US Marine Corps Pacific Theater of Operations
1944-45 I
II
PIO
I
~~--
II
<=)
I ...
I
II
m II
I II
SVC
GORDON L ROTTMAN entered the US Army in 1967, volunteered for Special Forces and completed training as a weapons specialist. He served in the 5th Special Forces Group in Vietnam from 1969-70 and subsequently in airborne infantry, long-range patrol, and intelligence assignments until retiring after 26 years. He was a special operations forces scenario writer at the Joint Readiness Training Center for 12 years, and is now a freelance writer.
OSPREY
Battle Orders · 8
PUBLISHING
US Marine Corps Pacific Theater of Operations 1944-45
Go rd 0 n L Rottm an •
Consultant editor Dr Duncan Anderson
Series editors Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic
Author's note
First published in Great Britain in 2004 by Osprey Publishing, Elms Court, Chapel Way, Botley, Oxford OX2 9Lp, United Kingdom. Email:
[email protected] © 2004 Osprey Publishing Ltd.
All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers. ISBN I 84176659 3 Editorial by lIios Publishing, Oxford, UK (www.iliospublishing.com) Design: Bounford.com, Royston, UK Maps by Bounford.com, Royston, UK Index by Alison Worthington Originated by The Electronic Page Company, Cwmbran, UK Printed and bound in China by L-Rex Printing Company Ltd 04 05 06 07 08
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 I
A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. For a catalog of all books published by Osprey Military and Aviation please contact: Osprey Direct USA, c/o MBI Publishing, P.O. Box I, 729 Prospect Ave, Osceola, WI 54020, USA E-mail:
[email protected] Osprey Direct UK, P.O. Box 140,Wellingborough, Northants, NN8 2FA, UK E-mail:
[email protected] www.ospreypublishing.com
Many contemporary abbreviations and styles have been used in this and the accompanying USMC volumes. Abbreviated dates: these follow the style adopted in official Marine histories and studies and in most other Marine-related references, namely day/month/year. Rank abbreviations: these too follow official Marine practice, e.g. BGen (Brigadier-General), MajGen (Major-General), LtGen (Lieutenant-General). Marine division and brigade: these are frequently abbreviated to MarDiv and MarBde respectively, following contemporary practice. Unit designations: Battalions organic to Marine regiments are designated with the battalion and regimental number, for example "1/1" for" I st Battalion, 7th Marines." Note also that "7th (etc.) Marines" always refers to a Marine regiment, whereas "4th Marine Division" is the correct way to list a Marine division: this distinction serves to avoid any confusion between regiments and divisions. Companies and batteries are designated in a similar fashion, for example "D/ I/2" for "Company D, I st Battalion, 2d Marines." Army infantry regiments are designated" I / I 06 Infantry" for "I st Battalion, 106th Infantry." Commanders' dates: When multiple unit commanders are listed for a unit, the date of the first commander is the date the unit commenced participation in the operation and not the date he assumed command. Officers shown as wounded in action (WIA), but not followed by a replacing officer were returned to duty. Unit trees and maps: In the unit tree diagrams and maps in this volume, the USMC designation symbol has not been shown throughout: unless otherwise indicated, all units are USMC, and are olive drab colour. US Army units are shown in mid-blue. Japanese units and positions are shown in red. For a key to the symbols used in this volume, see below.
Key to military symbols
xxx
xx
0 0 C8J 0
0
0
*
Corps
Division
[lli
~PN~
Infantry
Scout! Reconnaissance
Paymaster
Weapons
0
0
l2:SJ
[Q]
Anti-tank
Tank/armor
~
[S;J
0
~
Anti-aircraft
Headquarters and Service
Machine gun
Signal
Brigade
II
III
X
Military Police
EE bd G Medical
Supply
Engineer
Regiment
Service
G
Pioneer
* Defense battalions were sometimes identified by a regiment symbol. t
Groups organic to defense battalions were usually identified by a battalion symbol.
0
Battalion
t
rn Band
0 8
Company/battery
Artillery
00 00 Amphibian tractor
••
•••
I
0
0
E;J Defense
rn
~
EJ
Platoon
Section
Rocket artillery
Armored Mortar amphibian tractor
Headquarters
00
Motor Transport
B
Naval Construction (Battalion)
Key to unit identification Unit identifier
IZI .
Parent unit
Commander (+) with added elements (-) less elements
Contents Introduction
4
Combat mission
6
Expanding the Marine Corps
Unit organization
10
Unit designation practices • 1944-45 divisional organization • Amphibious Corps units
Tactics
22
The multi-division assault • Fire support • Small-unit tactics Tactical reserves • Logistics • Combat replacements
Weapons and equipment
30
Infantry weapons • Artillery • Tanks • Amphibian tractors
Command, control, communications, and intelligence
35
Command and control • Communications • Intelligence
Combat operations
39
Unit status • Guam • Peleliu • Iwo Jima • Okinawa
Reduction and occupation duty
91
Chronology
93
Bibliography
93
Abbreviations and linear measurements
94
Introduction
"The difficult we do immediately. The impossible takes a little longer"-the unofficial Marine Corps motto.
4
The US Army conducted 26 major amphibious landings in the Pacific Theater. The Marine Corps conducted 15 landings, but among these were some of the toughest fighting experienced against the Japanese.
As a component of the Navy Department, the US Marine Corps (USMC) served alongside the US Navy (USN) and US Coast Guard under the 18th Commandant of the Marine Corps, LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift (promoted to general in March 1945). The Commandant oversaw Headquarters, Marine Corps (HQMC) in Washington, DC, the Fleet Marine Force (FMF), and the Shore Establishment. HQMC was purely an administrative headquarters with no operational control over deployed combat units: it provided direction and policy, and had responsibility for personnel procurement, education, training, discipline, distribution, and discharge. The two broad organizations it oversaw, FMF and the Shore Establishment, were only administrative categories of units and organizations. Neither had a headquarters or commander. From July 1944 HQMC consisted of the Commandant of the Marine Corps, Assistant to the Commandant, Division of Plans and Policies (M-l Personnel, M-2 Intelligence, M-3 Operations, M-4 Supply, M-5 Training); Personnel, Quartermaster, and Paymaster departments; and Public Affairs, Administrative, and Aviation divisions. Two key activities that the HQMC took care of were the testing, evaluation, recommendation and standardization of operational equipment under the Marine Corps Equipment Board; and the training of officers at the Marine Corps Schools. Both of these entities were located at Marine Barracks, Quantico, Virginia. The FMF contained the Corps' operating elements: ground combat, aviation, service, and most training units. On July 12, 1944 Fleet Marine Forces, Pacific (FMFPac) was established under LtGen Holland M. Smith with headquarters at Pearl Harbor, TH. FMFPac, a type command, controlled most FMF units in the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) under the US Pacific Fleet. The Shore Establishment included Marine Corps Schools, supply depots, procurement stations, recruit training depots, and Marine barracks and detachments guarding naval stations and depots. All Marine Stateside installations, facilities, and camps fell under an organization called Posts and Stations, again a category of activities with no dedicated headquarters. By January 1945 the Marine Corps had grown to 35,598 officers, 5,384 officer candidates, and 366,353 enlisted Marines totaling 431,573 personnel (of whom 17,837 were female). The peak Marine Corps strength was at the end of August 1945-485,833 personnel. The FMF had grown to two amphibious corps, six divisions, 26 non-divisional artillery battalions (artillery, antiaircraft, defense), and numerous support and service units with a total of 224,855 Marines and sailors in its ground units. Marine Aviation had grown to five aircraft wings, 32 groups, and 135 squadrons with 118,030 personnel. The Marines had suffered defeats on Guam, Wake, and the Philippines in the war's early days and fought through the Solomons on Guadalcanal, the Russells, New Georgia, and Bougainville (discussed in Battle Orders 1: US Marine Corps in the Pacific Theater of Operations 1941-43). They went on to fight on New Britain, Tarawa, Roi-Namur, Eniwetok, Saipan, and Tinian (described in Battle Orders 7: USMC in the Pacific Theater of Operations 1943-44). This book addresses the formation of the 5th and 6th Marine Divisions (MarDiv) along with the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade (Prov MarBde), from which the 6th was organized, and the final and among the Corps' most brutal battles on Guam, Peleliu, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa. All six of the Corps' divisions were involved in these engagements. Further planned titles in this series will examine Marine Corps Aviation, and Marine raider and parachute units separately.
c::==:J Japanese occupied territory
+ - Marine Corps assaults . - Army assaults
J A PAN 50 I
150 mi
100 I
I
,
100
200 km
Marcus
;~:
~:" 0OSUMI GUNTO
-.
'.t
::i:'~: ..: •••
.~.
1 APR ~
NANSEI SHOTO
Gi~mami 0 Jima
Ie Shima
~~16APR45
~ if Okinawa Jima 26-27 Kerama Retto MAR 45
OGASAWARA GUNTO .:~.. Kita Iwo Jima KAZAN RETIO .:~.Iwo Jima
.:•• ~ 19 FEB 45
•• Minami Iwo Jima
:.:~
Parece Vela
() Pagan MARIANAS
PHILIPPINE
SEA 15 JUN 44
.;?: .:e:
:••-; ~::.
24 JUL 44 ~o Saipan Tinian 29 JUL 44 ,
Il Rota
() Guam
ULiTHIIS.
N
A
PALAU IS. ~~: 15 SEP 44 ;tf/ Peleliu :.? 17 SEP 44 Angaur
,.-.:.
The strategic situation in the Pacific Theater, late-1944--45.
,..~'.',' .•'.::.'"
..
... :;.(::::e:.• " TRUK IS. :,~,~ "':'; :': NEUTRALIZED . -:~.. ~:;:17-18 FEB 45
CAROLINE
ISLANDS
....:::-! ..... 5
•
•
Combat mission
The primary mission of the Marine Corps was to "Maintain a mobile force in immediate readiness as part of the US Fleet for use in operations involving shore objectives:'
6
By mid-August 1944 the Marine Corps had completed the conquest of the Marianas and would soon seize Peleliu. Marine artillery units were engaged in the Philippines in support of the Army, but would be withdrawn before the end of the year. The Marines were now poised for their final and most vicious battles: Iwo Jima and Okinawa Gunto. Upon completion of those operations FMFPac prepared for the invasion of the Japanese Home Islands. Instead its formations would qUickly reorient and deploy to Japan and North China as occupation forces. While the Corps still conducted a wide variety of supplementary missions, it was first and foremost an amphibious assault force. It could land, support, and sustain a multiple-division amphibious force on a hostile island and sweep it clean of resistance. It was more than just a specialized amphibious assault force though. It possessed the organic logistical and aviation support necessary to ensure success in a joint operational environment with other armed services. The Marine Corps' size and capabilities had multiplied almost 24-fold from the day of the Pearl Harbor attack. Even though the war with Japan was expected to grind on into late-1946, the Marine Corps would not organize any additional formations or combat units. Only small, specialized service units would be raised. The primary focus was to train additional replacements. Even with the anticipated invasion of the Home Islands lurking on the horizon, the Corps actually began to reduce in size. At the end of the war (V-J Day-September 2, 1945), the Marine Corps contained 484,631 personnel, a slight decrease from the previous month. At the same time the Navy contained 3,383,196 personnel and the Army had over 8,300,000. In the Pacific Theater the Army counted over 1,400,000 troops in the Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Armies; I, IX, X, XI, XI~ and XXIV Corps; and 22 divisions backed by massive service forces. Eight numbered Army air forces were serving in the Pacific. The Marine Corps was not the predominant ground combat force in the Pacific, as is sometimes stated, but its contribution far outweighed its size. The Pacific Theater was subdivided into what were essentially two "sub-theaters," the Pacific Ocean Area (POA) under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) under General Douglas MacArthur. The POA stretched from California to the coast of China and the entire north to south expanse of the ocean. The SWPA encompassed the Philippines, most of the Netherlands East Indies, Australia, New Guinea, and the Northern Solomons. Two of the Army's field armies, all six corps, and most of the 22 divisions fought in that area. Three of the Marine divisions (1st-3d) fought in a corner of this area (Northern Solomons and New Britain in 1942-43). Some Marine artillery units served briefly in the Philippines under the Army in 1944, alongside a Marine Aviation presence. The focus of the Marine Corps was the vast South and Central Pacific Areas, part of the POA command, a Navy responsibility. All six of the Marine divisions and a brigade fought there, where they conducted all but two of the Corps' 15 landings. Only the Army's Tenth Army, XIV and XXIV Corps, and the Americal, 7th, 25th, 27th, 77th, 81st, and 96th Infantry Divisions (InfDiv) conducted operations in the POA, where they executed six of the Army's 26 major landings. Although
these divisions fought ashore, in most cases they landed after D-Day and did not receive credit for an amphibious assault. On six occasions the 7th, 27th, 77th, and 81st InfDivs served under Marine command between 1944 and 1945.
Expanding the Marine Corps A new Marine brigade The pre- and early-war provisional 1st-3d MarBdes had been disbanded by November 1943. When the decision was made to form a new brigade the numbering began anew, as was traditional. The 22d and 4th Marines were assigned to the 1st Prov MarBde formed on April 19, 1944 at Tassafarougu, Guadalcanal. Its staff had assembled on Hawaii the previous month under BGen Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr. Assigned to IlIAC, the Brigade had a number of corps troops units attached. It was the largest brigade formed by the Marines and was sometimes referred to as a "two-regiment division." It departed Guadalcanal in June to stage at Eniwetok where the Army's 305th RCT, 77th InfDiv was attached for the July 1944 Guam operation. It began departing Guam at the end of August and was fully assembled at Tassafarougu in early September and expanded into the 6th MarDiv. Two new Marine divisions While the 1st-4th MarDivs were raised by drawing cadres from other regiments and battalions or splitting units to create new regiments or battalions, this was not the case with the 5th and 6th MarDivs. THE 5TH MARDIV The Marine Corps experienced some difficulty raising the 5th MarDiv as so many replacements were replenishing units engaged in the Pacific and at the same time filling the new 6th MarDiv. The "Spearhead Division" was activated at Camp Pendleton, CA on January 21, 1944. Many officers were reassigned from HQMC, Marine Corps Schools, the staffs of posts and stations, and various administrative assignments. Marine barracks and detachments were stripped of enlisted men qualified for overseas deployment. The deactivated 1st Marine Parachute Regiment's four battalions were absorbed into the new infantry regiments. Regardless of the difficulties in finding sufficient troops, 40 percent of the division had combat experience. The 5th Tank Battalion was the first to receive M4A3 Shermans. The 26th Marines had been activated at Camp Pendleton on January 10 with its 1st and 2d Battalions activated on the 19th and its 3d on February 15. The 27th Marines was activated on the same date as the 26th. The 28th Marines was activated on February 8 in lieu of assigning the existing separate 22d Marines then in the Pacific as had been proposed. The 13th Marines .[artillery] and its 1st, 3d, and 4th Battalions were activated on January 10, but the 2d Battalion had been activated as a separate unit on October 16, 1943 at Camp Lejeune, NC. The 16th Marines [engineer] had been activated at Camp Lejeune on December 15, 1943, but was deactivated at Pendleton on May 25, 1944. The 26th Marines (Reinforced) departed for the Pacific in July to serve as the 1st Prov MarBde's floating reserve during the Guam operation. Not needed ashore, it established itself in Hawaii at the end of the month. After undertaking training from the Troop Training Unit, Amphibious Training Command at San Diego, the Division echeloned into Hawaii between August and October 1944. THE 6TH MARDIV The 6th MarDiv was built around the 1st Prov MarBde at Tassafarougu, Guadalcanal, being activated on April 19, 1944. The Brigade's 4th and 22d Marines were assigned to the "Striking Sixth" along with the new 29th Marines from the States. Their reinforcing companies (engineer, medical, motor transport,
7
Marines in Europe and the Mediterranean Marine Detachment, American Embassy, London were the first Marines to arrive in Europ~, landing July 1941. It was briefly
The 5th MarDiv sleeve insignia, or "battle blaze," was approved in March 1944.The blue spearhead, from which the Division's nickname was derived, is symbolic of the Marine Corps amphibious assault mission. The "V" signifies the Division's number. The scarlet and gold colors are those of the Marine Corps.
deactivated in October 1942 and reestablished in January 1943. Marine Barracks, Navy Operating Base (NOB), Rosneath, Scotland was established in October 1942.The 1st Prov Marine Battalion arrived at Belfast, Ireland in May 1942 and was redesignated Marine Barracks, NOB, Londonderry (the insignia is shown here). Its advance detachment had arrived on January 26, 1942, and were credited as the first US troops to arrive in the European Theater after America's entry into the war. A few dozen Marines from this force participated in the North African landings as raiders in November 1942. They then formed Marine Detachment, NOB, Oran until deactivated in March
1943. Ships' detachment Marines from the cruiser USS Philadelphia accompanied Army units ashore for security missions during the invasion. In August 1944, 90 Marines from the cruisers USS Philadelphia and Augusta accepted the surrender of an 850-man German naval artillery battalion on islands outside of Marseilles during the invasion of Southern France. Marine officers served as observers with the British, and Marines took part in Office of Strategic Services covert operations in Europe. Hundreds of ships' detachment Marines served aboard battleships and cruisers. In total, seven Marines were killed, two were wounded, and eight were taken prisoner.
pioneer, service, tank) were redesignated as Companies A, B, and C respectively, of the new supporting battalions. The division headquarters battalion was organized from the 1st Prov MarBde's HQ MP, and signal companies while the reconnaissance company was raised from the 4th, 22d, and 29th Marines' reconnaissance platoons. The support battalions' headquarters were activated on Guadalcanal in September 'and October after the arrival of the 29th Marines. The 29th Marines was activated at Camp Lejeune on May 1, 1944, but its 1/29 had been raised on Guadalcanal by the 2d MarDiv in April 1944 and fought with the 4th MarDiv on Saipan. This meant that seven of the new division's infantry battalions, two of its artillery battalions, and approximately two-thirds of its supporting units had previously seen combat. The 15th Marines [artillery] was activated on Guadalcanal on October 23 from the Pack Howitzer Battalions of the 4th, 22d, and 29th Marines with the 4th Battalion activated on November 14. The Division undertook extensive training in preparation for the Okinawa assault. During that time all of its artillery battalions converted to 105mm howitzers. The 1st and 4th Battalions exchanged designations on July 1, 1945 after the battle. Fleet Marine Force, Pacific Established on July 12, 1944, FMFPac was a type command for all FMF ground and air forces in the POA. Located at Camp Catlin, Oahu, TH, it was under the command of LtGen Holland Smith. From September 17, 1944 it consisted of:
Headquarters and Service Battalion Force Artillery Force Antiaircraft Artillery Force Amphibian Tractor Group Force Reserve Force Service Troops FMF Supply Service FMF Transient Center IlIAC (1st, 6th MarDivs) VAC (2d*, 3d, 4th, 5th MarDivs) Aircraft, FMFPac * 2d MarDiv reassigned to IlIAC Dec 44.
8
The 6th MarDiv insignia was approved in October 1944. Melanesia, Micronesia, and Orient were the areas in which the Division fought, the Orient signifying the 4th Marines' pre-war China service.
On June 1, 1945 FMFPac was reorganized with Force Artillery, Force AAA, Force Amphibian Tractor Group, and Force Reserve disbanded and their units reassigned to the new Force Troops, FMFPac. LtGen Roy S. Geiger, former IlIAC commander, assumed command on July 5. In August FMFPac deployed a forward
headquarters to Guam to control Marine units tagged for the November invasion of Japan. In 1945 the 1st-6th MarDivs were assigned the following units: 1st MarDiv
2d MarDiv
3d MarDiv
4th MarDiv
5th MarDiv
6th MarDiv
rnfantry Regiments
Ist, 5th, 7th
2d, 6th, 8th
3d, 9th, 21 st
23d, 24th, 25th
26th, 27th, 28th
4th, 22d, 29th
Artillery Regiment
11th
10th
12th
14th
13th
15th
Engineer Battalion
1st
2d
3d
4th
5th
6th
HQ Battalion
1st MarDiv
2d MarDiv
3d MarDiv
4th MarDiv
5th MarDiv
6th MarDiv
Medical Battalion
1st
2d
3d
4th
5th
6th
MT Battalion
1st
2d
3d
4th
5th
6th
Pioneer Battalion
1st
2d
3d
4th
5th
6th
Service Battalion
1st
2d
3d
4th
5th
6th
Tank Battalion
1st
2d
3d
4th
5th
6th
To control and support garrison units, Garrison Forces, 14th Naval District had been activated on December 14, 1941 in Honolulu, TH. The 14th Naval District was the administrative headquarters for naval forces in Hawaii and outlying islands Oohnston, Midway, Palmyra, Wake, Samoa.) It controlled Marine barracks and detachments and defense battalions securing those islands and not assigned to the FMF as well as barracks and detachments in Australia and New Zealand.
Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, September 1944
II
III
H&S
II
II
x6
x2
x2
II
II
Amph Reeon
S&S
SVC
x4
iliAC
iliAC
VAC "I
II
sea:ast x3
II
x3
VAC
9
Unit organization In the period under discussion, there were further changes in Marine unit organization, but for the most part they were relatively minor compared to those of earlier years. Unit organization was considered close to optimal, and the basic structure of the 1945 Marine division remains in today's divisions.
Unit designation practices The raising of new divisions saw the activation of higher numbered infantry regiments than had previously existed in the Corps, akin to Army regimental numbers. Marine regimental designations did not include a branch or functional designation, nor was the term "regiment" used. They were officially known simply as, for example, 29th Marines. Marine infantry regiments were the 1st-9th and 21st-29th. The artillery regiments were the 10th-15th and the engineer regiments, in the process of being deactivated, were the 16th-20th. Those regimental numbers have never since been restored. Battalions within infantry regiments were designated 1st-3d. The regimental weapons company was designated, for example, Weapons Company, 4th Marines. With the elimination of the battalion weapons companies in early 1944, rifle companies were designated: 1st Battalion-A-C, 2d-E-G, and 3d-I, K, L (no company "J"). Companies D, H, and M had been the weapons companies. It was envisioned that the rifle companies would be redesignated to reflect this change, but that did not occur except in the 29th Marines, which was organized after the change. Artillery regiments consisted of four battalions with the 1st and 2d being armed with 75mm pack howitzers and the 3d and 4th with 105mm howitzers until all battalions were converted to 105mm in 1945. There were three batteries per battalion: 1st Battalion-A-C, 2d-D-F, 3d-G-I, and 4th-K-M (no battery "J"). Marine units were often designated with a Navy task-force designation for a specific operation. Such designations were part of the Navy task organization and communications plan. The Navy's World War II task force concept originated in Apri11940 when LCdr Maurice E. Curtis proposed that Navy task organization designations be standardized using prearranged numerical designators rather than the unwieldy system of functional nomenclatures then in use (such as Cruiser Scouting Force, Kyushu Bombardment Force, etc.). It was impossible to predict which task organization nomenclatures would be Regimental CombatTeam, 1944-45
I
IH&S
I
II
I
00
CWPN~
§
1••• r MP
10
••• s&S!svc
I
••• Delat JMCO)
I
required to support a given exercise or operation and a new communications plan had to be developed for each, making reorganization difficult during an exercise or operation. Prearranged numerical designators allowed for the easy activation and deactivation of task organizations and permitted the establishment of standard fleet-wide communications plans. Task force designations assigned to Marine and Army units as part of Navy task forces both were numerically distinct and served to indicate function. The Navy designation system used numbers beginning with that of the parent fleet; for example, TF 50 indicated Fifth Fleet and Central Pacific Task Forces. Subordinate task components are designated by decimal point numbers; for example, Task Group 51.1 indicated a task group assigned to Task Force 51. Task forces were asymmetrical with variable hierarchy, composition, and organization. The system afforded a great deal of flexibility with no fixed size specified for task component subdivisions of (from largest to smallest) task force (TF), task group (TG), task unit (TV), and task element (TE). Additionally, a specific task component could control other subordinate components of the same echelon; for example, TF 50 controlled three other task forces (TF 51, 57, 58) during the Okinawa campaign. One of these, TF 51, controlled five other task forces and three task groups. The task organization and hierarchy of Navy components could be quite intricate. Navy units seldom functioned as such. Flotillas, squadrons, and divisions were type commands comprising specific types of ships for administrative purposes. When task organized, ships from different units were assigned to task groups, units, and elements as required, resulting in mixtures of many different ships. Marine units were not as intricately task-organized. V sually only the amphibious corps and the divisions assigned to an operation as the "troops and landing force" were given task component numbers. Vnits subordinate to a division did not receive task component numbers, unless they were assigned an independent mission. Expeditionary troops' floating and area reserves did receive task component numbers. Practice still varied between divisions in the designation of combat teams (CT), with some being called regimental combat teams (RCT), a term borrowed from the Army. Even the placement of numbers varied. This also applied to battalion landing teams (BLT), with the term "landing team" (LT) being used by some. The terms were not standardized until after the war as RLT and BLT. The table below lists the combat teams for each Marine division:
1st MarDiv
CTI, 5, 7
4th MarDiv
RCT23, 24, 25
2d MarDiv
CT2,6,8
5th MarDiv
CT26,27,28
3d MarDiv
3d, 9th, 21 st CT
6th MarDiv
4th, 22d, 29th CT
By 1944 normal attachments to a CT during an assault included an amphibian tractor battalion; armored amphibian tractor, engineer, medical, and tank companies; MP and supply and service platoons; plus detachments from the joint assault signal company and a band section as litter bearers. More frequently pioneer and shore-party elements were retained under divisional control as were MT companies, though the latter might be attached after the landing. Tank companies were often retained under divisional control for the landing and then had companies attached once ashore with one or two platoons per infantry battalion. Once the landing had been accomplished the amphibian tractor battalion and armored amphibian tractor company reverted to corps control with elements being attached for supply, transport, and medical evacuation. Artillery battalions, while placed in direct support of specific CTs, were no longed assigned to them, being under divisional control.
II
1944-45 divisional organization 1st Marine Division, September 1944 xx 1st
1st 11th
I III
5th
7th~;;!.l II
II
1st
1st
2d
II 3d
1st
WPNS
4th
1st
1st
II
1st
PIO
Headquarters Battalion, Marine Division, 1945 1,794
649
465
~
•
•
•
56
War Dog
64
12 x 4.5In. RL
F-series TID, May 1944 Marine divisions were reorganized under the F-series May 5, 1944 TID between February and June 1944. Authority to reorganize was given prior to final approval of the TID and draft TIOs were issued. It was under this organization that the divisions would fight in the Marianas, on Peleliu, and on Iwo Jima. The infantry regiment was streamlined, the artillery regiment was reduc~d to four battalions, the engineer regiment was officially eliminated (though retained well into 1944) the special weapons battalion was deleted, and the amphibian tractor battalion permanently assigned to FMF (to which it had been detached since January 1944.) This division had a paper strength of 17,846: 843 Marine officers and 15,949 enlisted Marines with 119 Navy officers and 955 enlisted men, but regular changes of subordinate units' authorized strengths saw constant fluctuation.
12
G-series TID, September 1945 The September 4, 1945 G-series TID began to be implemented using draft TIDs in January 1945 in the 1st, 2d, and 6th MarDivs in preparation for Okinawa. The infantry and artillery regiments were most affected by this TID, with other divisional units only partly reorganized. The other divisions began to reorganize after Iwo Jima to prepare for the November 1945 invasion of
Kyushu, Japan, the southernmost of the Home Islands. Many of the changes specified by this T10 were already being implemented regarding the permanent assignment of small units previously assigned to FMFPac. The new division had a strength of 19,176 troops, although the authorized strength of the divisions differed, as not all components were fully reorganized under the new T/O. On average, the divisions were 1,000-2,000 men over-strength. Part of this was due to an authorized complement of Navy medical personnel. Medical units committed to Guam were 3-5 percent above the TIO and on Peleliu eight additional Corpsmen per infantry battalion allowed for two to be attached to each rifle platoon. In the below table, Marine warrant officer (WO) strength is included in the officer strength; 91 warrant officers were assigned to a division during this period. 1945
Marine Corps
Month
Officer
Navy Enlisted
Officer
Enlisted
Jan-Apr
856
16,069
123
955
May
923
16,844
136
948
Jun
939
16,833
136
948
Jul
961
17,171
136
948
Al:Jg
962
17,182
136
948
Sep
962
17,197
136
948
It must be noted that the above unit strength figures are not absolute. Minor modifications to Tlas were frequent, resulting in slight changes, and units were also reorganizing under draft T/Os. Additionally, the demands of combat, introduction of new equipment, and frequent availability of additional personnel and weapons saw units entering combat organized and equipped differently than already obsolete Tlas specified. Marine Division, G-I 00, September 4, 1945
xx
II
~ I
WPNS
13
The infantry regiment The infantry regiment changed little throughout the war, but the most significant changes were made in 1944 with the reallocation of crew-served weapons, introduction of new weapons, and refinements in subunit organization. The 1944 regiment has been described in detail in Battle Orders 7, and only a brief discussion is provided here. The 1944 infantry regiment possessed a regimental headquarters and service (HQ&S) company, three infantry battalions, and a weapons company. The HQ&S company consisted of a company HQ and regimental HQ section (with staff sections and aid station), communication and service platoons, and intelligence and paymaster sections. The scout and sniper platoon was eliminated and the former supply section was expanded into a large service platoon. The regimental weapons company had a headquarters, three platoons with four 37mm M3A1 antitank (AT) guns each, and a platoon with four self-propelled mount (SPM) M3 halftrack-mounted 75mm guns. It possessed a number of spare bazookas and .30-cal. and .50-cal. machine guns, to be loaned to other regimental units as required. Infantry battalions had a HQ company and three rifle companies. The HQ company had a company HQ and battalion HQ (with staff sections and aid station); intelligence and supply sections; and communication and mortar (4 x 81mm M1) platoons. The battalion weapons companies (D, H, M) had been eliminated with the mortars reassigned to the HQ company; the rifle companies' weapons platoons had been converted to machine-gun platoons, with their mortar sections reassigned to company HQ. Rifle companies had a headquarters, three rifle platoons, and a machine-gun platoon. The company HQ had three officers and SO enlisted Marines, which included a one-officer, 19-enlisted mortar section with three 60mm M2s. There were three bazookas in the company HQ to be allocated as necessary. The HQ section had a radio jeep with a quarter-ton trailer. The 56-man rifle platoons had a headquarters with a lieutenant platoon leader, a platoon sergeant (his rank and position), platoon guide (sergeant), demolitions corporal, and three messengers. The three 13-man rifle squads were organized under a new schema giving them three fire and maneuver elements, each led by a designated leader. Infantry Regiment, Marine Division f-seriesT/O March 27, 1944 HQ&S Company
249 996
213
HQ Company
270
17
Company HQ
26
Battalion HQ
131
HQ Company Company HQ
Rifle Company (x3) Company HQ
3,412
HQ&S Company
1,014
Battalion HQ
E-series T/O May I, 1945 Infantry Battalion (x3)
261
Infantry Battalion (x3)
81 mm Mortar Platoon
165 58
267 53
81 mm Mortar Platoon
58
Assault Platoon
55
Rifle Company (x3)
242
Company HQ
51
Rifle Platoon (x3)
56
Rifle Platoon (x3)
45
Machine Gun Platoon
44
Machine Gun Platoon
56
Weapons Company
208
Weapons Company
175
76
Company HQ
51
37mm AT Gun Platoon (x3)
32
37mm AT Gun Platoon (x2)
40
7Smm SP Gun Platoon
36
IOSmm SP Gun Platoon
44
Company HQ
14
3,463
Each squad had a squad leader (M1 carbine) and three four-man fire teams designated Nos. 1-3, each with a team leader (corporal, M1 rifle, M7 grenade launcher), rifleman (M1 rifle, M7 grenade launcher), automatic rifleman (M1918A2 BAR), and an assistant automatic rifleman (M1 rifle, M7 launcher). Initially the assistant BAR-men were armed with carbines and M8 grenade launchers, but these were soon replaced by more effective M1 rifles and in practice squad leaders often carried a rifle or SMG. The 44-man machine-gun platoon had six .30-cal. M1919A4 LMGs subdivided into three two-squad sections. The company HQ section had six reserve .30-cal. M1917A1 HMGs, which could be substituted for the LMGs. Within the regiment were 44 quarter-ton jeeps (eight with radios), five jeep ambulances, 23 one-ton cargo trucks, and two one-ton light repair trucks. Additional transport would be provided by the MT battalion in the form of 2.5-ton cargo trucks. The 1945 reorganization saw the early implementation of the May 1 TID for use on Okinawa. The regiment's strength was increased by only 86 men, but its capabilities were improved. The regimental HQ&S company lost 12 men with no change in organization. The regimental weapons company was reduced by 33 men, mainly by the loss of one of the three 37mm AT gun platoons, although the remaining platoons increased by eight men, and the deletion of 25 men from the cumbersome company HQ. The four halftrack 75mm M3 guns were each replaced by 105mm M7 self-propelled howitzers with the platoon gaining eight men. The infantry battalions were enlarged by 84 troops. There was a reallocation of personnel between company and battalion headquarters. A 55-man assault platoon was added and is discussed in the Small-unit tactics section on page 24. Rifle company strength was reduced by five men. The 20-man mortar section was retained in the company HQ. The rifle platoon changed only with the loss of the demolition corporal to the assault platoon. The machine-gun platoon was increased by 12 men with the addition of two M1919A4 LMG squads (two
Marine Infantry Regiment structure, 1944-45
~ I
rH&S r
I
~1ZJ
I.•
I
~PND
I I~m.ml I I
m
E~ I
F~ I
G~
15
Rifle Company, 1945 242
•••
Co HQ
51
Rifle
56
45
I
••
••
Platoon HQ
3x60mm 2x.3O LMG
Headquarters Company, Infantry Battalion, 1945 270
i
Co HQ
Bn HQ
••
••
II i
i
••
••
Message Center & Messenger
2x81mm Battalion Headquarters
Headquarters and Service Company, Marine Infantry Regiment, 1945
249
I
1
Co HQ
Regt HQ
••
••
III
Intelligence
I
••
[j
Regimental Headquarters
Weapons Company, Marine Infantry Regiment, 1945
175
Co
4x37mm
16
44
40
HQ~~~51
4x105mm
more guns to total eight). This allowed a two-squad section to be attached to each rifle platoon as was past practice, plus it provided an additional section offering the company commander more flexibility. These sections could substitute the six reserve M1917A1 HMGs for LMGs. Regimental motor vehicle strength remained roughly the same, but with minor adjustments: 46 quarter-ton jeeps (12 with radios), five jeep ambulances, 20 one-ton cargo trucks, and a single M3 halftrack as a command vehicle. Under the E and F-series TlOs there were no pistols in the infantry regiment. The G-series T/O replaced some M1 carbines with 408 .45-cal. M1911A1 pistols, mainly issued to medical and headquarters personnel. On Okinawa most of these retained their carbines. The artillery regiment The 1944 artillery regiment had two battalions (1st, 2d) with M1A1 pack howitzers and two (3d, 4th) with 105mm M2Al howitzers. This structure allocated two 75mm battalions in direct support of the two assault regiments while the reserve regiment could be supported by one of the 105mm battalions, with the other 105mm battalion in general support. Both 105mm battalions could provide general support. Battalion HQ&S batteries consisted of a battalion HQ, battery HQ and maintenance sections, and communication, operations, and service platoons. Artillery batteries were organized into three elements. The battery HQ had headquarters, local security, and maintenance sections. The battery detail had headquarters, forward observer, and communication sections. The firing battery had a headquarters, an ammunition section, and four howitzer sections, each with one piece irrespective of caliber. The intent of the 1945 reorganization was to make the Marine division artillery regiment mirror Army divisional artillery-for example, three 105mm and one 155mm howitzer battalions. The Marine's 155mm howitzer battalions were not reassigned to the divisions for Okinawa, but were retained under the corps artillery. All 75mm pack howitzer battalions were converted to 105mm for Okinawa, with the sole exception of 1st MarDiv's 1/11, giving the divisions four 105mm battalions. The divisional artillery regiments' 4th battalions were to be reorganized as 636-man 155mm howitzer battalions in time for the invasion of Japan. Sound Ranging Sections 1-5 were activated in August 1944 and attached to artillery regiments. Their role was to locate enemy artillery, mortar, and rocket positions using sound locators. By the end of the year they had been absorbed into the regiments.
Marine Artillery Regiment, 1945 III
8
2 617 •
I
I II
I
~. 592
I H&S .1 249
~ I
I
IH&sJl66
I
I,;:'M ~42 4 x l05mm Howitzer
17
Artillery Regiment, Marine Division f-series T/O 1944
2,639
G-series T/O 1945
2,617
HQ&S Battery
229
HQ&S Battery
249
75mm Artillery Battalion (x2)
603
105mm Artillery Battalion (x4)
592
HQ&S Battery 75mm Howitzer Battery (x3) I05mm Artillery Battalion (x2)
159
HQ&S Battery
148
I05mm Howitzer Battery (x3) 142
166
602
HQ&S Battery
161
I05mm Howitzer Battery (x3)
147
The engineer regiments Engineer regiments were organized between September 1942 and December 1943 from the existing divisional engineer and pioneer battalions plus a naval construction or Seabee battalion (NCB). The new regiment would control the division's shore party. Under the regiment the engineer battalion became the 1st, pioneer battalion the 2d, and the NCB the 3d, though it was often known by its original two-digit Navy designation. Each battalion in the engineer regiment had a HQ platoon and three companies. The engineer regiments were ordered deactivated in March 1944 and the NCBs reassigned to the Navy. The deactivation of the 2d, 3d, and 4th MarDivs' regiments, who were preparing to assault the Marianas, was delayed as they were integrated into the maneuver plan. The 18th, 19th, and 20th Marines were deactivated in August and September; the 3d MarDiv's 19th Marines were the last to see action, on Guam. The divisions retained the engineer and pioneer battalions, and they were redesignated with the parent division's number. An NCB was habitually attached to each division and amphibious corps to support shore parties. The Iwo lima assault divisions retained a Commanding Officer, Service Troops. This colonel and his small staff were an element of the division HQ. He controlled the medical, MT, pioneer, and service battalions as well as the shore party. After Iwo lima the various divisional battalions were lumped together as "division troops" to operate under the control of provisional tank, engineer, shore party, and service groups, usually commanded by the senior battalion commander within the group. The 1945 reorganization saw an almost 100-man increase in the division HQ and an even larger increase in the HQ battalion's HQ company. The signal
18
The 2d Marine War Dog Platoon crosses a bridge as the 3d MarDiv moves north on Guam. Doberman Pinchers were the most widely used of the war dogs.
Tank Battalion, 1945 623
113
170
1 x M4A3
•••
Co HQ
110 3x M4A3 3xM4A3
company was increased by 66 men, but the MP and reconnaissance companies were slightly reduced. While the G-series T/0 called for the assignment of rocket and war dog platoons to the HQ battalion, this did not officially occur until after the war. Rocket detachments (provisional), with 12 one-ton trucks mounting three 4.sin. launcher racks, and Marine war-dog platoons were habitually attached to divisions though. The joint assault signal company, with the "joint" dropped, was made organic in May 1945. Engineer, medical, and pioneer battalions experienced little change in 1945. The number of trucks increased; the total number of transport vehicles within the division rose from 1,548 to 1,918. The inclusion of a 349-man automotive repair company to the MT battalion greatly increased the division's ability to maintain its rolling stock. The DUKW-equipped 1st-6th Marine Amphibian Truck Companies were attached to divisions as necessary, along with similar Army companies, but in July 1945 they were formally assigned to divisions. There were approximately SO DUKW-3s3 2.s-ton amphibian trucks (a.k.a. "Ducks") per 178-man company. While the service battalion remained at about the same strength, its s02-man service and supply company was broken into two companies of more manageable size, and its ordnance company enlarged. The tank battalion changed little, retaining its three companies each with four three-tank platoons and three in the company HQ (one with an M1 dozer blade.) There were recommendations to return to the pre-1944 organization of three five-tank platoons, but this did not occur until after the war. One drawback was that the three-tank platoons could not remain effective even if they lost just one tank. Nine M4A3 flamethrower tanks mounting the E-12R71 flamegun, replacing the bow machine gun, were to be added to the HQ&S company, but this did not occur. The ability to retrieve damaged tanks in rough
The 19th ·Marines [engineer] erected cable tramways to evacuate wounded troops during the fighting on Guam's ridges. This spared litter bearers a great deal of effort and saved lives because of the speed with which casualties could be moved to a field hospital. Supplies would be sent back up the ridge on the return trip.
19
terrain was critical. In most campaigns virtually every tank within a battalion was repeatedly damaged or knocked out. More often than not they could be repaired and returned to action. For this reason M32B2/3 recovery vehicles were to be increased from three to 14 per battalion, but this too did not occur. Division Troops, Marine Division F-series T/O May 5, 1944
G-series T/O September 4, 1945
Division HQ
257
Division HQ
369
HQ Battalion
1,004
HQ Battalion
1,794
HQ Company
483
HQ Company
649
Signal Company
292
Signal Company
348 99
MP Company
102
MP Company
Reconnaissance Company
127
Reconnaissance Company
113
Assault Signal Company*
465
Rocket Platoon* War Dog Platoon* Engineer Battalion
904
Engineer Battalion
HQ Company
307
HQ Company
Engineer Company (x3)
199
Medical Battalion HQ&S Company
599
Engineer Company (x3) Medical Battalion
89
HQ&S Company
56 64 875 275 200 609 104
Medical Company (x5)
102
Medical Company (x5)
101
Motor Transport Battalion
539
Motor Transport Battalion
906
HQ&S Company
194
HQ&S Company
76
Transport Company (x3)
115
Transport Company (x4)
84
Automotive Repair Company 349 Amphibian Truck Company* Pioneer Battalion
745
HQ Company
127
Pioneer Company (x3)
206
Service Battalion HQ Company
748
Pioneer Battalion HQ Company Pioneer Company (x3) Service Battalion
68
HQ Company
145. 740 134 202 732 57
Service and Supply Company
502
Service Company
276
Ordnance Company
178
Ordnance Company
242
Supply Company
157
Tank Battalion HQ&S Company' Tank Company (x3)
630
Tank Battalion
123 169
623
HQ&S Company
113
Tank Company (x3)
170
* Existing FMF units habitually attached to divisions until reassigned after the war.
Amphibious Corps units
20
By war's end, IlIAC and VAC had evolved into mature assault forces possessing all necessary assets to accomplish their missions. In November 1944 the 1st and 2d Provisional Antiaircraft Artillery Groups were formed to control AAA battalions assigned to IlIAC and VAC Artillery respectively. The 1st and 2d Amphibian Tractor Groups (Provisional) were formed for IlIAC and VAC in April and]uly 1945 respectively. They controlled amphibian tractor and armored amphibian tractor
battalions attached to divisions for assaults. The corps HQ and service battalion consisted of HQ, medical, MP, service, signal, and MT companies. Existing bomb disposal and topographic companies were assigned in March and April 1945. The 1st-6th Separate Wire Platoons were absorbed into the corps signal battalions in January 1945. Although the assigned and attached units could vary significantly, at war's end an amphibious corps typically consisted of the following units: • Corps Troops-corps HQ and service, signal, medical, MT, separate engineer, MP, and NC* battalions; a service regiment, and other small attached units. • Amphibian Tractor Group (Prov)-an armored amtrac and four or five amtrac battalions. • Corps Artillery-Prov Field Artillery Group with three 155mm gun and howitzer battalions each; Prov AAA Group with 3 or 4 AAA battalions. • Three Marine divisions (reinforced). * Additional NCBs could to be attached to corps including special NCBs (stevedores.)
The mature Amphibious Corps, 1945
o I
Amtrac:".I.!".raEI • ·. ·. ·. ·. . Groupb:~::d · .·.t5l:!i.··.·.·
",•. • •
Arty"
corpS"··',.··'",.;""I ..........•................... ·.1.•",:,'
II
~
I ~ I
E8 I
~I I II
I@)
r . . . '. .:I . •. . . . . . . . . '.•
FieldGrouPL:-J ArtY .•
I
II
1'1~:~=ru
II
00 I
~ I
o II
I
II
I~.~..~ I III
I svc]. 21
Tactics The multi-division assault
The concept of a Marine Division assault landing.
Saipan was the first Marine two-division assault (one with two divisions landing simultaneously). It was also the first two-division assault in the Pacific. This became the norm, with two divisions landing on Guam (the reinforced brigade was a division for all practical purposes), Iwo lima, and Okinawa. Two divisions landed on Tinian, but the second followed the first ashore on to a firmly established beachhead. Peleliu was the last single-division assault. The second of the two-division landings, Guam, was somewhat risky and an exception in that the two forces landed seven miles apart. It required eight days of hard fighting to link up. The two-division assault required the centralization of some assets under the amphibious corps. Few support units, other than small, specialized units, were
REEF LINE
II
3~2 RESERVE III
2~ III
3~ 22
RESERVE
attached directly to divisions. Amphibian tractor battalions would be attached to divisions to support the assault, but then reverted to corps control under the amphibian tractor group. Engineer, medical, signal, and service units were retained under corps in taskorganized groups. The corps artillery retained control of non-divisional artillery battalions, although battalions were designated to support specific divisions. AAA battalions were also concentrated under a group. Corps control of these units under groups allowed them to be attached to divisions as necessary, to build combat power where needed. Army and Navy units were attached to these groups to fulfill specialized tasks or to make up for shortfalls in similar Marine units, especially amtrac, Duck, and medical units. In most instances, divisions landed with two regiments abreast. Only twice did divisions land three regiments simultaneously-the 3d MarDiv on Guam, and the 1st MarDiv on Peleliu.
SECTOR
5
SECTOR
6
Fire support As joint operations became the norm, it was common for Marine and Army artillery battalions to be crossattached to support each other. This allowed artillery to be massed and fire missions conducted under centralized control. This was practiced on Saipan, Guam, and Okinawa. Marine field artillery officers received much of their training at the Army's Field Artillery School at Ft Sill, OK and used the same forward observer and fire-direction procedures. The advent of the joint assault signal company GASCO) attached to each division greatly improved requests and coordination for field artillery, naval gunfire, and close air support. Activated between October 1943 and November 1944, these units' first combat was at Roi-Namur in February 1944. Their 1944 strength was 375 Marine and 124 Navy personnel and in 1945 they had 406 Marine and 156 Navy personnel. Their shore and beach party communication, shore fire-control, and air-liaison sections were subdivided into 13 parties or teams that were attached to each divisional, regimental, and battalion headquarters. In May 1945 the "Joint" was dropped from their designations, and they were assigned to division HQ battalions.
4in. gun battleships (OBB), heavy cruisers (CA), and light cruisers (CL) were assigned specific firesupport sectors, as shown in this Iwo jima D-Day fire plan. Rather than placing ships in support of specific units as done with field artillery, ships' spotters became intimately familiar with the terrain and targets in their assigned sector. Destroyers designated as "sniper ships" cruised along the coast looking for targets of opportunity.
The Ist Prov Field Artillery Group's fire-direction center on Iwo jima. Set up in a former japanese bunker, it coordinated fire requests for the group's two 155mm howitzer battalions.
23
A IOSmm M2AI howitzer emplaced to support the 3d MarDiv as it pushes north on Guam. The absence of Japanese counterfire capability at this time is demonstrated by the lack of a protective berm and the unprotected living tent behind each gun position.
Fire-support landing craft The first test use of new firesupport landing craft was on the Treasury Islands in October 1943, while the first large-scale use was in the Marshalls in February 1944.They were based mostly on the landing craft, infantry (LCI), either of new construction or conversion. These gunboats were armed with 4.Sin. barrage rockets, 4.2in. mortars, Sin. guns, and 40mm and 20mm automatic cannons. They included LCI (Rocket), (Gun), and (Mortar), but were armed with a mixture of other weapons besides their primary one. Their role was to advance toward shore ahead of the amtrac-borne assault waves, maintaining a high rate of fire from all weapons directed at the beach and immediately adjacent areas. They halted just outside the reef line with the assault waves passing through. Their fire was shifted to inland targets and the flanks of the beaches. Prior to the landing they covered UDT frogmen working offshore. Once the landing was accomplished they would support units operating adjacent to the shore, attack coastal targets of opportunity, and conduct screening patrols around transport anchorages to interdict Japanese suicide boats and counterlandings. 24
The control of close air support, defined as within 1,000 yards of the frontline, was further improved with the formati0!1 of Landing Force Air Support Control Units (LFASCU) at the end of 1944. These 87-man units, commanded by a colonel, provided direct control of fighter-bombers after the amphibious phase of the assault was completed. An LFASCU-1 detachment tested the concept on Iwo Jima and three LFASCUs were committed to Okinawa. Field artillery played an increasingly important role as the war progressed. Initially relying on comparatively light divisional artillery augmented by the heavy long-range artillery of defense battalions, additional non-divisional and progressively heavier artillery was fielded, as demonstrated in the following table. Marine/Army artillery battalions Island
Guam
7Smm
10Smm
155mm
ISSmm
Howitzer
Howitzer
Howitzer
Gun
4/0
2/3
2/1
I/O
Peleliu
2/0
2/3
1/1
I/O
Iwo Jima
6/0
6/0
2/0
0/0
Okinawa*
110
8/12
3/7
3/6
* Additional Army field artillery battalions present: I x 4.5in. rocket, 2 x Bin. howitzer.
Small-unit tactics The Japanese adopted a defensive concept of well dug-in, mutually supporting fortifications. As a result, highly refined tactics were developed to ensure coordination between infantry, tanks, and supporting weapons. It was not a simple matter of directly assaulting a pillbox or cave. Two or more other Japanese positions would cover the objective, as well as numerous concealed rifle and light machine-gun positions scattered through the area. These would have to be suppressed by combinations of close air support, field artillery, naval gunfire, mortars, direct tank and self-propelled gun fire, as assault teams maneuvered into position for the close-in attack. Smoke might be used to conceal friendly movements. It required a great deal of coordination to effectively and safely employ all these weapons simultaneously on different targets. Due to the numbers, types, and locations of enemy positions, the terrain, and the supporting weapons available, no two situations were alike. While a pool of bazookas, flamethrowers, and demolition kits were available to rifle platoons at battalion level, there were no dedicated crewmen assigned to operate these weapons. Infantrymen were trained to operate them and squads were task-organized into assault teams, but this proved less than
desirable. The 1st MarDiv on Peleliu fielded what were generally called "battalion weapons platoons." The 60-man units were armed with 19 flamethrowers (including spares) and three bazookas plus heavy demolitions teams. Five-man flamethrower groups, with two flamethrowers, were attached to each rifle company for the assault, which received additional groups as required. The personnel were mostly drawn from company headquarters, leaving them 10-15 men understrength. This successful concept was formalized in the G-series TIO and employed on Okinawa. The 55-man "assault platoon" was organic to the battalion HQ company. It had a 10-man headquarters and three l5-man assault sections, one attached to each rifle company. A section had a sergeant leader and two seven-man squads with a corporal squad leader and three two-man teams: flamethrower, bazooka, and demolitions (20-lb Ml and M2 tetrytol satchel charges). This provided fully trained crews to operate these weapons, who acted as a coordinated squad. This also allowed rifle platoons to maintain their organization rather than provide weapon operators. The assault platoon had twelve M2-2 flamethrowers and eight M9 bazookas including spares. Elements of engineer companies were also task-organized into assault teams with demolition charges and flamethrowers. Advancing tank-infantry teams usually by-passed small enemy pockets to maintain the attack's tempo. They would knock out significant strongpoints and continue forward against light resistance. Following support rifle platoons would complete the mopping up. Engineer companies attached to regiments were sometimes employed for this purpose. The Marines improvised weapons to deal with large, stoutly constructed fortifications and extensive cave and tunnel systems. Bunker bombs were made using entire cases of tetrytol, C-2, or Composition C. Several 2.25 or 2.5 lb demolition charges with a short delay fuze were wired to 8lmm mortar shells and dropped into caves and airshafts. Large cave systems proved to be particularly troublesome because of their depth, multiple levels, and twisting passageways. Fuel hoses were laid to caves and powered fuel pumps pumped in hundreds of gallons of gasoline, which was then ignited by M15 white .phosphorus grenades or satchel charges.
A grenade has been dropped into an Iwo jima cave entrance. During mopping up, japanese-American (Nisei) interpreters from divisional language sections would attempt to persuade any japanese soldiers inside to surrender. If the appeals were ignored, the position was destroyed.
Assault Squad, 1945 Six squads per battalion assault platoon.
a
b
c
d
e
Legend a Squad Leader (carbine) b Flamethrower Operator (flamethrower, pistol)
c Assistant Flamethrower Operator (carbine) d Rocket Launcher Operator (bazooka, pistol)
e Assistant Rocket Launcher Operator (carbine) f Demolition Man (rifle)
25
Tactical reserves Once the beachhead was secured and sufficient supplies and support units were ashore, the infantry regiments with attached armor maneuvered to increase the size of the secured area and cut the island in two. With one end of the island secure or enemy remnants isolated in pockets, most regiments were now deployed on-line and began to push toward the far end of the island. Reserve units would mop up the by-passed pockets. At nightfall, a defense was established to prevent enemy infiltration through the frontline. Occasionally ill-coordinated counterattacks were fought off. If possible regiments kept two battalions in the line and one in reserve. Battalions and companies did the same, keeping a subunit in reserve-two up, one back. A company's rear platoon was referred to as a "support platoon" rather than a "reserve." The frequency of rotation depended on the tactical situation, casualty rates, and fatigue. Units were rotated during lulls, but never at night. There was no movement in the vicinity of the frontline at night, otherwise it would draw friendly fire. Units in reserve were able to draw supplies and ammunition, conduct weapons and equipment maintenance, and perhaps grab a hot meal. and a little sleep. Islands that were wider across the central portion or at the ends sometimes forced regiments to deploy all three battalions on-line. Occasionally a division's three regiments were deployed on-line. In either case some form of reserve was constituted; for example, a regiment might retain a rifle company, a tank platoon, and part of the regimental weapons company as a reserve, or a battalion from the division's reserve regiment might be attached as the regimental or even division reserve. Once ashore, it became increasingly common for battalions to be cross-attached between regiments, even between Army and Marine divisions. Reserves were held at all levels. For the amphibious corps (troops and landing force) usually only a regiment, detached from one of the assault divisions or from an uncommitted division, was held as a "corps floating reserve" available for immediate commitment. It would be released to its parent division soon after the beachhead was established. The assault division contributing this regiment retained only a battalion as its reserve. The "expeditionary troops floating reserve" was usually a division. It additionally served as the D-Day divisionary force conducting a landing demonstration at another possible beach. This effort was to mislead the enemy into redeploying troops there (which they seldom did) and prevented them from redeploying troops from that sector to the actual landing beaches (in which it was usually successful). Once the operation ashore was well underway and success certain, the floating reserve division was sent back to its base, but remained on standby. A regiment might be retained as an expeditionary troops floating reserve though. Another Army
26
A reserve battalion moves forward on a north Guam road rebuilt by the 19th Marines and 25th Seabee Battalion.
or Marine division based some distance away was designated the"area reserve." It might take up to two weeks for it to deploy if needed. There were no instances of area reserves being committed.
Logistics Logistical support had improved vastly from the early days, when the Guadalcanal operation was nicknamed"Operation Shoestring." American industry was turning out materiel at a high rate and the Marines were more closely integrated with the Army's vast Services of Supply. New Marine supply and service units had been activated. To support the assault phase, landing craft pre-loaded with supplies were held at their transports by dispatchers and would not be released to head for shore until called for by the support commanders. This prevented congestion on the beachhead. Most units departed on an operation with up to 30 days of rations, medical supplies, and other materiel. Not all supplies would be landed immediately, but were brought ashore to maintain a S-10-day stock in dumps. After the South Pacific battles the expeditionary force brought its own water. What little local potable water there was became quickly contaminated. The "unit of fire" concept allocated an arbitrary number of rounds per weapon based on average daily expenditure. Early in the war the Army and Marines often specified different qualities of ammunition, but this was standardized in 1944.
Class I
(rations)
12 days
Class II
(organ.lindivid. equipment)
20 days
Class III
(fuels and lubricants)
20 days
Class IV
(miscellaneous supplies)
20 days (30 days' medical supplies)
ClassV
(ammunition)
7 units of fire ground weapons, 10 units AA weapons
Seven units of fire for artillery was standard. Smith recommended 10 after Saipan because of occasional shortages, but it appears that seven remained the standard because of limited shipping space. Note that units of fire were a means of calculating the quantity of ammunition with which to deploy and was not the basic load carried by an individual or crew-served weapon. To improve logistics support to assault divisions, increased service support was provided by attaching a field depot to amphibious corps. This was first done during the Saipan assault. Field depots varied in strength (300-4,000 with attachments), but generally each had one HQ engineer, general supply, MP, MT, ordnance, and signal company plus several attached ammunition and depot companies. These latter units were manned by colored troops and were essentially
Units of fire, Central Pacific Area Weapon Rounds .30-cal. carbine 45 .30-cal. rifle 100 500 .30-cal. BAR 1,500 .30-cal. machine gun 12-gauge shotgun 25 14 .45-cal. pistol 200 .45-caL submachine gun 600 .50-cal. machine gun 540 20mmAA gun 100 37mm AT or tank gun 37mm or 40mm AA gun 270 100 60mm mortar 81mm mortar 100 300 75mm pack howitzer 75mm SPM, tank gun, LVT howitzer 150 90mm AA gun J 25 I05mm howitzer 200 105mm SP howitzer 100 155mm howitzer 150 155mm gun I 00 Hand grenade I per man AT rifle grenade launcher 2 2.36in. rocket launcher 6
The agile M29C ("C" means Conversion indicating it is amphibious, unlike its M28 and M29 predecessors) proved to be an excellent vehicle for resupplying frontline units. Here 75mm pack howitzer ammunition is u~nloaded from a one-ton cargo trailer.
27
Scenes like-this give the impression of a disorganized beachhead. Despite the chaos, the scattered boxes of ammunition are not indicative of undisciplined unloading. Up to 700 Ibs of ammunition and water were simply dumped over the sides of assault amtracs as they crossed the beach. This could be recovered by details from frontline units needing hasty resupply.
Marines on Okinawa in a rear area after their company has been rotated into battalion reserve. While reserve units had to maintain local security and often mopped up by-passed enemy pockets, it also allowed them a bit of rest, an occasional hot meal, and essential weapons maintenance. The BAR-man to the left has typically removed the weapon's bipod and flash suppressor.
28
stevedore units. Not all elements of the field depot would deploy to the objective island, so their task organization varied greatly. Having the depot in the beachhead to manage and issue ammunition and supplies greatly sped up the requisition and issue process. It also allowed divisional service battalions to provide direct support to the regiments, and not be distracted with requesting supplies through the corps headquarters. In June 1945 the 7th and 8th Field Depots were redesignated the 7th and 8th Service Regiments and attached to IlIAC and VAC. Redesignating them as regiments was an effort to improve the sagging morale of service troops. Increased use was made of air transport to deliver ammunition and supply items expended at higher than forecast rates; grenades, mortar illumination rounds, flamethrower propellant compressed nitrogen bottles, and plasma, for example. Frontline units were sometimes resupplied by parachute drop from Marine transports and torpedo bombers. For this reason corps air delivery sections were established in February 1944.
Combat replacements Replacement drafts had been used as a means of deploying troops to the Pacific since July 1944. Numbering from 1,000 to 5,000 troops (1,300 was typical), they were assembled at camps Pendleton and Lejeune from graduates of the training centers. Most were sent to Pacific Marine bases where they were absorbed into divisions and other units recovering from combat. For the Iwo Jima and Okinawa operations two replacement drafts were attached to each division and accompanied it to the objective. Replacement detachments were detailed to divisional shore parties unloading cargo for the first few days before being released to combat units. Squads and platoons began suffering casualties immediately after landing. Fully manned and evenly balanced "by the book" subunits quickly evaporated. Any given element engaged in direct combat more often than not operated understrength and was forced to reorganize accordingly. BARs, bazookas, and flamethrowers were taken up by other men and all available crew-served weapons were kept operational with undermanned crews, although weapons too were lost and damaged. There were instances of spare weapons being collected from floating reserves for the troops ashore. There was little established doctrine for reorganizing battered units as this depended on the specific situation and was left to commanders.
However, it was specified that when a 13-man rifle squad was reduced to eight men it would be reorganized into two fire teams, one with two BARs, and the squad leader would double as a fire-team leader; he may well have been a fireteam leader if the squad leader had become a casualty. Squad and platoon leaders suffered high casualty rates. A platoon would retain three squads as long as possible, but when all squads fell to six or seven men they would most likely be consolidated into two. Seldom did squads suffer casualties at the same rate and often a squad or squads suffering higher losses would have men from other squads reassigned when the situation allowed. Such consolidations occurred during lulls, or when the company support platoon was rotated, or the company was rotated to the battalion reserve. A platoon down to 15-17 men, less than two seven- or eight-man squads, was no longer capable of effectively accomplishing platoon missions, even with attached crewserved weapons. At this point a company would usually consolidate into two platoons. This depended on the availability of individuals capable of leading platoons and the tactical situation. Besides troops provided by replacement drafts, there were other internal sources of unit replacements. Some men assigned to the large company and battalion headquarters were reassigned to rifle squads, as the platoon guide, demolition corporal, and messengers in the platoon HQ could be. Regardless of the "every Marine a rifleman" mantra, this was less than effective as headquarters troops were not entirely proficient in small-unit tactics and techniques. There were also a few lieutenants available, such as company executive officers, liaison officers, and assistant staff officers, who could be reassigned as platoon leaders if necessary. It was not uncommon though for platoon sergeants, platoon gUides, former squad leaders or even fire-team leaders to be found leading battered platoons. It was not unheard of for former 240-man companies to continue fighting on with 60-70 men. Such a company might consist of two two-squad rifle platoons, a few undermanned machine-gun squads, and the now reduced mortar section with a skeleton company CP. Souvenir hunters from rear units were often a problem in the frontline. Such men were frequently press-ganged into understrength platoons. One company commander on Peleliu informed parent units where their strayed men were if they behaved well. If they did not, he failed to report their whereabouts and their units carried them AWOL. Men were also attached from engineer, pioneer, artillery, amtrac, and service units if the need was pressing. There was a danger here in reducing the strength of supporting units to a point where they themselves were no longer able to provide effective support. It made no difference if the frontline rifle strength was reduced, support units still required a large percentage of their strength to remain effective. The first step was to ask for volunteers (as happened on Peleliu, Iwo lima, and Okinawa) either to fill infantry units and/or form provisional units. If volunteers were insufficient they were selectively "volunteered." Such provisional battalions were an important supplement as a campaign wore on, unit strengths dwindled, and replacement drafts dried up. These units were employed to mop up rear areas, serve as reserves for exhausted infantry units, screen support units in the rear from infiltrators, and contain by-passed enemy pockets. These battalions had three to five companies of often fewer than 100 men and a paucity of crew-served weapons. Even the ground echelons of Marine aviation units were employed. On Peleliu, early-landing service troops of Marine Aircraft Group 11 and its four fighting squadrons were employed unloading landing craft, carrying litters, hauling ammunition, and guarding against infiltrators as second-line riflemen.
Marine units rotated to the rear as reserves drew ammunition, demolitions, flamethrower fuel, rations, and water at resupply points such as this one on southern Okinawa. A IOSmm M7 self-propelled howitzer passes in the background.
29
Weapons and equipment
Infantry weapons
Marine infantry regiment weapons 1944-45 AS-cal. M 191 I, M 1911 A 1 Colt pistols .30-cal. M I Garand rifle .30-cal. M 1903AI, M 1903A3 Springfield sniper rifles .30-cal. M I carbine .45-caIoM 1928AI, M I, M IAI Thompson SMGs .30-cal. M 1918A2 Browning automatic rifle .30-cal. M 1919A4 Browning LMG .30-cal. M 1917A I Browning HMG .SO-cal. HB-M2 Browning HMG 12-ga M97, M 12 Winchester shotguns M7 grenade launcher (M I rifle) M8 grenade launcher (M I carbine) M IA I, M2-2 portable flamethrowers 60mm M2 mortar 81mm MI mortar 2.36in. M IA I, M9, M9A I AT rocket launchers 37mm M3AI AT gun* 7Smm M3, M3A I self-propelled guns* IOSmm M7, M7B I self-propelled howitzers*
* regimental weapons company
30
A rifle squad's fire distribution on an area target. The three BARs provided almost half the squad's firepower.
Weapons employed by infantry regiments remained essentially the same as used through early-1944. The M1 carbine became more widely available, but many units were not favorably inclined toward the weapon because of its limited knockdown power, poor penetration through vegetation, and short range. Infantry leaders and others often carried M1 rifles or Thompson submachine guns (SMGs) in lieu of carbines. The selective-fire M2 carbine and its 30-round magazine were adopted in late-1944, but none were issued until after V-J Day. It would have been available for the invasion of Japan. While T/Os provided few Thompson SMGs to divisions, they were sometimes more widely issued in place of carbines. In the last months of the war the .45-cal. M3 SMG, the "grease gun," began to appear. While the intent was to replace Thompsons with M3s, the Marines received few before the war's end. They were none too impressed with the strange looking weapon, but later found it to be as reliable as the heavier and more complex Thompson. Two improved support weapons greatly enhanced pillbox and cave reduction, the M2-2 flamethrower and M9 bazooka. Both were first used on Iwo Jima and the models they replaced were last used on Peleliu. The improved 2.36in. M9 and M9A1 shoulder-fired rocket launchers began to replace the M1Al in late-1944. The M9 had a longer tube increasing its accuracy and range to 300 yards, more reliable rockets, and the tube could be broken down into two sections for ease of transport. The M2-2 backpacked flamethrower began to replace the M1A1 in late-1944 and proved to be much more reliable and longer ranged (up to 50 yards with unthickened fuel and 60 yards with thickened), although a few pounds heavier. On Peleliu the 1st MarDiv was issued 100 60mm T20 bipod-mounted, shoulder-fired mortars. They did not replace the standard 60mm M2 mortars, but were assigned to assault teams as pillbox busters. The bipod-mounted mortar
proved to be too heavy, its parts broke easily, its hard recoil required gunners to be replaced after a couple of rounds, and its range was too short. Bazookas were sufficient for the task. Limited use was made of the 60mm T18E6 handheld mortar on Okinawa. This was an M2 mortar tube without bipod and fitted with a small spade base plate and a trigger-fire capability. It was intended to match the Japanese SOmm handheld "knee mortar." A major weapons change was the replacement of the 7Smm gun-armed M3 halftracked SPM, in use since 1942, with the M7 (riveted hull) and M7B 1 (cast hull) SP howitzers. This was an M4 tank chassis mounting a 10Smm M2A1 howitzer and a .SO-cal. MG. It replaced the M3 SPM on a one-for-one basis, first being used on Okinawa. With heavier armor than the SPM and better crosscountry mobility, it proved an effective assault gun even though its open gun compartment was vulnerable to close-in infantry attack.
Artillery Through the Iwo Jima campaign, divisional artillery regiments retained two battalions of 7Smm M1A1 pack howitzers and two with 10Smm M2A1 howitzers. The decision was made in late-1944 to equip the regiments solely with 10Smm howitzers. This was to take advantage of the 10Smm's longer range and more lethal effects, and to use only one caliber of ammunition to ease logistics. It eliminated the problem of uneven support by the two different battalions. Some favored the retention of the 7Smm, by now being called the "pea-shooter," as it could be loaded on any landing craft and easily manhandled through rough terrain. The abundance of new rear ramp-equipped LVTs and DUKWs somewhat negated this argument. On Okinawa only the 1st MarDiv's 1/11 still had 7Smm howitzers. FMF artillery battalions retained their lSSmm M1A1 "Long Tom" guns and lSSmm M1A1 howitzers. The radar-controlled 90mm M1A1, 40mm MI, and twin 20mm Mk 4 AA guns still armed the AAA battalions.
The 2.36in. M9 bazooka replaced the one-piece tube M IA I bazooka in late-I 944. The M9 was first used by the Marines on Iwo Jima. it weighed 15.87 Ibs and was 61 in. in length, 31.5in. when broken down into its travel mode. A two-man crew could fire up to 10 rounds a minute to an effective range of 300 yds.
ABOVE The .30-cal. M 1919A4 light machine gun was the mainstay company-level machine gun. Two were usually attached to each rifle platoon. This LMG is manned by a 4th Marines, 6th MarDiv crew on Oroku Peninsula, Okinawa.
ABOVE A Marine on Okinawa fits together the two tube sections of a 2.36in. M9A I bazooka. The only difference between the M9 and more widely issued M9AI was an improved locking latch.
LEFT The 105mm M7 self-propelled howitzer proved to be an excellent assault gun when first used by the Marines on Okinawa. Spare track sections have been fastened to the sides of this M7 for protection from antitank weapons. The MTs frontal armor was the same as an M4 Sherman tank's, but the side armor was thin. The Marine in the foreground carries an SCR-300 "walkie-talkie" radio.
3I
Artillery
Rate of fire
9,610 yds.
6 rpm
105mm M2A1 howitzer
12,300 yds.
2-4 rpm
155mm M IA I howitzer
12,700 yds.
1-3 rpm
155mm MIAI gun
25,715 yds.
1-3 rpm
1,100 yds.
36 rds/4 sec.
75mm MIAI pack howitzer
4.5in. Mk 7 rocket launcher
AAgun
Three 4.5in. Mk 7 rocket launcher racks, each holding 12 rockets, were mounted in the back of one-ton International M-2-4 trucks. These weapons were first used on Saipan in June 1944 and in all subsequent operations.
Max effective range
Max effective range
Rate of fire
20mm Mk 4 twin AA gun
2,000 yds.
550 rpm
40mm M I AA gun
5,000 yds.
120 rp
11,293 yds.
30 rp
90mm MIAI AA gun
A 155mm MIAI howitzer of either the 2d or 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion provides fire support on Iwo Jima. This was an excellent weapon for destroying reinforced concrete fortifications.
Tanks
32
After the introduction of the M4A1 and M4A2 Sherman medium tanks in 1942, it was only a matter of time before 37mm gun-armed light tanks were phased out. This occurred after the Guam operation. The gasoline-powered M4A3 was fielded in late-1944 in time for Iwo Jima, but the 1st MarDiv insisted on retaining its twin diesel M4A2s, citing the increased fire hazard posed by gasoline engines. An analysis of Marine and Army tank losses on Okinawa showed this was an unnecessary fear. It was argued that the gasoline M4A3 reduced the fuel supply burden as amtracs and trucks were all gasoline powered. The two-engine M4A2 did have the advantage of being able to limp off the battlefield with one engine knocked out. Another advantage was that, on average, diesel tanks typically reqUired refueling only every two days while gasoline engine tanks had to be fueled daily. The introduction of the M4A3 reqUired extensive retraining of crews and mechanics, which often cut into tactical training time prior to operations. In 1945 the Army ceased production of 75mm-armed Shermans, producing only M4A3s with high-velocity 76mm guns and 105mm howitzers. The Marines had a fleet of some 500 75mm-armed Shermans with no replacements available. This would result in the provision of replacement tanks armed with different weapons requiring additional ammunition inventories. It also reqUired changes in tanker and mechanic training and different spare parts. The 76mm was considered unnecessary in the Pacific as the 75mm could kill any Japanese tank and was effective against fortifications. The 105mm howitzer-armed Sherman was made
redundant by the 105mm M7 SP howitzer. The Marines accepted some M4A3(105)s, but while they used the same ammunition as artillery battalions, though carrying fewer rounds than the 75mm, early models lacked a powered turret and gyrostabilization of the gun-serious limitations. To make matters worse, equipment upgrades would not be provided for the 75mm tanks. Though some officers advocated the new 90mm M26 Pershing, they accepted the inevitable and planned to re-equip'with M4A3(105)s for the invasion of lapan, though the early surrender halted this. Six M4A2 tanks were fitted with the £4-5 (formerly M3-4-3) flamegun in lieu of the bow machine gun, and were used on Guam by the 3d MarDiv. It carried only 25 gallons of fuel, but could fire up to 45 seconds of bursts to 60-70 yds. The £4-5 was a kit that could be installed by the unit. In late-1944 24 kits were authorized to each battalion, reduced to 18 in the 1945 TID. With the previous extensive use of flamethrower tanks by the Marines in the Marianas, Peleliu, and Iwo lima, it is odd that neither Marine tank battalion on Okinawa employed them. Army flamethrower tanks of the 713th Tank Battalion were attached to the Marines.
Amphibian tractors Amtracs were now considered essential to a successful amphibious assault. They could transport the assault waves across coral reefs while providing some degree of protection and covering fire, deliver heavy weapons, transport ammunition and supplies and move them inland, evacuate casualties, and provide mobility ashore for infantry. Up to three amphibian tractor battalions (312 amtracs) and an armored amtrac battalion (72 amphibian tanks) would support a division. The LVT(2) Water Buffalo was commonly employed, but from the summer of 1944 (Saipan), the LVT(4) gradually came into wider use with the two models often mixed in battalions. The LVT(2) remained in limited use through the war. The LVT(4) featured a number of improvements, the foremost being the addition of a rear ramp allowing jeeps and light artillery to be carried easily. It also reduced the exposure of disembarking troops, who previously had to leap over the sides. It could carry 24 troops-half a rifle platoon-or 8,000 lbs of cargo. The LVT(3) Bushmaster was actually a better amtrac, but production delays prevented its deployment until early-1945 when it saw its first use at Okinawa alongside LVT(4)s. It too had a rear ramp and could carry 24 troops or 12,000 lbs of cargo. Its armament comprised a .50-cal. and a .30-cal. machine gun. The LVT(3) remained the standard amtrac after the war. Two other amphibian vehicles were fielded in late-1944. One of them was the two-wheel, 3.S-ton Clever-Brooks amphibian trailer for towing behind an LVT(4). They were difficult to tow in surf, especially back out to sea, so were
Amphibian tanks-LVT(A) The concept of the armored, gun-armed LVT was initially approved in June 1941.The first LVT(A) I test model was presented the following June. Production began soon after: of the 509 built, 182 went to the Marines. It combined the hull of the LVT(2), built of armor plate rather than steel, and an M3 light tank turret. This gave it a 37mm M6 gun, a .50-cal. machine gun atop the turret plus .30-cal. machine guns in the coaxial position (beside the main gun), and two in manholes aft of the turret. Late-production models added a bow machine gun. It had a crew of six. Its first use was at Roi-Namur and its last at Peleliu. Development of the LVT(A)4 (pictured above) began in 1943 and it entered production in early-I 944. It mounted the open-topped turret of an Army M8 SP howitzer with a short 75mm M3.lt lacked gyrostabilization, reducing its accuracy both on land and water. A .50-cal. was atop the turret and there was a .30-caL in the bow; some also mounted a .30-caL on the turret. It had a crew of five. The LVT(A)4 saw its first action at Saipan.The Marines procured 533 of them.
Engineer, pioneer, and Seabee battalions were amply equipped with Caterpillar D-9 and 0-18 bulldozers. Here a D-9 tows a Duck out of the Iwo Jima surf where it has become bogged down in the volcanic sand.
33
often used only to haul in essential supplies on a one-way trip. A more successful vehicle was the full-tracked M29C Weasel cargo carrier used on Iwo lima. It also saw use on Okinawa. It could carry a driver and four troops, or 1,200 Ibs of cargo. This small vehicle was effective in delivering supplies to forward units and evacuating casualties where roads were nonexistent.
ABOVE The DUKW-353 2.5-ton amphibian truck was fielded by the Marine Corps in late-I 943. The letters DUKW (hence "Duck," its nickname) were its General Motors model designation: D-year model (1942), U-amphibian, K-all-wheel drive, W-dual rear axles. Every fourth Duck was fitted with a .50-cal. machine-gun M36 ring mount.
RIGHT Besides being a means of delivering assault troops across coral reefs, and a supply vehicle, amtracs were used to evacuate casualties from forward areas. Here Marines load a dead comrade into an LVT(4) on Okinawa.
RIGHT This 3.5-ton Clever-Brooks amphibian trailer, beached on Iwo Jima, was to be towed by an amtrac. Difficult to tow in surf, they were used to haul emergency signal and medical supplies on one-way trips. These were first used at Peleliu. In the background are two wrecked LCVPs and an LSl:
34
Marine tanks 1944-45 Model Armament
Employed
M4A2 M4A2 M4A3(75) M4A3( IOS) M32B2/B3*
1942--45 1944-45 1944-50 1944-47 1944-50
75mm gun, 2x.30-cal. and Ix.50-cal. MG f1amegun, 75mm gun and Ix.30-cal. MG 75mm gun, 2x.30-cal. and Ix.50-cal. MG I05mm howitzer, 2x.30-cal. and Ix.50-cal. MG 81 mm mortar, Ix.30-cal. and Ix.50-cal. MG
* The M32B2/B3 recovery vehicle mounted an 81 mm mortar for smoke screening.
Command, control, communications, and intelligence Command and control Command and control of Marine operations had drastically improved from the early struggles in the South Pacific. IlIAC and VAC were now major command, planning, coordination, and logistical headquarters controlling all aspects of landing-force operations. While multiple-division landings had become the norm, a corps headquarters would still control and support a single-division operation such as Peleliu. Principal staff officers and sections were designated by a number (I-Personnel, 2-Intelligence, 3Operations and Training, 4-Supply, and 5-Plans [division and higher]). At battalion through FMF-Ievels, there were numerous special staff officers who increased in number at each higher echelon. Principal staff officers and sections at different echelons were identified by letters preceding their numeric designation: Bn-Battalion, R-Regiment, BBrigade, D-Division, A-Corps Artillery, C-Amphibious Corps, and F-FMFPac. This changed in March 1945 when it was directed that the simplified Army staff designation system be adopted. This provided a standard system to prevent confusion in orders as future joint operations (Okinawa and Japan) would employ both Marine and Army formations; Army tactics manuals were used by the Marines, and many Marine officers attended Army command and staff courses. This system saw battalion, group, regimental, and corps artillery staff officers and sections designated by an "S" and divisional, amphibious corps, fleet expeditionary troops, and FMFPac staffs designated by "G" for general staff. "G" staffs possessed a chief of staff. HQMC retained the "M" designation until 1952. Units committed to Iwo Jima, when the change was directed, did not convert until after the operation. Marine forces on Okinawa used the new system.
Some of the senior commanders in the Central Pacific,August 1944. From left to right: MajGen Roy S. Geiger (Commanding General, lilAC), Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Commander, Fifth Fleet), LtGen Holland M. Smith (Commanding General, FMFPac),Admiral Nimitz (Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet), and LtGen Alexander A. Vandegrift (Commandant of the Marine Corps).
A company CP on Iwo Jima. The officer is talking to one of his platoons on an SCR-S36 "handytalkie." This was late in the 3S-day campaign, originally projected to last 14 days, as evident by the men's beards and obvious exhaustion. The tape crosses on some men's helmets may identify them as messengers.
35
Operations in the Pacific were increasingly joint ones, and command and staff procedures were refined. The Army was the predominant land force and logistics provider. Future operations on Okinawa and Japan would see Marine amphibious corps assigned to Army operational commands. Preparations for the Okinawa landing and the invasion of Japan saw the activation of FMFPac liaison detachments attached to the Sixth and Tenth Armies aanuary 1945) and US Army Forces, Western Pacific aune 1945). Such close coordination with the Army had been important in the past. For example, the assistant division commander of the 8Ist InfDiv had been attached to IlIAC during the Peleliu assault to coordinate the Division's deployment there.
Communications
LtGen Holland M. "Holling Mad" Smith, Commanding General, FMFPac. He had previously commanded Amphibious Corps, Atlantic Fleet;Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet; FMF, San Diego Area; andVAC.
While Navy-designed radios remained common, increasing use was made of Army radios, especially as improved models were fielded. This also ensured more effective communications as joint operations increased and eased the logistical burden. Tank and most other combat vehicles used by the Marines were also Army-designed and mounted Army radios. Radios of the era used crystals, resulting in a limited number of frequencies that a given set could handle. Infantry, armor, and artillery units used radios with different frequency coverage. These overlapped, enabling communication with one another in theory, but there were only so many frequencies available. As the numbers of units increased in ever larger operations, so did the number of radio nets for specific purposes (command, fire support, logistics, administrative, etc.) and the need for alternate frequencies. There were simply insufficient frequencies available on given sets to always allow overlap. The Army SCR-S08 (one transmitter, two receivers) was fitted in company and platoon commanders' tanks, with the SCR-528 (one transmitter, one receiver) in
MARINE L.ANDING TEAM
~
~
~
p:l3
(SiJ
F6
~ w:r z
MajGen Roy S. Geiger, Commanding General, IliAC. Geiger was the fifth Marine Aviator to be commissioned. He had commanded IMAC since November 1943 and retained command when it was redesignated lilAC in April 1944. He went on to command lilAC during Guam, Peleliu, and Okinawa.
36
A battalion landing team (BLT) radio net diagram, 1944.VVV = a radio. ALO = air liaison officer. ALP = air liaison party. COMD/R = command/commander. F.S. = fire support. FWD.O = forward observer. NLO = naval liaison officer. RCT = regimental combat team. S.P. = shore party. VF = fighter aircraft. VB = bomber aircraft.
~
fb
fS2
. tr1lfD.O
fBI
ILf COMo NIT 1
'~~1 I
1
...
~
~
W
f
!
Ii
1! _TO "GT ALO'S • OTHeR At-P'S
1 ~\ 6
6'
J
~
~
ff ~
j
a:
~I
1 ir
l:!
\
\
-4
~
+
*
fi!
~._M"". ILT 1.1 NIT.
.." GOMDfI.
....
, ,.
Army radios like this SCR-536 "handy-talkie," or "spam can," came into wider use. These 5th MarDiv troops have just secured Hill 165 at Kitano Point on lwo Jima's north end.
other tanks. Both had a 10-mile range. Prior to 1944, non-commanders' tanks mounted an SCR-538, which had only a receiver. From 1945 all tanks additionally mounted an AN/VRC-3 radio, a modified SCR-300 backpack radio for direct communications with infantrymen. The handheld SCR-536 handy-talkie gave rifle platoon commanders a means of communication with the company commander and each other, but it was considered too fragile and short ranged. This was especially true on hilly terrain, which was the norm in the Western Pacific. It was inadequate for patrols operating forward of their parent unit, and there were insufficient SCR-300 walkie-talkies available. Patrols still frequently laid field telephone wire behind them to maintain contact and send reports. The SCR-536 had limited frequency coverage and could not be used to call directly for artillery fire. Fire requests had to be relayed through the company CP via attached artillery forward observers. The SCR-300 frequency coverage was 40-48 MHz while the SCR-536 was 3.5-6 MHz, preventing them from talking to each other. Company CPs also had to have SCR-536s to talk to their platoons. Artillery forward observers used the heavier, 55 lb, SCR-610 27-38.9 MHz FM backpack radio. They recommended that a version of the lighter SCR-300 be made with artillery frequency coverage.
Realizing there were no trees on lwo Jima, the Marines brought hundreds of poles and posthole borers in order to string miles of telephone line. Overhead lines were prone to being cut by fragmentation, but lines laid on the ground were much more liable to be cut by vehicle traffic.
37
Overall though, the effectiveness of tactical communications had greatly improved by 1944 and was now taken for granted. Wire communications had also greatly improved, with 90 percent effectiveness between division and regiment and 70 percent effectiveness between regiment and battalion.
Intelligence
This is a three-dimensional rubber terrain map made by a Marine topographic engineer unit. They were based on scarce maps predating the war and updated using aerial photographs. The light-colored area along the coast indicates the fringing coral reef.
38
Intelligence capabilities of all US armed forces greatly increased as the war progressed. The accuracy of intelligence improved as well. Although it has recently become fashionable to state that the Allies won the Pacific War because they broke the Japanese code, the reality was that only a comparatively small percentage of Japanese radio traffic was intercepted, recorded, decoded, and translated on a timely basis. There were still many information gaps. Good analysis, assessment, and dissemination to those who needed it before the information's value perished, were still vital. Accurate maps of islands became even more scarce as US forces thrust into the Japanese Mandated Territory. Aerial and submarine photography played a critical role in obtaining this information to make maps. The ability to access the number and type of Japanese troops on an island improved dramatically. Submarine through-the-periscope photography of beaches provided a "Marine's-eye view" of the landing beaches, as they would appear from amtracs. Low oblique aerial photography was not completely perfected until just before the Iwo Jima landing. The collection and assessment of data improved to the point that there was too much to process and disseminate. In order to deal with this, the Marines gradually enlarged the intelligence sections at all echelons. To produce tactical maps, aerial photographic mosaics, island terrain models, and terrain studies, the Marines organized a Company D in the 1st and 2d Separate Engineer Battalions on Guam in late-1944. The 141-man, four-platoon companies were redesignated the 1st and 2d Separate Topographic companies in February 1945 and assigned to IlIAC and VAC HQ&S Battalions. The HQ companies of divisional engineer battalions were assigned additional personnel to provide similar products. Dissemination of intelligence publications, maps, charts, terrain studies, and other products produced by Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Area OICPOA) was extensive with a wealth of products now available. JICPOA teams accompanied assault troops to interrogate prisoners and examine captured documents for their intelligence value. In the summer of 1944, the 48-man 1st-4th and 6th Separate Radio Intelligence platoons were activated for attachment to corps and divisions. The 6th was redesignated the 5th in November. They operated six portable SCR-206 radio direction finders to locate enemy communication sites for artillery targeting.
Combat operations Unit status July 1944 found VAC mopping up Saipan and Tinian with the 2d and 4th MarDivs. IlIAC had assembled the 3d MarDiv and 1st Prov MarBde on Guadalcanal and was staging at Eniwetok to assault Guam. The 1st MarDiv was on Pavuvu preparing for the Peleliu operation. The 5th MarDiv was still in training at Camp Pendleton, CA although its 26th Marines had been dispatched to serve as a floating reserve for the Guam operation. Most of the defense battalions had been converted to antiaircraft artillery and 155mm artillery battalions prior to this and new amphibian tractor battalions were either organized or in the process of doing so. Most units were at full strength and the divisions, prior to commitment to combat, were usually a thousand or so men over strength. A large percentage of combat veterans manned every division. Replacements were adequate, but stretched because of the effort to fill the new 5th MarDiv. Central and Western Pacific operations island
Island codename
Operation codename
Marine participation
Guam
STEVEDORE
FORAGER'
21 Jul-15 Aug 44 (25 days)
Peleliu
EARTHENWARE
STALEMATE II
6 Sep-20 Oct 44 (44 days)
IwoJima
ROCKCRUSHER
DETACHMENT
19 Feb-26 Mar 45 (35 days)
Okinawa
SCATTERING
ICEBERG
I Apr-30 Jun 45 (91 days)
Marine and Army infantry battalion participation Island/Group
Marine Corps
Army
Guam
15
9
Palau Islands
9 (Peleliu)
6/9 (Angaur/Peleliu)
IwoJima
24
3 (mopping up)
Okinawa Gunto .
21
36
Guam Guam (STEVEDORE) is the southernmost and largest of the Mariana Islands (GATEWAY). Saipan is 100 miles to the northeast. Guam is an American possession occupied by the Japanese on December 10, 1941. The island is 32 miles long from north to south and 10 miles wide at the north and south ends with a 4-mile wide central isthmus. The hilly south end rises up to 1,334ft and is covered by high grasses and scrub forest. The northern portion is a forested 400-500ft rolling plateau, with grassy hilltops. There are numerous streams and rivers, the only island in the Marianas with such features, and the only one self-sufficient in water. The island's administrative center was at Agana on the west-central coast. The partly developed Apra Harbor and Sumay Navy Yard were located to the town's south, as is Orote Peninsula. The Japanese built airstrips on Orote and northeast of Agana. The island was defended by the 29th Division (-50th Regiment), 48th Independent Mixed Brigade, and 10th 39
W-Day, GuaQ1, July 21, 1944.
N
A
1ProvD
3~22
1~22 305~ 2~22 YELLOW 1 3~4 2~4 YELLOW 2 1~4 WHITE 1 WHI
0 1 01-
/)
J
2mi
----r-L-..-.-,--.,......~~m
I,
3d Marine Division, Guam 3d(+)
3dCT
40
I
I
I
III
III
III
21stCT
Engr Group
Independent Mixed Regiment with 11,500 troops. There were also 7,600 UN 54th Guard Force and air service personnel present. Guam was to be recaptured not just as a point of honor, but to serve as a B-29 bomber base and would be developed as a major staging base for Iwo Jima and Japan. The Southern Troops and Landing Force totaled 54,691 troops, of whom 36,933 were Marines. Built around IlIAC, it included the 3d MarDiv, 1st
Ist Provisional Marine Brigade, Guam 1st Proy
I III 4th CT
305th RCT
Arty
Group
Amtrac
AA
Group~~~:
Group
I
N
A
ATTACK 6 AUG
\
Yiga
---.
:
....•...•... ..........•....•....-
.\
..
Prov MarBde, and 77th Inilliv, the latter initially serving as the IlIAC Reserve. The two Marine formations undertook rehearsals at Guadalcanal and the 77th Inilliv did the same in Hawaii. Special emphasis was placed on tank-infantry team training as well as artillery coordination, with tankers being trained as forward observers to enable them to call for fire as far forward as possible. The two Marine formations were in good shape. The 3d MarDiv had spent six months on Guadalcanal resting and retraining after fighting on Bougainville the previous year. The new 1st Prov MarBde had two veteran regiments: the 4th organized from the raider battalions, and the 22d, which had seen action on Eniwetok. However, some 1,800 troops of the 22d were inflicted with slow manifesting filariasis (a.k.a. elephantisis) contracted while in the Samoas in 1943. They were replaced by 500 men from the 3d MarDiv's overage and replacements from the States. This greatly reduced the number of experienced
Shifting companies in the line: I st Battalion, 9th Marines, Finegayan, Guam, August 3-5, 1944.
41
leaders and troops and required an intensified training program. (Some 3,000 Marines and sailors contracted filariasis in the Samoas and were treated and recovered at Marine Barracks, Klamath Falls, Oregon. HQMC policy was not to return recovered personnel to the tropics.) The Southern Troops and Landing Force (TG 56.2), like the Northern Troops and Landing Force (TG 56.1, VAC) tasked with securing Saipan and Tinian, was under Expeditionary Troops, Fifth Fleet (TF 56) commanded by LtGen Holland Smith. The IlIAC had arrived in the Marianas early to serve as the VAC Floating Reserve for the Saipan assault. Guam was to have been assaulted on June 18,1944, but this was delayed, first because of the threat of a Japanese fleet sailing from the Philippines (subsequently defeated in the Battle of the Philippine Sea) and then because of stout resistance on Saipan, requiring the 1st Prov MarBde to be retained as the VAC Reserve while the 3d MarDiv sailed for Eniwetok in the Marshalls. Saipan was secured on July 9, although mopping up continued into August. Guam was rescheduled for July 21 (W-Day). The 1st Prov MarBde in the meantime had withdrawn to Eniwetok to await the arrival of the 77th InfDiv from Hawaii. IlIAC then arrived off Guam aboard the Southern Attack Force (TF 53) between July III Amphibious Corps (Southern Troops and Landing Force-TG 56.2) Force Troops iliAC Service Group [shore party and services] lilAC HQ&S Battalion (-) iliAC Signal Battalion (-) 4th Marine Ammunition Company Detachment, Air Warning Squadron 2 Detachment, 756th Aircraft Warning Signal Company (USAAF) Detachment,Argus-17 (USN) [air warning unit] Mobile Communications Unit No. 41, Group Pacific (USN) lilAC Artillery 1st (-) and 2d 155mm Howitzer battalions 7th 155mm Gun Battalion Ist Experimental Rocket Platoon IliAC Rear Echelon Ist Base Headquarters Battalion Ist Separate Engineer Battalion 1st MP Company 3d Joint Assault Signal Company 5th Field Depot (-) Ist Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon Ist Separate Wire Platoon Forward Echelon, IliAC Air Delivery Section 1st Prov Base HQ, Island Command, Guam HQ&S Battalion, Ist Prov Base HQ
42
lilAC Troops
6,719 (inclusive of those detached to other formations)
3d MarDiv (+)
20,338 (inclusive of attachments)
1st Prov MarBde
9,886 (exclusive of 4,500-man 305th RCT and other attached Army units)
77th InfDiv
17,958 (inclusive of 305th RCT detached to 1st Prov MarBde until W+3)
20 and 21. Guam had been subjected to 13 days of bombardment. CT26 with 1/13 [artillery], detached from the 5th MarDiv in the States, served as the Expeditionary Troops Floating Reserve. It would sail to Hawaii at the end of the month. A departure from the norm saw the two Marine formations' beaches seven miles apart separated by Orote Peninsula and Agana Harbor on the west-central coast. This required some support elements that would have been kept under corps control to be attached to both formations. The risk was necessary because they were the only suitable beaches on the cliff-lined island. Both landings took place at 0830 hours as scheduled. They met stiff resistance from the dominating high ground and only shallow beachheads were established on W-Day. A total of 24 LVTs were lost on W-Day. The 3d MarDiv landed on the Northern, or Asan, Beaches located between Adelup and Asan Points and centered on Asan Town. 3/3 and 2/3 (3d CT Reserve) landed on Beach RED 1 while 1/3 landed on RED 2. The 21st CT landed on GREEN in a column of battalions (3d, 2d, 1st) and the 9th CT came ashore on BLUE in the same order as the 21st. It was planned for the 3d Marines' three battalion 81mm mortar platoons to be combined upon landing into a Mortar Groupment to concentrate fire on Adelup Point, but due to light resistance this was not done.
Troops of the 22d Marines, 1st Prov MarBde salute as the American flag is raised over the burnt-out Marine Barracks, Guam. The Japanese had captured the barracks on December 10, 1941. The 22d Marines had served as a separate regiment on Eniwetok and would later be part of the 6th MarDiv.
3d MarDiv (Reinforced) 3d Combat Team 3d Marines (Reinforced) 25th NC Battalion (..) Company C, Ist Battalion [engineer], 19th Marines Company F, 2d Battalion [pioneer], 19th Marines Company C, 3d Medical Battalion Company C, 3d MT Battalion Company C, 3d Tank Battalion [M4A2] Battery I [40mm], Light Antiaircraft Group, 14th Defense Battalion 3d Messenger Dog Section (..), 2d Marine War Dog Platoon 3d Scout Dog Section (-), 3d Marine War Dog Platoon Detachment, 3d Joint Assault Signal Company 3d Band Section 9th Combat Team 9th Marines (Reinforced) Ist Battalion [engineer] (-), 19th Marines 3d Tank Battalion (-) [M4A2] Company D,2d Battalion [pioneer], 19th Marines Company G (+ detachment, HQ Company), 25th NC Battalion Company A, 3d MT Battalion Company A, 3d Medical Battalion 3d Reconnaissance Company (-) Ist Messenger Dog Section (-), 2d Marine War Dog Platoon Ist Scout Dog Section (-), 3d Marine War Dog Platoon Detachment, 3d Joint Assault Signal Company Ist Band Section 21st Combat Team 21 st Marines (Reinforced)
(continued on page 44)
43
2d Battalion [pioneer] (-), 19th Marines Company B, Ist Battalion [engineer], 19th Marines Company H (+ detachment, HQ Company), 25th NC Battalion Company B, 3d Medical Battalion Company B, 3dMT Battalion Ist and 2d Platoons, Company B, 3d Tank Battalion [M4A2] 2d Platoon, 3d Reconnaissance Company 2d Messenger Dog Section (-), 2d Marine War Dog Platoon 2d Scout Dog Section (-), 3d Marine War Dog Platoon Detachment, 3d Joint Assault Signal Company 2dBand Section 12th Marines [artillery] (Reinforced) 14th Defense Battalion (- SeacoastArtiliery Group) 1st Prov Smoke Screen Unit (disbanded late-July) Artillery Liaison Group, iliAC Artillery Reserve Group
HQ Battalion (-), 3d MarDiv Company B (-), 3d Tank Battalion [M4A2] 4th Platoon, 3d Reconnaissance Company 2d and 3d Marine War Dog Platoons (-) 3d Joint Assault Signal Company (-) Detachment, IliAC Signal Battalion Engineer Group 19th Marines [engineer] (-) 2d Separate Engineer Battalion 25th NC Battalion Company B, 2d Special NC Battalion Garrison Beach Party Service Group 3d Medical Battalion (-) 3d Service Battalion (-) Detachment, Service Group, 5th Field Depot The 3d MarDiv lands on the Northern, or Asan Beaches, Guam. Asan Point is just off the lower right of the photo. Two LSTs can be seen in the bottom left corner. The Japanese occupied the ridges overlooking the coastal plain.
2d Marine Ammunition Company (-) Attachments IstArmored Amphibian Tractor Battalion (-) [57 x LVT(A) I] 3d Amphibian Tractor BattaHon (Reinforced) [193 x LVT(2)/(4)] Company A, 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(2)] iliAC MT Battalion (-) [60 x DUKW]
44
The 1st Prov MarBde landed on the Southern, or Agat, Beaches. 1/22 landed on Beach YELLOW 1 adjacent to Agat Town and 2/22 on YELLOW 2. The reserve 3/22 came ashore on YELLOW 1. 2/4 landed on WHITE 1 north of Bangi Point and 1/4 on WHITE 2 followed by the reserve 3/4. 2/30Sth Infantry landed on WHITE 1 on W-Day followed by the rest of the Regiment on W+1. IlIAC Artillery landed on WHITE 1 on W+2. The 30Sth RCT was returned to its parent 77th InfDiv's control on W+3 Guly 24).
8 AUG
3d MarDiv 1st Prav MarBde 77th InfDiv
28 JUL .... 27 JUL .....
26JUl 25JUl 24JUl 23JUL 22 JUL 21 JUL
0.
21 JUl 22JUl 23-27 JUL ---'\o-.-~__- - - - ,
Southern Guam Patrolled by nth InfDiv 28 Jul-2 Aug 1st Prav MarBde 1-4 Aug 9th Def Bn (+) 4-10 Aug
I st Prov MarBde
Daily progress, Guam, July 2 I-August 10,1944.
HQ Company, Ist Prov MarBde MP Company, 1st Prov MarBde (-) Signal Company, 1st Prov MarBde (-) Ist Prov Replacement Company 4th Combat Team 4th Marines (Reinforced) Engineer Company, 4th Marines Medical Company, 4th Marines MT Company, 4th Marines Pioneer Company, 4th Marines Tank Company, 4th Marines [M4A2] Reconnaissance Platoon, 4th Marines S&S Platoon, 4th Marines (continued on page 46)
45
Ist Marine War Dog Platoon
I st Platoon, MP Company, 1st Prov MarBde 4th Platoon, 2d Marine Ammunition Company I st joint Assault Signal Party, Signal Company, 1st Prov MarBde
Band Section, 4th Marines Detachment, 5th Field Depot 22d Combat Team 22d Marines (Reinforced) Engineer Company, 22d Marines Medical Company, 22d Marines MT Company, 22d Marines Pioneer Company, 22d Marines Tank Company, 22d Marines [M4A2] Reconnaissance Platoon, 22d Marines Ordnance Platoon, 22d Marines S&S Platoon,22d Marines 2d Platoon, MP Company, 1st Prov MarBde 2d joint Assault Signal Party, Signal Company, I st Prov MarBde Detachment, 5th Field Depot Band Section, 22d Marines Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit 515 (USN) 30Sth Regimental Combat Team (USA) 305th Infantry Regiment (Reinforced) 242d Engineer Combat Battalion [shore party] Company A, 302d Engineer Combat Battalion Company C (-), 706th Tank Battalion [M4A2] Platoon, Company A, 88th Chemical Battalion (Motorized) [4.2in. mortar] Company A, 302d Medical Battalion Platoon, Company D, 302d Medical Battalion Detachment, 77th Signal Company Detachment, 777th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company Detachment, 292d joint Assault Signal Company Artillery Group, 1st Prov MarBde HQ Detachment, Artillery Group, 1st Prov MarBde Pack Howitzer Battalion, 4th Marines Pack Howitzer Battalion, 22d Marines 305th Field Artillery Battalion (I 05mm Howitzer) (USA) Battery C, 1st ISSmm Howitzer Battalion Amphibian Tractor Group 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Reinforced) [178 x LVT(2)/(4)] Companies A and B, Ist Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion [26 x LVT(A) I] Company A, I Ith Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(2)] Company C (Amphibian Truck), lilAC MT Battalion [40 x DUKW]
46
(continued on page 47)
The amtracs of the Ist Prov MarBde approach the Southern, or Agat, Beaches, Guam. Orote Peninsula stretches across the top of the photo, and the Orote Airfield can be seen on its west (left) end.
Antiaircraft Group 9th Defense Battalion (-) Battery A, 7th AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion [40mm/.50-cal.] (USA) iliAC Medical Battalion (Reinforced) Detachment, 53d NC Battalion
The 77th InfDiv, under MajGen Andrew D. Bruce, was ordered to land on W+2 on the WHITE beaches. The 306th RCT landed that day followed by the 307th RCT on W+3, still designated the Force Reserve. With the 305th RCT back under its control, the Division cleared the area east and south of Agat. The 3d MarDiv secured Cabras Island on the 24th and the 1st Prov MarBde sealed off the Orote Peninsula on the 25th. It was cleared by the 29th. The day before, at 1745 hours, Marines of 1/9 from the north made contact with soldiers of 3/307 from the south. As on Saipan the Japanese had mostly withdrawn north. The push north began on July 31 with the 3d MarDiv on the left and the 77th InfDiv on the right while the 1st Prov MarBde secured the beachheads and patrolled the south. After slow progress in the rugged terrain against stubborn strongpoints, the 1st Prov MarBde was inserted in the line to the left of the 3d MarDiv on August 6. The northern end of the island was wider and the terrain rougher. Marine and Army units reached the northernmost ends of the island on August 10 and the island was declared secure at 1131 hours. Some 11,000 Japanese dead had been counted by this time. Mopping up continued with over 8,000 more Japanese killed by the end of August. Approximately 1,250 prisoners were captured and 500 civilians interned. There were several significant organizational initiatives undertaken on Guam. The effective integration of a reinforced Army RCT into the Marine brigade was noteworthy. The IlIAC MT Battalion had recently been reorganized as an amphibian truck unit with 100 DUKWs to haul 105mm howitzers, radio jeeps, and serve as mobile CPs for the 3d MarDiv, 1st Prov MarBde, and their CTs. IlIAC Service Group was formed to control the shore party, not only for IlIAC, but the Division's and Brigade's as well. It also controlled engineer, NCB, transport, supply, and medical resources as well as the restored Apra Harbor. The 1st Prov MarBde's 394-man 1st Prov Replacement Company, although unable to provide sufficient replacements, was the genesis of the larger replacement drafts attached to Marine divisions on Iwo Jima and Okinawa.
M4A2 Shermans of the 3d Tank Battalion advance from the beach to support the 21 st Marines' drive inland. The Marines usually removed the turret-mounted .50-cal. machine gun to prevent Japanese infantrymen from turning it on Marines, but in other instances replaced it with a .30-cal. as a more effective antipersonnel weapon.
47
Marine commanders, Guam Expeditionary Troops, Fifth Fleet
LtGen Holland M. Smith
Chief of Staff
BGen Graves B. Erskine
III Amphibious Corps
MajGen Roy S. Geiger
Chief of Staff
Col Merwin H. Silverthorn
IliAC Troops lilAC Service Group
LtCol Francis M. McAlister
IliAC HQ&S Battalion
LtCol Floyd A. Stephenson
lilAC Medical Battalion
LCdr William H. Rambo (USN)
lilAC MT Battalion
Maj Franklin H. Hayner
IliAC Signal Battalion
LtCol Robert L. Peterson
I st Armored Amphibian Tractor Bn
Maj Louis Metzger
2d Separate Engineer Battalion
LtCol Charles O. Clark
3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
LtCol Sylvester L. Stephan
4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
LtCol Clovis C. Coffman
IliAC Artillery
BGen Pedro A. del Valle
Chief of Staff
Col John A. Bemis
1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion
Col James J. Keating
2d 155mm Howitzer Battalion
LtCol Marvin H. Floom
7th 155mm Gun Battalion
LtCol John S. Twitchell
9th Defense Battalion
LtCol Archie E. O'Niel
14th Defense Battalion
LtCol William F. Parks
3d MarDiv
MajGen Allen H.Turnage
Asst. Division Commander
BGen Alfred H. Noble
Chief of Staff
Col Ray A. Robinson
HQ Battalion, 3d MarDiv
LtCol Newton B. Barkley
3d Marines
Col W. Carvel Hall (to 28 Jul) Col James A. Stuart
I st Battalion 2d Battalion
Maj Henry Aplington, II LtCol Hector de Zayas (KIA 26 Jul) Maj William A. Culpepper (to 26 Jul) Maj Howard J. Smith
3d Battalion
LtCol Ralph L. Houser (to 22 jul) Maj Royal R. Bastian
9th Marines
Col Edward A. Craig
I st Battalion
LtCol Carey A. Randall
2d Battalion
LtCol Robert E. Cushman,jr.
3d Battalion
LtCol Walter Asmuth, Jr. (YVIA 21 Jul) Maj Donald B. Hubbard (YVIA I Aug) Maj jess ~ Ferrill,jr.
21st Marines
48
Col Arthur H. Butler
I st Battalion
LtCol Marlowe C. Williams
2d Battalion
LtCol Eustace R. Smoak
3d Battalion
LtCol Wendell H. Duplantis
(continued on page 49)
12th Marines [artillery]
Col John B. Wilson
I st Battalion
LtCol Raymond S. Crist, Jr. (WIA 22 Jul)
2d Battalion
LtC 0 I Donald M.Weller
3d Battalion
LtCol Alpha L Bowser, Jr.
4th Battalion
LtCol Bernard H. Belzer (WIA 21 Jul)
19th Marines [engineer]
LtCol Robert E. Fojt
I st Battalion [engineer]
LtCol Walter S. Campbell
2d Battalion [pioneer]
Maj Victor J. Simpson
25th NC Battalion
LtCdr George J. Whelan (USN)
3d Medical Battalion
Cdr Raymond R. Callaway (USN)
3d MT Battalion
LtCol Thomas R. Stokes
3d Service Battalion
LtCol Durant S. Buchanan
3d Tank Battalion
LtCol Hartnoll J. Withers
1st Prov MarBde
BGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr.
Chief of Staff
Col john 1: Walker
4th Marines
LtCol Alan Sharpley
I st Battalion
Maj BernardW. Green
2d Battalion
Maj Roy S. Batterton, Jr. (WIA 21 jul) Capt Lincoln N. Holdzcom
3d Battalion 22d Marines I st Battalion
Hamilton M. Hoyler Col Merlin F. Scheider LtCol Walfried H. Fromhold (to 3 I Jul) Maj Crawford B. Lawton
2d Battalion
LtCol Donn C. Hart (to 27 Jul) Maj John F. Schoettel (WIA 27 Jul)
3d Battalion 305th Infantry Regiment
LtCol Clair W. Shisler (WIA 27 Jul) Col Vincent J. Tanzola (USA)
I st Battalion .
LtCol James E. Landrum,jr. (USA)
2d Battalion
LtC 0 I Robert D.Adair (USA)
3d Battalion
LtC 0 I Edward Chalgren,Jr. (USA)
242d Engineer Combat Battalion Artillery Group, 1st Prov MarBde
Maj Perry E. Borchers, Jr. (USA) LtCol Edwin C. Fergunson
Pack Howitzer Bn, 4th Marines
Maj Robert F. Armstrong
Pack Howitzer Bn, 22d Marines
Maj Alfred M. Mahoney
305th Field Artillery Battalion
LtCol Edward B. Leever (USA)
Island Command, Guam
MajGen Henry L. Larsen
Chief of Staff
Col Robert Blake
1st Prov Base HQ Battalion
LtCol Victor A. Barraco
5th Field Depot
LtCol Walter A. Churchill
49
Peleliu
The Ist Marines, 1st MarDiv, borne in amtracs, heads into the WHITE Beaches, Peleliu. The amphibian tanks of the 3d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion are already ashore. The area known as "The Point" bulges from the top portion of the photo. The 30ft-high coral ridge had been turned into a strongpoint and halted 3d Battalion, Ist Marines.
The Palau Islands (DRAGONMAN) are the westernmost islands of the Carolines and are 730 miles to the northeast of Guam with the Philippines 600 miles due West. The closely packed group consists of over 100 islands dominated by Babelthup (10 x 16 miles) in the north. On the southwest end of the chain is small Angaur (DOMESTIC) and seven miles to the northeast is Peleliu (EARTHENWARE). Peleliu, whose irregular shape resembles a lobster claw, is about six miles long and slightly over two miles across in the south. Most of the island is low, but a 1,000-yard-wide, 3,500-yard-Iong peninsula thrusts northeast from the main island mass. The peninsula's base, an area known as the Vmurbrogol Mountains, and the length of its spine are covered with extremely rugged 500ft-high hills, ridges, and gorges covered with coral outcrops, sinkholes, caves, crags, and ravines. This was covered by dense forest and the severity of the chaotic terrain was unknown to the Marines. Most of the vegetation was blasted and burned off during the battle revealing the rugged l~mestone and coral terrain beneath. Japan had gained control of the Palaus from Germany in 1914 and retained them as part of the Japanese Mandated Territory. Heavily colonized by Japan for its fishing grounds and phosphate mines, naval installations had been built on Koror and adjacent islands off the south end of Babelthup. They built an airfield on the south end of Peleliu and an airstrip was under construction on Ngesebus off the north end of Peleliu. Defending Peleliu was the much reinforced, 6,500-man 2d Infantry Regiment detached from the 14th Division on Babelthup. Over 3,000 UN guard-force, construction, and air-service personnel were also present. The Japanese had heavily fortified the island and the pockmarked terrain of the peninsula served to reinforce it. IlIAC, doubling as the Western Troops and Landing Force (TG 36.1), subordinate to the Expeditionary Troops, Third Fleet (TF 36), was assigned the mission of securing the southern Palaus and other areas in support of MacArthur's efforts in the Philippines. The 1st MarDiv (TV 36.1.1) would seize Peleliu on September 15, 1944 (D-Day) while the 81st InfDiv (TV 36.1.2) conducted a demonstration off Babelthup. It then assaulted Angaur from September 17 and 20 (F-Day). The Marine 7th AAA Battalion landed with the 81st and remained on Angaur as a garrison. The Division's 323d RCT, after serving as the IlIAC Floating Reserve during the Peleliu landing, secured 10 . unoccupied islands in Vlithi Atoll from September 21 and 25 a-Day). The 77th InfDiv (TG 36.3) was the Floating Reserve at Guam and the 5th MarDiv (TG 36.4) served as the Area Reserve in Hawaii; neither was committed. ExpeditionaryTroops,Third Fleet (TF 36) Elements, Administrative Command, FMFPac
III Amphibious Corps (Western Landing Force and Troops-TG 36.1) IliAC HQ and Service Battalion IliAC Troops 7th AAA Battalion Ist Echelon, Island Command, Peleliu (TU 10.15.3)
50
The 1st MarDiv had received 4,860 replacements after fighting on New Britain from January to March 1944. It had rested and retrained on less than hospitable Pavuvu in the Russell Islands for five months. The Division was well trained, and haVing suffered only moderate casualties on New Britain, had a
high percentage of experienced troops. They had suffered heavily from the harsh environment and poor health conditions though. Most of its Guadalcanal veterans had rotated back to the States. The 1st MarDiv had served under Sixth Army at New Britain using that command's communications plan. It was completely unfamiliar with the Central Pacific Communications Plan to be used at Peleliu and copies of the plan were late in being provided due to the Division's location on remote Pavuvu. To provide sufficient amtrac support, the 1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion was split three ways to form two additional units: 3d Armored Amphibian Tractor and 6th Amphibian Tractor battalions (Prov). They were manned by rear echelon personnel from other amtrac battalions; Company C, 1st MT Battalion; and replacements from the Tracked Vehicle School at Camp Pendleton. Company C, 1st Tank Battalion was shipped without its tanks because of limited space. The crews served as relief for the 30 tanks in companies A and B. Company A, 1st MT Battalion deployed with all vehicles and repair equipment, but Company B arrived with only its personnel, who were employed as litter bearers and relief drivers. It was felt that few trucks would be needed on the small island and the amtracs and Army Ducks would provide transport. The 1st Pioneer Battalion had two additional companies, D and E. They were initially employed to unload landing craft and then released as infantry replacements on D+3. Due to the much higher than expected casualty rates, replacements were inadequate. With some service and support units undermanned, they could provide few men to dwindling combat units. The 1st MarDiv had sailed to Guadalcanal with 24,234 troops to rendezvous with the 81st InfDiv and conducted rehearsals. Periodic bombardment of the Palaus had begun in March, and this intensified as D-Day approached. The vVestern Attack Force's (TF 32) Peleliu Attack Group (TG 32.1) arrived off Peleliu with 28,484 troops on the morning of September 14. It was anticipated that the island would be secured in four days. The landing beaches were on the west coast just north of the island's south end and adjacent to the airfield. The first wave came ashore at 0832 hours. From north to south: 3/1 landed on Beach WHITE 1 and 2/1 on WHITE 2 with the reserve 1/1 following. 1/5 landed on ORANGE 1 and 3/5 on ORANGE 2 with the reserve 2/5 following. The 7th Marines landed in a column of battalions (3d, 1st, 2d) on ORANGE 3 though 3/7 was forced to land on ORANGE 2. 2/7 doubled as the Division Reserve. For artillery support 1/11 supported CT1, 2/11 CT5, 3/11 CT7, and 4/11 in general support. 3/11 lost a complete battery on D-Day.
1st MarDiv (Reinforced) (Peleliu Landing Force-TU 36.1.1)
Marines shelter behind a knockedout LVT(A)( I) on Peleliu. To the left (rear) of the turret a Marine mans one of the vehicle's manholemounted .3D-cal. machine guns.
Because of the rugged terrain and many caves, M7 rifle grenade launchers were more widely used on Peleliu than previously. One drawback of the M7 was that the M I rifle could not be fired in semi-automatic mode while the launcher was fitted.
Combat Team I (SPITFIRE)
I st Marines (Reinforced) Company A, I st Engineer Battalion Company A, I st Medical Battalion Company A, I st Pioneer Battalion Company A, I st Tank Battalion [M4A2]
I st Platoon, 1st MP Company I st Platoon, Ordnance Company, I st Service Battalion Detachment, Service and Supply Company, I st Service Battalion Detachment, 4th Joint Assault Signal Company Combat Team 5 (LONE WOLF) 5th Marines (Reinforced)
(continued on page 54)
51
N
A
6
KONGAURU ISLAND
MURPHY ISLAND
Beach PuRPLE
Beach SCARLET 2
Beach SCARLET 1
52
The geography and landing beaches of Peleliu island.
1: ----.....,....1-km-----J~ I 11 -
mi
Advance line on D-Day ---{ID-- Subsequent phase line indicating D+ day dat~ /'f,:t . . - - D-Day Japanese counterattack
N
A
I
:1------1r-km-----'~ mi 1
I
ABOVE The battle for Peleliu, September 15-23 (D-Day to 0+8).
Ist Marine Division, Peleliu Landing Force,TU36.1.1
III
CT5
CT1
AA Group
CT7
Engr Group
Armd Amtrac Group ..... -- - -- _.'-
Amph Transport Group
t:=:;:::=:=:::l'
Arty Group
"""""_ _Pl·'·
Medical Group ...--....-.. '
53
Company B, I st Engineer Battalion Company B, I st Medical Battalion Company B, I st Pioneer Battalion Company B (- I st and 4th Platoons), I st Tank Battalion [M4A2] 2d Platoon, I stMP Company 2d Platoon, Ordnance Company, I st Service Battalion Detachment, Service and Supply Company, I st Service Battalion Detachment, 4th Joint Assault Signal Company Combat Team 7 (MUSTANG) 7th Marines (Reinforced) (- 2d Battalion)
Return of the Marines to the Philippines Because of the positioning of units for the cancelled Yap assault,VAC Artillery, under BGen Thomas E. Bourke, and its 5th 155mm Howitzer (LtCol James E. Mills), and 11th 155mm Gun (LtCol Thomas S. Ivey), battalions accompanied XXIV Corps to the Philippines for the 20 October 1944 (A-Day) Leyte landing (KING II). The 1,528 Marines ofVAC Artillery supported the 7th and 96th InfDivs along with the Army's attached I 98th (I 55mm Howitzer), 226th (155mm Gun), and 287th (Observation) Field Artillery battalions. XXIV Corps Artillery arrived from Saipan with additional field artillery battalions where it had supported VAC and relieved VAC Artillery and the two Marine battalions on December I I. They departed on December 13.The Marine 2d and 3d Joint Assault Signal Companies had supported 7th and 96th InfDivs until November 29. Other Marine elements with VAC Artillery included a small detachment of Company C, 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(2)] and a detachment of Air Liaison Section,VAC Artillery.
Company C (- 2d Platoon), I st Engineer Battalion Company C, I st Medical Battalion Company C, I st Pioneer Battalion
I st and 4th Platoons, Company B, I st Tank Battalion [M4A2] 3d Platoon, 1st MP Company Detachment, 4th Joint Assault Signal Company . Armored Amphibian Tractor Group 3d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Prov) [24 x LVT(A) 1,48 x LVT(A)4] US Navy Flamethrower Detachment [9 x LVT(4)] Amphibian Transport Group
I st Amphibian Tractor Battalion [120 x LVT(2)/(4)] 6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Prov) [80 x LVT(2)/(4)] Detachment, 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (- detachment) [21 x LVT(2)] 454th and 456th Transportation Corps Amphibian Truck Companies (USA) [50 x DUKW] Artillery Group I Ith Marines [artillery] 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion 8th 155mm Gun Battalion (- Battery C) Antiaircraft Group 12th AAA Battalion Engineer Group I st Engineer Battalion (- Companies A-C) 33d and 73d NC Battalions (-) Shore Party Group I st MT Battalion (- Company C) I st Pioneer Battalion (- Companies A-C) Detachments, 33d and 73d NC battalions Garrison Beach Party Service Group I st Service Battalion (-) 16th Field Depot 7th Marine Ammunition Company I Ith Marine Depot Company Forward Echelon, lilAC Air Delivery Section Detachment, 3d MT Battalion
54
(continued on page 55)
Medical Group I st Medical Battalion (- Companies A-e and - detachment, Company D) Reserve Group 2d Battalion, 7th Marines I st Tank Battalion (- Companies A-B) Detachment, 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(2)] I st Reconnaissance Company Detachment, 4th Joint Assault Signal Company 2d Platoon, Company C, I st Engineer Battalion Detachment, Company D, I st Medical Battalion Attachments 2d Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon 4th-6th Marine War Dog Platoons 5th and 6th Separate Wire Platoons
Resistance was heavy, especially on the flank beaches and only part of the airfield was reached on the first day. The Division lost 26 LVTs on D-Day and numerous DUKWs, demonstrating that the latter should not accompany the initial assault waves. Most of the southern part of the island was secured by D+2, including the airfield. The 1st Marines pushed into the south end of the Umurbrogol Mountains on the 20th, but at such high cost that it became combat ineffective with 4S percent casualties-I, 749 men. 2/1's F and G Companies were consolidated into one, 1/1 had to be reinforced with the 1st Reconnaissance Company, and headquarters personnel manned the remaining machine guns. The 4,OOO-plus-man 321st RCT under Col Robert F. Dark was sent from Angaur, landed over the ORANGE Beaches on the 23rd, and began relieving the 1st Marines. The 1st Marines were placed in reserve and remained on the island until October 2 departing with elements of the Division HQ, 1st Medical, 1st MT, 1st Service, and 1st Tank Battalions, and 1/11 and 2/11 [artillery].
The Japanese made several attempts, some successful, to land reinforcing troops on Peleliu from Babelthup to the north. Here LVT(A)(4) and LVT(A)( I) crews board a Japanese Daihatsu Model A landing barge they have intercepted during the night. Amtracs were especially useful for protecting against counterlandings thanks to their mobility and firepower.
321st Regirr-ental Combat Team 321 st Infantry I 54th Engineer Combat Battalion (- one company) Detachment, HQ&S Company, I I 38th Engineer Combat Group Company A, 306th Engineer Combat Battalion Detachment, HQ&S Company, 306th Engineer Combat Battalion Company A (Colleeting), 306th Medical Battalion Company D (Clearing) (-), 306th Medical Battalion Detachment, HQ Company, 306th Medical Battalion Detachment, 592d Joint Assault Signal Company Detachment, 481 st Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company Company B, 726th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(2)] Detachment, HQ&S Company, 726th Amphibian Tractor Battalion Company A, 71 Oth Tank Battalion [M4A 1] Prov 81 mm Mortar Platoon, 71 Oth Tank Battalion Company D,88th Chemical Battalion (Motorized) [4.2in. mortar]
(continued on page 56)
55
Detachment, Prov Graves Registration Company, 81 st InfDiv Detachment, 81 st Signal Company Detachment, 81 st Quartermaster Company Detachment, 81 st Ordnance Light Maintenance Company Detachment,Translator-Interpreter Team A, HQ Company, Central Pacific Area
A push by the 321st RCT and 7th Marines up the peninsula's west coast flanked the Umurbrogol Mountains, and what became known as the Umurbrogol Pocket was isolated on the 27th. Most of the remaining Japanese were now surrounded in the most rugged and well-defended area on the island. There were still pockets on the north peninsula and the islands to the north. 3/5, in a shore-to-shore assault, seized neighboring Ngesebus, Kongauru, and Murphy Islands on September 28-29. The 5th and 321st gradually cleared thepeninsula north of the Pocket. The 7th Marines attempted to reduce the Pocket from September 29. Two provisional composite groups, named after their commanders, were formed by the 1st MarDiv on September 29. They secured the north side of the Umurbrogol Pocket under the 7th Marines. The Richmond Group consisted of Companies B and C, 1st Pioneer Battalion and a detachment of the 3d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion. It was redesignated Lyman Group on October 9. The Evans Group (a.k.a. "Infartillery") consisted of an 11th Marines detachment and detachments of the 3d 155mm Howitzer and 8th 155mm Gun battalions. Both groups were reinforced with engineer, amtrac, and service troops. The two groups were dissolved on October 16 after the Pocket had been further compressed. After making little headway and suffering 46 percent casualties, it was relieved by the 5th Marines on October 5-6 and departed on the 19th. The 5th Marines continued to attack from the north and had spent themselves by October 14. The 1st MarDiv was completely exhausted, but MajGen Rupertus repeatedly refused to allow the 81 st InfDiv to relieve his division as recommended by IlIAC. Higher commanders took matters into their own hands on October 12 and the 81st was directed to relieve the 1st. This was accomplished between October 15 and 20 with 81st elements arriving from Angaur and Ulitihi. IlIAC turned over island responsibility to the 81st on the 20th and the 5th Marines remained in defensive positions until departing on the 26th. All 1st MarDiv elements were returned to Pavuvu. The island was finally declared secure at 1000 hours, November 27. Elements of the 1st Amphibian Tractor, 3d Armored Amphibian Tractor, and 1st Medical Battalions plus the 8th 155mm Gun Battalion remained with the Army until November 13. The 12th Defense Battalion remained with the Peleliu Ground Defense Force. Approximately 10,900 Japanese were killed on Peleliu with only 19 Japanese and 202 Korean and Okinawan laborers taken prisoner. Marine commanders, Palau Islands Expeditionary Troops,Third Fleet
MajGen Julian C. Smith
Chief of Staff
Col Dudley S. Brown
III Amphibious Corps
MajGen Roy S. Geiger
Chief of Staff
Col Merwin H. Silverthorn
IliAC Troops
Col MaxD. Smith
1st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Maj Albert F. Reutlinger (to 21 Sep) Capt Arthur J. Noonan (to 10 Oct)
56
(continued on page 57)
LtCol Matnard M. Noonan 3d Armored Amphibian Tractor Bn
LtCol Kimber H. Boyer
3d Base HQ Battalion
LtCol William 0. Smith
3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion
LtCol Richard A. Evans
6th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Capt john I. Fitzgerald,jr.
7th AAA Battalion
LtCol Henry R. Paige
8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
LtCol Charles B. Nerren
8d 155mm Gun Battalion
Maj George V. Hanna,1r.
12th AAA Battalion
LtCol Merlyn D. Holmes
16th Field Depot
LtCol Harten C. Cooper
1st MarDiv
MajGen William H. Rupertus
Asst. Division Commander
BGen Oliver
~
Smith
Chief of Staff
Col john 1: Selden
.HQ & Service Battalion, 1st MarDiv
Col Joseph F. Hankins (KIA 3 Oct) LtCol Austin C. Shofner Col Lewis B. Puller
1st Marines
I st Battalion
Maj Raymond G. Davis
2d Battalion
LtCol Russell E. Honsowetz
3d Battalion
LtCol Stephen V. Sabol Col Harold D. Harris
5th Marines
I st Battalion
LtCol Robert W. Boyd
2d Battalion
MajGordon D. Gayle
3d Battalion
LtCol Austin C. Shofner (WIA 15 Sep) LtCol Lewis Walt (to 16 Sep) Maj john H. Gustafson Col HermanH. Hanneken
7th Marines
I st Battalion
LtCol john j. Gormley
2d Battalion
LtCol Spencer S. Berger
3d Battalion
Maj E. Hunter Hurst
11th Marines [artillery]
Col William H. Harrison
I st Battalion
LtCol Richard W. Wallace
2d Battalion
LtCol Noah ~Wood,jr.
3d Battalion
LtCol Charles M. Nees
4th Battalion
LtCol Louis C. Reinberg
I st Engineer Battalion
LtCol Levi W. Smith, Jr.
I st Medical Battalion
Cdr Emil E. Napp (USN)
I st MT Battalion
Capt Robert B. McBroom
1st Pioneer Battalion
LtCol "Robert G. Ballance
I st Service Battalion
Col john Kaluf
I st Tank Battalion
LtCol Arthur J. Stuart
Provisio~al
Composite Groups (29 Sep-16 Oct 44)
Richmond Group*
Maj Harold1:A. Richmond (XO, 1/5)
Lyman Group
LtCol Edson A. Lyman (XO, 11th Marines)
Evans Group
LtCol Richard A. Evans (CO, 3d 155mm How Bn)
* Redesignated Lyman Group October 9.
57
Iwo Jirna
MajGen Harry Schmidt had commanded the 4th MarDiv at Roi-Namur and Saipan. He assumed command ofVAC for the Tinian assault and then Iwo Jima.
LVT(4)s churn their way to the Iwo Jima landing beaches. The four amphibian tractor battalions on Iwo Jima were all equipped with a mix of LVT(2)s and LVT(4)s.
Iwo Jima (Sulfur Island-RocKcRusHER) is located in the Kazan Retto (Volcano Islands), the southernmost island group of three groups comprising the Nanpo Shoto (Three Groups of Islands) stretching into the Western Pacific south from Tokyo. Iwo Jima is 670 miles from Tokyo and 625 miles northwest of Saipan, making it an ideal midway point for B-29 bombers. The porkchop-shaped volcanic island is 4.66 miles long from northeast to southwest and 2.5 miles wide across its northeast portion, a plateau some 300-plus feet above sea level. The plateau is honeycombed with rock outcrops, low hills and ridges, ravines, and caves. The lower triangular portion terminated at its southwest end with the 546ft-high Mount Sutibachi (HolRocKS). The island consists of volcanic sand and rock. The steep, loose-sand terraces rising up to 60ft above the narrow beaches proved to be a major obstacle to even tracked vehicles. With the exception of patches of grass and scrub brush, it is mostly devoid of vegetation. There is no surface water. The Japanese had sunk wells and constructed rain catchments. Once claimed by Britain, Japan took control of the Nanpo Shoto in 1861 and annexed them in 1891. Extensive fortification of Iwo Jima began in the spring of 1944 after the Marshalls fell. Two large airfields had been constructed on the central portion and a smaller strip was under construction in the north. The 109th Division (-1st Mixed Brigade) with the 2d Mixed Brigade, 145th Infantry Regiment, and numerous support units defended Iwo with almost 13,600 troops. Some 7,300 IJN personnel of the Iwo Jima Guard Force with coast defense gun, antiaircraft, and air service units were present. The summer of 1944 saw the beginning of carrier strikes and bomber raids on the island, which intensified up to the invasion. The Japanese were so well dug into caves, fortifications, and up to five miles of tunnels, that with the exception of neutralizing the island's aircraft, the defenders went largely unscathed. Iwo Jima is considered the most heavily fortified piece of terrain in history. The 4th and 5th MarDivs on Hawaii trained and conducted rehearsals as did the 3d MarDiv on Guam. The 4th had fought on Saipan and Tinian, suffering almost 6,000 casualties. It required almost six months of extensive rebuilding and retraining. The 5th was fresh from the States. Together they would comprise the VAC Assault Troops (TG 56.2). The 3d MarDiv had fought on Guam in July and August 1944. It remained there as the island defense force mopping up holdouts while it rebuilt and retrained, but this hampered its training. It would serve as the Expeditionary Troops Reserve (TG 56.3). Expeditionary Troops, Fifth Fleet (TF 56) was under LtGen Holland Smith and VAC, the Landing Force (TG 56.1), was commanded by MajGen Harry Schmidt. VAC consisted of 71,245 troops, of whom 65,953 were Marines. With the three divisions' 12 howitzer battalions, the island's small size, and abundance of naval gunfire and close air support, it was decided not to deploy all of VAC Artillery. Only two of its six 155mm battalions were committed. The strength of the three divisions, not including attachments, was: 3d-17,715, 4th-18,241, 5th-18,311. This would be the only operation in history where three Marine divisions fought together ashore. A unique organizational concept was employed by the 5th MarDiv in the form of the 5th Shore Party Regiment (Prov). Commanded by the former CO of its deactivated 16th Marines [engineer], it controlled all divisional shore-party elements. All divisions' shore p~rties were larger than previously employed. While Iwo Jima is often perceived as solely a Marine operation, there were a number of Army units attached to VAC including a two-battalion antiaircraft Expeditionary Troops, Fifth Fleet (TF 56) Landing Force (TG 56.1), Assault Troops (TG 56.2), and Expeditionary Troops Reserve (TG 56.3)
58
Company 'B, Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMFPac
group plus medical, signal, air-warning, port, and Duck units. The AAA group and field hospital began arriving on February 2S while most of the smaller units accompanied the assault troops. V Amphibious Corps Landing Force (Iwo Jima Landing Force-TG 56.1) VAC HQ and Service Battalion VAC Artillery 1st Prov Field Artillery Group 2d and 4th 155mm Howitzer Battalions The 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, 5th MarDiv digs in on one of the volcanic ash terraces on Beach RED I, Iwo Jima. Difficult enough for troops to crawl up the loose sand banks, it was almost impossible for vehicles. Even full-tracked vehicles experienced difficulties.
473d Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company (Colored) (USA) I38th AAA Group (USA) 483d AAA Automatic Weapons Battalion [40mm/.50-cal] (USA) 506th AAA Gun Battalion [90mm] (USA) 8th Field Depot (- detachments) VAC Shore Party HQ 8th Marine Ammunition Company 33d, 34th, and 36th Marine Depot Companies VAC Medical Group VAC Medical Battalion Corps Evacuation Hospital No. I 38th Medical Field Hospital (+) (USA) Company D,3d Medical Battalion (operated aboard USS Ozark (LSV-2) Medical Section, Civil Affairs Group (USA) VAC Prov Signal Group Landing Force HQ Signal Operations Section VAC Signal Battalion (- detachments) Shore Party Communication Unit Detachment, Signal Company, 8th Field Depot Detachment, Ist Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon Detachment, HQ Squadron,VII Fighter Command, Seventh Air Force (USAAF) Detachment, 49th Signal Construction Battalion, Light (USA) Detachment, Mobile Communications Unit No. 434, Group Pacific I I (USN) Detachment, Landing Force Air Support Control Unit I
(continued on page 60)
V Amphibious Corps, Iwo Jima Landing Force,TG56.1
xxx
VAcD I
I
:1 • I I
1st.·.•",.I... Field . Prov Arty1~
1,.'.'.:,.:.
I
8th
,--&_~~_I:t-,,/ ~:
EE
I
I
71. 245
I
I
VACLS:J VACG m ~~(. ··.00.:.. J
Signa.l. Group
.
.
Engr' Group
.....
Group
TG56.2
Assault Troops
I
G I
~D
138th; AAA Group
59
Detachment, 568th Aircraft Warning Signal Battalion (USAAF) Detachment, 726th Aircraft Warning Signal Company (USAAF) Detachment 44 (-), 70th Army Airways Communications System Unit (USAAF) VAC Prov Engineer Group 2d Separate Engineer Battalion 2d Separate Topographic Company 23d Special NC Battalion (- Companies C and D, - HQ Company) 62d NC Battalion 3d Platoon, 2d Bomb Disposal Company
(continued on page 6/)
D-Day, Iwo Jima, February 19, 1945.
I:1-------1r-km-------'~ mi I
N
Kitano Point
1
(;f
A
Kangoku Rock
Hanare Rock l)~ 00
o
D a
(?KamaRoCk
c:>
o
o
EAST BOAT BASIN BWE2 BLUE YELLOW 2
II
RED
1 II
1~27
2 r:::::7I 27 II
1 ~ 28 Q
~
60
0
0
Tobiishi Point
~
2~23
II
3~27
3~23 ~
..
1 ~ 25
1 ~23
2 II
RED
..
1
Regt Res
3~25 ~ II
2~25 III
24 r:::::7I ~ DIVRes
RegtRes
Regt Res
21Z1 28 31Z1
28 Div Res
III
26(-)~ VAC Res
3~
Expeditionary Troops Res
2d Bomb Disposal Company (- 3d Platoon) I56th Ordnance Bomb Disposal Squad (USAAF) VAC Provisional LVT Group (- battalions attached to divisions) MT Company,VAC MT Battalion VAC Air Delivery Section Detachment, Ist Platoon, 239th Quartermaster Salvage Collecting Company (USA) Interrogation Team, JIC/POA Enemy Material and Salvage Platoon, JIC/POA Detachment, HQ, Garrison Force and Island Command (USA) Daily progress, Iwo Jima, February 19-March 24, 1945.
Advance Detachment, 1st Battalior:l, 147th Infantry Regiment (Separate) (USA)
1 -----~1k-m----Jl mi I I:1-
(2
N
A
Kangoku ROCk.
Hanare Rock tl~
f':IAmph
~
B~ Recon
00
v-J 13MAR
(?KamaROCk
\ B!SJ::
13 MAR
o o
EAST BOAT BASIN
o Futatsu Rock
o
Tobiishi Point
61
A 37mm M3A I antitank gun of the 28th Marines fires on enemy positions as the Regiment advances toward Mount Suribachi.lt was standard practice to attach an irregularly shaped piece of sheet metal to the top of the gun shield. This made it more difficult to detect than the straight-line silhouette of its standard shield.
The invasion had been scheduled for January 20, 1945 then February 3, but was rescheduled for February 19 (D-Day). Landing beaches on the southeast coast were selected. Faced with deep water and no reefs, the surf was heavy and would hamper the landing of supplies. A benefit of the deep nearshore water though was the absence of obstacles. Beaches on the island's opposite side were considered, but they were pounded by even heavier surf. Supplies would be landed there later in operation to units fighting on that side, but this proved difficult. The entire north side of the island was faced with low cliffs. The 4th and 5th MarDivs sailed for Saipan and then to Iwo Jima in the middle of February accompanied by the 21st Marines, 3d MarDiv. The remainder of the 3d MarDiv followed as the Joint Expeditionary Force (TF 51) converged on Iwo Jima. As the pre-assault bombardment continued on the morning of the 19th, the 4th and 5th MarDivs loaded aboard their assault craft. The first amtracs came ashore at 0859 hours receiving negligible fire. Once ashore fire from Mount Suribachi and the northern defense line became intense and extensive minefields were encountered. The two tank battalions landing on D-Day had lost 30 tanks by D+1. The 5th MarDiv's beaches were on the left northeast of Mount Suribachi. 1/28 and 2/28 landed on Beach GREEN with 3/28 following as the Division Reserve. 2/27 and 1/27 landed on RED 1 and 2. The reserve 3/27 followed ashore later. The 26th Marines (-), as the VAC Reserve, was released to the 5th MarDiv and landed late on D-Day on RED 1 in a column of battalions. The 21st Marines, 3d MarDiv was designated the new VAC Reserve. The 28th Marines cut across the island isolating Suribachi and began its assault on the height. The 27th Marines too drove across the island. The 13th Marines [artillery] began landing in the afternoon. Initial artillery support was as follows: 1/13 and 2/13 supported CT27, 3/13 supported CT28, and 4/13 was in general support. 5th MarDiv (Reinforced) Combat Team 26 (VAC Reserve) 26th Marine (Reinforced) (-LT 126) (VAC Reserve) HQ&S Company, 26th Marines Weapons Company, 26th Marines Company A, 5th Engineer Battalion (- I st-3d Platoons) Company A, 5th Medical Battalion (- Collecting Section) 1st Platoon, 5th MP Company Detachment, 5th Joint Assault Signal Company LandingTeam 226 2d Battalion, 26th Marines 2d Platoon, Company A, 5th Engineer Battalion Detachment, 5th Joint Assault Signal Company Detachment, Collecting Section, Company A, 5th Medical Battalion Landing Team 326 3d Battalion, 26th Marines 3d Platoon, Company A, 5th Engineer Battalion
I st Section, 3d Prov Rocket Detachment Detachment, 5th Joint Assault Signal Company Detachment, Collecting Section, Company A, 5th Medical Battalion
62
(continued on page 63)
5th Marine Division, Iwo Jima
III
III
CT27fZl LT126 LT328
5th,,:1 Prov. Div Reserve
service Group,
:.'.,.:.1 ..'
SVC
I.
~.re Party
I,.
Amphlbj '«& ".' Annd[~ Group...................
~
Arntrac •.: . r a l n ..•,.•
Group~
Combat Team 27 27th Marines (Reinforced) 5th Tank Battalion (- Company C) [M4A31 Company B (-), 5th Engineer Battalion Company B, 5th Medical Battalion 2d Platoon, 5th MP Company Detachment, 3d Prov Rocket Detachment Detachment, 5th joint Assault Signal Company Ist Section, 6th Marine War Dog Platoon Detachment, G-2 Section, 5th MarDiv Combat Team 28 28th Marines (Reinforced) (- LT 328) Company C (- 3d Platoon, - detachments), 5th Engjneer Battalion
Mount Suribachi on the south tip of Iwo Jima was a Japanese strongpoint that looked down on the landing beaches and the Tidorighara lowlands that the 5th MarDiv had to cross to sever the island.
Company C, 5th Medical Battalion Company C, 5th Tank Battalion [M4A3] 3d Platoon, 5th MP Company Detachment, 3d Prov Rocket Detachment Detachment, 5th joint Assault Signal Company 2d Section, 6th Marine War Dog Platoon Detachment, G-2 Section, 5th MarDiv Interrogation Team, joint Intelligence Center/POA 5th Shore Party Regiment (Prov) 5th Pioneer Battalion 31 st NC Battalion 27th and 31 st Replacement Drafts 4th and 5th Platoons, 5th MP Company Detachment, 5th Engineer Battalion Detachment, 5th MT Battalion Detachment, 5th Service Battalion Detachment, 8th Field Depot Detachment, 5th Joint Assault Signal Company 492d Transportation Corps Port Company (Colored) (USA) ArtHlery Group 13th Marines [artillery]
(continued on page 64)
63
Marine Observation Squadron 5 5th Marine Amphibian Truck Company 471 st Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company (Colored) (USA) Armored Amphibian Group Detachment, HQ, 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(4)] Companies C and D, 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion [36 x LVT(A)4] Amphibian Tractor Group 3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion [90 x LVT(2)/(4)] I Ith Amphibian Tractor Battalion [93 x LVT(2)/(4)] Support Group HQ Company, HQ Battalion, 5th MarDiv 5th Joint Assault Signal Company (-) 5th MP Company (-) 5th Reconnaissance Company 5th Signal Company 6th Marine War Dog Platoon (-) Detachment,VAC Signal Battalion 6th Section, 726th Aircraft Warning Signal Company (USAAF) Division Band Service Group HQ&S Company, 5th Engineer Battalion (- detachments) 5th Medical Battalion (- Companies A-C) 5th MT Battalion (- detachments) 5th Service Battalion (- detachments) Division Reserve Landing Team 126 Ist Battalion, 26th Marines Ist Platoon, Company C, 5th Engineer Battalion Detachment, 5th Joint Assault Signal Company The organized confusion of the Iwo Jima beachhead. Supplies are endlessly passed forward by shore party personnel. In the center is a cloth marker panel in the color of the beach it identifies. Such square panels identified the beach's center while narrow rectangular panels identified the beach flanks, horizontal for the left and vertical for the right, a~ seen from the sea.
64
Landing Team 328 3d Battalion, 28th Marines 3d Platoon, Company C, 5th Engineer Battalion Detachment, 5th Joint Assault Signal Company Liaison Groups, FMFPac and VAC
The 4th MarDiv's beaches were on the right of the 5th's. 1/23 landed on Beach YELLOW 1 with 2/23 landing on YELLOW 2. The reserve 3/23 followed ashore on YELLOW 1. 1/25 and 3/25 landed abreast on BLUE 1 and the edge of BLUE 2. The reserve 2/25 followed ashore on BLUE 1. The 24th Marines (Division Reserve) landed on D-Day with 1/24 coming ashore on BLUE 1, 2/24 on YELLOW 2, and 3/24 on BLUE 2. The 23d Marines pushed toward Airfield No. 1 and the 25th Marines swung to the right to secure the quarry and that flank. The 14th Marines [artillery] began landing in mid-afternoon. Initial artillery support was as follows: 1/14 supported RCT25, 2/14 supported RCT23, and 3/14 and 4/14 in general support. Unlike other divisions in which the 1st and 2d Battalions were 75mm and the 3d and 4th Battalions 105mm, the 14th Marines' 2d and 4th Battalions were 105mm. Seven of 4/14's twelve 105mm howitzers were lost on D+1 when their Ducks sank.
4th MarDiv (Reinforced) Regimental Combat Team 23 23d Marines (Reinforced) 133d NC Battalion (- Company D) Company A, 4th Pioneer Battalion 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [94 x LVT(2)/(4)] Company B, 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion [18 x LVT(A)4] Company C, 4th Engineer Battalion Company C, 4th Medical Battalion Company C, 4th MT Battalion Company C, 4th Tank Battalion [M4A3] 3d Platoon, 4th MP Company 3d Platoon, Service and Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion Detachment, Ist Joint Assault Signal Company 2d Section, Ist Provisional Rocket Detachment 3d Section, 7th Marine War Dog Platoon Detachment, 8th Field Depot [shore party] 3d Platoon, 442d Transportation Corps Port Company (Colored) (USA) Liaison and Forward Observer Parties, 2d Battalion, 14th Marines [artillery] 3d Band Section Regimental Combat Team 25 25th Marines (Reinforced) 4th Pioneer Battalion (- Company A; + HQ Detachment, 8th Field Depot) Company A, 133d NC Battalion 5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [94 x LVT(2)/(4)] Company A, 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion [18 x LVT(A)4] Company A, 4th Engineer Battalion Company A, 4th Medical Battalion Company A, 4th MT Battalion Company A, 4th ~ank Battalion [M4A3] 1st Platoon, 4th MP Company Ist Platoon, Service and Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion Detachment, Ist Joint Assault Signal Company Ist Section, 1st Prov Rocket Detachment 7th Marine War Dog Platoon (-) Detachment, 8th Field Depot [shore party] 30th Replacement Draft (- detachments) [shore party] Ist Platoon, 442d Transportation Corps Port Company (Colored) (USA) Liaison and Forward Observer Parties, Ist Battalion, 14th Marines [artillery] Ist Band Section Regimental Combat Team 24 (Division Reserve) 24th Marines (Reinforced) Company' B, 4th Engineer Battalion Company B, 4th Medical Battalion Company B, 4th MT Battalion Company B, 4th Tank Battalion [M4A3]
(continued on page 66)
65
4th Marine Division, Iwo Jima 4th (+)
I
I
III
III Div Arty
RCT24
Support Group
Div Reserve
2d Platoon, 4th MP Company 2d Platoon, Service and Supply Company, 4th Service Battalion Detachment, Ist joint Assault Signal Company 2d Section, Ist Prov Rocket Detachment 2d Section, 7th Marine War Dog Platoon Detachments, 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts [shore party]. 442d Transportation Corps Port Company (Colored) (-) (USA) Liaison and Forward Observer Parties, 3d Battalion, 14th Marines [artillery] 2d Band Section Division Artillery 14th Marines [artillery] (-) 4th Marine Amphibian Truck Company 476th Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company (Colored) (USA) Marine Observation Squadron 4 Support Group HQ Battalion, 4th Marine Division (- detachments) 2d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion (- Companies A-D; - Det, Battalion HQ) 4th Engineer Battalion (- Companies A-C) 4th Medical Battalion (- Companies A-C) 4th MT Battalion (- Companies A-C) 4th Tank Battalion (- Companies A-C) Tank Maintenance Platoon, Ordnance Company, 4th Service Battalion 4th Service Battalion (- detachments) 4th Reconnaissance Company Ist joint Assault Signal Company (- detachments) Ist Prov Rocket Detachment (-) Detachment,VAC Signal Battalion Interrogation Team, joint Intelligence Center/POA Detachment, 726th Aircraft Warning Signal Company (USAAF) Liaison Groups, FMFPac and VAC
Note: the 5th and 10th Amphibian Tractor Battalions and 24th and 30th Replacement Drafts were attached to the Support Group after landing.
66
On February 23, 2/28 reached the top of Suribachi and a flag was raised. The 28th Marines was designated the VAC Reserve on the 25th, but spent several more days mopping up the island's south end before moving north. In the meantime the 4th MarDiv and the rest of the 5th wheeled northward and began slowly advancing. They had fought through the first defensive line by
3d Marine Division, Iwo Jima Expeditionary Troops Reserve,TG56.3
xx 3d(+)
12,715
3dCT
HILL 362-8
HILL 362-A
Boundary change 1430,3 MAR
9 RELIEVED 3/21 II
9
N
A February 24 and the 3d MarDiv was ordered to land. Serving as the Expeditionary Troops Reserve, it was released to VAC control on the 23rd. The 21st Marines, 3d MarDiv became the Corps Reserve on D-Day replacing the 26th Marines, 5th MarDiv in this mission when the 26th was committed to the line. The 21st Marines landed on the 21st on the YELLOW beaches and was attached to the 4th MarDiv. The 3d MarDiv HQ and 9th Marines came ashore on the 24th across a new beach established by contracting RED and YELLOW beaches. The 21st Marines was returned to 3d MarDiv control on that day. All four battalions of the 12th Marines [artillery] came ashore between February 24 and March 1. The Division was inserted in the line between the 5th and 4th MarDivs. The below initial task organization serves only as a guide as there were frequent reattachments of elements between combat teams and to the 4th MarDiv as the 3d MarDiv (- 3d CT) was landed piecemeal over 10 days.
3d Marine Division shifts from a one-regiment to a two-regiment front, Iwo Jima, February 28-March 3, 1945.
67
3d MarDiv (Reinforced) (Expeditionary Troops Reserve-TG 56.3) Division HQ&S Battalion (-) 3d Engineer Battalion (-) 3d Medical Battalion (-) 3d MT Battalion (-) 3d Pioneer Battalion (-) 3d Service Battalion (-) 3d Tank Battalion (-) [M4A2] 3d Joint Assault Signal Company (-) 3d Marine Amphibian Truck Company 3d Marine War Dog Platoon Oetachment,VAC Signal Battalion 3d Combat Team (Fleet Reserve) 3d Marines (Reinforced) Company C, 3d Engineer Battalion Company C, 3d Medical Battalion Company C, 3dMT Battalion Company C, 3d Pioneer Battalion Detachments, 3d Service Battalion Detachment, 3d Joint Assault Signal Company Detachments, 28th and 34th Replacement Drafts 9th Combat Team 9th Marines (Reinforced) Companies A and B, 3d Tank Battalion [M4A2] (attached to 2/9) Company A, 3d Engineer Battalion Company A, 3d Medical Battalion Company A, 3d MT Battalion Company A, 3d Pioneer Battalion Detachments, 3d Service Battalion Detachment, 3d Joint Assault Signal Company Detachments, 28th and 34th Replacement Drafts The Marines had expected higher than normal casualties on Iwo Jima and prepared accordingly. Divisional medical battalions were authorized a 100 percent increase in patient care facilities and equipment. The Army's reinforced 38th Medical Field Hospital was originally scheduled to land with the Garrison Troops, but came ashore on D+6.
21 st Combat Team 21 st Marines (Reinforced) Company B, 3d Engineer Battalion Company B, 3d Medical Battalion Company B, 3d MT Battalion Company B, 3d Pioneer Battalion Detachments, 3d Service Battalion Detachment, 3d Joint Assault Signal Company 12th Marines [artillery] 28th and 34th Replacement Drafts (-)
68
L/3/25 and 4th Reconnaissance Company were formed into the Provisional Battalion, 25th Marines on March 5 and attached to the 23d Marines for rear-area mopping up. It was dissolved on March 9 and replaced by the 4th Provisional Battalion, formed from Support Group troops, but this 535-man infantry unit was dissolved on the 12th. There were numerous instances in all divisions when service and support troops augmented infantry units because of the alarmingly high casualty rate and extent of exhaustion.
A significant Seabee presence was seen on Iwo Jima as the 41st NC Regiment accompanying VAC Assault Troops rebuilt and expanded the airfields while the fighting continued. Besides its own battalions it took over the 31st and 133d NC Battalions initially supporting 5th and 4th MarDivs plus the later arriving 70th NC Battalion (Pontoon, less elements). The 3d Marines (Reinforced) remained afloat as the Fleet Reserve until departing the area for Guam on March 5. Between 0900--1024 hours, March 13 Company B, Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMFPac and a detachment of Company C, 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion cleared the abandoned Kangoku and Kama Rocks 2,250 and 1,000 yards northwest of Iwo. The 506th AAA Battalion provided direct supporting fire. Iwo lima's north was gradually cleared with the remaining Japanese pressed into pockets on the north and northeast coasts. These had been reduced by March 16 and the island was declared secure at 1045 hours (the original estimate had been 10 days.) A final pocket near the northeast coast fell on March 24. In late-March the amtrac battalions were withdrawn to their bases for refitting. One-third of over 400 cargo amtracs were lost. On or around March 17, the combat-depleted 27th Marines' battalions were each reorganized with a headquarters and two rifle companies and placed in Division Reserve. The 27th Marines also formed the 460-man Composite Battalion, 27th Marines with four small rifle companies for attachment to the 26th Marines to complete mopping up. The 3d MarDiv assumed responsibility for mopping up in the north as the 4th MarDiv loaded out between March 14--19 and departed for Hawaii. The 5th MarDiv began loading on the 18th and sailed for Hawaii on the 27th. The Army's 147th Infantry Regiment (Separate), under Col Robert F. Johnson, arrived on March 20 from New Caledonia. It took over mop-up operations on the 24th and assumed full defense responsibility on April 4. The 3d MarDiv began loading and left for Guam between March 27 and April 12. Because of the extensive cave and tunnel systems it was impossible to determine an accurate count of Japanese dead. Virtually the entire garrison was wiped out. The Marines captured 216 prisoners, mostly Korean laborers. The 147th Infantry killed another 1,600 Japanese in April and May and took 867 prisoners. B-29 bombers returning from Japan to the Marianas began making emergency landings on Iwo Jima on March 4 with 2,251 bombers (24,761 airmen) doing so by the war's end. From April 7 fighters based on Iwo Jima began escorting bombers to and from Japan as they passed the island. VAC was scheduled to seize Miyako Jima in the Sakishima Gunto 100 miles east of Formosa (defended by a division and a brigade) after Okinawa was secured in June 1945. This operation was cancelled in April due to VAC's heavy losses on Iwo Jima and the need for it to prepare for the planned November 1945 Kyushu landing. Marine Commanders, Iwo Jima Expeditionary Troops, Fifth Fleet
LtGen Holland M. Smith
Chief of Staff
Col Dudley S. Brown
Amphibious Recon Bn, FMFPac
Maj James L. Jones
V Amphibious Corps
MajGen Harry Schmidt
Chief of Staff
BGen William W. Rogers
VACTroops
Col Anton A. Gladden
VAC HQ&S Battalion
Capt Cyril M. Milbrath
VAC Medical Battalion
LCdr William B. Clapp (USN)
2d Separate Engineer Battalion
LtC 0 I Charles O. Clark
8th Field Depot
Col Leland S. Swindler (also CO, Landing Force Shore Party)
(continued on page 70)
69
Corps Evacuation Hospital No. I 38th Medical Field Hospital 1st Prov Field Artillery Group
Maj Samuel S. Kirkland (USA) Col john S. Letcher
2d 155mmHowitzer Battalion
Maj Earl j. Rowse
4th 155mm Howitzer Battalion
LtCol Douglas E. Reeve
VAC Prov LVT Group
LtCol HarryW. G.Vadnais
2d Armd Amphibian Tractor Bn
LtC 0 I Reed M. Fawell,Jr.
3d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
LtCol Sylvester L. Stephen
5th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Maj George L. Shead
10th Amphibian Tractor Bn
Maj Vietor J. Croizat
11th Amphibian Tractor Bn
Maj Ralph E.Boulton
VAC Prov Signal Group VAC Signal Battalion 41 st NC Regiment 23d Special NC Battalion 62d NC Battalion I 38th AAA Group 483d AAA Auto Weapons Bn 506th AAA Gun Battalion Detachment, LFASCU-I
4th
Capt H. G.Young (USN)
M~rDiv
LtCol Harry W. G.Vandnais LtCol Alfred
~
Robertshaw
Cdr Paul F. Henderson (USN) Cdr H. W. Heuer (USN) LCdr Frank B. Campbell (USN) Col Clearance E. Rothgeb (USA) LtCol A. Roth (USA) LtC 0 I D. M. White (USA) Col Vernon E. Megee
MajGen Clifton B. Cates
Asst. Division Commander
BGen Franklin A. Hart
Chief of Staff
Col Melton J. Batchelder
HQ Battalion, 4th MarDiv
Col Bertrand 1: Fay
23d Marines
Col Walter W. Wensigner
I st Battalion
LtC 0 I Ralph Haas (KIA 20 Feb) LtC 0 I Louis B. Blissard
2d Battalion
Maj Robert H. Davidson (WIA 7 Mar) LtCol Edward J. Dillon (to II Mar) Maj Robert H. Davidson
3d Battalion 24th Marines
Maj James S. Scales Col Walter I. Jordan
I st Battalion
Maj Paul S. Treitel (to 8 Mar)
2d Battalion
LtCol Richard Rothwell
LtCol Austin R. Brunelli 3d Battalion
LtCol Alexander A.Vandegrift, Jr. (yVIA 23 Feb) MajDoyle A. Stout
25th Marines I st Battalion
Col john R. Lanigan LtC 0 I Hollis U. Mustin (KIA 21 Feb) Maj Fenton J. Mee
2d Battalion
LtCol LewisC. Hudson, Jr. (WIA 20 Feb) LtCol James Taul
3d Battalion
LtC 0 I Justice M. Chambers 0NIA 22 Feb) Capt James C. Headley
Provisional Battalion 14th Marines [artillery]
70
Maj Edward L.Asbili (XO,I/25) Col Lewis G. DeHaven
I st Battalion
Maj John B. Edgar,jr.
2dBattaiion
Maj Clifford B. Drake
3d Battalion
LtCol Robert E. MacFarlane 0NIA 19 Feb).
(continued on page 7/)
Maj Harvey A. Feehan (to 23 Feb) LtCol Carl A. Youngdale (to 10 Mar) Maj Harvey A. Feehan 4th Battalion
LtC 0 I Carl A.Youngdale (to 23 Feb) Maj Roland J. Spritzen (to 10 Mar) LtCol Carl A.Youngdale
Support Group, 4th MarDiv
LtCol Melvin L. Krulewitch (also CO, Service Troops, 4th MarDiv)
4th Medical Battalion
Cdr Reuben L. Sharp (USN)
4th MT Battalion
LtCol Ralph L. Schiesswokl
4th Service Battalion
LtCol john E. Fondahl
4th Provisional Battalion
LtC0 I Melvin L. Krulewitch (CO, Spt Grp)
4th Engineer Battalion
LtCol Nelson K. Brown
4th Pioneer Battalion
LtCol Richard G. Ruby
4th Tank Battalion
LtCol Richard K. Schmidt
133d NC Battalion
5th MarDiv
LCdr Ray ~ Murphy (USN)
MajGen Keller E. Rockey
Asst. Division Commander
BGen Leo D. Hermie
Chief of Staff
Col Ray A. Robinson
HQ Battalion, 5th MarDiv
Maj john Ayrault, jr.
26th Marines
Col Chester B. Graham
I st Battalion
LtCol Daniel C. Pollock {WIA 19 Mar} Maj Albert V. K. Gary
2d Battalion
LtC 0 I joseph ~ Sayers (WIA 23 Feb) Maj Amedeo Rea
3d Battalion
LtCol Tom M. Trotti (KIA 22 Feb) Capt Richard M. Cook (to 23 Feb) Maj Richard Fagan
27th Marines I st Battalion
Col Thomas A. Wornham Composite Battalion LtCol john A. Butler (KIA 5 Mar) LtCol justin G. Duryea (WIA 9 Mar) Maj William H. Tumbelston rNlA 14 Mar)
2d Battalion
Maj William H. Kennedy, jr.
3d Battalion
Maj Gerald
Maj john WAntonell {WIA 9 Mar} ~
LtCol Donn
Russell
J. Robertson
Maj Frederick j. Mix, Jr. (acting 17 Mar) LtCol Donn j. Robertson (CO, 3/27) 28th Marines
Col Harry B. Liversedge
I st Battalion
LtCol jackson B. Butterfield
2d Battalion
LtCol Chandler W johnson (KIA 2 Mar) Maj Thomas B. Pearce, jr.
3d Battalion
.
LtCol Charles E. Shepard, jr. (to 14 Mar) Maj Tolson A. Smoak
13th Marines [artillery]
Col james D. Waller
I st Battalion
LtCol john S. Oldfield
2d Battalion
Maj Carl W Hjerpe
3d Battalion
LtC 0 I HenryT:Waller
4th Battalion
Maj James ~ Coady
(continued on page 72)
71
5th Shore Party Regiment (Prov)
Col Benjamin W. Gaily (also CO, Service Troops, 5th MarDiv)
5th Pioneer Battalion
Maj Robert S. Riddell
31 st NC Battalion
LCdr Dominick J. Ermilio (USN)
5th Engineer Battalion
LtC 0 I Clifford H. Shuey
5th Medical Battalion
LCdr William W. Ayres (USN)
5th MT Battalion
Maj Arthur F. Torgler, Jr.
5th Service Battalion
Maj Francis
~
Daly (KIA 22 Feb)
None shown 22-27 Feb Maj Gardelle Lewis 5th Tank Battalion
LtCol William R. Collins
3d MarDiv
MajGen Graves B. Erskine
Asst. Division Commander
BGen John. B. Wilson
Chief of Staff
Col Robert E. Hogaboom
HQ Battalion, 3d MarDiv
LtC 0 I Jack F. Warner (to 14 Mar)
3d Marines (Fleet Reserve)
Col James A. Stuart
LtCol Carey A. Randall
I st Battalion
LtC 0 I Ronald R.Van Sockum
2d Battalion
LtCol Thomas R. Stokes
3d Battalion
LtCol Ralph L. Bastian
9th Marines I st Battalion
Col Howard N. Kenyon LtCol Carey A. Randall (to 6 Mar) Maj William 1": Glass (to 14 Mar) LtCol Jack F. Warner
2d Battalion
LtCol Robert E. Cushman, Jr.
3d Battalion
LtCol Harold C. Boehm
21st Marines I st Battalion
Col Hartnoll J. Withers LtCol Marlowe C.Wiliiams (WIA 22 Feb) Maj Clay M. Murray (WIA 22 Feb) Maj Robert H. Houser
2d Battalion
LtCol Lowell E. English (WIA 2 Feb) Maj George A. Percy
3d Battalion 12th Marines [artillery] I st Battalion
LtCol Wendell H. Duplantis LtCol Raymond F. Crist, Jr. Maj George B. Thomas
2d Battalion
LtCol William 1": Fairbourn
3d Battalion
LtCol Alpha L. Bowser, Jr.
4th Battalion
Maj Joe B. Wallen (to 20 Mar) LtCol Thomas R. Belzer
Service Troops, 3d MarDiv
Col James O. Brauer (to 6 Mar) Col Lewis A. Hohn
72
3d Medical Battalion
Cdr Anthony E. Reymont (USN)
3d MT Battalion
LtCol Ernest W. Fry, Jr.
3d Service Battalion
LtCol Paul G. Chandler
3d Engineer Battalion
LtCol Walter S. Campbell
3d Pioneer Battalion
LtCol Edmund M.Williams
3d Tank Battalion
Maj Holly H. Evans
Okinawa The Nansei Shoto (Southwestern Islands), or Ryukyu Islands (BUNKHOUSE), comprise five island groups curving 650 miles from Kyushu, Japan toward Formosa. Okinawa Gunto (LEGUMINOUS) is the largest of the groups in the chain's middle. Okinawa (SCATIERING) lies 350 miles northeast of Formosa, 320 miles southeast of Kyushu, 790 northeast of the Philippines, and 1,230 miles northwest of Guam. The main island is 64 miles in length from southwest to northeast and its maximum width is 18 miles, narrowing to a two-mile-wide isthmus in the center. This isthmus divides the island into two regions: the rugged, 1,500ft-high hills of the north with a sparse population, and the more densely populated south. The south consists of rolling plains crossed by 30G-500ft ridges and hills with moderate vegetation where it has not been cultivated. Streams in the south offered poor drainage. The ridges were honeycombed with caves. There were scores of villages and towns, and two cities: Naha, the administrative center, on the southern west coast, and Shuri inland to its northeast. This was the site of the ancient Ryukyuan Empire's capital. Ryukyuans are ethnically different from the Japanese, who had taken control of the islands in 1867, annexing them in 1874. The prewar population, including thousands of Japanese immigrants, government officials, administrators, and merchants, was 435,000. The Ryukyuans bore second-class status in their own homeland. Some 80,000 Okinawans were shipped to the Home Islands prior to the invasion on returning supply ships and untold thousands more had been pressed into labor units for service across the Pacific. Allied planners first considered Formosa as the next target, even at the expense of by-passing the Philippines. Because of Formosa's large size, its 480,000 defenders (approximately the same strength as the entire Marine Corps), and its proximity to Japanese airbases in China, it was decided that MacArthur would thrust into the Philippines and Admiral Chester Nimitz would seize Iwo lima then Okinawa as a base for the invasion of Japan. Okinawa and its adjacent islands were defended by the 32d Army consisting of the 24th and 62d Divisions, 44th Independent Mixed Brigade, and significant support and service troops, most of whom were organized into combat units prior to the invasion-67,000 troops. The Okinawa Naval Base Force included 3,800 I]N personnel and 6,000 combatant civilian employees. Included were large numbers of conscripted Okinawan Boeitai laborers and augmentation personnel to military units. They had constructed extensive fortifications in the south with several cross-island defense lines built along the ridges and hills. Over 60 miles of tunnels had been dug and the 32d Army's 100,000 troops were underground. Only light forces were positioned in the north, enough to distract a US division from the main effort in the south, and around the Yontan and Kendena Airfields where the landings would occur. Five airfields had been built on the island and two more on Ie Shima off the northwest coast. The Tenth Army under LtGen Simon B. Buckner, Jr. (USA) was organized in June 1944 specifically to seize Okinawa, and was staged at Hawaii. As Joint Expeditionary Troops (TF 56) it fielded 182,821 troops, of whom 88,500 were Marines. Of these, 66,636 Marines participated in the initial assault. Tactical Air Force, Tenth Army (TG 99.2) consisted of both Marine and USAAF units under the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing. For the Marines it was the most complex operational assault they had participated in. Originally planned for March, the operation was postponed to April 1, 1945 (L-Day), although operations would commence on L-6 (March 26) when outlying islands were seized. The Army's XXIV Corps (Southern Landing Force) deployed from the Philippines with the 7th and 96th InfDivs plus the77th InfDiv (Western Islands Landing Force). The 27th InfDiv was the Joint Expeditionary Force Floating Reserve (TG 51.2) while the 81st InfDiv was held at New Caledonia as the Area Reserve. The 2d MarDiv deployed as the Demonstration Force and Tenth Army Floating Reserve.
Typical southern Okinawa terrain as found on the Shuri Line, the main Japanese cross-island defense line. Such hills and ridges were honeycombed with caves reinforced by in-depth manmade fortifications.
73
III Amphibious Corps, Okinawa Northern Landing Force
lilAC
I
I
xx 6th (-)
III 29th CT
iliAC Reserve
Field Arty Group
AAA Group
N
A
EAST CHINA SEA
KEISE SHIMA /)0
PACIFIC OCEAN
c0 TSUGEN SHIMA
~UTAKA SHIMA
Airfields
Kiya
The location of the key towns, islands and facilities on Okinawa Gunto.
74
IlIAC Troops moved out from Hawaii. With 12,422 troops, it was the largestyet Marine assemblage of corps troops. With it came all six corps lssmm battalions and four AAA battalions, because of Okinawa's proximity to Japan. IlIAC Artillery had lost 500 men, mainly experienced NCOs, who had rotated
III Amphibious Corps (Northern Landing Force) III Amphibious Corps Troops iliAC HQ and Service Battalion Ist Separate Topographic Company iliAC Signal Battalion 3d Separate Radio Intelligence Platoon Communications Unit 43D (USN) Detachment, Air Warning Squadron (no designation given) Company A, 1st Prov MP Battalion (USA) [redesignated the 5/ st MP Battalion on April 9] Landing Force Air Support Control Unit I iliAC Medical Battalion Corps Evacuation Hospitals No.2 and 3 Corps Engineer Group 44th NC Regiment (- 11th Special, 58th, I30th, and 145th NC Battalions) 71 st NC Battalion Ist Separate Engineer Battalion 802d Engineer Aviation Battalion (USA) Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMFPac Corps Service Group HQ, Service Group HQ, Shore Party Group I Ith MT Battalion (Prov) 7th Field Depot (Reinforced) [redesignated 7th Service Regiment with HQ Bottalion and below attachments on June I.] Ist, 3d, and 12th Marine Ammunition Companies 3d Marine Ammunition Company 5th, 9th, 10th, 18th-20th, 37th, and 38th Marine Depot Companies 7th Separate Laundry Platoon Company D, 1st MP Battalion (Prov) Ist Bomb Disposal Company (-) Ist, 3d and 5th Platoons Military Government Detachment B-8 (USA) Military Government Detachment C-I (Camp) (USA) G-6 Hospital Unit No. I (USN) G-IO Dispensary Unit No. 12 (USN) iliAC Artillery HQ Battery, iliAC Artillery (Bemis Group) (supported 1st MarDiv) 6th 155mm Howitzer Battalion 8th and 9th 155mm Gun Battalions HQ Battery, 2d Provisional Field Artillery Group (supported 6th MarDiv) Ist and 3d 155mm Howitzer Battalions 7th 155mm Gun Battalion 456th Transportation Corps Amphibious Truck Company (USA) Marine Observation Squadron 7
(continued on page 76)
75
IIiACAAA 1st Prov AAA Group 2d. 5th. 8th (-). and 16th (-) AAA Battalions Air Defense Command. Tactical Air Force. Tenth Army (Task Unit 99.2.1) Air Warning Squadrons I. 6. 7. 8. and I I Air Support Control Unit.Tactical Air Force.Tenth Air Force (TU 99.2.5) landing Force Air Support Control Unit I (supported lilAC) Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 2 (supported XXIV Corps) Landing Force Air Support Control Unit 3 (supported Tenth Army and controlled lFASCU-1 and 2) Company B. 568th Signal Air Warning Battalion (USAAF) Detachment I. 305th Fighter Control Squadron (USAAF) 927th Signal Air Warning Company (USAAF) 5th Signal Radar Calibration Detachment (USAAF)
76
home. The 1st MarDiv with 26,274 troops was on Pavuvu having rebuilt after the Peleliu operation five months previously. Although casualties were high there and the Division had received 4,550 replacements, a hefty percentage remained combat experienced and well prepared for the dug-in, in-depth Japanese defense experienced on Okinawa. The 6th MarDiv with 24,356 troops had been upgraded from a brigade while on Guadalcanal as it rebuilt, reorganized, and retrained after the Guam assault six months before. Both assault divisions possessed significant attachments: armored amphibian tractor, two amphibian tractor, and Seabee battalions; a Marine observation squadron (VMO) with OY-1 (L-5) spotter aircraft attached to the artillery regiment; joint assault signal, two amphibian truck (one Marine, one Army), Army chemical mortar, and Army MP companies; rocket detachment; and war dog platoon. For the first time Army military government units were attached to deal with the large numbers of civilians. Each Marine infantry regiment had its usual attachments plus a joint assault signal company detachment consisting of a shore fire-control party, air-ground liaison party, and shore-party communications team. The 2d MarDiv deployed with 22,195 troops. As it was not envisioned for it to be landed unless in an emergency, it lacked some of the reinforcing units attached to the 1st and 6th, but was still understrength after dropping to a low of 16,465 men in December due to rotations and reassignments. Few veterans of Tarawa remained by this time. The 2d MarDiv's last operations had been on Saipan and Tinian, completed in August 1944. It mounted out of Saipan. All Marine regiments were above 100 percent strength, unlike their Army counterparts averaging 300 men understrength. The Marine replacement and training system was effective in providing replacements because of the practice of alternating IlIAC and VAC on operations and then rebuilding one while the other executed the next operation. The Army had to rebuild and sustain a large. number of divisions that had fought, including XXIV Corps, and were still fighting in the Philippines plus funnel even more replacements to Europe. Each Marine division also deployed with 2,500 troops assigned to two replacement drafts. Additional replacement drafts arrived during the campaign: 46th, 54th, 57th, and 63d in May and 55th and 62d in June with over 11,000 replacements absorbed by Marine units during the campaign. Kama Retto, a small group of islands 16 miles west of Okinawa, was seized by the 77th InfDiv between March 26 and 29. This neutralized a Japanese suicide boat base, and provided a fleet anchorage and repair base and an amphibian patrol bomber base. The Army's 420th Field Artillery Group with two 155mm
gun battalions landed on the four islets of Keise Shima, 11 miles southwest of the landing beaches, on L-l (March 31) to provide fire support for the main landings. The 2d MarDiv, under MajGen Thomas E. Watson, conducted demonstrations off Okinawa's southeast coast on L-Day and L+l and became the Tenth Army Floating Reserve. Original plans called for the 2d MarDiv to withdraw to Saipan as an area reserve. It was also scheduled to assault Kikai Shima to the north of Okinawa in July, but this was cancelled in April. The 2d MarDiv's 2/2 suffered S3 casualties during the D-Day demonstration. This resulted in the loss of 12 amtracs in contrast to none lost by the assaulting 1st and 6th MarDivs. The Division's 2d Marine Amphibian Truck Company and 130th NC Battalion were detached and put ashore. The Division departed for Saipan on April 11 to serve as an area reserve. 2d MarDiv (Rei nforced) HQ, 2d MarDiv HQ Battalion, 2d MarDiv 2d Joint Assault Signal Company
Marines cautiously enter one of the hundred of lyre-shaped, concrete Okinawan family tombs. There were often used as defensive positions by the Japanese. This one appears to have been used to shelter artillery ammunition.
2d Engineer Battalion 2d Medical Battalion 2d MT Battalion 2d Pioneer Battalion 2d Service Battalion 2d Tank Battalion [M4A3] 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion [100+ x LVT(2)/(4)] 2d Marine Amphibian Truck Company 2d Marine War Dog Platoon 4th Separate Laundry Platoon 2d Marines 6th Marines 8th Marines 10th Marines [artillery] Marine Observation Squadron 2 35th and 41 st Replacement Drafts I30th NC Battalion Military Government Detachments A-2 and B-2 (USA) G-IO Dispensary Units No. 19 and 20 (USN)
The landing beaches were on Okinawa's lower west coast. This allowed IlIAC landing to the north of XXIV Corps to seize Yontan Airfield while XXIV Corps took Kadena Airfield so that close air support fighters could quickly operate ashore. IlIAC had the mission of protecting XXIVs north flank as the latter swung south toward the main Japanese defenses. Beaches were considered on the lower east coast in the Nakagusuka Wan (bay), but were further from the airfields. The Japanese felt that the southeast coast beaches might be a US target, but the 2d MarDiv only conducted demonstrations there. The rest of the coast was mostly faced with cliffs. Underwater obstacles were negligible, the reef proved to be a minor obstacle, the low seawall was breached by naval gunfire at numerous points, and the under-armed airfield service personnel defending the two airfields melted away after the landing.
77
The 6th MarDiv's beaches were on the IlIAC's north flank. 2/22 landed on Beach GREEN 1 with 3/22 landing on GREEN 2 followed by 1/22. 3/4, assigned RED I, landed on the right on GREEN 2 while 1/4 landed on RED 3. The Division Reserve, 2/4, landed on GREEN 2.
6th MarDiv (Reinforced) Division Troops HQ Battalion, 6th MarDiv (-) Company C, 1st Prov MP Battalion (USA) 6th Joint Assault Signal Company (-) 6th Marine Amphibian Truck Company (-) Military Government Detachments A-3 and B-3 (USA) lilAC Artillery Liaison Teams Early Air Warning Team (no designation given) 4th Combat Team 4th Marines (- 2d Battalion [- Company E]) (Reinforced) Company A (-), 6th Engineer Battalion Company A (-), 6th Medical Battalion Company A (-), 6th MT Battalion Company A (-), 6th Pioneer Battalion Detachments, 26th and 33d Replacement Drafts Ist Platoon (-), 6th MP Company Ist Platoon (-), Ordnance Company, 6th Service Battalion Ist Platoon (-), S&S Company, 6th Service Battalion Detachment, 58th NC Battalion Detachment, I Ith Special NC Battalion Detachment, 6th Marine Amphibian Truck Company Detachment, 6th Joint Assault Signal Company Ist Band Section (-) Ist Section, 3d Platoon, Ist Bomb Disposal Company 22d Combat Team 22d Marines (Reinforced) Company B, 6th Engineer Battalion Company B, 6th Medical Battalion
(continued on page 80)
6th Marine Division, Okinawa 6th(+)
III
24,356
III
4th CT
22dCT
Annd
Arty Group
Amphib Group
CID
II Engr Group
2/4 Div Reserve
Note: 29th CT detached as iliAC Reserve.
78
Svc Group
Tank Group
1st
2d~=::::1I, Amtrac Group
• Japanese strongpoints L-Day (evening of 1April) positions
Zampo Misaki
6Mar(-)~
2~4 Diy Res
IIIIZJ 291ZJ
11ZJ
Corps Res
Diy Res
1841ZJ Diy Res
XXIVIZJ 3821ZJ
96(-)~
Corps Res
N
A 11
---"1-km--J~ I
I-
ml
L-Day,Okinawa,April I, 1945.
79
Company B, 6th MT Battalion Company B, 6th Pioneer Battalion Detachments, 26th and 33d Replacement Drafts 2d Platoon, 6th MP Company 2d Platoon, Ordnance Company, 6th Service Battalion 2d Platoon (-), S&S Company, 6th Service Battalion 58th NC Battalion Detachment, I Ith Special NC, Battalion Detachment, 814th Transportation Corps Amphibian Truck Company (USA) Detachment, 6th Joint Assault Signal Company 5th Prov Rocket Detachment 2d Band Section 3d Platoon (-), Ist Bomb Disposal Company Artillery Group 15th Marines Detachment, 6th Marine Amphibian Truck Company Detachment, 814th Transportation Corps Amphibian Truck Company (USA) Marine Observation Squadron 6 Armored Amphibian Group Ist Armored Amphibian Battalion [70 x LVT(A)4] 3-9-A Unit (no further identification given) IstAmphibian Tractor Group (supported CT4) 9th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [103 x LVT(4)] 2d Amphibian Tractor Group (supported CT22) 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [102 x LVT(3)] Tank Group 6th Tank Battalion (- Company A) [M4A3] Tank Maintenance Platoon, Ordnance Company, 6th Service Battalion Engineer Group 6th Engineer Battalion (-) 58th NC Battalion (-) Shore Party Group 6th Pioneer Battalion (-) 26th and 33d Replacement Drafts (-) Detachment, 6th Joint Assault Signal Company 814th Transportation Corps Amphibian Truck Company (-) One-half, I Ith Special NC Battalion (-) Service Group 6th Medical Battalion (-) 6th MT Battalion (-) 6th Service Battalion (-) G-IO and G-I I Dispensary Units (USN) Division Reserve 2d Battalion (- Company E), 4th Marines 2d Platoon, Weapons Company, 4th Marines
80
(continued on page 8/)
2d Platoon, Company A, 6th Engineer Battalion 2d Platoon, Company A, 6th MT Battalion 2d Platoon, Company A, 6th Pioneer Battalion Ist Platoon, Ordnance Company, 6th Service Battalion Detachment, Collection Section, Company A, 6th Medical Battalion Detachments, 26th and 33d Replacement Drafts Detachment, I Ith Special NC Battalion Detachment, Ist Band Section Detachment, Ist Platoon, 6th MP Company Detachment, Ist Platoon, S&S Company, 6th Service Battalion Detachment, 6th joint Assault Signal Company
The 29th Marines, 6th MarDiv was the IlIAC Reserve. 1/29 was released to the 6th MarDiv early and landed on GREEN 1 to support the 22d Marines and secure the left flank. The rest of the 29th landed later over the BLUE Beaches and defended Yontan Airfield. The 29th was released to the 6th MarDiv on April 5 for the drive north and replaced as the IlIAC Reserve by the 7th Marines (- 3d Battalion), 1st MarDiv.
Marines fighting through Shuri and Naha on Okinawa encountered numerous concrete and stone buildings. Although mostly destroyed by bombing, naval gunfire, and artillery, they provided formable defensive positions for the Japanese.
lilAC Reserve (29th Combat Team) 29th Marines (Reinforced) Company C, 6th Medical Battalion Company C, 6th MT Battalion Company C, 6th Pioneer Battalion Company A, 6th Tank Battalion 3d Platoon, 6th MP Company 3d Platoon, Ordnance Company, 6th Service Battalion 3d Platoon (-), S&S Company, 6th Service Battalion Detachment, 6th Marine Amphibian Truck Company Detachment, I Ith Special NC Battalion Detachments, 26th and 33d Replacement Drafts Detachment, 6th joint Assault Signal Company Ist War Dog Platoon 3d Band Section
The IstMarDiv landed on IlIAC's right flank. 2/7 came ashore on BLUE 1 and 1/7 on BLUE 2. 3/7 followed 1/7. 2/5 and 1/5 landed on YELLOW 1 and 2, respectively, to be followed by 3/5. The Division Reserve, CTl, landed on the afternoon of L-Day. 1st MarDiv (Reinforced) Division Troops HQ Battalion, 1st MarDiv (- 1st MP Company) Ist Medical Battalion (- Companies A-C) 4th joint Assault Signal Company (-)
(continued on page 82)
81
434th Transportation Corps Amphibian Truck Company (USA) (-) Military Government Detachments A-I and B-1 (USA) G-IO Dispensaries No. 17 and 18 (USN) Assault Air Warning Teams 4th Prov Rocket Detachment 4th Marine War Dog Platoon Combat Team I Ist Marines (Reinforced) Company A, Ist Engineer Battalion Clearing Motobu Peninsula, Okinawa, April 7-23, 1945 (L+6 to L+22).
(continued on page 83)
N
A Ist Marine Division, Okinawa 1st{+)
III
Div Reserve
82
III Arty Group
CT1
Engr Group
26,274
•
Annd Amphib Group
00
Company A, Ist Medical Battalion Company A, 1st MT Battalion Company A, I st Pioneer Battalion Detachment, Ordnance Company, Ist Service Battalion (+ 2d Platoon [-], I st Bomb Disposal Company) Detachment, S&S Company, I st Service Battalion Platoon, 1st MP Company Detachment, 4th Joint Assault Signal Company Detachment, 454th Transportation Corps Amphibian Truck Company (USA) Oroku Peninsula assault, Okinawa,
(continued on page 84)
June 4, 1945 (K-Day).
N
A
83
Combat Team 5 5th Marines (Reinforced) Ist Amphibian Tractor Battalion (-) [108 x LVT(3)] Company B, I st Engineer Battalion Company B, I st Medical Battalion Company B, 1st MT Battalion Company B, I st Pioneer Battalion Detachment, Ordnance Company, I st Service Battalion (+ 3d Squad,2d Platoon, I st Bomb Disposal Company) Detachment, S&S Company, I st Service Battalion Platoon, 1st MP Company Detachment, 4th joint Assault Signal Company Detachment, 434th Transportation Corps Amphibian Truck Company (USA) Detachment, 4th joint Assault Signal Company Combat Team 7 7th Marines 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion (-) [106 x LVT(4)] Company C, I st Engineer Battalion Company C, I st Medical Battalion Company C, 1st MT Battalion Company C, I st Pioneer Battalion Detachment, Ordnance Company, I st Service Battalion (+ 2d Squad, 2d Platoon I st Bomb Disposal Company) Detachment, S&S Company, I st Service Battalion 3d Platoon, 1st MP Company Detachment, 454th Transportation Corps Amphibian Truck Company (USA) Detachment, 4th joint Assault Signal Company Artillery Group 11th Marines 3d Marine Amphibian Truck Company Detachment, 454th Transportation Corps Amphibian Truck Company (USA) Marine Observation Squadron 3 Detachments, I st and 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalions Armored Amphibian Tractor Group 3d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Prov) [75 x LVT(A)4] Tank Group I st Tank Battalion [M4A2]
Detachment, I st Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(3)] Detachment, 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(4)] Tank Maintenance Platoon, Ordnance Company, I st Service Battalion Engineer Group I st Engineer Battalion (- Companies A-C)
145th NC Battalion (-) Shore Party Group I st Pioneer Battalion (- Companies A-C)
84
(continued on page 85)
One-half, I Ith Special NC Battalion Detachment, 145th NC Battalion Detachment, 4th Joint Assault Signal Company Replacement Group 29th and 32d Replacement Drafts Service Group Ist Service Battalion (- detachments) Ist MT Battalion (- Companies A-C) 2d Platoon, Ist Laundry Company MP Group Ist MP Company (-) Company B, 1st Prov MP Battalion (USA)
The 6th MarDiv moved north, securing the narrow Ishikawa Isthmus on April 4 as the 1st MarDiv reached the east coast on April 3 to sever the island. Resistance was minimal and even XXIV Corps in the south had made little contact with the enemy. Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMFPac, and Army units captured the lightly defended Eastern Islands between April 6 and 11. At the same time the Army began fighting through the defenses in the south. The mass of IlIAC Artillery was not needed in the north and the 1st, 3d, and 6th 155mm Howitzer and 8th and 9th 155mm Gun Battalions were attached to XXIV Corps Artillery on April 7/8. On April 9 the 27th InfDiv came ashore and began to be fed into the XXIV Corps line on the 12th because of the widening of the island. The 6th MarDiv continued to move north and found the enemy concentrated on the Motobu Peninsula on April 8. It was not cleared until April 18 when the Yae Take (mount) redoubt was seized by the 4th and 29th Marines. On April 14 the Seabee battalions attached to the divisions reverted to Navy control under the 44th NC Regiment and were employed to repair airfields and build roads. The 6th MarDiv continued mopping up in the north, with elements of the 1st MarDiv attached, until relieved by the 27th InfDiv on May 4. The 77th InfDiv seized Ie Shima, 3 miles northwest of Okinawa, between April 16 and 21. The 1st MarDiv was placed in Tenth Army Reserve on April 24. XXIV Corps had fought its way to the main cross-island defense line, the Shuri Line, on April 14. The Corps launched an offensive on the 19th with the 7th, 96th, and 27th InfDivs on-line. Progress was slow and US losses high. On April 30 the 1st MarDiv was attached to XXIV Corps and relieved the stalled 27th InfDiv on the right flank while the 77th InfDiv relieved the 96th in the center. The Japanese conducted a failed counteroffensive on May 4-6. IlIAC resumed control of the 1st MarDiv on May 7 in preparation for taking over the right flank of the line as the island widened further. The 22d Marines was placed in the line to the right of the 1st MarDiv on the coast. The American offensive resumed on May 11. Between May 25 and June 4 the Japanese conducted a complex fighting withdrawal to the south and established new defensive lines. During that time the 22d Marines seized Naha and an element of the 5th Marines secured Shuri Castle. Blocked from further advance by Naha Harbor, on June 4 (K-Day) an amphibious assault was mounted by the 6th MarDiv to seize the Oroku Peninsula and outflank the enemy. This proved to be the last opposed amphibious assault in World War II. The shore-to-shore assault was launched from the west coast north of Naha and skirting the harbor. The 6th Reconnaissance Company secured Ono Yama Shima in the harbor. 1/4 landed on Beach RED 1 and 2/4 on RED 2 at 0600 hours followed by 3/4. 2/29 and 3/29 landed in the afternoon followed by
85
1/29 (IlIAC Reserve for the landing). As the 6th MarDiv cleared the peninsula the 22d Marines wheeled around the east end of Naha Harbor making contact with the 4th Marines on June 8. The 1st MarDiv on the left continued to advance south. 4th Combat Team, 6th MarDiv 4th Marines (Reinforced) 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(3)]
9th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(4)] Weapons Company, 22d Marines Companies A and C, 6th Tank Battalion [M4A3] Company, 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion [LVT(A)4] (USA) 6th Reconnaissance Company Company A, 6th Engineer Battalion 6th Marine Amphibian Truck Company 91st Chemical Mortar Company (Separate) [4.2in.] (USA) 5th Prov Rocket D~tachment
The 2d MarDiv's 8th Marines returned to Okinawa from Saipan on May 30 as the Expeditionary Troops Special Landing Force. Its 2/8 and 3/8 landed on Iheya Jima on June 3 and 1/8 landed on Aguni Shima on June 9. These unoccupied islands are north and west of Okinawa and radar and fighter direction centers were established on both. The 8th Marines then landed at Naha on June 15 and was attached to the 1st MarDiv to assist with the final operations. Special Landing Force Command Group (Assistant Division Commander, 2d MarDiv) Combat Team 8 8th Marines (Reinforced) 2d Battalion, I Oth Marines [artillery] 2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion [100+ x LVT(2)/(4)] Company D, 3d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Prov) [18 x LVT(A)4] 2d Reconnaissance Company Company C, 2d Engineer Battalion Company E, 2d Medical Battalion Company B, 2dMT Battalion Company A, 2d Pioneer Battalion Company A, 2d Tank Battalion [M4A2] Detachments, HQ Battalion, 2d MarDiv Detachment, 2d Assault Signal Company 3d Pla~oon, 2d MP Company 2d Platoon, Ordnance Company, 2d Service Battalion 3d Platoon, S&S Company, 2d Service Battalion 3d Section, 2d Marine War Dog Platoon
86
(continued on page 87)
Detachment, 2d Prov Rocket Detachment one squad, Company B, 51 st MP Battalion (USA)
LtGen Buckner, commanding Tenth Army, was killed by artillery fire on June 18. MajGen Roy Geiger, commanding IlIAC, assumed command, while retaining command of IlIAC. He was promoted to lieutenant-general the next day and became the only Marine general to command an Army field army. He was relieved by Army LtGen Joseph W. Stillwell on June 23. Tenth Army pressed on south as the Japanese were pushed on to the Kiyan Peninsula on Okinawa's south end. The 1st MarDiv fought to the central southeast coast on XXIV Corps' right flank and 6th MarDiv cleared the southwest end of the island. The last major pockets of resistance were knocked out on June 21 and the island was declared secure at 1700 hours. Small Japanese attacks continued for a brief time, but mopping up continued into November, even after the remnants of the 32d Army had formally surrendered on September 7. IlIAC and 1st MarDiv remained on Okinawa while the bulk of the 6th MarDiv departed for Guam on July 10. Kume Shima The last amphibious assault of World War II, albeit unopposed, was conducted on Kume Shima, 55 miles west of Okinawa from June 26-30 to establish a radar site and fighter-direction center. Landing on the island's southeast coast, the force met no opposition from the SO-man garrison. In early-July the Japanese were engaged in two firefights and scattered. Amphibious Reconnaissance Battalion, FMFPac (Reinforced) Company A, Ist Battalion, 7th Marines 81 mm Mortar Platoon, HQ Company, Ist Battalion, 7th Marines Ist Platoon, Company C, 3d Armored Amphibian Tractor Battalion (Prov) [LVT(A)4] Detachment, 8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(4)] Naval Gunfire Shore Liaison Team, 4th Assault Signal Company Detachment, Underwater Demolition Team 21
The Japanese had lost over 66,000 troops with 7,400 taken prisoner during the campaign. Some 10,000 Japanese and 8,000 Okinawan Boeitai survived the battle. Another 105,000 Japanese personnel surrendered on other Ryukyu Islands. Over 122,000 Okinawans died, more than were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Marine commanders, Okinawa Gunto III Amphibious Corps
LtGen Roy S. Geiger
Chief of Staff
BGen Merwin H. Silverthorn
IliAC Troops (CO, Rear Echelon)
Col Edward G. Hagen
iliAC HQ&S Battalion
LtCol Harry A.Traffert,jr.
iliAC Medical Battalion
LCdr Maurice A. Diehr (USN) (to 29 Aug) LCdr Donovan C. Blanchard (USN) (to 18 jul) Cdr Robert Mazet,jr. (USN)
iliAC Signal Battalion
Col Robert L. Peterson
1st MP Battalion
LtCol Alfred H. Marks
(continued on page 88)
87
I st Separate Engineer Battalion
LtCol Alonzo D. Gorman
I Ith Motor Transport Battalion
LtCol Franklin A. Hayner
7th Service Regiment
Col Harold E. Rosecrans
HQ Battalion
LtCol Kenneth L. Moses
I st Armored Amphibian Tractor Bn
LtCol Louis Metzger (to 21 Jul)
3d Armored Amphibian Tractor Bn
LtC 0 I john I. Willimson, jr.
I st Amphibian Tractor Battalion
LtCol Maynard M. Nohrden
Maj Richard G. Warga
4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
LtCol Colvis C. Coffman
8th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
LtCol Charles B. Chappell (to 5 Apr) Maj Bedford Williams (to 17 Apr) LtCol Charles B. Nerren
9th Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Maj Theodore E. Watson
Amphibious Recon Bn, FMFPac
Maj james L. jones
lilAC Artillery
BGen David R. Nimmer
1st Prov AAA Group
Col Kenneth W Benner
2d AAA Battalion
LtC 0 I Max C. Chapman
5th AAA Battalion
LtCol Harry O. Smith
8th AAA Battalion
LtCol james S. O'Halloran
16th AAA Battalion
LtCol August F. Penzold, Jr. (to 19 jul) LtC 0 I Charles T. Tingle
2d Prov Field Artillery Group 1st 155mm Howitzer Battalion
LtC 0 I Custis Burton,jr. LtCol George H. Ford
3d 155mm Howitzer Battalion
LtCol Robert C. Hiatt
7th 155mm Gun Battalion
LtCol Guido F. Verbeck, j r.
Bemis Group (HQ Battery, lilAC)
Col john A. Bemis (also Chief of Staff, lilAC Artillery)
6th 155mm Howitzer Battalion
LtCol Lewis A. jones
8th 155mm Gun Battalion
LtCol George V. Hanna, Jr.
9th 155mm Gun Battalion
LtCol Merritt Adelman
1st MarDiv
MajGen Pedro A. del Valle
Asst. Division Commander
BGen Louis R. Jones
Chief of Staff
Col Robert O. Bare
HQ Battalion, 1st MarDiv
LtCol james S. Monahan (to 20 May) Col Kenneth B. Chappell
1st Marines
Col Kenneth B. Chappell (to 5 May) LtCol Arthur 1: Mason
I st Battalion
LtCol james C. Murray, Jr. (WIA 9 May) LtC 0 I Richard LtCol Austin
2d Battalion 3d Battalion
~
Ross (to 12 May)
Shofner
LtCol james C. Magee,jr. LtCol Stephen V. Sabot (to 20 May) LtCol Richard
5th Marines
~
~
Ross
Col john H. Gribel
I st Battalion
LtC0I Charles W Shelburne
2d Battalion
LtCol William E. Benedict (to 20 jun)
3d Battalion
Maj john H. Gunstafon (WIA I Apr)
Maj Richard 1: Washburn Maj Martin C. Roth (to 5 Apr) LtCol John C. Miller, Jr. (to 16 May)
88
(continued on page 89)
Maj Frank W. Poland, Jr. (to 17 May) LtCol Robert E. Hill 7th Marines
Col Edward W. Sneddeker
I st Battalion
LtCol john j. Gormley
2d Battafion
LtC0 I Spencer S. Berger
3d Battalion
LtCol Edward H. Hurst (WIA 19 jun) LtCol Stephen V. Sabol
11th Marines [artillery]
Col Wilburt S. Brown
I st Battalion
LtCol Richard W. Wallace
2d Battalion
LtCol james H. Moffatt, Jr.
3d Battalion
LtCol Thomas G. Roe
4th Battalion
LtCol Leonard F. Chapman, j r.
I st Engineer Battalion
Maj Theodore E. Drummond
I st Medical Battalion
LCdr Francis Giuffrida (USN)
1st MT Battalion
LtCol Marion A. Fawcett (to 15 Aug) LtCol Calvin C. Gaines
I st Pioneer Battalion
LtCol Robert G. Ballance
I st Service Battalion
LtCol Calvin G. Gaines (to 17 Aug) Col john Kaluf
I st Tank Battalion
LtCol Arthur J. Stuart (WIA 13 jul)
6th MarDiv
MajGen Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr. (WIA 16 May)
Asst. Division Commander
BGen William 1": Clement
Chief of Staff
Col john C. McQueen
HQ Battalion, 6th MarDiv
LtCol Floyd A. Stephenson
4th Marines
Col Alan Shapley
I st Battalion
Maj Bernard W. Green (KIA 15 Apr) LtCol Fred D. Beans (WIA 4 jun)
2d Battalion
LtCol Reynolds H. Hayden (to 26 May) Maj Edgar F. Carney,jr.
3d Battalion 22d Marines
LtCol Bruno A. Hochmuth Col Merlin F. Schneider (to 16 May) Col Harold C. Roberts (KIA 18 jun) LtCol August Laeson
I st Battalion
Maj Thomas J. Myers (KIA 15 May) Maj Earl J. Cook (to 17 jun) LtCol Gavin C. Humphrey
2d Battalion
LtCol Horatio C.Woodhouse,jr. (KIA 30 May)
3d Battalion
LtCol Malcom "0" Donohoo (WIA 16 May)
LtCol john G. johnson Maj George B. Kantner (to 19 May) LtCol Clair W. Shisler 29th Marines
Col Victor F. Bleasdale (to 14 Apr) Col William J. Whaling
I st Battalion
LtCol jean W. Moreau (WIA I 6 May) Maj Robert ~ Neuffer (to 25 May) LtCol Samuel S. Yeaton (10 14 jun) LtCol Leroy ~ Hunt, Jr.
2d Battalion
(continued on page 90)
LtCol William G. Robb (WIA 19 Apr)
89
3d Battalion
LtCol ErmaA.Wright (to 14 Jun) LtCol Angus N. Fraser Col Robert B. Luckey
15th Marines [artillery]
Maj Robert H.Armstrong
I st Battalion 2dBattaiion
Maj Nat M. Pace
3d Battalion
LtCol joe C. McHaney LtCol Bruce 1: Hemphill
4th Battalion
Maj Paul F. Sackett
6th Engineer Battalion 6th Medical Battalion
Cdr john S. Cowan (USN)
6th MT Battalion
LtC0 I Ernest H. Gould
6th Pioneer Battalion
LtC0 I Samuel R. Shaw (to 10 May) Maj john G. Dibble (to 8 jun) LtC0 I Samuel R. Shaw
6th Service Battalion
LtC 0 I George B. Bill (to 25 Apr)
6th Tank Battalion
LtCol Robert L Denig,Jr.
LtCol Alexander N. Entringer
Of the 1st and 6th MarDivs' 54 rifle companies, only eight retained their original company commanders. Most had two to four commanders with some having up to six. The 8th Marines lost only one company commander. The 1st MarDiv lost 30 tanks and the 6th 21. ~
Special Landing Force
BGen LeRoy
8th Marines (Reinforced), 2d MarDiv
Col Clarence R. Wallace
Hunt
I st Battalion
LtCol Richard L Holderness
2dBattaiion
LtCol Harry A. Waldorf LtCol Paul E. Wallace
3d Battalion 2d Battalion, 10th Marines [artillery]
LtCol Richard G. Weede
2d Amphibian Tractor Battalion
Maj Fenton A. Durand
V-J Day (September 2, 1945) found FMFPac preparing for the invasion of Japan. VAC planned to land on Kyushu under Sixth Army with I, IX, and XI Corps on November 1, 1945. VAC on Hawaii would control the 2d MarDiv on Saipan, 3d MarDiv on Guam, and 5th MarDiv on Hawaii. IlIAC, on Okinawa, would tentatively land on Honshu on May 1, 1946 under First Army with two Army corps. IlIAC would control 1st MarDiv on Okinawa, 4th MarDiv on Hawaii, and 6th MarDiv on Guam.
Marine Casualties, Central and Western Pacific
90
Operation
KIA
DOW
WIA
MIA
Total
Guam
1,156
395
5,365
17
6,933
Peleliu
1,050
250
5,450
36
6,786
IwoJima
4,554
1,331
17,272
46
23,203
Okinawa
2,699
519
15,667
20
18,905
Reduction and occupation duty When Japan declared its intention to surrender unconditionally on August 14, actions were immediately undertaken to land US forces in Japan. The Navy organized the Third Fleet Landing Force (Task Force A) built around the 4th Marines. Its 9,000 men included sailors drawn from Third Fleet ships' crews and Marine ships' detachments plus 450 Royal Marines and sailors detached from Royal Navy carriers. It was under the command of BGen William T. Clement, Assistant Division Commander, 6th MarDiv. TF A was to land on August 26 to secure Yokosuka Naval District Base on Tokyo Bay allowing the Third Fleet to enter. TF A conducted its landings as a combat operation prepared to meet opposition. The surrender was scheduled for August 31. The Third Fleet arrived at the entrance of Tokyo Bay on August 28, one day earlier than the Japanese had been notified, to protect the fleet from a brewing typhoon. At 0558 hours, August 30 (L-Day), 2/4 landed on Futtsu Saki (cape) to secure gun positions covering the Bay's entrance as aircraft carrying the 11th Airborne Division landed at Atsugi Airfield west of Yokosuka. Other area objectives were secured and the main TF A landing was at 0929 hours at Yokosuka Naval Base and Yokosuka Naval Air Station. HQ, Task Force A (TG 31.3) HQ Detachment, Task Force A 1st Platoon, 1st MP Company, HQ Battalion, 6th MarDiv 4th Combat Team (TU 31.3.1) 4th Marines (Reinforced) Ist Battalion, 15th Marines [artillery] Company A, 4th Amphibian Tractor Battalion [LVT(3)] Company C, 6th Tank Battalion [M4A3] Company A, 6th Engineer Battalion Company A, 6th Pioneer Battalion Company A, 6th MT Battalion Companies A and D, 6th Medical Battalion Detachments, 6th Service Battalion Detachments, 6th Assault Signal Company Third Fleet Marine Landing Force (TU 31.3.2) HQ, Third Fleet Marine Landing Force Ist-3d Battalions Third Fleet Naval Landing Force (TU 31.3.3) HQ, Third Fleet Naval landing Force Ist-3d Landing Battalions Royal Navy Landing Force Detachment, HQ Battalion, 6th MarDiv
On September 8 the 4th Marines fell under Eighth Army control, the reinforcing units departed for Okinawa on the 15th, and TF A was dissolved on the 20th. The 4th Marines was relieved from administrative control of the 6th MarDiv, now in China, on November 20 and placed under FMFPac. The 4th Marines was deactivated at the end of the year, but was reactivated in March 1946 and reassigned to the 6th MarDiv in China.
91
92
The 5th MarDiv landed at Sasebo on September 22 (A-Day) and occupied the northern portion of Kyushu while the 2d MarDiv landed at Nagasaki and occupied the south. The 3d MarDiv was to have been deployed, but was re-tasked as the FMFPac Reserve in event of hostilities by Japanese forces on bypassed Central Pacific islands. Sixth Army assumed command of all Kyushu occupation forces on the 24th. VAC was headquartered in Sasebo, the 2d MarDiv in Nagasaki, and the 5th in Ainoura. The 32d InfDiv arrived in October and relieved the 5th MarDiv, which departed in December. The 24th InfDiv relieved the 2d MarDiv when it departed in July 1946. The occupation ofJapanese-controlled North China was ordered on August 10, 1945, but IlIAC and 1st MarDiv did not land at Taku until September 30 (D-Day) and Chinwangtao on October 1 (D+1). The 1st MarDiv occupied Tientsin, Peiping, and Tangshaw with their headquarters at Tientsin. The 6th MarDiv landed at Tsingtao on October 11 (D+11) and occupied Tsinan. The 3d MarDiv on Guam and the 4th in Hawaii were tasked as Fleet Reserves. IlIAC Artillery was reorganized as infantry and remained on Okinawa as the IlIAC Reserve. IlIAC's mission was to disarm Japanese forces, secure military supplies, concentrate Japanese troops and civilians, and return them to the Home Islands. It was also to assist the National Government in regaining control of North China and preventing the Communists from taking power. Control of Marine units there passed from IlIAC to Marine Forces, China on June 10,1946 with IlIAC's deactivation. Most of the 6th MarDiv was deactivated there in March 1946. The 4th Marines remained as the core of the 3d MarBde at Tsingtao. In June the Brigade was redesignated Marine Forces, Tsingtao, and then disbanded in September. The 1st MarDiv departed in June 1947. FMF, Western Pacific took control of the remaining small Marine units in May 1947. Despite US military aid to the Nationalists, the situation quickly deteriorated. It was clear that without direct US military intervention, China would fall to the Communists. American leaders were unwilling to take the risk in the face of Soviet support. The People's Republic of China was proclaimed on October 1, 1949. Eleven months later the 1st MarDiv faced the Chinese People's Liberation Army at Chosin Reservoir, North Korea. Planning for the post-war Marine Corps began in May 1945 when the Chief of Naval Operations directed the Navy Department and HQMC to prepare demobilization plans. Plans called for two operational commands, FMFPac and FMF, Atlantic (FMFLant), each with a division and an aircraft wing. On V-J Day the Marine Corps' strength stood at over 485,000 personnel. By 1946 its strength had plummeted to 14,208 officers and 141,471 enlisted men and women. The six-division Marine Corps was rapidly reduced. The 4th MarDiv in Hawaii was moved to Camp Pendleton and deactivated on November 28, 1945. The 3d MarDiv was deactivated on Guam on December 28. The 5th MarDiv departed Japan and was deactivated at Camp Pendleton on February 5, 1946. VAC was deactivated in at Camp Elliot, CA on February 15. The 6th MarDiv was deactivated in China on March 31. Marine units remaining in China were under the 3d MarBde. The small 1st Special MarBde was formed at Quantico in February 1946 for contingency missions in the Caribbean. New Marine Reserve units began to be raised in 1946. The 2d MarDiv moved from Japan to Camp Lejeune in July 1946 and the 1st Special MarBde was disbanded. In September 1946, a new 3d MarBde was raised at Pendleton to receive units relocating from China. FMFLant was activated on December 16, 1946 at Camp Lejeune. The 1st MarDiv relocated from China to Camp Pendleton in June 1947 to serve as FMFPac's main force. IlIAC was deactivated in China on June 19,1947 and reorganized as Marine Forces, China. The 3d MarBde at Pendleton was absorbed into the Division. The 1st MarBde (Reinforced) was activated in June 1947 on Guam corp.prising detached elements of 1st MarDiv . It was moved to Pendleton in April 1949 and deactivated. Only the 1st and 2d MarDivs remained on the West and East Coasts, respectively.
Chronology 1944 21 January 15 April 19 April 5June 15June 21 July 24 July 7 September 15 September 17 September 20 October
1945 19 February 26 March I April 6/9 Aug 14 August 30 August 2 September 22 September 30 September
5th MarDiv activated at Camp Pendleton, CA. IMAC redesignated IliAC on Guadalcanal. 1st Prov MarBde formed on Guadalcanal. FMFPac established as type command for Marine forces in the Pacific Ocean Area. VAC with 2d and 4th MarDivs assaults Saipan. lilAC with 3d MarDiv and 1st Prov MarBde assaults Guam. VAC with 4th and 2d MarDivs assaults Tinian. 6th MarDiv activated on Guadalcanal from 1st Prov MarBde. lilAC with 1st MarDiv assaults Peleliu. 81 st InfDiv assaults Angaur Island. VAC Artillery lands on Luzon with XXIV Corps. 81 st InfDiv relieves 1st MarDiv on Peleliu.
VAC with 4th, 5th, and 3d MarDivs assaults Iwo jima. 77th InfDiv assaults Kerama Retto, Okinawa Gunto. lilAC with Ist and 6th MarDivs assault Okinawa under Sixth Army. Atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. japan announces its intent to surrender unconditionally. Task Force A (4th Marines) lands at Yokosuka on Tokyo Bay. japan surrenders (Vj Day). VAC with 2d and 5th MarDivs begins occupation of Kyushu Island, japan. iliAC with Ist and 6th MarDivs begins occupation of North China (advance party arrived September 20).
Bibliography Appleman, Roy E.; Burns, James M.; Gugeler, Russell A.; and Stevens, John Okinawa: the Last Battle (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1954) Bartely, Whitman S. Iwo lima: Amphibious Epic (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1948) Frank, Benis M. and Shaw, Henry I. Jr. History of us Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Central Pacific Drive, Vol. IV (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1966) Frank, Benis M. and Shaw, Henry I. Jr. History of us Marine Corps Operations in World War II: Victory and Occupation, Vol. 5 (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1971) Gailey, Harry Liberation of Guam, 21 luly-10 August 1944 (Novato, CA, Presidio Press, 1998) Hallas, James The Devil's Anvil: the Assault on Peleliu (Greenwood, CT, Praeger, 1994)
Lodge, O.R. The Recapture of Guam (Washington, DC, US Government Printing Office, 1954) Morison, Samuel A. History of us Navy Operations in World War II: New Guinea and the Marianas, March 1944-August 1944, Vol. 8 (Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Company, 1953) Morison, Samuel A. History of us Navy Operations in World War II: Victory in the Pacific, Vol. 14 (Boston, MA, Little, Brown and Company, 1960) Rottman, Gordon L. US Marine Corps Order ofBattle: Ground and Air Units in the Pacific Wat:, 1939-1945 (Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing, 2001) Rottman, Gordon L. World War II Pacific Island Guide: A Geo-Military Study, (Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing, 2001) Wright, Derrick Battle for Iwo lima, 1945 (Stroud, Gloucestershire, UK, Sutton Publishing, 2000) 93
Abbreviations and linear measurements AAA amtrac Asst AT BAR BLT Bn Btry Co CO CP CT Det DOW FMF FMFPac HMG HQ HQ&S HQMC lilAC InfDiv IjA IjN IMAC jASCO jlCPOA KIA LCI LCM LCT LCVP LFASCU LMG LSM LST LT LVT LVT(A) MarBde MarDiv MIA MP
anti-aircraft artillery amphibian tractor (see LVT) Assistant anti-tank Browning Automatic Rifle Battalion Landing Team Battalion Battery Company Commanding Officer command post Combat Team Detachment died of wounds Fleet Marine Force Fleet Marine Force, Pacific heavy machine gun Headquarters headquarters and service (company/battery) Headquarters, Marine Corps III Amphibious Corps Infantry Division (US Army) Imperial japanese Army Imperial Japanese Navy I Marine Amphibious Corps joint Assault Signal Company joint Intelligence Center/Pacific Ocean Area killed inaction Landing Craft, Infantry landing craft, mechanized Landing Craft, Tank Landing Craft,Vehicle or Personnel Landing Force Air Support Control Unit Light machine gun Landing Ship, Medium Landing Ship, Tank Landing Team Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Hamtrac") Landing Vehicle, Tracked (Armored) Marine Brigade Marine Division missing in action Military Police
MT NCB NCO NGF NOB 0-1 Line POA Prov RCT Regt S&S SMG SNLF S'PM SWPA TF TG TH T/O US USA USAAF USMC USN VAC WIA WO XO (-) (+)
Motor Transport (a.k.a. "Motor-T") Naval Construction Battalion ("Seabees") non-commissioned officer Naval gun fire Navy Operating Base Objective Line I Pacific Ocean Area Provisional Regimental Combat Team Regiment Service and Supply (platoon/company/battalion) submachine gun Special Naval Landing Force (Japanese) self-propelled mount (M3 halftrack-mounted 75mm gun) Southwest Pacific Area Task Force Task Group Territory of Hawaii Tables of Organization United States United States Army United States Army Air Forces United States Marine Corps United States Navy V Amphibious Corps wounded in action Warrant Officer Executive Officer (second-in-command) less (elements detached from unit) reinforced (additional elements attached)
Marine officer ranks 2dlt 2d Lieutenant I stLt I st Lieutenant Capt Captain Maj Major (USN LCdr, Lieutenant-Commander) LtCol Lieutenant-Colonel Col Colonel BGen Brigadier-General ("one-star") MajGen Major-General ("two-star") LtGen Lieutenant General ("thre~-star")
Distances, ranges, and dimensions are given in the contemporary US system of inches, feet, yards, and statute miles rather than metric: feet to meters:
94
multiply feet by 0.3058
yards to meters:
multiply yards by 0.9114
miles to kilometers:
multiply miles by 1.6093
Command, deployment, organization and evolution of forces in battle, describing elements of doctrine, training, tactics and equipment.
I
CD
I
II
@
I
II
m
Photographs Organization charts
Full color maps
OSPREY
Unrivaled detail
US Marine Corps Pacific Theater of Operations 1944-45 In late 1944 the US Marine Corps prepared for the toughest battles of the war. It had grown to 35,598 officers, 5,384 officer candidates, and 366,353 enlisted Marines, totaling 431,573 personnel, and now comprised two amphibious corps, six divisions, 26 non-divisional artillery battalions, and numerous support and service units. Following on from Battle Orders 1 and 7, this book examines the continuing development of the Corps' organization, its training, tactics, weaponry, and command structure. It details the formation of the 5th and 6th Marine Divisions and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, and examines the Corps' performance in the brutal battles on Guam, Peleliu, Iwo lima, and Okinawa, and its ~eployment as an occupation force.
ISBN 1-84176-659-3
PUBLISHING
www.ospreypublishing.com
11111111
1111
9 781841 766591
![Elite 059 - US Marine Corps 1941-1945[Osprey Elite 59]](https://docer.tips/img/300x300/elite-059-us-marine-corps-1941-1945osprey-elite-59_5aa17301d64ab26bdc02f136.jpg)
