OPERATION NEPTUNE 1944 D-Day’s Seaborne Armada
KEN FORD
ILLUSTRATED BY HOWARD GERRARD © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
CAMPAIGN 268
OPERATION NEPTUNE 1944 D-Day’s Seaborne Armada
KEN FORD
ILLUSTRATED BY HOWARD GERRARD Series editor Marcus Cowper
© Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
CONTENTS ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE
5
CHRONOLOGY
10
OPPOSING COMMANDERS
12
Allied commanders for Operation Neptune t German Kriegsmarine commanders
OPPOSING FORCES
18
Allied forces t(FSNBOGPSDFT
OPPOSING PLANS
28
Allied plans t(FSNBOQMBOT
ASSEMBLING THE INVASION FLEET
36
Building the ships t5IF#PNCBSENFOU'PSDF t The Mulberry harbours t5IF(PPTFCFSSZCSFBLXBUFST t Pipe Line Under the Ocean (PLUTO) t1SPUFDUJOHUIFNeptune armada
OPERATION NEPTUNE
51
The sea passage t"TTBVMUMBOEJOHTo'PSDF6 t"TTBVMUMBOEJOHTo'PSDF0 t"TTBVMUMBOEJOHTo'PSDF( t"TTBVMUMBOEJOHTo'PSDF+ t"TTBVMUMBOEJOHTo'PSDF4 t4JUVBUJPOBUUIFFOEPG%%BZ t5IFCVJMEVQ
OPERATION NEPTUNE AFTER D-DAY
84
The great gale t(FSNBOOBWBMSFBDUJPOUPUIFJOWBTJPO t1-650 t$BQUVSFPGUIFQPSUPG$IFSCPVSH
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY
92
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING
94
INDEX
95
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Harwich
Felixstowe
Milford Haven Swansea Southend Cardiff
London
Bristol
L
L
L
Tilbury
Sheerness
Dover
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The Solent
Southampton G J
Torquay
Exmouth
J
Poole
Exeter
O
Weymouth O Portland
Dungeness Shoreham Brighton
Portsmouth S Selsey
Boulogne
I. of Wight L
U
Brixham Plymouth B U U Dartmouth
Devonport
Newhaven
S
Area Z B
Falmouth
Dieppe Alderney Cherbourg
Guernsey S J G O U B L
Assault Force S Assault Force J Assault Force G Assault Force O Assault Force U Follow-up Force B Follow-up Force L
A B C D E F G H
Utah Beach (US 4th Division) Omaha Beach (US 1st Division, US 29th Division) Gold Beach (British 50th Division) Juno Beach (Canadian 3rd Division) Sword Beach (British 3rd Division) Airborne landing (US 101st Airborne Division) Airborne landing (US 82nd Airborne Division) Airborne landing (British 6th Airborne Division)
XX
Le Havre
709 G
XX
Jersey
243 XX
91
A
Trouville
F XX
B
352
C
D
E
XX
716
XX
21
H
Ouistreham Caen 711
XX
0 0
50 miles 50km
The overall plan for Operation Neptune
N
ORIGINS OF THE BATTLE When the British Expeditionary Force was expelled from France in June 1940, thoughts immediately turned to a time when Britain could return to the Continent to pursue its fight with Germany to a positive conclusion. This intention sounded simple, but the idea of landing a large army on a hostile continent was, however, such a complicated operation of war that it had been successfully attempted only a few times in history, and never against an enemy that was as powerful and skilful as the German Army. Britain’s Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, knew that the country had neither the means nor the manpower to undertake amphibious landings on a large scale, nor would it have for several years to come. All the nation could do in the meantime was to undertake operations around the periphery of the war zone, engaging the enemy at sea and in the air, and fighting him in the only theatre possible, North Africa. Closer to home Churchill urged the raising of a type of guerrilla force – the commandos – who could sweep across the English Channel and harass the enemy by lightning attacks on his
The liberty cargo ship SS Jeremiah O’Brien, which took part in the great supply chain that stretched across the English Channel during Operation Neptune. She was one of the 2,710 US-built, mass-produced vessels that helped win the war. The ship is now preserved as a visitor attraction in San Francisco harbour. (Carol M. Highsmith/ Library of Congress)
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coastline. These raids began as no more than ‘hit and run’ attacks, which caused little more than chaos and consternation, but grew into major assaults on specific strategic targets of some significance. In the whole scope of the conflict they were essentially sideshows, but they boosted morale at home and taught many lessons to those planning the crucial invasion of Nazi-dominated Europe. The first great plan for the proposed invasion was titled Operation Roundup and was developed in late 1941. In the early summer of that year Hitler had invaded Russia and had switched the bulk of his forces eastwards, leaving France and the Low Countries lightly held. Roundup was a plan to exploit any possible disintegration of Nazi power in Europe as a result of aerial bombardment, internal resistance and an overextended eastern front. In essence it would be an invasion to ‘round up’ any German resistance once the Nazi regime had begun to crumble. Its intentions were blinded by a large dose of wishful thinking, for Britain did not have enough of the specialized vessels to carry out any meaningful landings, nor did it have the forces available to exploit any such invasion. Nonetheless, flawed as it was, when the USA entered the war in December 1941 it was still the only plan on the table. Joint work continued on Roundup, but without a great deal of enthusiasm. The alliance between Britain and the USA, combined with President Roosevelt’s decision to undertake the defeat of Germany as its main priority, gave new impetus to the question of cross-Channel landings. American strategy called for an invasion to be launched as soon as possible to exploit Germany’s failure to defeat Russia. Flushed with the enthusiasm of its entry into the war, the United States wanted an invasion in 1942, or at least in 1943, seeing it as the only possible way to conduct a decisive stroke against Germany. Such an operation would open up a second front, which, together
A relic of the invasion: this British LCA was left on Utah Beach for many years after the war and was still there in the late 1970s. The craft was most likely used for later ferrying operations. It has since disappeared. (TS Collection)
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with the efforts being made by the Russians, would engage and tie down Nazi forces both in the east and in the west. Britain, primarily Churchill, felt a different strategy should be adopted that realistically reflected the forces available. Britain did not have an army large enough to undertake the ground war that would of necessity follow an invasion. Nor, it has to be said, did the USA. In 1939 the US Army numbered just 190,000 men. By the time it declared war on Germany two years later it had only just begun to grow and it took until the end of 1942 before it could number 1,600,000 men in 36 active divisions. In contrast Germany had mustered 112 divisions in September 1939 and, by December 1942, had 270 active divisions. When Germany invaded Russia in June 1941 its army consisted of 3,767,000 men, whilst that of the Soviet Union contained approximately 5,500,000 men. The size of these forces was quite staggering when one considers that Britain only managed to deploy 35 active divisions in the whole of the war. What these numbers show is that there was no way that Britain could effectively undertake an invasion of Europe without great help from the United States. Even then, the American Army in Europe would have to expand considerably from its 1941 size before it could take part, but that did not prevent the Americans from pushing for the invasion to be launched just as soon as it could. In the years between the end of 1941 and 1944 America wished to concentrate its strength for a cross-channel assault. Britain, again Churchill in particular, wanted to follow a different strategy, choosing to deploy its strength around the edges of Nazi Europe. Churchill had a great fear of amphibious operations conditioned by the memory of the failed Gallipoli landings in World War I, a disaster for which he carried some blame. Britain’s leader thought that Allied strategy might be better suited by avoiding
The cigar-smoking Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, joins with his Chief of the Imperial General Staff, General Sir Alan #SPPLF EVSJOHB+VOFWJTJU to the D-Day beaches. (NMRN)
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German forces and continuing the struggle in North Africa and through the ‘softer’ countries around the Mediterranean. He convinced the Americans to make landings in Morocco and Algeria to join with British Eighth Army to evict Axis forces from Africa. This was eventually achieved through the Operation Torch landings and subsequent actions in Tunisia. These Anglo-American landings against an undefended coastline were virtually unopposed. Fighting was sporadic and soon over, but some lessons were learned regarding the logistical requirements of staging an invasion. Churchill continued to press his Mediterranean strategy, and further amphibious landings were made against Sicily, southern Italy and at Anzio. All were against thinly secured coastlines with sparse enemy defences. The only amphibious attack against a strongly defended beach held by determined German troops was the raid on the French port of Dieppe in the summer of 1942. The troops, mostly Canadian, were held on the beaches and slaughtered in great numbers, with only half of the force making its way safely back to England. Landing against French colonials and Italians on wide-open beaches bore no relationship to the grim task of an assault against concrete fortifications manned by well-trained and motivated German troops. Whilst Churchill pushed his ‘soft underbelly’ idea of whittling away the enemy at the edges of his sphere of influence, Roosevelt and Stalin applied pressure for a cross-channel invasion to take priority. Both parties needed the ‘Second Front’ immediately; the Americans to deploy the growing numbers of divisions being produced in the United States and the Russians to help relieve pressure on their forces. Churchill, however, still held a strong hand, for the invasion could only be launched from England and would need the vast resources of the Royal Navy to make it happen. His intransigence infuriated the other two leaders. Roosevelt decided to call Churchill’s bluff by suggesting that if no invasion took place in 1944 he would switch the bulk
Many of England’s small south coast ports were used to embark troops for the invasion. Here US troops destined for Omaha Beach are loaded onto an LCVP alongside the famous Weymouth Pavilion, a favourite haunt of holidaymakers in peacetime. (NARA/TS Collection)
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of his forces to the Pacific and make the defeat of Japan his first priority. Churchill therefore had the choice of remaining a leading player in the Allied pact or watching from the sidelines as the USA and the USSR carved up the post-war world. At the Quebec conference in August 1943 Churchill conceded that the invasion should take place in the spring of 1944 and that it would receive the highest priority of the Anglo-American alliance. He did not, however, abandon his Mediterranean ideas. He tried again at the Tehran conference at the end of 1943 to get the invasion postponed until the autumn of 1944 to afford time for further operations on the enemy’s soft underbelly. Roosevelt and Stalin ignored his arguments and agreed that the invasion of north-west Europe would proceed as originally suggested. The operation was given the codeword Overlord and was set to take place on 1 May 1944. Churchill’s reluctance to push for the cross-channel landings was not just a personal eccentricity; his views were widely felt by many British and American leaders. Nazi propaganda had achieved a belief amongst military thinkers that the German defences along its northern coastline were just too powerful to be overcome by an attack from the sea. Hitler had turned his occupied territories into a vast fortress – a Festung Europa that stretched from Norway to Spain. Its seaward boundaries were fortified into the Atlantic Wall, bristling with all manner of defensive strongpoints, minefields and gun emplacements. Millions of tons of concrete had been poured into the wall to create a seemingly impenetrable barricade against any attacker. For the landings to be successful they would require meticulous planning, powerful naval forces and welltrained and determined troops, all of which would have to have a great air umbrella overhead to protect them. Even if the Allies could then gain a foothold ashore they would soon have to deal with strong, potentially overpowering, counterattacks by German infantry and armoured forces. It was no surprise then, that many leading military minds were made anxious by the very thought of an invasion. With the decision to launch Overlord made, a great team of planners on both sides of the Atlantic got to work on deciding how to deal with the problem of launching the great enterprise. The greatest problem of all would be getting the men and equipment necessary to penetrate the Atlantic Wall safely transported across the sea and onto the far shore. The task would require the greatest naval force ever assembled in history.
The modern light cruiser HMS Glasgow was built just before the war and commissioned in 1937. She is seen here bombarding German positions in support of American troops in Normandy as part of Bombardment Force C. (NMRN)
There were thousands of small vessels involved in Operation Neptune with a variety of responsibilities. These US Coastguard inshore craft were used for many different tasks in the waters off the American beaches, including the role of rescuing men from sunken and damaged vessels (NARA/TS Collection)
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CHRONOLOGY June 1940
British Expeditionary Force is evicted from France, leaving the continent of Europe occupied by Nazi forces.
September 1941
First outline plan for an invasion of Europe, Operation Roundup, is produced by British planners.
July 1943
First draft of Operation Overlord produced by COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander).
August 1943
Overlord plan approved by Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff.
December 1943
General Eisenhower appointed Allied Supreme Commander for Operation Overlord with Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay appointed as Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief for Operation Neptune. 1 May 1944 proposed as the date for D-Day.
1944 24 April
Large-scale exercises begin between 24 and 28 April (Exercise Tiger) and 3–8 May (Exercise Fabius). Force U is attacked in the Channel on 28 April during Exercise Tiger with great loss of life.
8 May
Date for the invasion is fixed for 5 June.
2 June
First sailings of warships for Operation Neptune leave the Clyde in Scotland.
3 June
First of the assault convoys (Force U) puts to sea for Normandy from ports in Devon.
4 June, 0515hrs
General signal for the postponement of Overlord promulgated from Eisenhower’s Battle HQ. Convoys already at sea are turned back.
5 June, 0400hrs
Eisenhower makes the decision to launch Operation Overlord.
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6 June 1944 0015hrs
British airborne forces begin landing in Normandy to the east of the river Orne.
0130hrs
US airborne forces begin their assault on the Cotentin Peninsula behind Utah Beach.
0230hrs
Task forces begin to arrive in their transport areas off the invasion beaches.
0530hrs
German coastal batteries open fire on Allied warships.
0535hrs
Naval bombardment forces open fire on German coastal batteries and beach fortifications.
0605hrs
Bomber attacks on landing beaches begin.
0630hrs
American troops begin their assaults on Utah and Omaha beaches.
0725hrs
Landings begin on Sword and Gold beaches, followed by those on Juno Beach at 0755hrs.
Late afternoon
All follow-up troops are ashore and beachheads expanding.
7 June
Work begins on Mulberry harbours and Gooseberry breakwaters
17 June
Mulberry harbours open for limited use, capable of handling 1,500 tons per day.
19–21 June
Fierce gale hits the invasion beaches, partially demolishing Mulberry A and damaging Mulberry B, also causing great damage to ships, ferries and landing craft. Delays in unloading supplies cause deferrals and postponements to land battle.
26 June
Port of Cherbourg is captured after bombardment by American warships and an attack by ground troops.
4 August
First of the PLUTO pipelines begins pumping fuel across the Channel from England to Normandy.
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OPPOSING COMMANDERS
A British assault landing craft (LCA) carries a group of American troops across Weymouth Bay during the beautiful summer weather that preceded the storms of early +VOF XIJDIDBVTFEUIF postponement of D-Day. (NARA/TS Collection)
Once the three Allied powers had agreed that Overlord should take place in May 1944, the main question on everyone’s mind was who should lead it? When the idea of invasion was first seriously considered in early 1942, Britain was the stronger party in the Anglo-American alliance. America had few troops in Europe and it would take time for more to arrive. Britain acted as the senior partner in the pact and it was decided that when the crosschannel invasion actually happened, it would be with a British supreme commander at its head. General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was Churchill’s suggestion for the role. Two years later the positions had been reversed, for although the naval side of the operation and the assault troops would be primarily from Britain and the Commonwealth, their strength would be soon be overshadowed by the numbers of troops arriving from the USA to exploit the subsequent land battle and the drive to Berlin. It was only the Americans who could produce the manpower necessary to complete the task, for by that time in the war, Britain’s ability to put more men into the field would be all but exhausted. As America was providing the bulk of the men and matériel required between the invasion and victory, it was political that an American should lead the way. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was chosen for the task. He was not necessarily the first choice, for America’s most senior commander, General George Marshall, was thought to be the best candidate for the job. As head of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, Marshall had led America’s forces thus far in the war and deserved to have the most important field command of the entire conflict. He was, however, denied the role, for Roosevelt thought that he was indispensable in his present role in Washington. The position would have been a just reward for all of his hard work, but it went instead to his protégé Eisenhower.
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With an American as supreme commander, it was thought necessary to make his three force commanders and his deputy British. It was a sensible decision for the commanders chosen all had a great deal of experience and long service in the war. The land, sea and air force aspects of the invasion were led by General Sir Bernard Montgomery as Commander-in-Chief 21st Army Group, with Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay as Allied Naval Commanderin-Chief Expeditionary Force and Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory as Air Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Force. Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder was appointed as Eisenhower’s deputy.
ALLIED COMMANDERS FOR OPERATION NEPTUNE Operation Neptune was the codename given to all phases of the invasion involving naval forces. This included planning, transport, bombardment, assault, reinforcement and exploitation. A combination of British and American naval officers was chosen to command the various parts of this amphibious operation. The naval commander appointed to lead the invasion was Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay (1883–1945). His full title was Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force (ANCXF). He was a sound choice for he had already been closely associated with many of the amphibious operations of the war. Bertram Ramsay was a veteran of World War I who had spent two years in command of a destroyer on the famous ‘Dover Patrol’, helping to keep the English Channel clear of enemy warships and submarines. During the interwar years he rose in rank to the top of the rear-admiral list through a succession of commands at sea in cruisers and on land in training and staff posts. In 1938, he was moved to the Royal Navy Retired List. He was recalled to service when war threatened in 1939, some say through the intervention of the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, with the acting rank of vice-admiral and was appointed Flag Officer Dover. In this post he found distinction in 1940 by organizing the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from the beaches around Dunkirk in Operation Dynamo. Under Ramsay’s leadership almost 340,000 troops were snatched from certain captivity after the fall of France by a fleet of small warships and an assortment of civilian-crewed ‘little ships’. It was a miraculous achievement of organization and one that marked Ramsay out for command of future amphibious operations. In 1942 he was deputy naval commander for the Anglo-American landings in North Africa (Operation Torch). This was followed by command of the Eastern Task Force during the landings in Sicily in July 1943. Admiral Ramsay’s experience in amphibious landings and his close working with both the US Navy and Gen. Eisenhower made him the obvious choice to command Operation Neptune. Neptune’s seaborne armada was divided into two task forces; one covered the American beaches – the Western Task Force – whilst the other was assigned to the British and Canadian beaches – the Eastern Task Force.
Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay RN, Allied Naval Commander-inChief Expeditionary Force (ANCXF). (IWM)
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Commander Western Task Force, Rear-Admiral Alan G. Kirk USN. (NARA/TS Collection)
The Western Task Force was commanded by Rear-Admiral Alan G. Kirk (1888–1963). He, in turn, had two separate forces under his command: Force O commanded by Rear-Admiral John L. Hall (1891–1978) and Force U commanded by Rear Admiral Don P. Moon (1894–1944). By the time that the 56-year-old Kirk had been appointed to this command in November 1943, he had served in the US Navy for 39 years. He was an excellent choice for the post for he was conversant with the Royal Navy’s ways of doing things and with many of its senior officers. His experiences had been gained as naval attaché in London at the outbreak of war and as chief-of-staff to the London-based Admiral Stark. He was also experienced in invasion techniques through his command of Amphibious Forces Atlantic Fleet and through his operational command of the eastern flank of the Allied landings in Sicily in 1943. Just before the start of the war, Rear-Admiral John Hall was captain of the US battleship Arkansas He then took up staff commands with the Atlantic Fleet. In 1942 he was given the acting rank of rear-admiral and participated in the US landings in Morocco during Operation Torch and in the invasion of Italy at Salerno in September 1943. Rear-Admiral Don Moon had a tragic career. Before the war he was a destroyer captain. When the USA entered World War II he was promoted to lead one of the Atlantic fleet destroyer squadrons, guarding convoys in northern waters. In November 1942 he joined Admiral King as his Chief of Naval Operations. At the end of this tour of duty, he was promoted to rearadmiral and designated as Force U commander for the Normandy invasion. Immediately after Operation Neptune, Don Moon moved to the Mediterranean as task force commander for the Operation Anvil landings in Southern France. The role proved to be too much for him. Suffering from mental exhaustion he took his own life on 5 August 1944, ten days before those landings. Leading the Eastern Task Force covering the British Gold and Sword beaches, and the Canadian landings on Juno Beach, was Rear-Admiral Sir Phillip Vian (1894–1968). The exploits of Phillip Vian were legendary. In World War I his destroyer was part of the outer screen at the battle of Jutland in 1916. Between the wars he saw service at sea in destroyers and cruisers, rising to command various destroyer flotillas in home waters. In February 1940, he succeeded in finding and boarding the elusive German supply ship Altmark to release over 300 British merchant sailors who had been captured during the cruise of the pocket battleship Graf Spee. Vian’s flotilla then took part in the Anglo/French landings in Norway. In May 1941, Vian participated in the operations to find and help destroy the German battleship Bismarck. Amphibious landings against the Germans in Spitsbergen won Vian a second bar to his DSO. Later sea service in command of the 15th Cruiser Squadron the Mediterranean saw him take part in both the first and second battles of Sirte against the Italian Navy. Vian also commanded support forces in both the invasion of Sicily and the landings at Salerno in 1943.
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In November of that year he returned to Britain in preparation for the Normandy landings. Rear-Admiral Vian’s three task force commanders also had a great deal of experience: Force S was commanded by RearAdmiral Arthur G. Talbot (1892–1960); Force G was headed by Commodore Cyril E. Douglas-Pennant (1894–1961) and Force J was led by Commodore Geoffrey N. Oliver (1898–1980). Rear-Admiral Talbot was also a veteran of World War I, serving right through from 1914. After the war he specialized in torpedoes, with several postings to HMS Vernon (Torpedo School) and as torpedo officer on the capital ships HMS Malaya and HMS Renown. During World War II he spent three years as commanding officer of the aircraft carriers HMS Furious, HMS Illustrious and HMS Formidable. In 1943 he was promoted to rear-admiral and became ADC to King George VI. In November of that year he was appointed to lead Force S for the invasion. Arthur Talbot retired from the Royal Navy in 1948 with the rank of vice-admiral. After service in World War I, Commodore Douglas-Pennant spent the interwar years on various sea-going postings, mainly in cruisers, and in several training establishments. After the outbreak of war 1939, he served in various staff posts and later commanded the light cruiser HMS Despatch. He was Admiral Ramsay’s chief-of-staff for two years in the Mediterranean, during the landings in Sicily and Salerno. In January 1944 he was appointed to command Force G for the invasion of Normandy. Commodore Geoffrey Oliver served as a midshipman in battleships during World War I, after which he specialized in gunnery. By 1925 he was gunnery officer in the light cruiser HMS Carlisle on the China Station. Nine years later he had his first warship command in the destroyer HMS Diana. In 1940 he was given command of the light cruiser HMS Hermione in the Mediterranean. The ship was lost when torpedoed and sunk by U-205 on 16 June 1942. In 1943 Oliver led Force N in the invasion of Sicily. His amphibious experience led him to be nominated to command Force J for the invasion. After the assault phase of the landings, two follow-up forces would introduce reinforcements ashore. Each main task force sector was provided with its own reserve force: Follow-up Force B, commanded by Commodore Campbell D. Edgar, would support the American Western Task Force, whilst Follow-up Force L, commanded by Rear-Admiral William Parry, would bring support to the British Eastern Task Force. These follow-up forces would be composed primarily of tank landing ships, bringing troops and equipment to the beaches. Commodore Campbell D. Edgar had spent many years in the naval transport commands of the US Navy. He was senior naval officer of the combat transport ships during the Torch landings and was very experienced in re-supply. In contrast, Rear-Admiral Parry had spent most of the war in fighting ships. He commanded the New Zealand cruiser HMNZS Achilles at the start of the war and took part in the battle of the River Plate in December 1939. He later commanded the battlecruiser HMS Renown.
Commander Force O, Rear"ENJSBM+PIO-)BMM64/ (NARA/TS Collection)
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GERMAN KRIEGSMARINE COMMANDERS Commander-in-Chief Marinegruppenkommando West (Naval Group West), Admiral Theodor Krancke (1893–1973) commanded all German naval forces in France. From his headquarters in Paris he was responsible for all naval ground units, naval coastal and anti-aircraft artillery and all warships throughout the country. Admiral Krancke joined the Kriegsmarine in 1912 and served throughout World War I in torpedo boats. He continued to be associated with torpedo craft for the next 14 years as he rose in rank to a flotilla command, before taking up various staff appointments. Just after the start of World War II he was given the command of the heavy cruiser Admiral Scheer. Krancke captained the warship as it broke out into the Atlantic in October 1940 and led it on a commerce-raiding spree that lasted until April 1941. During this cruise, which included a foray into the Indian Ocean, the German cruiser accounted for 13 merchant ships sunk, three captured and the destruction of the British armed merchant cruiser Jervis Bay. In mid-1941 he came ashore and became the naval liaison officer at Hitler’s HQ. Krancke was promoted to full admiral in March 1943 and took up his post as Commander Naval Group West in Paris, just two months before the invasion. Vizeadmiral Friedrich Rieve (1896–1981), who had his headquarters in Rouen, reported to Admiral Krancke as Commanding Admiral Atlantic Coast. He was responsible for the defence of this long coastline from Holland round to Spain. Rieve was also a veteran of World War I, most of which he served with the Naval Corps in Flanders where he was awarded the Iron Cross both First and Second classes. He saw little sea service between the
Naval Commander Normandy West, Konteradmiral Walter Hennecke (left), and Commander Cherbourg Garrison, General Karl-Wilhelm von Schlieben (centre), surrender to Major-General +PTFQI-BXUPO$PMMJOT SJHIU after the fall of the port of Cherbourg. (NARA/TS Collection)
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wars, mostly stationed ashore in training establishments or on staff appointments. Rieve was given command of the light cruiser Karlsruhe in April 1941 together with Warship Group 4 during Operation Weserübung, the German invasion of Norway. The Karlsruhe was sunk during this action and Rieve was severely criticised for abandoning the ship too soon, as it might have been salvaged. After service in Norway he became Chief-of-Staff to Commander North Sea. He was promoted to vizeadmiral in October 1943 and took up his post as Admiral Channel Coast just three weeks before the invasion. The naval commander for the western sector of Normandy, the area that covered the landing beaches, was Konteradmiral Walther Hennecke (1898–1984). He was based in Cherbourg and reported to Vizeadmiral Friedrich Rieve. Hennecke had served most of his time in the Kriegsmarine as an artillery officer, either aboard ships or at gunnery schools. He was promoted to konteradmiral on 1 March 1944 and became Commandant of Sea-Fortifications Normandy on 6 May 1944. All three of the above commanders who were responsible for the naval defence of Normandy only had a matter of weeks in post before the Allied landings stormed ashore. They had little influence on the outcome of the battle, for after the Allies had established themselves beyond the shoreline, any attempts by the Kriegsmarine to evict or harass them were quickly overwhelmed by superior force. What few German warships there were in the western Channel were impotent against such strength and the coastal artillery along the coastline of the landing beaches was quickly overrun or put out of action on D-Day itself.
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OPPOSING FORCES The German forces gathered in Normandy to repel any invasion from the sea were slight when compared to those available to the Allies. Numerically they failed any meaningful comparison on every level. They had neither the strength nor the effectiveness to compete head on with those that were planned to be pitted against them. But this did not mean that they posed little threat. On the contrary, what they lacked in numbers, manpower and modern equipment was more than compensated by the fact that the attacking troops had to be transported across an open sea and try to storm their way ashore against beaches that were fortified to an extent not seen before in history.
ALLIED FORCES Plans for the invasion from the earliest days were all formulated with one stipulation in mind. Before any attempt could be made, overwhelming force must be available in every single component of the overall plan. By the early summer of 1944, that strength had been gathered in ports and harbours around the British Isles. The superiority in the numbers of Allied troops actually landing in France was of course confined to just the area of the landings. Stationed in the country was a great number of German divisions, but it would take days and
The battleship HMS Ramillies bombards German coastal artillery emplacements during D-Day with its massive 15in. guns. (NMRN)
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even weeks for many of these to move against the landings. To commit too many too soon would leave other parts of the country vulnerable. To add to the enemy’s dilemma, a plan was produced to lead the German High Command into thinking that the Normandy landings were just a diversion and that the main invasion would be made much further east in the Pas de Calais region. This ruse tied down many German divisions that might have been rushed to Normandy immediately after D-Day. It would be more than six weeks before Hitler realized that there were to be no more landings in northern France and that Normandy was the main effort. It was Operation Neptune’s task to put five divisions ashore on D-Day itself and to build up these forces at a steady rate over the following weeks. Allied air forces would simultaneously deliver three airborne divisions on the flanks of the landings on D-Day and keep them supplied until ground forces linked up with them. Thus eight Allied divisions would be available to overwhelm the three German divisions known to be guarding the coast. They would also prepare themselves to receive the first armoured counter blow, which was expected to hit the landings late on D-Day or the following day. Admiral Ramsay’s task was, in essence, to bombard the beaches and enemy defences prior to the landings, carry the troops across the Channel and onto the beaches, reinforce and re-supply the landings, and then supply and build up the infrastructure necessary to keep the troops moving until major ports were captured. This last requirement included the transportation and erection of two artificial harbours (code name Mulberry) and a number of pipelines (code name PLUTO) from England and Normandy to carry fuel. The naval and maritime forces required for these tasks were huge. Admiral Ramsay was obliged to bring together the largest amphibious force ever assembled in history. It was originally intended to be assembled from British ships and craft, with America making up the shortfall in numbers. The US was at that time heavily committed in the Pacific fighting the Japanese and that theatre was already consuming huge amounts of shipping. Problems arose when the final agreed plan for the invasion was found to have been enlarged by 25 per cent. There was no way that this extra requirement could be provided just by the British and American ships already allocated to Operation Neptune. The Americans would have to somehow make up the shortfall. The US Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral King, was very reluctant to provide these extra ships. American involvement in the Pacific was seen by him as being the US Navy’s prime theatre; the Atlantic and northern Europe was more the province of the Royal Navy. King thought that the British had enough resources, bar suitable landing craft, to fulfil its needs and pointed to the numbers of ships of the Home Fleet that would be swinging at anchor in northern waters, watching the German fleet in Norway. The British refuted this and accusations against Admiral King were made suggesting that he was ‘starving NEPTUNE to fatten the Pacific Fleet’. A solution was reached through dialogue between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to allow the extra ships to be transferred for Operation Neptune, a move that did little to improve Admiral King’s Anglophobic tendencies.
The battleship USS Texas, which carried the flag of Rear-Admiral Bryant USN, Commander Bombardment Force C, in Operation Neptune. The Texas, a veteran of the Great War, was commissioned in 1914. On D-Day her ten 14in. guns fired a total of 255 shells at the cliff-top German gun battery on the Pointe du Hoc prior to the assault on the position by US Rangers. (NARA/TS Collection)
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The naval trawler HMS Foulness was just one of the thousands of small ships that took part in Operation Neptune. She was used on anti-submarine duties as part of the Western Task Force off Utah Beach. (NMRN)
When the final naval and maritime component of Operation Neptune was at last put together, the numbers involved were impressive. The force sent out to bombard the enemy guns and fortifications would contain seven battleships, two monitors, 23 cruisers, two gunboats and 104 destroyers. A total of 138 warships with guns ranging in calibre from 16in. down to 4.5in. The number of escort ships allocated to protect the fleet – destroyers, sloops, frigates, corvettes, US patrol craft and anti-submarine trawlers – amounted to 221. There were also 287 minesweepers provided to sweep safe channels; two midget submarines to act as location points; four minelayers to help seal off certain areas; one seaplane carrier; 495 coastal forces – motor gunboats, motor torpedo boats, US submarine chasers, motor launches and harbour defence launches; US coastguard cutters and rescue motor launches – as well as an anti-submarine escorts group that contained 58 vessels and included additional escort carriers, destroyers, sloops and frigates. All of these naval craft were part of the offensive element of the Allied armada. To carry troops and equipment ashore on the assault in the build-up phase of the operation, there was a wealth of specialized landing and support craft. The largest of these support fleet vessels were the landing ships. These mainly carried the troops across the English Channel – landing ship infantry (LSI) – and disembarked them onto smaller landing craft, but some were designed to carry tanks – landing ship tanks (LST). There were 310 of these great vessels allocated to Neptune. In addition there were 1,211 major landing craft; 2,075 minor landing craft and 531 landing barges. That was the offensive and build-up fleet of Neptune, but there were other ships involved in the operation. A large number of ships and craft of many types were essential for the Mulberry (amphibious harbours) and PLUTO (underwater pipelines) projects. A total of 423 ancillary ships and craft such as tugs, buoy laying, salvage, survey and rescue ships were necessary, and a further 1,260 merchant ships providing services such as stores, ammunition, accommodation and motor transport were required. Among this number were the 59 blockships that were to be sunk to provide sheltered breakwaters off the coast. These artificial reefs were called Gooseberries. With such a massive armada of ships and craft gathered together for just one large operation, it was not surprising that those men taking part in this great enterprise felt they were unstoppable.
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ALLIED NAVAL FORCES ORDER OF BATTLE FOR THE ASSAULT PHASE Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief Expeditionary Force, Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay
EASTERN TASK FORCE (ETF) Commander ETF, Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian RN Flag flown in Cruiser, HMS Scylla, Captain T. Brownrigg RN ETF Reserve Battleship, HMS Rodney Captain R. Fitzroy RN Cruiser, HMS Sirius Captain R. Edwards RN ETF or WTF Reserve Battleship, HMS Nelson Captain A. Maxwell-Hyslop RN (ship held at Milford Haven) Depot Ship, Cruiser, HMS Capetown Captain H. Nash RN Depot Ship, Cruiser, HMS Ceres Captain R. Allen RN Mulberry HQ Ship, Cruiser, HMS Despatch Captain Petrie RN Assault Force S Naval Commander Force S Rear-Admiral A.G. Talbot RN, HQ aboard HMS Largs Bombardment Force D Battleship, HMS Ramillies Captain G. Middleton RN Battleship, HMS Warspite Captain M. Kelsey RN Monitor, HMS Roberts Captain R. Dunbar RN Cruiser, HMS Arethusa Captain H. Dalrymple-Smith RN Cruiser, HMS Danae Captain J. Haines RN Cruiser, HMS Frobisher Captain J. Mudford RN Cruiser, HMS Mauritius Captain W. Davis RN Cruiser, ORP Dragon Commander Dzienisiewicz 13 RN Fleet Destroyers 2 RN Hunt Destroyers Assault Group S1 Captain W. Leggatt RN, HQ aboard HMS Locust 1st LST Flotilla 3rd LST Flotilla 5th LST Flotilla ‘T’ Squadron Landing Craft Assault Group S2 Captain R. Gotto RN, HQ aboard HMS Dacres ‘I’ Squadron Landing Craft Assault Group S3 Captain E. Bush RN, HQ aboard HMS Goathland LSI (L) HMS Glenearn, 435th Assault Flotilla, 543rd Assault Flotilla LSI (L) SS Empire Battleaxe, 537th Assault Flotilla LSI (L) SS Empire Broadsword, 538th Assault Flotilla LCI (L) SS Empire Cutlass, 536th Assault Flotilla ‘E’ Squadron Landing Craft Support Squadron Force S Build-Up Squadrons ‘C’ Build-Up Squadron ‘D’ Build-Up Squadron ‘U’ Landing Barge Squadron
Assault Force J Naval Commander Force J Bombardment Force E Cruiser, HMS Belfast Cruiser, HMS Diadem 7 RN Fleet Destroyers 4 RN Hunt Destroyers Assault Group J1
Commodore G. Oliver RN, HQ aboard HMS Hilary Captain F. Parham RN Captain E. Clifford RN
Captain A. Pugsley RN, HQ aboard HMS Lawford LSI (L) MV Llangibby Castle, 557th Assault Flotilla LSI (M) HMCS Prince Henry, 528th Assault Flotilla LSI (M) HMS Queen Emma, 526th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) SS Canterbury, 509th Assault Flotilla
LSI (H) SS Duke of Argyll, 517th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) HMS Invicta, 510th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) SS Isle of Thanet, 505th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) SS Laird’s Isle, 516th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) SS Micklenburg, 511th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) SS Ulster Monarch, 521st Assault Flotilla ‘K’ LCT Squadron 1st Support Squadron Assault Group J2 Captain R. Otway-Ruthven RN, HQ aboard HMS Waveney LSI (L) SS Clan Lamont, 558th Assault Flotilla LSI (L) SS Monowai, 544th Assault Flotilla, 556th Assault Flotilla LSI (M) HMCS Prince David, 529th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) HMS Brigadier, 513th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) HMS Duke of Wellington, 5506th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) SS Isle of Guernsey, 518th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) SS Lady of Mann, 512th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) HMS St Helier, 515th Assault Flotilla ‘N’ LCT Squadron 2nd Support Squadron Assault Group J3 Captain A. Fanshaw RN, HQ aboard HMS Royal Ulsterman 2nd LST Flotilla 55th Assault Flotilla 4th LST Flotilla 9th LST Flotilla ‘P’ LCT Squadron Assault Group J4 Captain R. Jeffreys RN, HQ at HMS Squid at Southampton Commando and Ranger Lifts assigned to both ETF and WTF LSI (H) SS Maid of Orleans, 514th Assault Flotilla – Force S LSI (H) SS Princess Margaret, 523rd Assault Flotilla – Force J LSI (H) SS Victoria, 508th Assault Flotilla – Force G
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LSI (S) HMS Prins Albert, 503rd Assault Flotilla – Force J LSI (S) HMS Prinses Astrid, 500th Assault Flotilla – Force S LSI (S) HMS Prinses J. Charlotte, 502nd Assault Flotilla – Force G Support Squadron Force J Build-Up Squadrons ’A’ Build-Up squadron ‘F’ Build-Up Squadron ‘W’ Build-Up Squadron Force J Unattached to Assault Groups HMS Northway Lt. Cdr A.J. Anderson RN HM LSE 2 (Landing ship emergency repair) Cdr R.W. English RN 712th Assault Flotilla
US LST Division 56 US LST Division 65 US LST Division 101 US 246th LCI Flotilla ‘U’ LCT Squadron Force G Unattached to assault groups HMS Adventurer (as LSE) 700th Assault Flotilla 706th assault Flotilla Follow-up Force L Naval Commander Force L Follow-up Force L1
Assault Force G Naval Commander Force G Commodore C. Douglas-Pennant RN, HQ aboard HMS Bulolo Bombardment Force K Cruiser, HMS Ajax Captain J. Wold RN Cruiser, HMS Argonaut Captain E. Longley-Cook RN Cruiser, HMS Emerald Captain F. Wylie RN Cruiser, HMS Orion Captain J. Gornall RN Gunboat, HNMS Flores Lt. Commander G. Koudys 9 RN Fleet Destroyers 4 RN Hunt Destroyers Assault Group G1 Captain J. Farquhar RN, HQ aboard HMS Nith LSI (L) SS Empire Arquebus, 524th Assault Flotilla LSI (L) SS Empire Crossbow, 553rd Assault Flotilla LSI (L) SS Empire Spearhead, 525th Assault Flotilla LSI (L) HMS Glenroy, 554th Assault Flotilla, 559th Assault Flotilla LCH No. 100 LCH No. 317 Support Squadron ‘D’ LCT Squadron 25th LBF Flotilla Assault Group G2 Captain F. Balance RN, HQ aboard HMS Kingsmill LSI (L) SS Empire Halberd, 539th Assault Flotilla LSI (L) SS Empire Lance, 540th Assault Flotilla LSI (L) SS Empire Mace, 541st Assault Flotilla LSI (L) SS Empire Rapier, 542nd Assault Flotilla LCH No. 187 LCH No. 285 Support Squadron ‘L’ LCT Squadron 26th LBF Flotilla Assault Group G3 Captain G. Dolphin RN, HQ aboard HMS Albrighton US LST Division 22 US LST Division 55
7th LST Flotilla 8th LST Flotilla US LST Division 21 US LST Division 98 US LST Division 99 US LST Division 100 US LST Division 102 US LST Division 103 Follow-up Force L2
Rear-Admiral W. Parry RN, HQ aboard HMS Albatross Captain F. Halahan RN, HQ aboard HMS Albatross
Captain H. Pawsey RN, HQ aboard HMS Woolverstone
‘V’ LCT Squadron ‘H’ LCT Squadron Follow-up Force L3 HMS Bachaquero HMS Misoa HMS Tasajera ‘A’ LCI (L) Squadron, 252nd LCI (L) Flotilla, 253rd LCI (L) Flotilla
WESTERN TASK FORCE (WTF) Commander WTF, Flag USS Augusta WTF Reserve Cruiser, HMS Belona 17 USN Destroyers Assault Force O Naval Commander Force O Bombardment Force C Battleship USS Texas Battleship, USS Arkansas Cruiser HMS Glasgow Cruiser FFS Montcalm Cruiser FFS Georges Leygues 9 USN Destroyers 3 RN Hunt Destroyers
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Rear Admiral A.G. Kirk USN Captain E. Jones USN Captain C. Norris RN
Rear-Admiral J. Hall USN, HQ aboard USS Ancon Captain C. Baker USN Captain F. Richards USN Captain C. Clarke RN Rear-Admiral Jaujard Capitaine de Vaisseau Laurin
Assault Group O1
Captain E. Fritzsche USCG, HQ aboard LSI (L) USS Samuel Chase LSI (L) USS Samuel Chase LSI (L) USS Henrico LSI (L) SS Empire Anvil, 550th Assault Flotilla USLST No. 309 USLST No. 314 USLST No. 357 USLST No. 373 USLST No. 374 USLST No. 376 LCH No. 87 LCC No. 10 LCC No. 20 5 LCI (L)s 44 LCTs 18 LCMs Assault Group O2 Captain W. Bailey USN, HQ aboard LSI (L) USS Charles Carroll LSI (L) USS Charles Carroll LSI (L) USS Thomas Jefferson LSI (L) SS Empire Javelin, 551st Assault flotilla USLST No. 310 USLST No. 315 USLST No. 316 USLST No. 317 USLST No. 332 USLST No. 372 LCH No. 86 LCC 30 LCC 40 LCC 50 17 LCI (L)s 45 LCTs 18 LCMs Assault Group O3 Captain L. Schulten USN, HQ aboard USS Ann Arundel USS Ann Arndel USS Dorethea L. Dix USS Thurston USLST No. 6 USLST No. 51 USLST No. 75 USLST No. 133 USLST No. 134 USLST No. 157 USLST No. 285 USLST No. 286 USLST No. 347 USLST No. 350 USLST No. 375
USLST No. 502 LCH No. 492 11 LCI (L)s 39 LCTs HMS Oceanway Assault Group O4 Commander S. Dennis RN Ranger Forces LSI (H) SS Amsterdam, 522nd Assault Flotilla LSI (H) SS Henry Cree, 520th Assault Flotilla LSI (H) SS Princess Maud, 519th Assault Flotilla LSI (S) HMS Prince Baudoin, 507th Assault Flotilla LSI (S) HMS Prince Charles, 501st Assault Flotilla LSI (S) HMS Prins Leopold, 504th Assault Flotilla Force O Gun Support Craft Assault Force U Naval Commander Force U Bombardment Force A Battleship, USS Nevada Monitor, HMS Erebus Cruiser, USS Tuscaloosa Cruiser, USS Quincy Cruiser, HMS Black Prince Cruiser, HMS Enterprise Cruiser, HMS Hawkins Gunboat, HMNS Soemba 8 USN Destroyers Green Assault Group
Rear-Admiral D. Moon USN, HQ aboard USS Bayfield Captain P. Rhea USN Captain J. Colquhoun RN Captain J. Walker USN Captain E. Senn USN Captain D. Lee RN Captain H. Grant RN Captain J. Josselyn RN Lt. Commander H. Proper Commander A. Warburton USN, HQ aboard LCH 530
LSI (L) SS Joseph T Dickman SS Empire Gauntlet, 552nd Assault Flotilla Three LSTs from LST Unit No. 1 Eight LSTs from LST Unit No. 2 Four LSTs from LST Unit No. 3 LCT Unit 69 LSI (L) Division 59 LSI (L) Division 63 LSI (L) Division 64 LSI (L) Division 65 LCH 530 Red Assault Group
Commander E. Wilson USNR, HQ aboard LCH 10
LSI (L) USS Barnet LSI USS Bayfield Two LSTs from LST Unit No. 1 Six LSTs from LST Unit No. 2 Five LSTs from LST Unit No. 3 LCI (L) Division 7 LCI (L) Division 9 LCI (L) Division 10
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LCI (L) Division 60 LCT Unit 83 LCH 10 LCH 217 Force U Support Group
Follow-up Force B Naval Commander Force B
Lt. Commander L. Hart USNR, HQ aboard LCH 209 Fire Support Units 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11
Commodore C. Edgar USN, HQ aboard USS Maloy
USLCI (L) Division 68 USLCI (L) Division 69 USLST Division 23 USLST Division 60 USLST Division 61 USLST Division 70 USLST Division 72 ‘Q’ LCT Squadron
GERMAN FORCES
A small landing ship infantry (LSI), with seven of her eight LCAs slung from her davits, off the Normandy beaches on D-Day. (NMRN)
When the forces of Operation Neptune touched down on the shores of enemy-occupied Normandy they had a very good appreciation of what was waiting for them. Years of intelligence gathering had provided a rounded picture of enemy preparations to meet the invasion. The whole of the northern coast of France had been fortified with every conceivable means, but every time the enemy broke ground to build a new defence work, Allied aircraft were overhead to take good reconnaissance pictures of the work. Try as they might to disguise each new fortified position, the Allies tried even harder to identify the site and to register it on their maps of enemy’s defences. Whilst almost all German positions were installed for defence, some were sited for offensive use. Large coastal batteries were built to attack the invasion convoys whilst its ships were still at sea. Heavy, medium and light batteries covered most of the seaward approaches, the heaviest of which were manned by naval personnel. Once the assault ships were closer to the beach static measures were in place to counter the landings, such as minefields and underwater obstacles. When the landing craft finally hit the shore, the attacking troops were confronted with barbed wire, concrete pillboxes, mines, machine guns, flamethrowers, field guns and rifle fire. All of these measures were designed to create a ‘killing field’ through which only the strongest and best-trained troops could penetrate. On paper the design of this layout looked like an impenetrable screen. It did, however, have a week point; the quality of the troops manning these defences was poor. Germany did have many first-rate divisions of tough troops available in France, but chose to man its Atlantic Wall in the most part with second-rate static divisions. These divisions had little transport of their own, few mobile weapons and contained large drafts of
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foreign ‘volunteers’. It was thought that these troops holding the coast needed little expertise to man concrete pillboxes and entrenched machine guns; they were expendable. If the attackers penetrated the outer crust of the coastal defences, then better troops backed by armour would come forward to sweep the invaders back into the sea. Garrisoning the stretch of coastline covered by the invasion were two static German divisions (716. and 709. Infanterie-Divisionen) and one regular division (352. Infanterie-Division). The 716. Infanterie-Division was a fortress division originally formed with older personnel. It was one of the divisions raised to garrison the occupied areas of France and had been in the Caen area since 1941. The division was later augmented with drafts of Polish and Russian troops who had been captured during the campaign on the Eastern Front. The division held that part of the coast that covered Gold, Juno and Sword beaches on the eastern British sector. The other static division, the 709. Infanterie-Division, held the lower eastern side of the Cotentin Peninsula, which included the American coastal area designated as Utah Beach. In the centre of the landing zones between these two static divisions was the 352. Infanterie-Division. It was a regular division that had been formed in November 1943 from elements of the 268. and 321. Infanterie-Divisionen, both of which had been all but destroyed on the Eastern Front during the previous year. This gave the 352. Infanterie-Division a cadre of tough and experienced troops to stiffen the resolve of any new recruits. The division held the coastline, which included the proposed American Omaha Beach, and these seasoned troops were able to do much damage to those Americans who landed on that beach. During the five previous years the once-mighty German Luftwaffe had been gradually worn down to just a shadow of its former strength. The war on the Eastern Front and the Allied bomber offensive against Germany had taken its toll on the Luftwaffe to the extent that just before the invasion its front-line strength in the west numbered just 1,515 aircraft. Of these only 590 were likely to be available to move against Allied operations in the invasion zone. To counter these few aircraft, the Allied air forces could put 5,886 planes into the air and this number excluded all those aircraft from reconnaissance, photographic, transport, troop carrier, coastal and naval squadrons. It was an overwhelming advantage for the Allies. Admiral Krancke’s naval forces available to counter any invasion were spread all along the Channel coast, for he did not know where the blow would eventually fall. Immediately available within striking distance of Normandy were five fleet torpedo boats (light destroyers) at le Havre; 23 motor torpedo boats (eight at Boulogne and 15 at Cherbourg); 116 minesweepers at various ports and harbours between Dunkirk and St Malo; 44 patrol vessels (21 at le Havre and 23 at St Malo) and 42 artillery barges (16 at Boulogne, 15 at Fecamp and 11 at Ouistreham). Further afield along France’s Atlantic coast in different ports between Brest and the Spanish border were five destroyers,
The E-boat (known as the Schnellboot or S-boat to the Germans) was one of the prime weapons planned to be used against any invasion. The craft were very effective in coastal waters. With a high cruising speed of 40 to 50 knots, and deadly torpedoes, the E-boat had an edge over slower warships and merchant vessels. (TS Collection)
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The German M262a fire-control bunker of the Longues Battery situated high on the cliff between Gold and Omaha beaches. (Ken Ford)
146 minesweepers, 59 patrol boats and a single torpedo boat. A further six destroyers and ten torpedo boats were held near the Baltic and could move south to intervene, but this would have lessened the security of the German heavy ships stationed in Baltic and Norwegian waters. Germany’s submarine service was numerically in no better position than the surface fleet. Allocated to anti-invasion duties were 49 U-boats, 24 of them in Brest, two in Lorient, 19 in St Nazaire and four in La Pallice. On the day of the invasion only 35 of these were ready for sea. Included in that total just nine of them were fitted with snorkel breathing tubes, which allowed the submarine to operate its diesel engines whilst submerged. All of the Atlantic coast submarine bases did, however, have more U-boats on station. There were another 130 large ocean-going types in those ports, but they were not suitable for operations in the shallower waters of the Channel and so were excluded from those allocated to the anti-invasion forces. To the German forces waiting for the blow to fall, there was a mixture of expectations. The static troops lining the coast must have been ambivalent when regarding their fate. If they believed the propaganda, they would destroy their enemy on the seashore. If they were more realistic, they would have known that their cause was hopeless; once the Allied whirlwind had swept over them they would be very lucky to survive. For those men in the Kriegsmarine, they knew that their puny craft would have little effect on the combined Allied navies pitted against them. There was no conceivable way they could stop the tide, their best hope was to attempt the impossible and survive. For those few Luftwaffe pilots who would have to attempt to stem the invasion, they too knew that their efforts would have little effect on the opposition and that they also would be lucky to return to their bases after any sortie.
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GERMAN NAVAL FORCES ORDER OF BATTLE ON D-DAY The total strength of the German Kriegsmarine had diminished considerably by 1944, but it still had some powerful warships that could cause the Allied navies problems if committed against them. These main units were all held well away from the invasion area in northern Europe. They consisted of the two capital ships, Tirpitz and Gneisenau (both seriously damaged); two pocket battleships, Admiral Scheer and Lützow; two heavy cruisers, Prinz Eugen and Admiral Hipper, and four light cruisers, Nürnburg, Leipzig, Köln and Emden. None of these units were actually committed against Operation Neptune. Commander-in-Chief Marinegruppenkommando West, Admiral Theodor Krancke Commander Atlantic Coast, Vizeadmiral Friedrich Rieve Commander Western Sector Atlantic Coast, Konteradmiral Walther Hennecke The strength of German naval forces that were close enough to counter the invasion is shown below, along with their operational bases: Submarines Brest Biscay Ports
20 35
Destroyers Le Havre Biscay Ports
1 5
Torpedo boats Le Havre
4
E-boats From den Helder to Dieppe inclusive Cherbourg and Channel Islands R-boats Heligoland Bight Ports From den Helder to Dieppe inclusive Seine Bay M Class minesweepers Heligoland Bight Ports From den Helder to Dieppe inclusive
30 17
10 55 5
20 20
Le Havre Cherbourg and Channel Islands Channel Islands to Brest Biscay ports Landing Craft – Gun Heligoland Bight Ports From den Helder to Dieppe inclusive Le Havre Seine Bay Cherbourg and Channel Islands
1 3 15 50
4 30 7 8 3
Sperrbrechers (Auxiliary Ships) Heligoland Bight Ports From den Helder to Dieppe inclusive Brest Biscay ports
8 3 8 15
M/S trawlers From den Helder to Dieppe inclusive Le Havre Cherbourg and Channel Islands
30 10 12
Patrol vessels From den Helder to Dieppe inclusive Le Havre Cherbourg and Channel Islands
4 8 20
Harbour defence craft From den Helder to Dieppe inclusive Le Havre Cherbourg and Channel Islands
10 15 45
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OPPOSING PLANS The original plane for Overlord was produced under the leadership of Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick Morgan as head of COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander). He was in post with a planning staff comprising both British and American officers to lead the formulation of a plan for the invasion. It was a post that was nominally head of Operation Overlord until a Supreme Commander was nominated.
ALLIED PLANS Morgan produced an operational plan for the invasion based on the number of troops and craft that would be available at the time of the proposed operation. His task was constrained by the lack of landing craft and other vessels allocated to the operation, and he therefore produced a plan that allowed for just three assault divisions and two airborne brigades to land in
Sunken obsolete transports formed five Gooseberry breakwaters off the landing beaches, two of which were incorporated into the Mulberry harbours. The ships were laid stem to stern and sunk to settle on the seabed with much of their superstructure above sea level to provide an area of ‘quiet’ water in which unloading operations could take place. (NARA/TS Collection)
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Normandy on D-Day. The plan achieved general approval from the Combined British and American Chiefs of Staff in August 1943. However, once Eisenhower and Montgomery were in post as Supreme Commander and Commander 21st Army Group in late 1943, it quickly became clear that Morgan’s proposals lacked sufficient strength to guarantee success. Morgan came in for some criticism for proposing an assault on too narrow a front and without adequate force. Both Eisenhower and Montgomery felt that more divisions were needed both in the assault phase of the invasion and on the airborne landings on the flanks. This was all very well and Morgan would have liked to have produced such a plan, but he was always labouring under the limitations of not having enough landing and support craft available to him. Both field commanders insisted that the plan be enlarged to suit their needs or the operation would most likely be doomed to failure. This of course caused a problem; where were they to come from? The simple answer was to postpone the proposed landings in the south of France, Operation Anvil, which were intended to take place simultaneously with Overlord. This would increase the number of landing craft, but not free up the required numbers of warships. The USA was thus pressured into making up the shortfall in naval vessels and landing craft, or risk having the invasion postponed even further. Eventually the US Navy concurred and agreed to provide the extra resources. With these decisions made, the strength of the assault waves of the invasion could be increased to five divisions and three airborne divisions. Two major decisions had to be made regarding the date and time of the landings. To assist the planners, the yet-unknown actual date of the invasion was given a nominal date that carried the code ‘D-Day’. This was usual practice and there had been many ‘D-Days’ in the war up until then during assault landings in the Mediterranean and elsewhere. Everything could be
A view of the large concrete caissons that made up part of the breakwater for the artificial harbour at Arromanches. (NMRN)
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planned using this imaginary date as being the time when all preparations had to be completed and the operation was ready to go. Delays in agreeing a final composition of the invasion meant that the long-agreed date of 1 May 1944 had to be postponed. The next suitable date would rely on a mixture of the moon and tides. A date between 4 and 7 June was the most likely, but up until the date was set, the day of the assault would still be known as D-Day. Like the nominal date for D-Day, the actual hour when the assault waves would touch down was allocated the code ‘H-Hour’. A timeline for the assault could then be drawn up showing all activities that had to take place in the right sequence. Those events before H-Hour were given a minus time, and those after would be positive. Thus it could, for instance, state that at H-Hour minus 120 minutes Group One tank landing craft with DD tanks should be at their lowering position and that at H-Hour plus 60 minutes the assault landing craft carrying the reserve battalion would touch down. In this way, complex and meticulous timetables could be organized. The next question was when should H-Hour be? The army wanted it to be at high tide so that the assault troops had the minimum of beach to cross before they got to grips with the enemy. The navy wanted the landings to be at low tide so that underwater beach obstacles would be exposed and could be avoided. A compromise was reached: H-Hour would be at the mid point of a rising tide. The troops would then have less open shoreline to cross and naval demolition parties and engineers could begin dealing with most of the underwater obstacles before the incoming tide covered them. H-Hour itself was slightly different for each of the landing beaches because of the state of the tides in the Channel. On the most westerly of the landings, Utah Beach, H-Hour would be 0630hrs, and, on the most easterly of the assaults on Sword Beach, H-Hour would be at 0725hrs. In addition, those troops landing on Juno Beach would have to arrive 20 minutes later than this to allow the incoming tide to give clearance over outlying rocks. The assault was to be made over five landing beaches. Three of these were in the Eastern Task Force zone allocated to the British – Sword, Juno and Gold – and two American in the Western Task Force area – Omaha and Utah. Sword Beach was located in the area between Ouistreham and Langrune, Juno Beach was between Langrune and Ver and Gold Beach between Ver and Port-en-Bessin. The American beach at Omaha stretched from Port-en-Bessin to the river Vire, whilst Utah Beach was between Quenelle and the mouth of the Vire. A division of troops was to land on each of these beaches. Sword Beach would be assaulted by the British 3rd Division; Juno Beach by the Canadian 3rd Division; Gold Beach by the British 50th Division; Omaha Beach by the US 1st Division (supplemented by elements of the 29th Division) and Utah Beach by the US 4th Division. The assault would also be reinforced by the addition of Commando and Ranger battalions for specific individual tasks. The British beaches would have their eastern flank secured by the 6th Airborne Division landing to the east of the river Orne during the hours of darkness before the dawn landings from the sea. To secure the inland routes leading across the flooded area behind Utah Beach, the US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions would undertake a night-time drop to seize strategic points on the Cotentin Peninsula. 30 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
31 Swept channels Coastal channels Destroyer/frigate patrol lines Coastal forces
D1 D2 D3
Milford Haven
0
50 miles
0
50km
Felixstowe Harwich
L2
L2
Swansea Southend Cardiff
London Bristol
L1
Tilbury
Sheerness
C2 The Solent
Southampton J1 G1
Poole
Exeter
E1
Weymouth O1 Portland
Torquay U1 Brixham U1 C1 Plymouth C2 Dartmouth U1 B1
Boulogne
S1 C2
O1 E1
Devonport
er
Area Z
ri ar
b ine
U1
Shipping routes to the invasion beaches
E1
Brighton Newhaven
I. of Wight
C2
Exmouth
Dungeness
Shoreham C1 J1 Portsmouth S2 S1 Selsey E1 E1
m an
Falmouth
rm
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Dieppe S1 S2 J1 G1 O1 U1 L1 L2 B1 B2
Embarkation Ports Sword Group 1, loading ports Newhaven and Shoreham Sword Group 2, loading port Portsmouth Juno Group, loading ports Southampton and Portsmouth Gold group, loading port Southampton Omaha Group, loading ports Weymouth and Portland Utah Group, loading ports Torquay, Brixham, Dartmouth and Plymouth Follow-up Group L, loading port Tilbury Follow-up Group L2, loading port Felixstowe Follow-up Group B1, loading port Plymouth Follow-up Group B2, loading port Falmouth
Alderney Cherbourg Guernsey
Trouville Jersey Bombarding Forces D1 Eastern Task Force bombardment ships, assembly port the Clyde D2 Western Task Force bombardment ships, assembly port Belfast
Caen
Ouistreham N
Mulberry Units
Covering Forces C1 Covering forces destroyers C2 Covering forces, coastal forces
Le Havre Assault area
Blockships D3 Corncob blockships, assembly port Oban
E1 Mulberry units, assembly ports Selsey, Dungeness,
the Thames, Portland, Solent and Spithead
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Dover
Motor torpedo boats and motor gunboats of the Royal Navy preparing to leave Portsmouth harbour to join other light forces in Operation Neptune. (NMRN)
It was the navy’s mission to get these troops on the right beach at the right time and it was no easy task for the planners to work out a complicated timetable to achieve this. Virtually every port and harbour along the southern coast of England helped assemble the invasion armada. Five main areas were chosen for the final embarkation of troops and their support. Force S (Sword Beach) was loaded at Portsmouth, Newhaven and Shoreham; Force J (Juno Beach) was loaded at Southampton and Portsmouth; Force G (Gold Beach) was also loaded at Southampton; Force O (Omaha Beach) was loaded at Weymouth and Portland, and Force U (Utah Beach) was loaded at the small Devon ports of Torquay, Brixham and Dartmouth, and at the major naval base at Plymouth. The follow-up forces that were to land after the assault were assembled further away: Force L was loaded on the eastern side of England at Tilbury and Felixstowe, and Force B used the Cornish ports of Falmouth and Plymouth East. Further American build-up forces were organized in the Bristol Channel ports. Naval forces came from much further afield, including the Scottish ports of the Clyde and Oban and the Northern Irish port of Belfast, as well as the major naval ports of Portsmouth, Plymouth, Dover and Portland. Once all the vessels taking part in the assault had been loaded they were assembled into convoys in sea areas close to their ports. When the final order for the invasion to take place was issued by the Supreme Commander, these assault forces would sail along strictly defined coastal channels to a final assembly point designated ‘Area Z’ to the south-east of the Isle of Wight. From here each force would split off towards its landing beach, preceded by minesweepers and protected by destroyers. The bombarding forces would progress independently. After the craft had landed the assault troops and began reversing off the beaches, they would be met by follow-up waves and reinforcements bearing down on them. Specific lanes had to be allocated and 32 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
HMS Bulolo, the headquarters ship of Commander Force G, Commodore C. DouglasPennant, RN. The ship was fitted out with special communications equipment for the task and had been used in previous amphibious operations in the Mediterranean. (NMRN)
identified and strict lane discipline had to be enforced to prevent massive traffic jams. Prior to the landings enemy gun positions and fortifications would have to be neutralized. The bombers of the RAF and USAAF would be called upon to do their best to wipe them out, but bombing very small targets was always a hit or miss process. The bombers would have to bomb areas rather than individual positions, for locating earth-covered emplacements and thick concrete gun batteries was extremely difficult. Attacks on these targets would be undertaken by naval warships with their big calibre guns and sophisticated range-finding equipment. A force of bombardment ships, comprising battleships, monitors, cruisers and destroyers, was assembled for each task force with orders to reduce the effect of enemy coastal batteries and support the advance inland of the assault troops. One of the greatest problems associated with the selected landing beaches was the absence of any major port. All the planners knew that until a port was captured there could be no guarantee that the build up of troops and equipment over open beaches would keep pace with the numbers required for offensive operations. Delays in capturing a major port would lead to delays in unloading operations in any kind of bad weather. Even if one of the nearby large ports of Cherbourg and Le Havre were captured quickly, they would almost certainly be unusable through demolitions and blockages. It could possibly be months before they could be working at full capacity. The answer to this problem was for the Allies to construct Mulberry artificial harbours, one for each task force. They could then be towed across the Channel and assembled off the beaches. These pre-fabricated harbours had to be capable of being erected within a few days and have sufficient capacity to maintain the build-up of troops and equipment for at least three 33 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
months. It would be a colossal feat of engineering to produce them in time for the invasion, especially considering the already overcrowded nature of Britain’s slipways, harbours, creeks and dockyards. Whilst the Mulberry harbours were being assembled, the landing sites had to be protected from the rough seas to allow supplies and reinforcements to be unloaded over the beaches. Artificial reefs were proposed to provide sheltered waters to guard these operations. These were termed Gooseberries, and consisted of rows of sunken ships arranged stem to stern just off each of the beaches. They were to be positioned to break the force of the sea and give relatively still water in their lee. The blockships that would make up the barrier were obsolete merchant vessels and warships that had come to the end of their service life. Once land operations had got underway it was expected that the invading armies would require a prodigious amount of fuel for their vehicles. Transporting and discharging this volatile cargo would be a hazardous and vital operation, one which if interrupted for any length of time would bring operations to a standstill. So important was this requirement that planners decided that fuel would be pumped over the Channel through ten individual pipelines from the Isle of Wight to the Cotentin Peninsula, safe from the weather and enemy interference. These fuel lines were given the code name PLUTO (Pipe Line Under the Ocean).
GERMAN PLANS In November 1943, Hitler appointed one of his favourite generals, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, as Inspector General of Coast Defences. His orders were to examine existing coastal fortifications and make suitable recommendations to improve them. He soon had troops constructing all manner of defences to prevent the Allies making a landing. In the area between low and high water wooden and metal post attached to mines and booby traps were placed. On the beaches themselves jagged metal obstructions, set to tear the bottom out of landing craft, were positioned. Mines, both buried and floating, were laid in large numbers. Above the shoreline, areas behind the beach were mined, wired and protected against tanks by concrete ‘dragon’s teeth’ and anti-tank ditches. Along the coast, spaced around one mile apart, defended positions were constructed armed with machine gun posts and anti-tank guns. Between these fortified posts, other concrete weapons pits containing machine gun and flamethrowers were sited to sweep the area with fire and shot. Positioned further apart larger artillery bunkers with weapons able to enfilade miles of open beach with high-explosive shells were established. Overlooking all of this, coastal batteries of large-calibre guns housed in concrete bunkers thick enough to withstand heavy bombing enabled defence to be carried into offence by shelling any ships within 10 miles of the shore. Areas likely to become landing places for gliders and airborne troops were obstructed with large wooden poles and tree trunks, or inundated with floodwaters. Rommel had gangs of troops and slave workers trying desperately to finish the fortifications before the expected Allied invasion came. And all this work was not confined to just Normandy, it involved the whole of the French and Belgian coasts, for no one knew where exactly the blow would fall. 34 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Fortifications were the major part of the German anti-invasion plan; they were intended to stop the invasion on the beaches and throw the invaders back into the sea. The invasion armada was also to be attacked whilst at sea from coastal batteries and naval forces. The Kriegsmarine relied on four main deterrents from their meagre resources to harass Allied warships: first, they would lay large numbers of all types of mines along the entire coastline; second, they would step up their U-boat attacks on Atlantic convoys bringing troops and supplies to Britain; third, the Kriegsmarine would commit as many submarines and coastal craft as possible to attack the Allied ships whilst they were in the Channel and, finally, they would use midget submarines and torpedo boats to stalk Allied shipping whilst they were close to shore. When we compare all these measures to those of the Allied nations, they seem woefully inadequate. However, Hitler and his generals did not hold this view. The failed raid on Dieppe in 1942 had shown the Nazis that assault landings could be stopped on the beaches by well-established defences. They then reasoned that a massive counterattack using Panzer forces was likely to end in the complete defeat of the invaders.
A simple but effective German beach obstacle was the mine attached to a wooden post, which became submerged and invisible as the tide came in. They proved to be deadly to any landing craft that struck them. (NARA/TS Collection)
One of the German gun positions of the Longues Battery. Hitler and Rommel both agreed that the best method of stopping an invasion was to defeat it at sea or on the water’s edge, before the invaders could get established. Coastal batteries such as the one at Longues were constructed all along the Channel coast and beyond with the intention of sinking any Allied ships that came into range. The four existing guns at Longues are the only ones left in situ along the D-Day coastline. (TS Collection)
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ASSEMBLING THE INVASION FLEET In accepting the command of Operation Neptune, Admiral Ramsay was taking on the task of assembling the greatest armada the world had ever seen. The number of craft required was truly staggering and when the overall details of the requirements for the operation were settled, many of those craft were just not available, or indeed had even been built. Bringing together the right numbers and types of ships for this task force was almost as complicated as mounting the operation itself.
BUILDING THE SHIPS
American troops are transferred onto assault landing craft from LSI(S) HMS Prince Baudoin. Before the war the Prince Baudoin was a cross-Channel ferry with the Belgian state railways. She was taken over by the Royal Navy after the Germans occupied Belgium and converted into a troop transport. (NARA/TS Collection)
Amphibious warfare has always been a demanding enterprise. Landing troops from the sea against a fortified shore was an undertaking that few commanders were willing to consider. Invasions were most successful when troops were set down away from enemy concentrations and then marched over land to confront their foe in battle. As an island nation it was the British who were most interested in amphibious warfare. They had been evicted from the continent of Europe in June 1940 and had immediately begun investigating how they could return to defeat the Nazi empire. Early attempts by commandos to land from the sea were made from light inshore craft, unsuitable in every way for offensive operations. It soon became clear that Britain could only seriously contemplate crossing over to France in force if they had specialized assault craft from which to make the landings. At that time the USA had not entered the conflict but its great manufacturing capability was at Britain’s disposal, at a price, to build the ships, tanks and aircraft it needed to continue its fight with Germany. Britain therefore commissioned American shipyards to build specialized landing craft. The Americans were also beginning to look into designing their own craft and, when the USA entered the war, both sides began working together on the various types required for amphibious operations. By the time of the Normandy invasion, lessons leaned from earlier landings in North Africa, Sicily, Italy and in the Pacific theatre had given the planners a clear picture of what was required.
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An American tank landing ship o-45oJTOVEHFEBMPOHTJEF one of Mulberry A’s floating pier by a British tugboat. (NARA/TS Collection)
There were four main types of landing ships and craft, all of which eventually spawned a large number of variants. These four types were designed to carry assault troops and equipment onto the beaches, and then keep them supplied and reinforced during subsequent operations. They were, in order of descending size: Landing Ship Infantry (LSI); Landing Ship Tank (LST); Landing Craft Tank (LCT) and Landing Craft Assault (LCA). The Landing Ship Infantry was basically an ocean-going passenger liner with speeds of between 16 and 20 knots, modified to provide accommodation for the transportation of a large number of troops. A number of Landing Craft Assault were slung from davits into which troops could be loaded once the vessel had arrived off the enemy shore. As most LSI started life as commercial vessels, they varied in size. The largest were known as LSI(L), and then came the medium LSI(M) and the smallest LSI(S). The LSI(L) type ranged from 7,300 to 14,000 tons, each carrying between 18 and 24 LCAs and about 1,400 troops. The LSI(M) were former passenger ferries of between 3,500 and 4,000 tons, each with eight LCAs and between 400 and 440 troops. The smaller LCI(S) types were Belgian cross-channel ships of between 3,100 and 3,700 tons, with eight LCAs and carrying 240 troops. The design of the Landing Ship Tank had two main variants at this time in the war. Early LST Mk. Is were converted tankers of about 4,000 tons fitted with bow doors and ramps. These were superseded by the purposely designed LST Mk. IIs, of which over 1,000 were built. These had a displacement of over 3,500 tons when fully loaded and a speed of 10–12 knots. They had a crew of ten officers and around 100 enlisted men. The ships proved to be invaluable during the landings, for their relatively shallow draught – 2.5m loaded and 1m unloaded at the bows – allowed them to be 37 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Tank landing craft were used after the assault to ferry transport and equipment ashore. Here LCT525 is unloading a truck onto a Rhino ferry to cover the last few hundred yards to the beach. (NARA/TS Collection)
beached to unload their cargo and then float off again on the incoming tide. A system of winches and their anchor allowed them to drag themselves afloat if necessary. The ships could carry a mixture of tanks, vehicles, stores and troops up to a limit of around 2,000 tons as required. This enabled for instance 400 troops and 70 vehicles to be carried at one time, or between 30 and 40 tanks depending on size and weight. The Landing Craft Tank was a much smaller vessel, built to carry tanks straight onto the beaches during the assault. They usually displaced 300 tons with a speed of 10 knots and a crew consisting of two officers and ten enlisted men. The British craft were armed with two 2-pdr pom-pom guns and a 40mm Bofors cannon. The American craft were similarly armed. Typically they could carry three to five tanks or nine trucks. They were also used as troop carriers for the follow-up waves of reinforcements. Landing Craft Assault were small assault boats with blunt bows that dropped down once they hit the beach to allow up to 30 fully equipped troops to storm ashore. Petrol engines gave the craft a low speed of just six knots with a relatively short range. Their flat bottoms gave them a shallow draught, but made them uncomfortable during any sea passage and their short range meant that they had to be transported close to the enemy shore on larger ships. They had a crew of four and were armed with one machine gun. The design of these ships and craft was a joint Anglo-American enterprise, with the Americans playing the major part. It had been decided that the USA would take on the bulk of the shipbuilding programme for these amphibious vessels, allowing the hard-pressed British yards to concentrate their limited resources on building warships. 38 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
There were a large number of variants for all of these vessels used in Operation Neptune. Each of them designed for a specific task and each of them with its own abbreviation to describe its function. The Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) was built with a front-loading ramp and shallow draught and was designed to ferry one eight-hundredweight vehicle or 30 men from ship to shore. It was similar to the British-designed LCA. The Landing Craft Tank Rocket – LCT(R) – was an LCT fitted with 5in. rockets designed to bring drenching fire down on an area target during the pre-landing bombardment. The Landing Craft Infantry Small – LCI(S) – was a British wooden personnel-carrying craft with a top speed of 12 knots. Its 104ft length allowed it to carry 96 fully equipped men and 18 bicycles. The troops disembarked down four ramps manhandled over the bows of the craft. The LCI(S) was primarily used to carry British commandos from their embarkation ports right onto the landing beaches as part of the assault waves. The above are just a few of the myriad of types of specialist craft produced for Operation Neptune. Once all these vessels were assembled and allocated to their task forces, there was much training to be done to ensure that the overall plans for the invasion would work. This culminated it two full-scale exercises that took place between 24 April and 8 May. These rehearsals involved loading troops onto transports, sailing them out into the Channel and then simulating assault landings on beaches in southern England. They were to be as close to the real action as possible, with everyone working to timetables and schemes laid out by the planners to test the effectiveness of port authorities, naval movements, communication links and the embarkation and disembarkation of troops.
American reinforcements arriving on the landing beaches aboard LCVP assault craft. These small craft could ferry one eight-hundredweight vehicle or 30 men from transport ships to the shore. In the background a fully loaded Rhino raft ferries a fleet of ambulances to the beaches. (NARA/ TS Collection)
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1
2
CONVOY OF AMERICAN LSTS IS ATTACKED IN THE ENGLISH CHANNEL BY A FLOTILLA OF GERMAN E-BOATS DURING EXERCISE TIGER (PP. 40–41) In the early hours of 28 April 1944, eight tank-landing ships of Convoy T-4 were crossing Lyme Bay off the Devon coast of England heading for Slapton Sands. They were taking part in Exercise Tiger, the final rehearsal before the proposed landings on Utah Beach on D-Day. The line of LSTs ploughed steadily forward through a calm sea at a speed of 6 knots. The ships were carrying part of the follow-up force of engineers and support vehicles and were unaware that the enemy had spotted them. Earlier the previous evening a flotilla of nine German E-boats had left Cherbourg on a routine patrol, seeking to interfere with Allied traffic in the Channel. The E-boats, known to the Germans as S-boats (Schnellboot), were very manoeuvrable craft capable of speeds up to 40 knots. They were armed with two torpedo tubes and three small cannons. These enemy craft had eluded a number of British patrols and the one RN corvette guarding the convoy, HMS Azalea, to approach the American ships undetected. At first the leader of the E-boats thought he had come across a line of destroyers, so he decided to launch a ‘hit and run’ attack which would allow his craft to veer away after
they had launched their torpedoes and withdraw at speed to evade the devastating fire that would be sure to follow from the warships. The E-boats (1) closed on the painfully slow LSTs (2) at speeds of over 35 knots. At 0204hrs they struck, coming out of the darkness at full speed to achieve complete surprise. One by one they loosed off their torpedoes into the line of perfect targets. LST 507 was hit immediately, burst into flames and then gradually sank. Then LST 531 was rocked by a giant explosion, causing it to capsize and sink in just six minutes. LST 289 was the next to be hit, but swift damage control enabled the ship to stay afloat and make it to shore. These explosions alerted the crews on other ships to the danger amongst them and the air was soon crisscrossed with fire from their guns. In the ensuing chaos LST 511 was damaged by friendly fire. As soon as the E-boats had made their attack, they turned for home and slipped away into the night unscathed, each generating smoke to cover its escape. Behind them, they left two LSTs sunk, two badly damaged and 198 American naval servicemen and 441 troops dead.
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The first exercise, code named Tiger, was carried out by Force U, the American group intending to land on Utah Beach on D-Day. On 27/28 April the force set out from ports in Devon to simulate the voyage along swept channels for Normandy. It spent the night at sea and then swept into the beach on Slapton Sands to carry out a practice assault. This was completely successful and much was learned from this phase of the exercise. The next night another convoy set sail to simulate the follow-up phase of the landings. Unfortunately, the Germans had spotted this activity in the Channel and launched an attack on the American ships with fast E-Boats. The small craft got amongst the US landing ships and managed to sink two and damage two more with the loss of over 600 men. Force U suffered more men killed in this rehearsal than they were destined to lose on Utah Beach on D-Day itself. The British and Canadian forces taking part in their own exercise (Fabius) days later did so without any major incidents, as did the American Force O when they began their simulated landings on Slapton Sands on 4 May.
THE BOMBARDMENT FORCE Both the Eastern and Western Task Forces had the support of naval bombardment forces to help destroy German fortifications. The plan was to neutralize all enemy gun batteries that could interfere with the landings, after which the bombardment ships would support the infantry as required. In the words of Admiral Ramsay the bombardment forces were to ‘assist in ensuring the safe and timely arrival of our forces by the engagement of hostile coastal defences and to support the assault and subsequent operations ashore’. The bombardment plan also depended on the help of the RAF and the USAAF to attack enemy positions prior to the landings. Well in advance of D-Day, all large German coastal gun sites were to be bombed by heavy and medium bombers. To help divert the enemy from thinking that Normandy was the target for the invasion, similar gun batteries all along the French, Belgian and Dutch coasts were also bombed.
The monitor HMS Roberts took part in Operation Neptune as part of Bombardment Force D. She was one of two ships of this type used in the invasion, the other being the World War I veteran HMS Erebus (Bombardment Force A). HMS Roberts was designed and built with a shallow draught in 1941 specifically for the task of inshore bombardment of enemy land positions. Its two 15in. guns were housed in a single turret mounted on a high barbette to increase their range. (NMRN)
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The heavy cruiser USS Augusta, flagship of the Commander Western Task Force, RearAdmiral Kirk, USN. The Augusta was commissioned between the wars in 1931. She later became prominent as a presidential flagship, carrying both President Roosevelt and President Truman on overseas visits during the war. (NARA/TS Collection)
It was intended that on D-Day −1, the ten heavy German batteries covering the landing beaches were to be raided by heavy bombers, each destined to receive over 100 tons of bombs. Two hours prior to the assault, these batteries were to be attacked again by medium bombers. Then, 30 minutes before H-Hour, the naval bombardment would open. Heavy warships would concentrate on the gun batteries whilst the cruisers and destroyers would use their smaller guns against individual enemy defence positions. Just before the assault waves went in, further saturation bombing was to be made against the immediate areas of the landings, together with drenching fire from rocket-firing landing craft. After the assault, once all the batteries and strong positions had been eliminated or captured, the warships were to support the infantry by engaging individual targets identified by ground troops. A total of 138 warships would be involved in the bombardment programme, including the heaviest ships available to both navies. There were five forces allocated to the programme: Bombardment Force A would support Force U; Bombardment Force C would support Force O; Bombardment Force D would support Force S; Bombardment Force E would support Force J; and Bombardment Force K would support Force G. The inclusion of seven battleships and two monitors as bombardment ships allowed naval guns of the largest calibre to engage the concrete defences of the biggest German coastal batteries. Allocated to the task were some of the most famous ships of the Royal and US Navies. The two sister ships HMS Nelson and Rodney together brought 18 16in. guns to the battle. These two ungainly looking battleships – with their triple turrets forward and superstructure aft, they were often referred to as looking like oil tankers with guns – had already seen a good deal of action. HMS Rodney took part in the sinking of the battleship Bismarck, during which she fired 340 of her 16in. shells at the stricken German warship. The American battleship USS Nevada (ten 14in. guns) was a veteran of World War I. She was at anchor in Battleship Row at Pearl Harbor when attacked by the Japanese in December 1941. She even managed to get underway in an attempt to make an escape, but was struck by torpedoes and beached. She was then salvaged and modernized, later taking part in many trans-Atlantic convoys. HMS Warspite (eight 15in. guns) was present at the battle of Jutland in 1916, where she sustained 15 hits and was put out of action. The USS Texas (ten 14in. guns) and the USS Arkansas (12 12in. guns) were also battleships dating from World War I, as was the British battleship HMS Ramillies (eight 15in. guns). All of these old battleships were gradually becoming obsolete and by that time in the war were most useful in the role of shore bombardment.
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45 Naval Commander Western Task Force Naval Commander Eastern Task Force Naval Commander Bombardment Force A Naval Commander Bombardment Force C Naval Commander Bombardment Force D Naval Commander Bombardment Forces E and K Naval Commander Force Gold Naval Commander Force Juno Naval Commander Force Omaha Naval Commander Force Sword Naval Commander Force U
German fortified zones and coastal guns Flagship
0
Bombardment Force A
Arkansas FOX
Port-enBessin
JIG
HOW
LOVE
Vaux-sur-Aure Bayeux
on
PETER
Benerville
QUEEN
Lanyrune Breny-sur-Mer
N
Villerville
SWORD
NAN
MIKE
OBOE
Longues
Islgny Carentan
KING
ITEM
Frobisher Arethusa
GOLD
EASY GEORGE
Danae
JUNO
HMS Mauritius (NCBFD)
ROGER
Houlgate
Colleville
Ouistreham er Riv rne O
Cabourg
RED
DOG
River Seine
GREEN
Maisy
CHARLIE
N
WILLIAM
Pointe du Hoe Grandcamp
RED
VICTOR
Roberts
EE
ABLE
HMS Hilary (NCFJ) HMS Scylla (NCETF)
ITE
BAKER
St Martinde-Varreville
Le Havre
Dra g
Montcalm
UNCLE
Ramillies
HMS Largs (NCFS)
GR
D
RE
Flores
HMS Belfast (NCBFE and K)
GREEN
G
George Leygues
Glasgow
OMAHA
TARE EN RE
Bombardment Force E
HMS Bulolo (NCFG)
WH
Soemba
SUGAR
Émondeville
USS Texas (NCBFC)
Le Havre Grand Clos
Warspite
Diadem
ROGER
USS Ancon (NCFO)
WHITE RED
Enterprise
UTAH
Bombardment Force K
RED
QUEEN
GREEN
Quinéville
Bombardment Force C
Nevada
10km
Bombardment Force D
GREEN
Quincy
Iles St Marcouf
RETER
USS Augusta (NCWTF)
USS Bayfield (NCFU)
GREEN RED
USS Tuscaloosa (NCBFA)
GREEN
Morsalines
Aja x Arg on Em aut era l Orio d n
Erebus
0
Western Task Force Area Eastern Task Force Area
Black Prince
St Vaastla-Hougue
10 miles
Sallennelles
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English Channel
GR WHITEEN RE E GRE D EN RED
Naval bombardment targets just prior to H-Hour, D-Day
NCWTF NCETF NCBFA NCBFC NCBFD NCBFE and K NCFG NCFJ NCFO NCFS NCFU
The F-class destroyer HMS Fury, which was commissioned in 1935. She took part in Operation Neptune as part of 'PSDF+ CPNCBSEJOHFOFNZ strongpoints along the coast near Courseulles. During the HBMFPG+VOFTIFTUSVDLB mine and was driven ashore. Her damage was severe enough for her to be considered a total loss and she was scrapped. (NMRN)
Built specifically for shore bombardment were the two monitors HMS Erebus and HMS Roberts. These heavy ships were never intended for naval actions, but were designed solely for supporting land operations. They were included in the bombardment force to engage coastal gun batteries and fortifications, with the Erebus stationed off Utah Beach and the Roberts on the extreme eastern flank of the landings concentrating on the gun battery at Houlgate 10 miles east of Ouistreham. The ships had shallow draughts, which enabled them to come closer into shore than the battleships. Both monitors were armed with two 15in. guns mounted in turrets on high barbettes, which gave them an increased range (up to 40,000yds). Both had previously supported the Allied landings in the Mediterranean. Supporting the big guns were the slightly smaller armament of the cruisers. Shells from their 6 and 8in. guns could also do great damage to German positions. Closer inshore were the destroyers who were primed to engage defences and positions along the shore, close to where the assault forces would touch down.
THE MULBERRY HARBOURS The planners of Operation Overlord knew that it was imperative to capture a sizeable port as soon as possible. If new formations and supplies were not brought ashore quicker than the Germans could move theirs, then the whole lodgement would be in jeopardy. Rather than plan for the quick capture of Le Havre or Cherbourg, both of which would be difficult undertakings, the Allies decided to build two prefabricated ports of their own just as soon as the landings had been achieved. 46 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Each of the proposed harbours would be roughly the same size as Dover harbour in England. It was intended that by D +4 a sheltered area of water would be established and by D +14 the new ports would be capable of receiving ships. They were never intended to be permanent constructions and had a proposed life of just 90 days. The ports were planned to be capable of eventually handling 12,000 tons of stores and 2,500 un-waterproofed vehicles per day when working at full capacity. All of the component parts of the Mulberry harbours were built in England and designed to be towed across the Channel and erected in winds of up to Force 4. There were three main parts to the Mulberry: concrete caissons known as ‘Phoenix’, structures in the shape of steel cruciforms known as ‘Bombardons’ and floating piers and pier heads known as ‘Whale’. Phoenix caissons were huge, varying in size from 2,000 to 6,000 tons, many of which had anti-aircraft guns mounted on the top of them. These caissons formed part of the outer breakwater protecting the inner harbour. They were sunk on the 5½ fathom line alongside sunken blockships helping to form part of the barrier. To seaward of them, Bombardons up to 200ft long were moored to provide shelter for a deep water anchorage. The Whale parts of the harbour were built of steel and concrete and provided quaysides for unloading and floating roadways linking back to the shore. Four of these floating piers ran out from the beaches to ‘Spud’ pierheads able to rise and fall with the tides. Here coasters and landing ships would unload their cargoes directly onto trucks. Larger ships anchored within the harbour would unload onto barges and ferries (landing craft, DUKWs, landing barges and Rhino ferries), which would then run their cargoes onto smaller piers and jetties or directly onto beaches. Rhino ferries were simple flat-bottomed barges measuring around 42 by 176ft,
This view of large caissons, which made up part of the breakwater on the outside of Mulberry B, gives a good indication of the method of construction of these prefabricated concrete structures. (NMRN)
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The ‘Whale’ roadway linking the pier heads of the American Mulberry A harbour to shore. Soon after this picture was taken much of the installation was destroyed by the great HBMFPGo+VOF (NARA/TS Collection)
constructed out of navy pontoons. They proved very effective in carrying stores and vehicles from larger ships to the shore, provided they were operated in calm inshore waters. Building and assembling the Mulberries consumed a great deal of manpower. It was estimated that over 50,000 men were involved in the project. Docks, shipyards, drydocks and hards all around the southern coastline of England, mainly in the Thames and Southampton areas, were commandeered for the work. All of this material was built and stored ready to be towed across the Channel as soon as the landings were established. The completed large Phoenix caissons were sunk in shallow water and then re-floated just prior to D-Day. The naval component of the Mulberries was also quite impressive. The convoys included nine HQ and control ships, eight LCVPs, two motor fishing vessels, 35 heavy tow tugs and 31 mooring vessels. Also allocated were 62 smoke-making trawlers. These were provided with ‘Esso’ smoke generators to be used to screen the assembly of the artificial harbour. They were organized into groups of 15, with one group always being available to each Mulberry.
THE GOOSEBERRY BREAKWATERS As part of the Mulberry harbours, individual ships, given the overall code name Corncob, were selected to be sunk as blockships to form part of new breakwaters off the Normandy coast. The ships had all come to the end of their working lives and were therefore dispensable. These quickly erected breakwaters were called Gooseberries. Once the landings had been made the first of these block ships were to arrive in the areas where the Mulberries were to be built. The ships were to be manoeuvred into place and quickly scuttled, allowing them to rest end to end on the seabed. The two Gooseberries off Arromanches in Juno sector and St Laurent in Omaha sector were to be included in the outer limits of the artificial harbours. Five Gooseberries were planned in total, two to be included in the Mulberry harbours, the other three to form simple breakwaters off the landing beaches Utah, Gold and Sword. A total of 59 blockships were used 48 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
in the programme, all merchant ships except for four ex-naval vessels. Most of the ships were between 4,000 and 6,000 tons, the largest was the American 7,177-ton merchantman James Iredell, and the smallest the 3,169-ton Swedish cargo ship Ingman. Of the four naval vessels used, the largest was the British 25,500-ton battleship HMS Centurion, a veteran of the battle of Jutland in World War I. Another battleship, the French 22,189-ton FFS Courbet, was sunk in the Gooseberry off Sword Beach. The other two naval ships used were the light cruiser HMS Durban and ex-Dutch light cruiser HMS Sumatra.
PIPE LINE UNDER THE OCEAN (PLUTO) The need for a continuous uninterrupted fuel supply was vital for the postinvasion land battle. This prompted planners to consider laying underwater fuel pipelines from England and France. PLUTO was the outcome of many years research in England and experimental work on the project begun as far back as 1942, well before the invasion date was set. Two types of underwater pipeline were designed. The first, the Hais type, was a flexible pipe with a 3in. core surrounded by layers of steel wire reinforcement. The lining of the pipe was made of lead, which made it very heavy and expensive to produce. The second type, the Hamel, also with a 3in. core, was of steel construction, which made it more rigid. At first it was thought that this pipe would be difficult to coil, but experimentation showed that it could be wound on large diameter drums called conundrums. As these conundrums were towed across the Channel, the pipeline was allowed to unwind and sank to the seabed. The Hais type, which was much more flexible, could be coiled and transported in the holds of cable ships and paid out like any other underwater cable. It was planned to run the initial underwater pipelines from a pumping station at Shanklin on the Isle of Wight over to Cherbourg on the Cotentin Peninsula. Feeding into the station at Shanklin was a network of pipelines that stretched back to refineries at Liverpool and Bristol. These national lines had been installed over the previous years as a means of distributing petrol around the UK safe from enemy attack. After the invasion, as the land war progressed and moved eastwards towards Germany, it was intended to lay many further PLUTO lines from Dungeness in Kent across to the Pas de Calais region closer to the front line. The shipping requirements of PLUTO, just one small part of the Neptune armada, shows how even this army project consumed
The obsolete 6,670-ton Dutch light cruiser HMNS Sumatra was sunk as part of the Gooseberry breakwater off Sword Beach, alongside the French battleship FFS Courbet. (TS Collection)
A cross section of the Hais type of pipeline that was used in PLUTO. The lead sheathing proved to be prohibitively expensive to produce and the Hamel type of pipe with its steel construction eventually superseded it. (NMRN)
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large numbers of ships and naval personnel. A total of 44 vessels were involved, including five cable ships, three tugs, five cable barges, four accommodation barges, three trawlers, one yacht (as a dispatch vessel) and 12 miscellaneous launches.
PROTECTING THE NEPTUNE ARMADA
The ‘grand old lady’ of the Royal Navy, the Queen Elizabeth-class battleship HMS Warspite. She was the Royal Navy’s most famous ship with the most battle honours awarded to any British warship in World War II: Atlantic, 1939; Narvik, 1940; Norway, 1940; Calabria, 1940, Mediterranean, 1940, 1941 and 1943; Malta Convoys, 1941; Matapan, 1941; Crete, 1941; Sicily, 1943; Salerno, 1943; English Channel, 1944; Normandy, 1944; Walcheren, 1944; and Biscay, 1944. By the time of the invasion she was an old ship, having been commissioned in 1915. The Warspite was even present at the last great fleet engagement BUUIFCBUUMFPG+VUMBOEJOUIF Great War. She was scrapped, to much public dismay, in 1950. (NMRN)
Passage across the Channel for all assault forces was along strictly confined shipping channels. The various convoys would use the appropriate coastal channels, which followed the English shoreline from their assembly points around the Isle of Wight to a point designated Area Z, located 15 miles south of the Nab Tower light. From here ten channels would swept through the known German minefield that crossed the route of the invasion. Two channels were allocated to each assault force, one to fast convoys, the other for slow convoys. Each assault force was to be accompanied by fleet minesweepers and a close escort of destroyers, but the main defence of the convoys rested on the steps taken to deny the enemy access to the convoy routes. Protection for the armada on passage consisted of numerous initiatives. To the east and the west of the route of the swept channels was a seven-milewide gun zone. Any ship entering this zone during darkness was presumed to be hostile and would be engaged by patrol vessels. Destroyers would patrol the outer sides of this gun zone and frigates would extend a radar screen even further out to identify intruders. Motor torpedo boats would patrol off the enemy coast and to keep watch and to screen off those ports used by enemy ships. Further afield in the western part of the Channel north of St Malo, a division of destroyers would keep a standing patrol, with a further division of destroyers patrolling off Ushant. To counter the threat from German submarines based in the Biscay ports, a three-pronged approach was used: mines would be laid near these ports; the area would be covered by air patrols; and anti-submarine groups would continually sweep for enemy U-boats. Minelaying forces would also act to protect Allied forces in the Channel. A programme was produced that would continue up to D −45 for offensive minelaying by aircraft and coastal forces using standard mines. From D −45, special types of mines new to the enemy, who would therefore not be able to produce sweeping techniques to counter them, were laid by surface minelayers. These mines were planted all along the Channel coast and in areas off the enemy’s North Sea ports. From D −3 to D −1 these mines were increasingly laid outside specific Channel ports all the way round into the Bay of Biscay off Brest. From D −1 to D-Day itself, these special mines were concentrated around Normandy off Le Havre, Cherbourg, Entretat and the Brittany coast.
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OPERATION NEPTUNE On 26 April, Admiral Ramsay and his headquarters staff moved to their Battle Headquarters at Southwick House in Hampshire. Operation Neptune was to be launched and controlled from this Victorian mansion located in secluded grounds behind Portsdown Hill. The communications centre for the operation was deep inside Fort Southwick, a Victorian fort on the top of Portsdown Hill overlooking the great naval base of Portsmouth. Both the Supreme Commander, Gen. Eisenhower, and the Commander 21st Army Group, Gen. Montgomery, would also have their final headquarters located close by: Eisenhower in a trailer camp in the grounds of Southwick House and Montgomery in Broomfield House, a modest Georgian building some 2 miles away. Towards the middle of May two important decisions were made. The preliminary date for the launching of Operation Overlord had always been 31 May, but by early April delays on many of the most important issues, such as the arrival of landing craft and the production of Mulberry components, had made this date unlikely to be achieved. When it was finally abandoned, Admiral Ramsay indicated to the Supreme Commander that 5, 6 and 7 June were the only other dates possible, for it would be another month before the moon and tides would be favourable. Eisenhower delayed making a decision on the date for D-Day until everything seemed likely to be in place. By 23 May a final judgment
Admiral Ramsay’s headquarters was located in Southwick House. Operation Neptune was launched and controlled from this Victorian mansion located in secluded grounds behind Portsdown Hill in Hampshire. (TS Collection)
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The light cruiser HMS Ajax, part of Bombardment Force K. She was credited with silencing the German gun battery at Longues between Gold and Omaha beaches with direct hits on two of the battery casemates. (NMRN)
had to be made, for the Corncob blockships, destined to make up the Gooseberry breakwaters, needed six clear days to make their passage from Scotland to their appointed locations off the Normandy Coast. The Supreme Commander decided it was time to name the day: D-Day was to be 5 June. At 2330hrs on 25 May this news was signalled to all senior commanders holding Operation Neptune instructions. Three days later, at 1800hrs on 28 May, Ramsay signalled ‘execute Operation NEPTUNE’. The whole of the invasion fleet and all the formations involved in the invasion now went into ‘lock down’. No individual was permitted to leave any ship or any transit camp until the invasion was launched. At Oban in Scotland, at 0700hrs on 31 May, the first of the 54 obsolete Corncob blockships began slipping away from their anchorages and heading south. Their commanders sailed with sealed orders and believed they were only moving to their ‘southern anchorages’, but they were in fact the first units of the invasion to set sail. Elsewhere the intricate manoeuvres required to load and assemble the assault forces proceeded according to plan, an exercise that had been practiced time and time again. In the event all went well without any major hitches. Everything moved smoothly eased by the knowledge that the invasion was at last at hand. With the wheels of Operation Overlord grinding inexorably forward and with reports coming into Battle Headquarters that everything was proceeding according to plan, the eyes of all senior commanders looked skywards. They were now virtually impotent to affect the outcome of the battle; it was the weather that was now the most important issue facing them. As May gave way to June, it looked increasingly clear that the fine spell of settled weather looked as though it was coming to an end. Eisenhower gave orders
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US troops waiting patiently to be loaded into LCVPs to be carried ashore to the landing beaches. (NARA/TS Collection)
that from D −3 (2 June) a detailed examination of weather forecasts by all force commanders would be held twice daily at Southwick House. At the first of these weather meetings on 2 June, the outlook did not appear promising. Less favourable conditions were predicted for 5 June. Northern Europe would be covered with low cloud base and rainfall. This was not good news for the C-in-C Allied Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Trafford Leigh Mallory, for his air forces required clear skies for the bombing and airborne transportation plans. However, it was too early to make any decision to change the plan because of the weather, so Operation Neptune continued as intended. On the evening of 2 June, the first warships to leave for the assault area set sail from the river Clyde in Scotland when Bombardment Force D weighed anchor. At Portsmouth the midget submarines X20 and X23, destined to be used as navigation aids to mark the channels into Sword and Juno beaches, also left port to be towed to their waiting stations just off the Normandy coast. By daylight on 3 June the weather had changed dramatically. During the night the wind had increased and the sky was low and grey. Rain started to 53 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
5IJTUBOLMBOEJOHDSBGUo-$5 3 oIBTCFFODPOWFSUFEJOUPB stable platform from which to launch salvoes of rocketpropelled bombs. It was fitted with 1,066 5in. rocket projectors designed to saturate the beaches before troops landed. Each rocket was packed with 60 pounds of high explosive. (NARA/TS Collection)
fall and the sea began to swell. The morning weather meeting at Southwick House depressed all who heard it. Force 5 winds and moderate seas were predicted for 5 June. Admiral Ramsay said that the armada could cope with the conditions, provided they had cover from the air. Leigh Mallory felt that he could not give this assurance. Eisenhower decided to wait for the next weather forecast that evening to see if conditions would improve. In the meantime, more and more units continued to set sail according to their schedules. More bombardment vessels left from the northern ports of Belfast and the Clyde. Further south, the smaller craft of Force U left the Devon ports of Dartmouth, Salcombe and Brixham, carrying the first of the assault troops towards France. More and more ships were leaving their berths and moving towards their assembly areas off shore. That evening, weather conditions had still not improved enough to satisfy Eisenhower and he decided that the commanders would meet once again early the next morning. When the commanders at Battle HQ met at 0415hrs on 4 June to hear Group Captain Stagg’s latest weather forecast, even the most optimistic of them knew that prospects for the invasion were poor. Outside the library where they gathered, the wind, now blowing at Force 6, was rattling the windows and the rain beating against the glass. Stagg gave a very pessimistic prediction of the likely state of the weather the next day; it would be totally unsuitable for both the naval and airborne operations. Eisenhower could do little but postpone the landings for 24 hours. At 0515hrs, the news was radioed to all the ships already at sea and those waiting at anchor in their assembly areas. Those convoys already on passage were ordered to come about and reverse their courses back towards land. During the afternoon of 4 June the weather forecast predicted that the unsettled weather would last until at least the 7 June. At the evening meeting at 2115hrs, events looked a little more promising. Group Captain Stagg reported that there was a good chance of suitable conditions existing for a short period on the morning of 6 June. The weather would abate only to return to high winds and low cloud on 7 June. The Supreme Commander was then faced with the dilemma of either trying to make his landings during this short respite or postponing them for several more weeks with the great risk of harming the morale of the troops and compromising security. He decided to proceed with the operation, but to make a final confirmation early the next morning. At 0400hrs on 5 June Stagg again considered the slight improvement predicted for the next morning was still a good possibility. Eisenhower then asked each of his commanders what they thought. Consensus was that they should launch the operation. ‘OK, let’s go,’ confirmed the Supreme Commander.
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THE SEA PASSAGE The order to launch Operation Overlord was met by those already at sea with some relief. Many ships had been riding out the rough weather for some time and the troops on board were tormented as a result. Force U suffered more than most, for it was not sailing together from one large port, but using nine individual loading ports from which to launch the operation. A British official history of the enterprise later explained the difficulties: ‘The twelve convoys in which 865 ships were organised contained three or four sections which sailed from different ports and had to rendezvous at sea. The escorts, too, in most cases were obliged to sail from different ports to their convoys. In addition, Force U’s embarkation ports were considerably further from the assault area than those of the other assault forces, which entailed greater fatigue and discomfort for the troops embarked and longer exposure to the hazards of passage.’ The report also highlighted the difficulties experienced by the group from having been the last to be formed. Many of the craft assigned to it were the last to arrive in England and in some cases their crews had had practically no training. 5 June saw all the forces at sea. The assault convoys of Force O sailed from Portland and Poole with their commander, Rear-Admiral Hall, raising his flag in the headquarters and command communications ship
The cruiser HMS Belfast was part of Bombardment Force E. The cruiser is now the last surviving World War II big gun warship in Europe. The Belfast is tied up on the river Thames opposite the Tower of London, a popular visitor attraction now under the administration of Imperial War Museums. (TS Collection)
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Two LSTs heading for the landing beaches as part of the build-up forces. (NARA/TS Collection)
USS Ancon. He left at 1600hrs to rendezvous with his bombardment ships south of St Albans Head. The British Force G, the right-hand force of the British beaches, left the Solent through the Needles passage after loading at Southampton. The Canadian contingent of the assault, Force J, also loaded in part at Southampton as well as at Portsmouth and left the Solent by the eastern exit via Spithead. Force S gained its load in three ports: Portsmouth, Newhaven and Shoreham, and assembled to the east of Spithead. Watching their departure from his headquarters ship HMS Largs was the commander of Force S, Rear-Admiral Talbot. As the convoys passed by he hoisted the signal ‘Good Luck: Drive On’ in tribute. At 2145hrs, Rear-Admiral Talbot raised anchor and followed the Allied fleet towards the invasion beaches. Far ahead of the assault forces the minesweepers set about their work. Leading the entire Neptune armada were the Harbour Defence Motor Launches (HDMLs). These small craft were using their minesweeping gear to protect the leading ships of the ten minesweeping flotillas that followed behind. As the minesweepers cleared each of the ten swept channels, some of the 54 dan-laying trawlers followed behind marking the passages with radar-reflecting dan buoys. At 1940hrs, the first of the leading minelayers sighted the French coast and, even though there were still many hours of daylight left, there was no German reaction to their arrival. By late afternoon, the leading groups of forces O, G, J and S had reached Area Z, where they all turned to the south to enter their marked and swept channels through the German mine barrier. Over to the west, Force U joined marked channels 1 and 2 to the south of Area Z in order to bring it onto its beaches on the eastern side of the Cotentin Peninsula. Rear-Admiral Moon had left Portland in USS Bayfield at 0930hrs and joined Force U at the same time as the ships of the Western Bombardment Force from Belfast. Everything was coming together nicely.
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Not long after darkness had fallen, the continuous drone of aircraft passing low overhead greeted all the ships in the Channel. Great waves of aerial transport could be heard, and occasionally seen, as they carried the airborne troops into Normandy on the first stage of Operation Overlord. Soon, well before dawn, the French coast appeared to the leading ships of the assault force as a dark blemish on the horizon, occasionally lit by bursts of anti-aircraft fire and exploding bombs from aircraft attacking the coastal batteries. The airborne landings created confusion amongst the enemy in the headquarters of both German Heeresgruppe B and Marinegruppenkommando West. Something was afoot, but reports were so scattered that it was difficult to understand what was actually happening. This confusion was increased by news that there was Allied naval activity in the bay of the Seine. At 0310hrs, Marinegruppenkommando West ordered E-boats to patrol the area to determine what was going on. Was this the start of the invasion, or just diversionary tactics to screen events elsewhere?
ASSAULT LANDINGS – FORCE U Bombardment Force A was scheduled to open fire on its pre-arranged targets at 0550hrs, just before dawn. At 0505hrs they were pre-empted in this matter by the enemy opening fire first. German coast defence observation had spotted two American destroyers, the USS Fitch and the USS Corry, some 3 miles off the coast moving into their bombardment positions. Then other guns along the Cotentin Peninsula joined in as they found other targets at sea when minesweepers were spotted offshore. The British cruiser HMS Black Prince returned this fire and drew enemy fire onto herself from the heavy battery at St Vaast-la-Hogue. With the firefight now under way, Commander Bombardment Force A, Rear-Admiral Deyo, gave the general order to open fire at 0536hrs. Just before this, at 0520hrs, Allied bombers swept over to begin their pre-assault bombing of the beaches and surrounding defences. The smoke and dust thrown up by the bombing raid made observation difficult for the gunners at sea. Spotter planes from the RAF and Fleet Air Arm that had flown across from airfields in England helped, but for a while pinpoint accurate fire was sporadic. Nonetheless, the number of shells that crashed down on enemy positions from the combined guns of the battleships, cruisers, monitors and destroyers forced the defenders in enemy batteries and field defences to take cover. To this background of noise, fire and smoke, landing ships anchored well offshore were disembarking troops into their assault craft. As each small LCA was loaded it left its mother ship to circle around until all the other boats were ready. Then, in one great wave, they headed for shore. Ahead of them the coastline began to disappear behind a smoke screen being laid by aircraft. When the craft were just half a mile from the beach, close-fire bombardment of the landing sites began. Accurate fire was put down by 4.7in. guns aboard the inshore Landing Craft Guns (LCGs) and a devastating barrage of fire was plastered across the landing sites by Landing Craft Tank Rockets, LCT(R)s, each unleashing over 1,000 5in. rocket-propelled bombs. 57 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
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1
DAWN, 6 JUNE, THE AMERICAN BATTLESHIP USS NEVADA OPENS FIRE WITH ITS MAIN ARMAMENT AGAINST THE GERMAN DEFENCES ON UTAH BEACH (PP. 58–59) The USS Nevada (1) was part of Rear-Admiral Deyo’s Bombardment Force A, located on the extreme right flank of the invasion. Its task was to engage German coastal batteries just after dawn and then to support the landings with aimed fire against beach defences. The bombardment force consisted of this one battleship, six cruisers, one monitor and eight US destroyers. Rear-Admiral Deyo flew his flag in the American Cruiser USS Tuscaloosa. The USS Nevada was, by the time of the invasion, an old ship, CVUBUIFSMBVODIJOHJO+VMZTIFXBTBWFSZTQFDJBMNPEFSO ship, for she introduced many new and revolutionary ideas into American battleship design. She was the first of the ‘super dreadnoughts’. The USS Nevada was the first US battleship to be powered by oil instead of coal, the first to have a single funnel and the first to mount triple-gun main turrets. She also concentrated her main armour around vital areas of the ship such as the magazines, turrets and engine rooms, rather than spreading it over the whole of the ship. Armed with ten 14in. guns mounted in two triple-gun turrets and two double-gun turrets, she was the most powerful warship in the US fleet. The Nevada had a very chequered history during her service life. In 1918 she was sent across the Atlantic to help with convoy protection, but never saw any action during the Great War. In the
interwar years she served with both the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets. On 7 December 1941 the USS Nevada was at anchor off Ford Island in Pearl Harbour when the Pacific Fleet was suddenly BUUBDLFE CZ +BQBOFTF XBSQMBOFT 6OMJLF UIF CBUUMFTIJQT UIBU were moored alongside of each other, the Nevada was able to get underway and try to make for the sea, but not before a torpedo had struck her. As she manoeuvred in the harbour she was struck by five bombs and was forced to beach herself to avoid sinking. The USS Nevada was later salvaged and repaired and a year later joined the Royal Navy in protecting convoys across the Atlantic Ocean. She was then selected as a bombardment ship for the invasion of France. After D-Day she remained off Normandy in a support role using her heavy guns to assist ground troops during their advance inland. In August 1944 she moved to the Mediterranean and carried out a similar role during Operation Dragoon, the invasion of southern France. This was followed by GVSUIFS TVQQPSU UP UIF MBOEJOHT JO UIF 1BDJGJD BU *XP +JNB BOE Okinawa. At Okinawa she was hit by a kamikaze aircraft that put the two main guns of No. 3 turret out of action. After the war the USS Nevada ended her days as a target ship during the testing of atomic weapons.
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Amidst all this fire there were casualties. The assault boats and the LCTs carrying Duplex Drive (DD) ‘swimming tanks’ were to be guided onto their beaches by control craft. When 7,000yds out, PC 1261, the primary control craft, hit a mine and sank. The secondary control craft had already been left behind after its screw was fouled on leaving the flotilla. Then an LCT hit a mine and sank, causing confusion in the mass of craft heading for shore. Without the control craft leading them in, and with the way ahead masked by smoke and haze, the vessels heading for the main landing beaches began to drift to the south-east. They hit the shore some 1,500yds from their aiming point. Amidst this disorder a decision was made to release the DD tanks closer to shore and they finally slipped out of their LCTs 2,000yds nearer the beach than planned. The error in selecting the wrong landing beach for the main assault proved to be fortunate. Both the sea obstacles and enemy defences along this stretch of the coast were less formidable and were actually easier to deal with. The support of the DD tanks at just the right moment also enabled the beachhead to quickly establish itself. The leading waves of troops landed virtually unopposed, which encouraged the naval beach masters to direct all further incoming waves onto the same landing site. Demolition engineers arriving on the second wave were easily able to remove the underwater obstacles in the 3 hours remaining until high tide, rendering the area clear for the follow-up waves. Enemy artillery fire falling onto the landings was immediately engaged by the bombardment force at sea, helping to ensure that the fire was sporadic and mainly ineffectual. By 0745hrs the lead troops – 4th Division’s 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 8th Infantry Regiment – had advanced inland to capture the village of St Martin-de-Varrreville and link up with the first of the airborne troops guarding the causeways that crossed the saturated ground behind the beach. The landings on Utah Beach progressed almost exactly as planned. There were, of course, casualties, but nothing like the numbers that were expected. Throughout the day the build-up continued and the beachhead expanded. By 1400hrs the 4th Division’s commander, Maj. Gen. Barton, had come ashore with his staff and set up his headquarters. Troops, vehicles and stores began to pour ashore as Operation Neptune unfolded. By 1800hrs, 21,328 troops, 1,695 tons of stores and 1,742 vehicles had been landed safely on Utah Beach.
5IF-4* ) oMBOEJOHTIJQ JOGBOUSZ IBOEIPJTUJOH o).4 St Helier. She was one of many cross-Channel ships of between 2,400 and 4,200 tons that were fitted out to transport infantry. Normally they could carry eight LCAs and 360 troops. The St HelierXBTQBSUPG'PSDF+ which landed follow-up USPPQTPO+VOP#FBDIPO D-Day. (NMRN)
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ASSAULT LANDINGS – FORCE O
A line of LCTs en route to the landing beaches, seen from a Royal Navy warship. (NMRN)
In contrast with the landings on Utah Beach, those on the Western Task Force’s other beach, codename ‘Omaha’, verged on disaster. Things began well when the major warships of Rear-Admiral Bryant’s Bombardment Force C arrived at their designated stations at 0220hrs and the main assault forces moved into their transport areas stationed 11 miles off shore as planned. For the next 3 hours the crews of these ships busied themselves preparing for the landings. At 0530hrs, German shore batteries, which had been alerted by the opening salvoes being fired off Utah Beach, identified the hostile ships of Bryant’s force moving into their firing positions. One by one the enemy gun positions opened fire on the Allied warships. Fire was immediately returned and the bombardment programme started slightly earlier than planned. The battleship USS Texas brought its massive 14in. main armament to bear on the enemy gun positions on top of the Pointe du Hoc, prior to an assault by US Rangers. Another battleship, USS Arkansas, bombarded positions on Omaha Beach, along with the British cruiser HMS Glasgow and the French cruiser FFS Georges Leygues. It was an awkward moment for Rear-Admiral Jaujard when he had to give the order for his ship to open fire and bombard the soil of France, but it was a necessary price to pay for the liberation of his homeland. In the meantime the transports continued to edge their way closer to shore to be ready to disembark the assault troops from their lowering positions. Unlike the forces off Utah Beach, which were somewhat sheltered in the lee of the Cotentin Peninsula, all the ships of Task Force O had to move into position though Force 5 winds and very choppy seas. It was an uncomfortable period for the assault troops as they tried to disembark the transports on their tiny assault craft, which pitched violently with each heaving wave. The aerial bombardment of the landing beaches was scheduled for 0600hrs. However, drifting smoke from the bombardment and low cloud resulted in a disjointed bombing effort, during which most of the bombs fell well inland from the shoreline and did little damage to enemy defences. Destroyers engaging individual targets also had some difficulty in identifying them, leaving some enemy strongpoints and gun batteries untouched. Those German guns that had been sited on Pointe du Hoc had in fact been moved inland, much to the dismay of the Rangers who braved accurate small arms fire as they scaled sheer cliffs to come to grips with them. The timings for the assault on Omaha Beach were very precise, with each wave arriving just when it was
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63 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
0229hrs, 6 June, Naval Commander Task Force U, Rear-Admiral D. Moon USN, aboard USS Bayfield, arrives in the Transport Area. 0251hrs, 6 June, Naval Commander Task Force O, Rear-Admiral J. Hall USN, aboard USS Ancon, arrives in the Transport Area 0300hrs, 6 June, Naval Commander Western Task Force, Rear-Admiral A. G. Kirk, aboard his flagship USS Augusta arrives in the area to command the American landings. Vaast- ships begin to arrive in Utah Beach’s Transport Area and move 0230–0330hrs,Sttransport la-Hougue into lowering positions for the embarkation of assault forces which begin immediately. 0230–0330hrs, transports begin to arrive in Omaha Beach’s Transport Area and move into lowering positions for the embarkation of assault forces which begins immediately. 0430hrs, 4th Cavalry Squadron engineers land and seize the St Marcouf islands. 0536hrs, Commander Bombardment Force A, Rear-Admiral Deyo, aboard USS Tuscaloosa gives the order to open fire on the German defences. 0540hrs, Commander Bombardment Force C, Rear-Admiral Bryant, aboard USS Texas gives the order to open fire on German defences.
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0600hrs, destroyers move close to inshore to begin bombardment of enemy defences and landing beaches. (Shown by green triangles). 10. 0630hrs, assault landings begin on Utah Beach. 11. 0630hrs, assault landings begin on Omaha Beach.
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USS Tuscaloosa
A line of LCVPs approaching the landing beaches. (NMRN)
required. The first to be launched on their run in to the beaches were the amphibious DD tanks. These would swim ashore and time their arrival between H −10 and H −5 minutes. Firing over the heads of all the landing craft were the LCT(R)s, drenching the beach with their rocket projectiles. At H-Hour (0630hrs), armoured landing craft LCT(A)s carrying two or three 95mm gun tanks would fire on the enemy during their approaches so as to land alongside the leading waves of infantry who would be arriving 1 minute later (H-Hour +1). At that time the beach would have assault troops and tanks moving simultaneously across it to tackle German defences. Three minutes later (H +3) combat demolition engineers and armoured bulldozers would land to begin the task of removing beach obstacles. During the whole of this period, destroyers close inshore would assist the landings with aimed gunfire until the troops became endangered by it as they moved inland. There would be no further landing of troops or equipment until H +30 to give time for the beach to be cleared of obstacles and enemy defences overcome. At this time successive waves of infantry, tanks and motorized equipment would land to seize a secure beachhead. It was an ambitious plan. The first thing to go wrong was the decision to launch the DD tanks from a point some 2½ miles from shore into a choppy sea. Most of those destined for the left-hand beach were quickly overwhelmed and sank. Only five tanks made it to shore. On the right, the officer controlling the launch thought that the sea was too rough to release the tanks and ordered the LCTs carrying them to take them right up to the beach. When the first of the infantry landed they did so with little tank support and with enemy defences still very active after the failed bombing raid. Naval support could not do the job of eliminating all the enemy machineguns posts and concrete bunkers, so the exposed infantry had to run the gauntlet of accurate fire across a wide expanse of open beach. Unlike all the other beaches, Omaha was edged by high sandy cliffs with enemy defenders having dominating fields of fire overlooking the shoreline. To make matters infinitely worse, the whole of this sector of coast was manned by the German 352. Infanterie-Division, an experienced field division manned with many battle-hardened troops. As successive waves of landing craft arrived, more and more of them and their assault troops were decimated by enemy fire. For the whole of the morning the landings on Omaha caused great concern until, eventually, the enemy defences along the cliffs overlooking the shore were overcome and troops began to get off the beach and move inland.
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ASSAULT LANDINGS – FORCE G Gold Beach, the target of Task Force G, was the most western of the British/ Canadian landing beaches. H-Hour for Force G was 0725hrs, some 55 minutes after the start of the landings on Omaha Beach just 15 miles to the west. Bombardment Force K, consisting of four cruisers, 13 destroyers and the Dutch gunboat HMNS Flores, opened fire on enemy positions alerted by the American assault at 0545hrs. This gave a clear 105 minutes before the assault troops made their landings and the extra time gained ensured that many of the enemy gun batteries and strongpoints were put out of action. One gun position that proved to be a little more tenacious than the others was the battery of 6in. guns at Longues. The cruiser HMS Ajax fought a duel with these guns and was able to score two direct hits on their concrete emplacements. The German naval crews manning the enemy guns were, however, of stiff resolve and continued firing sporadically until the mid afternoon. The lowering position for the assault troops was located 7 miles offshore. Once again, as on the American assaults, the passage from the landing ships to the beaches was cold, wet and uncomfortable for the troops inside the tiny craft, and seasickness overwhelmed most of them. The rough seas also resulted in the decision being made not to launch the DD tanks 6,000yds out as planned, but to carry them right onto the beaches in their LCTs. They arrived just behind the tank landing craft, carrying the demolition engineers and their supporting armour and equipment. This was just before the troop landings so that for a time the demolition parties worked on the beach obstacles unsupported. Hard as they might they were unable to clear all the beach obstacles in the face of the incoming tide and many craft were damaged by steel hedgehogs or sunk by mines. Most of the landings were successful enough for troops to quickly exit the designated beaches and move inland. One exception was the extreme right of the assault, where the solid defences built into the village of Le Hamel, right on the seafront, defied aerial and naval bombardment until the late afternoon and only fell when troops of the 1st Hampshire Regiment stormed the position from the rear. By the time that the reserve brigades landed between 1050hrs and 1200hrs, seven exits from the landings had been opened. Troops
American seamen pulled from the water after their craft had sunk off Utah Beach. On D-Day itself, apart from the large number of various major vessels that were damaged, only six Allied warships were actually sunk: HMS Wrestler mined; HMS MTB 248 sunk in collision; USS Osprey mined; USS Cory mined; H Nor MS Svenner torpedoed; and USPC 1261 mined. (NARA/TS Collection)
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Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 5km (3.1 miles)
ST MARCOUF
GERMAN FORCES A. Grenadier-Regiment 919 B. 709. Infanterie-Division C. Grenadier-Regiment 916 D. 352. Infanterie-Division E. 91. Luftlande-Infanterie-Division STE MÈRE-ÉGLISE
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EVENTS 1. 0110hrs, the US 101st Airborne Division begins its landings at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula. 2. The parachute drops are hit by strong winds which scatter them over a wide area and loose the tight concentration that was intended. Some cohesion is lost as most troops land to the east of their proposed drop zones. 3. 0230hrs, the US 82nd Airborne Division begins its landing close to St Mère-Église and suffers the same scattering of paratroops as 101st Division. 4. During the night sufficient paratroopers are gathered together to hold open the causeways leading inland from Utah Beach.
5. 0430hrs, Lt. Col. Dunn lands his 4th Cavalry Squadron Engineers on the islands of St Marcouf and clears the two islands of the enemy by 0530hrs. 6. 0630hrs, the 8th Infantry Regiment of US 4th Division lead the initial waves of the assault landings onto Utah Beach. Confusion during the run in to shore results in the landings being made 2,000 yards south of the intended landing zone. Opposition is slight and troops soon get off the beach and drive inland to join with the US 82nd Airborne Division. 7. 0630hrs, the assault landings begin on Omaha Beach. In the eastern sector the attack is led by US 16th Infantry Regiment from US 1st Division. Enemy defences here are especially strong and the first wave is pinned down unable to move. The arrival of the second wave later in the morning helps overcome enemy resistance and allows the division to begin moving inland by late afternoon.
8. 0630hrs, the assault on the western sector of Omaha Beach begins with the landings of 116th Infantry Regiment of US 29th Division. Enemy resistance delays movement inland for the whole of the morning. As further troops land they reorganize the weight of the assault and overwhelm the enemy sufficiently for the regiment to begin its move inland. 9. 0705hrs, 35 minutes behind schedule, the US 2nd Ranger Battalion lands on Pointe du Hoc to silence the enemy gun battery that threatens Omaha Beach. After successfully scaling the cliffs to get amongst the enemy strongpoint the Rangers find that the guns have been moved inland and the battery is empty. 10.#ZUIFFOEPG+VOFUIFUXPMBOEJOHCFBDIFTBSF secure well enough to allow new formations to land and for the remainder of US 1st, 4th and 29th Divisions to expand their lodgements.
THE AMERICAN ASSAULT The American assault on Utah and Omaha Beaches was preceded by landings by the US 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions in order to get behind enemy coastal defences and open up the roads leading inland. 66 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
US FORCES
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poured through the gaps and fanned out inland. Once past the outer crust of enemy defences they were able to expand the lodgement at remarkable speed. Before the end of the day the coastal town of Arromanches was in British hands, which enabled the Royal Navy to press on with the arrival of the component parts of Mulberry B. At the same time troops of 47 Royal Marine Commando had arrived in the rear of Port-en-Bessin ready to make their assault on the port the next day. Under cover of fire from naval warships and field guns, the commandos stormed through the town to capture the port with its sheltered harbour. With Port-en-Bessin taken, it now only needed American troops to advance from Omaha Beach to meet up to form a connected front between the eastern and western landings.
ASSAULT LANDINGS – FORCE J
An aerial view of the Canadian assault landings on the Nan 3FETFDUPSPG+VOP#FBDIBU Bernières. Tank landing craft are unloading troops and vehicles to support the enlargement of the beachhead. (NARA/TS Collection)
The Canadian Juno Beach was situated either side of the fishing port of Courseulles. It sat between the two British assaults on Gold and Sword beaches. Covering the beach’s seaward approach were German gun positions at Ver-sur-Mer and Mont Fleury on the flanks of Gold Beach and Bény-surMer some 3 miles inland. The first two were in concrete casemates, the other in open positions. These were all engaged by the cruisers HMS Orion, from Bombardment Force K, and HMS Belfast and HMS Diadem from Bombardment Force E, all of whom opened fire at 0530hrs. Also part of the bombardment programme were 11 destroyers, seven gun landing craft (LCG), eight rocket-firing LCT(R)s and six anti-aircraft LCFs (landing craft flak). Each of the seven LCG carried two self-propelled guns able to fire over the bows of the craft as they approached the beaches. H-Hour was later than Gold even though Juno was further to the east. Group J1, which was to land on Nan Beach to the right of Courseulles, was delayed by 10 minutes and Group J2 was put back 20 minutes later than the landings at Gold. This extra time was to allow the incoming tide to cover outlying rocks in front of the beaches. In the event these timings were delayed even further because of the bad weather and several groups of ships using the wrong channel. H-Hour therefore became 0755hrs on J1 and 0745hrs on J2. The resulting delays allowed the tide to cover many of the obstacles facing the assault troops and the assault craft landed amongst the obstacles instead of in front of them making the demolition parties’ task of clearing them more difficult. The result was that many craft were sunk or damaged.
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Acting as a beacon to aid incoming vessels onto Juno Beach was the midget submarine X20. She was positioned to aid navigation and intended as the marking point for the launching of the DD tanks. However, rough seas again prompted naval officers to delay the release of the tanks and ordered the LCTs carrying them to run right onto the beaches. This was completed on J1 Beach, but the senior officer of J2 Group decided that they could be launched from 1,000yds out to allow them to ‘swim’ ashore. They arrived shortly after the leading assault troops and demolition teams. Aerial bombing and naval bombardment just before the assault waves landing accounted for much of the resistance put up by the German 716. Infanterie-Division, which was guarding the beaches. Enemy small arms and mortar fire caused some delays and several individual sectors of the beach had difficulty breaking the outer crust of the enemy defences. By 1100hrs it was reported that the troops had got off all the beaches and were half way to the division’s intermediate objectives. On the extreme left of the assault 48 Royal Marine Commando was moving eastwards to tackle the strongpoint at Langrune and to meet up with other commandos moving westwards from the landings on Sword Beach.
ASSAULT LANDINGS – FORCE S The extreme left flank of the Overlord invasion covered the landings on Sword Beach, which was located alongside the small port of Ouistreham at the mouth of the River Orne and the Caen Canal. Airborne landings made during the night had seized crossings over the river and the canal some 5 miles from the beach. Seaborne commandos landing on Sword Beach were to advance across these bridges to enlarge the lodgement area and provide security to this flank of the invasion. Sword Beach’s position made it vulnerable to enemy attack by light craft from Channel ports to the east and from the heavy gun positions in the bay of the Seine towards Le Havre, including the massive 15in. guns of the Le Havre Grand Clos Battery. To help counter this, the offensive warships allocated to Force S were particularly heavy. Two battleships, one monitor and five cruisers comprised Bombardment Force D, while 13 destroyers, three LCGs, five LCT(R)s, four LCFs and eight LCT(A)s were added to the weight of fire available to counter enemy positions and smother Sword Beach with fire. Sword Beach was, like Juno, fronted by rocky outcrops and hemmed in on its eastern side by a long sandbank stretching out into the sea from the river Orne. This left a narrow front suitable only for a single brigade assault. There were a number of enemy gun batteries covering the beach and several other strong interlocking positions. These were to be bombed minutes before the troops touched down to spread alarm and confusion amongst the enemy. H-Hour was intended for 0725hrs, with the DD tanks leading the assault and the demolition parties landing 5 minutes
American LCVPs could carry 30 men from an infantry landing ship to shore in one lift. They could also be used during the build-up to carry small vehicles and supplies. (NARA/TS Collection)
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0455hrs, Naval Commander Task Force G, Commodore C. DouglasPennant RN, aboard HMS Bulolo, arrives at the Lowering Position. 2. 0510–0600hrs, 6 June, transport ships begin to arrive in the Lowering Positions off the Eastern Task Force’s beaches for the embarkation of assault forces which begin immediately. 3. 0515hrs, 6 June, Naval Commander Task Force S, Rear-Admiral A. Talbot Creully RN, aboard HMS Largs, arrives in the Lowering Position 4. 0530hrs, Commander Bombardment Force D, Rear-Admiral Patterson RN, aboard HMS Mauritius gives order to open fire 5. 0545hrs, Bombardment Forces E and K under the command of Rear-Admiral Dalrymple-Hamilton RN aboard HMS Belfast open fire on enemy positions in the area of Gold and Juno Beaches. 6. 0558hrs, Naval Commander Task Force J, Commodore G. Oliver RN, aboard HMS Hilary, arrives in the Lowering Position 7. 0610hrs, Naval Commander Eastern Task Force, Rear-Admiral Sir Philip Vian RN, aboard his flagship HMS Scylla, arrives in the area to command the British/Canadian landings. 8. 0700hrs, destroyers move close to inshore to begin bombardment of enemy defences and landing beaches. 9. 0730hrs, assault landing begin on Gold Beach. 10. 0730hrs, assault landings begin on Sword Beach. 11. 0759hrs, assault landings begin on Juno Beach.
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later. The infantry would then land 5 minutes after the engineers. Bombardment Force D sailed down the outermost swept channel of the approaches and anchored in their designated positions some 15 miles offshore during the early hours of 6 June. They were all within range of the large enemy guns, but waited to open fire until the planned start of their bombardment programme at 0530hrs. To help shield the assault force from the German guns, aircraft laid smoke to the east of the landings. Enemy coastal radar stations had actually spotted the approach of the bombardment force, and the 5th Torpedo Flotilla based at Le Havre was ordered to sea to attack the British ships. Fortunately for them, their line of attack was shielded by darkness and the swirling smokescreen that enabled them to suddenly appear from out of the gloom and attack the warships. Torpedoes narrowly missed both the battleships HMS Warspite and HMS Ramillies and the headquarters ship HMS Largs. The Norwegian destroyer HNMS Svenner was not so lucky. Hit by a torpedo from one of the fast German boats, she broke her back and sank in minutes The large ships of the bombardment group all opened fire on the small craft as they weaved violently in and out of the smoke, but they all managed to evade this fire and returned safely to base. A second enemy sortie out of Le Havre by the 15th Patrol Flotilla was not so fortunate. Alerted by the earlier attack, all of the warships were quickly in action and drove off the German boats. The enemy lost one craft after hitting a mine. Three groups were scheduled to land on Sword Beach: Assault Group S3 led the assault carrying the 3rd Division’s 8th Brigade, followed by Assault Group S2, which brought in 185th Brigade as follow up, and Assault Group S1 provided the reserve carrying 9th Brigade. The landings began right on time at 0725hrs with the arrival of the LCTs carrying the armour of the Royal Engineers. The infantry arrived a few minutes later along with those DD tanks that had made it to shore. These tanks had been launched some 5,000yds out and 34 of 40 tanks disembarked made it onto the beaches. Some were immediately swamped in the rough surf on landing, but their crews continued to engage the enemy until the incoming tide overwhelmed them. The LCT(A)s carrying self-propelled artillery also arrived on the flanks of the landings within 5 minutes of H-Hour. Their guns engaged enemy positions along the shore with great effect. The result of all this armour
This view from an American landing ship infantry clearly shows the large number of troops that could be loaded onto a LST for transport ashore. The carrying capacity for the average LCT was 55 men and 11 small vehicles. This method was only used after the assault waves had cleared the beaches and follow-up units had secured the lodgement. (NARA/TS Collection)
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The afternoon of D-Day shows the arrival of the 6th Airborne Division’s second wave of gliders. They approach the French coast flying over elements of Bombardment Force D. (NMRN)
arriving on Sword Beach within 10 minutes of each other meant that all enemy fire from gun positions actually on the beach, other than small arms fire, was silenced by H-Hour +20 (0745hrs). Behind the beaches other gun positions continued to interfere with the build-up for some considerable time. Nonetheless, the initial landings were a great success and troops quickly began moving inland. By 0906hrs two clear exits had been opened for tanks and vehicles to leave the beach. By 0945hrs all of Assault Group S3 had landed and the intermediate brigade had started to arrive. The build-up continued like clockwork and, after some delay through congestion around the beach exits, the reserve Assault Group S1 was ashore and the beachhead secured.
SITUATION AT THE END OF D-DAY As darkness closed over the beaches the Supreme Commander reflected on the results of the assault landings. It was clear that the initial stages of the invasion had been a complete success: surprise had been achieved; shipping losses had been acceptable; beachheads had been captured; intermediate and reserve formations had been landed and enemy resistance along the coast was gradually fragmenting. In the air the sky belonged to the RAF and USAAF, for the Luftwaffe had put up only token resistance. The same was true at sea, for there had been little interference from the Kriegsmarine. The Allied Expeditionary Force had been put ashore on enemy-occupied France just as planned in Operation Neptune. There had been a price to pay for the success of the first day with an estimated 8,500 casualties, of which around 2,000 were killed. Of the landing craft involved, 304 were lost or disabled, almost half of which were as a result of striking beach obstacles or mines. All of the five assault forces were now firmly established on their beaches. In the western sector the two American landings were now secure. On Utah the US 4th Division had carved out a lodgement 4,000yds long and had penetrated some 5 miles inland. Contact had been established with the airborne forces of the US 101st Airborne Division. On Omaha Beach, after the early morning scare, the troops of US V Corps had taken control of the beach and had established a captured area stretching a mile inland. Good exits from the shoreline meant that more troops and vehicles were pouring ashore and beginning to fan out through the closely knit countryside. These successes were mirrored on the British/Canadian beaches. The British 50th Division was in total control of Gold Beach and the surrounding area and had penetrated further inland than any other force. With armoured support it
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had reached the Bayeux–Courseulles road. The Canadian 3rd Division had also secured a wide lodgement from Juno Beach, carving out an area 3 miles wide and 5 miles deep. On Sword Beach the British 3rd Division had succeeded in establishing a firm footing and had linked up with the 6th Airborne Division across the Orne, but it was well short of its main objective, the city of Caen. The assault landings had been a great success, but all of the lodgements were relatively small. Each of them was vulnerable to any concerted enemy attack. Now the Allies were ashore and the ground troops were in contact with the enemy, the fate of the landings rested on the efficacy of Operation Neptune. Reinforcement and supply were now the most important factors of the invasion; the armies could fight the land battle only if the navies could give them the means to do it. As expected there was some chaos on each of the beaches. Traffic jams began piling up as reinforcements and supplies came ashore. The beaches themselves were obstructed with knocked-out tanks and vehicles, dead bodies and swamped and sunk shipping. Through all this chaos, the urgent needs of the formations pressing inland had to be dealt with. The follow-up groups now began to arrive on the second tide, bringing much-needed reinforcements and supplies. Further out to sea, the build-up convoys were on passage to Normandy from their distant loading ports. At 1700hrs that evening, Convoy ETP1 from the Thames ports was making its way through the Straits of Dover past the large German coastal gun batteries on the Pas de Calais. These were the first large ships to pass through the Straits for almost four years and they sailed through without interference, shielded by a massive smoke screen laid by aircraft and motor launches. During the night of D-Day and for the next few weeks, the security of the shipping lanes and inshore seaways along the invasion coast became an important consideration. Attacks by U-boats and surface craft had been anticipated in the planning stages and measures had been put in place to counter the threat. It was decided that during the night the greatest threat to the assault areas would be from fast surface vessels and aircraft. Allied naval superiority would make it unlikely that U-boats could penetrate so far inshore and Allied air superiority could deal effectively with any interference from the Luftwaffe. To protect against E-boats a static defence line was established 6 miles offshore running parallel with the beaches. A line of minesweepers, stationed approximately 1,000yds apart, formed a mutually supporting barrier to enemy interference. A line of stationery LCGs and LCFs anchored the eastern flank of this line. These craft and the minesweepers covered the close protection of the assault areas. Further to the northeast was a line of destroyers patrolling along channels
A jumble of beach obstacles gathered together after the landing. These ‘hedgehog’ steel obstructions could tear the bottom out of light assault landing craft. (NARA/TS Collection)
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A ROYAL NAVY BEACHMASTER AND HIS TEAM ON SWORD BEACH SOON AFTER THE ASSAULT WAVES HAD LANDED (PP. 74–75) The landing beaches after the assault waves had got off the beach and moved inland needed strict control to prevent the movement of incoming craft descending into chaos. The beach was alive with tanks and troops of the following waves, all eager to get clear of the shoreline. The RN Beachmaster’s main task was to bring order to ensure a smooth flow of incoming craft onto the beach and outgoing troops and supplies off the beach. The Beachmaster and his group were all Royal Navy Commandos specially trained and selected for the task of organizing all movement on the invasion beaches. Their first assignment was to land with the assault waves to determine whether subsequent landing craft could arrive on that section of the beach or be diverted elsewhere. They then set about other tasks such as removing mines and obstacles; making the rear area beach safe by clearing away any of the enemy that had been bypassed; clearing wrecked landing craft and vehicles to open up
landing points and building and defending the command post. They also placed great emphasis on keeping all exits clear so that no bottlenecks could build up to prevent troops and tanks moving inland. A lieutenant-commander (1) was in charge of each group, with a lieutenant (2) as second in command and a number of other ranks in support (3). Each of them undertook the same vigorous training as other Army and Royal Marine commando units, including some time spent at the commando training centre at Achnacarry in the north of Scotland. Those that survived the arduous nature of the training were awarded the coveted green beret and a Fairbairn Sykes dagger. As the leading formations moved inland and the assault phase of the invasion was completed, the RN Beach Commandos helped set up ammunition and supply dumps, rounded up and supervised enemy POWs and acted as security guards for the beach area.
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9 and 10. On the American side of the assault beaches a similar programme was adopted, with the vulnerable western flank patrolled by gunboats and torpedo boats, and a line of destroyers and patrol craft forming a close defence line some 7 miles offshore. During the daylight hours these defence lines moved further out and integrated with the larger programme of interdicting enemy movements into the English Channel from the west. German naval reaction to the landings was minimal. At 0336hrs on 7 June a half-hearted attempt to attack the eastern flank of the landings was made by eight E-boats, but these were seen off by two MTB flotillas after a short action and the enemy retreated into Le Havre. On the western side the night remained quiet, but out in the Channel several sorties by E-boats clashed with British destroyers and MTBs, during which one of the enemy craft was damaged and one destroyed. During the night aircraft detected 14 U-boats off Cape Ushant. Eight attacks were made by aircraft with at least two of the enemy craft damaged, but none of the submarines managed to penetrate the anti-submarine screen guarding the cross-Channel shipping lanes.
THE BUILD-UP
Small LCVPs were always kept busy ferrying light vehicles from large cargo ships to shore after the assault, providing the weather was favourable. (NARA/TS Collection)
The weather now became the most important concern for Admiral Ramsay, for it was vital that the timetable for the continuation of Operation Neptune should proceed as planned. Bad weather could delay or even stop the unloading of ships. Once all the assault groups had discharged and withdrawn, the area off the beaches was given over to resupply and this process needed relatively calm water to function. This requirement had been anticipated and planned for in the shape of the Mulberry harbours and Gooseberry breakwaters and on D +1 their component parts were well on their way to being delivered offshore. The first of the Corncob blockships arrived at 1230hrs on 7 June. Over the next four days more and more arrived off their respective beaches. All of these ships, except the French battleship Courbet, made their way across the Channel under their own steam – the French ship had to be towed. Each of the ships was manoeuvred into position in shallow waters and then scuttled by exploding amatol charges placed on either side, just below their waterlines. The controlled explosions allowed the vessels to settle upright on the seabed, leaving the bulk of their superstructures above water. The breakwaters were built at a time when the whole of the assault zone was still under shell fire, for the lodgement was not sufficiently deep to eliminate all artillery firing on the beaches. When the Germans saw the arrival of this line of ships they were somewhat confused as to their use. As they settled into position the enemy were sure that they had become victims of mines and the ‘sinking’ of the French battleship Courbet was seen as a great triumph. The blockships took the full force of the weather and heavy seas, leaving relatively calm water in their lee. This shelter allowed coasters and smaller 77 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 5km (3.1 miles)
GERMAN FORCES A. Infanterie-Regiment 726 B. Infanterie-Regiment 736 C. Panzer-Regiment 22 D. Panzergrenadier-Regiment 192
ARROMANCHES
LE HAMEL ASNELLES GOLD BEACH
6 4
7 MONT FLEURY COURSEULES
JUNO BEACH
A
BERNIÈRES
8
VER
5
9
9 CREULLY
LUC
LANGRUNE ST AUBIN
CRESSERONS XXX
LXXXIV
MARCKS XX
21
FEUCHTINGER 7
C
EVENTS
Brigades ready to begin the drive on the division’s D-Day objective, Caen.
1. 0015hrs, the British 6th Airborne Division begins landing its 3rd and 5th Parachute Brigades to the east of the river Orne in order to secure the right flank of the invasion.
4. 0730hrs, the British 50th Division begins its assault landings on Gold Beach with the 69th Brigade on the left and 231st Brigade on the right.
2. 0020hrs, a coup de main party from D Company of the 2nd Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry land by gliders and seize the bridges over the river Orne and the Orne Canal.
5. 0759hrs, the Canadian 3rd Division starts JUTBTTBVMUMBOEJOHTPO+VOP#FBDIXJUIUI and 8th Canadian Brigades.
3. 0730hrs, the British 3rd Division lands on Sword Beach on a one-brigade front with 8th Brigade. This is followed throughout the morning by the landings of 9th and 185th
6. Early afternoon, the British 3rd Division clears the beaches but is held up inland by increasingly strong resistance. 7. Early evening, a counterattack by PanzerRegiment 22 and Panzergrenadier-Regiment
192 from the German 21. Panzer-Division drives through the area between Sword and +VOP#FBDIFTBOESFBDIFTUIFTFBOFBS-JPO sur-Mer. The German armour quickly finds itself exposed and retreats to an area to the north of Caen. 8. 2400hrs, the 3rd Division fails in its attempt to reach Caen on D-Day as planned 9. 2400hrs, the lodgement made by the $BOBEJBOSE%JWJTJPOPO+VOP#FBDIJT established to a depth of 6 miles and contact has been made with the British 50th Division, which has also advanced to a similar depth from Gold Beach.
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D BÉNOUVILLE
THE BRITISH/CANADIAN ASSAULT The assault by British and Canadian Forces took place over three separate beaches, Sword, +VOPBOE(PME5IFXFTUFSOøBOLPGUIFTFMBOEJOHTXBTTFDVSFECZ"NFSJDBOGPSDFT landing on Omaha Beach. The eastern flank at Sword Beach was protected by the landings of the 6th Airborne Division on the far side of the river Orne and the Orne Canal which took place during the hours preceding the amphibious assault.
XXX
I
CROCKER DOUVRES LA DÉLIVRANDE
XXX
XXX
BUCKNALL LION
4
HERMANVILLE
SWORD BEACH
3
3
5 6
RIVA BELLA
FRANCEVILLE
8 MERVILLE 2
1
2
OUISTREHAM 1
RANVILLE
BRITISH AND CANADIAN FORCES
SALLENELLES B
British 1, 3rd Parachute Brigade 2. 5th Parachute Brigade 3. 8th Brigade 4. 9th Brigade 5. 185th Brigade 6. 69th Brigade 7. 231st Brigade Canadian 8. 7th Brigade 9. 8th Brigade
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This panoramic view of Omaha Beach demonstrates the enormity of the logistical task of transporting and landing an army from the sea. Beached tank landing ships are disembarking their cargoes of men and vehicles directly onto the beach. The incoming tide will then lift off the landing ships ready for their return voyages to England. (NARA/TS Collection)
vessels to discharge their cargoes onto DUKWs (amphibious trucks) and Rhino ferries (flat-bottom barges) to be carried onto the beaches for unloading. The area was also used for maintenance and repair work. Overall, the Gooseberry breakwaters were a great success. Whilst the task of providing sheltered anchorages with blockships was progressing, work on the construction of the artificial harbours began at St Laurent (American Mulberry A) and at Arromanches (British Mulberry B). The first of the Mulberry convoys had sailed from England on the morning of D-Day. This brought across the Channel the initial craft required for the preliminary work on the harbours, including control ships, handling tugs and mooring forces. Later that day the component parts of the harbours were starting to be brought across. Bombardons were towed from Portland and Phoenix caissons along special routes from St Alban’s Head, Selsey and Dungeness on the south coast. On 7 June boom defence vessels began mooring the outer Bombardon steel breakwaters ready for them to be placed the next day. A start was also made in positioning the Corncob blockships that would serve as part of the inner breakwater along with the Phoenix caissons. On D +2 the first of the Phoenix and the Whale (piers and floating roadway) constructions began arriving off the beaches. The weather that day and often during the following days was not, however, the best for towing operations – five Whale and two Phoenix tows were lost on passage over the next few days. By D +3 Phoenix caissons were being sunk in position and the establishment of the first of the Whale piers was underway. By D +10 both harbours were taking shape. At Mulberry B two pierheads had been completed and were ready for use, allowing 1,500 tons of supplies to be discharged per day. Mulberry A was also in use through its central pierhead and the connection of an LST pier to the floating roadway. Two days before this the Bombardons were all anchored in position and showing their effectiveness. Measurements showed that the floating breakwaters were giving a wave suppression of around 40 per cent. Each day brought the harbours closer to completion so that by 18 June they were fully open to all traffic. Before the artificial harbours came into full use, there were several other means for the discharging of cargoes. Follow-up troops were carried over the channel in transports and disembarked onto smaller craft – LCAs and LCVPs – to be taken ashore. LCTs were also used for this task. Coasters and smaller cargo ships unloaded onto Rhino ferries and DUKWs, which formed shuttle service to the beaches.
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Large LSTs carrying armour, bulldozers and transports were originally planned to be brought right onto the shoreline to discharge directly onto the beach. Then they would back off and return to sea. Initially this was found to be impractical, for the depth of water at the foot of the ramp was too great to allow vehicles to drive off. A crucial decision was consequently made to allow the LSTs to drive right onto the beach and dry out in the receding tide. After their cargoes were discharged, the vessels, now lighter after disembarking their cargoes, would float off on the next high tide. Inspection showed there was little damage suffered to the ships by the soft sandy beaches. This method was also used with small transport ships, which unloaded straight onto motor transports at low tide. Unexpectedly, this proved to be a simple and effective method of landing large cargoes and the process was adopted all along the invasion shore whenever conditions would allow. The flat beaches of Utah and the great tidal range made this method especially suitable for the Americans. Ultimately, the amount of stores unloaded in this way almost matched those brought ashore through the Mulberry harbours. The British and Canadian landings covered an area that included three small French ports. Courseulles and Ouistreham were in Allied hands on D-Day itself; Port-en-Bessin was captured by commandos on the afternoon of the next day. None of these ports were seriously damaged and great efforts by naval shore parties soon got underway to make them useful. These efforts were rewarded at Port-en-Bessin and Courseulles, for by D +8 they were both handling 1,000 tons a day. Ouistreham was a disappointment, for just across the river Orne, some 3,000yds away, the enemy was still in residence and remained so until August. Shell, mortar and rifle fire made life in the port difficult to the extent that it became closed to traffic. These problems also applied to the nearby Sword Beach, which remained under fire for weeks, and further landings there were eventually abandoned. In the American sector, the small ports of Isigny and Grandcamp were not in a position to be used until Utah and Omaha beaches were securely joined. Work at these ports started on D +7 and they became operational in a small way at the end of June. Although the timetables for the arrival and departure of all types of shipping into the assault area had been meticulously planned, some delay and confusion was inevitable. Ships trying to get on and off the beaches, jostling with each other for space, inevitably disrupted the orderly planned programme and delays began to creep in. Disruption through heavy weather and enemy interference also affected the timetables. Nor was the problem confined to Normandy, for difficulties were also experienced back in the ports allocated to the build-up convoys. Southampton and the anchorages of the Solent were particularly affected, as convoys waiting to go over were met in huge traffic jams by ships returning from France, including large numbers of coasters and naval ships returning for refuelling and replenishment of ammunition. Gradually the problems of the first few days were sorted out to allow a regular flow of shipping to make its normal passage across to Normandy. After the first week it became clear that the battle for the build-up was being won.
A Canadian LCT alongside a warship making ready to transfer wounded troops. 10%POPWBO+5IPSOEJDL Canada Department of National Defence, Archives of Canada)
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Note: Gridlines are shown at intervals of 1km (0.62 mile)
1
MANVIEUX CAP MANVIEUX
TRACY
ARROMANCHES
EVENTS 1. The Outer Breakwater, Western Shore Arm, linked the western entrance with the shore near Cap Manviex. 2. The Western Breakwater ran between the western and northern entrances. 3. The Eastern Breakwater ran between the northern entrance and the eastern entrance
4. The Outer Breakwater, Eastern Shore Arm, connected the eastern entrance with the shore at Le Hamel. 5. Gooseberry No. 3 blockships were sunk to form a barrier to create an area of quiet water in preparation for the laying of concrete caissons to form the most exposed section of breakwater, the Eastern Breakwater.
6. Floating pierheads in the central pierhead section allowed ocean-going vessels to tie up and unload cargoes at all states of the tide. 7. Floating roadways connected the floating pierheads, and the fixed piers closer inshore, back to the road system around Arromanches. 8. The Pontoon Pier on the eastern part of the harbour allowed the loading and unloading of inshore vessels and craft.
ARROMANCHES ARTIFICIAL PORT (MULBERRY B) The artificial harbour Mulberry B at Arromanches was started on the evening of D-Day, as was Mulberry A off the coast at St Laurent in the American sector. The construction of these two ports gave the Allies two harbours, each the size of Dover Harbour, from which unloading could take place at all states of the tide. 82 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
2
3
6
5
7
4
8
LA FONTAINE
LE HAMEL ST CÔME
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OPERATION NEPTUNE AFTER D-DAY The weather in the English Channel is well known for its unpredictability. To the disappointment of all it began to deteriorate on 14 June. A moderate wind started to hamper some of the cross-Channel tows that were underway, bringing the parts of the Mulberry harbours from their sites in England.
THE GREAT GALE
By the time this picture was taken, the British Mulberry B artificial harbour was operating at full capacity, with the area inside the breakwater busy with ferries and small coasters taking supplies from ship to shore. (NMRN)
Over the next few days, the overcast weather continued to decline so that by the early hours of the 19th the winds had increased considerably. A gale started to blow from the north-east and at 1500hrs in the afternoon gusts reached Force 7. Six-foot high waves were battering the landing beaches. The next day, and for part of 21 June, the weather deteriorated to a full gale and the waves reached a height of 8ft. The storm swept through the anchorages causing havoc amongst the partially completed artificial harbours and the still-settling Gooseberry breakwaters. All ferrying operations came to a halt and landing craft beached themselves for safety where they could. Rhino ferries in the lee of the breakwaters went aground and, as the tide rose, smashed into landing craft anchored inshore of them. The worst damage was done to the Mulberry harbours. The Phoenix breakwaters stood up well to the pounding, but many of the blockships settled further and allowed the seas to break over them, pounding the pierheads and roadways leading back to shore. The bombardons protecting the harbours broke free and were driven into other installations. Many broke completely adrift and became hazardous to shipping in the Channel. When the gale finally subsided, the scale of the damage it left was considerable. Mulberry A off St Laurent in the American sector fared the worst. Its pier was completely wrecked; its breakwater had become detached and was twothirds destroyed and the Whale
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roadways were broken and unusable. Mulberry B at Arromanches, however, weathered the storm a little more successfully. Although four Phoenix units were destroyed, its breakwater remained intact. Its Gooseberry blockships were mostly undamaged, as was the main pier, although there was minor damage to the pierheads. When the overall situation was assessed it was decided that the damage to the American Mulberry was irreparable and it was abandoned. Some of its parts were used to repair the British harbour. Damage to shipping was also severe, as the following quote from the official history shows: In the British area, one LCT capsized and six were driven ashore and broke their backs. One LST and three coasters were damaged by grounding. HMS Tasajera was dragged onto a GOOSEBERRY, HMS Diadem collided with a Rhino and HMS Fury was driven ashore after being damaged by a mine. In the US area, five LST, one LSI (H), 13 LSI (L), about 50 LCT, four LCF and several minor craft were damaged to varying degrees. Ferry craft suffered especially heavily in both areas.
This large concrete caisson has its own anti-aircraft position on its roof. A number of these ringed the Mulberry harbours to provide extra security from air attack. (NARA/TS Collection)
An example of this was the availability of LCVPs. Before the storm the British had 180 operationally fit craft. After the storm they could only find two that could immediately return to service. As for the Rhino ferries, there were 14 working at the time of the gale, but only two after it had subsided. The gale interfered with the build-up to such an extent that ground offensives were postponed in both the British and American sectors. The two armies had to hold still within their assault areas until the supply situation improved. Estimates from the army suggested that from 19 to 24 June inclusive the unloading loss due to the gale was in the region of 20,000 vehicles and 140,000 tons of stores. This lack of supplies caused a delay in the expansion of the lodgement and allowed the enemy to move more forces into Normandy than would have been possible if the Allies had remained on the offensive all along the line. The damage to the build-up programme was a severe problem, but not a lasting one. Mulberry B soon became operational and the easing of the weather allowed unloading to continue over the open beaches. It surprised everyone just how much of the material required to keep the armies supplied could be landed directly onto transports from beached landing ships and craft, easily making up for the lost tonnage that was planned to pass through of the other Mulberry harbour. 85 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
GERMAN NAVAL REACTION TO THE INVASION
5IFGFSPDJUZPGUIF+VOFHBMF caused much damage to both artificial harbours. (NARA/TS Collection)
The initial German reaction to the landings was limited to air attacks. These were sporadic and mostly ineffectual. They consisted of low-level ‘hit and run’ raids that swept over the beaches with total surprise. Each enemy aircraft was subjected to a barrage of anti-aircraft fire from land- and ship-based guns and, after dropping a few bombs or strafing the assault area, quickly returned to their bases. Many of these planes were pounced on by Allied aircraft whose air superiority made these enemy sorties very expensive for the Luftwaffe. The German naval plan to counter the invasion required the shifting of some of its surface fleet towards the area and carrying out limited attacks by fast motorboats. Its use of submarines was curtailed by the effectiveness of the anti-submarine screen that surrounded all shipping using the crossChannel routes. On D-Day Admiral Krancke ordered the following movements. The 5th and 9th E-boat Flotillas based at Cherbourg were to carry out minelaying and torpedo attacks on the US assault sector and on the Allied vessels along the western defence line. The 2nd and 4th E-boat Flotillas based at Boulogne would carry out minelaying off Ouistreham and launch torpedo attacks against the eastern defence line, using the ports of Le Havre and Cherbourg as bases. The 8th E-boat Flotilla would move from Ymuiden to Ostende to patrol the eastern part of the Channel, where further Allied landings in the Pas de Calais area were expected. Finally, the 6th E-boat Flotilla would move down from Finland to join other craft in the invasion area. The gathering of these fast motorboats resulted in nightly sorties against Allied warships on the extreme flanks of the invasion and on cross-Channel traffic. Several hits were made and ships damaged, but at great cost to the German forces. None of these attacks materially affected Allied operations in the Channel. The Germans also introduced new weapons into the battle, some of which took the Allies by surprise. They had produced a new type of oyster mine that was operated by hydrostatic pressure and was detonated by ships passing over them. They were very difficult to detect and had been kept in reserve on Hitler’s orders, only to be used after the invasion to prevent the Allies developing a means to counter them. These mines were now laid in large quantities by aircraft and inshore minelayers. They were very effective, for most of the Allied ships damaged or sunk during Operation Neptune were as a result of mines. The Kriegsmarine also began using midget submarines in the Channel. Many were the Neger type, consisting of two G7 torpedoes joined together with the upper one having a one-man
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cockpit in place of a warhead. The other torpedo slung underneath carried a conventional warhead and was armed with a magnetic pistol that would fire on contact. The craft travelled on the surface with only the Perspex dome of the cockpit visible. When making an attack the pilot would line up his craft on an enemy warship and release the torpedo beneath him to run onto the target. The low freeboard of these human torpedoes made them very difficult to identify in the dark. On 6 July, 24 midget submarines were launched en masse from their base near Houlgate against the Eastern Defence Line off Sword Beach. They were credited with some success for they sank two minesweepers – HMS Magic and HMS Cato – but only nine craft returned safely to their base after the attack. Two days later on 8 July the enemy tried again with a force of 21 human torpedoes repeating the previous operation. It was a daylight raid attempting to get amongst the anchorages off Sword Beach. The attack opened at 0307 hours and continued until 1130 hours. They were sighted no less that 31 times in the British assault area. They were attacked by RAF fighters and surface craft as they pressed home their attacks. Two Allied ships were sunk: the minesweeper HMS Pylades and the Polish cruiser Dragon. None of the German craft survived the attack. Explosive motorboats were another new weapon used against Allied shipping during the post-invasion period. The attack consisted of two boats armed with explosive charges accompanied by a control boat. Each explosive craft, piloted by a single crewman, would be brought close to a target ship. The motorboat would be aimed at the target ship and the pilot would then jump overboard. The coxswain in the following control boat would then guide the motorboats onto their targets by radio control. A spring bumper around the bows would detonate the explosive motorboats on contact. The two pilots who had ejected from the craft would, in theory, be picked up by the control boat. Once again the commitment of this ‘suicide’ type of craft against Allied warships proved to be a fiasco. On 3 August an attack by explosive boats and human torpedoes was met with strong resistance in the Bay of the Seine. During
Some of the debris left on the MBOEJOHCFBDIFTPO+VOF 1944 after the great summer storm had subsided. The whole of the coast was littered with damaged ships, craft and equipment. (NARA/TS Collection)
This wrecked roadway leading from the pierheads of Mulberry A has been smashed into twisted shapes by the great gale. (NARA/TS Collection)
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the sortie 22 motorboats were expended, two control boats were lost and two captured and 41 out of 52 human torpedoes were lost. Another attempt was made on 9 August by 28 motorboats. Sixteen were expended and four control boats lost. On 17 August 42 human torpedoes attacked and 25 were lost without any success. One other strange new German weapon used off the landing beaches was the long-range circulating torpedo. It was able to reach a speed of 9 knots powered by an electric motor. It left no wake and was virtually impossible to detect. After launching it would run straight for a predetermined distance, which in this case brought it into the anchorages off the beaches. Once amongst the Allied shipping it would circle round and round for up to 10 hours, hoping to strike one of the ships. If no target was found after this time it would remain in the area as a lethal form of mine. Whether or not it was successful was difficult to determine. Eleven vessels were sunk or damaged by underwater explosions off the British beaches between 7 August and 11 September, some of which, if not all, might well have been caused by circulating torpedoes.
PLUTO
The delivery of fuel supplies to formations in the front line in Normandy relied on a sophisticated distribution network. Fuel was pumped through pipelines along country lanes from the PLUTO terminals, feeding directly to storage tanks and fuel dumps for onward delivery by road tankers and trucks. (NARA/TS Collection)
The problem of shipping fuel to the Allied armies ashore was tackled in two stages. The first stage was to get motor and aviation fuel into the beachhead as quickly as possible. The second stage was to ship large amounts of fuel across the Channel in quantities that would enable forces to breakout out of the lodgement and drive towards Germany. Plans for the supply of fuel for the initial stages of Overlord required it to be transported over the Channel in large tankers. These ships would then secure themselves to offshore moorings built out from points off Port-en-Bessin at St Honorine. Attached to each of these moorings were two underwater pipelines, one of 6in. diameter known as ‘Tombola’ and one 10in. pipe known as ‘Amethea’. The tankers would attach hoses to the end of the pipelines and discharge directly to shore at a rate of 600 tons per hour. The fuel was then pumped from the landing points to a central fuel depot near Etreham 2 miles inland. Two days after the assault landings, surveyors began work on the projected sites. Offshore rocks at the entrance to Port-en-Bessin proved to be an initial problem, but by D +9 constructions on the moorings had reached a stage whereby pipeline work could begin. Although bad weather caused some delays, the target date for completion of the first line, D +18, was missed by just one day. When all four of the lines had been completed on D +27, their total pumping capacity was 8,000 tons a day. From the storage facility at Etreham road tankers distributed the fuel to the various fighting formations and emergency airfields. As more and more German prisoners were taken during the fighting some of them were put to good use filling
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‘Jerry’ cans so that it could be delivered directly to individual units inland. The main PLUTO operation took a little longer to become established. This required a series of ten pipelines to be laid across the English Channel from Sandown Bay on the Isle of Wight to Querqueville near Cherbourg. Work on the operation could not begin until the Cotentin Peninsula and the port of Cherbourg had been captured. When it did get underway the pipes were laid across the Channel as quickly as possible. There were eventually two types of pipelines used. The more flexible, but smaller, lead-lined Hais pipes were similar to high-voltage electric cables and so could be easily laid by converted cable ships. The larger steel Hamel pipes were more rigid and had to be first wound onto conundrums, which were essentially 50ft diameter drums or bobbins. The bobbins were then towed across the Channel behind a ship and, as the giant steel drums unwound, the pipeline would sink to rest on the seabed. The PLUTO operation was initially subject to considerable teething problems. Nonetheless, by 12 August the first Hais pipe was in use and fuel was being pumped across to Cherbourg from Sandown Bay. Other operational pipelines soon followed in succession so that eventually there were two Hais and six Hamel pipes supplying fuel to Normandy. By the time they were all operational, the Allied armies had broken out of Normandy and were on the France/Belgium frontier. The eastern channel was now free of the enemy and, to ease supply problems, further PLUTO operations were shifted closer to the front. On 25 September pipelaying began across the Straits of Dover from Dungeness in Kent to Boulogne in France. This work continued at pace so that eventually 11 Hais and six Hamel pipelines were able to supply enough fuel to carry Eisenhower’s armies to victory in Germany.
The cruiser HMS Glasgow under fire from a German shore battery during the bombardment of Cherbourg. (NMRN)
The task of clearing destroyed port installations that had been sabotaged by the enemy began as soon as each harbour was captured. Large teams of divers laboured under great pressure to get the ports working as soon as possible. (NARA/TS Collection)
CAPTURE OF THE PORT OF CHERBOURG Although great quantities of supplies were being brought ashore over the landing beaches and through the single artificial harbour at Arromanches, they were not sufficient to keep the growing strength of Allied forces at the level required for the drive for Berlin. Extra ports were needed and the capture of Cherbourg became a top priority. US VII Corps was fighting its way up the Cotentin Peninsula towards the port, but its capture would be a hard task in view of the strength of its defences. 89 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
A DUKW amphibious track is being unloaded onto a Mulberry pier head from an American LST. DUKWs were one of the great inventions of the war and were used extensively for waterborne operations throughout. (NARA/ TS Collection)
These two tank landing ships show how simple the task was of beaching the vessels for unloading. Once their cargoes had been cleared, the LSTs waited for the incoming tide to float them off again. Little damage was done to the ships and the method proved to be one of the great successes of the whole logistic enterprise. (NARA/TS Collection)
Cherbourg was already a welldefended port before the war when it was an important French naval base. After the arrival of the Germans in 1940 it had been further fortified to a point that it seemed to be almost impregnable. By 22 June VII Corps had reached the outskirts of Cherbourg and the task of reducing the fortress city began. Heavy bombing had destroyed some of the enemy positions but many were so well entrenched that they remained untouched. This event had been anticipated before the invasion in Operation Neptune and steps were in hand to attack them from the seaward flank with the largecalibre weapons of warships. A mainly American naval task force, designated CTF 129, had been put together at Portland in England under the command of Rear-Admiral Deyo. It comprised the US battleships Texas, Arkansas and Nevada and the cruisers Tuscaloosa and Quincy, together with the British cruisers HMS Glasgow and Enterprise, and a screening force of 11 US destroyers and two minesweeping flotillas, one British and one American. Its task was to neutralize the shore batteries and artillery positions around Cherbourg and to cover the assault by land troops on the port’s two major forts and its naval arsenal. The climax of the battle for Cherbourg took place on 26 June. Naval warships bombarded all known enemy positions and targets identified by ground troops. Throughout the day the ships did battle with powerful German shore batteries, often suffering near misses as a result. The gun duel went throughout the day until one by one the enemy batteries fell silent. That day the capital ships fired a total of 376 large calibre shells from their heavy guns. By the evening, just the naval arsenal remained fighting when the German garrison commander Generalleutnant von Schlieben surrendered the city. The following day this strongpoint also surrendered. Damage to naval ships by shore batteries was minimal considering the number of enemy guns involved: USS Texas suffered two hits; HMS Glasgow two hits and one very near miss; USS O’Brian one hit on the bridge; USS Barton one hit and the USS Laffey also one hit. The capture of Cherbourg was an event of great importance. This, the first French port to be taken, gave the Allies an all-weather harbour from which to establish themselves in Normandy. Unfortunately the enemy had destroyed most of the port facilities prior to its fall. What was left were quays blocked by sunken coasters, cranes twisted into grotesque shapes, jetties smashed by explosive charges and booby-trapped obstacles everywhere. Before the port could become operational much work by salvage experts was
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After the assault the inevitable problem of evacuating wounded troops was dealt with. Here a tank landing craft has brought a number of stretcher cases alongside an infantry landing ship to be transported back to hospitals in England. (NARA/TS Collection)
required. Once again all of this reconstruction had been anticipated and teams were on hand to begin the work immediately. Mines just beneath the surface were found in large quantities and teams of divers soon began the difficult task of clearing them by hand. Throughout the next two months every effort possible was put into clearing the port so that by early September Cherbourg became operational, allowing 12,000 tons of supplies a day to be unloaded. This was only half of the port’s normal capacity. It then took only a very short time until it was handling a greater tonnage than it had ever unloaded in peacetime. As Eisenhower’s land forces gradually cleared Normandy and began spreading out in all directions, the English Channel ports were steadily freed of the enemy. The seaways were now under the control to Admiral Ramsay’s ships and the task of Operation Neptune had come to an end. Shipping in the Channel still required some protection from enemy vessels that tried to penetrate the shipping routes, but naval operations once more resorted to normality. The greatest naval enterprise in history that had put two great armies ashore was gradually wound down and passed into history. The cost to shipping resulting from Operation Neptune might at first sight seem considerable. However, when compared with the number of vessels employed in the enterprise, over 7,000, it appears to have been acceptable. Between D-Day and D +30, 917 ships and craft were lost or damaged. Total losses amounted to 267, of which only 108 were as a result of enemy action. Only 25 of these were warships. The weather accounted for 153 complete losses and 437 more vessels were damaged, six others were lost due to marine hazards. German mines caused 292 casualties to shipping, of which only 11 vessels were sunk. 91 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY
A Cheerful group of US troops on board an American landing craft in the port of Southampton. After embarking British and Canadian forces for the assault phase of D-Day, Southampton was then used as the main transit port for American troops after the invasion. Over one million men passed through the port on their way to fight in north-west Europe. (NARA/TS Collection)
Operation Neptune was an amphibious operation with its start and finish on dry land. Although it involved thousands of ships, very little of the action was at sea. There were a few ship-to-ship encounters when German fast craft got too close, or a German submarine tried to run the gauntlet of strong anti-submarine defences, but virtually all of the offensive action was from ship to shore. This aside, Operation Neptune was mainly one of logistics. Relics of the battle today can be found on both sides of the English Channel and around the world. They are tangible reminders of the invasion; ships from many nations that returned to their homelands to be preserved as monuments to that great enterprise. On display in San Francisco is the Jeremiah O’Brien. She is one of only two remaining ‘Liberty’ cargo ships of the 2,710 mass-produced vessels that were built in the USA during the war. The Jeremiah O’Brien was part of the great supply train that supported the invasion. Also preserved in the USA is one of the battleships that formed part of the Bombardment Force C, the USS Texas. She is preserved as a monument in the Texas State Historic Park at La Porte in Texas. In England the cruiser HMS Belfast, part of Bombardment Force E, is tied up on the River Thames in London opposite the Tower. She remains the largest preserved World War II warship in Europe. It is sad to think that Great Britain, who once had the most powerful navy in the world, has not seen fit to preserve any of its capital ships, other than Nelson’s flagship HMS Victory. HMS Belfast was saved, not by the nation, but by a private trust. It is now in the hands of Imperial War Museums and is open to visitors. There is, however, one significant reminder of the Royal Navy’s capital ships in London, for outside Imperial War Museum, Lambeth, itself, guarding the entrance to the museum, are two guns taken from warships that took part in Operation Neptune. Mounted on a pedestal is a 15in. gun from the battleship HMS Ramillies alongside another 15in. gun from the monitor HMS Roberts, although the one from Ramillies was not actually on board during Neptune.
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There are many other reminders of the invasion scattered around the south coast of England. In Portland Harbour inside Weymouth bay are two surviving Phoenix caissons that were part of the Mulberry harbours. They were two of ten such caissons that were towed back from Normandy at the end of the war. They were intended to be used as shelters during the construction of piers in the harbour, but eight of them, however, were given to the Netherlands to help in the reconstruction work of dykes after the disastrous storms of 1953 that inundated large areas of the Low Countries. All along the coast are other reminders of the invasion, from slipways built for the loading of landing craft to construction sites for the components parts of the Mulberry harbours; from headquarters buildings to moorings along creeks and rivers. D-Day has left many reminders if you know where to look. Local history groups and Tourist Information Centres will give information as to what can be seen in their area. Perhaps the most poignant relic of Operation Neptune is the map that hangs on a wall in Southwick House, the Victorian mansion that once held the headquarters of Admiral Ramsay. The map shows the whole of Operation Neptune in progress at the time of the first landings. This one moment in time is now preserved in place in the old map room, just as it was at H-Hour on D-Day, 6 June 1944, when Ramsay, Eisenhower and Montgomery all looked at it to watch the landings unfold. In Normandy, all along the Channel coast are more relics of the invasion. At Arromanches the remains of Mulberry B still lie in a great arc off the beach. Along the cliffs of both the British and American sectors are concrete casemates that once housed the coastal guns that were bombarded by the capital ships of two navies. Smaller sites give witness to the persistent and accurate fire of cruisers and destroyers that tried to winkle out their crews
The operational chart at Admiral Ramsay’s headquarters at Southwick House north of Portsmouth remains in situ in what was once the map room of Operation Neptune. It shows the Allied situation at H-Hour, +VOF 54$PMMFDUJPO
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Two surviving 15in. guns from British warships located outside Imperial War Museum, Lambeth, in London. The gun on the left is from the battleship HMS Ramillies and that on the right from the monitor HMS Roberts. Both ships took part in the Operation Neptune. (TS Collection)
and silence their guns. The best is at Longues, where a battery of coastal artillery remains in situ, the only original guns still entrenched in their wartime casemates after their duel with the cruiser HMS Ajax. Normandy is still one of the best and most exciting of all battlefields, with a wealth of museums and artefacts to excite the visitor. Perhaps the best way to visit the battlefield of Operation Neptune is aboard one of the ferries that run between Portsmouth and Caen-Ouistreham. The route across the Channel passes south of the Isle of Wight through Area Z and then along the swept lanes that once passed through the German minefields, the route over which passed thousands of ships. If you are on an overnight ferry, just as you arrive at Ouistreham early in the morning, look to the right and see Sword Beach, where the British 3rd Division landed at about the same time of day as you are landing. A few hundred yards away the white artillery observation tower that vectored the German guns onto warships at sea rises about the houses. To the left, across the estuary of the river Orne, just 2 miles away, are the casemates that housed the guns that caused Sword Beach to be abandoned at the end of June, so persistent was their fire on the beach. The gunners remained at their posts until August, defying efforts by warships and artillery to displace them.
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND FURTHER READING The most comprehensive details of Operation Neptune are to be found in two major histories: in the UK (Roskill, S.W., The War at Sea, Volume III Part 2, HMSO, 1961) and in the USA (Morison, Rear-Admiral Samuel E., History of US Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. XI: The Invasion of France and Germany, 1944–1945, USNI, 1957). These books are very good starting points for any study of the operation. Another great source is a series of books and maps produced by HMSO called Invasion Europe. Issued in a boxed set of three books and two map folders in 1994, the contents were originally produced for the Royal Navy after the war as ‘Battle Summaries’. Invasion Europe is more of a detailed repository rather than a strict narrative, listing all named ships that took part in Operation Neptune, along with facts, figures and tables explaining various groups and organizations. At the National Archives at Kew in London are the reports of the Allied Naval Commander-in-Chief and the various task force commanders. These can be found in files ADM199/1659 to ADM199/1663. Other commercially produced titles which are of interest are shown below. Edwards, Kenneth, Operation Neptune, Collins (1946) Eisenhower, Gen. Dwight D., Crusade in Europe, Heinemann (1948) Ford, Ken, and Zaloga, Steven J., Overlord: The D-Day Landings, Osprey Publishing (2009) Harrison, Gordon A., Cross Channel Attack, US Army in World War II, Washington (1950) Morgan, Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick, Overture to Overlord, Hodder and Stoughton (1950) Schofield, Vice-Admiral B.B., Operation Neptune, Ian Allen (1974) Stagg, J.M., Forecast for Overlord, Ian Allen (1971)
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INDEX Figures in bold refer to illustrations. Admiral Scheer 16, 27 Ajax, HMS 22, 52, 65, 94 Ancon, USS 22, 45, 56, 63 Anglo-American alliance 9, 12, 38 Anglo-American landings 8, 13 Area Z 4, 31, 32, 56, 94 Arkansas, USS 22, 44, 62 Arromanches 29, 48, 68, 70, 78, 80, 82, 85, 89, 93 Assault Force G 4, 15, 21, 22, 32, 33, 44, 56, 65 Assault Force J 3, 15, 21, 22, 32, 44, 46, 56, 61, 68 Assault Force O 3, 14, 15, 22, 23, 32, 43, 44, 55, 62 Assault Force S 3, 14, 21, 22, 32, 44, 56, 63, 69, 70 Assault Force U 3, 10, 14, 23, 24, 32, 43, 44, 54, 55, 56, 57 Assault landing craft (LCA) 6, 12, 24, 30, 36, 37, 39, 57, 61, 73, 80 Atlantic Wall, the 9, 24 Augusta, USS 22, 44, 45, 63 Belfast, HMS 21, 45, 55, 68, 70, 92 Biscay ports 27, 50 Bismarck 14, 44 Black Prince, HMS 23, 45, 57 Bombardment Force A 23, 43, 44, 57, 60 Bombardment Force C 9, 19, 22, 44, 62, 92 Bombardment Force D 21, 43, 44, 53, 69, 71, 72 Bombardment Force E 21, 44, 55, 68, 92 Bombardment Force K 22, 44, 45, 52, 65, 68 Bombardons 47, 80, 84 Boulogne 4, 25, 31, 86, 89 British Army 8th Brigade 71, 78, 79 9th Brigade 71, 79 69th Brigade 78, 79 185th Brigade 71, 79 231st Brigade 78, 79 3rd Parachute Brigade 79 5th Parachute Brigade 78, 79 British Expeditionary Force 5, 10, 13 Brooke, General Sir Alan 7, 12 Bryant, Rear-Admiral Benjamin 19, 62, 63
Caen 4, 25, 31, 69, 73, 78, 94 Canadian forces 7th Brigade 78, 79 8th Brigade 78, 79 Cherbourg 4, 11, 16, 17, 25, 27, 31, 33, 42, 46, 49, 50, 86, 89, 90, 91 Churchill, Winston 5, 7, 8, 9, 12, 13, 19 Corncob blockships 31, 48, 52, 77, 80 Cotentin Peninsula 11, 25, 30, 34, 49, 56, 57, 62, 66, 89 COSSAC (Chief of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander) 10, 28
Glasgow, HMS 9, 22, 45, 62, 89, 90 Gooseberry Breakwaters 11, 28, 48, 49, 52, 77, 80, 82, 84, 85 Gold Beach 4, 11, 30, 32, 65, 68, 70, 72, 78
D-Day 7, 10, 12, 17, 18, 19, 24, 27, 29, 30, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 52, 60, 61, 65, 72, 73, 78, 80, 81, 82, 84, 86, 91, 92, 93, 94 Despatch, HMS 15, 21 Deyo, Rear-Admiral Morton 57, 60, 63, 90 Diadem, HMS 21, 45, 68 Douglas-Pennant, Commodore Cyril E. 15, 22, 33 Dover 4, 13, 31, 32, 47, 73, 82, 89 DUKWs (amphibious trucks) 47, 80, 90 Dunkirk 13, 25
Jeremiah O’Brien, SS 5, 92 Juno Beach 4, 11, 14, 30, 32, 53, 61, 68, 69, 70, 73, 78
Eastern Task Force 13, 14, 15, 21, 30, 31, 45, 63, 70 E-Boats 25, 27, 42, 43, 57, 73, 77, 86 Eisenhower, Dwight D. 10, 12, 13, 29, 51, 52, 54, 89, 91, 93, 94 English Channel, the 5, 13, 20, 42, 50, 63, 70, 77, 84, 89, 91, 92 Enterprise, HMS 23, 45, 90 Erebus, HMS 23, 43, 46 Exercise Fabius 10, 43 Exercise Tiger 10, 42, 43 Flores, HNMS 22, 45, 65 Follow-up Force B 4, 15, 24 Follow-up Force L 4, 15, 22 Fury, HMS 46, 70, 85 German Army 352. Infanterie-Division 25, 64, 66 709. Infanterie-Division 25 Infanterie-Regiment 726 78 Infanterie-Regiment 736 78 Panzergrenadier-Regiment 192 78
Hais pipes 49, 89 Hamel pipes 49, 89 Hall USN, Rear-Admiral John L. 14, 15, 22, 55, 63 Hennecke, Konteradmiral Walther 16, 17, 27 H-Hour 30, 44, 45, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 93 Hitler, Adolf 6, 9, 16, 19, 34, 35, 86
Kirk, Rear-Admiral Alan G. 14, 22, 44, 63 Krancke, Admiral Theodor 16, 25, 86 Kriegsmarine 16, 17, 26, 27, 35, 72, 86 Landing Craft Assault (LCA) 6, 12, 21, 24, 37, 38, 39, 57, 61, 80 Landing Craft Guns (LCGs) 57, 68, 69, 73 Landing Craft Infantry Small (LCI(S)) 37, 39 Landing Craft Tank (LCT) 21, 22, 23, 24, 37, 38, 39, 54, 57, 61, 62, 64, 65, 69, 71, 80, 81, 85 Landing Craft Tank Rocket (LCT(R)) 39, 54, 57, 64, 68, 69 Landing Craft Vehicle Personnel (LCVP) 8, 39, 48, 53, 64, 69, 77, 80, 85 Landing Ship Infantry (LSI) 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 36, 37, 61, 71, 85 Landing Ship Tank (LST) 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 37, 42, 56, 71, 80, 81, 85, 90 Le Havre 4, 25, 27, 31, 33, 45, 46, 50, 69, 71, 77, 86 Longues Battery 26, 35 Luftwaffe 25, 26, 72, 73, 86 Montgomery, General Sir Bernard 13, 29, 51, 93 Moon, Rear-Admiral Don P. 14, 23, 56, 63
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Morgan, Lt. Gen. Sir Frederick 28, 29, 94 Mulberry harbours 11, 28, 34, 46, 47, 48, 77, 81, 84, 85, 93
Pointe du Hoc 19, 62, 63, 66 Port-en-Bessin 30, 67, 68, 81, 88
Nelson, HMS 21, 44 Nevada, USS 23, 44, 45, 60, 90 Newhaven 4, 31, 32, 56 Normandy 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 24, 25, 34, 36, 43, 48, 50, 52, 53, 57, 60, 73, 81, 85, 89, 90, 91, 93, 94 North Africa 5, 8, 13, 36
Ramillies, HMS 18, 21, 44, 71, 92, 94 Ramsay, Admiral Sir Bertram 10, 13, 15, 19, 21, 36, 43, 51, 52, 54, 77, 91, 93 Rhino ferries 38, 47, 80, 84, 85 Rieve, Vizeadmiral Friedrich 16, 17, 27 River Orne 11, 30, 45, 69, 78, 79, 81, 94 Roberts, HMS 21, 43, 45, 46, 92, 94 Rodney, HMS 21, 44 Rommel, Generalfeldmarschall Erwin 34, 35 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 6, 8, 9, 12, 19, 44 Royal Air Force (RAF), the 33, 43, 57, 72, 87 Royal Navy, the 8, 13, 14, 15, 19, 32, 36, 50, 60, 68, 92, 94
Oliver, Commodore Geoffrey N. 15, 21, 70 Omaha Beach 4, 8, 11, 25, 26, 30, 32, 52, 62, 63, 65, 66, 68, 72, 79, 81 Operation Anvil 14, 29 Operation Dynamo 13 Operation Neptune 4, 5, 9, 10, 13, 14, 19, 20, 24, 27, 32, 36, 39, 43, 46, 51, 52, 53, 61, 72, 73, 77, 84, 86, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94 Operation Overlord 10, 28, 46, 51, 52, 55 Operation Roundup 6, 10 Operation Torch 8, 13, 14 Operation Weserübung 17 Orion, HMS 22, 45, 68 Pacific Fleet 19, 60 Parry, Rear-Admiral W. 15, 22 Pas de Calais 19, 49, 73, 86 Phoenix caissons 47, 48, 80, 84, 85, 93 Pipe Line Under the Ocean (PLUTO) 11, 19, 20, 34, 49, 88, 89
Quincy, USS 23, 45, 90
Schnellboot 25, 42 Shoreham 4, 31, 32, 56 Sicily 8, 13, 14, 15, 36, 50 Slapton Sands 42, 43 Southwick House 51, 53, 54, 93 Spithead 31, 56 Stalin, Joseph 8, 9 St Laurent 48, 63, 67, 80, 82, 84 Sword Beach 4, 14, 25, 30, 32, 49, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 78, 79, 81, 87, 94
Talbot, Rear-Admiral Arthur G. 15, 21, 56, 70 Texas, USS 19, 22, 44, 62, 63, 90, 92 Tuscaloosa, USS 23, 45, 60, 63, 90 U-Boats 26, 35, 50, 73, 77 US Air Force (USAAF) 33, 43, 72 82nd Airborne Division 4, 66 101st Airborne Division 4, 30, 66, 67, 72 US Army 7, 94 4th Cavalry Squadron Engineers 63, 66, 67 101st Division 66, 67 8th Infantry Regiment 61, 66, 67 16th Infantry Regiment 66, 67 116th Infantry Regiment 66, 67 US Coastguard 9, 20 US Navy 13, 14, 15, 19, 29 Utah Beach 4, 6, 11, 20, 25, 30, 32, 42, 43, 46, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 66 Vian, Rear-Admiral Sir Phillip 14, 15, 21, 70 Warspite, HMS 21, 44, 45, 50, 71 Western Task Force 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, 30, 31, 43, 44, 45, 62, 63 Whale (piers and floating runways) 47, 48, 80, 84 World War I 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 43, 44, 49 World War II 16, 50, 55, 92, 94 X20 53, 69
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AUTHOR’S NOTE
First published in Great Britain in 2014 by Osprey Publishing, PO Box 883, Oxford, OX1 9PL, UK PO Box 3985, New York, NY 10185-3985, USA E-mail:
[email protected]
I should like to thank Stephen Courtney of the National Museum of the Royal Navy at Portsmouth and the TS Collection for their help in tracking down and supplying many of the illustrations used in this book.
© 2014 Osprey Publishing Ltd
ARTIST’S NOTE
OSPREY PUBLISHING IS PART OF THE OSPREY GROUP. All rights reserved. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the copyright owner. Enquiries should be addressed to the Publishers.
Readers may care to note that the original paintings from which the color plates in this book were prepared are available for private sale. The Publishers retain all reproduction copyright whatsoever. All enquiries should be addressed to: Howard Gerrard, 11 Oaks Road, Tenterden, Kent, TN30 6RD, UK The Publishers regret that they can enter into no correspondence upon this matter.
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.
THE WOODLAND TRUST
ISBN: 978 1 4728 0271 2 E-book ISBN: 978 1 4728 0272 9 E-pub ISBN: 978 1 4728 0273 6
Osprey Publishing are supporting the Woodland Trust, the UK’s leading woodland conservation charity, by funding the dedication of trees.
Editorial by Ilios Publishing Ltd, Oxford, UK (www.iliospublishing.com) Index by Mark Swift Typeset in Myriad Pro and Sabon Maps by Bounford.com 3D bird’s-eye view by The Black Spot Battlescene illustrations by Howard Gerrard Originated by PDQ Media, Bungay, UK
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Key to military symbols
Army Group
Army
Corps
Division
Brigade
Regiment
Battalion
Company/Battery
Platoon
Section
Squad
Infantry
Artillery
Cavalry
Air defence
Air Force
Air mobile
Air transportable
Amphibious
Headquarters
Maintenance
Airborne Unit HQ
Anti-tank
Armour
Air aviation
Bridging
Engineer
Medical
Missile
Mountain
Navy
Nuclear, biological, Ordnance chemical
Reconnaissance
Signal
Supply
Transport movement
Rocket artillery
Parachute
Air defence artillery
Key to unit identification Unit identifier
Parent unit Commander (+) with added elements (–) less elements
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