I am going to try and reach our own lines”.’ Private Smith managed to make his way to the Fosse bridgehead, helping several seriously wounded troopers on his way. Giles was taken prisoner. His family received a card dated 16 April, not in his handwriting and with his name mis-spelt, via the German POW Registry at Limburg. Eventually a Red Cross notification was received that Lieutenant Robert O. Gilese (sic) of A Squadron, King Edward’s Horse had died on 26 April of a gunshot wound to the head, with resultant paralysis of right arm and both legs, in a hospital at Tournai. At the crucial moment the company of 5th Seaforth Highlanders arrived and formed a flank guard
in some shell holes while a group of Portuguese troops were cajoled into manning the parapet, where they performed rather well. The attack from the right flank was deterred and, though they kept threatening to resume their advance, the Germans did not press home their assault again. Once the situation on the right was sorted out news began to come in that enemy troops were working down the trench from the left. Fortunately Lieutenant Rich managed to stabilise the defence, but it was clear that the Germans were working round his flank towards the Fosse bridgehead. At about 1630 hrs Major Furse decided to pull back to link up with the Scottish troops holding a tenuous line to his rear between him and Fosse. The two centre troops were ordered to retire first, each leaving a platoon behind to maintain some firing. However, due to some confusion in the orders, the whole centre of the line fell back at once, leaving Major Furse to bring out the flank troops. He got the 2nd Troop out behind some houses but immediately they were clear of the parapets machine-gun fire opened from the flanks. The Portuguese troops took to their heels, almost carrying the Scotsmen with them as they broke across their line of shell holes, but Furse managed to rally them. At Lieutenant Addison’s suggestion, the men dropped into the ditch beside the road and waded, in half a metre of water, towards Fosse, with bullets whistling overhead. When they eventually reached the road junction of the Fosse – Vieille Chapelle road they were obliged to cross the road itself under machine-gun fire and lost several men. In pitch darkness the exhausted men reached the Fosse post at 1950 hrs, having taken two hours to travel just 1.6 kilometres.
T he Northe rn Se ctor Immediately north of the Portuguese 2nd Division the line was held by the British 40th Division, which had only recently moved up from the Somme sector, where it had been badly mauled in the German March offensive. Some fresh drafts had been received as the men made their way north and in the few days they were in the line, but most battalions were still under-strength; to make matters worse, many members of platoons and companies barely knew each other or their officers, and the men had not had time to properly reconnoitre the ground they were to fight over. They were also unfamiliar with the Portuguese on their right, which led to confusion once the retreat began, with German units being mistaken for Portuguese and some Portuguese units being fired on in error. The left of the front line was held by 119 Brigade, with the 18th Welch Regiment in immediate contact with the Portuguese and the 13th East Surreys on their left. North of them was 121 Brigade, with the 20th Middlesex on the right and the 13th Yorkshires on the left. The 12th Suffolks were in reserve. Also nominally in reserve was 120 (Highland) Brigade, but, given the doubts about the state of the Portuguese, this unit had been allocated a set of defensive roles and the only true reserves available to the division were some companies of pioneers and Royal Engineers. A kilometre or so behind the front line was a second line consisting of a series of posts, and behind this was a further series of (mainly machine-gun) posts covering the crossings of the rivers Lawe and Lys. The battle plan was for these lines of posts, all facing roughly east, to be defended sequentially, with troops falling back to successive lines, but the rapid collapse of the Portuguese resulted in the division actually fighting on a front facing south as their flank was quickly turned. The barrage commenced against the 40th Division at 0415 hrs, striking the front line, reserve lines and headquarters. Mist lay heavy across the ground, and because there was no other immediate sign of a German attack the staff at divisional headquarters initially assumed that the barrage was in response to a raid being made further north. It was only at 0500 hrs that they realised an offensive was in the offing and began moving up the reserve units. This delay was crucial, as it meant that some of the defences in the Portuguese area were not reached before they were overrun by advancing
Germans. By 0600 hrs reports were coming in that the Portuguese had abandoned their trenches and that Germans were in the line to the right of 119 Brigade. At about the same time the divisional transport reported that large numbers of unarmed Portuguese were clogging the roads heading westwards. By 0630 hours the 18th Welch were being attacked from their front and flank, their Lewis guns doing great execution, but the two companies on the far right were cut off and isolated. They fought to the bitter end. For the next two or three hours there was heavy hand-to-hand fighting on the right as the Germans pushed up the trenches and the intense gas and high explosive barrage fell on the rest of the line. Now 120 Brigade was moved to take up positions around Laventie station, but the mist and the rapid German advance meant that they could not reach their designated positions. By about 0900 hours the 18th Welch infantry in the front line were completely overwhelmed and the 13th Surreys found themselves under attack from Germans in their own support trenches and were, in turn, surrounded. Artillery guns in the rear of the Surreys came under close fire from advancing Germans and were obliged to pull back. The commanding officer of the 20th Middlesex, hearing that the Germans were in the Surreys’ first line, sent a messenger to their headquarters seeking clarification but almost immediately a wounded company sergeant major of the Surreys reached him and informed me that their support line had gone, and that the enemy were advancing on my headquarters. My adjutant and second-in-command immediately took all orderlies to man Gunners’ Walk. I then went in that direction and saw a large body of Germans advancing in extended order and in a N.E. direction. My adjutant and secondin-command were surrounded by overwhelming numbers before reaching Gunners’ Walk.
The river Lys and Armentières positions between 9 and 11 April as the troops fell back over the river and beyond Steenwerk.
By 1000 hrs German machine-gun fire was preventing the artillery guns to the rear of the division from being withdrawn, their horses being shot down as they tried to haul the guns to safety, though the gunners succeeded in removing the guns’ breech-blocks and sights. The battalion headquarters of the 18th Welch was almost overrun but made a fighting retreat, sometimes firing at a distance of less than 25 metres into the advancing enemy. With the strength reduced to the commanding officer and seven other ranks, the headquarters linked up with the remains of the 21st Middlesex and continued to withdraw. The last remnants of the 20th Middlesex headquarters made it to the river at Sailly and lined the opposite bank. The East Surreys had been all but annihilated, the few survivors fighting their way back towards Sailly. The next battalion in the line, the 13th Yorkshires, managed to form a defensive flank but at 1154 hrs the attack fell on them. They immediately sent up SOS rockets and sent runners to the 9th Northumberland Fusiliers, the next battalion in the line to the north. Their machine-guns and trench mortars succeeded in breaking up the enemy attack. The 12th Suffolks were nominally in reserve around Fleurbaix but by 1000 hrs they had come into contact with advancing Germans and had spotted a large number of enemy cyclists moving west. Their whole line came under heavy machine-gun fire and they soon found themselves holding an extensive flank east to west, with large parties of Germans moving across their front towards the river Lawe. The divisional artillery reported Germans west of Fleurbaix at 1100 hrs. Orders were issued to the Fleurbaix defences that they were to hold out at all costs. The 12th Suffolks War Diary records:
The whole line now came under heavy machine-gun fire from the enemy who had established himself in the ‘Subsidiary Line’. Our [Lewis guns] were occupying positions in concrete emplacements and in shell holes in front of our line. 3 LGs were put out of action by enemy fire, one gun being put out of action by a shell and the team killed. The fighting was severe and continuous and very heavy losses inflicted on the enemy, who continued to move in sections in single file across our front to the west. By 1630 hrs both flanks of the battalion were ‘in the air ’ and a withdrawal was made by sections, covered by the remaining Lewis guns. By 1830 hrs the remains of the battalion were part of a thin line of stragglers holding a tenuous line along the south bank of the Lys around Fort Rompu. Originally 120 Brigade had been ordered to support the Portuguese left and duly took up positions around Laventie but the men became isolated in the mist and soon discovered that parties of Germans were slipping round their flanks, mingled with the fleeing Portuguese. In confused fighting the brigade held out for about three hours before it became clear that they were being outflanked. The War Diary noted: The whole of the line was then being very heavily attacked and a gap existed between the right of the 10/Highland Light Infantry and the 11th, the troops on their right.... By this time the Brigade numbered only about 400 rifles with four machine-guns and, for about four hours they delayed the advance of the enemy on a front of 2,500 yards on the south-east of the Lys fighting a rearguard action to cover the bridgeheads... . By about 4pm the remnants of the Brigade, numbering some 200 rifles with only two Lewis guns, were across the Lys and holding the west bank in conjunction with troops of 150 Brigade. The main permanent bridge across the Lys was at Bac St Maur; Royal Engineer detachments demolished it and two of the three temporary bridges at 1415 hrs. British troops (the last remains of 119 Brigade, supported by some engineers and pioneers) lined the northern bank but came under fire from machine-guns and trench mortars that the Germans of the 10th Ersatz Division had managed to get into the upper storeys of houses overlooking the river on the southern side. Lacking cover, the British were forced to withdraw and in the late afternoon German troops began slipping across the Lys using the remaining temporary bridge. They spread out and attacked the flanks of British units holding the northern bank. The troops of the 50th (Northumbrian) Division began moving south across the Lys from their positions around Estaires and Merville at about 1820 hrs. They had only reconnoitred the posts across the Lys two days earlier, but had their positions assigned in a line of defended farmhouses and redoubts about 1,100 metres south of the river. Unfortunately the German bombardment was already hitting the roads and towns and even before the 6th Durham Light Infantry could move, a shell hit their officers’ billet, killing and wounding almost all of them. With only three officers, plus the commanding officer and adjutant, they moved to their battle positions with all the platoons and one company commanded by NCOs. By noon patrols were in touch with the enemy as they advanced in two columns towards the bridges across the Lys and the Lawe. The 6th Durhams took up a line of posts north of Laventie, which was already in German hands. Their left flank was overrun by 1345
hrs in spite of fierce resistance and a defensive flank was formed, but by 1500 hrs the last two of their posts had fallen. Their War Diary reports: ‘After fighting all day the Battalion withdrew to a line running north from Lestrem.’ The Battalion History says: The first reports which reached the Commanding Officer (Major T.B. Heslop) were to the effect that three Companies (W, X and Z) had been completely overwhelmed, and that two of his three company officers, Capt. Cardew (killed) and 2nd Lieut. Railton (prisoner) were casualties. The remainder of the Battalion, however, under Lieut. A.N. Brown, held its ground till the afternoon, when it was forced to withdraw to the railway near La Gorgue. At dusk, orders were received to cross the river Lawe and to hold the western bank. This withdrawal was successful and the opportunity was taken to reorganise the Battalion, which was divided into two companies, one under Lieut. Brown, with Sergt. P. Finn, MM, and Sergt. Field; and the other under C.S.M. T. Sordy, MC, with Sergts. Bell and Cooper. The strength of the Battalion was now barely 100, and when touch had been established on the flanks it was found that it was holding a frontage of about 2,000 yards. The 8th Durhams held the posts close to the Lawe river, covering the village of Pont Riqueult, the bridge there and one at Lestrem, as well as the footbridge at le Rault. The posts at Le Marais West fell at about 1315 hrs and the enemy closed in on the remaining posts at Le Marais which fell at about 1600 hrs, in spite of long-distance machine-gun fire assistance from the left flank of the King Edward’s Horse. It was at this point that the first German troops managed to cross the Lawe at the Lock de Rault, but were unable to hold on. The remnants of the 8th Durhams withdrew into the village of Pont Riqueult to defend the bridge across the Lawe. They did manage to make contact with the 7th Gordon Highlanders of the 51st (Highland) Division, who had moved up during the day to just north of Fosse, and so were able to form a tenuous defensive line along almost the whole length of the Lawe. Unfortunately this line was away from the river itself, so that Lock de Rault remained uncovered except by long-range machine-gun fire, and there were areas of the curve of the river that were not overlooked.
T he Si tuati on at the End of the Day In the southern sector, around Givenchy and Festubert, the day had gone horribly wrong for the German attackers and the British village line had held fast. The collapse of the Portuguese had opened up a huge gap, but elements of the 55th (West Lancashire) Division, supported by the advancing 51st (Highland) Division, had thrown out a defensive flank linking Givenchy to the defenders of the river Lawe. The valiant stand made by the XI Corps Cyclists and King Edward’s Horse had stopped the Germans crossing the Lawe, and the Durham Light Infantry were still preventing them from crossing at le Pont Riqueult. The men of the 40th Division had fallen back to the line of the river Lys and in most places were still holding it, but German troops had forced a crossing at Bac St Maur, which they were heavily reinforcing. The 34th Division still held Armentières in a narrowing salient, and so far there had been no serious action north of the town.
Chapter Four
10 APRIL: FORCING THE LAWE CROSSINGS German intentions for the day were relatively simple, at least in principle. Further attacks were to be pressed against the extended flank of the 55th Division with the aim of reaching La Bassée Canal and isolating Givenchy. The river Lawe was to be forced wherever possible and troops were to press on westwards; the bridgehead across the Lys at Bac St Maur was to be extended and other passages to be made either by existing bridges or using mobile ones brought up on lorries overnight. North of Armentières the Fourth Army was to storm the southern part of the Messines Ridge and Ploegsteert Wood, increasing the pressure against Armentières.
The Battle of the Lys 10th April 1918
The first German attack on the 55th Division’s flank came against the Liverpool Scottish. At 0600 hrs an enemy attack on Loisne Central was easily beaten off with heavy German casualties. Around noon the Germans tried again, but Z Company’s Lewis guns, which fired over 2,000 rounds of ammunition, combined with vigorous rifle fire once again beat them back. Y Company spent the day sniping at the occupants of Route A Keep. At dusk a party of 60 Germans succeeded in creeping down a drainage ditch between Loisne Central and Y Company to the south and got in behind Y Company’s trench. Fortunately they were spotted by Z Company’s officer ’s cook, who was gathering firewood, and a platoon of 1/5th South Lancashires and some men of Z Company rushed them. In the fierce hand-to-hand fighting that ensued, 25 Germans were killed or wounded and a further 16 captured, along with two machine-guns. Y Company riflemen hit several of the fleeing survivors as they ran back to the German lines. Lieutenant H.V. Tringham of B Company, 1/5th KORL recalled: The night went by quickly, but early next morning [10 April] our left two platoons were attacked in force, but held the enemy back, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. Again and again did they attack our left two platoons, each time being driven back, until the sixth time
of attacking they managed to get round our left flank and caused havoc among our two left platoons. Those who were not killed or wounded were taken prisoner. The right now became untenable and the order ‘Line the road’ was given; we attempted to do so, but found the enemy forces too great for us. Then we were ordered to get down the Rue Du Bois as best we could and join up with D Company and the Seaforths, three officers and thirty-one men gathered in the shell holes just behind D, and dug in according to orders. Later we were drawn back to the main line of resistance and had the unpleasant experience of having our own 18 pdrs firing at us at point-blank range. We dug in and later were ordered to form a defensive flank, which we had just completed when we received orders to relieve the garrison at Mesplaux Farm. After a very uncomfortable two days in this place under heavy shell fire, we were at last relieved after a very strenuous six days of hard fighting, digging and forming defensive flanks.
British soldiers turn a captured MG 08 on its former owners.
At 0850 hrs a strong attack was made against B Company, 1/5th KORL at Le Touret Central but it was beaten off. The rest of the morning was quiet but at 1400 hrs a further attack at Le Touret found the men of B Company outflanked on their left, as a reinforcing company of Seaforth Highlanders had failed to get in touch. Though the gap was only some 180 metres, German infantry were able to infiltrate the line. B Company fought its way to a position 180 metres further back but lost 100 of the 140 men it had gone into battle with the previous day. A counter-attack led by Major Phillips plugged the gap, while two companies came up from the reserves. ‘The men were wonderful and fought splendidly under conditions very trying to morale,’ wrote Major Phillips. ‘The casualties were severe; I believe I was the fifteenth officer casualty in the battalion. Their fighting spirit never shone brighter.’ During the day the battalion was rejoined by ‘One lance corporal and two other ranks ... the sole survivors ... of A Company, who had been encircled, rushed and swamped by overwhelming numbers in the mist, but went down fighting.’ During the course of the day it became clear that the Germans were firing captured Portuguese artillery at almost point-blank range against the defences but reinforcements were arriving from the 3rd Division and, apart from the slight withdrawal by B Company, KORL, the line was holding. At one point in the afternoon 166 Brigade Headquarters received a surprise visit from a drunken German ‘in a rollicking boisterous state’, who was promptly taken prisoner!
Though the main post at La Couture had been captured during the afternoon of the previous day, the remains of three companies of cyclists, supported by Portuguese troops, continued to hold on in pockets around the village after the rest of the XIth Cyclist Battalion had withdrawn. On the morning of 10 April the Germans began to flush them out. There were three companies of us, each about 100 strong. Our company was out of ammunition and had to surrender. We were marched back a short way and then marched back again towards the line. The other two companies were occupying two blockhouses behind the church. A German officer instructed one of our officers, Captain Lucas (Adjutant), to order the two other companies to leave their cover, as he was going to blow it down. They eventually came out and laid down their rifles, then the Germans rushed at them, fired their rifles, revolvers and threw hand grenades. There were some casualties – one officer badly wounded, Captain Wiggins, and one man killed, Private Flint. Private Tucker was one of those left surrounded inside the other blockhouses and he saw the shooting of the prisoners at close hand. Only small groups remained, but they were still dug in and ready. As the morning mist lifted, a column of horse-drawn German artillery could be seen advancing down the road as if on parade. Half a dozen Lewis guns opened up and within seconds the column was reduced to wreckage, but the action had used up almost the last of the ammunition. At 1000 hrs a German officer shouted across that he would give them 10 minutes to surrender. A hail of insults resulted in another half an hour of bombardment, at the end of which another offer was made to accept their surrender. Without ammunition, there was little choice but to comply, and the commanding officer went forward into the German lines and returned with an order for the men to lay down their arms. ‘Our position is now quite hopeless,’ he told the men, ‘even if we had ammunition and food. I cannot allow you to die needlessly. I must now order you to surrender. It is my duty.’ The men wearily disabled their weapons and filed out into the road, but some Portuguese troops who had been with them still carried their rifles and the Germans, thinking it was a trick, opened fire. With several men hit, the troops rushed back in panic but the commanding officer reappeared and assured the Germans it was a mistake. When they went forward again a German officer apologised and guaranteed their safety. Carrying a comrade who had been wounded after the surrender, Tucker made his way to an improvised dressing station and into captivity. During the afternoon the British prisoners were made to carry their own and German wounded to a German dressing station at Illies. According to Portuguese records, some 168 Portuguese but only 77 Britons were taken prisoner.
T he Forci ng of the Lawe Cros s i ngs The bridgehead at Pont Riqueul was held by troops of the 8th Durham Light Infantry but they were short of ammunition. At 0130 hrs on 10 April, supported by artillery firing at almost point-blank range, the Germans stormed the bridgehead and managed to get into the defences. Many of the defenders were killed or wounded, and it was impossible to counter-attack with the men available, so it was decided to demolish the bridge. The explosion failed to demolish it completely but further attacks were beaten off, at least temporarily.
The Lock de Rault, where the canal narrows and where German troops were able to slip across the undefended lock gates on the night of 9/10 April.
At about 0830 hrs the Germans, under cover of a machine-gun barrage, forced a crossing of the Lawe at Pont Riqueul. More of the enemy crossed again at Lock de Rault and wounded men began coming in to the 7th Gordons to advise that the 8th Durhams were falling back. Second Lieutenant (later Lord) McDermott moved up during the day with his company of 51 Divisional Machine-Gun Corps: Soon we were on our way to the front with the sections in battle order and the guns in their limbers. It was a sad and novel march for me. We held the right of the road while a pathetic stream of refugees, mostly old men and women, with all the possessions they could carry on their backs or in ramshackle carts or barrows, came down the other side. And off the road there hurried along the fields yet another stream of Portuguese soldiers with here and there a gun limber but without guns or, so far as I could see, any other arms. It was a veritable sauve qui peut and we had no doubt now that somewhere there was a gap to be filled and that that was likely to be our job. We seemed to be making for a little place called Lestrem, not far from the Lawe and a few miles south-east of Merville. Suddenly I heard a strange sound and then a shell burst on the ground a little in front of the column and about 100 yards to the right. Our mess corporal, an excellent and helpful fellow called Robertson, whom I had already met, was marching near me and I asked him ‘What was that?’ to which he replied very civilly, ‘Oh Sir, that’s just a small one called a whizz-bang.’ No one seemed to bother
about this sign of hostility but it cannot have been long afterwards that the Company was halted, a Company Headquarters set up and the gun sections taken over by the available subalterns. I was put in charge of one of the subsections of No. 4 Section and thus became responsible for its two Vickers guns and their gun teams. I did my best to appear nonchalant but do not think I deceived many. However, everyone was willing and eventually both guns were sited and mounted, one being dug into a bank on a small road with a good field of fire and the other, under an experienced corporal called Telford, being mounted some distance away and close to the River Lawe. I then set myself up a little way back and convenient to both guns in a diminutive one-room cottage with my batman and also, I think, a runner. By this time it must have been well into the afternoon but the light was still good and I went out to walk round to get better acquainted with the local geography.... I could not visit the gun team by the river, for that might give away their position; but I could approach the other gun team dug in by the side of the road without that danger if I used the cover of the bank or hedge that led to it, and this I did. When I got there I found the team in good heart with a good view towards the enemy and a house almost opposite and perhaps 200 to 300 yards away.... Suddenly a German soldier was walking across the front of the house and close to it. I thought he was hardly a target for the Vickers but felt that some show of hostility was desirable and would be good for morale. So I picked up a rifle, took careful aim, fired and missed! It was an easy shot and I thought I was a tolerable marksman; but the fact remains that, though he must have known he was being fired at, the German soldier neither changed pace nor looked around and disappeared from sight without the slightest show of concern! I’m afraid my intervention had served no useful purpose; but even worse, it did not warn me that, as the next day was to prove, we were opposed to a very steady and well trained enemy formation. Satisfied with his day’s work, McDermott found himself a bed in a small cottage and turned in, remembering to keep his boots on and his kit close to hand. He was to be glad of this in the morning.
The garrison at Vieille Chapelle continued to hold out. Lieutenant Stein recorded: The morning of the 10th we were heavily shelled about 5 am causing a few casualties. During the day we were shelled frequently and our 2 Hotchkiss guns put out of action. About 7 or 8 pm the enemy attacked Fosse and shelled us heavily. We still retained touch with both flanks. At 1000 hrs the Officer Commanding D Company, 7th Gordons, reported that the troops on his left had evacuated their positions but that, with one of his platoons and a platoon of stragglers, he had formed a defensive flank from the bend of the Lawe near the chateau towards the outskirts of Lestrem, joining up with the 6th Black Watch on the left. He had blown up the most northerly of the footbridges near the chateau on the Lawe river bend and asked for reinforcements. Enemy troops were trying to work round his left flank but appeared disinclined to try a frontal attack. This message was received by brigade headquarters at about 1100 hrs and one platoon of the 6th Black Watch company in battalion reserve and two machine-guns were at once ordered forward to reinforce D Company; at the same time orders were sent to the Officer Commanding D Company to gain ground so as to be able to cover the crossing at Lock de Rault. Shortly after, a full company of the 6th Black Watch, previously in the battalion reserve, was placed under the command of the commanding officer of the 6th Black Watch for use as a counter-attack force should the enemy gain the line immediately south of Lestrem. At 1425 hrs the Officer Commanding D Company reported that he had advanced his
line to run from just south of Lestrem to the river Lawe, covering Lock de Rault, and that the enemy were massing in the woods around the western end of the Pont Riqueul bridge. The artillery was therefore turned on to this point. Otherwise the situation was reported quiet. During the afternoon an attempt was made to relieve the last remaining King Edward’s Horse men in Fosse by men of the 7th Gordons but ‘Some 5th Seaforths induced one platoon to relieve them while the company commander was going round the line, and then moved off, thus making it impossible to relieve all the King Edward’s Horse.’ Between 1800 and 1900 hours there was heavy shelling of the banks of the river Lawe but casualties were slight. At 1925 hrs the Officer Commanding C Company reported that the enemy appeared to be attacking the front held by the 6th Black Watch and that his advanced line had been withdrawn. At the same time an attack had developed on Fosse Post which succeeded in driving in the northern edge held by the 5th Seaforths, thus cutting off the remainder of the garrison who had to fight their way back across the bridge. Troops of the 51st Division digging a slit trench. Note the Lewis gun. (IWM Q6498)
By 1950 hrs the situation was that all the companies of the 7th Gordons, with the exception of C Company, which was retiring across the bridge at Fosse, were in touch on their flanks and were heavily engaged with bodies of the enemy on the east bank of the river. The houses just south of the chateau on the east bank of the Lawe were still held, as were posts just east of the bridge at Fosse. Unfortunately the Germans could now cross the Lawe at Pont Riqueul and at several other points almost with impunity. They began forming up into company-sized units and shortly after about 2000 hrs they drove in on the Gordons’ left and began working down the left bank of the Lawe. The two platoons of D Company in the houses near the chateau were withdrawn across the river and the bridge destroyed, the company taking up a position on the right of D Company, 1/5th Black Watch. The remaining bridges were blown up but the enemy continued to press his attack from the left and from the front, and succeeded in slowly rolling up the Gordons’ line, though two defensive flanks were formed by companies in the line. The 7th Gordons’ War Diary recorded:
As far as can be ascertained the majority of the line held on to the last, firing to their front and flank and only retired when completely surrounded, the survivors having to fight their way through the enemy, who were in large numbers and appeared to be moving in large formations. At 2120 hrs the right company was still holding on to the river Lawe and had formed a defensive flank with the two platoons along the road running from La Fosse towards Rue de La Croix Marmuse. This was held for some time but, owing to lack of men, the soldiers manning it were finally forced to retire and took up a position near the 5th Seaforth Highlanders’ headquarters, just west of the Lock de l’Etroa, which they held for the remainder of the night. The rest of the battalion was scattered and in the darkness it was almost impossible to find all the stragglers. Finally two parties, each about 20strong, were collected and placed to cover any attempted German advance south-west out of Lestrem and a party of headquarters details, 24 in all, were placed between them and the Seaforths’ headquarters. Patrols reported that the enemy did not appear to be beyond the Lestrem—Fosse— Locon road. Another party, consisting of an officer and 20 men with a machine-gun, were positioned on the bend on the Rue Delanney and were in touch with the 6th Black Watch on their left. Some 20 men of A Squadron and 22 men of C Squadron, King Edward’s Horse, under the command of Lieutenant Addison, remained on the western side of the Lawe. Addison was accompanied by Lieutenant Moffat, and their tiny force was used to plug gaps as and when they appeared in the thin defensive line. During the morning of the 10th April 1918 about 12 noon C Squadron detachment were placed in shell craters in a position for defensive occupation for a distance of about 300 yards westward when Lieut Addison ordered the occupation by C Squadron detachment of [some] prepared trenches. This was done and at 5 pm several shells were dropped within my area and so increased in volume that I had to evacuate the prepared shell craters above mentioned. This intense shelling lasting about half an hour. After ceasing, the trenches were reoccupied. At about 10 pm Lt Col Scott (5th Seaforths) received information that the Fosse bridgehead on La Lawe N had been carried and crossed by the enemy, that no news was available about his left flank and that the right flank B Company, 6th Seaforths was in touch. The 7th Gordons (about 600 men) under a captain reported at same time, and I was instructed to gain touch with B Coy 6th Seaforths and place this party in line with the KEH detachments right and C Coy Seaforths left. This was immediately done and reported.
Bridge prepared for demolition by the British. A half hour later a report was furnished to Brigade Headquarters that the enemy was advancing along the main road to Locon from the N and almost immediately it was reported that the line 7th Gordons and B Coy Seaforths (upon which the connection had been established) had been broken and the Seaforths and Gordons had been withdrawn, the latter facing the Locon road with its right flank resting approximately Zetevos. The KEH and Gordons’ line ran north and south. No touch could be obtained with the Seaforths, although several patrols were sent out with that object in view. From a small wood to our front on the Locon road Very lights were being fired towards our line by the enemy and I consulted with Lt Addison and he ordered me to again place my command of twenty-two men in the trenches running along the southern edge of the chateau. Immediately it was reported by Sergt Moir ’s patrol that the enemy was forcing back the 7th Gordons across my front (southern trenches). Lt Addison then ordered me at about midnight 10/11th April to retire to the X roads at La Croix Marmuse, and his detachment of A Squadron would cover my withdrawal. This was effected promptly and in order. On reaching the roads Lt Addison and myself conferred regarding the situation and decided, after gaining information (very meagre), to establish two strongpoints of ten men each, under Sergeants Blackburn A Squadron and Gladwish C
Squadron respectively, and to send a patrol under Corporal Perkins to reconnoitre eastwards to a depth of 500 yards. A shell crater converted into a foxhole by troops of the 51st Division. (IWM Q6500)
Lt Addison established his post and placed his supports, both A and C squadrons, at Farm House at X roads. On reaching my post I noticed that my position was not sufficiently commanding and sent a patrol under Corporal Jones to reconnoitre a line of hedges to my front, with a view to occupation, at the same time reported to Lieut Addison my intention. Whilst Lieut Addison was coming towards me and my patrol was returning, my post was heavily fired upon by machine-guns from the north. I promptly withdrew to the road under cover, where Lieut Addison gave me instructions to occupy the second farmhouse on the left of the road from X roads. He informed me that he would send me the supports and see Lt Col Scott and obtain more men to back me up, as his post (Sgt Blackburn) was in danger of being cut off. My occupation of the farmhouse brought machine-gun fire from three sides so I decided to withdraw to the X roads. Pte Hartley A Squadron, who had secured a Lewis gun from a fleeing Portuguese, had placed this gun in position at the X roads covering the northern approach. Soon afterwards a party of about twenty-nine Bosche in column of fours approached the X roads and, not replying to a challenge by Sgt Moir,
delivered at five or ten yards, got the contents of Hartley’s gun. Casualties were inflicted on the enemy who dispersed, whilst Hartley, now joined by Pte Grundy, removed the gun, which had jammed, and endeavoured to collect more ammunition, but were unsuccessful; subsequently they destroyed the gun. About the same moment of opening fire, I placed my party, numbering twenty-five men, in a fine position along the road western exit of X roads, so as to cover any further retirements and because hostile Very lights and machine-gun fire were coming from that direction. I could not gain touch with Lt Addison and, during the rearguard action, which developed in intensity, I collected and placed all the stragglers of other units (about 150 men) in position lining the ditches along the road westward. I covered the retirement with two machine-guns I had collected, and a fair proportion of my mixed command, until I reached a prepared line of defence occupied by Seaforths and Gordons at and along the front of road running NW from the X roads at 6 am on the morning of 11th April. Ammunition by this time had run right out and men were withdrawing in all directions under no control from the front. I immediately assisted in collecting some hundreds of stragglers and placing them in the trenches; ordering others to dig themselves in, and in obtaining and issuing as much ammunition as was available.
North of the Lys The previous day the Germans had forced the crossing of the Lys at Bac St Maur and were still pressing hard towards the bridge at Pont Levis near Estaires which had, by accident, been left unguarded overnight. Though a small post was established at the bridge at dawn, some troops of the German 35th Division managed to effect a crossing. The 6th Northumberland Fusiliers mounted a counter-attack and almost reached the bridge but the Germans continued to dribble men across, supported by trench mortars, and pushed into the town and beyond. In spite of fierce street fighting, the Germans had cleared the town by early evening and the defenders fell back to an old trench line 1,100 metres from the river, where they repulsed a German attack at 1800 hrs. Having secured their bridgehead, the Germans began improvising more bridges but did not further press their attack. At Bac St Maur the Germans had brought reinforcements over the river during the night and rapidly set about expanding the bridgehead. By mid-afternoon they had pushed 74 Brigade back beyond the Steenwerck. South of the town, Royal Artillery batteries fired over open sights against advancing German troops, before 88 Brigade of the 29th Division, then being brought up as reinforcements, managed to create a thin but coherent front line. East of Estaires, around Sailly, 150 Brigade was still holding the northern end of Sailly bridge, but during the late morning German troops from the Estaires and Bac St Maur bridgeheads began to threaten both flanks. Expecting imminent reinforcements from the 29th Division, the troops held out but there was confusion at divisional headquarters and the reinforcements were not ordered up until 150 Brigade, which had held the bridge almost all day, had been forced back to a defensive line 900 metres from the river. As a result of the German success to the north, orders were given by First Army early in the day for the evacuation of Armentières. The 34th Division troops were still holding the salient, but it took some time for orders to reach the various brigades in the line. The men of 102 Brigade, who were directly to the east of the town, managed to withdraw in good order; they were across the Lys by early evening, holding a line between Nieppe and the river. Having withdrawn to the outskirts of
Erquinghem during the morning 101 Brigade pulled back to the bridges, the stone one being blown while the foot-bridges served to evacuate most of the men. Unfortunately, German troops advancing along the north bank from Bac St Maur threatened to capture the footbridges so these too were destroyed, leaving some men on the south bank to be taken prisoner. Private Arthur Poulter of the 1/4th Duke of Wellington’s Regiment won the Victoria Cross in this action. His citation reads: When acting as a stretcher-bearer during the battle of Lys, [Poulter] carried badly wounded men on his back through heavy machine-gun and artillery fire on ten separate occasions. During the withdrawal over the River Lys, he ran back under fire and brought in a wounded man who had been left behind. He then bandaged forty men under the same heavy fire and was dangerously wounded when attempting another rescue. Unfortunately, 103 Brigade, which held the centre part of the salient, did not receive the order to withdraw until late afternoon, by which time several of the bridges they had intended to use were being swept by German machine-gun fire or had already been blown. They managed to work their way through the deserted town, clashing with a German patrol en route, and crossed the Lys by the town’s old bridge. One German patrol, hot on their heels, took cover behind some boxes on the approach to the bridge, not realising that they were full of Mills bomb hand-grenades. The British concentrated their fire on the boxes themselves, much to the Germans’ discomfort as they began to detonate!
Private Arthur Poulter, of the 1/4th Duke of Wellington’s Regiment, who won the Victoria Cross on 10 April 1918 carrying wounded men under fire at Erquingham.
T he Battl e of Me s s i ne s North of Armentières an intense barrage began at 0230 hrs and, as on the day before in the south, it concentrated on batteries, headquarters, roads and back positions, before switching to the front line for the last 15 minutes. Using concealed bridges (built so that they were actually below the surface of the river) to get across the Lys, German troops moved swiftly through the early morning mist and infiltrated the British line. There was heavy fighting but Ploegsteert Wood fell during the morning and the southern part of Messines Ridge, in spite of counter-attacks, had fallen by nightfall.
T he Si tuati on at the End of the Day In spite of their best endeavours, the British had failed to prevent the Germans exploiting their crossing of the Lys and forcing a crossing of the River Lawe. Reinforcements were coming up, but it was going to be touch and go. The troops of the 51st and 40th Divisions were particularly exhausted. The German advance north of Armentières had already taken much of the ground captured in the Messines battle of 1917. On the positive side, Armentières had been successfully evacuated and its garrison added to the troops trying to contain the German bridgehead at Bac St Maur.
Chapter Five
11 APRIL: THE FALL OF VIEILLE CHAPELLE German attacks, under cover of heavy shelling, were made against the 55th Division’s far left flank, close to the River Lawe. At 1000 hrs the 1/4th South Lancs, who were holding the line on the east bank of the Lawe, came under attack and were forced back north of Mesplaux Farm. A counter-attack by a company of pioneers and a company of Northumberland Fusiliers restored the position. A heavy bombardment fell all along the 55th Division’s front all day and German units were reported as massing in the Old British Line but divisional artillery inflicted heavy casualties. At about 1500 hrs a German attack developed against Festubert East Keep and both the Cailloux keeps which were all captured. A counter-attack by the 5th and 13th King’s Liverpools, who had come up from the reserves, soon retook Festubert East Keep, and a little later troops from Festubert itself succeeded in recapturing Cailloux Keep. On the night of 11 April a German patrol got caught up in the wire in the front of Z Company, Liverpool Scottish, and a badly wounded German was found trapped in it. Before he died he revealed that a major attack was to made at dawn but the heavy artillery rained a barrage down on all the likely enemy forming-up points and no attack developed.
Map 3: The Lawe defences, 11 April 1918.
The remaining troops in the Vieille Chapelle bridgehead, under Captain Christie, continued to hold their positions east of the main village and frustrated several German attempts to capture the bridge, but by the morning of 11 April matters were becoming desperate. After his release from Germany, Lieutenant Stein described how he was captured: During the night 10/11th an RE Officer and Corporal arrived to demolish [the] bridge but were unable to start work, as we had to send for the explosives which they had not been able to bring with them. Morning 11th heavily shelled, 4.30 am – 6 am. Sent runner to 152 Brigade for situation report. Reply was that our flanks were intact. The RE Officer proceeded to prepare the bridge for demolition. About 7 am liaison patrols we had sent out returned and reported no one on our left but enemy and situation doubtful on our right, also that some of our infantry were holding a line N of Zelobes. Capt Christie decided to withdraw to Zelobes when the bridge was demolished. This was successfully done at 9 am. Our troops commenced to withdraw across a small footbridge to Zelobes. I stayed in rear to see everyone out of the village. I then followed with an officer of the MG Coy who was covering the retirement. As soon as I left the village I saw that Capt Christie, his Coy and B Squadron were surrounded. We therefore decided to try to cut across behind them but we were soon surrounded and captured. As far as we could see, excepting ourselves, there was no one but enemy in sight.
British troops ready to stop the German breakthrough.
Lieutenant Laurenson was in the main party, which consisted of about 50 men: At about 10 am [on] the 11th the bridge was blown up and we then tried to get back but found ourselves completely surrounded. We were forced into a farmyard near the Fosse—Locon road where we continued to fight for a time but owing to casualties and the impossibility of getting through the enemy who were in great force, we were given the order to surrender by Capt. Christie. Most of the men had been wounded, either during the crossing of the Lawe or while moving down the road into the farmyard; Christie himself had been hit twice. Lieutenant Pinckney had foreseen that the
unit would become trapped and led two or three men of his troop north along the riverbank in an attempt to escape. They failed, and were never seen again. However, Corporals Brazier and Payne, who covered the withdrawal with the one remaining Hotchkiss gun, did manage to escape. The German attack south of Lestrem against the 51st Division’s troops resumed at 1630 hrs and advanced rapidly, the situation becoming horribly confused for the freshly trained British troops who found themselves up against an experienced enemy who infiltrated their positions and enfiladed their pathetic lines of fortified shell holes and gentle folds in the ground. The Official History records: As the flat ground behind the front was so swept by fire that little ammunition could be brought up, the British rifle fire began to slacken and the troops were slowly forced back, becoming ever weaker in numbers, especially in officers. Gradually battalions disintegrated into a chain of small parties, which it was almost impossible to control ... the front line of the First Army, except where whole reinforcing divisions came up, continued to dwindle in density. It was often no more than a chain of small posts or single men, sometimes twenty yards apart, and ‘fluid’, that is unstable, with parts of it shifting their positions. Entrenching, too, proved difficult work as there was a shortage of spades, whilst digging was of little avail as water was found a foot below the surface. Lieutenants Moffat and Addison with their King Edward’s Horse detachment were dug in a couple of hundred metres behind the main line when it broke: To my immediate front (north) Scottish troops were rushing backwards under heavy machine-gun fire from the farmhouses in front. This rush of troops and stragglers almost created a panic along our whole front line but Lieutenant Addison, Capt Sutherland of the Seaforths and myself immediately ordered all men along our line to hold fast and under no circumstances to give way. When the tide reached us we checked them and ordered them to occupy all available trenches so as to prevent them from communicating their terror to the lines behind us, where other infantry were engaged in digging in, in the frenzied haste which the situation demanded. Our own King Edward’s Horse men immediately grasped the situation and opened a rapid fire upon the farmhouses into which the Boche had penetrated on the heels of the scared infantry. This action calmed the situation and soon the Highlanders were merrily joining in with rifle and Lewis guns against the same target.
Lieutenant Noel Addison MC, King Edwards Horse. A citizen of Natal, he was studying at Oxford on the outbreak of the war; already a KEH trooper, he was rapidly promoted. He was a keystone of the defence in the fighting between 9 and 11 April but was killed by shrapnel. Though his body was identified later, he now has no known grave. The men of the King Edward’s Horse detachment held together but, discovering at about 1400 hrs that they were unsupported on either flank, they withdrew by section, each platoon covering the other as they fell back, until they reached the new line, which was itself threatening to pull back. However, the arrival of the KEH men along the line was enough to steady it and the last 25 men were withdrawn in the early evening. At about 1400 hrs Lieutenant Addison had become separated from his men; he was never seen alive again. In August, when the Germans withdrew from the area, men from the King Edward’s Horse found his body in a grave south of Rue du Monde. His officer ’s record (WO 339/46422) says that the regiment was quite certain it was him, but he is recorded on the Loos Memorial to the Missing all the same. Lieutenant John MacDermott of the 51st Divisional Machine-Gun Corps slept the night of 10/11 April in his cottage. His experiences on 11 April were typical: I was awakened by the sound of shooting and the news that the enemy was across the Lawe and attacking. It was just daybreak outside and there was heavy morning mist everywhere, which limited visibility considerably and had obviously been exploited by the enemy to cover his advance. I saw some of our infantry lying in a shallow depression in the open, which slanted at an angle to the river and I joined them with my batman. But if we could not see the Germans they could see us and soon we had the chilly experience of being enfiladed by an enemy machine-gunner who remained invisible but was able to spray the depression we were lying in right along its length. Quite a number, including my batman lying next to me, were wounded and I had a
bullet through my trench coat, which neatly cut my electric torch in two without even scratching me. About then I saw another lad called Cromarty, from the Orkneys, and another member of my section who had been with the gun I had visited the previous afternoon. They had the gun with them, but not the tripod, and also a number of belt boxes. The ground over which the Germans advanced on 10/11 April on the west bank of the Lawe. There were more hedges in 1918 but it was just as flat, with no cover against bullets.
German troops operating a 08/15 light machine gun during their advance. I got to them at once. They had managed to get away when the Germans attacked but some members of the gun team had, they thought, been captured and they could save no more of the equipment than what they carried. In the conditions then prevailing, the ground we were on was quite defenceless and I thought the best course would be to take the gun to some point of vantage from which we might hold or at least delay the advance. Meantime there was no sign of the other gun or Corporal Telford and his team. Afterwards I found that they had got away, but the enemy had come on them so suddenly that all the corporal could do was take the lock out of the Vickers and throw it into the river. So, with Cromarty and the other member of the section and an infantryman who attached himself to us for a time and was very useful, we went in search of a defensible position. I recall going into one farm building to explore its possibilities when I was met by a Highlander coming out whose face was as white as a sheet,
though he had not been hit. The only reason for this that I could see confronted me when I entered what must have been the best bedroom. There, laid out in a great bed, was the body of an old lady laid out for her funeral. The shock of this scene lay in its complete incongruity with the death and violence that had been taking place outside. But the house was not what we wanted and we hurried through into its garden. There, perhaps a little over 200 yards away, was a small, one-storey cottage, standing at a crossroads, one of which ran in the direction from which the Germans were attacking and the other at right angles to it and in front of us. The cottage stood at one of the corners of the intersection, with one side along the road which pointed in the direction of the attack and the other abutting on the crossroads on our side of the crossing. We made for this little house and I thought it answered our purpose. The small garden had barbed wire over most of it. This had no virtue as an obstacle and meant that an effort to turn the cottage into a strongpoint must have been made a long time previously. But there were two recent shell holes in the garden and a fair field of fire towards the house we had just left and the ground where we had been shot up that morning. So we occupied the shell holes without delay and I mounted the gun in one of them. This was a simple operation as we had only the collapsible auxiliary mounting to use. We loaded and placed the belt boxes handy and waited with new hope, for the mist was lifting! After what seems now a short time we could see the enemy were in the house we had been in earlier and then they came out of it on our side. Here at last was a target and we shot it up effectively with a short burst. While I have never been a pacifist, I think I can claim that by nature and upbringing I was far from being a blood-thirsty person. Yet, I must confess, the lethal consequences of that burst had a most invigorating effect and I would have been tempted to throw my tin hat in the air had it not been fixed on my head by a stout chin strap. Now, at least for a time, the tables were turned. We could see and our tormentors of the dawn could not. But they soon lost this disadvantage. Their pattern of attack was to push out small patrols with a light machine-gun and these worked their way forward, taking cover when firing caught them and noting whence it came, then cautiously wormed their way on. It was skilfully done and it was not long before we were being shot at. Then I realised that at any rate some of these enemy patrols had been gathering behind a kind of agricultural store about 200 yards away and round which they were firing without presenting a good target. At first this was a problem, for the building seemed solid and strong. Then we saw its sides were either wood or corrugated iron and I fired several bursts through it. This brought us peace from that quarter for a time, but it was, I think, about then that another problem arose. The gun had got very hot and on examination we found it had been shot clean through the barrel casing, which had thus lost some of its cooling water. I knew what the book said [to do] in such a crisis and how to use one’s own supply if no fresh water was available. Cromarty knew all this too, for he was an excellent machine-gunner, and I asked him to get me a billy-can and take the necessary steps to fill it. He looked reluctant but produced the billy can promptly. Then to my horror he stood up in full view and walked back a few yards to the cottage. On his return, with the can full, I rebuked him as he got back into the shell hole and told him he might have been shot. But, like many Scottish islanders, he was a sensitive and modest soul and just said that he had noticed a pool as we came in to the place and had gone back to it. We then applied pads made
of clay and bits of cloth to each of the bullet holes and tied them tightly to the barrel casing by the only strong cord I could find, which was the string around my chest that kept my box respirator in position. After pouring in all that the billy-can held we loaded up again and for the next hour or so fired short bursts to keep the encroaching patrols at a distance. They were still there but cautious and getting harder to spot. My next problem arose when the importance of two obvious facts suddenly dawned upon me. We were down to our last fifty rounds and sooner or later the enemy was bound to come at us from the rear and along the road from the other side of the cottage which was out of our sight. So we had to go and the sooner the better! This meant getting out of the garden and over an ordinary barbed-wire fence on to the road behind the cottage. When I gave the word the others ran for the fence with the belt boxes and I followed with the gun. We were seen and came under quite a warm fusillade. I passed the gun to Cromarty, got over the fence and joined the others on the little pave road. Once there it was only a matter of seconds till we were all in the shelter of the cottage. But the relief was momentary as we then saw a body of German infantry marching along the road towards us. They were perhaps twenty or thirty strong and, I think, about 250 yards or so away. We lay flat on the pave, Cromarty helped me load the gun and I fired off, straight down the road, all the remaining fifty rounds of our last belt. Immediately the enemy disappeared. I saw no sign that any had been hit but they were off the road and taking cover and we got up at once with the gun and belt boxes and made down the road in the opposite direction. We had not gone very far, perhaps between a quarter and half a mile, when we came across an English battalion lying in a long line in a fold of the ground at right angles to the road we were on and to the right of it. We joined them, and looked back to see if any of the enemy had resumed their march, but there was no sign of them. I then explained our position to our new friends and sought news of our own B Company, which we were all most anxious to find. They had no information to give us but were helpful and willing to let us fill our empty gun belts from their clipped rifle ammunition. At this point I saw one of B Company’s sergeants approaching from our right as we faced the attack. He was Sergeant Brodie DCM, MM, an outstanding character whom I had met during the few days I had been with the Company. I think he may have been looking for us, but he never said so. He lay down beside me and must have realised how weary I was for he offered me a flask which he said contained some Portuguese brandy. I had been brought up on water and one sip of the fiery stuff was enough, for it nearly choked me. Then he proffered his water bottle which was full of cold, sweet tea. I took a long greedy draught and still think it was the most satisfactory drink I ever swallowed. Brodie had his Balmoral on instead of his tin hat and told me he thought he could show us the way to get to Company Headquarters. This was good news and I agreed to go back with him the way he had come. What remained of the gun team would bring the gun and belt boxes after us later, the reason I think being that they were still intent on the slow business of belt filling. It was a day of new experiences and we had not gone far before we ran into a regular storm of shrapnel, fired by our 18 pounders, with the shells bursting high above our heads. I then felt my tin hat a comfort for the first time. But Brodie looked
up, saw what was happening and seemed quite unconcerned. Presently we came to a spot where Brodie started to bear to the right. I had seen, some distance ahead, a low hill or knoll, covered with smallish trees on which our troops seemed to be collecting in two and threes, and I decided to go there and see if there was anything I could do; and so we went our separate ways. I am not sure that this was a wise decision for it led to further adventures which were much more exciting than useful, but it seemed to me the proper course at the time.
British Vickers machine gun team awaits the advancing Germans.
Troops of the 51st Division digging in. Note how flat and open the terrain is. (IWM Q6497)
The hill was not far, but I found on the way a wounded man who could go no further. I tried to help him cross a little stream with steep banks but had to carry him over. It was an awkward crossing and I felt at the end of my strength when four Jocks passed by on their way and readily relieved me of my burden. Just outside the trees I saw a small officer standing there who wore the badges of the RAMC and I asked him to look at the casualty. This he did, but could only say that he had gone. He then noticed my MG lapel badges and asked if I was a machine-gunner. When I told him I was, his eyes brightened, he discussed the Vickers in very knowledgeable terms and said he was almost through his medical course when he had joined up in Australia and had served as a machine-gunner until the authorities discovered his student career and sent him back to get his medical qualifications. Doing this, however, had clearly not cooled his ardour as a combatant and his conversation lives in my memory as remarkable for its enthusiasm and also because of the occasion, as we were standing in full view of the enemy! This became even more painfully evident a little later when I had entered the trees in search of the senior officer. Suddenly a machine-gun was giving us its full attention. I threw myself into a space and flattened myself as close as I could get to mother earth. I remember watching an insect climbing up a blade of grass and noticing my head was almost touching the shoulder of a burly Highlander. Like many of those German MG attacks it was vicious while it lasted but was not renewed – I suppose because the Germans were usually more saving of their ammunition. Then a lieutenant-colonel of the Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders asked was anyone hit and my close neighbour
said he thought he had got it in the back. We took off his jacket and pulled up his shirt revealing the score made by a bullet which had not penetrated and had caused little more than superficial damage. The Colonel looked at the wound and then addressing the man by name said he could clear off to a dressing station. For a moment I thought this a bit lenient, but then caught sight of six wound stripes on the chap’s sleeve and concluded that his commanding officer was in the best position to judge. Not long afterwards I saw to my great relief the faithful Cromarty and his team mate – their infantry helper had apparently departed – coming towards us with the gun and belt boxes. I told the Colonel of their arrival and asked if we could be of any service. I doubt if he was much more than out of his twenties, but he made a lasting impression upon me by his courtesy and determination. He thanked me, said he was going to try to hold the ground in front and asked me to help stop the enemy if they approached next morning across the open fields. I noticed that several great binds, perhaps three or four feet high, ran across one of these fields. They were potato banks and I got my small party down and dug in behind one of them, putting the gun on top in a slight depression where we would have a good field of fire and see rather better than at ground level. It was still daylight and I went back to a house, which I found was Headquarters of an infantry company. I was kindly received and given a bunk for an hour or two. After a refreshing nap I awoke to find the light going and went back to the gun for the hours of darkness. Though itself badly mauled in the Somme fighting in March, the 39th Division, which had been withdrawn from the line to rest and recover, was moving up in support of the 51st Division. Its advanced units, the 1/5th Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry (two companies) and the 2/6th Royal Warwicks, had taken up positions to the rear of the initial front line and their presence gave the retreating troops something to fall back on. Though the Brigade and Battalion War Diaries strive to see some kind of order in the situation retrospectively, it is clear that the young, fresh troops, though well trained and initially enthusiastic, were finding it almost impossible to cope with close-range machine-gun fire with little cover, and that the dwindling number of experienced officers, men and NCOs were having difficulty in keeping the new men together. By the end of the day the British line (for want of a better term) had been pushed back over 1,800 metres and now ran north to south from a small stream named La Vieille Lys, east of Calonne down through what is now the eastern end of the airport and parallel to the Paradis road (D175), though 450 metres to the west of it. Like Lieutenant MacDermott, the troops settled down for the night warily.
North of the Lys German attacks north of the Lys began at 0430 hrs, pushing forward large masses of troops westward along the northern bank of the river and along the road towards Neuf Berquin. Although British reinforcements were being brought up, the front line repeatedly crumbled and fell back. Isolated units fought virtually to the last man - the 2nd South Wales Borderers were reduced to a single officer and 15 other ranks - and there were local counter-attacks but the whole line was gradually forced back. In places the front line consisted of individual men 20 metres apart. By 1900 hrs, as the Official History states, ‘there was considerable doubt where the front line lay’. Lieutenant-Colonel J. ForbesRobertson, the commanding officer of the 1st Border Regiment, made a personal reconnaissance and then led a courageous counter-attack. The citation for his Victoria Cross reads:
On one occasion, having made a reconnaissance on horseback in full view of the enemy under heavy fire, he led a counter-attack which was completely successful in establishing our line. When his horse was shot under him he continued on foot, steadying the men and inspiring confidence by his disregard for personal danger. The Germans began to enter Merville at about 1930 hrs. The bridges there were blown by the Royal Engineers, while a thin line of scattered posts was established east and north of the town. North of Armentières the Germans attacked south of Ploegsteert Wood and captured the village of Le Romarin, in spite of counter-attacks. The vital observation post of Hill 63, north of the wood, was captured in the late afternoon. Wytschaete held out all day, though there was some shortening of the line in the early evening.
Lieutenant-Colonel James Forbes-Robertson who won a Victoria Cross near Berquin, 12 April 1918.
Lieutenant-Colonel James Forbes-Robertson winning his Victoria Cross leading a counter-attack on horseback near Vieux Berquin on 12 April 1918.
Chapter Six
12 APRIL: THE BREAKTHROUGH CONTAINED – JUST The Battlefield Nomenclature Committee decided that the first three days of the battle of the Lys would be known as the ‘battle of Estaires’ and that it ended on 11 April. To the men on the ground the idea that one battle had stopped and another one had started would have appeared absurd. Givenchy, apart from some shelling, was once again left alone and an attack on 165 Brigade in the evening was beaten off easily. It was on the 51st Divisional front that a near-total collapse threatened a German breakthrough. The thin British line ran north to south parallel to the modern D178, west of La Paradis. The advanced units of the 39th Division, namely the 1/5th Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry (two companies) and the 2/6th Royal Warwicks, were on the left of the line. Remnants of the brigade headquarters’ troops mixed in with the depleted Highland infantry battalions held the remainder of the line. Patrols from the Warwicks had gone forward to warn of an attack but never returned. The 51st Division’s artillery, supported by an Australian artillery brigade (XII), was now able to offer good supporting fire from positions 1,800 metres behind the line. The German plan for the sector was to break through and capture Calonne and great stress was placed on a rapid advance. At Pacaut the Germans achieved a breakthrough that threatened this whole section of the front. A German account reads: The companies, under cover of darkness, crawled forward and succeeded in getting quite close to the enemy. At 4.45 am the I/68th opened fire with trench mortars and rose to the assault at 5 am precisely. Ten minutes earlier the enemy had opened a barrage, but the whole of it fell on the main street of Paradis, that is behind the German front line. II/68th also assaulted.
A Royal Artillery battery brings its 60-pounders into action during the Allied retreat.
The enemy was obviously surprised; his front line was easily overrun. A battalion staff and about 30 men were captured by II/68th. The enemy offered lively resistance from his rearward machine-gun nests, but one after the other they were silenced and one strongpoint after another was taken. Pacaut was soon captured; by 6.40 am even the III Battalion had passed through it. By 6.30 am Quentin [3 kilometres west of Paradis] was also in German hands. Once again the Germans made superb use of stormtrooper tactics, infiltrating machine-gun teams between the British lines and firing flares from the rear to disconcert the troops. The major commanding the 2/6th Royal Warwicks recorded: At about 5 am artillery fire noticeably increased to the south. 5.15 – 5.20 am Capt B.K. Parson reported our troops retiring past [battalion headquarters]. I went to investigate
and found a large number going backwards, did my best to stem the retreat and succeeded in throwing a few into trenches with some men of C Coy. Enemy Very lights were falling between [headquarters] and the nearer buildings of Pacaut and were some 500 yards distant on the left. MG fire opened from the general direction of Pacaut – well in enfilade and sweeping our men retiring. I went into [headquarters] and burned my maps and plans and attempted to send a warning to 153 Bde but found the lines gone. I went out again and found the troops had disappeared. The battalion began to fall back north and west towards les Rues des Vaches, as Very lights were going up from the direction of La Pierre au Beure and there was machine-gun fire coming from that direction. Under covering fire from parties in La Pierre au Beure itself and on the railway line, the main body fell back, picking up some stragglers from the Royal Scots along the way. Attempts to dig in were frustrated by close-range machine-gun fire from enemy patrols on the left flank. The 2/7th Warwicks had taken up positions covering the river Clarence crossings the day before and the remnants of the 2/6th Warwicks were able to pass through them; the two battalions then dug in and held the northern bank of the river Clarence together. A patrol of King Edward’s Horse under Lieutenant Lade had been sent up to 152 Brigade headquarters overnight and Lade himself had gone up to the front line to see if he could find the missing Lieutenant Addison. At about 0450 hrs he had reached nearly the outskirts of Paradis when long-range machine-gun fire began from his left and
Retreating before the rapidly advancing Stormtroopers.
at the same time large numbers of Machine-Gun Corps and RAMC men came streaming down the road quite out of control. They were followed by a party of the Warwicks, at least seventy strong, and in every direction men from various units were hurrying back unchecked, with that look on their faces, which it was bad to see. An attempt by Lade to rally them was met with a cry of ‘Shoot the blighter!’ and a further stampede as a machine-gun opened up nearby. Regaining his patrol, Lade met up with three King Edward’s Horse orderlies who had been attached to 152 Brigade headquarters. They told him that the headquarters personnel had almost certainly been captured or killed (Brigadier-General Dick-Cunnynghame and his entire staff were in fact taken prisoner) and the general himself had told them to escape. Sending a rider to regimental headquarters at Bellerive, Lade and the rest of the patrol rode to divisional headquarters at Robecq to alert them, before riding to the regiment with instructions to them to ‘ride like the wind’ and secure the various bridges across La Bassée Canal before the Germans could reach them. The divisional artillery suddenly found itself under close-range fire. Both A and B Batteries of 255 Brigade near Riez de Vinage managed to limber up and get away across La Bassée Canal to the south, though with heavy casualties among their horses. C and D Batteries had all their horses killed before
they could get their guns limbered up, but the men stood and fought to cover the retreat of their comrades. The gunners of 256 Brigade RFA received some warning of the German breakthrough from the officers of 153 Brigade, who had themselves only just managed to escape when their headquarters was attacked. Gathering together as many stragglers as they could find, they formed a fire line that gave the gunners some covering fire as they tried to extricate their guns. With the Germans less than 275 metres distant, and the guns being fired by direct observation, the artillery was limbered up, with Sergeant Illidge distinguishing himself by cutting free several dead and wounded horses from their traces. Lieutenant McFarlane of the battery was last seen firing his revolver into the enemy at almost point-blank range. Covered by parties of stragglers and some of their own gunners, 12 Australian Army Brigade RFA managed to get their guns away through Robecq. Across the fields behind them streamed groups of infantry heading for the crossings of the river Clarence. The few remaining officers and NCOs tried repeatedly to rally them and form a new line, but the Germans pressed home their attacks vigorously.
British 18-pounder team limbered up and pulling out when their position becomes threatened by the German advance. Lieutenant John MacDermott of the 51st Division Machine-Gun Corps took part in the general withdrawal: When the dawn came at long last we noticed that the mist was not nearly as thick as it had been the morning before and we were able to see a patrol marching across our front at least 200 yards away. This vanished after we fired a burst or two at it; but the threat of attack must have been stronger than we knew, for we soon received a message to retire to a position some way back, which lay a little in front of a wood. We got there without trouble and lay down in a line which seemed to consist mostly of
infantry. Then, as the day brightened, the snipers became very active indeed. I raised my head on several occasions to try and see where they were but every time drew fire so closely that I had to lie down without finding a trace of the enemy. A little later, on looking round to my left, I saw, perhaps fifty yards away, and a little to the rear, several raised emplacements which appeared to offer a better view and some protection. I walked over without any interference and to my astonishment found four Vickers guns mounted on their tripods, each with a separate emplacement and a full belt box at hand; but of gun teams or officers there was not a sign. I went to the first, loaded it and looked for some sign of a sniper but again quite in vain. Then my eye caught sight of a low and fairly distant hill with enemy troops moving down it in small separated columns – what the British army of that day termed ‘Artillery Formation’. This was not the target I wanted but I put 2,000 yards on the gun sights and fired off a belt. I think my guess of the range must not have been so far out, for once more the marchers just seemed to disappear. Then, as no other sniper obliged by making a target of himself, I went back to my place in the line. There I heard the sad news that the Colonel of the Argylls I had spoken to the day before had been shot through the head and some time after that grave loss we were told to retreat into the wood in successive groups. This drew a lot of fire and when it came to our turn my stiff ankle (which was much improved) did not prevent me from getting to the trees in good time. There were casualties and I heard a lot of loud smacks as bullets struck the flesh of those retreating. I now found myself in a quandary about what to do. I saw no sign of reorganisation and came to the conclusion that my best course would be to get to what looked like a village, or the outskirts of some town and try and find out where B Company’s Headquarters were to be found. But I could not expect Cromarty and his mate to come along with all their weighty gear so, as I recall the arrangement, they were to follow and I would try to pick them up on theway back if I could, but if they found out how to get to Company Headquarters they were to go there on their own.
British 18-pounder field gun is being brought into position to defend this canal bridge.
Spreading out after their initial breakthrough, parties of Germans captured several of the small villages and farms between La Bassée Canal on the left and the river Clarence on the right. Their official account says: The attack went on without a pause. The advance was extraordinarily quick, the troops doing their best to keep on the heels of the retiring enemy. All hostile artillery fire had ceased and batteries were found abandoned. The 5th Company pressed on into La Pierre au Beure; one group disarmed the men they found in an isolated farm, who turned out to be a brigade staff: a general and seven officers. Five other officers and 192 men were also taken at La Pierre au Beure. By 8.30 am the second company had occupied the western edge of La Pierre au Beure and the road which leads northwards to Bacquerolles Farm. On its right a small party had reached a position 500 yards east of the Clarence river, from the north bank of which it received heavy machine-gun fire. Further south, Riez de Vinage was occupied by the leading men of all companies of the I and II/68th, their total strength at midday totalling four officers, four NCOs
and fifty-six men (including three light machine-gun crews) with three heavy machine-guns. There were only 400 rounds left for each machine-gun and only fifty for each man. One party of the I/68th went even further, right up to the houses of Carvin [on the Clarence 1.6 kilometres north-east of Robecq]. A patrol got into the outskirts of Robecq and reported the enemy was retiring.
Portugese retreating near Merville
Men of the 1st Black Watch at Lapugnoy in April 1918. Fortunately for the remnants of the 51st Division, more troops of the 61st Division were moving up and occupying the River Clarence line. In particular 182 Brigade had been detailed to hold the river and at 0930 hrs reported that 400 Field Company, Royal Engineers was holding part of the line with the assistance of stragglers from the 51st Division. By 1000 hrs the 2/4th Royal Berks were in Robecq with the 2/4th Ox and Bucks on their left. The Clarence is neither wide nor deep, but becomes sufficient of an obstacle when defended. Though it is not stated in the German account, one cannot help but feel that the speed of their advance had outstretched their resources. The fighting settled down to sniping as the troops dug in along the banks of the river. Lieutenant John MacDermott completed his solitary retreat and seems to have managed to reach Robecq: My journey was more exciting than I anticipated. After getting clear of the wood I saw an officer sitting in the lee of a rock on the other side of a slight depression. I went over to him, thinking he might be from the 51st and asked did he know where their B
Company MGC was. He had no idea, but pointing to the place I had just passed said, ‘Be very careful, there’s a sniper on that spot’. He spoke the truth. I escaped a nearmiss and hugged the ground to avoid if I could its successors. The little depression was my salvation. The sniper had three or four more shots at me and I could see the flick of the grass near my toes. Then after a little the entertainment seemed to be over and I got up and walked off. This had happened both with sharp shooters and machinegunners, as though their sense of duty ended with a good try. And it was to happen again just before I reached my journey’s end. This time I was walking on a small road which was level with the field on my left when a German machine-gunner got me in his sights and, with several bursts, forced me off the road to shelter in a little steepsided stream, which had perhaps three or four inches of water in it. I held myself above the surface by pushing hands and feet against the sides. But suddenly I slipped and got soaked from the waist down. This was most annoying and there was nothing to do except get up and get out and on my way. This I did and, again, there was no more show of hostility from my assailant!
Manning a shallow trench these kilted warriors await the grey-clad hordes. When I arrived at the buildings I had seen I had no difficulty in finding some staff officers to whom I told my tale, though I don’t think it shed much light on the prevailing confusion. But they knew where B Company Headquarters was and told me how to get there. I then retraced my steps; but there was no sign of the wounded gun or its trusty attendants. They had found their own way back to Company Headquarters and there, to my great relief, I found them a little later. It was the 12th April and my 22nd birthday. At several moments of acute fear during its course I had thought it would also be my last; but with a friendly welcome, a decent meal and a good night’s rest, hope revived and I soon felt none the worse after the toil and muddle and excitement of it all. I had, however, to make a new hole in my Sam Browne belt (which was worn in action in those days) for lack of food had made me even more miserably thin than I normally was and my reduced waistline did not fill out to its ordinary size until the summer.
On the west bank of the River Lawe the German 18th Reserve Division attacked suddenly, under cover of a heavy barrage, at Locon, which finally fell in the mid-afternoon. As the Germans pressed forward from their original breakthrough at Pacaut the thin British line fell back but maintained a front linking the River Lawe to La Bassée Canal near Hinges.
A German account of the day states: In the northern part of the battlefield the renewed attack, with the effective support of artillery, had led to the capture of Calonne by parts of the II/68th, III/68th and the left wing of the 28th Regiment which had attacked through Bouzateux Farm. After lively house-to-house fighting, a passage over the Clarence was achieved at 10.30 am. The bridge was found undamaged and about 11 am the western edge of Calonne was occupied. Major Furse of the King Edward’s Horse ordered Lieutenant Rich to ‘go hell for leather across country, drive back the enemy and hold the eastern bridge at all costs’. He arrived at the bridge at the eastern end of les Harisoins to find the enemy being held back by the two remaining guns of a whole artillery brigade that had been based at the village of Riez de Vinage, to the north of the canal. Taken totally by surprise, the gunners had managed to get away with only two guns, which were being worked by bootless gun crews and officers dressed only in their pyjamas. Nevertheless, they prepared to hold the crossing. Rich’s troopers’ few rifles seem to have tipped the balance and the Germans fell back into Riez de Vinage. The King Edward’s Horse troops secured the bridge and the other canal crossings even though, behind them, soldiers and civilians were clogging the roads in retreat. Meanwhile 76 Brigade and a number of small units, including 404 Field Company, Royal Engineers and some divisional pioneers, formed a line along the southern bank of the canal and linked up with the 61st Division at Robecq. The southern flank was secured. North of the Lys, a planned counter-attack to recapture Merville, which had fallen to the Germans during the night, was cancelled. The exhausted troops of the 50th Division fell back slowly in the face of German attacks that were not pressed home vigorously.
Chapter Seven
THE LATER BATTLE On 13 April the 55th Division decided to recapture Route A Keep, in order to remove the threat to its left flank. X Company, Liverpool Scottish and D Company, 13th King’s Liverpools were detailed for the assault. During the day 60- and 18-pounder guns, as well as trench mortars, registered the Keep and some ruins immediately to its south which the Germans had occupied. At 2300 hrs the men of X Company moved to their assembly position and, as soon as the barrage lifted, rushed the ruins, taking the occupants by surprise, killing five and capturing nine. They quickly consolidated but could hear the sounds of fighting continuing around the Keep. Captain McSwiney went forward to find that only the southern part of the Keep had been captured, that both D Company officers were wounded and that the troops had run out of hand grenades, vital in trench fighting. McSwiney quickly sent for more grenades, organised several bombing parties and sent them forward into the attack. By 0330 hrs the whole Keep was in British hands and a weak German counter-attack was easily beaten off. The Official History describes the Keep as ‘a veritable shambles; for it had not only changed hands four times, but repeated attacks on it had failed’.
Battle of the Lys April 1918 13th April The German counter-attack had been meant to be a surprise. However, Lieutenant-Colonel Munro and Second Lieutenant G.N. Rome had visited the Keep shortly after its capture and, at 0400 hrs they started to walk back to Festubert, with two other ranks, along Route A. Not far from the Keep they walked straight into a group of ten Germans, to the total surprise of both parties. Reacting instinctively, Munro lashed out with his cane and caught one German round the head before joining his colleagues in a dash for safety. The surprised Germans reacted by throwing grenades rather than using their rifles, giving the British a chance to escape, though Munro received shrapnel wounds in his buttocks and Rome took a bullet through the hand. The warning they were able to give the Keep garrison enabled Captain McSwiney to get his defences ready for the attack. In the early hours of 13 April a patrol from Y Company at Cailloux Keep South brought in a badly wounded German warrant officer. He had been wounded on 11 April but had pleaded with a British patrol to be allowed to stay out in the hope that his own people would find him and take him in. He had not been found and was obviously suffering, so he was taken to battalion headquarters on a
stretcher. As he lay awaiting attention, a German deserter, who had walked across to the British lines, was also brought in. ‘It did one good to see the undisguised contempt of the warrant officer, exhausted and suffering as he was, for this little skrimshanker,’ recorded the battalion historian.
The divisional artillery itself under fire during the attack of 18 April, drawn by Colonel Rettie of the 55th Divisional Artillery. Further German attacks against the southern flank were easily repulsed. Along the river Clarence, to the north of Robecq, troops of XI Corps beat off, with rather more difficulty, several attempts to penetrate their line of posts along the river. Elsewhere, continuing pressure enabled the Germans to capture Neuve Eglise and make further advances around Bailleul. Around Ypres itself British troops began an orderly withdrawal from the top of Passchendaele ridge to a shorter line closer to the town. On 14 April a small-scale British counter-attack drove the Germans back a few hundred metres in front of Robecq, and they were able to recapture some of the guns lost on 12 April; further German attacks on either bank of the Lys were also repulsed. There was fighting along most of the line, but British reinforcements were now arriving and a second line of defence was being prepared. On 15 April a German attack captured the Ravelsberg Ridge and Bailleul itself, and there were small-scale British operations along La Bassée Canal. On 16 April Meteren, west of Bailleul, was captured and a German breakthrough was only narrowly averted; further enemy attacks north of Bailleul were beaten off relatively easily but Wytschaete, on the Messines Ridge, was captured. British troops completed their withdrawal to a line close to Ypres itself. On 17 April the Germans launched a series of attacks against the line of hills south of the Ypres salient, Mont Noir, Mont Rouge and Mont Kemmel, but their attack was stopped at all points by heavy machine-gun fire. A further attack against the Belgians to the west of Ypres also broke down completely. French reinforcements took over sections of the line in the northern sector, including the strategically important Mont Kemmel. On 18 April the final German push in the southern sector was launched against the Givenchy –
Festubert line and La Bassée Canal. An artillery barrage similar to that of 9 April was brought down on the whole of the line between Givenchy and Robecq. Six German divisions were sent into the attack under cover of a thick mist. Under a creeping barrage German troops rushed Givenchy and the men of the 1st Division (1st Black Watch), who had only taken over the position 36 hours previously, had large parts of their position overrun before they were able to organise counter-attacks. Their counter-attacks did go in, supported by machine-gun fire from south of the canal, and by the end of the day only a small part of the village and some of the crater line remained in German hands.
The Allies finally halted the German attacks. Around Festubert the enemy managed to recapture Route A Keep and to break in around Le Plantin, where they met the 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment. Surrounded by four German battalions, the Glosters fought back-to-back, just as they had done at Alexandria in 1801; their courage on this day beat off the Germans and the battalion won twenty-five Military Medals in a matter of hours. It was recorded that at the end of the day’s battle the barrels of their Lewis guns had been worn smooth with constant firing. Counter-attacks by the battalion orderlies, signallers, cooks and batmen drove the Germans away from the left flank of the position, while troops from the Divisional Reserve reestablished the line at Le Plantin. An attempt was made by the Germans to cross Le Bassée Canal near Pacaut Wood, first by capturing the bridge and then by using pontoons and foot-bridges supported by bladders, but troops on the south bank shot them down and the attack faltered and then ceased. At the end of the day the Germans had made a few small gains, but their objectives of Hinges and Mont Bernenchon remained
well out of reach. In the northern sector a planned German assault on Mont Kemmel was broken up by heavy artillery as the men moved forward. However, British records do not mention a barrage and it appears the Germans blundered into their own artillery fire. There was a lull of several days in the fighting across the whole of the Lys front while the Germans made preparations for a new assault on Mont Kemmel. There were small actions around Givenchy, involving the capture, loss and recapture of Route A Keep (subsequently lost again and finally recaptured on 28 April), along La Bassée canal and north of the Lys around the Forest of Nieppe, but no significant German advances were made. On 25 April the German offensive resumed in the northern sector, between Bailleul and the Ypres—Comines Canal. The line was held by both British and French troops and the attack fell particularly on the French, whose artillery was virtually neutralised by gas shells. At 0600 hrs the assault fell on the French front-line trenches and German Alpine Corps troops were at the summit of Mont Kemmel in just over an hour. Mopping-up operations took a little while longer, but by midday the finest observation position on the whole Flanders front was safely in German hands, along with the villages at its base. Other German units captured positions around Dranoutre while British forces were pushed back along the northern part of the Messines Ridge, but a series of stands made by British units gradually exhausted the attack and a major breakthrough into the Ypres Salient’s rear area was prevented, though a sizeable dent was pushed into the southern part of the salient. Counter-attacks launched on 25/26 April were badly affected by torrential rain which soaked both the troops and the ground. Around Ypres itself Plumer ’s Second Army completed its withdrawal to the very walls of the city itself. On 29 April the final German assault of the battle of the Lys was launched in the vicinity of Mont Kemmel against the Scherpenberg and other hills overlooking the southern part of the Ypres Salient. Though initial alarmist reports suggested that the Germans had broken through, by the end of the day only small German gains were made. Wounded and exhausted British troops at an Advanced Dressing Station during the fighting at the Lys.
Erich Friedrich Wilhelm Ludendorff reached the conclusion on 30 April that the troops of his Fourth and Sixth Armies were no longer capable of continuing the attack. The battle of the Lys was over Unknown to the Allies, Ludendorff reached the conclusion on 30 April that the troops of his Fourth and Sixth Armies were no longer capable of continuing the attack. The battle of the Lys was over and Ludendorff now turned his attention to the south. The troops on the ground were unaware of any of this and stood prepared and waiting for further attacks that did not materialise. In the southern part of the battlefield the Germans had managed to drive themselves into a narrow salient bounded by La Bassée Canal in the south and the Forest of Nieppe in the north. It was an area of flat, wet ground dominated by Allied artillery. The Germans held it throughout the early and mid-summer of 1918, but to no advantage to themselves, and began a voluntary evacuation in August. By the end of August the 55th Division was back in the Givenchy area and recaptured the craters and Old British Line lost in April. The 46th (North Midland) Division was advancing to their north, and these two divisions recaptured much of the ground lost by the Portuguese on 9 April, including La Couture. By early October the 55th Division was advancing out of the area altogether – an advance that was to take them to Ath and an advance of over 80 kilometres in the final 80 days of the war. Casualty figures were calculated immediately after the event and, as the Official History states, ‘the various sets available do not seem always to agree, do not cover quite the same periods, and do not sometimes include all arms of the service’. The staff of the Army Historical Section had neither the time nor the manpower to analyse the figures in detail but produced figures of some 8,000 officers and men killed between 9 and 30 April, 42,250 officers and men wounded and 38,000 officers and men missing. They estimated that about 7 per cent of the missing had subsequently returned, giving a total casualty figure for the battle of 76,300. German casualty figures were estimated to be similar.
Chapter Eight
TOURS Walking round Givenchy The defence of Givenchy, perched on its small ridge and overlooking virtually the whole of the British line and back positions for miles, was absolutely essential for the defence of the entire area. The modern village has grown somewhat since 1918, when it consisted of a small nucleus of buildings around what is now the Mairie, with outlying farms. The walk starts at the monument to the 55th Division at the eastern end of the village (1), where the D167 turns sharply north towards Violaines. A short minor road leads off the corner to the Communal Cemetery and there is parking here for several cars. The monument takes the form of a cross standing 9 metres high with the motto ‘They Win or Die who wear the Rose of Lancaster ’ inscribed beneath, and the inscription ‘To the Memory of the 55th (West Lancashire) Division 1914— 1918’. Details of the division’s various battles are inscribed on one face of the plinth.
The monument to the 55th Division at Givenchy. START WALK HERE Built of Belgian granite in 1921, the monument was the work of Lille sculptor Edouard Baisine, and was constructed by the 55th Division Comrades Association on land donated by Monsieur and Madame Willerval. It was formally unveiled by Marshal Joffre in front of an honour guard of 55th Division veterans in uniform, in the presence of General Jeudwine and the Mayors of Liverpool,
Givenchy and several other local French towns. The divisional band played the division’s march ‘My love is like a red, red rose’ and the national anthems of Britain and France. Following speeches by the various dignitaries, Marshal Joffre went on to inaugurate Givenchy’s own memorial to its war dead. The whole day was judged a great success but unfortunately it soon came to light that the monument had been built without the official permission of the French Government. For six years the Imperial War Graves Commission patiently corresponded with the 55th Division’s Comrades Association, who seem to have spent most of the period ignoring it, before retrospective permission was finally obtained in 1929. Adjacent to the memorial, and looking out over the fields, is the Tunnellers’ Monument, unveiled in June 2010. It jointly commemorates all the Royal Engineer tunnellers who fought on the Western Front and William Hackett VC who won his Victoria Cross close by. Hackett was buried alive, with several comrades, when the Germans exploded the mine that created the Red Dragon Crater in 1916. When other tunnellers managed to reach them and rescue three men Hackett, who was a Nottinghamshire collier in civilian life, refused to leave the injured Thomas Collins, saying ‘I am a tunneller, I must look after the others first’. Before the rescuers could return the tunnel collapsed and Hackett and Collins lie under the fields still. Their resting place can be seen through a T cut in the memorial. A plaque with drawings of the tunnel and the attempted rescue explain the events of the day.
The Hill Trevor memorial in Givenchy, opposite the Orchard Farm Keep.
William Hackett VC. Close to the monument lies the Communal Cemetery (2), which contains two interesting graves from the Second World War. One is of a Red Army soldier buried under a Commonwealth War Graves headstone; the other is of Lieutenant George William Reginald Victor Coventry, 10th Earl of Coventry and a pre-war member of the Worcestershire Regiment, who was killed in the defence of the village on 27 May 1940 as the Germans forced the crossing of La Bassée Canal from the south. Turn right out of the cemetery, and the road soon becomes a track. In April 1918 the British frontline trench lay about half-way between the end of the small grove of trees by the monument and the place where the track makes an abrupt turn to the right (3). The top of the church at La Bassée can be seen in the distance. The German front line lay a couple of hundred metres in front of the bend in the track, approximately under the modern power line. Neither side held their front line very thickly, and raids into the German lines only a few days before 9 April had found their front-line trench empty. At the point where another track heads off round the edge of the wooded area the track recrosses the British line, which ran along the edge of the trees down to the canal. As you head towards the canal, with Givenchy on your right, Finchley Road and Orchard Road communication trenches would have snaked back to the second line of Oxford Terrace and Cambridge Terrace, much closer to what is now the edge of the village. The anti-tank gun that gave sterling support by firing shrapnel at pointblank range lay in front of the line of houses on your right (4). German troops broke through the front line along this section and moved rapidly west to cut off Givenchy from the canal, with plans to join up with other assault troops working round from the attack at Windy Corner.
On reaching the canal turn left, and walk along towards the bridge in the distance. A large sign bearing the number 63 marks the approximate site of Death and Glory Sap (5), which was on the spoil bank behind. The 55th Division heavy machine-guns on the opposite bank gave support to the sap as it held out during the morning, and it was from the railway embankment that machine-guns fired on the Germans who could be seen on the ground higher up on the left. Walk on along the towpath to the sign marked ‘300m Section Reservée’; this is the approximate spot of The Tortoise (6), the forward German sap. Retracing your steps along the towpath, go past the spot where the track joined it and continue towards the lock in the near distance. The British trench Cheyne Walk (7) ran alongside the towpath among the trees. The lock (8) is in the same place as the one that was there in 1918 but has been expanded to take larger traffic. A British trench line, Warrington Street, crossed the lock and allowed a certain amount of communication across the canal. Leaving the canal by the ramp beside the lock, turn right and follow the road round the sharp bend and up the hill. This road was there in 1918 but, with the exception of the large farm on the right-hand side half-way up (opposite the statue), there were no other buildings. A short distance up the slope on the left-hand side is a beautiful statue (9) commemorating the death of a British officer killed at Givenchy in 1914. The inscription reads: Close to this spot sleeps in eternal peace Hillyar George Edwin Hill Trevor, Lt Scots Guards, beloved only child of the Hon. George Edwyn and Ethel Hill Trevor, Brynkinalt, Chirk, England, killed while gallantly leading his men Dec 21 1914 aged 18 years. Unfortunately, neither Hill Trevor ’s surviving War Office Personal File (WO 339/11127) nor the battalion War Diary (WO 95/1263) give any details of the manner of his death. The War Diary merely records ‘Objective – to drive Germans east and establish ourselves in the old trenches at Rue D’Ouvery ... Heavy shelling across Canal. Attack began at 4.15 pm and took up position W of Givenchy. Killed Lt H G Hill Trevor.’ His body has never been recovered and he is commemorated on Panels 3 and 4 of the Le Touret Memorial to the Missing. Opposite the statue stands Orchard Farm (10), rebuilt on the same spot after the war. In the summer of 2007 it was painted white, with a red tile roof. Behind the farm there is still a small orchard and it was while defending Orchard Keep at its far end that Lieutenant Collin won his Victoria Cross. It is possible to see past the end of the building into the orchard but the land is private property and thus inaccessible. Gunner Siding, mentioned frequently in the reports of the fighting of 90 April, ran parallel to the road on the left-hand side, approximately under the power line visible between the houses.
The plaque commemorating the gift to Givenchy of its village hall from the people of Liverpool in 1924. A recent Mayor of Liverpool, on an official visit, was surprised to learn of this gift, which Liverpudlians seem to have forgotten.
The French war memorial at Givenchy. Unusually, it commemorates the defence of the village by both French and British troops. Follow the road to the centre of the village, where some new bungalow-style houses are being built on the right-hand side of the road. It was here, towards the top of the rise, that Mairie Keep was situated, though the current Mairie is on the left-hand side of the road near the church, in the Grand Place. Givenchy Keep (11) lay under the church, and it was from here that an underground passage,
dug by tunnellers, ran down to Moat Farm down the hill on the left and across to Bunny Hutch, a spur of which connected to Mairie Keep.
The dedication of the Memorial Hall in Givenchy in 1924. Badly damaged in the Second World War, it was again rebuilt with the aid of further contributions from the City of Liverpool. Near the church (not rebuilt until the 1950s and then in a modern style) is the communal war memorial (12), erected and dedicated at the same time as the 55th Divisional Monument in 1921. It shows a mourning woman, representing France, weeping over the graves of her children, with a rising sun in a symbol of hope. Though the names on the monument are all French, an inscription says that it is also ‘En Hommage public aux soldats des armies Britanniques et Francaises tombes dans le secteur de Givenchy’. From the church turn right and return to your car at the memorial, which is only 5 minutes’ walk away. The main point of interest on the walk back is the Memorial Hall, (13) which was donated to the village by the City of Liverpool in 1919 and completed in 1924, and still bears a plaque to that effect. The site of Moat House Farm Keep as it is today. Parts of the moat are still visible. The farm was not rebuilt after the war.
The farm used as a headquarters by the 4th Lancashire Fusiliers during the defence of Givenchy on 9 April 1918. Though close to the front line, the walls still stood almost to their full height – but the HQ was built into the cellar. Extended Walk
The headquarters of the 1/4th Loyal North Lancaster Regiment, built into the cellar of the farm. This photograph was taken in early 1918 and clearly shows that buildings close to the front line were still standing. (IWM Q6470)
From the church walk down the slight hill. On the right-hand side about half-way down the slope you will pass the remains of Moat Farm (14), visible through the wire fence. This was never rebuilt after the war and a small part of the original moat is still visible. It is possible to see the field of fire that the farm commanded across the open ground towards Windy Corner. The range of posts known as the Old British Line are marked by the base of the slope. At the bottom of the slope on the left-hand side stands a large red-brick farmhouse (15). This was still standing more or less intact at the start of the battle and housed, in its cellars, the headquarters of the 1/4th Loyal North Lancashires. Though the Germans got close enough to throw grenades at the entrances, it never fell and was a lynch-pin in the defence. The road junction ahead was known as Windy Corner (16) throughout the war and was one of the targets for the Germans on 9 April. By capturing this junction and linking up with the troops advancing around Givenchy and between the village and the canal, they hoped to isolate Givenchy itself. Troops were then to press forwards toward Gorre and along the canal towards Bethune. Opposite the road to Givenchy a small side road leads to the Guards Military Cemetery (17) a couple of hundred metres away. The original cemetery was begun by the 2nd Division in January 1915, and it was used extensively by 4 (Guards) Brigade in and after February 1915. It was closed at
the end of May 1916, when it contained 681 graves. After the Armistice more than 2,700 graves were brought in from the neighbouring battlefields - in particular from the battlefields of Neuve Chapelle, Aubers Ridge and Festubert - and from various small cemeteries. It now contains 3,443 burials and commemorations from the First World War, 2,197 of which are unidentified, and there are special memorials to thirty-six casualties known or believed to be buried among them. Row VIII J 10 contains the grave of Major John Mackenzie VC, who won his Victoria Cross as a sergeant in the Seaforth Highlanders, attached to the West African Frontier Force, who led a charge against an Ashanti stockade. Commissioned into the Black Watch in 1900, he saw further active service in West Africa and was serving as a major in the 2nd Battalion, Bedfordshire Regiment when he was killed leading his men out of a trench at Festubert on 17 May 1915, during the battle of Festubert. Return to the main road and walk north towards Festubert. The small group of houses a couple of hundred metres up the road marks the site of Le Plantin South (18), where the defences were rushed at noon on 9 April. The defences here were dug in among the houses and gardens and the defenders were pushed back up the road towards Festubert. It was here that Captain J.W. Cook MC, the garrison commander, organised his counter-attack and succeeded in recapturing part of the position, and where the Germans were forced to retire in disorder under the fire of the three captured German machine-guns mounted on the parapet.
Major John Mackenzie VC. A lane runs behind the houses and effectively cuts the corner for the return to Givenchy. As you walk along this track, the prominence on which Givenchy stands is quite clear. It was across this ground that the retreating Germans fled on 9 April, under fire from Le Plantin South and Windy Corner to their rear and from Moat Farm on the slope ahead and to the right. It was a killing ground. The path rejoins the road into the village and you climb up the slight rise back to the square by the church. Going straight ahead you pass, on the left, the village hall, which was donated by the City of Liverpool to the Commune of Givenchy in 1919 (13) and which still bears a plaque commemorating the event. This is clearly visible from the road. The 55th Division Monument is directly ahead.
A Dri ve around 55th Di vi s i onal Are a Maps: Institut Geographique National (IGN) Serie Bleu 2405 O (Bethune) and 2405 E (Lens) The 55th Division held the sector north of La Bassée canal around Givenchy and Festubert and
back as far as the river Lawe, with reserve units billeted on the far side of the Lawe around Locon and with further rest camps in the Bethune area. The line dividing the 55th Division from the Portuguese 2nd Division to its north was an artificial one, but it ran close enough to the modern road, the D171, that this can be taken as the boundary. The starting point for the tour is Locon (1), which is about 10 kilometres north of Bethune on the D945 Bethune—Estaires road. There is the equivalent of a village square by the side of the prominent church with the Mairie close by. Locon has a few shops and a café. On 9 April 1918 it housed the headquarters of 166 Infantry Brigade. During the three days of the battle of Estaires the village remained in Allied hands and was held by units of the 51st Division but it was transferred to the 3rd Division, which promptly lost it on 12 April. Having pushed forwards to a point just beyond the village boundaries the Germans were stopped and the line here became more or less static until the September 1918 offensive recaptured the ground lost by the British in April. Map 8: A tour around the 55th Divisional area.
The memorial stone laid by the Cycling Club de France on the outskirts of Locon. The helmet should be a British one, as it was British troops that prevented the German advance beyond this point. The small road which enters Locon square from the west (2) runs out to the two small groups of farms called Le Cornet Malo and La Tombe Willot, where units of 165 Brigade from the 55th Division were billeted on the evening of 8/9 April, prior to their moving up to take over part of the Portuguese line. It was along this road that the 1/5th King’s Own Royal Lancasters advanced to their battle posts on receipt of the order ‘Bustle’. Locon was then itself under shellfire (the village was virtually demolished over the next few days and rebuilt in the early 1920s) and the 1/5th KORL crossed the main road and moved down what is now the Rue de Paris towards the river Lawe. In 1918 it was a country lane but today it is lined with some rather nice houses. Part way down on the left-hand side there is a Cycling Club de France boundary stone (3) erected in the 1930s to mark the extent of the German advance. The helmet on top of the stone is a French one but it should, of course, be a British one! Near the bottom of the hill is a convenient stopping-place where you can park and walk down to the banks of the river Lawe (4). The modern bridge replaced the one that German guns were searching for on the morning of 9 April but it is in the same place. Some 225 metres across the river ahead and slightly on the left is the modern Mesplaux Farm (5) where the Liverpool Scottish were billeted before moving up into the line; this was the scene of some ferocious fighting over the next few days. Some 500 metres due south is the hamlet of Les Glatignies (6), the base for the 1/5th KORL headquarters on 9 and 10 April.
Mesplaux Farm as it is today, standing on the same spot and rebuilt to the same design. It acted as both a billet and a strongpoint for the 55th Division (the King’s Liverpools) in April 1918.
Return to your car, drive over the bridge and follow the road round past Mesplaux Farm, which has been rebuilt on its old foundations and looks very prosperous. Drive down the road past Les Facons to the junction with the D171 (7), which was known in 1918 as the Rue du Bois. About 100 metres on the right is another Cycling Club de France boundary stone, again bearing a French helmet. Another 100 metres or so towards Le Hamel is the small drain known as La Rigole, where the 1/5th KORL established its headquarters early in the battle so as to cover the Rue de Bois. It is possible to park near the junction and walk down the road towards Le Hamel, but this is a busy road and care should be taken. Remember that French traffic will be coming at you on the ‘wrong’ side of the road! Turn left at the junction with the D171 and drive up the road in the direction of Le Touret (8), about 2 kilometres. This village was held by the 1/5th KORL’s B and D Companies, and it was up the road on the left (now the Rue de Touret) that A Company set out to try to establish contact with the XI Corps Cyclists at La Couture. In the fields on the left of the road they were rushed and overwhelmed in the morning mist (9). At the corner of Rue de Touret and the D171 stands the Maison d’Alphonse Wallaert, whose original owner had an equestrian statue of Marshal Foch built on part of his roof. The statue still stands, but the modern owner has planted his garden with Leylandii trees so that the statue can only be seen properly through a convenient gap in the trees from the pavement near the house. Continue along the D171 for another kilometre or so until you reach, on the right, the Le Touret Military Cemetery and Memorial to the Missing (10). This was active in 1914 and 1915, and covered the original battles of La Bassée, Cuinchy, Givenchy, Festubert, Neuve Chapelle and Aubers Ridge. Listed on the memorial are more than 13,000 names of men who fell in this area before 25 September 1915 and who have no known grave. Though not connected with the 1918 battles, it is too good a place to miss and you should allow at least 20 minutes to look around. The regimental badge carvings on the memorial are particularly fine.
Glimpsed through the deliberate gap in the Leylandii trees, Marshal Foch’s statue looks down on the village of Le Touret. Four Victoria Cross holders are commemorated on the memorial:
Private Abraham Acton of the 2nd Battalion, Border Regiment, won his VC for bringing in wounded comrades at Rouges Bancs, France, on 21 December 1914; he was killed on 16 May 1915 at Festubert.
Corporal William Anderson of the 2nd Battalion, Yorkshire Regiment, defended a trench with bombs and a rifle on 12 March 1915 at Neuve Chapelle; he was killed the next day.
Private Edward Barber of the 1st Battalion, Grenadier Guards, charged the enemy single-handed, throwing bombs, on 12 March 1915 during the battle of Neuve Chapelle; his attack caused a great number of Germans to surrender but he was killed shortly afterwards.
Private Jacob Rivers of the 1st Battalion, Sherwood Foresters, on his own initiative, crept forward and disrupted an enemy counter-attack with bombs on 12 March 1915, during the battle of Neuve Chapelle. He broke up another attack in the same way later in the day but was killed on this occasion. Several ‘Shot at Dawn’ soldiers are also commemorated on the memorial, including Driver John Bell, Royal Field Artillery; Private James Briggs, Border Regiment; Private T. Cummings, Irish Guards; Private J. Duncan, Cameron Highlanders; Private F. Sheffield, Middlesex Regiment; Private A. Smythe, Irish Guards; and Private E. Tanner, Wiltshire Regiment. Looking over the southern cemetery wall (the one furthest away from the road), it is possible to see how flat the countryside is. Festubert is south and slightly east. German troops crossed the fields at the bottom end of the cemetery on the morning of 9 April to seize Route A Keep (11), an important British position about a kilometre due south of the cemetery, before its small garrison could be reinforced. Go back to your car and turn right down the D166 (12) (Rue de Epinette) towards Festubert. About a kilometre and a half down the road there is a Calvary on the side of the road (13). This is approximately on the site of the Cailloux Keeps, the northernmost point of the British defences around Festubert. The Keeps were on either side of the road that turns left off the Rue de Epinette, one in the garden of the house, the other in the field on the other side. The troops knew this as Brewery
Corner, because the road ran down to the shelled-out remains of an old brewery. Festubert has spread out somewhat over the years but the core of the village has been restored. Given that many houses were still standing in April 1918, troops might even today have recognised the square and the church. Festubert Keep (14) was built into the damaged houses and estaminet on the corner opposite the church, while Festubert Keep East was a couple of hundred metres along the road behind the church. Along the Rue de Bethune, on the way to the Post Office Rifles Cemetery, is the Halles de Village (15). This hall was kindly donated by the people of Stockport after the war (though it has subsequently been extended and modernised). A plaque inside the building commemorates the gift. Continue along the D166 towards Cuinchy and Givenchy along what is now called the Grand Rue, and Brown’s Road Military Cemetery (16) is clearly marked from the main road. This cemetery was begun in October 1914 and was used by fighting units and field ambulances until November 1917, when it contained 299 graves. It was greatly enlarged after the Armistice, when bodies were brought in from small cemeteries and isolated sites on the surrounding battlefields. Brown’s Road Military Cemetery now contains 1,071 burials and commemorations from the First World War, of which 407 burials are unidentified. For those with an interest in such matters, it also contains the graves of three men who were ‘shot at dawn’:
Relics of the battlefield in the form of steel ladders and a steel look-out in a farmyard near the Portuguese front line.
Rifleman W. Bellamy of the 1st King’s Royal Rifle Corps, executed 16 July 1915 for cowardice. He is buried in Plot IV, D. 19. Private G.H. Lawton of the 17th Sherwood Foresters (Notts & Derby Regiment), executed 30 July 1916 for cowardice. He is buried in Plot V, G. 13. Private B. McCubbin of the 17th Sherwood Foresters (Notts & Derby Regiment), executed for cowardice 30 July 1916. He is buried in Plot V, B. 16. Return to the D166 and turn right. The road follows the village line of defences that held out on 9 April. Though there are some lovely modern houses to be seen, the older farms, outbuildings and cottages were the keystones of the village line defences and most were rebuilt on the sites of the originals after the war. Drive past two small side roads on the left, Rue Capitte and Rue Piquette. At the slight bend in the road, the houses immediately in front mark the site of Le Plantin (17), the scene of fierce fighting by the King’s Liverpools on 9 April. The road junction ahead is Windy Corner (18), captured briefly by the Germans on 9 April but recaptured by the British shortly afterwards. Turn left along Rue Robespierre and the road ahead takes you into Givenchy. Keep on straight past the church and the 55th Divisional Monument (19) is ahead (see the Walking Tour of Givenchy for details of this area). Return from Givenchy to the Windy Corner junction and turn right back up the D166 towards Festubert, until you arrive back at the village square and turn left along the Rue de Bethune. Festubert Communal Cemetery (20) on the road out of the village includes a dozen Commonwealth War Graves from the Second World War, all of soldiers killed during the retreat to Dunkirk. Six are unknown. The graves are on the left-hand side of the cemetery about 10 metres in, slightly concealed by some French civil graves. Continuing along the Rue de Bethune, the Post Office Rifles Cemetery (21) is on the left-hand side of the road. This cemetery is named after the 8th
Battalion, London Regiment (Post Office Rifles), who buried 38 men here in April—June 1915. In all, this cemetery contains some 400 First World War burials, many of which are unidentified as it was used as a concentration cemetery after the war. The 55th Division burials from their period in the area, including several men killed during the battle of Estaires, are on the left of the cemetery towards the rear. Members of the French Veterans Society from Festubert visit the cemetery every 11 November to celebrate Armistice Day and to note their respects in the Visitors’ Book.
A concrete relic of the battlefield on private land near the Tuning Fork positions. I’ve never been able to get close enough to identify it more precisely. About 100 metres beyond the Post Office Rifles Cemetery make a left turn down the small road under the electricity pylons and after another hundred metres turn right. This is the area known as the Tuning Fork (22) because of the configuration of the road system. The houses on the left make up the hamlet of Le Marais L’Avoue, where Lieutenant-Colonel Rettie and his guns of 275 Brigade, Royal Artillery, were based throughout the battle. Though the houses were demolished, or at least badly damaged, by German shelling, they have been rebuilt in the same places. It does not require much imagination to work out where the individual batteries were sited in the small fields that lie between the cottages and buildings. The estaminet that the gunners visited is no longer there but must be presumed to have been on the site of one of the cottages near the far end of the road. On the righthand side, 50 metres beyond the small house with the walled surround, a shallow drainage ditch marks the line of the southern part of the Tuning Fork Line, the northern part of which was manned by the 1st Battalion, Liverpool Scottish on 9 April. Another 50 metres along on the left, in a small field or paddock next to a farm, lie the remains of a British bunker or blockhouse, surrounded by general detritus. The southern road of the Tuning Fork rejoins the main Rue de Bethune. About a kilometre further along lies the Gorre Chateau Cemetery (23). This charming cemetery, with its Cross of Sacrifice set on a mound, contains graves from many units who fought in this sector from
late 1914 onwards. The Indian part of the cemetery is at the far end from the gate and was closed in October 1915, when the bulk of the Indian Corps left France. The 55th (West Lancashire) Division buried many of their dead in Plots V and VI. A few graves were brought into the cemetery later from near Gorre and from Mesplaux Farm, near Locon. There are now 934 Commonwealth casualties of the First World War buried or commemorated in this cemetery. Private Walter Mills VC of the 10th Manchesters is buried in Plot V, C 2, and Private T. Hopkins of the 1/8th Lancashire Fusiliers, who was shot for leaving his post, is buried in Plot V/ D 13.
Private Walter Mills VC.
Behind the trees which fringe the rear of the cemetery lies Gorre Chateau itself, which in April 1918 housed the headquarters of the 2/5th Lancashire Fusiliers. Though it was a target for the first day of the German attack and came under heavy fire, it was never taken. Rebuilt after the war, it had become rather dilapidated in recent years and is currently being renovated. It is private property.
Wal ki ng the Lawe Bri dge he ads This walk takes in the area of the defence, mainly by King Edward’s Horse, of the posts at Vieille Chapelle and La Fosse during the first two days of the offensive. The terrain is flat and a large part of the route follows the roads so, apart from the walk along the Lawe towpath, it can be done by car if
you do not fancy a stroll. Boots will be necessary for the walk down the Lawe between La Fosse and Vieille Chapelle, as part of the path is quite stony and it is frequently wet and muddy, even in dry weather.
Map 9: Walking the Lawe bridgeheads. The starting point is Vieille Chapelle New Military Cemetery (1), where there is parking on the roadside. This cemetery is of particular interest because it contains the graves of many soldiers who were buried elsewhere during the early part of the battle of the Lys but whose bodies were concentrated here after the war. The cemetery itself is situated on the west side of the village on the small road that links it to the main D945 Bethune—Estaires road. It is approximately 10 kilometres north of Bethune. The cemetery was begun in November 1915 and was used until March 1918. It fell into German hands in April 1918 but was liberated in September of that year. There were a few more
burials at that time. Row III, A 11 contains the grave of Second Lieutenant Joseph Henry Collin of the 4th King’s Own Lancaster Regiment, who was awarded the Victoria Cross for his defence of Orchard Keep at Givenchy on 9 April. A couple of rows behind Collin’s grave is that of another Victoria Cross holder: Lieutenant John William Schofield of the 5th Lancashire Fusiliers, who was also killed on 9 April 1918 during the defence of Givenchy. For those with an interest in the subject, there are three ‘Shot at Dawn’ soldiers buried here: Privates H. Crimmins, A. Wild and J.A. Haddock. The ground behind the cemetery was covered by the troopers of King Edward’s Horse when they left their lorries at Zelobes to reach the bridge across the Lawe across country, because of the intensity of the barrage. It was also in one of the farm buildings nearby that Captain Christie and the last of the bridgehead defenders were surrounded and forced to surrender when they tried to fight their way out on 11 April. Leaving the cemetery by the gate turn right and follow the road to the right to the T-junction. It was here that the XI Corps Cyclists’ Battalion left their bicycles before heading up the road, straight ahead, to La Couture, but our walk takes the left turn into the body of the village, past the church on the right and by the Rue de Capitaine Woodley. The village was destroyed in the course of the fighting but has been rebuilt with its buildings in the same locations as before the war. Crossing the bridge over the Lawe (2), which is on the site of the one blown by the Royal Engineers on 11 April, one enters the bridgehead held by Captain Christie, Lieutenant Stein and their men. Their positions were not in the buildings but dug in on the edge of the village, which did not extend as far up the road ahead as it does now. Just past the Mairie and the école is probably the limit of the defence.
The grave of Lieutenant J.H. Collin VC, who was killed on 9 April 1918 at Givenchy. He is buried in Vieille Chapelle New Military Cemetery.
A brisk walk up the road straight ahead will bring you to the crossroads and La Vielle Chapelle Communal Cemetery (3). Just outside the village to the east, at the crossroads, this cemetery contains the graves of only two Second World War casualties but it is worth a visit to see the monument to the officers and men of King Edward’s Horse. This was built, on land donated by the Commune in perpetuity, in 1921 and the first stone for the plinth was laid in a ceremony attended by the Maire and Curé of Vieille Chapelle, the Colonel of the Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel L. James, Major M.F. Dick and Mrs McIntosh, the wife of Lieutenant McIntosh from Melbourne. French schoolchildren sang hymns and a girl from the village promised that ‘we will ornament with flowers the tombs of the glorious British soldiers fallen on the field of honour, and that we shall never forget them in our prayers’. The monument bears the inscription: 1st KING EDWARD’S HORSE (The King’s Overseas Dominions Regiment) To the memory of the following ranks who were killed or died on service in France 1915—1918. Very many were killed in a very gallant defence of this locality, April 1918. The names of 82 officers and men are listed on three sides of the stone. On the rear is the solitary name of Lieutenant (Temporary Captain) G.H. Havelock-Sutton, who died of his wounds after the stone was completed. Nearby is a monument to the military and civilian casualties of Vieille Chapelle, a reminder that many local inhabitants were also killed in the course of the fighting.
The memorial to the King Edwards Horse in the communal cemetery at Vieille Chapelle, where the villagers commemorate the defenders of the village on Armistice Day every year.
French casualties from the village of Vieille Chapelle. Many of the ‘Victimes Civiles’ were killed on 9 April 1918. From the rear of the cemetery you can look over the ground over which the Germans advanced when they moved round the flank of Lieutenant Giles’ troop, which was dug in to the left of the houses visible along the road to Le Bout Delville, at the spot marked on the map as Rue Mars. To the right the road runs towards the strongpoint that was held by Lieutenant Laurenson; look back and to the right and La Couture church is just visible. From here you can walk directly along the road to Fosse itself, while those with the time and energy for a longer walk can walk out to the Huit Maisons position. In either case, it is useful to walk up the road towards where the power line crosses it (4), as from here, at Rue Marsy, it is possible to look along the line to see the bare and flat terrain in which were positioned the Huit Maisons trenchworks, where Major Furse and his squadron fought. It was from approximately here that the Germans were able to build up their strength and take the 4th Troop in the flank and begin rolling up the line. If you wish to walk up to Huit Maisons, then go on up the road to the next crossroads and turn left. The road bears left and then right and it was at the right-hand bend (5) that Lieutenant Fisher built his barricade where the road crossed the trench line, and was killed defending it. The houses and orchards of Huit Maisons were rebuilt in their old positions. It was while they were moving away from the houses down the road towards Fosse that Furse and his men were caught by machine-gun fire from both flanks and were forced to drop into the ditches alongside the road. The Germans had captured the farm buildings you can see ahead of you at the junction of the road between Fosse and Bout Delville (6), and it was along the straight stretch towards La Longue Rue that the men were forced to cross the road under fire before making their way into the Fosse bridgehead, near what is now the water tower. If you wish to go straight to Fosse, return from Rue Marsy and, at the crossroads by the cemetery, turn right. A brisk walk of some 20 minutes, past some very typical old French farmhouses and some
very nice modern homes, brings you to the outskirts of Fosse. At the water tower the road to the right is the one down which Furse and his squadron came in from Huit Maisons (7). At Fosse itself the defence post outside the village was at what is now a T-junction (8), where the road swings left into the main village. Apart from a few humps and bumps nothing is visible. Ignoring the turn into the village, press on straight ahead until the next crossroads, where there is a Calvary at the junction (9). Press on a little further and the woods on the left hide the Lock Ecluse du Rault, which was accidentally left undefended on 9 April. The Germans were able to force a crossing here on 10 April. What appears to be a path down to the Lock is, unfortunately, clearly marked as Privée (‘Private’). From the far edge of the wood the sturdy farmhouse of La Grand Marais, (10) where the 8th Durham Light Infantry held the strongpoints, is clearly visible. Returning to the crossroads and Calvary, turn right down the straight road towards the canal. This used to be the drive to the chateau at le Rault, which was never rebuilt after the war. At the end of the road the farm buildings on the left (11) conceal the remains of a concrete British strongpoint, guarding one of the temporary bridges across the canal at this point that were destroyed by the Royal Engineers. These houses were held by two platoons of D Company, 7th Gordons until late on the evening of 10 April. Turn to the right and walk along the towpath. The grounds of the old chateau are in the trees on the right; some new building is going on here but it is clearly marked as Privée). Shortly you will reach a concrete footbridge on the site of a wooden one that was here in 1918 (12). Crossing this bridge brings you to the west bank of the Lawe. Though on maps and in Vieille Chapelle the river does not appear too formidable an obstacle, at this point it is clear just how difficult an opposed crossing would be as it’s clearly too deep to wade, too broad to jump and cannot be crossed without a bridge or boat. Having crossed the Lawe it is possible to walk up to the main D945 (13) road that runs between Bethune and Estaires. It was along this road that German troops, having forced the Lawe at the Lock du Rault, moved down to turn the flank of the 51st Division on 10 and 11 April. A brisk walk of 10 minutes in the other direction will bring you to the Lock du Rault itself (14), reachable from the road by a short path. It is obvious how vulnerable a point this was if left ungarrisoned – lightly armed troops could quite easily have swarmed over the lock. Head back to the Lawe footbridge, recross the river and turn right, heading down the towpath to reach Fosse itself at the Rue de Halage, where there is another bridge replacing one blown by the Royal Engineers. Turn right into the village and then right again towards the Communal Cemetery (15). Unusually for the area, this cemetery contains no war graves from either world war but on reaching it you should turn left and take the small track between the houses. This is the only slightly difficult part of the walk as the track surface is rough and often wet. The track leads through the Bois de la Fosse and emerges beside the Lawe near the Lock de L’Etroa (16). The route now follows the towpath to Vieille Chapelle. It must have been along here, or through the fields on the left, that the King Edward’s Horse squadrons kept in touch with each other by runner after being separated on the evening of 9 April. It is clear that they were in communication but, unfortunately, I have not so far been able to find any individual accounts. The ground is so open that the trip must have been an extremely difficult and dangerous one for those attempting it. Enter Vieille Chapelle itself at the bridge (2) and turn right to head back to the New British Cemetery (1). About 500 metres outside the village to the west, across the busy D945, stands the small but beautiful Indian Cemetery of Zelobes (17). Though it contains only graves of Indian soldiers from
1914 and 1915, it is worth a short detour. This is one of the few Commonwealth War Graves Cemeteries to have neither a Visitors’ Book nor a Graves Register, though it is obvious that it does receive visitors. It was here for the first time that I saw commemorative markers with no obvious religious connotations. The cemetery contains the graves of 105 Indian soldiers—Gurkhas, Sikhs, Mohammedans and Hindus—all lying together. It was in the vicinity of the cemetery that Major Furse disembarked his squadron from their lorries and took them across the fields into Vieille Chapelle on the morning of 9 April.
Othe r Poi nts of Inte re s t for a Dri vi ng Tour The battlefield is quite small so rather than giving a definitive itinerary for a tour I thought I would point out some places of interest, both within the battlefield area and just beyond, and readers can make their own choice of route. The Portuguese Memorial at La Couture (1) Worth a detour from the 55th Division driving tour, or just to visit on its own, is the splendid Portuguese Memorial in the main square at La Couture, which was built in the 1920s. It is in the form of a Portuguese soldier (but note the British uniform and kit) dashing his rifle butt into the face of Death while France, in the form of a beautiful young woman armed with a sword, shrieks encouragement. The base of the monument resembles a demolished church with a torn drum and battered altar behind. Numerous plaques testify to the regular visits of Portuguese veterans over the years.
The Portuguese Memorial undergoing repair in the summer of 2007. The work is now complete.
The grave of a Portuguese soldier killed on 9 April, one of many in the Portuguese Cemetery and Memorial near La Bombe. The Portuguese Cemetery (2) Situated a couple of hundred metres south of the better known Indian Memorial at La Bombe crossroads, the cemetery was built in the 1920s and served as a collection point for bodies previously buried elsewhere. There are 1,831 graves in the cemetery, 239 of them unknown (‘Desconhecido’). The cemetery was rather dilapidated in the 1980s but it has since been much restored and tidied up, the surrounding wall has been lowered and there is a tiny museum in one corner. Many of the men buried
here died on 9 April 1918. Immediately opposite the cemetery is a small shrine dedicated to Our Lady of Fatima, which was added in 1975. The Loos Memorial to the Missing (3) The Loos Memorial forms the sides and back of Dud Corner Cemetery, and commemorates over 20,000 officers and men who fell in the area from the river Lys to the old southern boundary of the First Army, east and west of Grenay, and have no known grave. It includes those officers and men recorded as missing during the 1918 battles. Loos-en-Gohelle itself is 5 kilometres north-west of Lens, and Dud Corner Cemetery is located about a kilometre west of the village, to the north-east of the N43, the main Lens—Bethune road. Lieutenant Noel Addison of the King Edward’s Horse, killed in the fighting for the Lawe crossings, is commemorated on Panel 2. Houchin Military Cemetery (4) Though not active during the April offensive, this cemetery was extensively used both before and after the Lys offensive by the 55th (West Lancashire) Division and should be visited by anyone with an interest in the division. The 55th tried, wherever possible, to bury their men together so the cemetery contains many of their 1918 casualties. The cemetery was started in March 1918 when 6 Casualty Clearing Station was based nearby and, apart from the period of the Lys battle, it continued to be used for the rest of 1918. It is situated to the south-west of Houchin village, about 5 kilometres south of Bethune. There are also burials of eight Commonwealth casualties from the First World War in the village communal cemetery south-east of the village. Laventie German Military Cemetery (5) Containing 1,978 graves, the German war cemetery at Laventie was begun by German troops in April 1918. The French military authorities later enlarged the cemetery through the additional reburials of a further 360 fallen Germans from seven neighbouring villages. Those buried here belonged to units whose home garrisons were in Saxony, Silesia, Thuringia, Brandenburg, Pomerania, Hesse, Bavaria, Westphalia, Eastern and Western Prussia, Württemberg, Posen (Poznan) and the Rhineland. The 1,978 fallen are buried in individual graves. Seventeen of them remain nameless. There are several gravestones (as opposed to the more usual metal crosses) to mark the graves of Jewish soldiers who died for the Fatherland.
The German cemetery at Laventie contains numerous victims of the fighting in April 1918. Though more sombre in tone than the Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemeteries, the German cemeteries have a grace and atmosphere of their own.
Part of a trench mortar projectile used as a bollard in a farmyard near the Portuguese front line. St Vast Post Military Cemetery (6) The cemetery lies near the village of Richebourg-l’Avoue, which is 9 kilometres north-east of Bethune. From Bethune follow the D171 toward Armentières and then turn on to the D166 proceeding into the outskirts of Richebourg. Take a left turning into Rue des Charbonniers for approximately 2 kilometres and the cemetery is on the right-hand side. There are 90 German casualties from the Lys fighting of 1918 buried in the south-east end of the cemetery. The farm on the right as you enter the cemetery was a casualty clearing station during the diversionary attack on the Boar ’s Head on 30 June 1916, and there are many men from the two Sussex battalions buried here. There was a defended post here surrounded by wire and mounting four machine-guns on 9 April 1918, but the fate of its Portuguese defenders is unknown. For those with an interest in such matters, Plot I, G. 1, contains the grave of Private E. Beaumont of the 2nd Battalion, Leicestershire Regiment, who was executed for desertion on 24 June 1915.
Paradis Military Cemetery (7) Though completely unconnected with events in this book, few readers will want to miss this Second World War Commonwealth War Graves Commission cemetery. Travel south down the D945 from Zelobes Indian Cemetery and take the fourth turn on the right, the D178 signposted for Paradis, and follow the road towards the village. In the fields to the left and right the units of the 51st Division fought their retreat south on 11 April 1918, and somewhere near here Lieutenant Addison of King Edward’s Horse finally met his end. Paradis Military Cemetery is behind the village communal one, and there is parking in front of the church. The French war memorial is instantly noticeable, but next to the church is a monument erected by the Dunkirk Veterans’ Association to mark one of the most despicable acts of the retreat. Having fought until their ammunition gave out, 99 men of the 2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment surrendered to the German Totemkopf SS Division on 27 May 1940. They were taken into a field near the village and machine-gunned, all the survivors being shot at close range. Miraculously two men survived. They were hidden and cared for in the village, and were later handed over to a regular German unit, which treated them correctly and had them sent to hospital. Eventually repatriated, they had the satisfaction of seeing the SS Commander, Hauptsturmfuhrer Fritz Knochlein, hanged for war crimes after the war. The 97 victims, plus a number of other soldiers lost on the retreat, and four RAF aircrew killed in 1940 are buried here.
German dead, caught in a British counter-attack, collected for burial.
Appendix I
BRITISH ORDER OF BATTLE This is the order of battle for the main British divisions that took part in the southern section of the battle of Estaires. I have also included a few small units, such as tunnelling companies, that took part in the fighting as stop-gap infantry units but were not officially part of any division. There were also a few hastily thrown together battalions composed of stragglers which were dissolved as soon as they could be replaced and for which there are no records per se, though you may find some material about them in the war diaries of the brigades they were attached to. The War Diary references are to the diaries held in the National Archives’ WO 95 series and are only for the period of the battle. Some of them also cover longer periods of the war but this shouldn’t be treated as a definitive list of diaries for any given unit.
Unit: War Diary Reference: Portuguese Expeditionary Force (BMM)
WO 95/5488
XI Corps Troops: 1/1 King Edward’s Horse
WO 95/890
Corps Cyclist Battalion
WO 95/890
55th Division: Headquarters Branches and Services
WO 95/2913
Artillery: 275 Brigade Royal Field Artillery
WO 95/2914
276 Brigade Royal Field Artillery
WO 95/2914
Divisional Troops: Divisional Trench Mortar Batteries
WO 95/2915
Divisional Ammunition Column
WO 95/2915
419 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2916
422 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2916
423 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2916
Divisional Signal Company
WO 95/2916
4th Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment (Pioneers)
WO 95/2917
55 Battalion, Machine-Gun Corps
WO 95/2917
1/3rd West Lancashire Field Ambulance
WO 95/2917
2/1st Wessex Field Ambulance
WO 95/2919
1/1st West Lancashire Mobile Veterinary Section
WO 95/2919
Divisional Train (95, 96, 97, 98 Companies ASC)
WO 95/2919
164 Infantry Brigade: Headquarters
WO 95/2921
4th Battalion, King’s Own Royal Lancaster Regiment
WO 95/2922
1/8th Battalion, King’s Liverpool Regiment
WO 95/2923
2/5th Battalion, Lancashire Fusiliers
WO 95/2923
165 Infantry Brigade: Headquarters
WO 95/2925
1/5th Battalion, King’s Liverpool Regiment
WO 95/2926
1/6th Battalion, King’s Liverpool Regiment
WO 95/2926
1/9th Battalion, King’s Liverpool Regiment
WO 95/2927
166 Infantry Brigade: Headquarters
WO 95/2928
1/5th Battalion, South Lancashire Regiment
WO 95/2929
1/10th Battalion, King’s Liverpool Regiment
WO 95/2929
1/5th Battalion, King’s Own Royal Lancaster Regiment WO 95/2930
51st Division: Headquarters Branches and Services
WO 95/2853
Divisional Troops: 255 Brigade, Royal Field Artillery
WO 95/2854
256 Brigade, Royal Field Artillery
WO 95/2854
Divisional Trench Mortar Batteries
WO 95/2854
Divisional Ammunition Column
WO 95/2854
400 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2855
401 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2855
404 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2856
Divisional Signal Company
WO 95/2856
8th Battalion, Royal Scots (Pioneers)
WO 95/2857
51 Battalion, Machine-Gun Corps
WO 95/2857
1/2nd Highland Field Ambulance
WO 95/2858
2/1st Highland Field Ambulance
WO 95/2858
1/3rd Highland Field Ambulance
WO 95/2859
1/1st Highland Mobile Veterinary Section
WO 95/2860
Divisional Train (471, 472, 473, 474 Companies ASC)
WO 95/2860
152 Infantry Brigade: Headquarters
WO 95/2863
5th Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders
WO 95/2866
6th Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders
WO 95/2867
6th Battalion, Gordon Highlanders
WO 95/2868
153 Infantry Brigade: Headquarters
WO 95/2874
6th Battalion, Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)
WO 95/2876
7th Battalion, Black Watch (Royal Highlanders)
WO 95/2879
7th Battalion, Gordon Highlanders
WO 95/2882
154 Infantry Brigade: Headquarters
WO 95/2885
7th Battalion, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders
WO 95/2886
4th Battalion, Gordon Highlanders
WO 95/2886
4th Battalion, Seaforth Highlanders
WO 95/2888
40th Division: Headquarters Branches and Services: General Staff
WO 95/2593
Headquarters Branches and Services
WO 95/2594
Commander Royal Artillery
WO 95/2596
Headquarters Branches and Services
WO 95/2597
178 Brigade, Royal Field Artillery
WO 95/2598
181 Brigade, Royal Field Artillery
WO 95/2598
Divisional Trench Mortar Batteries
WO 95/2599
Divisional Ammunition Column
WO 95/2599
224 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2600
229 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2600
231 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2601
Divisional Signal Company
WO 95/2601
12th Battalion, Yorkshire Regiment (Pioneers)
WO 95/2601
40 Battalion (Machine-Gun Corps)
WO 95/2601
135 Field Ambulance
WO 95/2602
136 Field Ambulance
WO 95/2602
137 Field Ambulance
WO 95/2602
51 Mobile Veterinary Section
WO 95/2603
Divisional Train
WO 95/2603
Headquarters 119 Infantry Brigade
WO 95/2605
21st Battalion, Middlesex Regiment
WO 95/2606
13th Battalion, East Surrey Regiment
WO 95/2606
18th Battalion, Welsh Regiment
WO 95/2607
Headquarters 120 Infantry Brigade
WO 95/2610
14th Battalion, Highland Light Infantry
WO 95/2612
Headquarters 121 Infantry Brigade
WO 95/2614
20th Battalion, Middlesex Regiment
WO 95/2615
12th Battalion, Suffolk Regiment
WO 95/2616
13th Battalion, Yorkshire Regiment
WO 95/2616
34th Division: Headquarters Branches and Services: General Staff
WO 95/2436
Adjutant and Quartermaster General
WO 95/2439
Commander, Royal Artillery
WO 95/2442
Assistant Director, Medical Services
WO 95/2443
Commander, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2444
Assistant Director, Ordnance Services
WO 95/2444
Assistant Director, Veterinary Services
WO 95/2444
152 Brigade, Royal Artillery
WO 95/2445
160 Brigade, Royal Artillery
WO 95/2447
Divisional Trench Mortar Batteries
WO 95/2448
Divisional Ammunition Column
WO 95/2448
207 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2449
208 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2449
209 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2450
Divisional Signal Company
WO 95/2450
18th Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers (Pioneers)
WO 95/2451
34 Battalion, Machine-Gun Corps
WO 95/2451
102 Field Ambulance
WO 95/2452
103 Field Ambulance
WO 95/2453
104 Field Ambulance
WO 95/2453
44 Mobile Veterinary Section
WO 95/2454
Divisional Train
WO 95/2454
101 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/2456
10th Battalion, Lincolnshire Regiment
WO 95/2457
15th Battalion, Royal Scots
WO 95/2457
16th Battalion, Royal Scots
WO 95/2458
11th Battalion, Suffolk Regiment
WO 95/2458
102 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/2461
22nd Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers
WO 95/2463
25th Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers
WO 95/2463
103 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/2465
5th Battalion, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders
WO 95/2466
5th Battalion, King’s Own Scottish Borderers
WO 95/2466
9th Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers
WO 95/2466
8th Battalion, Cameronians
WO 95/2466
3rd Division: Headquarters Branches and Services: General Staff
WO 95/1380
Adjutant and Quartermaster General
WO 95/1387
Commander Royal Artillery
WO 95/1394
Assistant Director Medical Services
WO 95/1396
Commander Royal Engineers
WO 95/1397
Deputy Assistant Director Ordnance Services
WO 95/1398
Deputy Assistant Director Veterinary Services
WO 95/1398
40 Brigade, Royal Artillery
WO 95/1400
42 Brigade, Royal Artillery
WO 95/1401
Divisional Ammunition Column
WO 95/1402
Trench Mortar Batteries
WO 95/1402
56 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/1403
438 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/1403
529 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/1404
Divisional Signal Company
WO 95/1404
3 Battalion, Machine-Gun Corps
WO 95/1405
20th Battalion, King’s Royal Rifle Corps (Pioneers)
WO 95/1405
7 Field Ambulance
WO 95/1406
8 Field Ambulance
WO 95/1407
142 Field Ambulance
WO 95/1408
11 Mobile Veterinary Section
WO 95/1408
3 Divisional Train
WO 95/1412
8 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/1419
7th Battalion, Shropshire Light Infantry
WO 95/1421
1st Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers
WO 95/1422
2nd Battalion, Royal Scots
WO 95/1423
8 Trench Mortar Battery
WO 95/1424
9 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/1428
13th Battalion, King’s Liverpool Regiment
WO 95/1429
1st Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers
WO 95/1430
4th Battalion, Royal Fusiliers
WO 95/1431
74 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/1434
1st Battalion, Gordon Highlanders
WO 95/1435
8th Battalion, King’s Own Royal Lancasters
WO 95/1436
76 Infantry Brigade
WO 95/1437
2nd Battalion, Suffolk Regiment
WO 95/1437
Brigade Trench Mortar Battery
WO 95/1437
50th Division: Headquarters Branches and Services
WO 95/2813
Adjutant and Quartermaster General
WO 95/2813
Commander Royal Artillery
WO 95/2814
Assistant Director Medical Services
WO 95/2815
Commander Royal Engineers
WO 95/2816
Deputy Assistant Director Ordnance Services
WO 95/2816
Deputy Assistant Director Veterinary Services
WO 95/2816
250 Brigade, Royal Artillery
WO 95/2817
251 Brigade, Royal Artillery
WO 95/2819
Divisional Trench Mortar Batteries
WO 95/2820
Divisional Ammunition Column
WO 95/2820
7 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2821
446 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2821
447 Field Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/2821
Divisional Signal Company
WO 95/2822
5th Battalion, Royal Irish Regiment (Pioneers)
WO 95/2823
1/7th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry (Pioneers)
WO 95/2823
50 Battalion, Machine-Gun Corps
WO 95/2823
1/1 Northumbrian Field Ambulance
WO 95/2824
2/2 Northumbrian Field Ambulance
WO 95/2824
1/3 Northumbrian Field Ambulance
WO 95/2825
1/1 Northumbrian Mobile Veterinary Section
WO 95/2825
Divisional Train
WO 95/2825
149 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/2827
4th Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers
WO 95/2828
5th Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers
WO 95/2828
6th Battalion, Northumberland Fusiliers
WO 95/2829
150 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/2833
4th Battalion, East Yorkshire Regiment
WO 95/2835
4th Battalion, Yorkshire Regiment
WO 95/2836
5th Battalion, Yorkshire Regiment
WO 95/2836
151 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/2839
5th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry
WO 95/2840
6th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry
WO 95/2840
8th Battalion, Durham Light Infantry
WO 95/2842
61st Division:
Headquarters Branches and Services
WO 95/3036
Adjutant and Quartermaster General
WO 95/3036
Commander Royal Artillery
WO 95/3037
Assistant Director Medical Services
WO 95/3038
Commander Royal Engineers
WO 95/3040
Deputy Assistant Director Ordnance Services
WO 95/3041
Deputy Assistant Director Veterinary Services
WO 95/3041
306 Brigade Royal Artillery
WO 95/3042
307 Brigade Royal Artillery
WO 95/3044
Divisional Ammunition Column
WO 95/3045
Divisional Trench Mortar Batteries
WO 95/3045
476 Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/3046
478 Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/3047
479 Company, Royal Engineers
WO 95/3048
Divisional Signal Company
WO 95/3049
61 Battalion, Machine-Gun Corps
WO 95/3049
5th Battalion, Duke of Cornwall’s L I (Pioneers)
WO 95/3050
2/1 South Midland Field Ambulance
WO 95/3051
2/2 South Midland Field Ambulance
WO 95/3051
2/3 South Midland Field Ambulance
WO 95/3051
61 Mobile Veterinary Section
WO 95/3052
Divisional Train
WO 95/3053
182 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/3055
2/6th Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment
WO 95/3056
2/7th Battalion, Royal Warwickshire Regiment
WO 95/3056
2/8th Battalion, Worcestershire Regiment
WO 95/3057
183 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/3059
1st Battalion, East Lancashire Regiment
WO 95/3061
5th Battalion, Gordon Highlanders
WO 95/3061
184 Infantry Brigade Headquarters
WO 95/3064
2/4th Battalion, Royal Berkshire Regiment
WO 95/3065
2/5th Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment
WO 95/3066
2/4th Battalion, Ox & Bucks Light Infantry
WO 95/3067
USEFUL SOURCES In addition to the unit War Diaries (see Appendix), there are many unit histories ranging from divisional level down to individual battalions. There is no recent history of the battle of the Lys and the only comprehensive one is in The Official History of the War: Military Operations – France and Belgium, 1918 compiled for the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence by Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds and published in 1937. Though largely dealing with events at brigade level, this does contain some detail of battalion actions. Maps are in a separate volume. Ainsworth, Captain R.B., MC, The Story of the 6th Battalion, the Durham Light Infantry. France, April 1915—November 1918 (St Catherine’s Press (London), 1919) Bewsher, Major F.W., History of the 51st (Highland) Division, 1914—1918 (Reissued by Naval & Military Press, 2001) Coop, Revd J.O., DSO, TD MA, Senior Chaplain of the Division, The Story of the 55th Division, 1916 —1919 (Liverpool ‘Daily Post’ Printers, 1919). A relatively brief history of the division with maps, photographs and various appendices Eastwood, Stuart, Lions of England – A pictorial history of the King’s Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster) 1680—1980 (Silver Link Publishing, 1991) Gilchrist, A.M. The Liverpool Scottish, 1900 —1919 (Henry Young & Sons Ltd, Liverpool, 1930). Hodgkinson, Albert, The King’s Own, 1/5th Battalion, TF (Privately published, printed by Lewes Printers, 1921). An excellent battalion history containing many personal reminiscences, maps and detailed lists of officers and casualties. Recently republished by the Regimental Museum James, Lieutenant-Colonel L., The History of King Edward’s Horse (The King’s Overseas Dominions Regiment). With a Foreword by General the Hon. Sir Herbert A. Lawrence (Sifton Praed, 1921). Includes a nominal roll of officers, honours and awards (with citations), and transcripts of several key documents Shakespear, Lieutenant-Colonel J., The Thirty-Fourth Division, 1915—1919 (1921; reprinted by Naval & Military Press, 1998). Covers the fighting in the northern part of the battlefield, including the fall of Armentières Wadham, Lieutenant-Colonel W.F.A., and Crossley, Captain J., The Fourth Battalion, The King’s Own (Royal Lancaster Regiment and The Great War) (Privately published, 1920) Wadsworth, Captain W.W., MC, War Diary of 1st West Lancashire Brigade RFA (Privately published, 1923). Contains the history of one of the artillery brigades of the 55th Division, with many personal reminiscences Whitton, Lieutenant-Colonel F.E., History of the 40th Division (Reissued by Naval & Military Press, 2004) Wylly, Colonel H.C., CB, The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (Vol II) 1914—1919 (Royal United Services Institution, 1933)
Wyrall, Everard, The Fiftieth Division, 1914—1919 (Reissued by Naval & Military Press, 2002)
Index
In di vi dual s:
Acton, Pte Abraham VC Addison, Lt Noel Anderson, Pte William VC Bruchmuller, Lt Col Draper, Major (RAF) Chadwick, Sgt Christie, Capt Collin, 2nd Lt Joseph Collins, Sgt, SE Cook, Capt C W Costa Cabral, 2nd Lt Dane, 2nd Lt R S Dawson, Cpl W Forbes-Jackson, Lt Col James, VC Furse, Major Giles, Lt Gomes da Costa, General GorlessLt H Hackett, William, Spr, VC Hill Trevor, Lt H G E Horne, General Sir Ireland, Co Sgt Mjr J Jackson, Pte J James, Lt Col Lionel Jeudwine, Hugh, Major General Lade, Lt Lawton, Sgt Leach, Capt MT Laurenson, Lt MacDonald, Major McDermott, 2nd Lt Mackenzie, Major John, VC Merville Moffat, Lt Monro, Lt Col Moon, Lance Sgt CJ Parkinson, L/Cpl W Pepper, George, Pte Pinckney, Lt Poulter, Pte Arthur, VC Rettie, Lt Col, RFA Rich, Lt Rivers, Pte Jacob VC Roddick, Capt
Roma, capt Bento SchofieldLt John Stein, Lt Tamagnini, General TringhamLt HV Tucker, Pte WA Von Quast, General Walker, Co Sgt Mjr R Whiteside, Sgt Wilkinson, Sgt Wyre, Cpl Xavier da Costa, Major
Pl aces:
Armentieres Aubers Ridge Bailleul Bac St maur Bayswater Terrace (Givenchy) Bethune Calonne Cheyne Walk (Givenchy) Estaires Death or Glory Sap (Givenchy) Erquinghhem Farquissart Festubert Fleurbaix Fosse Fromelles Givenchy(tour) Gorre Guards Military Cemetery Gunner Siding (Givenchy) Hazebrouck Houchin Military Cemetery Huit Maisons La Bassee La Bassee Canal La Gorgue Laventie Laventie German Military Cemetery La Couture Le Marais Le Plantin (Festubert) Le Touret Lestrem Locon Lock de Rault Loss Memorial Loisne Mairie Keep (Givenchy) Mesplaux Farm Messines
Moat Farm (Givenchy) Mont Kemmel Neuf Berquin Neuve Chapelle Orchard Keep (Givenchy) Orchard Road (Givenchy Oxford Terrace (Givenchy) Pacaut Paradis Paradis Military Cemetery Pont Riquel Portuguese Cemetery Richebourg Robecq Route A Keep (Festubert) Sailly St Vaast Post Military Cemetery Steenwerk Tuning Fork (Festubert) Wytschaete Vieille Chapelle Windy Corner (Givenchy)
Un i t s:
Corps XIth XVth Divisions Lahore Division Portuguese 2nd, 1st 3rd 29th 34th 39th 40th 46th 50th 51st, 100 55th 61st Brig ades XII Australian Artillery 74th 76th 88th 101st 102nd 103rd 119th 120th 121st
150th 152nd 153rd 154th 164th 165th 166th 182nd 255th (RFA) 256th (RFA) 275th (RFA) 276th (RFA) Portuguese 4th (Minho)
B at t al i on s/Reg i men t s
1st King Edward’s Horse Black Watcht Btn Black Watchh Btn Black Watchh Btn Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantryh Btn Durham Light Infantryh Btn Durham Light Infantryh Btn East Surreys. 13th Btn Gloucestershire Regtt Btn Gordon Highlandersh Btn Highland Light Infantryh Btn Highland Light Infantryh Btn Middlesex Regth Btn Kings Own Royal Lancastersh Btn Kings Own Royal Lancastersh Btn King’s Liverpoolsh Btn King’s Liverpoolsh Btn King’s Liverpoolsh Btn King’s Liverpoolsh Btn (Liverpool Scottish) King’s Liverpoolsh Btn Loyal North Lancashiresh Btn Northumberland Fusliersh Btn Ox & Bucks Light Infantry/4th Btn Royal Berkshires/4th Btn Royal EngineersField Co Royal EngineersField Co Royal Engineers, Field Co Royal Engineers, Field Co Royal Warwicks/6th Btn Royal Warwicks/7th Btn Seaforth Highlandersh Btn Seaforth Highlandersh Btn Seaforth Highlandersh Btn South Lancashiresh Btn South Lancashiresh Btn South Wales BorderersBtn Suffolk Regth Btn
Sussex Regth Btn Sussex Regth Btn Welch Regth Btn Yorkshire Regth Btn XIth Corps Cyclists
Port ug uese
Portuguese Infantry 2nd Btn Portuguese Infantry 3rd Btn Portuguese Infantry 7th Btn Portuguese Infantry 8th Btn Portuguese Infantry 10th Btn Portuguese Infantry 12th Btn Portuguese Infantry 15th Btn Portuguese Infantry 17th Btn Portuguese Infantry 20th Btn Portuguese Infantry 29th Btn
German
Divisions 1st Bavarian Reserve 8th Bavarian Reserve 4th Ersatz 10th Ersatz 16th Reserve 18th Reserve 35th 42nd 43rd Reserve 44th Reserve Reg iments 138th