The Battle of Britain (Explore Series)

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7 5 TH A N N I V E R S A RY S P E C I A L

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Combat Stories

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World War Heroes Remembered

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Hurricane BACKBONE OF FIGHTER COMMAND

The Luftwaffe’s planned assault on London and RAF

Pictorial of the Luftwaffe’s dive-bomber

THE BLENHEIM DURING THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN BY JARROD COTTER

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JUNKERS JU 87 ‘STUKA’

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he Bale of Britain, the name given to a conflict by Winston Churchill even before it had begun was a defining moment of the Second World War. It lasted from July to October 1940 and up to this point, the German forces had literally scythed their way through Europe and had it not been for the English Channel, they would have continued onwards as far as the Outer Hebrides before consolidating their position. As it was, the crucial stretch of water that separated Britain from the rest of Europe held the German forces at bay while the country re-grouped and licked its wounds from the crushing defeat that it had suffered in France. It was the foresight of Fighter Command’s Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Dowding, which gave the RAF the edge they needed to confront the might of the Luwaffe, under the command of Herman Göering who, unsurprisingly, was in confident mood. Göering boasted that his Luwaffe would destroy Fighter Command in just four days and the country’s aircra production centres in just four weeks. If he had stuck to this sole aim, the Bale would have swung in a different direction, albeit in a slightly longer timescale. The invasion of Britain could only be achieved with total aerial domination and, up to early September 1940, the Luwaffe was within a hair’s breadth of achieving just that, only to switch its tactics away from Fighter Command aircra and airfields towards civilian and industrial targets. Fighter Command was then given crucial time in which to repair its airfields, rest and re-group front-line squadrons while London suffered the early stages of a long Blitz. The onslaught began on September 7, 1940 when the Luwaffe unleashed the largest bombing raid the world had ever witnessed and, in doing so, effectively lost the Bale of Britain. The raid represented an admission by the German forces that Britain could not be invaded easily and it was only a maer of time before the tables turned. Unfortunately, it would take another five years of bier war but the inevitability of Germany’s eventful defeat was clear for all to see following the outcome of the Bale. By moving the main aim of the Bale – to destroy the RAF in the air and on the ground – Göering had lost the Bale. With regard to Britain, it was not really a victory, more a bale for survival which it achieved with a reasonably strong air force still intact. There is no doubt that Germany did come very close to achieving invasion, something which had not occurred in this country since 1066!

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The Bale of Britain - 75th Anniversary Special is published once a year by MyTimeMedia Ltd, Enterprise House, Enterprise Way, Edenbridge, Kent TN8 6HF © MyTimeMedia Ltd. 2015. All rights reserved ISSN 977205721601704. The Publisher’s wrien consent must be obtained before any part of this publication may be reproduced in any form whatsoever, including photocopiers, and information retrieval systems. All reasonable care is taken in the preparation of the magazine contents, but the publishers cannot be held legally responsible for errors in the contents of this magazine or for any loss however arising from such errors, including loss resulting from negligence of our staff. Reliance placed upon the contents of this magazine is at reader’s own risk.

Acknowledgements Special thanks to Jon Molyneux who helped with various photographs from his collection throughout this publication. Thanks also Jarrod Coer and Alastair Goodrum for producing articles and to Clavework Graphics and Andy Hay (www.flyingart.co.uk).

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Contents

A scene captured during the making of the film Bale of Britain in 1969. Via Jon Molyneux

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Battle of Britain 75th Anniversary Special

6 14 24 32 38 40 46 54 64 70 78 86 92

The Battle of Britain Story – Part 1 ‘The Luftwaffe’s opening gambit’ Behind the Battle – 6 OTU RAF Sutton bridge by Alastair Goodrum The Battle of Britain Story – Part 2 ‘Attack of Eagles’ The backbone of Fighter Command – the Hurricane by Martyn Chorlton Fighter Command’s only Victoria Cross – James Nicolson He 111 ‘The Spade’ – pictorial of the Luftwaffe’s main bomber The Battle of Britain Story – Part 3 ‘Fighter Command at bay’ Ju 87 ‘Stuka’ – pictorial of the Luftwaffe’s dive-bomber by Jarrod Cotter RAF Bentley Prior – Dowding’s office by Jarrod Cotter ‘Stuffy’ Dowding and ‘The Few’ Bader and RAF Coltishall by Mick Jennings MBE Blenheims in the Battle of Britain by Jarrod Cotter The Battle of Britain Story – Part 4 ‘Target London’

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

The Battle of Photographs supplied by Jon Molyneux unless otherwise stated

The early stages of the Bale of Britain panned out well for the Luwaffe, who successfully drew Fighter Command uncomfortably forward in order to protect coastal convoys which were of lile strategic importance at the time.

General air offensive

L

ong before the completion of the German military campaign in France, the strategists of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht were planning the next phase of the war against Britain. Regardless of the diplomatic moves by Hitler to achieve peace with Britain, there was no doubt that a rapid conclusion of the war in Western Europe was an essential part of German strategy. It was obvious that the next phase of offensive operations against Britain would be different from the Blitzkrieg tactics that had served the German armies so well. Three options were on the table. The first, a maritime blockade of British lines of supply by using surface ships,

U-boats and aircra. This option would take time, and the naval bases which were situated in Western Europe had yet to be prepared. Next was a terror bombing campaign against Britain that might lead to eventual surrender; mass demonstrations of air power had precipitated the fall of the Netherlands in May 1940 and brought about the bloodless occupation of Denmark. The third option was a seaborne invasion of the southern coast of England, preceded by the Luwaffe’s achievement of air superiority over the southern portion of the country. While the Luwaffe was still involved in operations against Dunkirk and the armies of

Hurricane Mk I, P3059 and P3208 of 501 (County of Gloucester) Squadron, taking off from Rochester in early August 1940; both were shot down by Bf109s over Canterbury on August 18 within five minutes of each other.

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Allies in France, Hitler issued a somewhat vague directive to OKL (Oberkommando der Luwaffe) calling for ‘unlimited freedom of action’ in aacks against England as soon as strength had been regained following the completion of the campaign in France. Plans for a general air offensive against Britain now began to take form. On June 30, the Oberbefehlshaber der Luwaffe, Hermann Göering, issued an operational order to the Luwaffe regarding the conduct and aims of the forthcoming offensive. The plan called for the following: 1. The establishment and build-up of bomber and fighter bases in France, Belgium and the

Britain Netherlands. 2. The testing of the resilience of RAF Fighter Command’s air defences by aacks through small formations of bombers and dive-bombers, escorted by fighters, against British shipping in the Channel. 3. A full-scale counter air offensive, by day and by night, against the RAF both in the air and on the ground. 4. An aerial blockade of British ports and sea communications to prevent the continued supply of oil, arms and foodstuffs from the Commonwealth and the United States. The order concluded: ‘So long as the enemy

air force is not defeated the prime requirement of the air war is to aack the enemy air force on every possible opportunity by day or night, in the air or on the ground, without consideration of other tasks.’ While the Luwaffe prepared itself for this task, the Führer was considering the option of invading Britain with considerable prudence. However, on 2 July, Hitler, through the medium of OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht), issued the first of many directives concerning the invasion: ‘The Führer and Supreme Commander has decided: That a landing in England is possible, providing that air superiority can be aained and certain other

The Early Stages

Supermarine Spitfire Mk I, R6596 ‘QJ-S’ as flown by Plt Off A Wright of 92 Squadron based at Pembrey, South Wales in August 1940. Clavework Graphics

necessary conditions be fulfilled. The date of commencement is still undecided. All preparations to be begun immediately.’

Air superiority essential Growing emphasis on the invasion began to show itself in the plans of OKH and OKL from the beginning of July, despite the fact that Hitler was still cautious about the whole plan. His aitude changed when the final aempts to achieve peace collapsed. On July 16, he issued Directive No.16, termed the ‘Preparation of a Landing Operation against England’. In part, this

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

concluded: ‘Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation, still shows no sign of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to prepare a landing operation against England, and if necessary to carry it out. ‘The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English homeland as a base for the carrying on of the war against Germany, and, if necessary to occupy it completely.’ Codenamed Unternehmen Seelöwe (Operation Sealion) the plan was expected to be carried successfully through by mid-August. In the meantime, it was now the task of the Luwaffe to sound out the fighting potential of its immediate enemy, RAF Fighter Command, and to destroy all opposition when this had been achieved. Only with the defeat of the RAF and the achievement of air superiority over England could Operation Sealion go ahead.

Well-organized defence The burden of air defence by day and by night would fall upon Air Chief Marshal (ACM) Sir Hugh Dowding’s RAF Fighter Command, with its HQ at Bentley Priory over the coming months. The primary commitment of the command in 1940 was to defend the aircra and engine

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industry upon which it relied, and thereaer Britain as a whole. Fighter Command was organized on a territorial basis and its force of interceptors operated with a unique system of fighter control based on radio and radar. The defence of London and South East England came under Air Vice-Marshal (AVM) Keith R. Park’s 11 (Fighter) Group; the Midlands and East Anglia, where many of the vital aircra industries lay, came under 12 (Fighter) Group commanded by AVM Trafford L Leigh-Mallory; 13 (Fighter) Group, under AVM R E Saul, defended northern England. A fourth group, 10, came into existence on July 13, 1940 for the defence of south-western England: its commander was AVM Sir Quentin Brand. Each Group was divided into Sectors for the purpose of the sophisticated ground-to-air fighter control now used operationally within the command. The RAF was the first to incorporate a radar system in its defensive structure. Controlled by 60 (Signals) Group, the radar network consisted of a line of long-range early-warning radar stations (termed RDF, or Radio Direction Finding, until 1944) backed by shorter ranged stations that could pick up the elusive low-flying aircra. The long-range RDF stations were termed Chain Home (CH), operated on 22-52 MHz (5.8 to

Messerschmi Bf 110C-6 ‘M8+EP’ of ZG 76 pictured over the English Channel in August 1940. Like most Luwaffe machines prior to the Bale of Britain, the Bf 110 enjoyed an element of superiority which was soon exposed by the tactics of Fighter Command.

10.0m) wavelength and had a maximum pick-up range of 120miles (193km) with calculated altitude. The Chain Home Low (CHL) stations catered for the low-flyer, working on 200 MHz (1.5m) and with a maximum range of 50miles (80km). By June 1940, there were 21 CH and 30 CHL stations in existence. All looked out to sea to offer immediate plots on any aircra that were approaching the shores of Britain; the only gaps in RDF coverage were in north west Scotland, the Bristol Channel and in parts of the Welsh coast. The location and tracking of enemy aircra over land were the tasks of the Observer Corps (soon to become the Royal Observer Corps) and they relied solely on aural and visual methods. All information received from the RDF stations was passed to the Filter Room at HQ, Fighter Command, where the details of enemy strength, bearing, altitude and distance were analysed and converted into a ‘plot’ for display on a horizontal

The Early Stages

air situation table. From the Filter Room, the details were sent by land-line to the relevant Sector Operations and Group Operations Rooms. Differentiation between enemy and friendly aircra was deduced by the carriage of IFF transponders in all RAF aircra. Over land, the position of friendly fighters was determined by high-frequency direction-finding, while their control was conducted on HF radio-telephones (TR 9 radio-transmiers). The backbone of Fighter Command was the Hawker Hurricane Mk I which, early in July 1940, equipped 26 squadrons; 19 squadrons (Nos. 19, 41, 54, 64, 65, 66, 72, 74, 92, 152, 222, 234, 266, 602, 603, 609, 610, 611 and 616) were equipped with Supermarine Spitfire Mk IA; two squadrons, Nos. 141 and 264, operated with the two-seater, turret-armed Boulton Paul Defiant; and six squadrons were equipped with the Bristol Blenheim Mk IF for night-fighter duties. On July 6, 1940, Fighter Command had 644 fighters combat ready out of an initial establishment of 871. Much work had been done to improve the combat efficiency of the Hurricane and Spitfire: the installation of Rotol and de Havilland constant-speed propellers offered an additional 7,000 to the ceiling, and improved rates of climb; the 2in (50mm) armour-glass windscreen and 1/4in (6.35mm) steel backplate were standard; the rate of fire of the eight-gun armament was increased by the use of the Browning Mk II machine-gun, while the de Wilde incendiary-tracer round offered easier aiming. The most crucial factor for the command in the forthcoming conflict with the Luwaffe would lie in the shortage of operational fighter pilots.

May 15-16, 1940, when 90 Vickers Wellingtons, Armstrong Whitworth Whitleys and Handley Page Hampdens aacked installations in the Ruhr. Thereaer, Bomber Command was to operate whenever the weather permied to play a vital, if constantly under-emphasized, part in the Bale of Britain. Two Fliegerkorps were assigned to establish air superiority over the Channel, focussing on British shipping in an operation called the Kanalkampf. General der Flieger Bruno Loerzer’s II Fliegerkorps, operating from bases in the Pas-de-Calais, was to close the Straits of Dover, while General der Flieger Wolfram, Freiherr von Richthofen’s VIII Fliegerkorps was to operate over

and bombers in the air was to be unreliable. The two Fliegerkorps charged with the closure of the Channel to British shipping were only part of the strength of Lufloen II and III, which were establishing bases in the Netherlands, Belgium and France for the next round of operations. In addition, Lufloe V, based in Denmark and Norway, under the command of Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff, was to act on the flanks and over the North Sea with the anti-shipping and bomber aircra of X Fliegerkorps. An escalation in Luwaffe activity was evident on July 3, when single Do 17Z-ls and Ju 88A-ls made daylight aacks: these roamed over Berkshire with aacks on White Waltham airfield

Part of Britain’s vital Chain Home (CH) radar network at Poling in West Sussex.

The Kanalkampf begins Acting on a directive of May 26, the Luwaffe commenced limited night operations against Britain while the Dunkirk evacuation was still progressing. On the night of June 5, 30 Junkers Ju 88A-ls and Heinkel He 111H-ls of Kampfgeschwader 4 (KG 4) and 30 (KG 30) aacked targets on the British mainland: in a raid on Mildenhall I./KG 4 lost four Heinkels, including one flown by the Gruppenkommandeur. On the following night, a similar force was sent. Following a lull, airfields in Lincolnshire, Norfolk and Yorkshire were aacked on the night of June 18 and thereaer some 60 or more bombers operated nightly over Britain. German losses were due mostly to the effects of anti-aircra fire, despite the average of 40 sorties flown by Fighter Command’s Hurricanes and Blenheim Mk IFs. The aacks on airfields were prompted by the launch of RAF Bomber Command’s first strategic bombing offensive, which started on the night of

the western portion of the Channel from airfields near Le Havre and in the Cotentin peninsula. Within II Fliegerkorps, Oberst Johannes Fink had operational control of KG 2 (Dornier Do 17Z-1) and the dive-bombers of II./StG 1 and IV(Stuka)/ LG 1; fighter protection was afforded by Oberst Theodor Osterkamp’s JG 51 and, aer July 12, by Hauptmann Walter Kienitz’ III./JG 3. The task of the Messerschmi Bf 109E units was to seek out and destroy the RAF fighter squadrons sent up to intercept Fink’s bomber force. The VIII. Fliegerkorps was covered by the Bf 109Es of JG 27 and JG 53 initially, as other units were re-equipped in Germany. The tactics employed by the Jagdgruppen during the Kanalkampf consisted of medium- and high-altitude freelance sweeps, known as freie Jagd (free chases), in which the speed and manoeuvrability of the Bf 109E was advantageous. But, for the Luwaffe, no form of ground-to-fighter control existed, while even the communication between fighters

and the RAOC depot at Thatcham. At 0841hrs the following day, 39 Ju 87B-2 dive-bombers of III/StG 51, escorted by III./JG 27, aacked shipping and naval installations at Portland; at 1400hrs bombers of KG 2, covered by I./JG 51, aacked a convoy traversing the Straits of Dover, whilst, inland, single bombers aacked the Aldershot barracks. Aacks on convoys, the freie Jagd missions, by high-flying Bf 109Es, and inland aacks by single bombers now formed the daily paern. On July 9, the Boulton Paul aircra works at Norwich were aacked, with other raids directed at RAF airfields in Cardiganshire and the docks at Cardiff. The most important raids were those on Dover, Falmouth, Plymouth, Portland and Weymouth during the period July 2-9: in the course of this week, Dowding posted fighter squadrons to coastal airfields, where they usually operated at a disadvantage against the Bf 109Es which had the tactical benefit of superior altitude. 79 Squadron moved to Hawkinge from

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN Biggin Hill, 65 to Manston from Hornchurch and 238 and 501 to Warmwell (operational from July 5) from Middle Wallop for shipping protection duties. On July 8, the newly-formed 10 (Fighter) Group took over the airfields and squadrons at Pembrey, Exeter and St Eval, thereby relieving 11 Group of the responsibility of the defence of south western England. The first major action of the Kanalkampf took place on July 10, 1940: at about 1050hrs, a reconnaissance Dornier of 4.(F)121, escorted by I./JG 51, was intercepted by six Spitfires of 74 Squadron under command of Sqn Ldr A G Malan, off the North Foreland. At the same time, 610 Squadron’s Spitfires engaged a frei Jagd mission over the Straits. The subject of the Dornier’s aention was the convoy ‘Bread’, sailing up the Thames Estuary. At 1331hrs, the first radar plots indicated the build-up of a heavy raid forming over the Pas-de-Calais, and the details were passed to 11 Group. This raid materialized into some 26 Do 17Z-ls of I./KG 2 escorted by I./ZG 26’s Messerschmi Bf 110C-2 heavy fighters and two Staffeln of the I./JG3; a major dogfight involving over 100 aircra took place off the North Foreland when the Sptifires and Hurricanes of 32, 74 and 111 Squadrons intercepted. The fighting of July 10 is regarded as the first day of the opening phase of the Bale of Britain, despite the previous spate of operations. The escalation of the Luwaffe’s probing aacks on the previous day were formalized on July 11 by the issue of the first directive, termed the ‘Intensive Air War against Britain’, by the Luwaffenführungs-stab (OKL Operations Staff): the directive gave orders for preliminary aacks against shipping and raids on a limited number of targets. It was on this day, also, that Fighter Command’s combats with VIII. Fliegerkorps off Portland marked the beginning of the end of the vaunted and over-inflated reputation of the Ju 87 Stuka and the Bf 110C Zerstörer.

The vulnerable Stuka

Two of the key German players during the Bale of Britain; Oberbefehlshaber der Luwaffe, Reichsmarschall Hermann Göering (Le) and Major Adolf Galland, the Gruppenkommandeur of III./JG 26 operating the Bf 109E.

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During the raids of the early morning, the Stukas escaped with relative impunity. Then, shortly before 1100hrs, the Ventnor CH located an enemy formation, consisting of two Staffeln of III./StG 2 escorted by III./ZG 76, heading for Portland. Elements of 87, 213, 145 and 601 Squadrons made contact and were able to claim several Ju 87s: the RAF pilots found the Stuka relatively easy to follow down in its 70° dive and discovered that the aircra was highly vulnerable to the effects of fire from eight machine-guns. The Bf 110C-2s of III./ZG 76 were unable to turn with the more nimble RAF fighters and were forced to form defensive circles: four were shot

The Early Stages

Messerschmi Bf109E-3 of 4/JG26. Clavework Graphics

A derivative of the Dornier Do 17 ‘Flying Pencil’ family, the Do 215 was mainly used during the Bale of Britain for long-range reconnaissance operations.

Over-shadowed by the Supermarine Spitfire in almost every respect, the Hurricane was the workhorse and backbone of Fighter Command and was always available in numbers when needed thanks to its more simplistic design.

down. The 609 sorties flown by Fighter Command on this day marked the hardest fighting to be experienced since the fall of France and represented only the beginning. Operations were limited by the weather. In general, flying conditions were not good, with particularly bad weather experienced during the periods July 14-19, and July 30 to August 7. Cloud base was usually 2,000 to 3,000 (610 to 915m) with visibility down to 3miles (4.8km) or less and the changeable weather seemed to have governed the incidence of Luwaffe aacks during this time. Twenty-five major raids (twelve or more aircra) were recorded between July 2 and August 7, of which seven were directed to the Portland and Isle of Wight areas, two to the Thames Estuary and the remainder against Dover. The weather improved on July 19 and the presence of several convoys in the Channel prompted the Luwaffe into action: in anticipation of action, RAF flights and squadrons were moved from their sector airfields to forward bases on the coast as was now the practice in 10

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN 23 Squadron Bristol Blenheim Mk IF, L8687, flown by Squadron Leader O’Brien, was credited with shooting down a Heinkel He111P down near Six Mile Boom June 18/19, 1940. Andy Hay/www.flyingart.co.uk

and 11 (Fighter) Groups. At 1200hrs, RDF reports were received of build ups over the Pas-de-Calais but, 15 minutes later, a Staffel of Ju 87B-2s slipped through the screen to dive-bomb two destroyers in Dover harbour.

Erroneous tactics Loerzer’s II Fliegerkorps made particularly heavy aacks on convoys in the Straits of Dover on July 25, and for the first time since the start of Kanalkampf, RAF squadrons were overwhelmed by vastly superior numbers of Bf 109Es operating at height: 54 and 64 Squadrons, both equipped with Spitfire Mk IAs and manned by experienced pilots, suffered such losses that the former was withdrawn to re-equip. Luwaffe aacks on coastal convoys, isolated daylight raids inland and constant night aacks continued to be the paern of air fighting until August 8, when, with the advent of good weather, the bale was intensified. Despite the major advantage of having radar, RAF Fighter Command was forced to defend strategically unimportant convoys as the result of misguided policy on the part of the Admiralty and the Air Staff. The Luwaffe held the initiative, if not the element of surprise: the theatre of air fighting was the Channel, where RAF fighter squadrons were engaged from superior altitude and, in greater numbers, by the Bf 109Es of The main Luwaffe fighter during mid to late 1940 was the excellent Messerschmi Bf109E. Messerschmi Archiv via editor

The Blenheim was another RAF machine which featured during the Bale of Britain with some success, especially at night with 23 Squadron based at Digby during July 1940. Seated from le: Ensor; Baker; Harding; Duke-Woolley; Sqn Ldr Bicknell; Sqn Ldr O’Brien; Knight; Anderson; Cooper-Key; Gawith. Standing from le: Swan; Young; Sgt Bicknell; Willans; Atkinson; Grogan; Duff; Hoole; Orgias; Pushman; Gillespie; Burton; Penford; Dann; Rose. 23 Squadron Association via Alastair Goodrum

Jagd-fliegerfuhrer Nrn 2 and 3 acting with flair and initiative on the lethal frei Jagd missions. Frei Jagd tactics negated the advantage of radar and their effect upon the arition suffered by squadrons in 10 and 11 (Fighter) Groups caused grave concern to both Dowding and the Air Staff. In major bales over the Channel (July 10 to August 7), Fighter Command lost 49 Hurricanes,

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Spitfires and Defiants, with 30 pilots killed or missing, for combat claims of 108 enemy aircra destroyed: operations as a whole over the same period resulted in the destruction of 75 RAF fighters and the loss of 40 pilots. Fighter Command’s strength of 52 squadrons rose during July 1940 to 55, plus six under training, including 1 (RCAF) Squadron; three new units were also

formed, these were 302 and 303 (Polish) and 310 (Czech). There was still a shortage of pilots: despite the combats, figures rose from 1,259 on July 6 to 1,434 on August 3 (a shortfall of 124), but the effect of increased output from the OTU establishments was to be cancelled out by the increase of air fighting that took place on August 8, 1940 and from that day on.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Behind the Battle Photographs supplied by Jon Molyneux unless otherwise stated

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The role of the fledgling fighter Operational Training Units in providing fresh, fully trained pilots was crucial during the Bale of Britain. Alastair Goodrum relates the contribution by 6 OTU, RAF Suon Bridge.

Behind the Battle

No 6 OTU, RAF Suon Bridge from the air in the summer of 1940. Peter Green Collection

Filling the gaps in the frontline So much are we in awe of the frenetic, day-byday bale over southern England that it is easy to forget how critical the fighter pilot arition rate was and how it was handled. Losses sustained during the Bale of France and Dunkirk would leave Dowding 400 pilots short by the end of June 1940. Ideally he needed re-supply at the rate of 300 pilots a month but existing sources and training programmes could not deliver this, so a drastic rethink was needed. It is a sobering thought, therefore, that many of Churchill’s Few had not even climbed into a Hurricane or Spitfire before Adler Tag dawned. What follows gives a flavour of how the RAF filled

Staff of 6 OTU in front of the Officers Mess at RAF Suon Bridge, June 2, 1940. From le: Flt Lt H.C.V. Jolleff; Flt Lt George Greaves; Fg Off K.C. Jackman; Fg Off A.A.M. Dawbarn; Sqn Ldr Philip Pinkham; Flt Lt P.A.N. Cox; Fg Off H.A. Yeo; Plt Off D.G. Smallwood; Fg Off A.W.A. Bayne. One week later, Philip Pinkham AFC (Air Force Cross) was posted to command 19 Squadron and was KIA on September 5, 1940. Philip Cox went to 501 Squadron on June 21, 1940 as a flight commander and was MIA (Missing in Action) on July 27, 1940. Alfred Bayne went to 17 Squadron, fought in the Bale of Britain and survived the war. via PN Saunders

some of the gaps in its front line by taking a look at the work of 6 OTU (Operational Training Unit), a Hurricane conversion unit based at RAF Suon Bridge in Lincolnshire, whose role in the nation’s defence began well before the official start of the Bale of Britain. On March 10, 1940, with a complement of seven Hurricanes, three Harvards, five Mentors and one Gladiator, 6 OTU, its aeroplanes and a team of instructors under the command of Sqn Ldr Philip Pinkham AFC, arrived at Suon Bridge from St Athan. Formerly known as 11 Pilot Pool, it now became part of 12 Group and one of two Hurricane OTUs operating in 1940, the other being 5 OTU based at Aston Down.

6 OTU, No.5 Course

Posted to

Notes

Plt Off R.H. Dibnah

1 Sqn

* Surv Survived war

Plt Off G.E. Goodman

1 Sqn

KIA (Killed in Action) 1941 * Palestinian; K

Plt Off C.M. Stavart

1 Sqn

* Survived war

Plt Off H.W. Eliot

73 Sqn

* KIA A 1945 1

Sgt Friend

73 Sqn

Plt Off A. McFadden

73 Sqn

* KIA 1942

Plt Off V.D.M. Roe

73 Sqn

1940 KIA KI May 14, 194 40 France

Plt Off R.D. Ruer

73 Sqn

S war * Survived

Plt Off D.H. Wissler

85 Sqn

November with 17 Squadron * MIA Novembe er 11, 1940 wit

Plt Off P.L. Jarvis

87 Sq Sqn

KIA May 14, 1940 19 France

Plt Off A.E. LeBreuilly

87 Sqn

MIA May 14, 14 1940 France

Sgt E.J. Penike

87 Sqn

Survive Survived vived war

Sgt K.N.V. Townsend

607 07 Sqn

Sgt Wright: Injured in training accident with L2009 into a hillside near Dishforth, Yorks. th 6 OTU on April 22, 1940. Lost in fog, crashed L20

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* = Fought in Bale of Britain.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

The memorial to all those who trained at RAF Suon Bridge. The plinth is topped with a propeller blade, recovered by the Fenland & West Norfolk Aircra Preservation Society, from 6/56 OTU Hurricane, L2529, that crashed at Tilney St Lawrence on 21/3/41. Martyn Chorlton

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Behind the Battle

Hurricane Is of 111 Squadron at Northolt in July 1938. The aircra line-up includes: (from foreground) L1559, L1560, L1548, L1552 and L1555, all of which flew with 6 OTU during the Bale of Britain period. via Peter Green

Wasting no time, the next day, the first course to be run at the station, No.5, got under way. Each training course was scheduled to last roughly six weeks although this was rapidly reduced as that fateful summer progressed. In that length of time, the intention was to teach pupils how to fly a Hurricane, hopefully without bending it and themselves too much; something of what to expect in an operational squadron situation and perhaps how to stay alive in bale. Aer combat operations with 607 Squadron, Flt Lt Bill Whiy was posted to 6 OTU on September 8, 1940. He recalled: “OTUs did not come under Training Command and we were not trained instructors, so ideas about step by step training with tests two or three times while the pupil was on the course, were generally lacking. You could only watch him while he was in formation with you in the air and talk to him on the ground aerwards. Numbered flying exercises, for each pupil to carry out, were first described on the ground then practised in the air, oen by the pupil flying alone. Generally pupils were given dual on the Harvard or Master then sent off solo on the Hurricane. This might be followed by cross-country flights, formations, aerobatics and simulated ‘dog-fights’. Late in the course, pupils would be sent over to the Aerial Gunnery Flight, for air firing experience but its tow-aircra serviceability was poor. We complained bierly about this situation because it meant pupils did not get enough - if any - live ammo time. In those days things were not well organised and no-one bothered to check on the effectiveness of one’s particular training method. I had my own routine worked out, which basically was to try to ensure all my pupils were happy with their aeroplane when airborne and learned to spend plenty of time practicing watching for Huns - or they wouldn’t know what hit them when they went on ops!” Commencing on March 11, 1940, fourteen students made up the first fighter pilot course, graduating from Suon Bridge on April 27, aer about six weeks of training. It was followed, on April 28, by the start of No.6 Course with another 18 pilots but, before long, batches of trainees became smaller, more frequent and less defined, at least until groups of foreign pilots began to arrive. When the Wehrmacht invaded France and the Low Countries on May 10, backed up by the

In reality, if Fighter Command was to have any chance of growing sufficiently to defend mainland Britain, there was no choice but to send the ex-OTU ‘new-boys’ into the fray, thus releasing what was left of the combat-weary ‘old-hands’ to inject backbone into new units and pass on their combat experience. Luwaffe, with one exception, the whole of No.5 Course was pitched headlong into the thick of the Blitzkreig in France.

Operational inexperience Denis Wissler’s inexperience (200 hours total, with just a handful on the Hurricane) was quickly recognised by 85 Squadron’s CO who kept him off operations for as long as possible. By May 12, though, losses meant that he had to take his chances with the rest. Despite tiredness, enemy bombing and combat itself, he managed to survive, returning to Debden when the squadron was withdrawn to re-build. Posted to 17 Squadron on June 8, he joined it in France on the following day, surviving more combats to return to Debden again on June 19. Denis went into action at the start of the Bale of Britain and fought until he was wounded and crash-landed at Debden on September 24. Back in action on October 10, his luck finally ran out on November 11 when he was shot down off the Essex coast and reported as Missing In Action. Such was the mounting loss rate in France that in 1 Squadron for example, by May 20, less than a month aer leaving Suon Bridge, Stavart and Goodman were leading sections of aircra

several times daily on combat sorties while Dibnah, who was equally commied, was put out of operations for three months with a thigh wound. Exhausted by incessant - though successful - air combat, mounting losses and a nomadic existence, the squadron was forced to re-organise in France in late-May. The CO, Sqn Ldr P J H Halahan, pleaded with authority to replace his dwindling pool of experienced pilots and return them to England before they all succumbed to the inexorable arition rate. Not only were combat losses among the pre-war trained pilots and early products of 11 Group Pool robbing Dowding of his hard core of experienced men, but he was also short of replacements and equally short of men capable of teaching them how to stay alive in the air. In reality, if Fighter Command was to have any chance of growing sufficiently to defend mainland Britain, there was no choice but to send the ex-OTU ‘new-boys’ into the fray, thus releasing what was le of the combat-weary ‘old-hands’ to inject backbone into new units and pass on their combat experience. The new boys, too, acquied themselves with honour and those who survived went on to play a key role in the next big bale - the Bale of Britain. Halahan’s recommendation was accepted

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN Hurricane and pilots of 17 Squadron during the Bale of France. First le: Fg Off Harold BirdWilson, who instructed at 6 OTU aer the Bale of Britain. Second right: Plt Off Denis Wissler, who trained at 6 OTU in April 1940, fought in the Bales of France and Britain and was MIA on November 11, 194011/11/40. Crown Copyright OGLv.3

Pilots of 17 Squadron during the Bale of France including; first le, Plt Off Denis Wissler and third le, Fg Off Harold Bird-Wilson. Crown Copyright OGLv3

and, on May 28, the following pilots from 1 Squadron, all distinguished Bale of France veterans, each with many ‘kills’ to his credit, reported to 6 OTU Suon Bridge for duty as flying instructors. These were Fg Off J.I. Kilmartin*; Plt Off R.G. Lewis*; Plt Off P.W.O. Mould; Fg Off C.D. Palmer; Flt Sgt F.J. Soper; Fg Off W.H. Straon; Fg Off Billy Drake* and Flt Lt Prosser Hanks. (* = Fought in the Bale of Britain.) The last two were original 1 Squadron pilots, both wounded in combat in mid-May and hospitalised in England where, on recovery, they too were posted to Suon Bridge as instructors. Sqn Ldr Halahan with his remaining original members of 1 Squadron were posted to 5 OTU at Aston Down. As we can see, even some of the instructors were thrust back into bale. By June 1940, the quantity of serviceable aeroplanes which were available to 6 OTU rose to

North American Harvard I, N7001. Dual instruction was given on this type at 6 OTU. Author’s Collection

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a more practical 24 Hurricanes, four Harvards, five Mentors and three Gladiators. With effect from June 9, therefore, to get the supply of pilots flowing more effectively, flying training was organised on a ‘Flight’ basis; ‘A’ commanded by Flt Lt George Greaves, ‘B’ Flight commanded by Fg Off Cyril ‘Pussy’ Palmer and ‘C’ Flight by Fg Off Alexander (AAM) Dawbarn. Another veteran of the Bale of France, Sqn Ldr George Tomlinson, was now Officer i/c Flying, while Wg Cdr Humphrey (JH) Edwardes-Jones was appointed OC 6 OTU. Sqn Ldr Philip Pinkham* had been posted away to command 19 Squadron with which he was killed in action on September 5, 1940. The paern of training at 6 OTU was thus established and the next few courses of ex-FTS pupils - becoming ever shorter in duration provided replacements for the final weeks of the campaign in France. As the depleted squadrons returned from France during June, subsequent

Behind the Battle

Resplendent in factory-fresh, high-visibility black and yellow stripes, Fairey Bale (TT) Target Tug L5598 represents the type used to tow targets over The Wash for the Hurricane trainees to practice air-to-air gunnery. Author’s Collection

Aer fighting in France, Fg Off John Kilmartin (le) with Fg Off William Straon were both posted from 1 Squadron to become instructors at 6 OTU in May 1940. Courtesy of Kelvin Youngs/ AircrewRemembered.com

trainees helped rebuild those squadrons for the imminent Bale of Britain. No. 5 course had a duration of six weeks but No.6 lasted less than three weeks. Throughout that hectic summer some pilots were posted to squadrons with less than a week at OTU. These tended to be pilots processed by 6 OTU in parallel to the intakes from FTS. They were drawn from a variety of units - including non-operational posts - being selected or volunteering for rapid conversion to Hurricanes in a desperate aempt to top up the flow of pilots to the front line.

Some lived, some died Much has been wrien about young replacement pilots - in both World Wars - being pitched into the cauldron of bale with woefully lile experience. Some lived, some died, as the following examples show. Commissioned on May 26, 1940, Plt Off Kenneth Carver was posted to 29 Squadron at Digby, to fly the Blenheim If. His subsequent posting is an example of the policy of trawling for potential single-seat fighter pilot material as the Bale of Britain gathered momentum and highlighted gaps in manpower. Grasping the opportunity to transfer to single-engine fighters, Plt Off Carver, together with Plt Off Neville Solomon and Sgt Ronald Bumstead, were the three 29 Squadron pilots detailed to report to 6 OTU on July 16 for what was termed ‘a flying refresher course’. This term differentiated pilots being trawled from other units - or even Staff non-flying posts - from those new pilots fresh from FTS. The laer were referred to as being ‘posted in for Operational Training’ but every few days from June and throughout that fateful summer, there was a constant trickle of two or three of the former, inter-mingling with the ‘new boys’. Ken Carver recalled turning up at Suon Bridge and being billeted in the local doctor’s

house. That same day, he was confronted by his first Hurricane and swily shown over the controls. Abruptly le to himself ‘to work it all out’, he climbed into the cockpit and took off gingerly, only to be alarmed to find that the windscreen was gradually becoming obscured by leaking glycol (engine coolant fluid). Landing safely aer ‘a hairy flight’ he was blithely informed that he should not have been allocated that particular aeroplane as it had been declared unserviceable! The very next day, now considered capable of flying a Hurricane, he was posted out to join 229 Squadron at Wiering! Fortunately perhaps for Plt Off Carver, Wiering sector was prey quiet and he had time to find his feet before the squadron moved to Kent to take a more active part in the Bale. Ken Carver finally got to grips with the enemy but

was shot up and badly burned on September 11. He bailed out and survived his ordeal, returning to 229 Squadron aer many months of hospitalisation. He retired aer the war as a Squadron Leader with the DFC. Neville Solomon was less fortunate. He le Suon Bridge bound for 17 Squadron at Debden aer just three days on the Hurricane. Debden, being closer to the action, offered no gentle breaking-in period but fortunately Plt Off Solomon’s woeful lack of experience was quickly recognised and his CO packed him off for more Hurricane training, this time to 5 OTU Aston Down. It was August 15 before he returned to 17 Squadron where he took his place in action alongside his hard pressed comrades. Plt Off Solomon lasted just three days before he was shot down and killed.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN Sgt Ron Bumstead spent a lile longer at Suon Bridge, being posted out to 111 Squadron at Debden on August 26. He survived the Bale and eventually became an instructor himself. Examples of the ‘Staff Officer’ conversions occurred on May 27 when Sqn Ldr Terence Lovell-Gregg, who joined the RAF in 1931 and Sqn Ldr Henry Sawyer, in since 1933, reported to 6 OTU for a flying refresher course. Lovell-Gregg was posted to 87 Squadron on June 15, taking command of the squadron a month later. He was killed in action on August 15. Sawyer joined 65 Squadron at Hornchurch on July 2 where he also took command of his squadron a week later. He was killed on August 2 when his Spitfire crashed during take-off for a night patrol.

Miles Master I. Author’s Collection

The OTUs machines The principal aeroplane at Suon Bridge was the Hurricane, supported by the Harvard and later the Master I for dual instruction and the three-seat Mentor for radio training. The Hurricanes on the 6 OTU inventory during 1940 were Mark Is, issued pre-war to squadrons that upgraded to newer models then passed on their old or later war-weary aeroplanes for training duty. From among the thousands of Hurricanes built - or indeed destroyed - during the war and even among the hundreds which bore the brunt of back-, undercarriage- and engine-breaking duty at establishments like 6 OTU, one particular Hurricane epitomises the breed and deserves a mention. Built at Hawker’s Brooklands factory, Hurricane I, L1555 became known unofficially as State Express - aer a popular brand of cigarees of the day called State Express 555 - and was, on January Aer serving with distinction with 1 Squadron in France, Fg Off Peter ‘Boy’ Mould was posted to 6 OTU as an instructor in May 1940. Courtesy of Kelvin Youngs/AircrewRemembered.com

Suon Bridge ‘old boys’ as 1 Squadron pilots at the end of the Bale of Britain. Top from le: F/L Arthur ‘Darkie’ Clowes; Sgts Zavoral (Cz)*; Prihoda (Cz)*; P/O Elkington. Middle: P/O ‘Moses’ Demozay (Fr); Sgts Kuelwascher (Cz); Novak (Cz); Stefan (Cz)*. Boom: P/O N P W Hancock*; F/L Mark ‘Hilly’ Brown (Can); P/O Chetham* and Sgt Plasil (Cz)*. via No.1 Squadron archive

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Behind the Battle 31, 1938, first issued to 111 Squadron. The Hurricane represented a vast increase in fighter technology and seemed to be viewed with some trepidation when it reached the squadron. In an effort to promote confidence in this brand-new aeroplane, Treble-One’s CO, Sqn Ldr John Gillan, undertook, on February 20, 1938, a high-speed flight from Northolt to Turnhouse (Edinburgh) and back and the Hurricane he used was L1555. It was this flight that did more than any other to convince his pilots that, in the Hurricane, they had a potent but uerly reliable machine. However, even L1555 was to find its way, as did most of its compatriots from 111 Squadron’s first batch, to 6 OTU on June 7, 1940. Here her proud past meant lile and she simply became one of the many, eventually succumbing, just like any other ‘hack’, to the heavy-handedness of budding ‘tyros’ and, aer a number of accidents and repairs, she was finally scrapped in June 1941.

Multi-National In its time, Suon Bridge saw aircrew of all Allied nationalities pass through its gates. Poles, the first of many batches of exiles destined for combat in the summer of 1940, arrived on June 23 (see table) complete with an interpreter. The laer was a highly necessary role in a potentially hazardous situation. Some of these fellows, in most cases trained pilots (to varying degrees) already, had lile command of the English language, high performance aeroplanes in which all the knobs, levers and dials were labelled in a foreign tongue, or RAF radio procedures. 6 OTU was eventually to train these men with great success, together with a stream of other foreign nationality pilots, many of whom fought and died in the Bale of Britain and/or carved out distinguished war records. The next Polish course, comprising twelve pupils, began on July 14 and batches of Poles continued to arrive throughout that summer. One of this second batch, Plt Off K Olewinski was airborne at 0700hrs on July 29 in Hurricane L1714, authorised to practice air combat and aerobatic manoeuvres above 5,000. His aeroplane was last seen by one of his comrades beginning a dive at 10,000 from which it never pulled out, crashing deep into the earth at Walsoken, near Wisbech. Olewinski became the first of a long line of war graves in Suon Bridge village churchyard. On July 20, the first group of Frenchmen arrived (none of whom fought in the Bale), followed ten days later by three Belgians, more Poles and, on August 17, the first group of 20 Czech pilots (see table). Of course, interspersed between all these was a steady flow of British and Commonwealth pilots too, a further illustration of overlapping the courses among the

Sgt Fred Howarth, 6 OTU, killed in a mid-air collision on September 3, 1940 in Hurricane L1654. via Andy Ketley, FAWNAPS

Sgt Karel Stibor, 6 OTU; Czech pilot killed in a mid-air collision on 3 September 1940 in Hurricane L1833. via Andy Ketley, FAWNAPS

Sgt Vaclav Cukr, one of several pilots who served on the first Czechoslovakian course at 6 OTU in August 1940. He went on to serve with 43 Squadron during the Bale of Britain. Courtesy of Tom Dolezal; www.fcafa.wordpress.com

Plt Off Jaroslav Himr, another Czech pilot who passed through 6 OTU in August 1940. Himr served with 79 Squadron during the Bale of Britain. Courtesy of Tom Dolezal; www.fcafa.wordpress.com

In its time, Sutton Bridge saw aircrew of all Allied nationalities pass through its gates. Poles, the first of many batches of exiles destined for combat in the summer of 1940, arrived on June 23 (see table) complete with an interpreter. www.myhobbystore.co.uk

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN three Flights to keep the momentum going. For example, on the day of the Czech’s arrival, a group of thirteen English pilots also appeared, three from 9 FTS and ten from 10 FTS. Among their number was one Sgt Fred Howarth (in L1654), whose name would be forever linked with the Czechs due to a mid-air collision during combat practice with Sgt Karel Stibor (L1833) on September 3, near the station. Collisions were not rare at 6 OTU, and another occurred on August 18 when Polish pilot Mjr Kazimierz Niedzwiecki (324) and Sgt Dudley McGee (L2082) were both killed. ‘324’ was an ex- Canadian Hurricane serial, originally L1887. To cope with the rising tide of pupils, 33 for example, arrived to begin training on August 17, the inventory of 6 OTU was increased. Serviceable aircra on that date included 34 Hurricanes, four Harvard I, eight Master I, four Bale Trainers and four Mentors. In addition to a few remaining Bale Trainers, four Bale Target Tugs (TT) also appeared in the OTU inventory during July 1940. This reflects the increased workload on Suon Bridge Station Flight - which operated Henley Tugs primarily for ‘visitors’. Up to July, the Henleys provided a service for OTU trainees when required, as well as towing targets for any squadron wishing to book air-to-air firing time over The Wash range - much as their predecessors had done pre-war. Squadrons which served regularly between April and June 1940, for example, were 19, 23, 29, 32, 66, 213, 254, 264 and 611. It should be remembered, too, that air-to-ground firing continued apace on the Range and it was even recorded, on 15th, 18th, 19th and October 27, that a cannon-armed Hurricane and Spitfire used Holbeach Range for testing purposes. The Bale (TT) aircra therefore were operated by the OTU, allowing the Station Flight to concentrate on operational units while the OTU dealt with its own requirements. From mid-June 1940, there was an air-raid warning at Suon Bridge every night until the month’s end, while, during July and August, alerts sounded at intervals of every two or three nights. Anticipating aacks by the Luwaffe against RAF stations, a ‘Q’ site for Suon Bridge was established about five miles away on farmland at the edge of Terrington Marsh. The Luwaffe took its first crack at Suon Bridge on the night of August 30/31, 1940 and proved the effectiveness of the Terrington ‘Q’ site. Four HE bombs exploded NW of the glimmering ‘flarepath’ followed by 15 more falling SE of the site. Three weeks later, the Luwaffe tried again; equally unsuccessfully. Late in the evening of September 22, those tempting lights at Terrington persuaded a single raider to unload seven HE bombs near the ‘Q’ site. ‘Jerry’ paid two more

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visits on October 28 when the ‘Q’ site lights collected thirteen HE bombs and another five exploded a quarter of a mile away. Although unit records are oen vague and at times incomplete, it is estimated that No.6 (‘56’ from November 1940) Operational Training Unit, while located for two years at Suon Bridge, processed at least 800 pilots for fighter operations, of whom it is estimated that 200 were sent into bale at that most crucial period of the air war during the summer of 1940. Sadly, not all those who arrived were able to leave as 30 of the total were killed during training. In Suon Bridge can be found an excellent example of contemporary wartime training for fighter operations and without doubt the contribution made by 6 OTU to the Bale of Britain was one of the utmost value both to the RAF and to the nation.

Sgt Vaclav (aka Venda) Jicha who also served on the first Czech pilot course at 6 OTU in August 1940. He joined 1 Squadron during the Bale of Britain and was later a test pilot at Vickers under Alex Henshaw. He was killed in an air accident in Scotland in 1945. Courtesy of Tom Dolezal; www. fcafa.wordpress.com

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

The Attack of Eagles Not satisfied with the success they had achieved in the Kanalkampf, the Luwaffe decided to take on Fighter Command under its own terms. The bale of arition was now about to begin and even though Fighter Command was steadily being ground down, they had to win.

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Photographs supplied by Jon Molyneux unless otherwise stated

The Attack of Eagles

A Messerschmi BF 110C-6 fighter-bomber of Hauptmann Walter Rubensdörffer’s Erprobungsgruppe 210. This unit commied itself brilliantly to conduct low-level fighter-bomber sorties against precision targets. Messerschmi Archiv via Editor

Silencing Fighter Command

T

he Luwaffenführungsstab saw that the most instant and pressing task of the Luwaffe was to defeat the defensive forces of RAF Fighter Command before Operation Seelöwe could commence. The defeat of Fighter Command would leave the Kampfgruppen free to engage the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet in the Channel and the North Sea; in the air, the squadrons of Bomber Command, unescorted by the Hurricanes and Spitfires, would be savaged by the Jagd- and Zerstorergruppen as they aempted to aack the invasion fleets. With airfields in southern England secured by its Fallschirmjäger, the Luwaffe would move in and be able to operate over the length and breadth of

Britain, aacking vital arms industries, ports and harrying the last vestiges of Fighter Command. But this immediate objective, upon which the entire success of Seelöwe depended, soon became clouded by a multitude of directives and counter-directives, each ordering aacks on different targets and this in turn, weakened the strategic tasking of the Luwaffe. At a conference at Karinhall on July 21, at which Göering addressed the assembled leaders of the Lufloen and Fliegerkorps, the basic principles of the conduct of the air was against Britain as laid down in Göering’s directive of June 30, were examined. Two of the orders given had already been achieved or were in progress: the Lufloen II, III and V (under

Generalfeldmarschall Kesselring, Generalfeldmarschall Sperrle and Generaloberst Stumpff respectively) were combat ready and assembled on airfields in Belgium and the Netherlands, in France and in Norway. The testing of Fighter Command’s defences, within the terms of the Kanalkampf under the direction of II and VIII Fliegerkorps, was being conducted, with results that were not unfavourable for the Luwaffe. What now remained was the completion of planning for an all-out counter air campaign aimed at winning air supremacy from RAF Fighter Command in a bale of arition in the air which was to run concurrently with assaults on British shipping. With the accent of operations now on Seelöwe, however, Göering

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

directed the Luwaffe to aack units of the Royal Navy both at sea and in port which added yet another commitment for its increasingly overstretched resources. Allied to these factors, serious policy disagreements were occurring between the Lufloen commanders while the entire Luwaffe strategy was placed on an erroneous basis by faulty air intelligence. The strength of the RAF, and in particular that of Fighter Command, had been seriously underestimated by the staff of Oberst Josef Schmid’s lc (Intelligence) Department. Regardless, Göering was confident that Fighter Command would be defeated within four days of the start of the Luwaffe’s major air offensive. Over the following six days, the plans for the major assault, termed Adlerangriff (Aack of Eagles), to be commenced on Adlertag (Eagle Day), were finalized: at a meeting with his commanders on August 6, Göering gave the order for the start of Adlerangriff as soon as weather conditions over Britain became clear: later Adlertag itself was set for August 10, only to be postponed to August 13.

The Luftwaffe assembles In the forthcoming bale, the areas of operations of the Lufloen were clearly defined: Generaloberst Hans-Jurgen Stumpff’s Lufloe V

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(based in Norway and Denmark) covered the selection of targets to the north of the Humber and East Lancashire to southern Scotland; Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring’s Lufloe II (the Netherlands, Belgium and north eastern France) was to operate over England to the east of a line drawn through Selsey Bill, Oxford, Manchester and Carlisle: and Generalfeldmarschall Hugo Sperrle’s Lufloe III (north west France) would act to the west of the aforesaid boundary. On August 10, the total first-line strength deployed against Britain was 3,258 combat aircra, of which 2,550 were serviceable. The serviceable strength included 151 reconnaissance machines of the Fernaufklärungsgruppen, 998 bombers (the principle types being the Do 17Z-1, Ju 88A-1 and He 111H-1 to H-4) of the Kampfgruppen, and 261 Junkers Ju 87B-1 and B-2 dive-bombers of the Stukagruppen; the fighter forces, upon which much would depend, comprised 224 Bf 110C-2 Zerstorer (including fighter-bomber versions) and 805 Bf 109E-1 to E-4 single-engined fighters. In addition, there were 80 coastal reconnaissance aircra.

Battle is joined The great air bales which took place over the Channel and off St Catherine’s Point on August 8

marked the last day on which the Luwaffe expended the bulk of its efforts against British coastal convoys and the first in which the level of activity by RAF Fighter Command and the Luwaffe rose to unparalleled intensity: this day, therefore, started a second phase in the Bale of Britain but otherwise could simply go down in history as the Bale of Convoy C.W.9 ‘Peewit’. On the previous night, the convoy sailed from the Thames Estuary and made course for the Straits of Dover, where it was located by the coast-watching German ‘Freya’ radar situated above the cliffs of Cap Blanc Nez. Before dawn, a sharp aack by E-boats sank three ships and damaged others. Thereaer, the reconnaissance Dorniers kept track of the convoy’s progress. At 0900hrs, the Ju 87s of VIII. Fliegerkorps, drawn from StG 1 and escorted by JG 27, approached from the direction of Cherbourg but were effectively dispersed by five squadrons of 11 Group and one of 10 Group. Then, at 1245hrs, 57 Stukas of StG 2, 3 and 77, with an escort of 20 Bf 110C-ls of V(Zerst)/LG 1 and a top-cover of Bf 109Es of II and III./JG 27, aacked on a broad front of 20miles (32km) as the convoy steamed to the south of the Isle of Wight: once again, a large dogfight took place when four and a half squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires engaged. As the convoy aempted to re-assemble, a third

The Attack of Eagles

Hurricanes of 615 (County of Surrey) Squadron return from a sortie during the Bale. The unit operated from Kenley, Prestwick and Northolt between July and October 1940.

strike was launched by von Richthofen’s VIII. Fliegerkorps at 1600hrs: this consisted of 82 Ju 87s escorted by 68 Bf 109s and Bf 110s. Seven RAF squadrons were commied to the bale. Of the action, Squadron Leader J R A Peel, the commanding officer of 145 (Hurricane) Squadron, later submied the following in his Form F Combat Report: ‘We climbed to 16,000, and, looking down, saw a large formation of Ju 87s approaching from the south with Me 109s stepped up behind to 20,000. We approached unobserved out of the sun and went in to aack the rear Ju 87s before the enemy fighters could interfere. I gave a five-second burst to one bomber and broke off to engage two Me 109s.

There was a dogfight. The enemy fighters, which were painted silver, were half-rolling, diving, and zooming in climbing turns. I fired a twin five-second burst at one and saw it dive into the sea. Then I followed another up in a zoom and got him as he stalled.’ Nos. 43, 64, 65,145,152, and 238 Squadrons bore the brunt of the day’s combats, in which RAF Fighter Command claimed the destruction of 24 bombers and 36 fighters; 19 RAF fighters were lost (one at night). Thirty-one German aircra were actually lost on operations during the day, including 10 Ju 87B-2s of VIII. Fliegerkorps. On the morning of August 8, No.11 Group possessed 20 squadrons, with eight (plus one flight) in 10

Group; 26 squadrons and one flight were based in the quieter sectors of 12 and 13 Groups. In the course of the next week, the groups would maintain this balance, with the exception of 249 Squadron, which moved from 12 Group to Middle Wallop under 10 Group control. The new units, Nos. 1 (RCAF) and 302 and 303 Squadrons, were shortly to become operational in 11 and 12 Groups. Characteristically, the Luwaffe lc Intelligence staff considered that Fighter Command had suffered ‘crippling’ losses as the result of the fighting on August 8, but this was not the opinion of the crews involved in daily combat with Dowding’s fighters. On a more ominous note,

Messerschmi Bf 110C ‘UB+FL’ of ZG (Zerstörergeschader (Destroyer Squadron)) 26. Clavework Graphics

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› 27

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN The most familiar and most prolificallyproduced variant of the Dornier Do 17 was Z series. Successful as a light bomber, the Do 17 could never pack the same punch as the British and American four-engined heavies that would appear in even greater numbers from 1940 onwards.

German signals Intelligence had by now come to the conclusion that the RAF defensive system relied on radio and RDF (radar) and, on August 7, a brief regarding this fact had been circulated to the Lufloen. The resilience of Fighter Command had already caused much concern and there was much divergence of opinion within the Luwaffe as to the best tactics. The Zerstorer concept, which had won such accolades in Poland and the West, was now seriously challenged: the Bf 110 was urgently required for the forthcoming spate of deep penetrations into British airspace but it was clearly outclassed by the Spitfire and Hurricane. The redoubtable Bf 109E-4 (the latest version) would be seriously hampered by its lack of range and, as yet, there had been lile effort made to fit it with a jeison-able fuel tank to increase its combat radius. Changeable weather continued to delay the start of Adlerangriff. Heavy fighting took place on

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August 11 when Portland, Dover and shipping in the Thames Estuary were aacked. The Luwaffe had been quick to recognize the significance of RAF radar and employed diversionary and feint aacks on a regular basis. The 32 fighters that were lost or wrien off was a grim indication of the escalation of casualties for RAF Fighter Command: 38 German aircra were destroyed, with the brunt being born by the Bf 109s and Bf 110s of Jagdfliegerfuhrer Nrn 2 and 3. By the evening of August 12, Dowding was aware of the start of a new and formidably dangerous trend in the conduct of the Luwaffe’s operations. The RAF stations at Manston, Hawkinge and Lympne in 11 (Fighter) Group were aacked and, more significantly, the RDF radar installations at Ventnor, Pevensey, Dunkirk and Rye were singled out for dive-bombing and strafing aacks. In the forefront of the raids on the CH stations was Hauptmann Walter Rubensdörffer’s Erprobungsgruppe 210, equipped

One of the greatest multi-role combat aircra of the Second World War, the Junkers Ju 88, was operated in great numbers during the Bale of Britain. This example, Ju 88A-1 ‘L1+AL’, served with 3./LG 1. Clavework Graphics

with Bf 110C-6 fighter-bombers: this unit’s original role was the service testing of the new Me 210A-0, but this task had been set aside with the unit commiing itself to brilliantly conducted low-level fighter-bomber sorties against precision targets. Operations on the long-awaited Adlertag of August 13 got off to a false start as bad weather forecasts prompted Göering to send a cancellation order in the early hours of the morning. The first raid, by 74 Do 17Z-2s of Kampfgeschwader 2, arrived in the Sheppey area without Oberstleutnant Joachim Huth’s escorting ZG 26 to split up and aack Eastchurch airfield

The Attack of Eagles

and Sheerness at around 0835hrs. A frei Jagd by I./JG 2 in the Shoreham/Bognor area at the same time heralded the arrival of KG 54’s feint on the airfields at Odiham and Farnborough. In the case of the laer, it was the Zerstorer that misheard the recall signal and arrived over English soil without their charges.

Adlerangriff The large-scale raids that were intended for the start of Adlerangriff came in the aernoon, despite poor weather. Reports from RDF stations arrived at HQ 10 and 11 Groups at around 1530hrs, and concerned Brand’s group. While 30 Bf 109E-4s of II./JG 53 ‘Pik As Geschwader’ scouted ahead on a frei Jagd at 27,890 (8500m), the first wave of Lufloe III set course on a broad front of 40miles (64km) from the Cotentin peninsula: 40 Ju 88A-ls of KG 54, 80 of I-III./LG 1, and 27 Ju 87B-2s of II./StG 2, with an escort of Bf 110Cs of the V(Zerst)/LG 1, set course for Southampton and 10 Group’s airfields

in Hampshire. A second wave of I-III./StG 77, with the escorting JG 27, followed. Savage combats ensued, with Nos. 152, 213, 238 and 609 Squadrons gaining several successes. Nos. 43 and 257 Squadrons engaged LG 1 as the laer made for Southampton where serious damage was inflicted: the Stukas missed Middle Wallop and hit Andover airfield. Lufloe II joined the fray at 1716hrs with a two-pronged aack on Eastchurch and Rochester, with the Ju 87s of IV(Stuka)/LG 1 locating and bombing Detling instead of their assigned target. Aacks on the other targets also went astray; but a frei Jagd by Major Adolf Galland’s III./JG 26 caused several losses to the defending RAF fighters. Aer nightfall, the bale continued: KGr 100 raided Castle Bromwich and Belfast, while the Bomber Command Whitleys struck at distant Turin and Milan in the Po valley. The Luwaffe flew 1,435 sorties and lost 45 aircra; 13 of RAF Fighter Command’s aircra fell in combat. On the following day, Adlerangriff was

A Hurricane is turned around by its ground crew ready for its next sortie before the pilot has alighted his cockpit. It was crucial that all fighters were re-armed, re-fuelled and serviced as quickly as possible. Via Jon Molyneux

conducted on a reduced scale because of the weather, with strikes on communications in the Bristol/Portland area and aacks on RAF and FAA airfields at Manston, Middle Wallop, Cardiff, Kemble, Andover, Sealand, Hullavington and Yeovilton. The aack on Manston by 1 and 2./ Erprobungsgruppe 210 was particularly successful. The operations of August 15 marked the first and final entry of Generaloberst Hans-Jürgen Stumpff’s Lufloe V based in Norway and Denmark. The day was decisive. At 1000hrs, 72 Heinkel He 111H-ls of KG 26 took off from Sola for their primary (Dishforth and Usworth) and secondary (Middlesbrough, Newcastle and

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›

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Junkers Ju 87B-1, ‘6G+HR’ of 4.StG 1 which operated from France during 1940. Clavework Graphics

Sunderland) targets within 13 (Fighter) Group. Hauptmann Werner Restemeyer’s I/ZG 76, equipped with the long-range Bf 110D-0 Zerstorer, gave cover. A navigational error brought the force along the track of a preceding feint and it thus bore the brunt of aacks by 13 Group’s Nos. 41, 72, 79 and 605 Squadrons with heavy losses; Nos. 73 and 616 Squadrons reaped similar execution on 50 Ju 88A-ls of KG 30, which bombed Driffield. The losses of Lufloe V exceeded 50% of the force despatched, against targets that included Church Fenton and Leconfield. In the south, Lufloen II and III aacked Hawkinge, Lympne, Eastchurch, Martlesham, West Malling, Rochester, Croydon airfields and Kentish towns. On this apocalyptic day, the Luwaffe despatched 1,786 sorties as against Fighter Command’s 974: 79 German aircra were lost in return for 34 of Dowding’s command.

A change in tactics The appalling losses suffered on schwarze Donnerstag (Black Thursday) proved to the Luwaffe that an all-out bomber offensive against Britain could not be conducted until air superiority had been wrested from Fighter Command. The failure of Lufloe V’s diversionary operations, which relieved Stumpff’s force of its bombers and reduced it to a reconnaissance command, swung the bale south to where heavier bomb loads could be carried within the radius of the Bf 109E; in addition, the Bf 110 Zerstorer and the Ju 87B Stuka were confirmed as unsuitable for their tasks and the former now had to have an escort of Bf 109Es to prevent their decimation. The RAF noted that, at this time, Luwaffe strength on raids was rarely more than one or two Gruppen, the bombers at 11,480-18,050 (3500-5500m), with their escort usually above and

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behind at 25,425 (7750m). This height advantage still put RAF Fighter Command’s squadrons at a grave disadvantage; but in combat it was apparent that, despite the aentions of the Bf 109s, the bombers, lightly armoured and defended by hand-held 7.92mm (0.31in) machine-guns, were easily shot down. On August 16, RAF fighter pilots reported a change in the Luwaffe’s fighter tactics: the Bf 109E Staffeln flew alongside and ahead of the bomber stream, weaving to hold their slow speed. This was noted again on August 18 and also on August 24 when heavy aacks were resumed. The Luwaffe sought airfield targets on August 16, aacking West Malling, Gosport, Tangmere, Brize Norton, Harwell, Lee-on-Solent and Farnborough; the Stukas of I and III./StG 2 were badly mauled by RAF fighters in the raid on Tangmere, with the Luwaffe’s losses amounting to 45 in the course of 1,715 sorties. Fighter Command lost 22 destroyed. Aer a lull, aacks resumed on August 18 when the once redoubtable Ju 87 Stuka suffered losses that caused its temporary withdrawal from the bale: out of 281 Ju 87s on strength within II and VIII Fliegerkorps at the beginning of August, 39 had been lost in 14 aacks and the decimation of StG 77 on this day added another 18 losses. At 1200hrs, Dover CHL reported a massive build-up over the Pas-de-Calais: but this raid failed to materialize in great numbers and, in the event, Staffeln of KG 2’s Dorniers made low-level aacks on Kenley and Biggin Hill. VIII. Fliegerkorps sent 85 Ju 87s of StG 77 to aack airfields at Ford and Thorney Island and the CH station at Poling at 1400hrs, with KG 54 (Ju 88A-ls) earmarked for Gosport. This force was engaged by Nos. 43, 152, 234, 601 and 602 Squadrons, while the remainder of 10 and 11 Groups baled with waves of bombers during the course of the aernoon over Sussex, Surrey and Kent. Fighter Command lost 27 aircra with 10 pilots killed; the

Luwaffe lost 71 aircra (including 37 bombers and eleven Bf 110s) in crashes and air combat, and to anti-aircra fire. The fighting of August 18 was one of the hardest of the whole of the Bale of Britain: a lull in fighting took place over the next five days because of the weather and effectively brought to an end the second phase which had started with the intensification of daylight operations on August 8 and been compounded by the start of aacks on coastal airfields on August 12.

RAF attrition During the period of August 8 to 18, 90 pilots were killed on operations and 60 were wounded: 54 Spitfire Mk IA/B fighters were destroyed, along with 121 Hurricane Mk Is and, in addition, 40 Spitfires and 25 Hurricanes had been so badly damaged that they had to be sent to a maintenance unit for repair. Approximately 30 fighters had been destroyed on the ground. But there were replacement aircra aplenty and it was the pilot shortfall that gave rise to continued anxiety. On August 8, Fighter Command was still 160 pilots short of its establishment but the rate of casualties called for an increase in the average squadron establishment and that meant a shortfall of 350 pilots. Added to this was the exhaustion and loss of experienced squadron and flight commanders and the redoubtable NCOs who had seen service since the start of the war. The Operational Training Units were now drained of instructors, while pilots were drawn from the Fairey Bale and the Westland Lysander units of 22 (Training) Group; these, together with freshmen with as lile as six hours’ flying on the Spitfire or Hurricane, quickly succumbed to the predatory Messerschmis. In the following round of air bales, Britain’s survival would rest on Dowding’s ability to maintain an element of conservation among his pilots.

T H E L U F T WA F F E C R A S H A R C H I V E S E R I E S

The Luftwaffe Crash Archive is a landmark series presenting new information on every enemy aircraft to come down in or around the UK. This incredible body of work sources details from all WKHFRQWHPSRUDU\5$)LQWHOOLJHQFHUHSRUWVWKDWJDYH¿UVWKDQGGHVFULSWLRQVRIFRORXUVDQGPDUNLQJV WHFKQLFDODQGRSHUDWLRQDOQRWHVDQGFRPELQHVWKHPLQWRWKHGH¿QLWLYHJXLGH(DFKSDJHYROXPH FRQWDLQV RYHU  RULJLQDO SKRWRV PDQ\ UHYHDOLQJ UHPDUNDEOH FORVHXS GHWDLO  DV ZHOO DV VHYHUDO QHZO\FRPPLVVLRQHGFRORXUSUR¿OHVHPEOHPVDQGPDSVSLQSRLQWLQJDOOWKHFUDVKORFDWLRQV 297mm x 210mm Softback 128 pages. RRP. £25 each. Volume 1, September 1939 Volume 2, 15th August 1940 Volume 3, 30th August 1940 Volume 4, 10th September 1940 Volume 5, 28th September 1940 Volume 6, 28th October 1940 Volume 7, 1st January 1941 Volume 8, 17 April 1941 -

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

More of ‘The Few’ flew the Hawker Hurricane during the Bale of Britain than any other aircra type. The simple design, straight-forward lines combined with a steady reliable gun platform, made the Hurricane the ideal mass-produced answer to the Luwaffe threat during 1940.

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The Hawker Hurricane

The backbone of

Fighter Command Photographs supplied by Jon Molyneux unless otherwise stated

For many years the Hawker Hurricane has been over-shadowed by Spitfire with regard to its role during the early stages of the Second World War. There is no doubt though, that this rugged, reliable fighter played a crucial role in Britain’s air defence when it needed it most.

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33

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN Dominant type available Of the 58 operational squadrons available to Fighter Command on July 1, 1940, 29 of them were flying the Hurricane, of which 347 aircra were ‘combat ready’ and a further 115 were unserviceable but likely to be flying again within a few days. To fly the Hurricanes, 527 pilots were available, although not all were classed ‘checked out fully on type’, making the fighter the most dominant compared to the Spitfire, Blenheim and Defiant squadrons. This dominance was no more in evidence than in AVM K Park’s strategically vital 11 Group, which was responsible for protecting the south east of England. Early forays by the Luwaffe began during early July and, at first, were confined to high-level reconnaissance sorties by single aircra followed by a few organised Junkers Ju 87 aacks on Merchant shipping in the Channel. It soon became apparent that these early probing raids were designed to give the Luwaffe crews experience of ‘over-sea’ operations which they had not been trained to do and to draw out the RAF fighters to engage on needless and oen wasteful patrols. This enemy tactic was confirmed on July 7 while the Hurricanes of 145 Squadron, under the command of Sqn Ldr J R A Peel, began a standing patrol over a convoy off the Isle of Wight. During that morning, Peel and Plt Off E Wakeham had already shot down a Dornier Do 17P before handing over the patrol to 43 Squadron who also shot down a Dornier, which ultimately crashed in France. A third Dornier was claimed by Sqn Ldr M Aitken of 601 (County of London) Squadron before the day was over. However, in an aempt to catch the RAF out, the Luwaffe despatched several Staffels of Messerschmi Bf 109Es to aack the Hurricanes and Spitfires coming and going from their patrols. As a result, 54 and 65 Squadrons Spitfires took the brunt, losing five aircra between them while only one Hurricane was lost. Unfortunately, it is believed that Hurricane Mk I P2756, being flown by Sqn Ldr J D C Joslin of 79 Squadron, was set upon by several Spitfires. Joslin managed to bail out of his burning Hurricane over Chilverton Elms, Kent, but did not survive. Three days later, 79 Squadron, who had been in action for two months solid, were withdrawn from the bale to Turnhouse, near Edinburgh for a rest.

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Hawker Hurricane I N2359 pictured in service with 17 Squadron. The fighter survived both the Bale of France and Britain.

Into the fray The biggest dogfight to involve the Hurricane so far took place on July 10, the opening day of the official first day of the Bale of Britain. 22 Hurricanes from 32, 56 and 111 Squadrons, along with eight Spitfires of 74 Squadron, aacked 26 Do 17 and Do 215s, 30 Bf 110s and 20 Bf 109Es over a convoy off the Kent coast. For 111 Squadron, led by Sqn Ldr J M Thompson, it was the first time that the line-abreast head-on style of bomber aack was carried out. Unfortunately, Fg Off T P K Higgs collided with a Dornier of 3/ KG2 during the first aack and was forced to bail out of his crippled Hurricane Mk I P3671, only to drown in the Channel. By the end of the encounter, two Dorniers, six Bf 110s and a Bf 109 were destroyed, four other bombers were damaged and several fighters were claimed as probables. Hurricanes were involved in an action on July 19 which tragically exposed the inadequacies of the Defiant as a ‘convoy escort’ fighter. 264 Squadron, who had been moved south from Turnhouse to replace 79 Squadron were bounced by ten Bf 109Es and, within the space of a minute, five of the nine Defiants were spiralling down in flames. If it had not been for the arrival and prompt action of 111 Squadron, the remaining four would have joined their colleagues in the sea. By the end of July, the Luwaffe had yet

to aempt a major bombing raid beyond the extreme southern counties but it was still the Hurricane, by a whisker, that led the tally board. By July 31, the Hurricane claims were 87 enemy aircra compared to the Spitfire’s 71, made up of 17 He 111s, 15 Do 17s, 14 Bf 110s, twelve Bf 109s, ten Ju 87s and seven Ju 88s plus twelve ‘other aircra’. On the other side of the coin, the Luwaffe had claimed 40 Hurricanes shot down, although at least two of these had actually been shot down by ‘friendly fire’. The Luwaffe carried out another large raid on the morning of August 13, a day when Fighter Command could boast a total of 678 aircra, 353 of which were Hurricanes. The main success of the day for the enemy came when an unescorted raid of 74 Dorniers of KG.2 bombed the airfield at Eastchurch, but five of their number were still shot down by Hurricanes. One of the victims was claimed by Flt Lt R L Smith of 151 Squadron, who was flying the RAF’s only experimental Hurricane armed with a pair of 20mm cannon. Smith, flying L1750, opened fire at 300yds; one bomber burst into flames and another was le trailing smoke.

The Hawker Hurricane

Frantic battles Poor weather on August 27 gave some respite to the aircrew on both sides of the Channel, while approximately 100 Dorniers of Lufloe 2 set course up the Thames Estuary the following day. It looked as if the large enemy formation were about to aack the airfields at Hornchurch and North Weald but instead split into two, to bomb Rochford and Eastchurch instead. As the Hurricanes of 56 Squadron from North Weald tore into the enemy bombers, a large wave of Bf 109s joined the fray which was initially tackled by the Spitfires of 603 Squadron from Hornchurch. Aer another frantic bale, nine enemy aircra had been shot down but 603 Squadron lost four of its aircra and 56 Squadron lost three, although for the laer unit two pilots were safe and one wounded. It had been a light day for

High spirits as the pilots of 32 Squadron enjoy the sun at Hawkinge on July 31, 1940. Behind is Mk I P3522 (parachute on tailplane) which survived the bale to be transferred to 213 Squadron. The aircra was lost on January 10, 1941 when it hit a hill in low cloud at Calbergh Moor, North Yorkshire.

Hurricane losses, with just four machines lost while the enemy had lost a total of 28 by the day’s end. As the fighter versus fighter loss rate continued to remain static, by August 30, AVM Park was ordering his controllers not expose his forces in free chasing combats with the Bf 109s. The Hurricanes of 1, 56 and 242 Squadrons were unleashed against a large enemy raid north of London aer their fighter escort was forced to turn back for France. Thirteen Fighter Command squadrons in total were in action in total against the raid of approximately 300 aircra which aacked targets from Harwich to Oxford in groups of ten to 20 aircra. 29 enemy aircra were shot down and out of three Hurricane squadrons only 56 Squadron lost two aircra with one pilot injured and the other safe. ‘A’ flight of 253 Squadron, led by Sqn Ldr T Gleave, were less fortunate when they broke cloud during their climb, only to find themselves in the middle of a formation of approximately 90 Bf 109s. Gleave instinctively aacked and, within a minute, had shot down three Bf109s and probably a fourth before making his escape. His three wingmen were not so lucky, all of them were shot down,

two were killed and a third was injured. The week beginning Saturday August 31 was by far the most critical week of the Bale of Britain and one that would see 55 pilots killed, 78 wounded and the loss of 107 Hurricanes and 71 Spitfires in combat. This rate of arition represented an entire squadron of pilots being lost each day and nearly two squadrons per day in aircra. Squadrons were being withdrawn from the bale to rest at a moment’s notice to be replaced by fresh squadrons from the north of England and Scotland. Very oen, the unit being withdrawn only had four out of five aircra serviceable on strength and such was the extent of their losses, they were temporarily redesignated as training units.

Revitalised RAF Some of the older Hurricane squadrons were brought back into the bale, all of them eager to see action again. August 31 was by far the worst day for the Hurricane squadrons, 1 losing a single fighter, 1 (RCAF) lost three, 56 four, 79 four, 85 two, 111 one, 151 two, 253 two, 257 two, 310 two, 501 one and 601 Squadron losing three Hurricanes. It had truly been a horrendous day

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Although this is a scene for the benefit of the press, it is quite a typical Bale of Britain scene, played out by Plt Off A G Lewis DFC of 85 Squadron at Croydon in September 1940.

and amongst these losses were included three squadron commanders. 85 Squadron’s Sqn Ldr P W Townsend was shot down by a Bf 110 over Tunbridge but managed to bail out with a wounded foot. While the outgoing 253 Squadron commanding officer was shot down over Cudham by a Ju 88 and survived, his replacement, Sqn Ldr H M Starr, was not so lucky. He was shot down by enemy fighters over Grove Ferry in Hurricane Mk I L1830 and was killed. The weather window in which the invasion by the Germans was meant to occur, was rapidly closing by mid-September, but this did not stop Göering from giving it his all, again, on the 15th. However, the Luwaffe found themselves up against a revitalised RAF and, by the end of the day’s fighting, 179 enemy aircra had been destroyed for the price of 30 RAF fighters, 23 of these being Hurricanes, although not all were wrien off. In terms of manpower, the Luwaffe lost 163 aircrew either killed or captured making it clear that Fighter Command were far from defeated and so Hitler was forced to shelve his plans to invade Britain.

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From this point, the momentum of Luwaffe raids began to falter, until September 27 when three major aacks were despatched from France between 0900hrs and 1530hrs by approximately 640 enemy aircra. All three raids targeted London but many of the formations were broken up by determined head-on Hurricane aacks while the Spitfires fought furiously with the Bf 109 escorts. By the early evening, another 131 enemy aircra lay strewn across the English countryside for the price of 30 of our own fighters, thirteen of them were Hurricanes.

Hurricane I N2479, coded US-B, at rest between sorties with 56 Squadron. Re-issued to 6 OTU during the Bale of Britain, it suffered a landing accident in the hands of Sgt Philip Pearson on September 3, 1940. Sgt Pearson was posted to 238 Squadron on September 28, 1940 and fought in the Bale. Don Hannah Collection via Alastair Goodrum

The Hawker Hurricane

Hurricane units which served during the Battle

Victory or a score-draw? The last great success of the Hurricane during the final stages of the Bale of Britain was against an enemy that was not known to be operating in Northern Europe, namely the Corpo Aereo Italiano (the Italian Air Force). On November 11, the same day that the FAA carried out its successful Taranto aack, the Hurricanes of 17, 46 and 257 Squadron intercepted a force of ten BR.20s, escorted by 40 CR.42s, G.50s plus a few Bf 109Es, intent on bombing Harwich. 257 Squadron alone, under the temporary command of Flt Lt H P ‘Cowboy’ Blatchford, claimed nine Italian aircra and a single Bf 109E. Aer Blatchford had run out of ammunition, he aacked a CR.42 by ramming it and ‘milling the enemy’s top wing with his propeller!’ With no losses incurred by the defending Hurricanes, the Italians never returned to Britain in daylight and, by the end of 1940, were withdrawn from their Belgian bases. Fighter Command had clearly defeated the Luwaffe, but the Bale of France and Bale of Britain had taken its toll and over 50% of the highly experienced pre-war pilots had been killed during this period. However, regulars such as Douglas Bader, Bob Stanford Tuck, Roland Beamont and ‘Ginger’ Lacy, to name a few, would help to carry Fighter Command through its most difficult period, transforming its role from defensive to offensive in a maer of months. With regard to the Bale of Britain, there is still conjecture today as to the exact figures but Fighter Command claimed 2,741 enemy kills, 42% by Spitfires, 3% to other types and 55%

Re-formed at Manston on October 1939 with the Fairey Bale, 253 Squadron was swily reequipped with the Hurricane in February 1940. The unit operated from Kirton-in-Lindsey, Turnhouse, Prestwick and Kenley during the Bale of Britain.

Czechoslovakian pilot, Sgt Jozef František of 303 (Polish) Squadron who, at the controls of a Hurricane, became the highest scoring RAF pilot of the Bale of Britain with 17 enemy aircra to his credit.

to Hurricanes. Many of these kills were achieved by airmen whose countries had been overrun by the enemy, including Czech pilot, Sgt Jozef František, of 303 (Polish) Squadron, who became the highest scorer, with 17 German aircra downed. Sadly, he was lost in his Hurricane Mk I R4175 at Ewell, Surrey on October 8, 1940.

1 Sqn (Northolt, Tangmere, Manston, North Weald, Heathrow & Wiering), 1 Sqn (RCAF) (Middle Wallop, Croydon, Northolt & Prestwick), 3 Sqn (Wick, Castletown, Montrose, Dyce & Turnhouse), 17 Sqn (Debden, Tangmere & Martlesham Heath), 32 Sqn (Biggin Hill & Acklington), 43 Sqn (Tangmere, Northolt & Usworth), 46 Sqn (Digby, Ternhill & Stapleford), 56 Sqn (North Weald & Boscombe Down), 73 Sqn (Church Fenton, Sherburn-in-Elmet & Castle Camps), 79 Sqn (Hawkinge, Sealand, Acklington, Biggin Hill & Pembrey), 85 Sqn (Debden, Martlesham Heath, Castle Camps, Church Fenton & Kirton-in-Lindsey), 87 Sqn (Church Fenton, Exeter, Hullavington & Bibury), 111 Sqn (Croydon, Debden, Drem & Dyce), 145 Sqn (Tangmere, Westhampne, Drem, Dyce & Montrose), 151 Sqn (North Weald, Manston, Rochford, Stapleford, Digby & Wiering) 213 Sqn (Biggin Hill, Exeter & Tangmere), 229 Sqn (Wiering, Bircham Newton & Northolt), 232 Sqn (Sumburgh, Castletown, Skien & Drem), 238 Sqn (Middle Wallop, Warmwell, St Eval & Chilbolton), 242 Sqn (Coltishall & Duxford), 245 Sqn (Turnhouse, Hawkinge & Aldergrove), 249 Sqn (Leconfield, Church Fenton, Boscombe Down & North Weald), 253 Sqn (Kirton-in-Lindsey, Coleby Grange, Ringway, Turnhouse, Prestwick & Kenley), 257 Sqn (Northolt, Debden, Martlesham Heath & North Weald), 263 Sqn (Grangemouth, Montrose, Drem, Macmerry & Prestwick), 302 (Poznanski) Sqn (Leconfield, Duxford & Northolt), 303 (Kosciusco) Sqn (Northolt & Leconfield), 310 (Czechoslovak) Sqn (Duxford), 312 (Czechoslovak) Sqn (Duxford & Speke), 501 (County of Gloucester) Sqn, AAF (Croydon, Middle Wallop, Gravesend & Kenley), 504 (County of Noingham) Sqn, AAF (Castletown, Caerick, Hendon & Filton), 601 (County of London) Sqn, AAF (Tangmere, Debden & Exeter), 605 (County of Warwick) Sqn, AAF (Drem & Croydon), 607 (County of Durham) Sqn, AAF (Usworth, Tangmere & Turnhouse), 615 (County of Surrey) Sqn, AAF (Kenley, Prestwick & Northolt), 421 Flight (Gravesend), 422 Flight (Shoreham) and the Fighter Interception Unit (Tangmere & Shoreham).

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Nicolson pictured at the controls of a 72 Squadron Gloster Gladiator which later re-equipped with the Spitfire.

Fighter Command

Victoria Cross James Eric Brindley Nicolson was the only airman to win the Victoria Cross for Fighter Command. His accolade was bestowed upon him whilst flying a Hurricane during the Bale of Britain.

O

A portrait of Nicolson by Frank Thatcher as a newly-promoted wing commander in 1943.

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f the 32 airmen awarded a Victoria Cross for actions during the Second World War, only one was won by an RAF fighter pilot, James Eric Brindley Nicolson. Even more surprising is the fact that Nicolson’s award came aer his first aerial combat. Born in Hampstead, North London, in 1917, Nicolson joined the RAF in December 1936. He was trained as a fighter pilot and joined 72 Squadron, based at Church Fenton, Yorkshire, on August 7, 1937. Quickly establishing himself as a ‘natural’ pilot, Nicolson recorded above-average gradings and became a first-class shot in air-to-air firing exercises. The Squadron began to replace its Gloster Gladiators with the new, sleek Supermarine Spitfire monoplanes in April 1939; Nicolson adapted easily to the more modern fighters, remaining with No 72 Squadron until May 1940. In the early months of the war, the unit flew numerous sorties from successive bases at Leconfield, Drem, Church Fenton and Acklington; although Nicolson took part in many war patrols,

mainly protecting East Coast convoys, he had yet to engage a German aircra in combat.

Initial combat In May 1940, Nicolson was posted to a newlyformed unit, 249 Squadron, as an acting flight commander. Working up to operational standard on Hawker Hurricanes, 249 Squadron completed this task on July 3 and, on August 14, moved south from its Church Fenton base to Boscombe Down, Wiltshire, to join the daily aerial struggle against the Luwaffe. Just two days later, 249 Squadron took off with orders to patrol the Poole-Ringwood-Salisbury area. Nicolson led one vic of three Hurricanes; his two wingmen were Pilot Officer M. A. King and Squadron Leader E. B. King, a supernumerary officer aached to the Squadron to gain combat experience. For all three men this was to be their initial combat. Climbing to 15,000 and heading towards Southampton, Nicolson spoed three Junkers Ju 88 bombers about four miles away and promptly

Victoria Cross

Nicolson and a few colleagues during his recovery at Torquay Hospital. It was during his stay in the hospital that he received the telegram from the King informing him that he had been awarded the Victoria Cross.

led his men towards them. Any aempts at interception were, however, frustrated by Spitfires, which ‘jumped’ the Ju 88s before the Hurricane trio could get within firing range. Resuming their climb to 18,000 over the suburbs of Southampton, the three Hurricanes were abruptly aacked by some roving Messerschmi Bf 109s and all three suffered damage. Pilot Officer King’s aircra erupted in flames and he baled out, only to be shot at as he descended by over-zealous ground troops. Their fire shredded King’s parachute, leaving him to plunge to his death. Squadron Leader King’s Hurricane received serious damage but he managed to avoid further assault and eventually landed at Boscombe Down. Nicolson’s Hurricane suffered four direct cannon strikes in the cockpit area, wounding Nicolson and seing the fuselage petrol tank on fire. Painfully preparing to abandon his aircra, with petrol flames licking into the cockpit instrument panel, Nicolson noticed a Messerschmi Bf 110 cross his line of fire. Determined to destroy at least one opponent, Nicolson dropped back into his seat, pressed the firing buon and watched as his tracers riddled the Messerschmi’s fuselage. By now the terrifying

flames and heat all round him had started to burn the flesh off his hands and scorch his face. Giving his target one final burst, Nicolson managed to bale out of his shaered cockpit at 12,000. He dropped towards earth for several minutes before operating his parachute release. Wounded, shocked and bleeding, with his uniform in taers, he was then hit by the trigger-happy ground troops before eventually reaching the ground. Rushed to hospital, Nicolson’s life hung in the balance for several days before he began to slowly recover from his ordeal. Whilst convalescing in Torquay in November, he received a telegram from King George VI, informing him that he had been awarded the Victoria Cross. Nicolson’s astonishment was perhaps best summed up in his comment to a fellow pilot, ‘Now I’ll have to go and earn it. ..’ As his burns and wounds healed, he requested a return to operational flying and, in February 1941, he joined the staff of 54 OTU. This was followed in September by an appointment as commander of 1459 Flight, an experimental night fighter unit which was later retitled 538 Squadron. Six months later, he was posted to the Far East theatre as a staff officer at Alipore, India. Nicolson finally got his wish for a more

active post when, as a wing commander, he assumed command of 27 Squadron at Agartala, India in August 1943. No.27 Squadron was the first Beaufighterequipped unit to operate from India and had recently become the first unit in the Burma campaign to operate de Havilland Mosquito fighter-bombers. For almost exactly one year, Nicolson led 27 Squadron on operations, despite the pain of his still healing wounds. On leaving the squadron in August 1944 and being posted to HQ, 3rd Tactical Air Force at Comilla, Nicolson was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross. By April 1945, Nicolson was on the staff of HQ RAF Burma and, on May 2, persuaded higher authority to permit him one more ‘look at the real war’. Joining the crew of a 355 Squadron Consolidated Liberator as an observer, Nicolson le Salbani, Bengal that same day for a bombing sortie. When the bomber had reached a point 130 miles south of Calcua, one of its engines erupted in flames and the Liberator crashed shortly aerwards in the open sea. Sixteen hours later, Consolidated Catalinas located the scene of the crash but retrieved only two survivors; the rest of the crew, including Nicolson, was never found.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

He 111 ‘The Spade’ Photographs supplied by Jon Molyneux unless otherwise stated

B

y the beginning of the Bale of Britain, the main variant of the Luwaffe’s backbone medium bomber was the He 111H. Many senior crews were still operating the He 111P, including the commanding officer of KG 55, Oberst Alois Stoeckl, who was shot down and killed near Middle Wallop on August 14, 1940. The He 111H proved to be a good performer and its top speed of 270 mph was one of the many reasons why it was difficult to shoot down compared to the much slower Dornier Do 17. 17 Gruppen operated the He 111H in healthy numbers during the Bale, averaging 500 aircra

First flown in February 1935, the Heinkel He 111 was originally presented to the world as a civilian transport aircra but was, in fact, a very useful high-speed medium bomber.

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The Luwaffe’s main bomber during the Bale of Britain in pictures

on strength at any one time. However, the unit still managed to lose 245 of its number between July and October. The He 111 certainly made its mark on the Bale including the devastating raid by KG 55 on Bristol on September 25 and the equally crushing aack on the Supermarine Woolston Works the following day. The main variants that were operated during the Bale were the He 111H-1, H-2, H-3 and H-4, the laer being powered by the 1,100hp Jumo 211D engine. Losses of He 111s were no worse than the Dornier Do 17 or Junkers Ju 88 but the difference lay in the number of crew. The He 111

had a crew of five while the others only had four, all of them concentrated in the forward part of the fuselage. Even so, the Ju 88 still came out worse during the Bale with 397 aircrew killed, compared to 368 for the He 111 and 247 for the Do 17. The He 111, while not classed as a heavy bomber, carried enough bombs to cause serious damage to strategic targets. Although the type was becoming obsolete by late 1940, the He 111 continued to be developed throughout the remainder of the war and production did not come to an end until late 1944.

He 111 ‘The Spade’

The view from the ‘greenhouse’ nose of the He 111 was impressive but would also prove to be one of its weak areas, especially when it was aacked head on.

He 111H specification Type: Five-seat medium day/night bomber Power: Two 1,350hp Junkers Jumo 211F-1 or F-2 liquid-cooled inline Span: 74 1¾in Length: 53 9½in Height: 13 1¼in Weight (Empty): 19,136lb Weight (Loaded): 26,500lb Max Speed: 270 mph at 19,685

Ceiling: 21,330 Range: 1,212 miles Armament: (Guns) Seven 7.92mm MG 15 or MG 81 machines guns; One 20mm MG FF cannon and one 13mm MG 131 machine gun. (Bombs) Up to 4,400lb carried internally or up to 7,900lb externally.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

A He 111 of KG 26 (Kampfgeschwader 26), a unit which served in virtually every major Luwaffe campaign during the Second World War, including the Bale of Britain from Scandinavian bases.

He 111 of KG 55 which lost 73 aircra during the Bale of Britain. Clavework Graphics

6,508 He 111s were built between 1935 and 1944, 5,656 of these during the war years. SA-Kuva collection

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Classed as a medium bomber, the He 111 could carry up to respectable bomb load over a considerable distance. This example appears to be dropping 250kg bombs from its internal bomb bay.

He 111 ‘The Spade’

KG 55 He 111s under aack by 609 (West Riding) Squadron Spitfire I flown by Plt Off J D Bisdee. These particular bombers had just successfully aacked the Supermarine works at Woolston.

RAF Fighter pilots view just before opening fire on a group of He 111s.

He 111 statistics during the Battle of Britain 15 units of 34 Gruppen took part in the Bale 245 aircra were destroyed during the Bale 96 aircra damaged, 368 aircrew killed, 473 missing/POW & 108 aircrew wounded 60% of He 111 losses were aributable to British action 463 He 111s were stationed in Northern France in August 1940

One of many iconic images captured during the Bale of Britain was the fate of this He 111 and its five-man crew, photographed by the gun camera of the Hawker Hurricane that shot it down.

The wreckage of an He III of KG 27 which was shot down on July 13, 1940 is inspected by British airmen. They are paying particular interest to one of the bombers’ 7.92mm MG 15 machine guns.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

The salvage men of Britain were kept very busy from 1940 through to end of the war and beyond in breaking up enemy aircra, including the forward fuselage of an He 111 in the centre of the frame.

A few of the He 111 unit’s badges which took part in the Battle of Britain

I Gruppe KG 53 ‘Legion Condor’

II Gruppe KG 53 ‘Legion Condor’

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III Gruppe KG 53 ‘Legion Condor’

KG 4 ‘General Wever’

KG 26, III, I & II Gruppe

KG 51 ‘EdelweissGeschwader’

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Fighter Command at Bay The Luwaffe was on the right track, but its losses urged Göering to order a change in basic tactics at just the moment that Fighter Command was approaching the end of its tether. Even so, the altered German plans posed Dowding and Park merely another threat.

Photographs supplied by Jon Molyneux unless otherwise stated

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Fighter Command at Bay

Sector airfields at risk

T

he two crucial factors which were to emerge for RAF Fighter Command following the period of German massed daylight raids (August 8 to 18) were the shortage of both experienced and newly trained aircrew and the recent aacks on fighter bases. In many cases, the appalling lack of good air intelligence, which was the responsibility of Oberst Josef Schmid’s lc department of the Luwaffenführungsstab, had resulted in aacks being made on several relatively unimportant airfields. But many had been carried out, some with devastating effect, on the vital sector airfields in Nos. 10 and 11 (Fighter) Groups. The sector airfields formed an essential link in the radio/radar defensive system upon which Fighter Command, and the defence of Britain, depended. Should the Luwaffe succeed in obliterating the sector airfields, the RAF fighter squadrons would no longer be able to be closely controlled in aerial interceptions.

Air battles of attrition AVM Keith Park, commanding 11 (Fighter) Group, called a conference at his HQ at Uxbridge on

August 19: with the experience gained during the previous ten days’ fighting, it was clear that the Luwaffe had abandoned its policy of securing superiority in fighter-versus-fighter bales over the Channel and had turned its aention to the search and destruction of RAF fighters far inland, in the air and on the ground, within the now questionable security of their bases. Above all else, it appeared that the Luwaffe was desperate in its aempt to draw Fighter Command into a series of vast air bales of arition over South East England. In this area, the advantage would lie with the redoubtable and experienced Jagdgruppen operating from the Pas-de-Calais. Park, therefore, reasoned that his first priority was the defence of his sector airfields: here he had no option, despite the fact that most lay within the combat radius of the Bf 109E. The second in order of priority was the avoidance of fighter-versus-fighter combat, for it was here that the losses were sustained. In Instruction No. 4 to his controllers, he made this clear: ‘Against mass aacks coming inland despatch a minimum number of squadrons to engage enemy fighters. Our main object is to

engage enemy bombers, particularly those approaching under the lowest cloud layer.’ Here he alluded to the recent low-level aacks by KG 2 and Erprobungsgruppe 210 which had caused such recent damage. In addition, he called for the controllers to use Nos. 1 (RCAF) and 303 (Polish) Squadrons, both recently made operational, to patrol the sector bases as needed. Park also asked for assistance from 10 and 12 (Fighter) Groups for the defence of the same when all of 11 Group’s units were airborne. His overall tactics continued to be the use of small (i.e., squadron or pair of squadrons) units to effect early and efficient interception of the Kampfgruppen. Throughout the Bale of Britain, the interpretation of the Luwaffe’s tactics was conducted by both Dowding and Park with great intelligence: Dowding, aided by intimate ‘Ultra’ knowledge of the Luwaffe’s priorities, strength and losses, knew that RAF Fighter Command had only to remain strong in the south in order to prevent Unternehmen Seelöwe. Park was occupied in the more immediate maer of defending his sector stations while, at the same time, preventing an exorbitant casualty rate

While the Supermarine Spitfire was more complicated to manufacturer, than the Hawker Hurricane, it was still available in sufficient numbers to hold back the tide of German aircra during the Bale.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Air Vice Marshal Sir Keith Park, the AOC of 11 Group from April 20 to December 27, 1940.

amongst his pilots: this was best effected by aacking the German bombers in small groups at speed. The losses incurred by the Kampfgruppen caused frantic requests by the bomber leaders for close escort and evidence of the laer had been duly noted by RAF pilots. This was exactly what Park wanted: he could deal with the massed raids but not with the high-level and devastatingly efficient frei Jagd tactics of the Luwaffe.

The Reichsmarschall confers In a meeting with his fighter commanders at Karinhall on August 19, Göering again emphasized the need to keep the pressure on RAF Fighter Command. ‘Until further notice,’ he stated, ‘the main task of Lufloen II and III will be to inflict the utmost damage on the enemy fighter forces. With this are to be combined aacks on the ground organization of the enemy bombers conducted, however, in such a manner to avoid all unnecessary losses.’ The success of RAF Bomber Command’s aacks on the invasion ports had led to calls from OKW for aacks on RAF bomber bases but, as had been seen from the fiasco of August 15, this lay well beyond the Luwaffe’s daylight capabilities. Göering was displeased with the performance of his fighter pilots and aributed the high arition of the bombers directly to the lack of aggression

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Promoted to Major on July 19, 1940, Werner ‘Pappy’ Mölders became commander of JG 51 the following day. Mölders claimed 20 enemy aircra during the Bale of Britain.

by the Jagdgeschwäder. He now charged Oberstleutnant Werner Mölders and Major Adolf Galland with the task of seing the maer right. The young Experten (aces) would set the example. Mölders was already the Kommodore of JG 51 and, aer awarding Galland with the Deutsches Kreuz (Gold), Göering promoted the laer to the command of JG 26 ‘Schlageter Geschwader’. His policy of promoting the younger fighter leaders was to continue: Major Günther Lützow took over JG 3; Wolfgang Schellmann was promoted to command JG 2; Major Günther Freiherr von Maltzahn succeeded to JG 53 and Hannes Trautlo became commander JG 54 over the next few weeks. Göering in return demanded much tighter bomber escort tactics than had been the case previously. The frei Jagd tactics, as vehemently demanded by the fighter leaders, could remain but the ratio of fighters to bombers on a mission had to be raised to at least three-to-one. Moreover, the fighters had to fly alongside, ahead and above in the form of a close escort at the same speed as the bombers: this, the bomber leaders had insisted upon. The fighter leaders argued their case, stating that the Bf 109E was totally unsuited to such work and that its performance and the tactics hitherto employed would be effectively neutralized. They achieved nothing. Thus, with one ill-considered

Another of Göering’s young ‘Experten’ was Major Günther Lützow, who took command of JG 3 on August 25, 1940.

judgement, taken with the emotional demands of his bomber pilots, Göering effectively drew the teeth of the Jagdwaffe.

Equipment limitations Over the long summer of 1940, the outcome of the Bale of Britain depended primarily on the performance of the men and machines of the respective fighter organizations opposing each other. The shortage of fighter pilots in RAF Fighter Command has been emphasized, as have the poor training standards achieved as a result of the exigencies of war faced by the RAF in 1939-40: the backbone of Dowding’s command was the cadre of experienced pilots that had seen service in France and over Dunkirk. But these men were dwindling away. No such shortage faced the Luwaffe’s fighter arm, despite the casualties: the product from the Fliegerschülen continued to be of a high standard. Moreover, the quality of the formation leaders (the Kommodoren, Kommandeure and Staffel-kapitäne), in particular those recently promoted to command, was extremely high: already pilots such as Mölders, Galland, Wilhelm Balthasar, Helmut Wick, Lützow, von Maltzahn, Josef ‘Pips’ Priller, Rolf Pingel and others, had high tallies of aerial kills. Men such as these were experienced and extremely dangerous. On the other hand, it was in fighter

Fighter Command at Bay

Remains of Do 17Z ‘F1+FH’ on the roof of a house in Vauxhall Bridge Road.

equipment that the balance lay more or less even. When equipped for a defensive bale over its own ground, Fighter Command’s Spitfire Mk IA and Hurricane Mk I aircra were admirably suited despite several deficiencies; the same could not be said of the Defiant Mk I (withdrawn finally from day-fighting on August 31) and the Blenheim Mk IF, but these were used in relatively few squadrons. Rugged, easy to fly and reliable, the Hurricane continued to equip the majority of squadrons but it was at a distinct disadvantage against the Bf 109E above 18,000 (5485m) and policy therefore dictated that, where possible, it was employed against the bombers. It was the Spitfire that the men of the Jagdwaffe respected.

Battle rejoined During the period between August 24 and

September 6, the Luwaffe kept up unrelenting aacks on the airfields and sector airfields of 11 (Fighter) Group, following the short lull in the bale which was caused by bad weather. The Stukas of VIII Fliegerkorps were inactive, with von Richthofen’s command moving to the Lufloe II (Kesselring) area from August 29 onwards. In keeping with the policies of Göering, the majority of the Jagdgruppen were concentrated in the Pas-de-Calais under the Jagdfliegerführer Nr 2 (General-Major Theodor Osterkamp) and to a lesser extent under the newly-formed Jagdfliegerführer Nr 1: the units involved in the move included JG 2, JG 27 and JG 53. Tactically, with the initiative for target selection placed in their hands, the Lufloen commanders adopted every conceivable tactic: primarily, this encompassed the spliing of major raids into

Dornier Do 17Z ‘F1+FH’ (Werk No.2361) of KG76 which was publically shot down on September 15, 1940. Aer being aacked by aircra from 310, 504 and 609 Squadrons, the bomber broke up over London, parts of the aircra were photographed falling on Victoria Station, Putney, Fulham and Vauxhall Bridge Road. Clavework Graphics

three or four groups, each to its selected target, with a heavy escort of Bf 109Es and Bf 110Cs. The height of the incoming raids varied from 1,970 (600 m) to 21,980 (6700 m) with fighters operating up to 31,990 (9750 m), while there was a high accent of low-level aacks on airfields in groups up to Staffel strength, in particular by the specialist elements of KG 2 and the skilful Bf 110s of Erprobungsgruppe 210.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN On August 24, the aacks by the Luwaffe again escalated with raids on Dover, Manston and Portsmouth. By 1600hrs, AVM Park’s squadrons were all commied and he requested help from AVM Leigh-Mallory’s 12 (Fighter) Group: one squadron arrived to give ineffectual assistance. The loss to Fighter Command was 22 aircra destroyed in the course of 936 sorties, with another 16 fighters shot down during the following day. On the night of August 25, Bomber Command launched a sharp aack on Berlin, the capital city of the Third Reich, to the acute embarrassment of Göering and the fury of Hitler. The fighting of August 26 covered three main aacks by the Luwaffe: the first on Kenley and Biggin Hill; the second on Debden, North Weald and Hornchurch; and the third on Portsmouth naval docks and the airfield at Warmwell. In the majority of cases, the aacks failed but at a cost of 28 fighters of Nos. 11 and 10 Group in particularly bier bales. The apparent lack of co-operation by AVM Leigh-Mallory stung Park into a rebuke. In his Instruction No. 7, dated August 27, he praised the efforts of reinforcement by Brand’s No. 10 Group but stated that ‘in operations to date No. 12 Group, on the other hand, have not shown the same desire to co-operate by despatching the squadrons to places requested . . .’ This was a measure of his exasperation and the enmity between the two group commanders now became open.

Loggerheads at the top The controversy between Park and Leigh-Mallory centred on the manner in which squadrons were to be used in combat. Park, as described, employed small units (one or two squadrons together) in order to swily react to threats on the vital sector airfields and at the same time to conserve his forces from the effects of major

RAF Biggin Hill was aacked many times during the Bale but one particularly devastating raid came on September 1, 1940. Many brave acts were carried out by RAF personnel on the ground including those of telegraphists, Sgt Joan Mortimer (le), Fg Off Elspeth Henderson (Centre (a Corporal during the raid)) and Sgt Helen Turner (right), all of whom remained at their posts during the aack.

the expertise needed to operate one: in the case of the so-called Duxford Wing, the time taken to assemble for action was inordinately long, the climb to height was slow, and endurance limited by the amount of throle-bending that took place in order to keep position: Leigh-Mallory’s wing would have worked in 1941, when and if the Luwaffe returned for a second round but not in the summer of 1940. Fighter Command’s heaviest losses of the Bale took place on August 31: 39 fighters were

From August 29 onwards, Sperrle’s Luftflotte III operated mostly at night against Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester and other selected targets. There was no respite for RAF Fighter Command. fighter-versus-fighter bales. Leigh-Mallory, on the other hand, considered that the use of large wings (up to five squadrons), as advocated by the commander of 242 Squadron, Squadron Leader D R S Bader, would be more effective: both points of view had their merits. To the German crews, the sight of 50-60 Spitfires and Hurricanes bearing down on them might well have been daunting but in truth no group, least of all 12 (Fighter) Group, had sufficient forces to afford such a luxury as the ‘Big Wing’ or, indeed,

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destroyed (14 pilots killed) in return for 41 German aircra lost over the 24-hour period. At 0800hrs, massed raids headed via the Thames Estuary and Kent to Duxford, Debden and North Weald: Debden was hit by both HE and incendiary bombs but the aack on Duxford was, ironically, thwarted by Park’s 111 Squadron. At 0445hrs, 100 or more German aircra headed for Eastchurch and also bombed Detling. The most serious raids came aer 1200hrs when two bomber streams, escorted by waves of Bf 109s

and Bf 110s, hit Croydon, Biggin Hill and Hornchurch, while aacks also went into the CH/ CHL stations at Rye, Pevensey, Dunkirk, Foreness, and Whitstable. The day ended with several Staffeln of Ju 88A-1s and Bf 110C-2 Jagdbombers streaking in to aack Hornchurch. The day cost the Luwaffe 41 aircra. The aacks on the airfields and sector stations continued over the next six days when clear anti-cyclonic weather permied operations from dawn to dusk: on September 1, aircra factories were added to the list of the German priorities through a directive of the Luwaffenführungsstab, with the necessary briefings completed two days later. Amongst those that came in for immediate aack by day were the Vickers-Armstrong concern at Brooklands (responsible for two-thirds of Wellington production) and Short Bros Ltd of Rochester (Stirling). From August 29 onwards, Sperrle’s Lufloe III operated mostly at night against Liverpool, Birmingham, Manchester and other selected targets. There was no respite for RAF Fighter Command.

Fighter Command at bay The Luwaffe’s focus on aacking the RAF fighter airfields brought Dowding’s command to a state of crisis. At last the Luwaffe’s strategists had hit upon the correct targets with which to

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

The Junkers Ju 88, nicknamed the ‘Schnellbomber’, proved to be one of the Luwaffe’s most versatile aircra of the entire war. The superior speed of the Ju 88 meant that its loss rate during the Bale was much lower than the Do 17 and He 111.

Junkers Ju 88A-1 ‘5J+CS’ of 8./KG 4. Clavework Graphics

bring the RAF fighters up to combat and heavy losses. The effect on Fighter Command was daunting, over the period from August 23 to September 6, the command lost 295 Spitfires, Defiants and Hurricanes, with another 171 severely damaged; but as the gross output was some 269 new or repaired aircra, the supply was never limiting. Far more serious was the loss of 103 pilots killed or missing, and 128 wounded. As many as 120 pilots out of 1,000 were out of action, including several of great combat experience. The new, or refreshed, squadrons reaching 11 Group were badly mauled; the tired and combat-experienced ones survived. For example, between arriving in 11 Group and

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retiring to 12 Group, 616 Squadron lost five pilots and twelve aircra between August 25 and September 2. During the period August 28 to September 6, 603 Squadron lost 16 aircra and seven pilots. In the period August 30 to September 6, 253 Squadron lost nine pilots and 13 of their aircra. On the other hand, the experienced 54 Squadron (relieved on September 3) lost nine Spitfire Mk IAs but only one pilot, and 501, which served in the Biggin Hill sector throughout lost four men and nine Hurricanes. As a desperate expedient, Dowding introduced the so-called Stabilisation Scheme, wherein squadrons were categorized into classes. Class ‘A’ were those in 11 Group and the Middle

Wallop and Duxford sectors which were always kept up to establishment in fully-trained pilots, Class ‘B’ were those in Nos. 10 and 12 Groups which were kept up to strength for the relief of 11 Group; and Class ‘C’ were those in an exhausted condition, in a low state of pilot strength and serviceability, posted far from the theatre of action. The output of pilots from the OTUs during August numbered 260 pilots. By using these men and draining the baered units, Fighter Command kept fighting with an average of only ten fully operational pilots out of the usual establishment of 26. There was no doubt that Fighter Command was steadily wasting away.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Seen from the gunner’s position of a Stuka, more Ju 87s are visible in a formation en route to their target.

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Junkers Ju 87 Stuka

‘Stuka’ Sortie

For a brief period during the Bale of Britain, the much-feared Junkers Ju 87 Stuka aacked our shores. However, without an umbrella of air superiority, the slow flying and poorly armed dive-bomber was at great risk from fighter aack and the inevitable heavy losses from the guns of RAF Spitfires and Hurricanes soon led to the type being withdrawn from operations over England. Jarrod Coer describes the Stuka’s involvement in the Bale during August 1940 and presents a pictorial representation of a typical sortie using images from the SA-Kuva archive.

S

ynonymous with the Blitzkrieg campaigns of the early war when Germany gained its initial victories, there is no doubt that the Junkers Ju 87 Stuka was an effective dive-bomber which possessed a great deal of notoriety and was much-feared by those on the ground under its aack. The Stuka, whose name was derived from a shortening of “Sturzkampfflugzeug”, the German word for dive-bomber, gained its fearsome reputation aer wreaking havoc during the advances into Poland and France. At the time of the start of the Bale of Britain in July 1940, the Luwaffe was operating the Ju 87B-2 and a long-range version, the Ju 87R. Some anti-shipping strikes had been carried out by Stukas just prior to the Bale of Britain, however its use in force would not begin until early August 1940. Having concentrated the Stukagruppen in the Cherbourg area, the first sorties in strength took place on August 8, five days before Adler Tag. Despite a strong fighter escort of Messerschmi Bf 109Es, without the total air supremacy that the Stukas needed to be able to operate successfully, this first raid suffered heavy

losses. Then, on Adler Tag itself, August 13, a formation of Ju 87s en route to aack Middle Wallop was aacked by Spitfires of 609 (West Riding) Squadron. Nine of the Stukas were shot down in quick time and these early losses were indicative of worse that were to follow. The Stuka was not achieving the success that it did in Poland and France because the Luwaffe did not have total aerial superiority over the RAF and its slow flying speeds and light defensive armament were making it highly vulnerable. During the following week, more than 40 Ju 87s were lost on raids over England. With nine aircra lost on a raid to Tangmere on August 16, and 16 more Stukas lost on raids to Ford and Thorney Island two days later, it was time for the Luwaffe commanders to make a decision. In order to avoid the entire Stukagruppen from being wiped out, the Ju 87 was withdrawn from operations and moved to the Pas de Calais area to re-group. It had lasted just ten days of flying missions over RAF airfields and other strategic targets such as radar sites in the south of England.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

At a forward operating airfield with limited facilities, a truck load of bombs have arrived on the flight line and are seen being unloaded. These are the smaller 50kg bombs, four of which could be fied underneath the wings, two on each wing.

A member of the Stuka’s ground crew carries a 50kg bomb towards an aircra, on his shoulder.

By the time of the Bale of Britain, the Stuka in service was the Ju 87B-2 which boasted individual ejection exhaust stubs for a measure of thrust augmentation, hydraulically operated radiator cooling gills and an improved propeller over the Ju 87B-1. The Ju 87B-2’s improved performance gave it the capability to carry a 1,000kg bomb load as well as two crew which meant that it could carry either a 250kg or 500kg underslung bomb as well as the wing mounted bombs. Here, an underslung bomb is fied into position on the bomb crutch.

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Junkers Ju 87 Stuka

Armourers mount a 50kg bomb onto the bomb rack under the starboard wing of a Stuka.

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Refuelling aircra at forward operating bases was not always done conventionally, as depicted in this view.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Stuka aircrew don their flying gear as the bombing operation nears.

Using maps in hand, the aircrew are briefed on their target out on the flight line, rather than in a more familiar briefing room which would be available at a fully equipped base.

A Stuka pilot is helped to strap into his seat by a member of his ground crew as take-off time nears.

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Junkers Ju 87 Stuka

All crewed up and strapped in with his gunner, a Stuka pilot calls for start-up.

A Luwaffe ground crewman toils with the inertia starter of a Ju 87. The handle turned a flywheel which, when enough momentum had been built up, was used to start the engine.

With their engines started, the Stuka pilots go through the pre-flight checks to make sure that their aircra are ready for a dive-bombing aack on a strategic target.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

All pre-flight checks have been carried out, so the Stuka taxies out for take-off.

A formation take-off takes place and the Stukas are airborne ready to formate and fly to their target.

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Junkers Ju 87 Stuka

The formation is seen en route to its specified target. Typically, the Stuka formation would be made up of numerous threeaircra vics (“keen”) flying at about 15,000, cruising at 150mph. If there was a fighter escort protecting the Stukas, they would follow the formation by flying a weaving path behind and slightly above the dive-bombers. As the Stukas neared the target the escort would split up, with about onethird remaining at medium height while the rest descended to about 4,000 ready to be in position to protect the dive-bombers from enemy fighters which could pick them off quickly as they pulled out of their dives.

Meanwhile, back at base, a tired member of the ground crew takes a break by sleeping using a Stuka bomb as a pillow.

For strikes on small strategic targets, the aircra would move into echelon during the approach and peel off and aack individually in line astern. The pilot was able to see directly beneath his aircra through a small window set in the floor and so was able to judge when to begin his bunt into the dive. Shortly before reaching their target and while still flying at around 15,000, the Stuka pilots ready themselves for the aack. Before entering the dive, the Ju 87 pilot would switch on his reflector sight, trim the aircra for a dive, set the pull-out altitude on the contact altimeter to 4,000, close the radiator flaps and throle back the engine. He would also open the ventilation air supply to the windscreen, which would prevent possible misting up as the aircra entered the more moist air found at the lower altitudes which would be reached quickly. His final action before diving would be to switch on the wind-driven “screamer” siren and open the dive brakes. The opening of the dive brakes automatically lowered an elevator tab, which would counter the nose-up trim-change that would otherwise result.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Each aircra began its dive aack individually from the medium cruising altitude of 15,000 and the pilots put their aircra into a near-vertical 80° dive-angle.

The pilots then used the dive-bombing sight (“stuvi”) to point their Stuka at the specified target. With the dive-brakes extended, the Stuka gained speed quite gradually, taking about 8,000 for it to reach 350mph, whereupon its speed remained constant. The success of the aack depended on the accuracy with which the dive angle was maintained and to assist him with this, the pilot used etched lines on the side panel of his canopy with which he could align the horizon.

As the Stukas enter the near-vertical 80° dive-angle, the aircra’s aerodynamic siren mounted on the starboard wheel fairing wailed loudly to put fear and confusion into the minds of those on the ground. A dive from 15,000 to the release altitude of 4,000 took about 30 seconds, during which the pilot controlled his aircra to keep the target in the centre of his sight. Four seconds before the dive-bomber passed the previously set pull-out altitude, the contacting altimeter sounded a horn. The horn stopped at release height, then the pilot pressed a buon on his control column to actuate a powerful spring which returned the elevator trim tab to the neutral position, making the aircra tail-heavy so that it would begin to automatically pull out of the dive. The pressing of the buon also actuated the automatic bomb-release mechanism and aer a set time the bombs were released. The lengthy bomb crutch swung the large under fuselage bomb down clear of the Stuka’s propeller disc. Aer the pull-out, the pilot regained control and retracted the dive brakes, opened the throle, trimmed for level flight and began his escape from the defences around the target area.

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75th Anniversary of the Battle of Britain

THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

RAF Bentley Priory

HQ Fighter Command Photographs supplied by Jarrod Coer unless otherwise stated

Long-serving historic building

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rom July 1936 to April 1968, Bentley Priory served as the Headquarters of RAF Fighter Command. As well as being a well-restored Sir John Soane building and so of architectural importance, it is of great value in terms of RAF heritage. The Bale of Britain was masterminded from there and, right up until it was vacated by the RAF in 2008, its Mess contained many remembrances of the Bale and Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding’s wartime office, with its original furniture, telephone and the like, which was maintained just as he le it. This preserved office found widespread fame aer it was used for filming in the epic 1969 film Bale of Britain which starred Sir Laurence Olivier as Dowding. From 1937 until March 1940, Dowding’s Filter Room was in the converted Ante room of the Priory until the underground bunker was opened where an Operations Room was built. It was in there that Dowding monitored the intelligence required for his vital decision-making both in the run up to, and during, the Bale. As part of an estate rationalisation programme, the Ministry of Defence sold the Bentley Priory

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Once home to Fighter Command and from where the Bale of Britain was masterminded by Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, Jarrod Coer recently visited Bentley Priory which now houses a public museum dedicated to the memory of ‘The Few’.

site within a large contract for land disposal tied to a major rebuild at RAF Northolt. The Bentley Priory Bale of Britain Trust is a registered charity which was formed to ensure the preservation of this pivotal part of world history in readiness for when the RAF vacated the site. The Trust was formed at the request of the Bale of Britain Fighter Association, whose membership was made up of survivors of ‘The Few’, many of whom have since sadly passed away. The Association considers Bentley Priory its spiritual home and an important reminder of the sacrifices of those who did not survive the Bale or the remainder of the war. The Association has commemorated victory in the Bale of Britain with a dinner at Bentley Priory every year since 1946, when Sir Hugh Dowding was their guest of honour. The Trust’s objectives are: w To establish and maintain Bentley Priory as a centre for education, information, training and teaching of the history of the Bale of Britain, aerospace history, aerospace technology and its future advancement.

w To use Bentley Priory as a permanent memorial to those who served in the Royal Air Force and in particular (but not exclusively) during the Bale of Britain in order to assist future generations in acknowledging and recognising the sacrifices made during the Bale to ensure freedom of Europe and the world. The RAF finally le Bentley Priory on May 30, 2008. The Bentley Priory Bale of Britain Trust then worked hard to negotiate a strong position with the disposal brokers whereby the costs of refurbishing the museum were funded as an ‘enabling development’ within the planning consent for the development of residential housing and apartments on the site. Museum development involved the installation of accessible and stimulating interpretive displays telling the story of the house, its changing roles throughout history, its association with significant historical characters, the landscaped grounds and the vital role of the Priory during the Bale of Britain, the D-Day landings and the Cold War. The Trust also funded enhanced heritage-standard finishes to the

RAF Bentley Priory

Bentley Priory in its beautiful grounds seen before the war; is not only a well-restored Sir John Soane building of great architectural importance but it was HQ Fighter command from 1936 to 1968. Courtesy Bentley Priory Bale of Britain Trust.

A recent view of the façade of Bentley Priory, with its Hurricane and Spitfire gate guardians seen in the grounds to the front of the Grade II listed building which now houses a museum dedicated to ‘The Few’.

From 1937 to 1940 the Filter Room was in the converted Ante room of Bentley Priory until the underground Operations Room was opened in March, just a few months before the Bale of Britain began. Courtesy Bentley Priory Bale of Britain Trust

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN The original sector clock from Bentley Priory’s Operations Room is displayed in the restored Ante room at the new museum. The clock is marked with yellow, blue and red triangles which represent 5 minute intervals. These repeat every 15 minutes and were used to denote the ‘age’ of plots marking the position of enemy aircra on the operations map, which were considered of lile use aer 15 minutes.

During the Bale of Britain, the ‘Dowding System’ was used to great effect. This was an integrated defence consisting of radar, raid ploing and radio communication and at the height of the Bale, the staff at Bentley Priory would sometimes work for 48 hours at a time. Courtesy Bentley Priory Bale of Britain Trust

The rotunda at Bentley Priory, a round glass-domed room in a similar style to the one that Sir John Soane designed at the Bank of England. Many artefacts relating to some of ‘The Few’, including medals, logbooks and uniforms, are now displayed in this beautiful room and have been generously loaned to the museum by Melissa John.

An experimental Filter Room was created at Bentley Priory in the late 1930s. This has been recreated to tell visitors the story of the innovative technology used to co-ordinate the RAF fighter defences.

In the museum’s entrance hall are two arched windows, originally designed by Sir John Soane and now fied with framed stained glass windows depicting scenes from the Bale of Britain. One has a Spitfire as its centrepiece and the other a Hurricane.

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RAF Bentley Priory

historic rooms and conservation work on the nationally important collection of paintings, documents and memorabilia as well as financing the detailed planning of an education programme aimed at both formal and life-long learning.

Stepping on hallowed ground The Bentley Priory Museum was formally opened by HRH The Prince of Wales, Patron of the Bentley Priory Bale of Britain Trust with The Duchess of Cornwall at a ceremony on September 12, 2013. Just to set foot inside these historic rooms is like stepping on hallowed ground to anyone with a passion for RAF heritage, as it gives one a real sense of stepping back in time to the very nerve centre from where the Bale of Britain was masterminded and controlled by the Air Officer Commanding-inChief Fighter Command, ACM Sir Hugh Dowding. The museum comprises several rooms, including the rotunda, in which are now displayed many artefacts relating to some of ‘The Few’. These, which include medals, logbooks, uniforms and other items, have been generously loaned to museum by Melissa John in memory of her brother Christopher, who died in 2008. The items include displays of pilots including Gp Capt John ‘Cat’s Eyes’ Cunningham CBE DSO** DFC*, who went on to become the RAF’s highest scoring night-fighter ace of World War Two, and Sgt Josef Frantisek DFM*, the highest scoring Allied ace of the Bale of Britain. These make a very fiing tribute to ‘The Few’, showing

Another aspect of the museum is a room containing four period desks, each representing a different era of Bentley Priory’s RAF occupation. A number of historic ceramic squadron crests given to the station by relevant units such as Nos 1, 17, 23, 29, 41, 43, 56, 72, 74, 85, and 92 Squadrons are also displayed in the same room.

On display in the museum is one of the rare Bale of Britain presentation lace panels produced by Dobsons and M. Browne & Co of Noingham, thought to have been manufactured circa 1941/1942. Measuring around 15 high, Only 38 of these panels were woven and were presented to individuals and organisations such as King George VI, Winston Churchill, various RAF units, Westminster Abbey, the City of London and the City of Noingham, plus some were sent to Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. Jarrod Coer

the personal side of those who fought in this crucial turning point of World War Two. The museum has also built a recreated Filter Room, where visitors can learn about the innovative early warning technology used during the Bale of Britain. This display includes maps, life-size bronze figures and information boards. Additionally, there is a room containing four period desks, each representing a different era of Bentley Priory’s RAF occupation. A number of historic ceramic squadron crests given to the station by the relevant units are also displayed in the same room. However, the highlight of your visit will surely be the superb 10-minute audio-visual display which the museum staff will play for visitors as required. Atlas AV worked with the designers and museum personnel to create this unique experience that offers visitors an intuitive insight into the building’s wartime operations using cleverly integrated leading edge technology. The superbly produced show highlights the trials, tribulations and triumphs of Dowding during his reign as the Commander-in-Chief of Fighter Command. It begins by seing the scene with images projected onto a semi-transparent gauze screen behind which high resolution images are projected around the walls and ceiling in Dowding’s original and now restored office to produce a captivating visual experience. The nostalgic presence of Dowding is brilliantly represented by show control technology allowing features of the office to ‘come to life’ using scene control of the lighting and an automatically opening door. Shadows and reflections created using projection masking techniques depict the vital work of the secret ‘Dowding System’ during the Bale of Britain. With the gauze still displaying subtle visuals including maps and subtitles, the show becomes

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Scenes from the superb audio visual display which is projected onto the walls of ACM Sir Hugh Dowding’s wartime office. Jarrod Coer

fully immersive with three dimensional textures. As radio broadcasts are played, a period wireless set is illuminated inside the office along with images of those speaking, such as Prime Minister Winston Churchill. Aer achieving victory in the Bale, Dowding stepped down and his emotional words contained in a leer to his aircrews are relayed while the visual display depicts him writing the leer. Shadows projected onto his mirror then depict Dowding clearing his desk and leaving the office, as footstep sounds

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transmied from wireless surround-sound speakers hauntingly animate him leaving before the office door swings open. All in all, a visit to the Bentley Priory Museum is a thoroughly rewarding experience. This is the first major anniversary year in which members of the public have had the opportunity to get access to the site and it is a highly recommended day out. With thanks to Museum Director Eleanor Pulfer for her generous assistance on the day of the author’s visit.

LOCATION: Bentley Priory Museum, Mansion House Drive, Stanmore, Middlesex, HA7 3FB (SatNav postcode: HA7 3HT). The museum is reasonably close to exits from the A1, M1 and M25 in the North London area. Please note: The museum is located within a secure residential area and on arriving you will see closed gates – but do not worry! Just approach the gates and a friendly security guard will greet you, then just let them know you would like to visit the museum and they will give you directions and open the gates for you. The nearest Underground station is Stanmore. Bus 142 stops outside the gates to Bentley Priory and outside Stanmore Underground station. Free parking, with disabled parking outside the museum. The site is fully accessible for wheelchairs, with a li and disabled toilets. There is an on-site cafe downstairs serving hot and cold drinks and light refreshments. OPENING TIMES: Monday, Wednesday, Friday and Saturday. March to September 10.00am-5.00pm, October to February

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Hugh Dowding Letter

F

rom his office at Bentley Priory, on May 16, 1940 Sir Hugh Dowding wrote this famous and controversial leer that changed the course of history. Prime Minister Winston Churchill had flown to France and sent a telegraph instructing that more fighters be sent to France to help with the desperate situation there. Three days aer reading Dowding’s leer, he cancelled that order and all but three of the Hurricane squadrons based that were overseas flew back to operate from home airfields. Dowding remarked that their return had “converted a desperate situation into a serious situation.” This leer and Dowding’s insistence during Cabinet meetings that Britain should maintain a sufficient home fighter force paved the way for the country to be in a position to achieve victory in the Bale of Britain. These pictures are of the original leer which is now held in the care of the RAF College Cranwell. A copy of the leer is displayed at the Bentley Priory Museum. Jarrod Coer

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

‘Stuffy’ and his ‘Few’ A thorn in the side of the Air Ministry from the mid-1930s, Hugh Dowding was, never-the-less, the right leader of Fighter Command, at the right time

Intolerable indignity

F

ollowing the uer defeat of France and the near annihilation of the British Expeditionary Force in the spring of 1940, Britain stood virtually alone against the menacing might of Hitler’s Germany. The defence of Britain now depended mainly upon the ability of RAF Fighter Command to repel a pre-invasion air assault by the Luwaffe. It is internationally recognised that the ‘handful’ of fighter pilots-some 3,000collectively known as ‘The Few’, succeeded in their desperate task and through their courage and sacrifices brought victory in the conflict from July to early November 1940, which came to be called the Bale of Britain. Yet, even as the free world was beginning to realise the extent and significance of the victory of The Few, the architect of that victory, the reticent and outwardly austere AOC-in-C of Fighter Command, Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, suffered intolerable indignity and injustice at the hands of his political masters and certain senior RAF officers. Retired prematurely, he was allowed within less than a year to slide into obscurity. Astonishingly, it was not until May 1943 that he was honoured with a baronetcy for his ‘splendid service’ and even the customary

honours that were due to any retiring senior officer were withheld from him. Despite his 42 years of loyal service to his country and his seniority, he was never promoted beyond Air Chief Marshal. However, this was the price he paid for having fashioned Fighter Command counter to the obtuse and dogmatic policies of the Air Ministry of the day.

Staff officer Hugh Caswall Tremenheere Dowding was born on April 24, 1882 at Moffat, Dumfreisshire, where his father was employed as a schoolmaster but his true family roots were deep in the West Country of England. Educated at Winchester, Dowding entered the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, in September 1899 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the Garrison Artillery on August 18, 1900, although he had aimed for the Royal Engineers. He served in Gibraltar, Ceylon, Hong Kong and, for six years in India. By 1913, he had reached the rank of Captain, in which year he returned to England to aend Staff College at Camberley and, while there, decided to widen his experience by learning to fly. On December 19, 1913, he was granted Royal Aero Club Certificate No.711 and, by the spring of

The defence of Britain now depended mainly upon the ability of RAF Fighter Command to repel a pre-invasion air assault by the Luftwaffe. 72 www.myhobbystore.co.uk

1914, he had gained his RFC (Royal Flying Corps) ‘wings’ at the Central Flying School, Upavon. He was placed on the RFC Reserve List and returned to the Garrison Artillery but, upon the outbreak of the First World War, he was detached to the RFC and, in October 1914, went to France as a pilot with 6 Squadron, RFC. The following month, however, he was posted as a staff officer to RFC Headquarters and did not return to flying duties until March 1915 when he was posted as a flight commander to 9 Squadron. On July 22, he became the commander of 16 Squadron and was promoted to Lt-Col in February 1916. Thereaer, his service in France alternated between staff and squadron command posts until, in 1917, he fell foul of General Trenchard, Commander of the RFC in France and was sent back to England where he remained until the Armistice. Although his experience of active operations had not been vast or intensive and he rarely piloted aircra aer the war (which might be said to be reflected in later judgements), his military experience both with the Army and the RFC had been wide. This fied him for Staff Commands and, by 1918, he had risen rapidly to the rank of Brigadier General in the RFC. In the post war RAF, Trenchard reluctantly granted Dowding a permanent commission with the rank of Group Captain. During the years of the peacetime RAF, Dowding held various senior posts in Britain and overseas. He was promoted to Air Commodore in 1922, served in Iraq from 1924 to 1926 and then, once promoted to Air Vice-Marshal, was appointed Director of Training at the Air Ministry. On December 28, 1929, he

Behind the Battle

Air Chief Marshal Sir Hugh Dowding, the Commander-inChief of RAF Fighter Command throughout the Bale of Britain. Crown Copyright

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN became Air Officer Commanding Fighting Area, Air Defence of Great Britain, the predecessor of Fighter Command. He held the post for only one year before being appointed to the Air Council as Air Member for Supply and Research, a post he held until 1936, being promoted to Air Marshal in January 1933 and then made a KCB in June. As Air Member for Supply and Research he was responsible for the specifications and design supervision of future RAF aircra and must therefore share in the criticism of the Air Council for the inadequacy of the aircra types introduced into squadron service in the 1930s.

Air defence problems The inadequacies of the service aircra and aerial defence arrangements were the result of a

responsibilities for the entire United Kingdom were prodigious, and Dowding devoted himself to improving, expanding and modernising his command. The command was woefully lacking in truly modern aircra and equipment, early warning systems, and effective means of co-ordinating squadrons in the air. Dowding pressed for rapid re-equipment with Spitfire and Hurricane aircra and anticipated the need for all-weather runways. He was interested in early warning radar systems and he was instrumental in the restructuring of the Observer Corps. In order to use advance warning to its fullest advantage by co-ordinating interceptions, a new system was devised to link radar stations and observer posts to operations rooms via a filter room. Controllers assessed the reports

It is internationally recognised that the ‘handful’ of fighter pilots-some 3,000- collectively known as ‘The Few’, succeeded in their desperate task and through their courage and sacrifices brought victory in the conflict from July to early November 1940, which came to be called the Battle of Britain.

and the state of the aerial conflict and made the necessary decisions about interceptions, a system essential that was designed to fully exploit the ability of the fast-climbing interceptor. However, the necessity for the training of pilots and evaluation of systems, equipment and tactics was considered a low priority by the Air Ministry who denied the requisite facilities. The work that Dowding accomplished was in the face of opposition from blinkered minds in high Service and Government circles. The mounting strength of Germany’s Luwaffe gave impetus to the expansion of the RAF, but it took the Munich Crisis of September 1938 to cause a major change of emphasis in air rearmament policies and, due to Dowding’s far-sighted awareness, priority was at last switched from bomber to fighter production in quantity. However, by September 1939, Dowding’s constant struggle to provide Britain with an adequate air defence had produced only partial success. Although the Air Ministry had finally agreed that at least 53 fighter squadrons were needed for such a defensive system, at the outbreak of hostilities, Dowding could still only muster the equivalent of 34. The initial campaign

compound of causes. It was felt throughout the aircra industry and the Air Ministry that a biplane would be a beer fighter than a monoplane but, by 1934, the biplane’s development limits had been reached. However, the problems involved in the transition to the monoplane were multiple and not just technical: the authorities had to be convinced about the feasibility and effectiveness of the high power monoplane fighter projected by the theorists. It was only as a result of pressure from Supermarine, Hawker and Rolls Royce that specification F5/34 was issued, calling for a 275mph, fast-climbing six or eight gun fighter. Sydney Camm of Hawker and R. J. Mitchell of Supermarine still found the specification inadequate and the prototype Hawker Hurricane and Supermarine Spitfire were ordered under specifications F36/34 and F37/34 respectively. Both were Rolls-Royce Merlin powered. Thus, mainly through the imagination and foresight of the industry, the RAF gained two fast modern fighters. In 1936, RAF commands were completely reorganised and Dowding was appointed the first AOC-in-C of the newly-formed Fighter Command.

AOC Fighter Command Once in control of Fighter Command, Dowding rapidly saw the inadequacies of the provisions made for the aerial defence of Britain. His

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Dowding escorts King George V and Queen Elizabeth during a visit to HQ, Fighter Command, at RAF Bentley Priory. Via Jon Molyneux

Behind the Battle

Dowding chats with Fighter Command pilots during the fih anniversary of the Bale on September 15, 1945. He is captured in conversation with Douglas Bader. Via Jon Molyneux

in France during the ‘Phoney War’ period further exacerbated Dowding’s problems. Motivated primarily by political considerations, the British Government ordered several fighter squadrons to France in support of BEF operations. When, in May 1940, the German invasion of the Low Countries swept all opposition aside, the newly-constituted British Government, under Winston Churchill, ordered Dowding to increase the number of fighters being despatched in order to bolster the failing French and British forces in France. Casualties among the fighters mounted alarmingly, yet Churchill continued to press Dowding for more reinforcements. Acutely aware of the debilitating consequences of Churchill’s demands upon the already inadequate strength of Fighter Command, simply in order to support a bale which, in Dowding’s view, was already lost, Dowding requested a meeting with the Cabinet on May 15. He placed before Churchill a graph of the actual losses of fighters in the French struggle-more than 200-and calmly predicted that if this ‘wastage’ continued for just two more weeks ‘we shall not have a single

Dowding’s immediate responsibilities included air protection of the BEF’s evacuation from Dunkirk, a series of operations which cost Fighter Command yet more precious aircraft and pilots. Hurricane le in France or in this country’. Churchill (reluctantly) agreed to stop sending any further fighters but, immediately aer the meeting, he issued orders that four more squadrons were to move to France! Still dissatisfied, Dowding returned to his headquarters at Bentley Priory, Stanmore and prepared a personal statement which was addressed formally to the Under Secretary of State at the Air Ministry, in which he clearly outlined the state of weakness of Fighter Command, reminded the Under Secretary of the past promises of minimum fighter defensive strength and called for a clear-cut, unambiguous statement of the Air Ministry’s figure for the minimal fighter strength required to defend Britain. It was a heart-felt plea for a clear and

final decision regarding what the government’s intentions were for the air defence of the United Kingdom. With Air Staff support, this statement eventually led to the decision to cease the obvious wastage of fighters in France. Though well below his required minimum squadron strength, Dowding’s command could be hastily rebuilt and enlarged for the expected imminent air assault on Britain by the Luwaffe.

Decisive victory Dowding’s immediate responsibilities included air protection of the BEF’s evacuation from Dunkirk, a series of operations which cost Fighter Command yet more precious aircra and pilots. By July 1940, some 500 fighters, mainly

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN When, on June 18, Churchill said in the House of Commons…..‘the battle of France is over. I expect that the Battle of Britain is about to begin…..’ Hugh Dowding had already laid his outline plans for the defence of Britain in the coming months.

The prototype Hawker Hurricane which entered service in 1937 as the RAF’s first monoplane fighter. One of the most important tools Dowding has in his new armoury, the Hurricane and the Spitfire could not have been developed at a more crucial time in the RAF’s history. Via Jon Molyneux

Hurricanes, had been lost in the French debacle in a mere seven weeks of desperate fighting. When, on June 18, Churchill said in the House of Commons…..‘the bale of France is over. I expect that the Bale of Britain is about to begin…..’ Hugh Dowding had already laid his outline plans for the defence of Britain in the coming months. His far-sighted planning and re-equipping of Fighter Command had, despite the near disaster in France, produced a resilient combat force. Although throughout the Bale from June to November 1940, there was continual concern about the replacement of casualties among aircra and particularly trained pilots, Dowding had instigated a system of rotating bale-weary squadrons with fresh squadrons from the north. Backed by the brilliant tactical handling of 11 Group by the New Zealander, Keith Park, who

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wisely resisted the pressure of Leigh-Mallory and others to use the big wing ‘Balbo’ formations, Dowding’s strategic policies, aided by disastrous strategic mistakes by the German High Command, proved to be the right and indeed only methods of achieving victory. Despite all these achievements and, even whilst engaged upon controlling the bale, Dowding was subjected to mounting criticism within RAF and political circles, an ill-timed opposition instigated to a large degree by a junior commander in Fighter Command but stemming mainly from Dowding’s opposition to Air Ministry policy. The result was astonishing. In midNovember 1940, as the bale petered out in all too obvious triumph for ‘The Few’, Dowding, having master-minded Britain’s survival, was relieved of his command at the briefest possible notice.

The political and Service intrigue, which led to the removal of Dowding and Park from their commands, has been well documented in post-war records, biographies and histories. Completely in character, Hugh Dowding made no public protest over his shabby treatment and quietly stepped into retirement. On February 15, 1970, Air Chief Marshal Baron Dowding of Bentley Priory, GCB, GCVO CMG, leader of the legendary ‘Few’ and virtual saviour of his country, died peacefully at his home in Tunbridge Wells, Kent. Known from his youth as ‘Stuffy’ and in manner and appearance the antithesis of the popular image of a fighting leader, Dowding nevertheless laid the foundations for Fighter Command’s greatest achievement.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Coltishall Summer Douglas Bader and 242 Squadron’s first tour at Coltishall From RAF Coltishall, Fighter Station, by Mick Jennings, MBE.

New Arrivals

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n June 20, 1940, Coltishall welcomed its second resident unit, 242 Squadron. The squadron was manned mainly by Canadian pilots who had joined the RAF prior to the start of the war. Their mount, the Hurricane, was an aircra that was to become the backbone of Fighter Command throughout the dark days of the Bale of Britain. Due to the mauling that 242 Squadron had received in the Bale of France, it was felt that the squadron needed a strong commander to raise the pilots’ morale and to help the squadron regroup and re-establish itself. The man selected for this difficult and demanding task was a 30 year-old fighter pilot with artificial legs, Douglas Bader. Douglas Bader was a charismatic man whose great weakness, according to his friend, Sqn Ldr Kenneth Cross, was that; ‘he knew beer than anyone else’. He had never worked in an Operations Room and frequently complained that his squadron was sent up too late. He did, however, have some of the virtues lacked by his AOC, Leigh-Mallory, including extroversion and charisma but Bader did lack experience of bale responsibility. If these shortcomings were true to life at the beginning of his time at Coltishall, they certainly changed as he whipped 242 Squadron into shape. Bader had been told of his new command by AVM Leigh-Mallory, AOC 12 Group, at Watnall, NW of Noingham. At first, Bader thought he

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had been summoned to his HQ to explain a landing accident which had taken place the previous day, when the Spitfire he was flying overshot a night landing. The aircra slid on its belly over the low wall of an aircra pen, shearing the undercarriage off and jarring to a stop. As the bricks were raining down on the metal of his aircra, Bader just sat there prior to uering one short, unprintable word! Without any preamble, Leigh-Mallory said: “I’ve been hearing of your work as a Flight Commander. I’m giving you your own squadron, 242.” Bader replied, “Yes Sir…...Sir, there’s one thing I should tell you.........I broke a Spitfire last night, overshot my landing.” Mildly, Leigh-Mallory replied: “Well, that happens sometimes, you know.” Aer a further briefing on what the AOC expected of the newly promoted acting squadron leader, Bader drove the hundred or so miles back to his base at Kirton-in-Lindsey to pack his bags, prior to his journey to Coltishall, and his new command. He arrived in the Norwich area at about 2300hrs on a dark, damp night. A local policeman gave him directions on how to get to Coltishall. However, just five minutes later, Bader was well and truly lost! He asked a local chap, who just happened to be on the road at that time of night, for directions. That request failed, as the man did not know either! He then saw a woman and she, fearful of his intentions, fled as soon as he spoke. With no signposts anywhere, he felt that his chances of finding the base that night were now minimal, but (yet again) he found

Photographs supplied by author unless otherwise stated

Coltishall Summer

Sqn Ldr Douglas Steuart Bader poses for his first portrait since becoming the CO of 242 Squadron in June 1941.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

another man who said suspiciously, “How do I know who you are? You may be a spy; anyway I don’t know where the aerodrome is!” About an hour later, Bader’s journey around the back roads of Norfolk came to fruition when he came across a barbed wire barrier across the road and, behind it, in the light of a red lamp, stood an RAF sentry. Bader explained to the sentry that he was the new CO of 242 Squadron. The sentry requested the password of the day. Bader exploded, “How the hell do I know the password, I’ve never been here before!” “Sorry Sir”, replied the sentry, “without the password, I

can’t let you through.” Bader simmered at the barrier for another twenty minutes until the guardroom located the Duty Officer who then ruled that Acting Sqn Ldr Bader could be admied without the password. Douglas Bader had worked hard to prepare his new squadron for further action, although not without causing a few headaches to his superiors along the way. At one point, he sent a signal to his group which stated, “242 Squadron now operational as regards to pilots, but non-operational, repeat, non-operational as regards equipment.”

The whole of 242 Squadron out in the best blue for usual group photograph at Coltishall in 1940.

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Bader’s personal Hurricane V7467 complete with ‘D’ for ‘Dogsbody’ code leer. Aer serving with 242 Squadron, the aircra was sent north to 111 Squadron before being destroyed in a crash with 59 OTU at Crosby-on-Eden. Clavework Graphics

Wg Cdr Beisiegal, the phlegmatic Coltishall Sector Controller, was appalled and demanded to know why Bader had not shown him the signal prior to its release off the station! Word soon came back that the signal was causing an awful shindig at Group HQ, to which Bader replied, “There’ll be an awful shindig at Fighter Command

Coltishall Summer

Fg Off William ‘Willy’ McKnight RCAF flew as Bader’s wingman during the Bale of Britain. Later awarded the DFC & Bar, McKnight went on to achieve 17 victories before he was killed on January 12, 1941.

Without any preamble, Leigh-Mallory said: “I’ve been hearing of your work as a Flight Commander. I’m giving you your own squadron, 242”.

Bader replied, “Yes Sir…...Sir, there’s one thing I should tell you.........I broke a Spitfire last night, overshot my landing.” Mildly, Leigh-Mallory replied: “Well, that happens sometimes, you know.” Percival Stanley ‘Stan’ Turner, who was awarded the DFC, whilst serving with 242 Squadron during the Bale of Britain.

too; I’ve sent them a copy as well!” A short pause followed this statement until the Engineering Officer, WO Bernard West, broke the silence by saying, “Well Sir, we’ll either be geing our tools or a new CO!” The fall-out from Bader’s signal highlighted a serious shortage of support equipment and ruffled the feathers of many within the group and command. Bader was summoned to Stanmore Park, Fighter Command’s HQ, to explain his outburst to the AOC, ACM Sir Hugh Dowding. Bader explained to the AOC his reasons for bypassing the chain of command in sending the signal. The AOC accepted his explanation and

said cheerfully, “All right. Now you come with me and we’ll fix this up.” At Coltishall the following day, Wg Cdr Beisiegal held an inquiry into the affair of 242 Squadron’s equipment. The next morning, the lorries were rolling past the guardroom to the maintenance hangars to offload the piles of spares. During this time of chaos on the ground, Bader continued to lead his squadron on twice-daily training missions, developing the tactics of large formation fighter aacks. Many of the young pilots found training under him to be hard and unrelenting. His persistence and bloody mindedness paid off, as, on the receipt of

the spares he so desperately needed, he reported to Squadron Ops and sent signals to both HQ 12 Group and Fighter Command to say that his squadron was now operational. It has oen been said that, under Bader, 242 Squadron was the best in Fighter Command, “It was the first, the last and at all times the best”.

Into Battle It was not until July 10, when three pilots of Green Section were on patrol over East Anglia, that success finally came for the unit. At 0820hrs, at 8,000 over a convoy ten miles off Lowesto, the section sighted two He 111s of III/

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

The Hurricane of long-serving 242 Squadron Canadian pilot, Plt Off Noel Karl Stansfield, in fading light at Coltishall in the summer of 1940.

KG53. Plt Off J B Laa began the aack, selecting an He 111 that was five miles west of the convoy. Immediately increasing his speed, he soon closed in on the raider. His first burst of fire from the stern quarter had no effect. The next aack came from astern at a range of 200yds. At 50yds, the Heinkel sought cover in the cloud layer at 4,000. However, by this time smoke was pouring from his starboard engine. Plt Off Laa followed through the thick cloud but was unable to spot the bomber again. It was presumed that the Heinkel returned safely on one engine, but like so many other combat reports, the actual outcome was inconclusive. Sub Lt R E Gardner, seconded to 242 Squadron from the FAA, had the most successful outcome of the trio of Green Section pilots. As he headed out to relieve Red Section on convoy patrol, he first became aware of the presence of the Heinkels by seeing Anti-aircra fire from the Royal Navy ships whilst flying at 15,000 above the convoy. No sooner had he set his gyro on intercept course for the Heinkels, and started to climb to 24,000, then he was ordered back to continue his convoy patrol. Back above the convoy, he noticed another aircra four miles to the southeast. This time he successfully intercepted the aircra and, shortly aer visual identification, he dived into the aack dead astern. For his second pass, he came in fast at an angle of 25 degrees to the port side. Both the port engine and undercarriage-bay of the bomber were hit in this aack. Aer his third aack, the bomber succumbed to the damage and crashed into the sea. It was two or three minutes before the Heinkel sank, by which time one of the crew had taken to a life ra. The leader of Green Section, Plt Off A F Eckford, saw two bombs drop close to the convoy

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Famous group photo of Bader with his young pilots taken at Duxford during one of their daily detachments from Coltishall in September 1940. From le to right: Crowley-Milling, Tamblyn, Turner, Saville, Campbell, McKnight, Bader, Ball, Homer and Brown.

and then spoed an He 111 as it climbed north from 12,000 into the nearest cloud cover. On emerging from his temporary shelter, the Heinkel was met with a long-range burst of fire from Eckford’s Hurricane, silencing the fire from Heinkel’s upper gun position. The aircra sank back into the cloud and re-emerged, the Heinkel climbing to the south-east, trailing white smoke in its wake. Eckford then saw a second Heinkel approaching Green Two. He gave chase and went in for the aack but soon lost it again in heavy cloud cover.

Bader’s First Kill July 11 was a memorable day for Sqn Ldr Bader, for it was to be the day that he claimed his first enemy aircra. Over the following months he was to claim a score or more, but this one was special. The aircra was a Do 17Z of Wekusta Staffel 261, a long-rang weather reconnaissance unit. Low cloud and rain had prevented any flying in the morning but a call from operations reporting the presence of a likely enemy raider over the coast, spurred Bader into action. Due to the adverse weather conditions, low cloud at about 600 and drizzle, Bader prevented the rest of his section from being scrambled and chose to get airborne himself. Aer breaking the low cloud and murk at around 700, he turned north towards Cromer. Very soon he spoed what turned out to be a Do 17, 400yds directly in front of his aircra. Closing to within 250yds, Bader re-set his reflector gun sight to 200yds as the rear gunner of the Do 17 opened fire. Bader returned fire as the Dornier banked to the le. Descending through 180 degrees, the bomber then started a shallow climb into the cloud with Bader close behind. At this stage, a second burst

of fire erupted from the Hurricane, again without any visible signs of contact with the bomber. As it seemed obvious to Bader that the interception was unsuccessful, he returned to Coltishall where his failure was reported to the Intelligence Officer in the Ops Room. However, on his return to the dispersal, approximately 15 minutes later, he was informed that a Home Guard observation post had reported that a Do 17 had crashed into the sea near Cromer at the exact time of the action. On July 23, Flt Lt G S Powell-Sheddon destroyed a Ju 88 southeast of Great Yarmouth at dawn. Junkers aircra from this squadron had recently begun daily weather reconnaissance flights along the East Coast. As Powell-Sheddon was dealing with this particular aircra, a second Ju 88 broke through the cloud in an aempt to bomb Harleston. Luckily for the German crew, they managed to escape before the Hurricanes of 242 Squadron could catch them.

The Tally Rises On Thursday August 1, while Wg Cdr Beisiegal was preoccupied with providing escorts for two coastal convoys, a raid approached the coast without being detected and carried out an aack on Norwich. The targets were the Boulton-Paul factory and the Norwich Thorpe railway yards. A timber yard was almost burnt out, Thorpe station was hit and the nearby Prince of Wales Road machine-gunned before the raider made its escape without harm, leaving 13 dead and 131 injured in the city. The balance was adjusted slightly later that aernoon, when Ju 88s of KG 30 and He 111s of KG 4 were heading for a convoy which, at that time, was passing along the Norfolk coast. From 1800hrs, the bombers made 90 minutes’-worth

Coltishall Summer

Bader’s famous ‘kick up the backside’ Hitler caricature lives on today. The aircra is actually Sea Hurricane X AE977 but it is painted to represent Bader’s aircra while retaining its own serial. The aircra is now in the hands of Tom Friedkin’s Cinema Air Organisation at Chino, California.

of repeated aacks in an aempt to sink the ships. Hurricanes of 242 Squadron ‘B’ Flight, Green Section, were scrambled from Coltishall to their aid. Fg Off G P Christie (Green 1), Plt Off J B Laa (Green 2) and Sgt Richardson (Green 3) headed towards the convoy and, at 1810hrs, whilst cruising in a climb at 200mph, Green 1 saw the familiar form of a Ju 88, heading east, about 25 miles off Lowesto. Flying at 800 above sea level, the Hurricane approached the Ju 88 that was flying at about 1,000 at half a mile distance. At that point, the crew of the Junkers became aware of the Hurricanes and immediately climbed steeply into cloud. 15 minutes later, Green 1 sighted another Ju 88 just at cloud base. The enemy immediately sped into the cloud with Fg Off Christie following on the same course, but this time underneath the cloud base. He soon spoed the Ju 88 in light cloud and he pulled vertically into the aack, managing to fire two short bursts into the underside of the Ju 88 before his Hurricane stalled in the climb. Once more, he returned to the patrol. Shortly aer, an He 111 appeared out of the cloud directly in front of him. Being caught by surprise, the lower rear gunner on the Heinkel opened up on the Hurricane just as the bomber released its bombs on the convoy - both bombs and bullets missed their target. The He 111 was flying west when Christie went in for the aack but yet again the enemy sought the sanctuary of the clouds. This time, however, the Hurricane pressed home the aack as the bomber entered the cloud and Christie witnessed a large piece of the starboard wing detach from the bomber. Unfortunately, low on fuel, Christie had to break off the engagement.

Lady Bader and ‘Johnnie’ Johnson unveil Coltishall’s latest gate guard in July 1989. The Hurricane I replica, V7467, LE-D, which guarded the entrance to RAF Coltishall, was displayed in the markings of Bader’s aircra when he flew from the station with 242 Squadron. His widow, Lady Joan Bader, unveiled the aircra in the presence of Sir Denis Crowley-Milling and many of Bader’s old wartime comrades.

Meanwhile, Green 3, Sgt Richardson, flying P3087, sighted a Ju 88 at 1855hrs with the help of Anti-Aircra fire from the convoy below. Flying at 700, 15 miles east of Lowesto, he flew in for a rear quarter aack on the bomber. The Junkers tried in vain to regain cloud cover when the Hurricane broke away to its rear and turned to starboard. Overtaking the Ju88 on its starboard side, Sgt Richardson made a front quarter aack. He noticed, even before firing, that the starboard engine on the Junkers had stopped. Pressing home the aack, he saw thick grey smoke billowing from the crippled Ju 88. The bomber then began a very shallow dive towards the sea where, just above wave height, the nose rose up steeply and the tail struck the sea. The impact caused the bomber to break in two and, just 30 seconds later, it had sunk with no trace of any survivors. Whilst Green 1 and 3 were busy with their respective bombers, Plt Off Laa saw a succession of enemy aircra which appeared above the convoy at about five minute intervals. They each sneaked out of the cloud cover for no more than a few seconds at a time. On a couple of occasions, Green 2 managed to get two or three short bursts into the bombers as they appeared out of the cloud but, as soon as they saw him, they would drop their bombs and run for cover. As the Junkers and Heinkels kept breaking the clouds, it was difficult to know exactly how many there were, perhaps it was just a couple of each type. The three Hurricanes linked up again for their return flight where they landed at 1920hrs. This eventful patrol was typical of the operations that were to follow over the following months. Another raid on Coltishall occurred on August 21 at 1415hrs when a Do 17 of 4/KG3 aacked the

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

The Hurricane replica served on Coltishall’s gate until September 17 2006 when it was moved to High Wycombe. By November 30, 2006, this famous fighter station was closed.

airfield from out of the clouds. An eyewitness recalled that ‘it was like a hornets’ nest when he came over’. Both 66 and 242 Squadrons were scrambled and began to chase the raider in and out of the low clouds. Blue Section, led by Flt Lt Powell-Sheddon, sighted the Dornier flying at 3,500 between two layers of cloud. On intercepting the aircra, Powell-Sheddon fired at the raider before it reached the relative safety of the lower layer of cloud. The Dornier went right through the cloud with the three Hurricanes on its tail. Plt Off J B Laa (Blue 2) found himself underneath the bomber about 100yds distant. He allowed 25 degrees of deflection and gave it a six-second burst. Simultaneously, Blue 3, Sub Lt Gardner carried out his own aack. There was no return fire from the cornered enemy. The Dornier’s port engine began to burn and there seemed to be a fire in the fuselage as well. The pilot of the aircra aempted to land but the aircra crashed in flames. Soon the Hurricanes returned to report the raider shot down at Sarston near Harleston where it had crashed in a field killing two ponies; Gardner was credited with his second victory. By the end of the Bale of Britain, he was to be credited with one He 111, one Do 17, one Do 215 and half of another, all whilst serving with 242 Squadron. Sqn Ldr Bader’s luck in finding a target on July 11 was repeated on August 21. Being warned by Sector Operations of enemy aircra at 7,000 over Great Yarmouth, he climbed into the area to find a thick layer of stratocumulus at slightly above the briefed level. On climbing above the cloud layer, he was rewarded with the sight of a Do 17 in front of him crossing from le to right. The Dornier saw him as he aacked and dived for the cloud cover below. With guns firing, Bader

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V7467 replica on a modern ‘Queen Mary’ transporter before departing for High Wycombe having spent 27 years’ guarding Coltishall’s gate.

followed him down but it was nowhere to be seen once his Hurricane came out below the cloud layer. Seething with frustration, and being low on fuel, he returned to Coltishall where he was informed that the bodies of the Dornier crew had been washed ashore aer the bomber had crashed into the sea; Bader was credited with its destruction.

The Big Wing Due to its location, Coltishall was escaping most of the wrath of the Bale of Britain which had been the daily lot of fighter squadrons in 11 Group and it was not until the end of August that AVM Leigh-Mallory hatched the idea of a ‘Big Wing’. That was when squadrons based at Coltishall became more involved in this monumental struggle. Bader, amongst others, was uerly convinced that this was the most effective method of aack. The ‘Big Wing’ concept was to gather a minimum of three fighter squadrons operating from bases in East Anglia and to the north of London at a designated airfield; in 12 Group’s case, Duxford. Each day, the selected squadrons would assemble at Duxford in preparation for the day’s conflict. From Coltishall, 242 Squadron flew to Duxford ready to carry out their air defence duties. In fact, the AOC oen visited Coltishall to discuss the ‘Big Wing’ concept with Douglas Bader. As a good leader, Leigh-Mallory knew how to involve himself with his ‘team’. This was illustrated on one of his visits to Coltishall when 242 Squadron held a champagne party for the pilots in the Officers’ Mess one evening. Leigh-Mallory came over and entered into the spirit of things by doing a Highland fling on a mess table! There was no doubt that he enjoyed being with his pilots and, more significantly,

listening to them. He believed that, by involving the pilots in lively discussions, be they experienced flight commanders or first tourists, he could develop his own tactics and ideas. Action came quickly for the new ‘Big Wing’ and, on August 30, it was scrambled to engage a large enemy formation between Enfield and Hatfield. Seven Me 110s and three He 111s were claimed that day without loss. Extracts from Douglas Bader’s flying log-book gives some insight as to how ‘Big Wings’ were operated. The entry for September 9 shows that 242 Squadron led a wing comprising of 19 and 310 Squadrons on patrols over London. On this occasion, they intercepted enemy bombers and fighters south of the River Thames. Of the 20 enemy aircra destroyed on September 9, eleven were credited to 242 Squadron. Bader himself shot down a Do 215 that crashed in the Thames. Operations on September 15 saw a much larger ‘Wing’ comprising of 19, 242, 302, 310 and 611 Squadrons. Once again, the patrol area was over London and the tally recorded in Bader’s logbook was: 52 Enemy Aircra destroyed and eight damaged with 242 Squadron laying claim to a total of twelve enemy aircra for that day. 242 Squadron continued with their success and, on September 14, action over London resulted in Bader being awarded the DSO. September 1940 was a hectic month for Fighter Command, which resulted in the climax of the Bale of Britain. 242 Squadron were despatched to Duxford on September 15 and, on that day, as the bales came about, the squadron was successful in shooting down five Do 17s, a He111, a Do 215 and three Bf 109s. On October 20, 1940, Coltishall’s first unit, 242 Squadron, and their famous commander, Douglas Bader, le the station for Duxford.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

Blenheims

in the Battle of Britain Photographs supplied by Jarrod Coer unless otherwise stated

Blenheim packs a punch

T

he Bristol Blenheim holds a very important place in British aviation heritage, because when it was first flown in 1935, its forebear, the Bristol Type 142, was a revolution in both design and performance to the pre-war RAF pilots who, at the time, were flying biplanes. It was first delivered for service with 114 Squadron in early March 1937, was the RAF’s first all-metal monocoque monoplane, became the fastest aircra on the Service’s inventory and remained as the RAF’s fastest bomber at the outbreak of World War Two. However, its crews were to suffer heavy losses as the Blenheim was faced with overwhelming odds flying at low-level in daylight against the latest enemy fighters and defences. As well as being used in its intended bomber role, for a time it became the RAF’s principal night-fighter. Even with the introduction of the Hurricane and Spitfire, the Blenheim’s speed was still prominent in the minds of the officials at the Air Ministry and it was decided early on that the type could be modified to make it suitable as a long-range day fighter which could also be used for night intruder sorties. Designated as the Blenheim IF, the new variant first arrived on 23 and 25 Squadrons in December 1938. It differed from the bomber in that it was fied with a substantial gun pack mounted over the area of

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If you were asked to name a British fighter which took part in the Bale of Britain, the Hurricane and Spitfire would likely immediately spring to mind. However, while designed to be a light bomber and flying daily bombing operations over the German invasion ports in France during the Bale of Britain, the RAF’s principal night-fighter during this famous aerial conflict was the Bristol Blenheim. With a newly-restored warbird set to introduce the first sight of this variant seen in the air since World War Two, JARROD COTTER describes the Blenheim Mk IF

the bomb bay. These were manufactured by the Ashford workshops of the Southern Railway Company and contained four forward firing fixed Browning 0.303in machine-guns. The Blenheim bomber’s single 0.303in Browning was retained in the port wing and the Lewis 0.303in machinegun was also le in place in the aircra’s dorsal turret. The added drag of the Mk IF’s gun pack reduced its top speed by nearly 30mph, leaving it much slower than the new monoplane fighters which were entering service with both the RAF and the Luwaffe. Still more than 200 Blenheims were converted to fighter standard.

Blenheims at War By the outbreak of World War Two, 111 Mk IFs were serving with Fighter Command. During the early months, many Blenheims were lost on daylight operations causing great concern to Fighter Command so, before June 1940, with France having fallen, a decision was made to transfer all of Fighter Command’s Blenheim fighter squadrons to the night-fighting role. It had become obvious that the Blenheim IF’s performance was no match for the Bf 109 but, it could be used more effectively at night. Simultaneously, the type was selected as the most suitable for the testing of airborne radar and this ground-breaking technology first found

success with Blenheims. Equipped with the Airborne Interception (AI) Mk IIIm, early trials at night were revealing that it was difficult to even find any enemy bombers, let alone engage them. It was 25 Squadron that was the first unit to operationally trial the new radar while still maintaining its night-fighter role. For this task, the squadron had a Flight of AI-equipped Blenheim IVFs, one of the few units in Fighter Command to operate this mark. The majority of these sorties took place over the slightly less hostile environment of the North Sea. From the beginning of the war, a handful of 23 Squadron Blenheim IFs, based at Collyweston, were also deployed to Digby, where they were placed on night readiness. The unit saw lile action though, until the Luwaffe mounted its first large scale night raid against British targets on the night of June 18/19, 1940. So it was that on that night 23 Squadron became the first Blenheim IF unit to achieve success at night, when seven Blenheim IFs were sent on patrol in the area of The Wash. Three He 111s were shot down during a raid on London, including 5J+DM which crashed into shallows just off Blakeney on the north Norfolk coast. This He 111 had fallen victim to the guns of Flt Lt Raymond Duke-Woolley’s Blenheim who, while flying over Suon Bridge had spoed one of his

Blenheims

A unique sight the world over, as Bristol Blenheim Mk I L6739/YP-Q (G-BPIV) is caught en route back to Duxford following an early air test on December 3, 2014. Not only is this aircra currently the world’s only airworthy Blenheim, it is also the only complete Blenheim in ‘short-nose’ Mk I configuration. Following a ten-year restoration, it first flew in this guise on November 20, 2014.

All-over black Blenheim I K7159/YX-N of 54 Operational Training Unit alo over England in 1941. Air Ministry via Author

The cockpit of a Blenheim Mk I. Bristol Aeroplane Co. via Author

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN colleagues being shot down by the enemy bomber shortly before midnight on the 18th. His subsequent combat report recorded the incident as such: “Observed a ball of fire, which I took to be a Blenheim fighter in flames, breaking away from behind the tail of the E/A [enemy aircra]. I climbed to engage the E/A and aacked from below the tail aer searchlights were extinguished. I closed to a range of 50 yards and opened fire. The E/A returned fire and appeared to throle back suddenly. My own speed was 130-140mph and I estimate the E/A slowed to 110mph. I delivered five aacks with the front guns and during these my air gunner fired seven bursts at various ranges. “Aer the last front gun aack my air gunner reported that the E/A’s port engine was on fire. As my starboard engine was now U/S, I broke off the engagement and returned to base, where several bullet holes were found in the wings and fuselage, including cannon strikes in the starboard wing and rear fuselage.”

Plt Off Peter Kells climbs into the cockpit of his 29 Squadron Blenheim Mk IF for a night patrol from Coleby Grange, Lincolnshire, in October 1940. Crown Copyright

The Mk IF fighter gun pack fied to L6739.

Meanwhile, 23 Squadron’s Commanding Officer, Sqn Ldr Joseph O’Brien, spoed another He 111 in searchlights close to Newmarket at 0125hrs on the 19th. Once again the Blenheim pilot flew a number of passes of the German bomber, firing bursts from the front guns and, as the enemy aircra appeared to the gunner in the rear turret, he fired with his Lewis gun. Smoke was seen pouring out of the Heinkel before it disappeared out of sight in a diving turn, seemingly out of control. However, the successes that night came at a price as two of the seven Blenheims were shot down with three of the aircrew on board them killed. One of those lost was Sqn Ldr O’Brien’s L8687/YP-X. Having sent the enemy aircra earthwards, the pilot quickly lost all control of his Blenheim which went into a spin. He ordered his crew to bale out and he and his navigator escaped through the hatch. The air gunner, however, was killed. 23 Squadron also acted as an operational

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The aperture for the fixed Browning machine-gun muzzle fied in the port wing covered with red fabric tape sealing. When the aircra returned from a sortie and the red seal was broken, armourers would know that the gun had been fired.

testing unit for the new AI radar, carrying out calibration work for the many new ground radar stations which were appearing up and down the country.

The Battle begins As the Luwaffe consolidated its squadrons in northern France, more and more frequent aacks on Britain were mounted with the objective being an invasion of England. However first air superiority needed to be gained and, during the

summer of 1940, RAF fighters were put on the front line of a crucial fight for survival. On July 10, 1940, the first phase of the Bale of Britain officially began. Such was the importance of the new airborne radar that the Fighter Interception Unit (FIU) was formed within 11 Group Fighter Command based at Tangmere, Sussex. Continuous testing of the AI Mk.III was being carried out and, on the night of July 22/23, 1940, Fg Off G. Ashfield and his crew of Radar Operator Sgt R.H. Leyland and Observer Plt Off G.E. Morris, took off from Tangmere for an interception of enemy aircra. The system worked well as Ashfield’s Blenheim was vectored directly towards a Dornier Do 17 which was successfully shot down into the sea off Brighton. The FIU had achieved the world’s first successful controlled interception which had led to the destruction of an enemy aircra. Another unit which had a long association with the Blenheim IF was 604 (County of Middlesex) Squadron, with which the Blenheim had been on strength from January 1939. Aer several moves, the squadron arrived at Middle Wallop in Hampshire on July 27, 1940, where AI radar was installed. Testing had to take place during the aernoons while operational sorties were flown at night looking for prey along the south coast. A success finally came on August 11 when, aer a lengthy pursuit, a Heinkel He 59 was set on fire off the French coast. This small victory was tarnished on August 15. First came the loss of L6610, which was pounced upon by the Spitfires of 609 Squadron during a patrol. Luckily, the crew managed to make it back to Middle Wallop where all survived without

Blenheims

The gun firing buon on the control wheel of a Blenheim IVF shown as it was operated by the pilot’s right thumb. Air Ministry

‘We shall defend our island, whatever the cost maybe’ In the cockpit, the pilot had a fold-down ring sight for the fixed forward-firing machine-guns.

injury aer the crash-landing, although the aircra had to be wrien off. The second blow of the day came when the airfield was bombed by Junkers Ju 88s which were successful in destroying Blenheim IF L6723. Following the success of the FIU interception, contact with the enemy was few and far between but 219 Squadron, based at Caerick, began operating in daylight again on August 15. The unit really had lile choice because it was operating alone while the local Hurricane squadrons had been moved south to bolster 11 Group. Entering into its first aerial combat of the war, the squadron managed to claim a Dornier Do 17 ‘damaged’ and a Junkers Ju 88 ‘probable’, all in the face of overwhelming odds. 29 Squadron, operating from Debden, had already opened its account by shooting down two enemy aircra on June 18, although this had come at the price of two of their own. A move to Lincolnshire saw the squadron enter a very busy and successful August with a pair of Heinkel He 111s destroyed. A third He 111 was claimed as damaged but the loss of L1330 and its crew was suffered on August 25. It was shot down by an unknown enemy aircra off Wainfleet and more losses were to follow. It was not until September 1940 that 25

Squadron, which had been flying the Blenheim IF since December 1938, saw its first action. Once again though, some of the RAF fighter pilots’ aircra recognition had failed them. Whilst on patrol over North Weald on September 3, L1512 was aacked by a Hurricane and shot down, killing the pilot, Plt Off D.W. Hogg, who had no time to escape the stricken aircra. However, two He 111s were shot down over Suffolk the following day. Before the month was out, a Do 17 was added to the tally. 600 (City of London) Squadron had been having a difficult time with its AI-equipped Blenheims and since suffering heavy losses in May 1940, had been confined to the nightfighting role. Contact with the enemy had been negligible, although a Heinkel He 59 was damaged on July 20. Several airfield moves had not helped, combined with very unreliable equipment which le 600 Squadron claiming a single Ju 88 destroyed on September 15/16 as its only ‘kill’ during the entire Bale. The Blenheim IF could not be classed as a complete success during the Bale but had provided a valuable stepping stone for future AI-equipped night-fighters. Losses inflicted far outweighed the total enemy aircra shot down but the aircra filled a gap that was seriously

lacking in Fighter Command’s capability at the time.

Blenheim Mk IF Reborn No complete examples of a Blenheim survived in Britain aer the war. There were, however, numerous survivors in Canada in the form of the Bristol Bolingbroke (licence-built Blenheims used by the RCAF) and also licence-built aircra in Finland. Following their withdrawal in Canada, though, none were kept airworthy (however, the type did continue flying in Finland until 1958). Many surplus wartime aircra were bought by Canadian farmers, who used a wealth of the components from them for various purposes around their farms and drained them of any valuable oil and fuel which was le in their tanks. During the 1970s, pioneer preservationist Ormond Haydon-Baillie bought two Bolingbrokes, 9893 and 10038, plus numerous more engines and propellers and had them shipped to the Imperial War Museum Duxford. The Blenheims were initially stored in one of Duxford’s hangars, but their owner negotiated with the IWM to try and secure a workshop in which to restore them. He succeeded and was given Building 66. Part of Ormond Haydon-Baillie’s early team of volunteers included John Romain, who for many years now

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN has been a historic aircra restoration specialist as well as one of the world’s most experienced warbird pilots. Tragically, Ormond Haydon-Baillie was killed in a crash in July 1977 and his collection was sold off. It was Graham Warner, who passed away before L6739 took flight, who bought the Blenheims. Graham offered John Romain the restoration of the Blenheim project as he had recently completed an apprenticeship with British Aerospace. He then sat exams to obtain the necessary CAA licences required to carry out a restoration to flight of an aircra such as this. The fuselage used was 10038, for which the appropriate civilian registration G-MKIV was chosen. It first flew on May 22, 1987, piloted by John Larcombe with John Romain in what, in a restored Blenheim, became the engineer’s seat. The Blenheim was painted as V6028/GB-D of 106 Squadron as flown by Wg Cdr ‘Hughie’ Edwards VC. It flew to great acclaim at several events, much to the delight of all the ‘Blenheim Boys’. However, on June 21, 1987, just a month aer its maiden flight, G-MKIV crashed at Denham following an unscheduled touch-and-go by the aircra’s reserve pilot. Also on board were John Romain and John ‘Smudge’ Smith and thankfully all three survived. The Blenheim was a write-off, but Graham Warner organised a press call just a few days later and announced that another example of the type would be rebuilt to fly. John and Graham then formed the Aircra Restoration Company. Bolingbroke 10201 at the Strathallan Collection in Scotland was chosen as the basis for the second restoration project and, using all the team’s experience gained from G-MKIV, this aircra was flying aer five years of work in an all-over black paint scheme as Z5722/WM-Z of 68 Squadron and registered as G-BPIV. Its first post-restoration flight took place on May 18, 1993, when it was piloted by Hoof Proudfoot with John Romain again in the right-hand seat. Over the following ten years the aircra was a hugely popular sight at air shows, especially as, apart from Lancaster PA474 of the RAF’s Bale of Britain Memorial Flight, it was the only other airworthy World War Two-era British bomber in the UK and the only flying example of an early-war RAF light bomber. While returning to Duxford from an event in 2003, G-BPIV suffered a landing accident at its home airfield. The historic aviation community was devastated, especially all those involved closely with the project.

Not to be beaten The feeling of loss to all those who had spent countless hours restoring and then caring

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Blenheim Mk IF L1436/RX-M of 25 Squadron alo pre-war while wearing a Fighter Command ‘arrowhead’ unit badge on its tail. Air Ministry

meticulously for G-BPIV for ten years can be easily understood, and initially there was much consideration given as to how to proceed. Graham Warner later transferred the airframe to John Romain and, undefeated by a second accident beyond his control, John then formed a new company called Blenheim Duxford Ltd, under the umbrella of which a new restoration project would begin. There was to be a significant twist in the story though. Aer the war, Bristol employee Ralph Nelson bought a Blenheim Mk I nose section and he later converted it into a car. During the nose’s transformation into a car, Ralph had retained all the equipment that he removed from it and also any metalwork that was cut away for its transformation. Realising its importance, Ralph donated the ‘car’ to the Duxford Blenheim project and, when faced with another rebuild some years later, the team decided that, to distance the

project from their previous work, they would restore the Mk I nose for the Blenheim. The nose was from Avro-built Mk IF L6739/ YP-Q, which was on the strength of 23 Squadron, based at Collyweston, from September 1939. This aircra flew on night-fighter sorties during the Bale of Britain, so it came with hugely important provenance. However, in doing this, the team gave themselves a huge amount more work to do, estimated to be in the region on an extra two years plus. The end result, as illustrated in this article, has already been and will be so much more appreciated by a massive audience as it embarks on its first display season in this anniversary year. Very few people who are alive now will ever have seen a Blenheim Mk I fly and the aircra began geing lots of enquiries for air show bookings for events in 2015 as soon as it had first flown in November 2014.

Jarrod Coer is the author of the forthcoming Haynes Bristol Blenheim Owners’ Workshop Manual. This book tells a far ranging story of the Blenheim, from its origins as a civilian fast transport through to detailed information about the aircra’s structure and systems, the story of the return to flight of G-BPIV as well as much information on how the type was maintained and flown during World War Two. It is due to be published in July this year to coincide with the newly restored Blenheim Mk I’s first air show season.

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

On the verge of collapse

I

n the quest for air supremacy over southern England, the Luwaffe was within an ace of achieving this elusive objective by the beginning of September 1940. Although the Germans were denied knowledge, the heavy daylight aacks on airfields and sector stations in AVM Park’s 11 (Fighter) Group had wrought a devastating effect on Fighter Command’s ability to continue the fight. Five forward fighter fields had been extensively damaged and, what was worse, six of the seven key sector stations were so severely bombed that the entire groundcontrolled fighter interception system was on the verge of collapse. Although the lethal Jagdgruppen were now tied to the bombers on escort duties, the tactics employed by Generalfeldmarschälle Kesselring and Sperrle, by which numerous raids, including feints, fought their way through to the airfields, increased the casualty rate of Dowding’s command. Fighter losses rose to a peak on August 31 when the Hurricanes and, to a lesser extent the Spitfires, were forced to do bale with overwhelming numbers at a grave disadvantage. Over the period August 23 to September 6, 466 RAF fighters had been destroyed or badly damaged, as against 138

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bombers and 214 Bf 109Es and Bf 110Cs of the Luwaffe; and 25% of Dowding’s operational pilots (103 killed and 128 wounded) had been lost. Moreover, one-third of Fighter Command’s forces consisted of barely operational Category ‘C’ squadrons, manned by inexperienced pilots led by a nucleus of exhausted leaders. It was doubtful, therefore, if Fighter Command’s position could get any worse. Events took place, almost by way of chance, that were to turn the fortunes of both RAF Fighter Command and the Luwaffe. The scaered bombing of the outskirts of London on the night of August 23 led, in all probability, to the reprisal raid on Berlin two nights later by a small force of Wellingtons dispatched by Bomber Command. Assured by Hermann Göering that such a thing could never happen, the Berliners were stunned, although the raid resulted in minimal damage. As early as August 31, the Luwaffenführungsstab issued orders to Lufloen II and III for the preparation of night and day aacks on London and other British centres of population; but at a conference held in the Hague on September 3, the decision to concentrate upon one target, in this case London, was made largely at the instigation of

Kesselring. And to this decision the Luwaffe adhered, commiing itself to a day and night bombing campaign that would bring RAF Fighter Command to heel within ‘four to five days’. On the following night, Hitler addressed an enthusiastic audience in the Berlin Sportspalast, and promised them that he would repay the ‘British air pirates’ back in kind and so the bale was joined.

The decisive period On the morning of September 7, Invasion Alert No. 1 (invasion imminent) was received by Dowding’s HQ, to indicate that Operation ‘Sealion’ was, in the opinion of British military intelligence, about to be launched. The day was magnificent: hazy, with clear skies but for some high cirrus. The Reichsmarschall, Hermann Göering, personally directed the aacks of this day which, for the first time, were directed specifically at London and in great strength. The CH stations picked up the first signs of a raid at 1545hrs when 20 or more German aircra were located forming up over the Pas-de-Calais; then, at 1616hrs, the Observer Corps posts reported many hundreds crossing the Maidstone area. It must have been an awe-inspiring sight:

Target London!

Target London!

Contrails over the south-east of England like these were commonplace throughout the Bale of Britain. These were captured over Kent on September 3, 1940.

Photographs supplied by Jon Molyneux unless otherwise stated

some 348 Ju 88A-1, He 111H and Do 17Z-2 bombers stacked from 13,125 (4000m) to 23,785 (7250m), advancing in column formation along a 20 mile (32km) front up the estuary of the Thames. The units taking part were KG 1, KG 2, KG 3, KG 26 and KG 76; below, alongside, above and tucked high into the cirrus were the ‘contrails’ of the fighters: 617 Bf 109Es and Bf 110C Zerstorer drawn from JG 3, JG 51, JG 52, JG 54 and I./JG 77. By 1617hrs, 11 (Fighter) Group had eleven squadrons of Spitfires and Hurricanes in the air, whilst a few minutes later all remaining squadrons were on alert status. By 1630hrs, some 21 squadrons were in the air, presenting a defensive force of about 280 fighters. Although outnumbered, Nos. 19, 41, 43, 111, 249 and 303 Squadrons gave a good account of themselves and, by 1745hrs, the last of the raiders had turned south and were withdrawing over Kent. Heavy damage had been inflicted upon Silvertown, the East India Docks, Limehouse, West Ham, Barking, Toenham, Millwall and other neighbourhoods in eastern London. The fires acted as beacons to the follow-up raids of the evening and night, when 247 sorties were flown from 2010hrs until 0430hrs. During the fighting of the day, Leigh-Mallory’s

With victory over the RAF in sight, the Luwaffe was again forced to change its tactics to meet political requirements: London became the target, and the bomber streams heading this way in daylight gave Fighter Command just the tactical situation it had been waiting for.

12 (Fighter) Group had co-operated admirably with Nos. 10 and 11 Groups, although the Duxford Wing tended to throw a false light on this and other events by gross over-claiming in combat. In all, Fighter Command lost 28 aircra (19 pilots killed), as against 41 German aircra lost. Such was the strength of the daylight raid that several pilots and crews of the Kampfgruppen returned to state that combats had been few and the reaction small: a fact that was borne out by the low casualty rate.

Virtual decimation Poor weather on the following day restricted operations, but the Luwaffe put in a strong aack on London aer dusk. The weather continued to hamper the Luwaffe’s raids on September 9: the only major aack occurred when 26 He 111H-4s of II./KG 1, escorted by Jagdge-schwader Nr 3 and III./ZG 76, aempted to break through and bomb the Royal Aircra Establishment at Farnborough. Far from showing the signs of recent strain, 11 (Fighter) Group reacted swily and with skill: Hurricanes and Spitfires from Biggin Hill, Croydon, Kenley and Northolt routed the enemy. The day cost Fighter Command 19 aircra destroyed (13 pilots killed);

28 German aircra were lost over the 24-hour period. German crews started to complain once again of an upsurge in RAF fighter activity and to criticize the long-suffering Jagdflieger. Aer a short lull, operations were stepped up on September 11 when Lufloe III broke from its night commitment to aack Southampton and Portsmouth; Kesselring’s Lufloe II sent three waves to aack London starting at 1445hrs. The bombing was scaered as a result of fighter opposition and bad weather, with hits at Paddington, in the City and the docks. Other bombs fell on Biggin Hill, Kenley, Brooklands and Hornchurch. For Fighter Command the casualties continued to be alarmingly high with 29 aircra lost (17 pilots killed) against 24 lost by the Luwaffe during the day/night phase. Small raids continued to be launched on London over the next three days until the arrival of good weather permied another major assault. At 1100hrs, on September 15, the watchful CH stations picked up formations of Lufloe II as they arrived over the Pas-de-Calais for the ceremonial joining up with the escorting Messerschmis. The first aack by KG 3, with heavy escort, was engaged over Kent by Nos. 10, 11 and 12 Groups and mauled as it baered its ›

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN way to London: scaered bombing took place at Beckenham, Westminster, Clapham, Tooting, Wandsworth and Kensington before the bombers retired. Twenty-three squadrons were in the air (about 300 fighters) from 11 Group and they joined by five from 12 Group and three from Brand’s 10 Group: it was the largest and best co-ordinated RAF fighter reaction to date and furious combats ensued over Kent and Sussex. In London, bombs fell at West Ham, Woolwich, Erith, Stepney, Hackney and elsewhere. To the south, at 1500hrs, KG 55 aacked Portsmouth as a diversion while the Bf 110s of Erprobungsgruppe 210 raided the Supermarine works at Southampton (Woolston). The day ended in the claim by Fighter Command of a record 185 enemy aircra destroyed for the loss of 13 pilots and 26 Hurricanes and Spitfires destroyed. For the Luwaffe, even the horrendous figure of 60 bombers and fighters shot down, missing or wrien off in crash landings was bad enough. It was a clear and unequivocal victory for RAF Fighter Command.

Hitler postpones Seelöwe The decision of Hermann Göering, aided by several of his commanders, to switch the aacks

of the Luwaffe from RAF Fighter Command’s vital airfields to London has gone down in history as the second of the great fatal errors of Hitler and the German High Command in World War 2: the first was stopping the Panzers around Dunkirk, so sanctioning of the escape of the British Expeditionary Force. Certainly the effect upon RAF Fighter Command was dramatic. The fighting was as savage as it had ever been; the rate of arition in men and machines was the same and the supply of new pilots just as critical. There were several reasons for Fighter Command’s recuperation. Firstly, pressure was taken off the sector airfields: these were repaired and sent back into service as an integral part of Fighter Command’s defensive system. Secondly, the policy of the Luwaffe to concentrate on one prime target using the tactics of the continuous bomber stream permied Fighter Command the opportunity of dramatically increasing the size of its fighter reaction: hitherto there had been several concurrent raids on vital targets, each of which had to be defended. Thirdly, squadrons could be posted in numbers back to 11 Group without risk of their decimation on the ground and in the vicinity of their airfields. In effect, the Luwaffe ceased to conduct the

counter-air campaign that had been the foundation of its policy from the start and this permied Fighter Command to survive. Policy changes were made in the field of tactics by Göering following the week of fighting that saw heavy losses on both September 7 and 15. Amongst the changes were reduced formation sizes, aacks on London only with maximum fighter escort, mass formation aacks only in clear weather and stepping up of aacks on aircra production centres. But, for the launching of Unternehmen Seelöwe, the Luwaffe had tarried too long. Originally intended to be launched ‘if needed’ in the second or third week of September 1940, the preparations for the operation were already finalized. But the continued ability of RAF Fighter Command to inflict casualties on the Luwaffe served to warn OKW that mastery of the air had not yet been achieved. In addition, Bomber Command’s Whitleys, Wellingtons and Hampdens and, in particular, the Blenheim IVs of 2 (Bomber) Group continued to harry and bomb the barges and ships of the invasion fleets at anchor at Roerdam, Antwerp, Ostend, Dunkirk, Boulogne, Le Havre and Cherbourg: in this, they were ably assisted by the Albacores, Skuas and Swordfish of the Fleet Air Arm. The Kriegsmarine was concerned at the heavy losses and, voiced its continued reservations as to the feasibility of launching the operation. On September 17, the following laconic entry appeared in its war diary: ‘The enemy air force is still by no means defeated. On the contrary, it shows increasing activity. The weather situation as a whole does not permit us to expect a period of calm . . . The Führer therefore decides to postpone “Sealion” indefinitely.’ Pressure was to be maintained on the British at sea and in the air to sustain the fear of invasion, and to keep British forces on the defensive in the West. Within the Wehrmacht, units were stood down from the invasion fleets and dispersed.

The pressure continues

One of many iconic images taken during the Bale shows a pair of Do 17s aacking the Silvertown area of the London’s docklands.

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On September 17, the Luwaffe turned to oil installations at Thameshaven, preceded by a frei Jagd mission by 60 or more Bf 109s at 0900hrs in the Kent area; four raids were heading inland by 1100hrs, with bombs falling at Chatham. On September 25, Bristol and Plymouth were aacked during the day: KG 55, escorted by III./ ZG 26, aacked the Filton works at 1145hrs to inflict severe damage. On the following day the Vickers-Supermarine works at Woolston (Southampton) were aacked by KG 55’s He 111H-4 bombers under Major Korte, again with ZG 26 and 70 tons of HE effectively stopped production of the Spitfire. Fortunately, the vast

Target London!

Bombs rain down from Do 17 over London on September 20, 1940.

shadow-factory at Castle Bromwich (responsible for production of Spitfire IIA and IIBs) was in the process of assuming the bulk of Spitfire production at this time. Heavy German losses occurred on September 27 when new tactics were tried out: these took the form of small formations of the fast Ju 88A-ls with a heavy escort of Bf 109Es, accompanied by several Gruppen on frei Jagd missions. The high speed of the Ju 88 enabled the Bf 109E to take greater advantage of its manoeuvrability. At 0800hrs, a feint aack failed when it was broken up near Dungeness then, at 1130hrs, a split raid took place when 80 or more headed for Bristol while 300 or more in Gruppe and Staffel strengths headed across the Channel to London. The last aack got no further than Kent while, in the former, only the Bf 110C-4s of Erprobungsgruppe 210 got through despite the loss of its Gruppenkommandeur. Fiy-five German aircra were lost on this day. At the end of September 1940, the majority of the Kampfgruppen within Lufloen II and III were withdrawn from daylight operations and put into use at night and the final phase in the Bale of Britain started. Aer three months and ten days of fighting, the Luwaffe had lost 1,653 aircra destroyed with lile to show for its sacrifice. Morale was high, however and pilots and crews still had confidence in their equipment. On October 1, London, Southampton and Portsmouth were aacked: the raids on targets in 10 (Fighter) Group started at 1045hrs and met stiff opposition. It was noted that the German formations contained many bomb-laden Bf 110C-4s and Bf 109Es. And the Luwaffe’s adoption of the fighter-bomber (Jagdbomber, or Jabo) was evident in the raids that streaked across Kent and Sussex to drop bombs on

Londoners take cover in Aldwych Underground Station during a raid in October 1940. 79 underground stations doubled as air raid shelters during the Second World War.

A Bf110C of 3./ZG 76 which operated from Scandinavian airfields during the Bale. ZG 76 lost 98 aircrew, killed, missing or POW during the Bale of Britain. Andy Hay/www.flyingart.co.uk

London in the aernoon. A recent order from the OKL called for one Staffel within each Jagdgruppe to re-equip with fighter-bomber aircra. Many units used the Bf 109E-7 which was fied with the necessary electronics and fusing gear but several units merely performed field modifications whereby an ETC 500/IXb or ETC 50/VIIId rack was bolted to the belly: the normal bomb load for the Bf 109Es was one 551lb SC250, and two SC250s for the twin-engined Bf 110C-4 Zerstorer.

Limited strike accuracy Fighter pilots received very lile training in Jabo work. The two specialist fighter-bomber units, Erprobungsgruppe 210 and II.(Schlacht)/LG 2, gave instruction, but for the most part it was up to individual Staffelkapitäne and Gruppenkommandeur to develop tactics. Low-level work was not employed. The tactics usually consisted of a mixed gaggle of Bf 109E-7/ Bs, plus a top-cover of fighters at 19,685 (6000m) or more, with formations approaching up sun. The Jabo aircra went into dives of between 30° and 60° to release their bombs, recovered, and flew out at low level. Accuracy therefore was extremely limited and, in general, the Jabo raids were considered of nuisance value

only. The interception of such raids was extremely difficult and was a very hazardous undertaking for the pilots of Nos. 10 and 11 (Fighter) Groups. The element of warning both from the CH stations and the Observer Corps was usually short in duration and defending RAF fighters were oen bounced from out of the sun as they clambered up to altitude. When at height, the Hurricanes and Spitfires generally fought at a disadvantage against the Bf 109E due to the laer’s excellent high-altitude supercharger. For the remainder of October 1940, the Jabo raids, high-altitude fighter sweeps and the occasional aacks by fast formations of Ju 88A-ls were the order of the day for Fighter Command, whilst raids gathered momentum by night.

The end of the battle The massed daylight raids finally ceased towards the end of October 1940 and the 31st of that month is now generally accepted as the end of the fih and final phase of the Bale of Britain. During the epic fighting of the Bale of Britain, from July 1 until October 31, the Luwaffe lost 1,789 aircra on operations: this included 600 Bf 109Es and 235 Bf 110s. During the same period, the Metropolitan Air Force (home-based elements of the RAF) lost 1,603 aircra destroyed, including

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN

237 Bf 110s were available to the Luwaffe at the beginning of the Bale and 223 were lost during it.

1,140 twin- and single-engined fighters and 367 bombers. Thus, the results of the fighting, on balance, were about even. But the fighting continued aer October 31, over the next seven weeks at varying states of intensity, only to finally cease during the third week of December 1940 because of the need to restore serviceability and as a result of appalling weather. Aacks against the Channel convoys were resumed on November 1 by Generaloberst Wolfram, Freiherr von Richthofen’s VIII Fliegerkorps on the orders of Göering. StG 77 was joined for a short time by StG 1 and StG 2 before both of the laer were withdrawn to Germany prior to moving to the Mediterranean theatre at the end of December. Jabo raids continued against England, while frei Jagd sweeps were flown over the Channel and as far inland as Salisbury and London: during November 1940 Major Helmut Wick claimed his 53rd kill to come within one victory of the Luwaffe’s top-scorer, Major Werner Mölders of JG 51. Wick was to surpass Molders’ score soon aer. But, on the aernoon of November 28, while leading the Stabsschwarm of JG 2, Wick engaged a squadron of Spitfires. He claimed his 56th, and last, kill at 1703hrs off Bournemouth. He was hit (possibly by Flt Lt J C Dundas DFC of 609 Squadron) and baled out of his Bf 109E-4, WNr 1344, off the Isle of Wight. But no trace of him was ever found. Shortly before the death of Wick, ACM Sir Hugh Dowding was retired with scant recognition of his achievements, before or during the Bale of Britain. Dowding had made too many enemies and, worst of all, all his policies had been vindicated despite the efforts of his detractors. The brilliant leader of 11 (Fighter) Group, AVM

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Another German bomber crew walks into captivity during the Bale. Always at a disadvantage when operating over enemy territory, this scenario was the same as a total loss for the Luwaffe as this crew would never fight again, unlike their RAF counterparts.

A Heinkel He 111 of KG 4, a unit which suffered heavy losses throughout the Bale but, despite this, continued their campaign against British targets until February 1941. Clavework Graphics

Park, was sacked. His successor, the protégé of the new AOC-in-C, William Sholto Douglas, was none other than his opponent in 12 Group, AVM Leigh-Mallory.

Luftwaffe failure The failure of the Luwaffe to achieve air supremacy over the UK during the summer of 1940 may be aributed to a combination of the following factors: 1. Fundamental failure of air strategy and policy of the Luwaffe which followed the doctrine of aack on the Blitzkrieg principle: this led to a disproportionate weakness in the fighter arm as opposed to the strength of the bomber and dive-bomber forces. 2. The armament of German bombers (He 111, Ju 88 and Do 17Z), consisting of single manually operated 7.92mm (0.31in) MG 15 machine-guns, was totally inadequate against the armoured RAF eight-gunned fighter. This led to disproportionate losses in the Kampfgruppen and the demands for close escort when every available Bf 109 was needed for counter-air offensive tactics.

3. The lack of appreciation by Oberst Josef Schmid’s lc (Intelligence) department of the Luwaffenfürungsstab in assessing the strength of the RAF and the strength of RAF Fighter Command in assessing the true nature of the significance of the British RDF (radar) chain and its part in the defensive fighter system and in correct target selection. 4. The Luwaffe’s failure to take account of the fighting qualities of the Hurricane Mk I and the Spitfire Mk IA, the quality of the experienced pilots, and the RAF methods of fighter control. 5. The Luwaffe’s reliance upon the Bf 110C Zerstorer for medium- and long-range penetration escorts. When the type failed to meet up to the RAF fighters, the combat radius of the Bf 109E-4 was insufficient to give the Kampfgruppen the freedom required. A long range drop-tank for the Bf 109E, issued in quantity, would have changed the course of the Bale. 6. The adoption of a strategic policy, i.e. that of defeating Britain by air aack alone, tempered by a localized quest for air superiority, by an air force that had been built up from the beginning

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THE BATTLE OF BRITAIN as a tactical air force in service of the army. The bombers available to the Luwaffe were medium-capacity types with insufficient bomb loads; the term ‘heavy bomber’ was virtually unknown to the Luwaffe.

RAF conduct Amongst the factors that affected the conduct of the Royal Air Force during the Bale of Britain were the following: 1. Squadron strength was friered away aer the evacuation of Dunkirk as a political expedient and, on the eve of its greatest test, RAF Fighter Command was weaker than it had been since the start of World War 2. 2. During the years of peace, no aempt was made by the RAF to study actual warfare, i.e. in Spain, and to learn the lesson thereof. RAF fighter tactics were of a very rudimentary nature in comparison to the Luwaffe’s Schwarme (fours) and Roen (pairs). Lile regard for German fighter tactics was made in France. As a result, RAF squadrons fared badly, in general, against the Bf 109s. 3. Training and the output of the Operational Training Units: the output was totally insufficient and came as close to losing the bale for Fighter Command as anything, additionally the standard of students leaving the OTUs le much to be desired. Final combat polish was supposed to be furnished by the squadrons themselves. 4. The quality of RAF fighters gave cause for concern during the laer stages of the bale. The Hurricane Mk I was inferior to the Bf 109E, especially at altitude, and suffered from poor acceleration and slow rates of climb; the Spitfire Mk IA was inferior to the Bf 109E above altitudes of 27,000 (8230m), where several of the combats took place. Both types could be out-dived by the Bf 109 and both suffered under negative-g conditions. 5. Development of the 20mm cannon for British fighters was extremely slow. The Armee de l’Air used the Hispano-Suiza HS 404 20mm cannon in combat during 1939-40 and it was built under licence in Britain during the Bale: several were fied in Spitfire Mk IBs of 19 Squadron and a few Hurricanes with a conspicuous lack of success. The German 20mm MG FF cannon, despite its detractors, was in service and highly lethal. 6. The lack of any formalized air-sea rescue service for the RAF was nothing short of a scandal. The Bale of Britain ended without fanfare during the mists and fogs of early December 1940: it was unique in history as being the first major air campaign conducted solely by two opposing air forces in pursuance of a strategic aim, whilst the combatant powers stood back, watched, and awaited the outcome.

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The mount of Alan Geoffrey Page during the Bale was Hurricane Mk I, P2970 of 56 Squadron. Page was shot down on August 12, 1940, and suffered severe burns before he bailed out. He was admied to Queen Victoria Hospital in East Grinstead where Air Archibald MacIndoe, the pioneering plastic surgeon, carried out 15 operations to repair Page’s face and hands. Andy Hay/www.flyingart.co.uk

James Harry ‘Ginger’ Lacy was typical of the many non-commissioned pilots who fought during the Bale of Britain. By November 1940, he had 23 claims to his name, 18 of these were achieved during the Bale.

The future Queen Elizabeth II, makes her broadcasting debut alongside her sister, Princess Margaret, on October 22, 1940.

Battle of BRITAIN

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