Hitler Versus Stalin The Eastern Front 1941 - 1942 Barbarossa to Moscow

Newly raised militia units from Leningrad.

This book is dedicated to my mum, Dorothy, to Liz and to our children, James, Charlotte and Alex

First published in Great Britain in 2016 by PEN & SWORD MILITARY an imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire. S70 2AS Copyright © Nik Cornish 2016 ISBN: 978-1-78346-398-5 PDF ISBN: 978-1-47388-144-0 EPUB ISBN: 978-1-47388-143-3 PRC ISBN: 978-1-47388-142-6 The right of Nik Cornish to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Typeset by Mac Style Ltd, Bridlington, East Yorkshire Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Pen & Sword Books Ltd incorporates the imprints of Pen & Sword Aviation, Pen & Sword Family History, Pen & Sword Maritime, Pen & Sword Military, Pen & Sword Discovery, Wharncliffe Local History, Wharncliffe True Crime, Wharncliffe Transport, Pen and Sword Select, Pen and Sword Military Classics For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact: PEN & SWORD BOOKS LIMITED 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England. E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk

Contents Preface Acknowledgements Introduction Chapter 1: Into the Great Beyond Chapter 2: Many Rivers to Cross Chapter 3: Herding People Chapter 4: Murmansk and Sevastopol Chapter 5: Spoilt for Choice Chapter 6: Panic in the Streets Chapter 7: Stretched to the Limit Chapter 8: Retaliation Chapter 9: Lend-Lease

Preface The concept underlying this book, and the volumes that follow it, is to provide the general reader of military history with a heavily illustrated overview of the war on the Eastern Front between 1941 and 1945. Each book will be self-standing and cover a particular time period during this titanic four-year campaign. There has never been a war waged with such ferocity in the entirety of human history, indeed it was, as one eminent historian of this conflict entitled it, ‘a clash of Titans’. On the one hand the brown-shirted followers of Adolf Hitler, on the other the red-flagged communists of Joseph Stalin. With two such totalitarian regimes, where the power was highly concentrated in the hands of individuals who issued edicts through a vast civilian and military bureaucracy, the manner in which military and political advice was taken and acted upon frequently verged on the erratic. When the campaign began Hitler’s faith in the German General Staff was considerable due to their achievements elsewhere. However, this belief was to deteriorate rapidly as the Russian winter of 1941 took hold and the Red Army first rallied and then mounted a series of successful counterattacks. The result was that Hitler took command of the Wehrmacht and increasingly interfered with the micro-management of operations, often with disastrous effects. Closeted in the Kremlin, Stalin reacted to the Axis invasion and the manner in which the Red Army almost collapsed by unleashing a reign of terror resulting in a wave of executions and promotions that generated an all-pervasive atmosphere of dread. However, as the Red Army began to fight back and demonstrate itself capable of defeating the enemy, Stalin’s faith in his commanders’ abilities increased and he allowed them greater leeway to plan and fight the war while he slowly relaxed his iron grip. Both dictators had personal but different experiences of warfare – Hitler had endured over three years in the front line on the Western Front, whereas Stalin had been a leader, albeit briefly, during the Russian Civil War around the city formerly known as Tsaritsyn. In 1942 Tsaritsyn was known as Stalingrad – the city that would provide the venue for the showdown between the Boss and the Austrian Corporal.

Acknowledgements The usual suspects to whom I am indebted include Dmitry Belanovsky, Norbert Hofer, Stephen Perry and Andrei Simonov – many thanks boys. Further thanks are due to Alex Cornish for many hours of technical assistance coupled with interesting comments and criticisms. The debt that I owe to the staff members of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces and the Krasnogorsk Archive in Moscow is immense – thank you all. Picture Credits All images are by Nik Cornish at www.Stavka.org.uk aside from: Courtesy of the Central Museum of the Armed Forces, Moscow via Stavka: p. xi B, p. 27 B, p. 36 T and B, p. 46 T, p. 48 B, p. 52 T and B, p. 57 B, p. 63 B, p. 71 B, p. 78 T, p. 79 T, p. 80 T and B, p. 81 T and B, p. 82 B, p. 84 T, p. 85 B, p. 86 B, p. 92 T and B, p. 93 B, p. 94 T and B, p. 95 T, p. 96 T, p. 97 B, p. 98, p. 99 T, p. 101 T and B, p. 102 T and B, p. 107 B, p. 112 B, p. 113 T, p. 114 B, p. 116 T, p. 121 T and B, p. 127 T, p. 128 B. The fonds of the RGAKFD in Krasnogorsk via Stavka: frontispiece, p. 23 B, p. 40 T, p. 49 T, p. 67 B, p. 68 T and B, p. 72 T and B, p. 122 T, p. 124 T and B, p. 125 T, p. 127 B, p. 128 T. Courtesy of TASS: p. 69 T, p. 123 T.

Introduction During the summer of 1939 the world was shocked to hear of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact: this effectively declared that the USSR and the Third Reich would remain at peace with one another and divide Eastern Europe into spheres of influence. The first nation to suffer under this arrangement was Poland, which was overrun from east and west and reduced to impotence. Following this success the Red Army was launched on an ill-starred winter campaign to conquer Finland. However, the outcome was disastrous for the USSR for, despite eventually defeating the Finns, it was at such cost that the results were not worth the effort. The Baltic States were occupied, without bloodshed, during the spring of 1940, as was the Romanian province of Bessarabia some weeks later. The borders of the USSR had advanced several hundred kilometres to the west reincorporating former Tsarist Russian lands and creating a buffer zone against any likely attack from Germany. The success of Germany in the west and north had enabled the USSR to move westwards. However, having overrun France, the Low Countries, Denmark and Norway, Hitler’s ambition was only wetted for further conquests. Although Britain stood isolated and apparently ripe for the plucking, the Führer turned his attention once more to the east and the lebensraum of the Russian steppes. During the summer of 1940, flushed with the apparently easy victories to date, Hitler ordered selected staff officers to draw up plans for the destruction of the USSR. Under the code name of Operation Barbarossa, the plan was more of a series of flexible guidelines than a prescriptive set of instructions. It was optimistically assumed that the Red Army would swiftly collapse when faced with the onslaught of experienced blitzkrieg veterans. An eventual stop-line was pencilled in, running roughly from Archangel in the north, along the crest of the Ural Mountains down to the shores of the Caspian Sea. Beyond that the rump of the Soviet state was expected to wither and die amidst the forests and tundra of Siberia. The Caucasus, as far as the Turkish border, would provide a land bridge into the rear of British possessions in the Middle East that would yield up the crude oil so vital for mechanized warfare. More than a hint of overconfidence was apparent during the autumn and winter of 1940–1 in Berlin. As goods and luxuries flowed in from the new conquests, the civilian population enjoyed a very merry Christmas and looked forward to a prosperous New Year. Although Operation Barbarossa was designed as a predominantly German affair, the Reich’s

allies also wanted to share in the spoils. Slovakia, Italy and Romania were all eager to be involved and were prepared to contribute men and materiel to the cause. Finland, not formally an ally of Germany but smarting from the Winter War of 1939–40, was keen to regain her lost territories. Nor was Turkey an innocent bystander as the lure of regaining land in the Caucasus was an unstated desire that, should the USSR be on the point of collapse, would likely be satisfied. However, Barbarossa was postponed because it was necessary to deal with Yugoslavia and Greece. The six-week campaign to eliminate these potential thorns in the Reich’s underbelly led to the launch of blitzkrieg in the USSR being put off until 22 June. The Red Army was mustered along the western border of the USSR. On paper it was a massive force, with immense tank and air fleets. However, numbers are deceptive and reassuring. This apparently mighty array suffered from a number of weaknesses that all but undid the strength in numbers. The infantry were solid but inexperienced, trained to fight a war that called for clear leadership and planning where the initiative lay in their officers’s hands. Until the mid-1930s Soviet strategy had assumed a defensive war which led to the erection of the Stalin Line along the old border. This concept had proved incompatible with Stalin’s new policies and from the mid-1930s aggressive warfare had become the order of the day. Fighting would not take place on Soviet land, but across an enemy’s border. It became blindingly clear during the Winter War that the Red Army was a blunt instrument, ill-suited for the cut and thrust of mechanized campaigns. Its leadership, deprived of such a huge number of senior officers during the purges of the late 1930s, was a pale shadow of its former self. Gone were many of the thinkers, the experienced men and in their place were officers who would not rock the strategic ship – men who, concerned for their lives, would not act without reference to higher authority. Often having been promoted beyond their capabilities, many of these officers were to prove singularly inadequate in the summer of 1941. These men had read of Germany’s blitzkrieg in the west and they had seen the French and British armies humbled, but they were also aware of their near-defeat against Finland. However, they were reassured by the German-Soviet Pact that promised peace. Few, if any, were psychologically prepared for the storm that was coming. Across the border the Axis steadily assembled its forces. Veterans of three campaigns manned the tanks that would spearhead the invasion. Pilots, flying some of the best warplanes in Europe, would fight for control

of the skies over the battlefields. Their leaders were well-trained, products of a system that encouraged initiative and flexibility. Their weapons were tried and trusted. Many balmy evenings passed with the landser (infantry) dozily listening to lectures that stressed the sub-human nature of their opponents. Nevertheless, few were stupid enough to underestimate a trained enemy with a gun fighting for his homeland but they were buoyed up by and confident in their record of success. Psychologically these men were anticipating victory and then, maybe, peace. Deserters telling tales, intelligence of the German forces arriving daily, reconnaissance flights without number – all these signs were ignored by the Kremlin: to Stalin and thus the Soviet government war with Germany was inconceivable. It was only when the bombs and shells rained down that the fact was slowly and grudgingly accepted – Hitler’s Wehrmacht was on the move eastwards.

For the vast majority of the Red Army training exercises such as this were the nearest they came to combat. Those who had fought against Finland and Poland were thus at an advantage when it came to the real thing. These men are taking part in a chemical warfare exercise

supported by a T-26 tank.

However, the majority of the German army had combat experience. Campaigning from Poland to the English Channel had provided invaluable experience for millions of landser as well as proving the worth of their equipment and tactics. These troops are seen advancing on a town in Poland.

Having demonstrated the lethal power of blitzkrieg-style warfare, the Germans were more than confident that the speed of their armoured

forces would once again reduce a less mobile enemy to confusion. This SdKfz 232 armoured car is equipped with a ‘bedstead’-style aerial. Efficient communications were one of the areas where the Germans were infinitely superior to the Soviets.

Other than the Spanish Civil War, the Red Army’s experience of armoured warfare had been confined to limited action in Poland, Manchuria and Finland. This armoured car crew is part of Zhukov’s army that defeated the Japanese in 1939 during the Khalkin Gol Campaign.

A German artillery crew carefully apply camouflage to their 210mm howitzer. Although an imposing weapon, its drawback was its short range – under 15km. The Germans deployed over 7,000 guns in support of Barbarossa.

On the border with Romania an NKVD (Russian acronym for People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs) frontier guard (right) warily eyes his Romanian counterpart. Romania, as well as regaining the lost province of Bessarabia, had ambitions to control Odessa and parts of the Black Sea coast and Crimea. They were only officially briefed on Barbarossa two days before it began.

Chapter One Into the Great Beyond Perhaps fate was dropping a huge clue when Hitler gave responsibility for the basic planning of Operation Barbarossa to General Friedrich Paulus, for it was he that was to lead Germany’s largest army to ignominious defeat at Stalingrad in early 1943. The German invasion force was divided into three army groups, north, centre and south. On 14 June 1941 Hitler defined the objectives of the invasion as Leningrad, Ukraine, the Donbass and the Caucasus. Moscow was not mentioned. It was assumed that the Red Army would collapse, swiftly followed by the Soviet state. Operation Barbarossa was therefore to be a short campaign, some six to ten weeks of fighting, with a mopping up period followed by the establishment of zones of occupation. There were three army groups lined up from north to south, Army Group North (AGN), Army Group Centre (AGC) and Army Group South (AGS). AGN consisted of Eighteenth and Sixteenth armies, Fourth Panzer Group and Luftflotte I. Its objective was the occupation of the Baltic States, the capture of the Baltic Sea Fleet’s main base at Kronstadt and finally the conquest of Leningrad, the ‘cradle of the revolution’ – a symbol of Bolshevik power that stuck particularly in Hitler’s craw – as well as an important industrial area. AGC controlled Second and Third Panzer groups, Ninth and Fourth armies and Luftflotte II with two Fliegerkorps. The task facing AGC was a daunting one – the destruction of Soviet forces in Belorussia. Third Panzer Group operated on the left flank of AGC, Second Panzer Group on its right. Moscow was not an objective to be considered until Leningrad was neutralized and Soviet resistance to the north had been broken irreparably. Once the Soviet lines had been breached each panzer group would drive eastwards creating pockets of encircled Red Army units that would be mopped up by the infantry following along behind. It was anticipated that after the fall of Smolensk AGN would head towards Leningrad. Army Group South (AGS) was composed of Sixth, Eleventh and Seventeenth armies along with First Panzer Group and Luftflotte IV. It also included Italians, Hungarians, Slovaks and Romanians. Its mission was to cross Ukraine towards Kiev, and once the city was under control to wheel south to pin Soviet forces against the Black Sea coast. This would be followed by an advance to Rostov on Don – the gateway to the Caucasus.

The Soviet ‘1941 Plan for the Defence of State Borders’, issued in May 1941, was predicated on the assumption that the Red Army would hold an invader on the border for several weeks before mounting a counteroffensive. During the defensive period mobilization and deployment would take place, thus bringing the army up to strength for the counter blow. The border defence line was divided into groups of armies known as Special Military Districts which were soon described as fronts. The Northern Front (N Front) covered the Finnish border and Leningrad, while the North Western Front (NW Front) protected the Baltic States and the coastal route to Leningrad. The Western Front (W Front) ran from Lithuania into the Pripet Marshes and from there to the Black Sea coast west of Odessa where the South Western Front (SW Front) took over. Odessa and the adjacent Romanian border were the responsibility of the Southern Front (S Front). The forces were deployed as follows. For the S Front Ninth Army, which included four tank divisions, air support provided by the Odessa VVS (Russian acronym for Military Air Force). The SW Front comprised Fifth, Sixth, Twelfth and TwentySixth armies, which fielded twelve armoured divisions and with air support from the Kiev VVS. The W Front deployed Third, Fourth and Tenth armies also with twelve tank divisions. The three armies of the NW Front were Eighth, Eleventh and Twenty-Seventh and included a mere three tank divisions. Finally, the N Front was held by Fourteenth Army, which had only one tank division, a reasonable force considering the polar conditions and incredibly rough going in which they would be operating in defence of Murmansk and Archangel. By the evening of 21 June the Red Army, densely packed into the defensive line facing the Axis, numbered 11,500 aircraft, some 3,250,000 men, 60,000 guns and mortars and 15,600 armoured fighting vehicles. There were a further six armies held in what became known as the Reserve Front. Further back, some 300–500km, were the old fixed defensive lines (the so-called Stalin Line), dating from the 1920s. Across the frontier waited just over 4 million men with 4,000 armoured fighting vehicles, 42,500 guns and mortars and over 4,300 aircraft. Soviet planning had imagined a strong attack but not one as widespread and violent as that which broke over the border in the fast rising dawn of Sunday, 22 June 1941 – Barbarossatag had begun. Between 0300 and 0330hr (Berlin time) a false dawn lit up the sky as the German artillery commenced its bombardment of Soviet positions from the Carpathian Mountains to the Baltic coast. Earlier that night

Moscow had issued Directive 1 to commanders in the west, the nub of which was ‘not to succumb to any provocative (German) actions that can cause serious complications’. Fearful of German provocation, Stalin did not wish to give Hitler the excuse to attack. When news began to flood into the Kremlin General G.K. Zhukov, Chief of the General Staff, telephoned Stalin to inform him of what was happening. As the Germans and their Soviet counterparts began to fight so Stalin’s inner circle met in the Kremlin. The German ambassador was consulted and he confirmed that a German attack was underway. At 0715hr (Moscow time) Stalin issued Directive 2 which ordered Soviet ground forces not to cross the frontier. However, by that time some Soviet troops were already retiring from their forward positions. As the morning wore on Stalin authorized mobilization, the transformation of western military districts into fronts and the creation of the Stavka – the HQ of the Supreme Commander-inChief. Stalin would assume that title on 8 July 1941, replacing Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. As information was fragmented and confused, Stalin dispatched Zhukov to the SW Front and other senior officers to other fronts to attempt to make sense of what was going on. An attempt by Stalin to contact the commander of the W Front met with the reply ‘he has gone to the troops’. Stavka’s observers, who had arrived at the W Front, were also unable to piece together a coherent picture of the unfolding events. Stalin then issued Directive 3 which ordered the NW, W and SW fronts to launch a series of ‘powerful concentric blows … counterattacks against the flank and rear of the enemy and by the end of June 24 destroy the main enemy force … regardless of the border’. Within 24 hours Moscow had issued three directives that, depending on when, where and in which order they were received, would cause chaos from north to south. For the next 9 hours Stalin rested at his country house where no one dared to disturb him. In Berlin Goebbels quoted Hitler and announced the invasion of the USSR to the German people on the morning news at 0600hr on 22 June. He stressed Soviet provocation and ended with the words, ‘Today I decided to pass on the fate of the state and our nation into the hands of our soldiers. God help us in this important fight.’ In Britain, later that day, Churchill pledged his support for the USSR.

The vast majority of the invasion force was German. These men of AGC clearly have no doubt of their destination whatever the Führer thought. Indeed, General Guderian, commanding AGC’s Second Panzer Group, stated on 22 June ‘the objective is Moscow’.

Hungarian Csaba (the son of Attila the Hun) armoured cars carrying 20mm guns. Admiral Horthy, Hungary’s ruler, was ambivalent in his

support of Barbarossa, only committing troops on 1 July 1941. The socalled ‘Rapid Corps’, an armoured formation, was eventually attached to First Panzer Group but suffered such severe losses that it was withdrawn before the end of the year.

Italian Bersaglieri (note the capercaillie feathers on their helmets) bicycle troops plod east during the summer of 1941. Mussolini’s contribution to Operation Barbarossa, the CSIR (Corpo de Spedizione Russia) began to arrive in AGS’s First Panzer Group’s area of operations from July 1941.

A Finnish anti-aircraft gun team man its 40mm Bofors gun. The Finns were not officially allied to Germany, but were regarded as waffenbruder, brothers in arms. When they embarked on their Continuation War in 1941 it was simply to regain what they had lost in 1940. When this was accomplished their army settled into defensive positions.

Part of the Slovak contribution to Barbarossa was the armour of the Mobile Division. Attached to AGS, its equipment consisted of Czech models LT vz. 38 (foreground) and the LT vz. 35 (background). The unit participated in the fighting around Lvov.

A Panzer III, to the right, and an 88mm anti-aircraft gun, to the left, deployed against a ground target. The Panzer III was the most numerous

German tank at the time of Barbarossa. Although inferior to several Soviet tanks, in the hands of veterans it was still highly effective. If all else failed, the 88 could kill any tank at ranges up to 2,000m.

Air superiority was essential to blitzkrieg warfare. ‘Flying artillery’ support provided what horse-drawn guns could not – rapid mobility. The four air fleets were supplemented by the Romanian Air Force and one of that formation’s crewmen is seen here.

The Germans and their allies depended on horse-drawn vehicles to a very large degree. Travelling over unmade ground, such as that seen here, would prove exhausting for men and draught animals alike. During the thaw or wet weather the dust would turn to bottomless, glutinous mud creating further logistical problems.

Assault troops of AGC wait to cross the Bug River on Barbarossatag. In the distance the smoke from a burning town rises into the early morning sky. A Light Assault Boat type 39 can be seen returning to ferry more men across to the Soviet bank.

A senior German officer stands by his car to inspect some of the first

POWs captured on 22 June. Although the Red Army had stepped up its anti-fascist propaganda efforts somewhat in the weeks pre-Barbarossa, the shock of invasion left many ordinary Soviet troops dazed and confused.

However well-trained the Red Army was it still had not overcome its postpurge weaknesses. Fearful of punishment from above, officers, particularly at junior level, were afraid to act on their own initiative. Furthermore, relations between officers and enlisted men were poor and led to mistrust on both sides, especially in the infantry units, although the technical branches were more disciplined. These men are practising with a M1938 107mm mortar.

To the people of the USSR the Red Army was a symbol of their sacrifices and achievements post-1917. Parades such as this were filmed and then shown the length and breadth of Stalin’s empire to generate belief in the state’s invincibility. Here a formation of M1931 b4 203mm howitzers drawn by Stalinets S-65 tractors participates in just such an event.

The Soviet tank forces of the 1930s had been superior in both numbers and technology. Unfortunately, by 1941 they had been overtaken by the Germans in terms of doctrine, training and quality. During the early weeks of Barbarossa thousands of Soviet tanks were abandoned or lost due to shortages of parts and fuel or a simple lack of crew familiarity. The model seen here is an M 1931 T-26 with twin machine-gun turrets.

Stalin and Marshal K.Y. Voroshilov attend a pre-war parade in Moscow. A close colleague of Stalin from the days of the Russian Civil War, Voroshilov denounced many of his comrades during the purges and then went on to command the army that failed to defeat Finland during the 1939–40 campaign. His personal bravery was unquestioned but his failure to prevent the German encirclement of Leningrad led to his dismissal in late 1941.

The fate of so many early production T-34 tanks. This Model 1941 has been abandoned because of a lack of fuel. Nevertheless, when fuelled and operating well the Red Army’s new medium tank proved a most unwelcome foe as its sloping armour was impervious to all German antitank weapons other than at extremely close range.

As with other branches of the Red Army, the artillery was undergoing changes when the power of Barbarossa was unleashed. One area in which the Soviets excelled was that of camouflage/concealment (maskirovka), as this gun position shows.

Soviet anti-tank gunners move their Model 1932 45mm piece from cover. They are preceded by an anti-tank rifle team. On the far side of the road is another anti-tank crew. The road is flanked by dense forest, often swampy, which is typical of the countryside through which AGN and AGC had to fight before reaching relatively open ground. It was ideal terrain for ambushes and later partisan operations.

Infantry training was not highly developed nor had any of the experiences gained during the Finnish War and the occupation of eastern Poland

been fully incorporated. Small unit tactics were often overlooked and weapons training was frequently curtailed due to lack of equipment. Here machine-gunners receive instruction in the use of the M1928 DP light machine gun, known as the record player because of its distinctive pan magazine.

The Red Army maintained large numbers of cavalry regiments. Although apparently anachronistic, they were well-suited to the terrain of the USSR, providing mobility in areas where vehicles were useless. This unit of Bashkirs proudly displays its horse-tail banner.

One area in which the Soviet Union was more prepared for a long war than the Third Reich was munitions production. As a result of the pre-war Five Year Plans many industrial facilities were built beyond the range of bombers. Furthermore, when the invasion got under way the evacuation of strategically important factories and workers to areas beyond the Ural Mountains began.

Chapter Two Many Rivers to Cross The geography of the Axis–Soviet borderlands was defined in great part by the numerous rivers, particularly the Bug and the Dniester that faced AGS and AGC respectively. Elements of AGN would have to cross the Niemen River followed by the Dvina and the Lovat, the spaces between which were cut by smaller rivers and tributaries. In many areas the approaches were swampy and the bridges few and far between and frequently incapable of sustaining more than light vehicles. Therefore, the fighting would be dominated by both sides attempting to take or hold bridging points. To further complicate the issue vast swathes of the western USSR was heavily forested, remaining what it had been for thousands of years – a primeval wilderness. Many of the waterways were well over 100m wide and certainly during the early weeks of the Barbarossa campaign swollen by heavy rainfall. AGC faced the additional problem of its invasion route being split in two by the soaking morass known as the Pripet Marshes. The armoured spearheads of AGC, Second and Third Panzer groups (Generals Hoth and Guderian respectively), would confront these problems from the very first day. Indeed, Hoth’s forces had to deal with three rivers within 60km of their ‘dry’ border crossing. Second Panzer Group crossed the Bug River in the vicinity of Brest-Litovsk Fortress on bridges captured by Russian-speaking special forces troops of Regiment 800 – the Brandenburgers. These specialists in infiltration and sabotage were also largely responsible for widespread disruption of the Soviet communications system by the simple expedient of cutting the wires of the civilian network. Radios were in short supply and consequently the Red Army depended on civilian landlines. Furthermore, when radios were available their operators were frequently jammed and continually monitored. A commonly intercepted message within the first 24 hours of the invasion was, ‘The Germans are attacking what shall I do?’ By 1500hr on 22 June, Barbarossatag, units of Second Panzer Group had bypassed Brest Fortress and were into open country. Third Panzer Group, crossing all three rivers by captured bridges, were within 48 hours responsible for breaking the connection between the NW and W fronts where the Eleventh and Third armies linked. With his communications with Third and Fourth armies in chaos, the W Front’s commander, General D.G. Pavlov, could only guess at what was going on. It seemed that his Tenth Army in the centre of the front was the only unit holding

together. In an attempt to restore contact with the NW Front, Pavlov ordered a counterattack in the direction of Grodno. The operation was to be led by General I.V. Boldin, the W Front’s second-in-command, and involved VI Mechanized and VI Cavalry corps from Tenth Army and XI Mechanized Corps from Third Army. The mechanized corps each had 2 tank divisions, totalling some 1,000 armoured vehicles. A formidable force, it included over 200 T-34 and KV1 tanks. Despite the numbers, it was German experience that told and the attack failed and Grodno was lost. On 25 June Moscow ordered the W Front to fall back to a line running north to south from Lida–Slonim– Pinsk on the edge of the Pripet Marshes. Unfortunately for Pavlov, Hoth’s armour was already on the way to Minsk via Vilnius, which had fallen on 24 June. To the south Second Panzer Group, having destroyed 95 per cent of XIV Mechanized Corps’s 480 tanks, was well on its way to Baranovichi. Moscow’s next instruction to Pavlov was to ‘achieve positive control over front line units’ and to ‘evacuate Minsk and Bobruisk’ to the south west. But by this time most of the W Front’s original forces were being contained in what became known as the Minsk Pocket. The German term for this technique is kessel, which translates as cauldron and this is the term that will be used in this book. Minsk, capital of the Belorussian SSR, had already witnessed the evacuation of the Communist Party’s officials. Martial Law had been declared in the western and southern districts of the USSR on 22 June and the evacuation of officials and state property from Minsk began three days later in the face of Third Panzer Group’s rapid advance. In the process of this Hoth’s forces were passing through the fixed defence line of the 1920s and 1930s. Line is a misnomer, conjuring as it does the impression of fortifications similar to those of the Maginot Line. The socalled Stalin Line was neither continuous nor in many places was it anything other than a set of blueprints. It had been conceived as a series of fortified zones covering river crossings and other points of strategic value from the 1920s when the border ran along the Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Polish and Romanian frontiers. To cover the designated areas hundreds of concrete machine-gun and field-gun bunkers were built between 1928 and 1939. When the frontiers moved westwards another series of fortified zones was planned – the so-called Molotov Line. Such engineering works were expensive in terms of time, money, resources and manpower. Furthermore, prioritizing which to build varied with the

prevailing political mood. Weapons allocation was transferred to the Molotov Line so that many assets were shipped from the Stalin to the Molotov Line. A case of robbing Joseph to pay Vyacheslav. Consequently, the invaders were faced with a patchwork of fortifications, some tough and viable, others simply holes in the ground. Manning these systems fell to the remnants of first-line units, reserves and local militia, few of which had the specialist training required to carry out such work. With Guderian reluctantly closing on Minsk from the south and Hoth moving more eagerly from the north, Pavlov ordered the recently raised Thirteenth Army to hold the Minsk Fortified Region. On 29 June the city was surrounded and Belorussia lost, and 24 hours later Pavlov was relieved of command of the W Front and replaced by Marshal S.K. Timoshenko. Simultaneously, OKH (Oberkommando der Heeres (German Army Supreme High Command)) ordered von Bock’s AGC to align his forces for ‘operations in the direction of Smolensk’. OKH was, until late 1941, subject to control from the OKW (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht which directed army, air force and navy operations). When Hitler took leadership of the OKH, in December 1941, it effectively became independent of OKW. As AGC regrouped, Hitler and his staff had to decide what their course of action would be – where would von Bock’s armour go next? AGN’s left flank rested on the Baltic Sea and was the responsibility of General von Kuchler’s Eighteenth Army. In the middle of AGN General Hoepner commanded Fourth Panzer Group and on the right flank Sixteenth Army, led by General Busch, was tasked with maintaining the connection with AGC. AGN was commanded by Field Marshal von Leeb. Fourth Panzer Group was expected to secure the river crossings and made a mixed start. By 23 June one crossing over the Dubysa River by 1st Panzer Division had been taken but 6th Panzer Division failed in similar missions because of a shortage of fuel brought on by the heavy going. It was then attacked by strong Soviet armoured units. For 24 hours battle raged at close quarters as 1st Panzer Division fought through to relieve its sister unit. Eventually, with constant support from Fliegerkorps 1, the tables were turned and the Soviet attackers were thrown back with losses of 90 per cent in men and machines. With much of the Soviet tank force thus eliminated, the panzers were free to resume their missions. General Manstein, commanding LVI Panzer Corps (8th Panzer and 3rd Motorized infantry divisions) was in the happy position of exploiting the

gap created by Hoth’s Third Panzer Group when they pushed the NW Front’s Eleventh Army east instead of north. Now the race was on to capture the vital Dvina River bridges at Dunaberg. General F.I. Kuznetsov, commanding the NW Front, recognized the threat and committed the newly raise Twenty-Seventh Army, composed entirely of infantry but supported by XXI Mechanized Corps, to make for Dunaberg. However, locally conscripted militia were unable to prevent the city’s bridges and fortifications from being captured. As elsewhere in the Baltic States, natives took up arms to attack what they regarded as Russian occupation forces. Stavka had ordered Kuznetsov to hold the Dvina River line but, despite counterattacking valiantly, he had signally failed to do so. Incredibly, he instructed Twenty-Seventh Army to fall back to the east and thus opened the road to Leningrad! As the men of Eleventh and Twenty-Seventh armies retired they began to reach parts of the Stalin Line which Kuznetsov had been told to hold. General N.F. Vatutin was ordered to join Kuznetsov as Chief-of-Staff with an instruction directly from Stalin to halt the Germans ‘at all costs’. On AGN’s left Sixteenth Army made rapid progress across Lithuania and in ten days had covered some 120km, crossed the Dvina River, captured Riga and proclaimed a Latvian Provisional Government. Cheered on by the Lithuanians and Latvians, the operation to date had seemed to some ‘like an exercise.’ However, despite almost cornering Eighth Army, its infantry had been unable to effect an encirclement and the Soviet troops fought on doggedly. Away on the right flank the forward elements of General Busch’s Sixteenth Army had reached the capital of Lithuania, Kaunas, which had already been liberated by local forces. The newly formed Lithuanian Provisional Government took office in the capital on 23 June. However, they were too late to save the bridges over the Niemen River and its tributaries. Supported by local forces, 121st Infantry Division held off several Red Army counterattacks to occupy the city. With Kaunas secure, Sixteenth Army’s infantry set off in the wake of the panzers in an east– north–easterly direction. As they advanced there were increasingly numerous and worrying reports of attacks by roving groups of Russian stragglers on their dramatically stretched supply lines. To counter this threat unofficially raised units of Lithuanians and Latvians were permitted to carry out security duties, a task that they undertook with relish and often little mercy.

But now it was von Leeb’s turn to commit errors which would gift his opponents time to prepare defensive lines before Leningrad and realign their battered forces. Hoepner’s panzer group was ordered to halt along the Dvina River and await the arrival of Sixteenth Army, which took until 4 July. To compound matters von Leeb did not unite his armour into one mass but instead he prevaricated and lost more precious time. In his defence Fourth Panzer Group was a precious asset not to be committed recklessly to battle in the vast, dank, brooding forests in front of Leningrad unless it enjoyed the close support of infantry. As Sixteenth Army fell in along the Dvina River and its supply columns pushed ahead as fast as they could, Stalin wasted little time. The N Front’s troops in and around Leningrad were to create a defensive line along the Luga River from the coastal city of Narva to Lake I’lmen. This cobbled together force was to be known as the Luga Operational Group (LOG). Behind the Luga Line a series of defence lines were to be put in place with the final section covering suburban Leningrad. The people of the former capital were mobilized to dig and the fit and able to fight. As well as noting the defensive preparations German intelligence also observed the build-up of Soviet forces in the Velki Luki area, which posed a threat to the junction of AGN and AGC. Leningrad was not about to be abandoned to the invaders without a fight. Far away to the south Field Marshal von Rundstedt’s Army Group South’s Brandenburg Special Forces failed to take the bridge over the San River until late on 22 June. III Panzer Corps, part of First Panzer Group, broke through Soviet infantry positions and was en route for Lutsk, an important road and rail hub on the Styr River. It was taken on 25 June. To the south infantry of General Kempf’s XLVIII Panzer Corps opened the way for 11th Panzer Division to advance on Dubno. To interdict this movement General M.P. Kirponos, commanding the SW Front, set several of his mechanized corps in motion to counterattack. IV and XV Mechanized corps were both bloodily repulsed, while others, having endured a gruelling march of up to 75km under almost continual Luftwaffe attack, arrived with their numbers significantly depleted. 13th Panzer Division had little difficulty in fending off their poorly coordinated attacks. Elsewhere, however, it was a very different story. XV and VIII Mechanized corps had nearly surrounded 11th Panzer Division until the jaws of the encirclement were torn apart by 16th Panzer Division. Sensibly, Kirponos withdrew his armoured units on 27 June before the

losses became too great. Despite this prudent move, a gap was now developing between Fifth and Sixth armies which First Panzer Group was about to exploit. As Fifth Army retired to the southern reaches of the Pripet Marshes Sixth Army prepared to defend Lvov. At his HQ von Rundstedt was concerned that AGS’s right flank, Seventeenth Army, was moving too slowly and exposing other forces to Soviet penetration from the south. Anxiously, von Rundstedt awaited Hungarian and Romanian intervention. While considering how best to encircle Lvov, von Rundstedt received news that 9th Panzer Division was to the rear of the city and the Soviets were hurrying to leave. Covered by a succession of rearguard actions, the SW Front fell back in relatively good order towards the Stalin Line. On 2 July Hungarian forces crossed the Dniester River and Seventeenth Army broke the connection between Kirponos’s Sixth and Twenty-Sixth armies. However, as AGS advanced its frontage increased, as did that of the Soviets just as they began to lose their cohesion. Now moving into more open country, von Kleist’s armour was able to pursue its opponents with greater effect. Once again the defences that stood before the Axis troops were a mixed collection of useful and useless, manned in many cases by reservists with little or no idea how to make use of what weapons they held. Operation Munich was the code name for Romania’s invasion of the USSR by which it hoped to reintegrate the lost province of Moldavia. German elements of Eleventh Army took a major bridge spanning the Prut River on 30 June, but the main blow came on 2 July with an attempt to split Eighteenth and Ninth Soviet armies. Eleventh Army was sandwiched between Third and Fourth Romanian armies to the north and south respectively. The attack was preempted by General I.V. Tyulenev’s blow at the junction of Fourth and Eleventh armies. German support for the Romanians was swiftly provided and the S Front, weakened by transfers elsewhere, was ordered to withdraw and re-assemble near Uman, roughly 120km to the north east. Initially, von Schobert moved, utilizing the recently arrived Italian CSIR, to encircle S Front between the Bug and Dniester rivers. Crossing the latter between 17 and 21 July, a combination of unseasonably bad weather and recently introduced Soviet scorched earth tactics allowed the S Front’s forces to escape. The SW and S fronts had achieved some success in holding up AGS’s progress, indeed considerably more than W or NW fronts had, but both

were now starting to suffer from the same symptoms of impending doom already experienced by the W Front. Communications were disintegrating and there was very little left to defend before the Dnieper River and the Ukrainian capital of Kiev aside from the rolling steppe. Kirponos’s front slowly but surely began to unravel. By mid-July Fifth Army was holding out on the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes, while Sixth and Twelfth armies gravitated towards the S Front’s operational area. Much as was the case with AGN, Hitler wanted to use the panzers of AGS to do more including the capture of Kiev while von Rundstedt wished to leave Kiev to the infantry of Sixth Army. But now the flanks of the latter were receiving the attention of Fifth Army. On 4 July elements of Kleist’s First Panzer Group had broken into the Stalin Line at NovgorodVolynski, 250km west of Kiev. 13th Panzer Division took Berdichev three days later and on 9 July Zhitomir fell and III Panzer Corps was ordered to take Kiev. This was in line with the Führer’s wishes but he wanted part of Kleist’s armour to participate in an encirclement of Soviet forces in the Dnieper River bend to the south of Kiev. This topic became the subject of much debate but before a conclusion was reached 13th Panzer Division had crossed the Irpen River and was within 25km of the Ukrainian capital. The appearance of German tanks that close to Kiev horrified the Soviets. Stalin ordered an immediate series of counterattacks by the S and SW fronts. These desperate efforts were poorly coordinated and costly both in terms of men and materiel. The German armoured formations held on desperately as infantry, both motorized and on foot, was rushed to their aid. By 19 July von Stulpnagel’s Seventeenth Army was coming up and it was decided to use nine of its infantry divisions to replace I Panzer Corps, which would now combine with other infantry divisions to encircle Soviet troops in the Uman area. Satisfied that he had blunted the German attack, Kirponos was unaware that it was elsewhere along the Eastern Front that the stage was being set for an even greater disaster than those that had already overtaken the Red Army.

During the early hours of 22 June 1941 scores of bombing raids were carried on Soviet bases and cities. Sevastopol, Minsk, Kovno, Rovno and Grodno as well as Odessa and ports on the Baltic Sea were targeted. Here a Dornier Do 17 is re-armed for a daylight raid.

During the Western European campaigns the Germans had exploited locally available fuel sources from civilian garages to re-supply their

panzer units. In the East, where fuel consumption was greater due to the rough going, such sources were rare. In the early weeks of Barbarossa fuel consumption was found to be three times higher than the estimated figure with consequent effects on the supply lines.

A KV-1 tank, part of VI Mechanized Corps, is inspected by Germans during June 1941. The crews’ unfamiliarity with the machine and frequent mechanical failure led to it being rendered impotent. The German armoured car is a Kfz 13, as used by the reconnaissance units of infantry divisions.

German artillery observers in the vicinity of Brest Fortress consider the fall of shot. This immense fortress complex built to cover the confluence of the Bug and Mukhavets rivers took almost a week to reduce with the help of ordnance up to 60cm calibre. Although control over the main road to Moscow and the railway line was gained on the first day, defenders were still being rooted out as late as the end of July. It became a ‘Hero Fortress’ in 1965. For outstanding service during the Second World War twelve cities and Minsk Fortress were awarded the honorific title of ‘Hero’.

It was into terrain such as this that Red Army stragglers slipped when their units lost cohesion. Here men of AGN attempt to pursue fugitives. Note the netting to protect them against the swarms of insects that made the summer months so unpleasant in the swamps.

A Stalin Line bunker after capture. This is possibly a battalion command post with three Maxim M1910 machine guns. The embrasures could be sealed to protect the garrison against gas yet still operate the weapons. Much of the camouflage remains in place. In very few areas did the Stalin Line live up to expectations.

By 2 July AGC claimed to have captured 340,000 POWs, destroyed upwards of 1,700 aircraft, 4,500 tanks and over 9,000 guns. Amidst the debris of a Soviet column the huge bulk of a KV-2 tank is easily recognizable. With its first-line troops disappearing in smoke, much of the fighting was now left to second- and third-line formations.

As well as POWs the Red Army also had to contend with desertion. Here

Lithuanians of the Red Army’s XXIX Rifle Corps, wearing their distinctive M1931 Posalmis caps and an arm band denoting their new loyalty, join AGN.

To make up for the lack of tank support assault guns (Sturmgeschutz) were pressed into service by AGN. Designed to destroy fortified positions armed with a short barrelled 75mm L/24 gun and based on a panzer III chassis, the StuG III proved remarkably effective.

This image neatly encapsulates the obsolete nature of the majority of tanks deployed by the Red Army and the Germans in the Baltic States. To the left a Czech-made panzer T-35 of 6th Panzer Division, which was entirely equipped with these vehicles, passes an abandoned T-28 of III Mechanized Corps, the fate of so many Soviet tanks.

As a result of Soviet activity behind its lines Sixteenth Army was resupplied almost exclusively by air well into July 1941. This row of JU 52s is preparing to off-load munitions to a waiting group of lorries for local distribution.

Captured Red Army political officers, known as politruk, who enjoyed considerable power over field units in 1941. One such, N.N. Vashugin, overruled his unit’s commander and led VIII Mechanized Corps tanks to destruction in a swamp. Vashugin committed suicide rather than face the punishment his actions would have incurred. Devoted communists such as these men were sentenced to immediate execution if taken prisoner under the terms of the infamous ‘Commissar Order’.

Civilians gather to celebrate the establishment of the Ukrainian state in Lvov/Lemburg. The city fell to the Germans on 30 June 1941, the same day as a state assembly of émigrés declared Ukraine a nation. Taken by surprise, the German reaction was swift and the nationalist leaders were arrested in early July. It was an ugly warning of the fate in store for those nationalist organizations that were not fully supported by the Germans. Exploitation not liberation was the order of the day.

A well-camouflaged gun position west of Kiev protects and masks a 76mm 02/30 76mm field gun. Part of the Kiev defence network was the Korosten Fortified Region which had only two battalions of infantry to defend 180km of its line.

Elsewhere immense anti-tank ditches meandered across the empty steppe. Created at great expense in man hours, they often proved no hindrance to the enemy whatsoever.

The huge number of rivers that criss-crossed the western USSR proved to be a more time-consuming obstacle. This was particularly so where they ran in or out of the Pripet Marshes, where the ground could be swampy for hundreds of metres either side of the watercourse. The work of Axis engineering units was vital to maintain the speed of the advance.

A fish very much out of water – a T-38 amphibious tank stranded on the Ukrainian steppe, July 1941. Designed for river crossings, it had poor cross-country capabilities and a weak cooling system which resulted in many rapidly overheating. Consequently, a large number were simply abandoned by their crews, as has happened here. This was symptomatic of the fate of much of the Red Army’s tank fleet during Barbarossa.

Not everything went smoothly for the invaders. This panzer III with a 50mm gun has been captured and is about to be towed away for analysis. The panzer III was rendered almost obsolete by the appearance of the T-34 and KV-1 types. Nevertheless, it provided sterling service in upgraded versions beyond 1943.

Chapter Three Herding People The re-alignment of AGS’s I Panzer Corps towards Uman opened the gap between Fifth and Sixth Soviet armies even further. As events and armies swirled in a seemingly random manner the Soviets created Twenty-Sixth Army some 70km south of Kiev on the Dnieper River to threaten von Kleist’s rear. However, their intentions became known and a trap was laid utilizing elements of German Sixth Army supported, when the scale of the Soviet attack became apparent, by part of XIV Panzer Corps. This threat was only contained following hard fighting, leaving XLVIII Panzer Corps en-route to Uman and the south. From 21–7 July XLVIII Panzer Corps, supported by 16th Panzer Division and Leibstandarte Adolph Hitler SS Motorized Division, held off attacks by Sixth Army. By the beginning of August III Panzer Corps and men of Seventeenth Army had arrived to seal off the pocket around Uman. A report to Stavka noted that ‘withdrawing Twelfth and Sixth armies either to the east or north east is futile’. Eighteenth Army was also being sucked into the Uman cauldron. Steadily, the Germans drew the noose tighter until on 8 August the Soviets surrendered. Over 100,000 officers and men passed into captivity along with more than 300 tanks and 1,000 guns. Attempts by Konev’s Twenty-Sixth Army to break through the slowly solidifying ring failed. Hitler, having achieved part of his southern strategy at Uman, waited for AGS to create bridgeheads across the Dnieper River. On 12 August Hitler declared that the aim now ‘is not the capture of Moscow but … occupation of the Crimea … the Donets Basin … the cutting of Russian supply lines from the Caucasian oil fields’. Moscow was to be left to the infantry of AGC as Guderian’s II Panzer Corps was already on its way to join AGS. In Moscow Stalin’s Stavka was slowly coming to terms with the critical situation developing along the entire front line. Convinced that the capital was the main target, Stalin prevaricated about Kiev. On 12 August permission was granted to abandon the Dnieper River line and support Odessa and the Crimea – the former under siege by the Romanian army but holding out strongly. The main assault on Odessa had begun on 8 August, but three weeks later had bogged down in the face of stiff resistance. For Stalin the defence of Odessa was a glimmer of hope and a symbol of resistance at an increasingly gloomy time. To add to his distress, the loss of Kherson and the bridge over the Dnieper River at

Berislav near the coast had opened the way into the Crimean Peninsula, home of the Black Sea Fleet and the essential link in Odessa’s supply chain. Consequently, in mid-August Stalin reversed his decision regarding Kiev and the Dnieper River line – now the forces positioned there were ordered to hold out. Reserves were poured into Kiev itself but its flanks were ignored. Hundreds of thousands of the city’s population were mobilized to dig defences or to serve in militia brigades. The failure of weak German attacks earlier in the month convinced Stalin that the city and river could be held. However, fate ruled otherwise. While shortening the line and struggling to maintain contact with the Bryansk Front to the north, Fifth Army failed to destroy the only bridge across the Dnieper River between Kiev and the Pripet Marshes. 11th Panzer Division crossed this gift and although the Soviets subsequently destroyed it, by 2 September it had been rebuilt thus enabling elements of Sixth Army to threaten Kiev from the north and rear. Over 150km to the south the Dnieper River had been crossed at Kremenchug on 20 August and five days later further south at Dnepropetrovsk. By the following week both these bridgeheads were solidly held. To counter these threats ThirtyEighth Army was formed at Poltava to the east but it had only 40,000 men with which to hold a front of 100km. All of the SW Front’s reserves were being marshalled around Kiev to fend off Guderian’s rapidly approaching II Panzer Corps. The 300 tanks of LVIII Panzer Corps were moved into the Kremenchug bridgehead and with massive air support from V Flieger Corps broke out on 12 September. Despite the clear danger of encirclement, Stalin refused to grant permission to withdraw to the Psel River, 150km east of Kiev, and thus the die was cast. I Panzer Corps brushed aside Thirty-Eighth Army and drove north to link up with II Panzer Corps. Guderian’s troops, headed by 3rd Panzer Division, commanded by General Walter Model, smashed into the enemy defences. The Soviet armies’ cohesion began to fall apart with TwentyFirst and Thirteenth armies pulling back exposing the flank of Fortieth Army and breaking contact with the Bryansk Front. Almost the entirety of the SW Front began to implode upon Kiev itself. Untroubled by air attacks, 16th Panzer Division advanced freely to the south of Kiev. This movement led to the link up of the pincers of AGS and AGC at 1820hr on 14 September at Lokhvista. Three days later Kirponos was put in charge of all encircled units and ordered to try to escape. It was too late for both commander and men as Kirponos was killed along with countless

thousands of his hapless troops. As the Germans reduced the pocket from all sides the last street fighting in Kiev ended on 24 September. The Axis statisticians counted over 440,000 POWs but ignored the dead and wounded. The final pacification of the Kiev area was only announced on 4 October. Events elsewhere were almost a catastrophic for the Red Army. Kiev may have been sacrificed to buy time for the development of Moscow’s defences but how well would they fare? AGC’s success around Minsk and the pockets thus created took until 23 July to finally mop up and even then thousands of Soviet soldiers disappeared into the woods and marshlands where a not inconsiderable number took to life as partisans. To the east, however, von Bock’s panzer groups were preparing to create another pocket around the city of Smolensk. Although the Red Army had been brutally handled, it was still drafting hundreds of thousands of men, both trained reservists and untrained militia, to the front. On 4 July Stavka ordered the W Front to attack in the direction of Lepel, Borisov and Bobruisk and to defend the line of the Berezina River. Second Panzer Group’s XLVII Corps was held but its most southerly thrust crossed the Berezina River with relative ease. Then it was Hoth’s turn. Third Panzer Group had a 120km gap between its two corps. Into this space two Soviet mechanized corps attempted to insert themselves. A swirling battle ensued and drew in four panzer divisions which drove the Soviets back on Smolensk, leaving 1,300 tanks and armored vehicles behind them. Seizing the opportunity for a rapid pursuit, Third Panzer Group found its ambitions marred by poor weather and only one serviceable road. These limitations gave Twenty-Second Army’s weak force of six divisions time to prepare some desperately needed defensive positions along its 200km front. With nothing to strike at Hoth’s exposed flanks Stavka gave up the Berezina Line and fell back on the headwaters of the Dnieper and Dvina rivers. Grinding slowly through the mud towards Vitebsk and Polotsk, north west of Smolensk Hoth placed his faith in 19th Panzer Division, which was rushed ahead to capture a bridge over the Dvina at Disna. Simultaneously, 7th Panzer Division struck at Vitebsk, which fell during mid-July. These were the first steps towards the breaking of the Dvina–Dnieper Line. At that vital moment Hoth’s armour was briefly diverted northwards to protect the junction with AGN. To the south Guderian had crossed the Dnieper utilizing amphibious tanks, and on 5 July a bridge was built as his tanks gave covering fire.

But now II Panzer Corps was in among a well-organized defensive area which it took from 7–16 July to break down. Both panzer groups had broken through the Dvina–Dnieper Line and, as their infantry slogged manfully along dozens of kilometres behind them, they prepared to set up an encirclement around Smolensk. With considerably more operable tanks than Hoth, Guderian’s group was chosen to act as the spearhead. XLVI Panzer Corps was tasked with leading the advance towards Yelnia, roughly 50km east–south–east of Smolensk. 29th Motorized Infantry Division headed for Smolensk to effect a junction with Hoth’s 7th Panzer Division, which took Yartsevo, east of Smolensk, cutting the road and rail links with Moscow on 13 July and they linked up two days later. However, the encirclement was very thinly spread. 29th Motorized was heavily engaged in street fighting, complicated by the lack of any bridges linking the two sides of Smolensk. With the bulk of Guderian’s force moving towards Yelnia, 7th Panzer bore the brunt of fighting off the increasingly violent breakout attempts. These were frequently successful and much of Sixteenth and Twentieth armies escaped to the east. Von Bock declared the Battle of Smolensk over on 5 August. Arriving to give his commanders well-deserved plaudits, Hitler confirmed that Hoth’s panzer force would go north to support AGN against Leningrad and that Guderian would go south to AGS. The Führer also approved offensives from the Yelnia area where the bridgehead over the Desna River had been taken over by XLVI Panzer Corps on 20 July. However, Stalin had not been idle. In an attempt to relieve the Smolensk Pocket he had, on 1 August, ordered an assault on the Yelnia position. Yelnia itself was the head of a salient and was initially occupied by units of 10th Panzer and SS Motorized Division Das Reich. Marshal S.K. Timoshenko’s attack began on 4 August and continued for fourteen days. But luckily for Yelnia’s defenders, as the Smolensk Pocket was reduced more troops were released to support them. As AGN replaced Hoth and Guderian with the infantry of Fourth and Ninth armies respectively so the Soviets stepped up their offensive and by 11 August were engaged with AGN across a broad front. The Soviet Reserve Front, commanded by General G.K. Zhukov, released a cavalry corps on a deep penetration sweep into the German rear. By late August the Yelnia position had become untenable and by the end of the first week in September it was abandoned. Nevertheless, and the removal of AGC’s armour notwithstanding, Stalin still was still convinced that Moscow was the main objective. Indeed, as Stavka celebrated the liberation of Yelnia,

Hitler was in the process of ordering what would be known to history as Operation Typhoon – the attack on Moscow. When the operations against Leningrad and Kiev were successfully concluded both Hoth and Guderian’s armour would return to AGC. In addition, AGN would lose its Fourth Panzer Group. The respite granted to AGN along the Dvina River dealt a good card to both the N and NW fronts. The opportunity to raise new formations and dig defences was eagerly grasped with both hands. These defences, although initially far behind the front, would soon be tested. On 2 July XLI Panzer Corps smashed through feeble resistance and quickly found itself less than 40km from Ostrov, a bridging point over the Velikaya River, on the central highway to Leningrad. Ostrov was taken on 4 July with its bridges intact. The Luftwaffe played havoc with the tanks launched in futile, bloody counterattacks by Twenty-Seventh Army, which withdrew followed closely by Manstein’s LVI Panzer Corps. The pursuit ended when Twenty-Seventh Army found refuge in the swampy forests. On 9 July AGN HQ decided that its armour would make for Leningrad, XLI Panzer Corps via Pskov and LVI Panzer Corps via Novgorod. Rheinhardt’s corps would pass to the right of Lake Peipus, Manstein’s to the left of Lake I’lmen and both would hit portions of the increasingly strong Luga Line, which followed the course of the Luga River from Narva to Lake I’lmen for 300km. With the capture of Pskov AGN’s troops entered the Leningrad administrative area for the first time, reaching the Luga Line by mid-July. Rheinhardt’s corps established several small bridgeheads across the river and were within 120km of Leningrad itself. However, such was the fortitude of the defenders that it swiftly became obvious that further progress would only be achieved with the support of Manstein’s forces. With Chudovo as its first target Manstein’s corps had advanced confidently expecting to sever the Moscow–Leningrad rail link through that town. Then the Soviets struck back. Vatutin’s Eleventh Army encircled Manstein’s foremost unit 8th Panzer Division, which lost seventy-five tanks in short order. Von Leeb ordered a halt to realign his forces and firm up the connection with AGC. Meanwhile, Manstein’s 3rd Motorized Division and SS Division Totenkopf plunged ahead. Heavy fighting meant that the attack on the Luga Line at Luga town in the centre of the line only began on 8 August. The aim was now to link up with the Finns at Svir station, 300km to the north east between lakes Ladoga and Onega, east of Leningrad. The Finns had agreed to this but the Svir River would mark the limit of their involvement. In support of this ambitious

thrust Hoth’s panzers would be detached from AGC, as would VIII Fliegerkorps. Infighting and conflicting ambitions among army commanders and the higher staff echelons around Hitler added confusion to the overall situation, as did the length of time it took to reduce the Smolensk Pocket. During this period Hitler was unwell and he interfered with his generals’ decision-making to a more limited degree. So, while the German commanders squabbled Vatutin prepared to attack just at the point von Leeb feared most – the long, sparsely held right flank south of Lake I’lmen. The Soviet attack was delayed until 12 August but when it began Forty-Eighth Army headed for Novgorod to the north, Eleventh and Thirty-Fourth armies in the centre pushed into the gap between Sixteenth Army’s X and II corps, while to the south Twenty-Seventh Army advanced on Kholm. When Staraya Russa was liberated on 16 August both German corps retired. Von Leeb’s counter stroke was fast and powerful. Diverting Manstein’s armour supported by the massed aircraft of Fliegerkorps VIII, he attacked and by 23 August the flank was firmly restored. If von Leeb had held his nerve for a while longer LVIII Corps from AGC would have achieved the same aim. Nevertheless, TwentySecond and Thirty-Fourth Soviet armies were in ruins. Uniting the X and II corps with LVI and LVII Panzer Corps, the Germans advanced on Demyansk, which they reached on 16 September. Now, however, it was time for much of the armour to return to AGC for the push on Moscow as Leningrad was regarded as being in the bag. As Sixteenth Army’s infantry plodded towards the Valdai Hills and firmed up the link with AGC so Eighteenth Army cleared northern Latvia and moved into Estonia. On 5 September Hitler had ordered von Leeb to take the town of Shlisselburg on the shore of Lake Ladoga, thereby sealing off Leningrad from the rest of the USSR other than by air. From that position von Leeb would then proceed to meet the Finns on the Svir River. In true blitzkrieg style, 20th Motorized and 12th Panzer divisions broke through Forty-Eighth Army’s positions and on 8 September captured Shlisselburg. The German propaganda machine immediately announced that ‘the iron ring around Leningrad has been closed’. Hitler was not inclined to allow his men to get involved in street fighting and therefore the city was placed under siege. Now the defenders elsewhere across the region began to crumble, falling back to either the city’s inner defence system, the newly created Volkhov Front to the east or into the strange pocket west of Leningrad on the Baltic coast around

Oranienbaum. For Leningrad’s garrison and population 900 days of hell were about to begin.

Men of the Leibstandarte SS Adolph Hitler Motorized Division enjoy a rest during the Uman encirclement. Although designated a division, the unit was still at reinforced brigade strength. The two 37mm anti-tank guns were virtually obsolete by this time but nevertheless were still the mainstay of the troops. The letter K on the motorbike’s fuel tank denotes Panzer Group von Kleist.

The cheerful docility of the great mass of Soviet POWs was a cause of wonder to many of their captors. Here a group of men taken by AGS labours to repair a highway across the steppe under minimal guard. Others were not so compliant.

For many Soviet troops surrender was not an option. They fought to the last man and drop of fuel and when that ran out dug in their tank to do the best they could. Here an entrenched BT-7 tank reveals only its 45mm

main armament.

In little more than shirt-sleeve order a German gunner cleans his weapon after a summer deluge has turned the earth to mud. The short-barrelled 75mm light infantry gun was designed in the late 1920s to provide close support for the infantry. Crewed by six men, it was in service, with modifications, throughout the war.

As well as human labour machines such as this trench digger were pressed into service to bolster Kiev’s defences. But no matter how strong the defences were by ignoring the flanks the Soviets made a colossal mistake.

German artillery takes instruction from forward observers. The 105mm field howitzer M18 was the basic model that equipped the German army from 1935 onwards and was upgraded during the war. With a range of over 10km and a rate of fire of up to six rounds per minute, it was a reliable workhorse that appeared in all theatres, performing well everywhere.

The bulk of the SW Front’s remaining air power was deployed to counter Guderian’s advance guard. To the south the Luftwaffe reigned supreme. Here a Polikarpov I-16 takes off from a grass runway. It was a robust machine capable of carrying 500kg of bombs but suffered from poor visibility.

From the 1920s the Red Army had trained dogs to attack tanks with explosive charges strapped to their backs. This tactic was used in

earnest during the late summer of 1941. Unfortunately, the dogs had been trained to attack static, silent targets and consequently gunfire and moving objects confused them. In addition, their limited value was detrimental to the dogs of the USSR as a whole as Axis troops took to shooting them on sight.

On 24 September an NKVD saboteur unit led by I.D. Kudyra detonated several large devices along Kiev’s main thoroughfare, the Kreschatik. Among the buildings destroyed were the crowded officers’ club and the occupation HQ. This image shows the detonator for a similar device found by German security troops.

Stalin would have no truck with senior officers who went into captivity. Major General N.K. Kirillov, on the left, and Major General P.G. Ponedelin, on the right, the commanders of XIII Army Corps and Twelfth Army respectively, were both captured in the Uman Pocket. Both were condemned to death in absentia. When they were released from German imprisonment they were arrested and executed as traitors in 1950. However, both were rehabilitated following Stalin’s death.

Third Panzer Group’s action around Borisov/Lepel at first went badly as

7th Panzer Division was forced to give ground. Here one of its Panzer IVs is seen next to a BT-7, both having suffered significant damage. The BT has heavy duty recovery chains attached to the front showing that it was about to be salvaged. A Panzer Mann can be seen peering into one of the Panzer IV forward hatches.

A BA-10 heavy armoured car stands forlorn on the road to Smolensk. Armed with a 45mm gun, its two pairs of rear wheels were designed to utilize tracks for snow or rough terrain. Deployed in the reconnaissance role, few were used after the first year of the war in the USSR.

From choking dust to cloying mud in 24 hours. Such was the nature of the terrain on the Eastern Front that there was little by way of happy medium for mechanized troops. Wear and tear, fuel consumption and the strain on the men went way beyond calculations of normality when faced with such conditions.

Poor driver training was often a cause of Soviet loss. This perfectly intact 152mm M 1938 howitzer and tractor are now at the disposal of the Axis: over fifty were sold to the Finns later in the war and others employed by the Germans under the designation 15.2cm sFH 443(r) (Russian).

Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge (centre) enters Smolensk on 10 August 1941. Commander of AGC’s Fourth Army, von Kluge enjoyed a strained relationship with Guderian, whom he viewed as insubordinate.

Many of the newly raised units from Leningrad were militia made up of non-essential workers. Known as People’s Militia Divisions (DNO), 160,000 men and women volunteered. Frequently lacking modern firearms and uniforms, they suffered very high casualties due to their enthusiastic amateurism and poor training.

Beautifully posed, this German anti-tank gun crew appear to have just destroyed the T-34 tank to the left rear. Their 50mm PAK 38 weapon was one of the few widely available anti-tank guns capable of dealing with the T-34s sloping armour. It was later issued with a tungsten cored round to deal with the heavier armour of the KV-1.

AGN did not achieve the spectacular hauls of POWs that the other two army groups did. Nor was von Kluge’s order of 29 June 1941 that ‘Women in uniform are to be shot’ followed, as this female prisoner illustrates.

Chapter Four Murmansk and Sevastopol At the extremes of the Eastern Front in 1941 lay two very different theatres of war – Crimea and the Arctic. Both featured naval and land operations and neither proved to be as simple to overrun as the German planners had anticipated during the previous twelve months. One would be reduced to a mere sideshow, the other would expand into a siege of epic proportions. Unsurprisingly, warfare in the Arctic is dominated by extremes of weather and terrain that is virtually impassable off-road whatever the season. It is certainly a place where the environment heavily favours the defender. Pre-Barbarossa planning assumed Finnish participation in the upcoming invasion of the USSR on the basis of regaining territories lost to the Soviets during the Winter War of 1939–40. The German force allocated to fighting in the Arctic Circle came under the command of General Nicholas von Falkenhorst in Norway with field command of Mountain Corps Norway (MCN) held by General Edouard Dietl. The German plan was three-fold. MCN would march along the White Sea coast line and first gain control of the Petsamo district with its important nickel mines. From there it would proceed to occupy Murmansk, the region’s main port facility. Further south a joint Finnish-German force would march directly across country via the town of Salla to occupy the port of Kandalashka, also on the White Sea. This achieved, the southern prong of the offensive would march up the coast and link up with Dietl in Murmansk. This entire northern sector was under German control. South of that line, where the bulk of the Finns were to operate, was under direct Finnish command. On paper the plan looked incredibly simple and the distances involved relatively short, Murmansk being less than 150km from the Soviet–Norwegian border. With Murmansk taken and the railway from there to Leningrad through Kandalashka in German hands the supply line from the Western Allies would be cut and the USSR isolated from that direction. The port of Archangel, further to the east, had been designated the northern terminus of the Axis advance into the USSR with its end located at Astrakhan, so-called the A–A Line. However, it must be stressed that Finland had not signed the Tripartite Pact and was not an official ally of the Axis, and consequently it was under no obligation to accept German strategic objectives or coercion, their alliance being one of mutual convenience, a brotherhood in arms. Hitler was happy to

accommodate Finnish ambitions as it ensured the participation of their highly regarded army. The attack on Petsamo began on 29 June 1941. However, the following day the road along which they were advancing came to an abrupt end, necessitating a swift realignment of the order of march. Having crossed the Titovka River it was time to cross another, the Litsa. Soviet counterattacks prevented the early bridgeheads from holding and the offensive immediately bogged down. In late July Hitler begrudgingly sent reinforcements. However, the Soviet Northern Fleet and the Royal Navy disrupted the arrival of these seaborne troops until mid-October. By this time Dietl had advanced a mere 35km for the loss of one-third of his original complement of 27,000 men. And there was still over 60km to go before reaching Murmansk. By then it was too late as the Soviets had dug in solidly. General Jodl, representing Hitler, visited Dietl in early September. Despite the two agreeing that Murmansk was too ambitious an objective, another attack was launched which once again failed, leading to the Germans digging in on 21 September. Although there was a plan to resume the offensive in 1942, it came to nothing. From late 1941 to the summer of 1944 the line barely moved. The joint Finnish-German offensive towards Kandalashka began on 1 July 1941. The German SS Mountain Division ‘Nord’ and 169th Infantry Division, supported by Panzer Battalion 211, took a week to capture the town of Salla. This advance was out performed by the Finnish 6th Infantry Division in their sector. Pushing forward over harsh terrain, cutting roads as they went, the Finns and Germans made steady progress until almost continual torrential rain and the exhaustion of the men forced a halt during the third week of August. Although they had lost most of their heavy equipment and fifty tanks, the 104th and 122nd Soviet Rifle divisions evaded envelopment. With their pursuers’ armour incapable of movement across the saturated ground, the Soviet infantry gained a respite and dug in along the banks of the Vermanyski River. Further operations in this region, although apparently on the verge of success, were called off by Hitler on 10 October due to the seemingly inevitable fall of Stalin’s regime on the main front. The Finns and Germans halted 65km from the railway and established another position that changed very little for almost three years. Neither of the ports had fallen to the invaders, although the Murmansk– Leningrad railway was cut by the Finns and relocated further to the east. The main area of operations was near Leningrad and lakes Onega and

Ladoga. It was here, following a ritual provocation by the soviets, that the Finns commenced what to them was known as the Continuation War on 10 July 1941. On their left VI Army Corps advanced against the Seventh Army in the space between lakes Ladoga and Onega. Covering over 100km in ten days, much of their opponent’s force was backed onto the shores of Lake Ladoga. Germany’s contribution to this push was the weak 163rd Infantry Division which guarded the Finns left flank. The Finnish objective was the Svir River that connected the Onega and Ladoga lakes, both to the east of Leningrad where they hoped to create a border and defence line. Svir Station, where Hitler anticipated a junction with the Finns, lay roughly at the river’s mid-point between the lakes’ southern shores. Smaller battle groups, or at best divisional sized forces, were the units of choice in the wilderness further north. These succeeded in cutting the Murmansk railway at several points, particularly at Petrozavodsk on Lake Onega’s western shore which fell on 10 October. The Finnish attack south towards Leningrad utilized the land bridge between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland and began in mid-July. Keksgolm, on the western side of Lake Ladoga, fell on 5 August. Fighting in this heavily wooded land of lakes, rivers and marsh was incredibly difficult. Both sides were plagued by innumerable mosquitoes and a shortage of fresh water. Outnumbered, the Soviet forces yielded a bridgehead over the Vousalmi River on 18 August then Vyborg Fortress on the Gulf of Finland was encircled four days later. With both flanks in danger Twenty-Third Army withdrew towards Leningrad, stabilizing the line less than 10km below the 1939 border and thus providing Leningrad with a substantial area of land to the north. Here both they and the Finns dug into positions that they would retain until 1944. The garrison of Leningrad benefitted from the arrival of Vyborg’s last infantry division, the other pair having broken out earlier. The Finns had no intention of marching into Leningrad but on 7 September captured Svir Station where they dug in to wait for the Germans. Across the river Seventh Army breathed again as many of its units dribbled ashore, evacuated by ships of the Ladoga Flotilla. Having achieved its aims, Finland waited and watched Axis progress further south. The Crimean Peninsula had not featured in the original planning for Operation Barbarossa. It was expected to rate as a sideshow after the main event in Russia had been concluded. Everything was to change, however, when in mid-July aircraft of the Black Sea Fleet bombed the

Axis’s main oil source at Ploesti in Romania. Hitler’s recognition that this resource was essential led him to insist that the Crimea, which he described as ‘an unsinkable aircraft carrier’, be included along with the ‘capture of Ukraine and the territory of the Russian Federation to the Don [River]’ as a priority mission. Indeed, on 21 August he reinforced that instruction, noting ‘the most important missions before the onset of winter are [the seizure of] Crimea and the industrial and coal regions of the Don [bass]’. It followed from this that Soviet oil fields in the Caucasus would be under threat from captured air bases. Conquering the Donbass and Crimea became the responsibility of the slow-moving Eleventh Army, which had until this time covered the right flank of AGS and supported the Romanians. When General von Schobert, its commander, was killed (his aircraft landed in a minefield) he was speedily replaced with General Manstein, formerly of AGN, on 17 September. Aware that Eleventh Army was incapable of achieving both its tasks, Manstein prioritized Crimea. Covering his eastern flank and rear with formations around the city of Melitopol, Manstein decided to use LIV Army Corps to break through the formidable defences protecting the main route into Crimea, the Perekop Isthmus. Manning this position were troops of Fifty-First Army, led by General F.I. Kuznetsov. A powerful force of artillery and numbers of tanks backed up the infantry. Following the initial German and Romanian bombardment infantry and assault guns made a frontal attack. Despite taking heavy casualties, the Germans managed to gain a foothold after two days of intensive combat. But by 1030hr on 26 September a considerable section of the position was in their hands. Kuznetsov, tongue-lashed by Stavka, committed his reserves in a near successful attempt to restore the situation. When the attempt had clearly failed Stavka, unhappily, gave permission to withdraw to the next line at Ishun. However, at that point Soviet Ninth and Eighteenth armies moved on Manstein’s covering positions to the east, forcing him to send his only motorized troops plus other reserves to counter this threat. When the danger had passed Eleventh Army was relieved of its Donbass mission which devolved on von Kleist’s I Panzer Group. Free now to focus on Crimea, Manstein concluded that as the routes in were so obvious it would be prudent to attack, or at least demonstrate an intention to do so, at all three points. On 18 October a 2-hour artillery and aerial bombardment of the main line at Ishun began. A key position fell 24 hours later and this led to the rapid disintegration of the entire Ishun position. As confusion and

insecurity infected the rear areas, Fifty-First Army, despite mounting desperate, uncoordinated counterattacks, fell back. Another German attack on 26 October forced the Soviets first to retire then retreat, FiftyFirst Army dragging Coastal Army along with it as men raced to the interior. Covered by cavalry and armoured trains, the retreat began to descend into a rout. At Sevastopol, HQ of the Black Sea Fleet, organization and command were distinctly lacking. Ad hoc naval units were rounded up, one of which held the advance of Brigade Zeigler at the Kacha River bridge to the north of the city. Sevastopol attracted stragglers by the thousand during late October and early November. Others made for the Yaila/Crimean mountains that run along the southeast coast and further east into the Kerch Peninsula. Soviet naval units played a negligible part in evacuating troops from the harbours along the shoreline. Happily for the Soviets, the larger part of Eleventh Army’s air assets were in Ukraine with von Kleist, so despite the chaos the pursuit was limited. Around Sevastopol the fighting seesawed as each side brought more men to bear. By 9 November it was apparent that the city was not going to fall off the march. To the east the Fifty-First took up a defensive position across the neck of the Kerch Peninsula at AkMonni, its narrowest point. The Fifty-First held this position from 4–8 November then withdrew into Kerch town itself prior to evacuation. At this time the full tragedy of the sea borne evacuation began to unfold. Small vessels of the Azov Sea Flotilla valiantly made the 14km-round trip from Kerch to Taman, but, lacking air cover, they were easy prey for the Luftwaffe. Thousands were drowned as vessel after vessel was sunk. When Kerch town was captured even more marched into captivity and by 17 November the east of Crimea was German. The slow re-assembly of Manstein’s scattered forces frustrated him and he now embarked on a series of attacks on Sevastopol which gained little and cost much. Now under the leadership of Vice Admiral F.S. Oktyabrsky, commander of the Black Sea Fleet since 1939, Sevastopol would take more than a hasty attack to force its collapse. The stage was now set for a siege of epic proportions but before Manstein could muster his artillery train he was ordered by Hitler to take the city before the New Year. But during late November the Soviets had not been idle. Reserves had been ferried in and the defences laced with barbed wire and minefields. It was into this arena that Eleventh Army’s LIV Army Corps advanced on the morning of 17 December. As bombs

and shells rained down the landser went forward, pushing back the naval infantry they faced. The Soviet line buckled but held as the guns of the fleet opened counterbattery fire. As the fighting raged around Sevastopol, the men of Fifty-First Army were landed back at Kerch on 23 December. However, Manstein refused to be distracted from the siege and underestimated the strength of Soviet intentions to the east. On 29 December the port of Feodosia was liberated and over 20,000 men with armoured support poured ashore, forcing the nearby XLII Army Corps to withdraw until reinforced by XXX Army Corps. These two formations managed to seal off the Kerch incursion and on 31 December the attacks on Sevastopol were called off to deal with the increasing threat from the east. Feodosia was re-captured on 15 January 1942 but further progress was impossible as Eleventh Army was exhausted. Soviet reinforcements were fed into the Kerch enclave, which became the HQ of the newly constituted Crimean Front. With every passing day the defences around Sevastopol grew in strength. The garrison made one or two sallies but generally restricted itself to digging. As both sides took stock during the winter and spring of 1942 Hitler’s attention was fixed on the oil of the Caucasus. Sevastopol and Kerch were once again the overture to be concluded before the main programme of 1942, Operation Blue, began.

MCN initially consisted of 2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions with some

armour, panzers types I and II, and air support. When the road ended the tanks with their narrow tracks were almost useless in the rocky gullies and boulder strewn terrain. Most of the men’s supplies were brought up by large numbers of mules.

Facing them were two Soviet rifle divisions, 14th and 52nd. A militia division was cobbled together from convicts and others by early September 1941. A clear picture of the nature of the ground can be seen here. This 76mm gun is being manoeuvred into position by its crew, the tractor being unable to do so.

The Soviet Northern Fleet was remarkably aggressive in its reaction to the German invasion. Within a week a force of marine infantry had been landed behind German lines. They proved to be stubborn foes and when finally dislodged had earned themselves the nickname of the ‘striped devils’ for the description of the vest they wore under their tunics.

Close artillery support for the German mountain troops was provided by the 75mm M18 mountain gun. It broke down into six mule loads. The German attack began when the thaw was still underway which further impeded their rate of advance. Fog was another semi-constant factor, reducing the power of the Luftwaffe to support attacks.

A Feisler Fi 156 Storch (Stork) liaison and reconnaissance aircraft flying over much less harsh terrain than that in Lapland. The Luftwaffe provided 30 Stukas, 10 bombers, 10 fighters and 10 reconnaissance planes for the attack on Kandalashka, with a similar force to support Dietl. The Stork’s STOL (Short Take-Off and Landing) capabilities made it ideal for operations from primitive airstrips.

Once the fighting in Lapland had died down both sides confined themselves to patrolling, sniping and generally surviving the horrific conditions. Here a Soviet mortar detachment plods off into the wilderness to drop a few rounds to remind their foe that the war is going on.

Light and virtually obsolete armour was most frequently deployed in the Arctic Theatre. Here two T-40 amphibious tanks, supported by a T-38, advance cautiously towards the camera.

Panzer Battalion 211 was equipped with over 100 French tanks of the Somua and Hotchkiss types. Here a pair of Hotchkiss H-35s wait for supplies. Deployed in platoons of one Somua to four Hotchkisses, they were virtually useless off road in the sort of dense undergrowth seen here.

Officers of SS Mountain Division Nord pose outside their HQ. Initially of brigade strength, it was recruited from over age, unfit men and the unit went on to suffer some 700 casualties and lose cohesion. Although it recovered, the unit’s reputation was forever tarnished despite a better performance during the static years ahead.

In the south of Finland Marshal (from 1942) Carl Mannerheim led an independent command against the Red Army. Seen here on the right reading, Mannerheim was a veteran of the Tsarist army and a powerful figure in Finnish politics. He refused to allow Finnish troops to be used in the siege of Leningrad or to advance much beyond the regained territory lost in 1940. He was one of the few foreign dignitaries that Hitler left Germany to meet.

A Finnish machine-gun unit cross a bridge destroyed by Red Army

engineers during the advance to the Svir River. Finland committed the greater part of its armed forces to this area. Jews fought in the Finnish army in many capacities to the disguised chagrin of their German allies.

Crimea’s first line of defence centred on the old earth embankment and ditch known as the Turkish Rampart or Tartar Wall. Built centuries before, it had been used effectively during the last stand of the White forces in southern Russia during the Civil War. Re-furbished, mined and re-wired, this 7km-long position was to prove a tough nut to crack in 1941.

As well as solidly constructed positions, the Perekop’s defenders made use of small machine-gun and anti-tank rifle nests such as this one. The two-man crew of this 14.5mm PTRD anti-tank rifle have several rounds at the ready. Capable of penetrating the armour of most Axis afvs (armoured fighting vehicles), if close enough, until 1943 it was a useful weapon in expert hands.

Fire! One of two Skoda-built 240mm howitzers fires a shell from its very limited supply of ammunition at the Perekop defence lines. The bombardment began at 0500hr on 24 September and two days later most of the heavy guns’ ammunition had been expended.

Few reinforcements were sent to support the position at Kerch. Here artillerymen haul their 76mm M27 infantry gun ashore from a rather flimsy raft. In the distance can be seen the coast of the Taman Peninsula jutting out from the Caucasus. Taman lay 7km from Kerch.

Manstein’s lack of motorized troops was compensated for by the use of

an extemporized formation, Brigade Zeigler, of which this Romanian motorcycle unit was a part, along with bicycle troops and halftrack mounted AA guns. They were very active in the pursuit stage of the campaign.

German infantrymen go to ground during one of the early attacks on Sevastopol.

Sevastopol as the Luftwaffe saw it.

This artillery position housing a 152mm M10/37 demonstrates how substantial the positions around Sevastopol had become during the autumn of 1941. Ammunition was used sparingly as every round had to be shipped in.

A captive Luftwaffe man considers his future within the Sevastopol defence lines.

Chapter Five Spoilt for Choice The scarcely credible haul of POWs taken in and around Kiev absorbed the attention of both Sixth and Seventeenth armies for some time. Even for a state with the vast human resources of the USSR the losses sustained in the south, over 600,000 prisoners alone, was not negligible. The scale of the disaster left Stavka desperately scrabbling for men to fend off AGS and satisfy Stalin’s desire to mount counterattacks in the area. As Eleventh Army battered its way down the Perekop Isthmus, the S Front’s Ninth and Eighteenth armies attacked towards its rear in late September. However, Manstein had a covering force in place there with more powerful assets available. At Dnepropetrovsk III Panzer Corps was at rest but from this position was ideally situated to strike at the Soviet attackers’ flank. In fact when von Rundstedt ordered a counterattack on 1 October it was not only III but also XIV Panzer Corps that went into action. Within 48 hours both Soviet armies were in retreat. Up from Eleventh Army came both the Leibstandarte SS and 1st Mountain Division. III Panzer Corps occupied Melitopol while the hard-driving XIV Panzer Corps raced to link up with the Leibstandarte SS at the coastal town of Berdichev on the Sea of Azov to the Soviet rear. The Soviets were trapped and with no hope of a breakout or relief. Within a week a further 100,000 POWs had been taken and with them went over 200 tanks and 750 guns. With yet another victory it is hardly surprising that Hitler was more and more convinced that the Red Army must surely be on the point of collapse. Almost inadvertently, von Kleist’s two major armoured units, III and XIV Panzer Corps, found themselves well-placed to carry out the invasion of the Donbass. But the strain was beginning to show. Now re-designated First Panzer Army, von Kleist’s units were but a shadow of their former selves. XLVIII Panzer Corps had been dispatched to Guderian’s command to be replaced by the Leibstandarte SS Motorized Division. Increasingly problematic was the supply of fuel and munitions. The Dnieper River to AGS’s rear would, unless bridged with more than pontoons, become almost impassable as so many bridges had been destroyed and ice floes were soon to become a deadly worry. The regauging of the railways had fallen behind schedule and was not expected to catch up until December. Nor, with its aircraft almost reduced to flying on fumes, could the logistical support of the Luftwaffe be counted on.

Such was the situation that von Rundstedt proposed an end to operations and the taking up of winter quarters. During the planning stage, when wargaming the operation, it appeared that a pause, at the Dvina–Dnieper river position, to upgrade the supply lines was essential to the operation’s continued success. Needless to say, von Rundstedt was overruled. While AGS armour had been winning the Azov battle, farther north the less glamorous footsloggers had been similarly active. Von Reichenau’s Sixth Army, with Seventeenth Army on its right, had gone over to the offensive on 6 October. But this was a steady advance, conducted at almost walking pace as they faced little by way of serious opposition. These armies were making their way to the industrial and coal rich area of the Donbass as required by Hitler ‘before the onset of winter’. For Sixth Army the objective was Kharkov, for Seventeenth it was first Izyum on the left followed by Stalino on the right. General Herman Hoth, now commanding Seventeenth Army, was also responsible for covering the left flank of First Panzer Army while its right rested on the sea coast. To ensure the occupation of Kiev Seventeenth Army was instructed to provide support. Bad weather now slowed the advance on Kharkov and the withdrawal of Thirty-Eighth Army south of the city. But it did not hinder the raising of over 150,000 volunteers from the Donbass to fight in its defence. It was these amateurs that were to be sacrificed as the fighting raged in and around Kharkov until it fell to Sixth Army during the last week of October. Stavka had, from bitter experience, learnt the price of costly, fixed point battles and had no desire to repeat the Kiev disaster. Therefore, the S Front was allowed to retire, husbanding its resources for better days. As Seventeenth Army spread out into the Donbass, ably supported by the Italian CSIR Sixth Army, it occupied Belgorod, south west of Kursk, where it halted to allow the supply chain to catch up. To the south the armoured divisions were rampaging across the steppe to Rostov. Their first major obstacle was the Mius River. Facing them were Fifty-Sixth and Thirty-Seventh armies which fell back to dig in west of Rostov below a bend in the Tuslov River, where they made the most of a gift of bad weather to dig in deeply. Fearful of the threat now approaching the Caucasus and its oil fields, Stavka approved a planned counterattack against von Kleist’s vulnerable left flank. Drawing together the disparate bits of Ninth, Twelfth, Eighteenth and Thirty-Seventh armies, Marshal S.K. Timoshenko, commanding much of the front line south of Moscow, intended to cut First Panzer Army off from AGS by an

attack that would reach Taganrog on the coast of the Sea of Azov. Aware of this flank’s vulnerability, von Rundstedt nevertheless risked an assault on Rostov. Although the city fell, it was not to remain in German hands for long. When the counterattack came von Kleist ignored Hitler’s stand fast order and created a strike force from 13th and 14th Panzer divisions and began to retreat. Covered by Luftflotte 4, First Panzer Army escaped from Rostov on 29 November and eluding Timoshenko’s envelopment it took up positions on the Mius River. Von Rundstedt resigned to be replaced by General von Reichenau on 1 December. The German defeat at Rostov provided a much-needed fillip for Soviet morale as well as demonstrating that trading space and overextending an invader deep in the heart of the Motherland was a very worthwhile strategy. Unfortunately, around Leningrad there was little land to trade and the USSR’s second city was not a prize that could be relinquished easily. The final attack on the city was to be led by XLI Panzer Corps and I and XXXVII Army corps from the south east and XXVIII Army Corps and elements of 8th Panzer Division from the south, while to the east XXXIX Panzer Corps would hold off any relief attempts. After two days of fighting Leningrad’s inner defensive ring had been reached to the west near Krasnoe-Selo. However, to the south XXVIII Army Corps made no progress in the face of doughty resistance from Fifty-Fifth Army. But near Lake I’lmen success was achieved as the remains of the Luga Line collapsed. Reinforced by men released as a result of that, the Germans pushed ahead. By 18 September Pushkin had fallen and now the taller buildings and factory chimneys of Leningrad were clearly visible. A couple of days later XLI Panzer Corps was returned to AGC. With fatigue setting in many of von Leeb’s troops were incapable of further exertions. Settling down to blockade the city into submission was the preferred option but there was still the junction with the Finns to achieve, a matter of prestige if not essential strategically. South east of Leningrad the Germans had reached a line running roughly due north from Lake I’lmen to Lake Ladoga’s southern shore where they faced the Volkhov Front’s Fourth, Fifty-Fourth and Fifty-Fifth armies. Stalin had created this force and it was tasked with breaking through to Leningrad starting on 20 October. It was AGN that struck first, however, on 16 October when XXXIX Panzer Corps broke into the connecting point of Fourth and Fifty-Second armies. Their objectives were the towns of Tikhvin and Volkhov (the latter a major transport hub).

The weather was against the attackers from the outset and alternate periods of frost and thaw denied them any hope of a rapid advance. Left without reinforcements, von Leeb’s men took Tikhvin on 8 November but failed to reach Volkhov. Fourth Army had been destroyed in the process, as had all chance of reaching the Svir River. Then the Soviets counterattacked. Staggering the start of each army’s attack, by 7 December Tikhvin had been liberated boosting Soviet morale further coming as it did on the heels of the liberation of Rostov. By Christmas AGN’s units in this area had reformed at their start lines on the Volkhov River. Tragically, the Soviet forces were now too weak and the weather too foul for a serious attempt to be made to relieve Leningrad. Inside the city thousands were dying on a daily basis and worse was yet to come. The offensive undertaken by AGC that culminated in the attack on Moscow, Operation Typhoon, was the product of mixed objectives and diverse aims. In late August Hitler had stressed the importance of operations towards Rostov and the Svir River ‘rather than capture Moscow’. With both these objectives on the way to being achieved, conditions in the centre were so favourable that AGC should ‘conduct decisive operations against Army Group Timoshenko’ (commanding the central fronts west of Moscow) which was to be ‘destroyed decisively before the onset of winter’. This was to be followed up by a vigorous pursuit to an unspecified destination, the latter assumed by the generals to be Moscow. Therefore, the first objective was the Soviet W Front. Again, the tactics to be employed were encirclement led by the panzer groups now re-named armies. The relative immobility of AGC during September had allowed it time to study its immediate opponents which included, from north to south, the W, Reserve and Bryansk fronts. All three had been heavily involved in counterattacking AGC since midAugust, only halting, exhausted, on 10 September. These attacks had cost Stavka dear in terms of armour, artillery and trained men. These facts denied Stavka the means to achieve the defence in depth it required. Nor did Soviet intelligence gatherers spot the return to AGC of the panzer armies from north and south. Crucially, Stavka did not believe that an offensive by AGC was probable, convinced that AGS posed the main threat. It fell to Guderian’s Second Panzer Army to strike first, which it did on 30 September. The Bryansk Front was on the receiving end. Yeremenko, its commander, had requested permission to conduct a mobile defence but had been denied such freedom of movement. With the city of Bryansk

as the first objective, Guderian’s armour smashed through the defenders to the left of the city, brushing aside counterattacks. By the next day the Bryansk Front’s left flank was disordered. XXIV Panzer Corps directed its efforts towards Orel, which fell on 4 October. Thirteenth Army now began to withdraw with its left flank adrift. On 2 October AGC commenced its main attacks north of Guderian’s area of operations. Hoepner’s Fourth Panzer Army was to form the righthand arm aimed at encircling Vyazma, behind which they would link up with Hoth’s Third Panzer Army coming from the left of the city. To achieve this it had to break through Forty-Second Army dug in along the Desna River. As this was being accomplished Thirty-Third Army was undergoing the same drubbing, freeing up LVII Panzer Corps to exploit the open ground beyond the fast-evaporating front line. These achievements were replicated by Third Panzer Army which poured over the W Front with the early objectives of capturing the Dnieper River bridges intact, which it did on 3 October. While its tanks drove ahead, the infantry was deployed to undertake attacks that would deny the Soviets the opportunity to disengage with the intention of increasing the haul of POWs. Second Army, under General von Weichs, was particularly adept at this tactic, focusing the attention of the Bryansk Front on its activities rather than those of Guderian. Diversionary attacks by Ninth Army prevented the W Front from moving its units elsewhere but it was von Kluge’s Fourth Army’s infantry that was the most successful. With minimal armoured help Fourth Army damaged the W Front’s left flank so as to render it useless. General I.S. Konev watched aghast as his W Front was breached time after time despite fielding some 400 tanks. Reserve Front was the Cinderella of the line. Composed of exhausted, demoralized shadowy units that survived the early impact of Barbarossa or ill-armed militia formations, it was barely capable of moving (having had its fuel sent to the W Front) or fighting. These men just sat around and waited fatalistically for something to happen.

To the left a German supply column wends its way east while to the right one of dozens of columns of Soviet POWs plods off into captivity. If they were lucky locally recruited militia men could slip quietly away and return home such was the inadequacy of the security.

During a quiet moment on the steppe in eastern Ukraine a soldier is

given first aid outside a well-constructed bunker. The Red Army placed thousands of women, not only nurses as seen here, in frontline roles releasing more men for combat duties.

To improve mobility the Axis pressed all manner of captured vehicles, agricultural and military, into service. Here a licence-built Soviet Caterpillar tractor is towing a convoy of panje wagons. With its broad tracks, this tractor was an excellent vehicle when the rains turned the roads to an almost impassable, fathomless sludge. By September AGS was at the end of its logistical tether.

Despite having some excellent equipment, the Soviets lacked the experience to make the best use of it. This PE-2 dive bomber in service

from early 1941 was to prove itself one of the best ground attack aircraft of the war.

The distances marched by the infantry during the advance across Ukraine were remarkable. Here a group of Germans passes a collective farm’s office during a foraging expedition. For the Ukrainians it was another event that re-kindled in many minds the horrors of the forced collectivization policies of the communists during the 1930s.

Wearing a mixture of the old and new steel helmets, the crew of a 45mm M1932 anti-tank pushes it into position. Conscripting men as it withdrew the S Front fought off the Sixth and Seventeenth armies as best they could. Small blocking detachments, such as the one seen here, were a frequently used tactic.

Kharkov was a huge industrial centre and vital to the armaments industry. A titanic and generally successful effort was made during AGS’s advance to evacuate as many of the factories and machinery as possible. Not everything got away, as this marshalling yard shows.

Italians participating in the capture of Stalino. The CSIR formed the left flank of First Panzer Army. To the Sea of Azov the order was CSIR, XLIX

Mountain Corps, XIV Panzer Corps, III Panzer Corps and Leibstandarte SS. The spearhead was XIV Panzer Corps which led off across the Mius River in early November.

Panzer IIs with supporting infantry roll into Rostov on Don on 20 November. The attack had begun three days earlier, coinciding with Timoshenko’s offensive. Despite a dogged effort by the defenders, the city was cleared of Soviet troop two days later. The frozen, 1.6km-wide Don River along the city’s southern boundary marked the limit of the German position.

A battery of 76mm M1931 Soviet anti-aircraft guns waits to engage any Luftwaffe involvement with Fifty-Sixth Army’s attack on Rostov, which began on 25 November. A desperate attack across the Don River was only just contained.

Soviet machine-gunners operating a 7.62mm TD drum fed weapon.

Originally designed for armoured vehicles, it was provided with a bipod for infantry use. Leningrad’s defenders stripped any useful item from disabled vehicles to augment their firepower in the front line.

The speed of the German advance on Leningrad prevented the

evacuation of many of the city’s munitions factories. When the blockade began in earnest this was to prove invaluable as it meant weapons production continued and the supply chain was very short. Indeed, armoured vehicles were driven from the factory straight into action on several occasions.

Malnutrition, short rations and, allegedly, cannibalism were the order of the day in Leningrad during the first winter of the Blockade, as it became known to the outside world. Following the war Leningrad was, rightly, awarded the honorific of Hero City.

A classic image showing the Spanish volunteer division ‘Azul’. Its 15,000 men provided a welcome source of reinforcements for Sixteenth Army. They acquitted themselves well in fighting along the Volkhov River durng the winter of 1941–2.

Spotting for the 15cm Sig 33 during AGC’s first phase Typhoon

operations. This top-heavy ‘gun in an armoured box’ sat atop a Panzer I chassis. Its unwieldiness notwithstanding it packed a powerful punch. This possibly belonged to Heavy Gun Company 701, attached to 9th Panzer Division, Second Panzer Army.

A small group of Soviet infantry moves cautiously forward in wooded terrain. Left in the wake of the panzer thrusts, such men would prove a drain on the German infantry following behind.

On the way to Vyazma. Here two Soviet infantry divisions disappeared under a landslide of over 500 German tanks deployed across a 25km front. Reserve Front’s armour suffered the same fate. Very swiftly the disoriented POWs were being rounded up in their thousands.

Soviet infantry dash for safety, while their comrades provide covering fire. In the background a farmer’s crop lies rotting. Many cameramen on both sides risked their lives to capture front-line images such as this one.

Chapter Six Panic in the Streets On 5 October Stalin replaced Konev with Zhukov and granted permission for the W Front to fall back on Vyazma. With two fronts now impotent it was vital that something was done as the road to Moscow was fast becoming clear. With but a handful of reliable, regular and NKVD units, due to the reinforcing of the S Front and Leningrad region, paratroopers supported by a strong force of T-34 and KV-1 tanks were moved to the town of Mtensk, north east of Orel. Their job was to stop Guderian’s advance guard. In fact, it had halted in Orel where it had nearly run out of fuel. When supplies permitted a reconnaissance in force moved towards Tula but ran into a Soviet ambush, losing several Panzer IIIs in the action. To proceed it was necessary to break through this strongly held Soviet position. With powerful air and artillery support the position eventually fell on 10 October but the opportunity to rush Tula had gone. Second Panzer Army could only watch as the Soviets dug in more deeply by the day. But elsewhere the encirclements were bearing fruit. Around Bryansk Soviet units probed for escape routes, finding several that allowed passage to the east. The situation around Vyazma was similar but on a much larger scale. Furthermore, there were more infantry available to seal the area effectively. The Germans announced they had taken some 600,000 POWs with a proportionate number of guns and tanks. The pockets of resistance were all eliminated by 20 October as Stavka scrabbled around to conjure up forces for the defence of Moscow. A new W Front was created from the original and what remained of Reserve Front and placed under Zhukov’s command. On 10 October the first of the reinforcements from Siberia arrived and over the next week the Soviets performed miracles of organization and extemporization. While the army prepared to fight several government agencies were transferred to Samara. Stalin remained either at the Kremlin or in a Metro station. The evacuation caused panic among Muscovites. On 16–17 October, large numbers tried to flee, swamping trains and jamming the roads. It was only the intervention of the NKVD that halted the panic. Despite their efforts, a hailstorm of ripped up Party cards decorated Red Square. A major defensive network was assembled west of Moscow which ran from Volokolamsk in the north through Mozhaisk to Maloyaroslavets. Known as the Mozhaisk Line, it was 50km in length and manned by roughly 90,000 troops and. The battle for this position began on 15

October near the Napoleonic site at Borodino. Fighting raged along the line but by late October it was mostly overrun. The time won, however, had given Zhukov the chance to create further blocking points and build up a reserve. To the south of the city Tula was under threat and to the north Rhzev had fallen. As Stalin worked in the Kremlin five panzer divisions rested within 100km of his desk. October had been a month of triumph for AGC. Von Bock’s forces had once again smashed through the opposition in true blitzkrieg style. Now their commander wanted to push on to Moscow with barely a pause for breath, but Hitler was undecided. Stalin had ordained that Moscow would be held so it would be a fight to the finish. Each day that the Führer delayed granted Zhukov another batch of reserves and deeper defences. In the city NKVD cadets patrolled the streets checking for saboteurs, paratroopers and fifth columnists. Finally, convinced by overly optimistic reports regarding the condition of the Red Army, Hitler consented to the envelopment of Moscow. The format for this operation was similar to that used at Vyazma and elsewhere. The panzer thrust to the north would be carried out by Third and Fourth Panzer armies. They would break through the Kalinin Front’s Sixteenth Army, led by General K.K. Rokossovsky, and gain a bridgehead on the Moskva–Volga Canal, north east of the capital. The southern pincer was Second Panzer Army which would strike at Tula through the Bryansk Front (rapidly absorbed by the W Front), push on through Kolomna to link up with the northern pincer where they could. Central pinning attacks on the W Front would be made by von Kluge’s Fourth Army, which was also the force that was expected to push on through to Moscow itself. The only air support was von Richthofen’s VIII Fliegerkorps. Both sides were low on ammunition but the Germans were also critically short of fuel. AGC made its first move on 15 November with elements of Ninth Army’s XXVII Army Corps attacking Thirtieth Army near the Moscow reservoir to shield the flank of Third Panzer Army and disrupt the connection between the Kalinin and W fronts. Third Panzer Army followed up this successful move by crossing the Lama River, running south from the reservoir to Volokolamsk, with the next target the town of Klin. Soviet counterattacks failed. Fourth Panzer Army joined the fray on 18 November pushing eastwards from Volokolamsk, brushing aside cavalry and infantry screens. By nightfall Thirtieth Army was falling back on Klin, Sixteenth

Army on Istra. The following day Ninth Army was told to defend the panzers’ flank and pin the Kalinin Front to prevent it from interfering. Meanwhile, the Soviets dug in around Klin, which held out until Thirtieth Army withdrew to the Moskva–Volga Canal on 23 November. Rheinhardt’s Third Panzer Army followed up quickly, occupying Rogachevo on 24 November before wheeling south towards Solnechnogorsk on the Klin–Moscow railway. Their left flank guard faced east to Yakhroma on the canal. Here they were horrified to discover a most unexpectedly powerful force – First Shock Army. Composed of seven rifle brigades and eleven ski battalions, this unit had been committed to fill the gap between Sixteenth and Thirtieth armies. No headway was possible in that direction. The town of Istra, 35km west of central Moscow, was defended by 78th Rifle Division, recently arrived from Siberia with a full complement of men and artillery. Attacked directly off the march by XL Motorized Corps and the SS Das Reich Division, the Siberians held firm for three days having in that time inflicted 1,000 casualties on the SS. Although the Germans were making progress, it was costly and, although the Soviets were standing and fighting, more tellingly they were not allowing themselves to be captured in droves. Indeed, the defence of Istra and Klin bought Rokossovsky time to create another defensive position north west of Moscow. Late November saw a deterioration in the weather that had a detrimental effect on the less acclimatized Germans. Nevertheless, they pushed forward reaching the Moskva–Volga Canal on 27 November. Third Panzer Army had by now almost reached the limit of its capabilities and three days later went over to the defensive. Hoepner’s Fourth Panzer Army still kept going and one of its infantry units took Krasnaya Polyana, 32km north of the Kremlin on 29 November. This incursion was extended eastwards to Lobaya. Here the Germans encountered another surprise – Twentieth Army, commanded by the later to become infamous General A.A. Vlasov – and were stopped dead. The following day von Bock commented in his diary on the ‘huge reserves’ the Soviets possessed. AGC’s northern pincer had been held and along its left flank the very much intact Kalinin Front stood poised. Following the occupation of Istra, Fourth Panzer Army sent out several patrols to probe for weak spots in the porous Soviet line. One such group avoided detection and drove through the line into the rear of Rokossovsky’s forces until they halted at a small railway station. The

village was called Khimki and it was just 19km from Red Square. Following a short break, the patrol returned to their own lines having exchanged a few shots with local militia men. It was the closest the invaders got to the capital. Sixteenth Army moved units into this area shortly after the Germans departed. The southern pincer, Second Panzer Army, had expended valuable resources staving off attacks against its worryingly exposed right flank. Other concerns were the lack of fuel and the rapidly increasing strength of Fiftieth Army defending Tula. Guderian concluded that Tula was best taken by an outflanking move but this had to be postponed, once again, because of an attack on the right flank. The outflanking of Tula began on 24 November as XXIV Panzer Corps moved to the north east of the city. Breaking away from this thrust, 17th Panzer Division made for Kashira. When Zhukov was made aware of this move he committed First Guards Cavalry Corps to Kashira’s defence. The cavalry arrived hours before the panzers and went into action immediately. Disrupting 17th Panzer Division’s forward units, the Guardsmen rode off into the rear of AGC where they would re-appear much to the German’s horror in December. Guderian’s forces took Venev, 40km to the east. Hot on the heels of this Guderian was ordered to cut the Kashira–Mikhailov railway, an important supply line for Moscow, but here Second Panzer Army ran into stiff opposition and lacked the resources to go any further. The last effort to capture Tula was made between 2 and 4 December but with a much depleted force it made little or no progress. Understrength and inadequately provided for, Second Panzer Army was now dangerously exposed with its forces spread thinly. Discreetly, to avoid Hitler’s ire, Guderian began to consolidate his forces. To the south of Second Panzer Army Second Army, the force connecting AGC with AGS, was moving at a snail’s pace towards Voronezh on the upper Don River. But they too halted short of their objective, reined in by lack of supplies and the steady defence of the Third and Thirteenth armies. By 3 December both outflanking movements had obviously failed and were dangerously exposed. Von Kluge had signally failed to carry out the holding attacks so what had Fourth Army been doing? On 18–19 November a limited attack had been made by its left wing. Then, however, two weeks were spent in justifying no further action on the grounds of a weak right flank. Finally, on 1 December Fourth Army attacked again, targeting Forty-Third Army. Early reports were optimistic leading von Bock to tell Reinhardt and Hoepner that the Soviets were on

the point of breaking. Pushing towards the Minsk–Moscow highway, the prospects looked good as it was defended by Fifth Army, a mish-mash of second-line units. But Zhukov had foreseen this possibility and struck back with two tank brigades supported by ski-troops. Horrified at the appearance of armour and ‘wraiths in white’, the German advance broke down and men routed back to their start lines in panic. This was just a taste of things to come. Throughout Fourth Army on 3 December there were many who breathed a sigh of relief that the fighting had been halted. For those out on the flanks, shivering in their dank armoured vehicles or warming themselves in a peasant hut, there were more questions. Moscow, so tantalizingly close and appealingly warm, was not theirs for the taking as had seemed the case so recently. Operation Typhoon was the last effort of Operation Barbarossa but if Moscow had fallen would the USSR have collapsed? One thing was certain in early December, the landser would not be home for New Year. Now with its strategic industries re-locating east of the Ural Mountains and Lend-Lease in all its forms starting to flow, there was no doubt that Stalin’s regime would fight on, it just remained to be seen where the next counterblow would fall.

This image was taken from a Luftwaffe bomber during a raid on Fili, 5

August 1941. The district was an industrial area and one of the factories there was Zavod (factory) 22, where Tupolev aircraft were developed. In the bottom left is the Moskva River which flowed through the USSR’s capital.

As happened elsewhere, militia units were formed and these Muscovites are from one such formation. In a mixture of clothing but, seemingly, all armed, they were sent to the front to fight. Many were committed to the battle at Tula where they helped defeat Second Panzer Army.

The first German record of snow falling covered the period 7–13 October in Guderian’s area. Frost and mud affected other parts of AGC’s front. During November the temperature fell but frost improved the performance of vehicles, particularly tanks, as the ground hardened. The real deterioration came in early December when the snow came and the temperatures remained almost consistently low.

The twenty-fourth anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution was celebrated as usual with a parade through Red Square on 7 November. Here an NKVD rifle battalion is saluted by Stalin from atop Lenin’s mausoleum. Many of the troops would depart for the front directly after this event.

The railway lines to the rear of AGC had suffered considerable damage not only from combat but also from Soviet demolition units. The number

of supply trains reaching a useful point had declined and the replacement units had not arrived in sufficient numbers to give von Kluge confidence in his Fourth Army’s capabilities in November 1941.

Denying any succor to the invaders was a priority for the Soviet government. Anything that was likely to provide comfort was either destroyed or, as is the case with this herd of cows, removed.

Equally important was the maintenance of morale. Millions of posters were printed, many in cartoon-style, telling of atrocities, lampooning Nazi leaders and praising the efforts of the armed forces.

Moscow’s defenders were well-supported from the air with the Red Air Force achieving local air superiority. It also enjoyed the use of all-weather airfields.

Every day the Germans did not attack gave Zhukov the opportunity to

move up reserves. For public consumption, images would always show the best armed and equipped. Here a column of T-34 tanks with 76mm guns passes a line of infantry armed with PPSh 40 and 41 sub-machine guns.

The perils of the mixture of snowfall, thaw and mud can be seen here. In addition to the limited fuel supply, this only increased the strain on the Wehrmacht. The decline in the performance of vehicles was noticeable, as was the exhaustion of the men.

On all the main roads into the capital defences ranging from barricades to anti-tank traps, such as these, were put in place by thousands of workers.

Despite all the problems the Germans were still making progress and taking POWs. Here an armoured unit shares some food with recently taken Soviet infantry.

The presentation of new colours to the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps took place shortly before they were dispatched to hold off Guderian’s advance beyond Tula. The honorific title was introduced, along with higher pay and better weapons to encourage army units to improve their performance and morale.

KV-1 tanks were superior to those operated by the Germans. Armed with a 76mm gun and well armoured, they were deployed in small numbers often in an infantry support role. Entseucht (disinfected) may mean that the remains of the crew have been cleared from the tank.

Infantry of Fourth Army move towards the front with supply wagons close behind. Hard, frosty ground made the going easier but the consistently

cold nights led to a sharp decline in the men’s morale.

Husbanding reserves included assembling heavy artillery. Here the crew of a 280mm mortar prepares to load. The relative immobility of such weapons made them vulnerable to capture by a fast-moving enemy.

A Soviet artillery unit caught in the open by the Luftwaffe. Having left the road, guns, limbers and lorries lie abandoned. The lack of bodies suggests the men rode off on the draught animals.

Armour, including T-34s, BT-7 and T-26 types. Such mixed model units were typical of the armoured formations deployed during the defence of Moscow and the subsequent counteroffensive.

Dressed in their white fatigues German transport troops camouflage their vehicle with whitewash.

Chapter Seven Stretched to the Limit The plan for a counter-thrust against AGC had been approved in Moscow on 30 November. Then, having weathered the final serious attack on the city, launched by Fourth Army, the Red Army was as ready as it would be to launch its Winter Offensive. The overall plan was straightforward enough. Zhukov required the annihilation of the Third and Fourth Panzer armies to the right, north of the capital. To the left, in the south near beleaguered Tula, the same fate was forecast for Second Panzer Army. In the centre pinning attacks were to be carried out to prevent reserves shifting to either AGC’s right or left flanks. Following the ‘general destruction’ of the panzer armies the Soviet centre would press forwards to the west. To accomplish these aims Stavka had assembled three army groupings. Running in order from the north of Moscow to the south in a rough arc were Thirtieth, First Shock, Twentieth and Sixteenth armies which would strike in the region of Klin-Istra with the aim of penetrating up to 70km. Centrally, pinning the German line west of Moscow, were Fifth, Thirty-Third, Forty-Third and Forty-Ninth armies. The southern arm was under orders to break into Guderian’s right flank and rear along the line Tula to Bogorodsk to a depth of 25–80km. Carrying out this mission was the responsibility of Tenth Army, I Guard Cavalry Corps (with added infantry and armour) and Fiftieth Army. Due to Guderian’s failure to take Tula his line curved somewhat eccentrically with Tula at the head of a salient. To maintain the utmost secrecy no one but Zhukov and Stavka was aware of the scale of the undertaking, and unit commanders were assigned their targets with little or no clue about what their neighbours would be doing. Certainly, German intelligence had no idea of the strength that had been accumulated in and around Moscow. A report detailing projected Soviet capability predicted that the Red Army would be in no way able to mount an offensive, nor was one likely soon. Having chosen to ignore Luftwaffe reports on the build-up of First Shock Army, the report concluded, ‘at present there are no large reserve formations on any significant scale’. This state of affairs also prevailed behind German lines – there were no reserves, significant or not, a fact that was of major concern to those who chose to notice. The Stavka calculation of forces in this region, that is including the Kalinin Front and part of the SW Front along with the W Front itself, stood at 720,000 men, 8,000 guns and 740 tanks against the Germans 800,000

men, 14,000 guns and 1,000 tanks. The odds were certainly not stacked in Stavka’s favour. What Zhukov was relying on, and would frequently remind his subordinates of, were the elements of speed and surprise. The first attack began on Friday, 5 December at 0300hr. The Kalinin Front’s ThirtyFirst Army moved against the southern defences of Kalinin, crossing the frozen Volga River. Later that morning Twenty-Ninth Army joined in and soon both forces were battling to maintain bridgeheads on the southern bank of the river. The next day the W Front’s right flank struck, Thirtieth Army towards Klin and Rogachevo and First Shock Army liberated Yakroma in a bid to link up with Thirtieth Army. At the same time, Twentieth and Sixteenth armies attacked Krasnaya Polyana. With both Panzer armies fully occupied Klin had to be held as its loss would seriously threaten AGC’s left flank. Soviet incursions by 8 December pointed to the isolation of Third Panzer Army as Thirtieth Army had cut the Kalinin–Moscow road. However, First Shock Army was making limited progress and received a terse directive from Zhukov to outflank not frontally attack enemy positions. The fighting was now spreading to the central sector of the W Front. On 11 December Fifth Army was ordered into play, having been bolstered with three rifle divisions and some tank units, to support the attack on Istra. Zhukov’s right wing was now fighting its way through a warren of blazing villages in an effort to prevent the Germans falling back to establish a line running from Volokolamsk to the north. But what of the W Front’s left? Guderian had begun to withdraw his more exposed forces just as the Soviet blow fell. Tenth Army, almost directly from the march, attacked Mikhailov on 6 December, rapidly engaging with 10th Motorized Division. Later that day Belov’s I Guard Cavalry Corps, with its attached 9th Tank Brigade, cut the road to the rear of 17th Panzer Division which just managed to escape. Attacks from Tula helped to pin German reserves. During the afternoon of 8 December Fiftieth Army added its weight to the operation, attacking due south from west of Tula but it was weak and had few tanks and therefore fared badly in the face of determined German forces. It thus fell to Belov’s mobile units to cut Guderian off. So far things were not looking too worrying for Second Panzer Army but this was to change when the right flank of the SW Front, in the form of Operational Group Moskalenko, shattered Second Army’s front south of Guderian’s position. Second Panzer Army’s right flank was suddenly completely adrift and exposed. As Second Army reeled under the blows of Third and

Thirty-First armies, Guderian had no option but to fall back on the nearest defensible position along the Plava River, 80km to the west. There he would attempt to reconnect with the left flank of Second Army falling back towards Orel. Also at risk was the junction with Fourth Army to the north at Kaluga which would create a tempting 30km gap for the Soviets to exploit. Usefully for the Germans, holding out in and around Klin, higher temperatures had reduced the ground to slush, slowing the pace of Soviet movements as battle groups of panzers and infantry screened the evacuation of the wounded and heavy equipment. Finally, on the night of 15 December, First Shock Army broke into Klin. On 16 December Twenty-Ninth and Thirty-First armies recaptured Kaluga. With AGC’s front on the Volga River broken Ninth Army, its northern bulwark, was in danger of attack from the rear by Thirtieth Army, now assigned to the Kalinin Front. So far Zhukov’s plan was working well. Nevertheless, Third and Fourth Panzer armies were still very much in being despite taking heavy losses in men and equipment. By mid-December Moscow radio was able to announce the ‘German repulse at the very outskirts of Moscow’ and the liberation of Tikhvin to the north. In Stalin’s mind it was now time to assert further influence and control over army operations so that too much glory did not attach itself to Zhukov’s reputation at the expense of his own. Orders were issued to the Volkhov Front near Leningrad and the NW Front above the Kalinin Front that informed them that they would be involved in a significant operation in the near future. Stalin was preparing for nothing less than the destruction of the invaders in all areas. Prior to the really big offensive, this plan would concentrate on more immediate issues concerning AGC. The Kalinin and W fronts and the northern units of Timoshenko’s SW Front were instructed to expand their operations. The centre of the W Front was now to commit fully to the offensive, pinning attacks were yesterday’s plan, as the entirety of the W Front was to advance. The Kalinin and SW fronts were ordered to activate their right-flank formations. By 20 December the W Front’s right wing had reached the German trenches along the Lama, Ruza and Moskva rivers. These units of von Kluge’s Fourth Army had had weeks to prepare and had not wasted their time. Unfortunately for them, Volokolamsk fell the same day and thus they were all but outflanked, for some to the north for others from the south east. To create panic and confusion II Guards Cavalry Corps was

pushed through a gap in the line to wreak havoc in the German rear. Pinned to their front, outflanked and under threat from rampaging cavalry and ski-troops, 78th Infantry Division, XLVI Panzer Corps, 11th Panzer Division and VII Army Corps began to lose their cohesion. With success and thus opportunity growing Zhukov ordered his Sixteenth Army to support the mobile units of Twentieth Army and advance on Ghzatsk, 80km west of the Lama–Ruza line, capturing it by 27 December. Attempts by Thirty-Third and Forty-Third armies to break the German position around Novo Fominsk, on the Nara River, on 18 December had failed. Despite this both Fifth and Forty-Ninth armies had made some westward progress. Von Kluge still retained Kaluga, which was the key to Vyazma, a city much desired by Stalin as it lay deep behind Fourth Army on the Moscow–Smolensk road. Indeed, such was the importance attached to Kaluga that Marshal B.M. Shaposhnikov, Chief of the General Staff, personally telephoned Fiftieth Army’s commander to emphasize the point. The second-in-command of Fiftieth Army, General V.S. Popov, was tasked with the capture of Kaluga. To accomplish this it meant moving into the gap that separated Fourth and Second Panzer armies, covering a distance of 72km. In keeping with Zhukov’s doctrine of speed, Popov was given a mobile group which consisted of 154th Rifle, 112th Tank and 31st Cavalry divisions, a militia unit from Tula and 131st Independent Tank Battalion. Following in their wake Forty-Ninth and Fiftieth armies would push Guderian away to the south west and XXXXIII Army Corps away to the north west, which would break AGC’s southern flank. Moving rapidly, Mobile Group Popov reached the outskirts of Kaluga on 20 December. Early the next morning Soviet infantry attacked but in short order a counterattack encircled Popov’s command. Support from Fiftieth Army was on its way, however, and the battle for Kaluga began in earnest. Under instructions from Stalin to ‘break him [the Germans] into little pieces’ the attackers did just that. With its buildings smoking rubble, Kaluga fell just a week later. The W Front’s other Cavalry Mechanized Group, based on Belov’s guard cavalry corps, was enjoying some brief respite following its hard-fought engagements with Second Panzer Army when orders came through to take Yukhov, midway between Kaluga and Vyazma, and ‘to destroy the rear and staff of Fourth German Army’. An additional two rifle and three cavalry divisions plus fifty tanks were placed under Belov’s command. To reach their objective they would have to cover over 150km, fight through at least three German infantry divisions

and cross the Oka River all in up to a metre of snow, scoured by a vicious wind chill. On 18 December Stalin resurrected the Bryansk Front, between the W and SW fronts, giving it Sixty-First, Third and Thirteenth armies. Its purpose was to push towards Orel. Unfortunately, it was short of ammunition and had little armour or transportation. The Kalinin Front was, from mid-December, presented with the task of destroying Ninth Army. Konev planned to do this by striking in the direction of Rhzev from the north and east which would cut off the Germans escape routes. Across roughly a 300km front Konev disposed of, from left to right, Twenty-Second, Thirty-Ninth, Twenty-Ninth, ThirtyFirst and Thirtieth armies. This axe above the neck of Third Panzer Army fell on 26 December when the six divisions of Thirty-Ninth Army were committed, piecemeal, to the attack. Changes of alignment and direction at the junction of the Kalinin and W fronts meant that the Soviets were now aiming to shatter AGC’s line that ran from Rhzev in the north west to Lotoshino, south of Novo Fominsk, south west to Maloyaroslavets then almost due west to Vyazma. Falling back on these points were the three panzer armies, Fourth and Ninth armies plus a host of disordered, disoriented men from Luftwaffe and security forces. As units struggled to maintain themselves in an orderly fashion while retreating the men brought tales of partisans and ski-troops appearing from frosty, ethereal woodlands. As the Soviets advanced they were moving into areas devastated by both sides at different times. Shelter was scarce and the night temperatures consistently fell well below freezing. Contrary to popular belief, many Soviet troops were poorly equipped to deal with the extreme conditions and they too froze to death in the arms of their erstwhile ally ‘General Winter’. Rokossovsky reported that in late December many of his battalions numbered ‘less than a dozen men’. Nor were the German units a stumbling, panic-stricken mob. They fought wherever they had to because they were veterans and well aware of the alternative. The Red Army sustained huge numbers of casualties driving AGC west. Indeed, Thirteenth Army’s return for end of 1941 gave figures of under 12,000 men and 82 guns from a paper strength of four times that number of infantry alone. 112th Tank division was reduced to one T34 and fifteen T-26s. By the turn of the year the future for AGC looked worse than grim. Although it benefitted from a shorter front, it had not enjoyed the luxury of time to organize a reserve. As his generals debated the best course of

action Hitler ordered his troops on the Eastern Front to stand firm, form hedgehog positions and fight. His faith in his senior commanders declining rapidly, the Führer acted. Retirement or reassignment was the order of the day for von Bock, Guderian and Hoepner to name but three. Stalin, sitting on an increasing number of reserve formations, was in a much better situation. The USSR had blunted and bloodied the Axis invasion and the regime had survived. Now was the moment to capitalize on these achievements. The Soviet Union’s Supreme Commander was about to become over ambitious as he set out the agenda for the continuation of the counteroffensive.

An Illyushin Il-4, capable of carrying 2400kg of bombs. Throughout the winter the Red Air Force made the bombing of any possible shelter for German troops a policy.

Luftwaffe bases were frequently targeted as this image of Junkers 88s on the ground at Orel airfield shows.

Capturing the conditions perfectly, this image shows a Panzer III of Second Panzer Army moving through a settlement south east of Tula. Behind the turret is a large container of extra fuel.

Innocent civilians suffered alongside the soldiers. When their food stocks were taken and their homes destroyed this was the fate of thousands that winter.

Clearly visible against the snow, Red Army men charge. To encourage fewer casualties Zhukov’s directed his commanders to outflank and attack the enemy’s rear using infiltration methods whenever possible.

Special groups of tanks and infantry were established in some units to carry out Zhukov’s infiltration directive. Cavalry and ski-troops were often included.

The Soviet deployment of cavalry has been underrated by many commentators. With their mounts perfectly adapted to the environment and able to find forage almost anywhere, the speed with which they were able to move frequently gave rise to the cry ‘der Kosake Kommt’ (‘The Cossacks are coming’) with all the fearful memories that phrase entailed.

Keeping the mobile kitchens hot and stocked was not easy as AGC retired. Nevertheless, the cooks always tried to provide something hot and nourishing for their units.

Second from left, General K.K. Rokossovsky, commander of Sixteenth Army, joins others amidst a graveyard of abandoned German vehicles.

A desperate attack by German troops to gain shelter from the freezing nights.

Other counterattacks were more powerful. The contrast between the two forms of horsepower is neatly made as the sledge driver merely watches the armour drive by.

Partisan units, formed from Red Army stragglers or civilians, took the opportunity to strike back as the Germans retired. Here a mixed group inspects an SdKfz 250 half track for anything of value.

For many Germans the retreat became the stuff of nightmares. Discarded

kit, vehicles, weapons and even Christmas hats and decorations were among the booty gathered by the advancing Soviets when the efforts of moving them any further proved beyond human capacity.

Specialist ski-troops were often at the heart of the Soviet offensive. Launched into the rear of the German lines, their morale effect added to their combat abilities and led to the Germans to nickname them ‘White Wraiths’.

A German hedgehog position was intended to provide all-round defence using all available means. This 20mm anti-aircraft gun was equally effective against ground targets, particularly infantry. The trenches, made up of banked snow and ice, have some straw footings.

A pair of interlocked T-34s. Many of the Soviet tank crews were even more poorly trained than those who participated in the summer campaigns. Maintaining their vehicles was a continual challenge.

Sweeping a former German area for mines was a perilous task, as the solitary engineer seen here demonstrates. Not all abandoned vehicles were as powerless as they appeared, with many having been boobytrapped.

Soviet artillery kept as close to the front line as possible and here a 76mm field gun is seen providing support for an infantry attack in late December. So much German ordnance was captured intact that some units adopted it until ammunition supplies dried up.

Not a merry Christmas for these recently captured Germans.

The Red Army’s New Year gift to Stalin.

Chapter Eight Retaliation The planning for the Soviet winter offensive had been underway for sometime before it was formally announced on 5 January 1942 in a meeting that brought together the State Defence Committee and Stavka, with Stalin presiding. Marshal Shaposhnikov outlined the situation thus. From north to south, Leningrad, Volkhov and elements of the NW Front, with the support of troops in the Oranienbaum Pocket, would relieve Leningrad and advance westwards to destroy AGN. The Kalinin, W and Bryansk fronts would be responsible for completing the work begun by the NW Front’s other units plus the annihilation of AGC. Finally, the SW and S fronts would liberate the Donbass and eastern Ukraine while crushing AGS. The Crimean Front, with the support of Caucasian forces, would drive the Germans from Crimea and link up with the S Front at Perekop. Breathtaking in scope, the Soviet offensive would ripple down the length of the 1,500km front line. Only Zhukov raised a note of caution, requesting a more limited exploitation of the W and Kalinin fronts’s ongoing advance. N.A. Voznasensky, effectively munitions Commissar, pointed out that supplying such an immense, simultaneous undertaking would be problematic if not impossible. Stalin was unmoved by either voice and, as there were no other opinions put forward, the die was cast. Behind Axis lines Hitler was replacing those officers deemed inefficient and categorically ordering all troops to defend what they held. Reserves were being organized in the West and troops were already on their way from France and Germany. Fresh, fit and well-equipped, these men were desperately needed. As the troop trains rattled eastwards the Soviet Front commanders shuffled their own forces. Stavka’s strategy was based on a series of gigantic outflanking moves, the outer pincers of which would form a far-flung envelopment while the shorter pincers would form smaller ones inside the larger. The left flank of the NW Front would push south westwards towards Smolensk, helping the Kalinin Front eliminate the Rhzev position. The Bryansk Front would aim for Orel covering the W Front’s southern flank. The SW Front would advance towards Kursk, its centre to Kharkov and its left to Dnepropetrovsk. AGN’s Sixteenth Army was the target of the NW Front’s main attack. Slicing into it below Lake I’lmen, the NW Front would then link up with the Volkhov and Leningrad fronts in the rear of Eighteenth Army – its line ruptured, AGN would be liquidated.

By the second week of January 1942 the whole front was ablaze and the invaders were facing critical times. Although the intensity of the fighting had died down, it had not ceased despite the temperature remaining well below freezing, with deep snow and blizzards. The Red Army had not gone into winter quarters and the combination of hedgehog positions combined with desperate rearguard actions had been the salvation of AGC – so far. When Stavka ordered the offensive to begin the renewed pressure began to tell. The SW Front moved once again towards Kursk, Timoshenko ordering Fortieth and Twenty-First armies into action while other forces under his command battered their way towards Kharkov and Dnepropetrovsk. But these operations did not go well: attacks towards Oboyan, between Kursk and Belgorod, as Thirtieth Army failed badly, allowing the Germans time to regroup and then counterattack. Consequently, with its rear and junction with Fortieth Army in peril, Twenty-First Army was forced onto the defensive. The left wing of the SW Front drove AGS back some 30km but in doing so allowed a salient pointing west and overlooked by German forces in Kharkov to develop. This section of the Axis’s line bent backwards but refused to break. Desperate to introduce his three cavalry corps into any gap in this region, on 24 January Timoshenko appealed to Stavka for reinforcements with which to liberate Kharkov. The support was granted, 4 rifle brigades and over 300 tanks. With armies pushing at AGS from all directions and the bridgeheads over the Donets River filling with more men every day, the Axis position in the south looked grim. Incursions were made into Axis lines but these always held with judicious counterattacks. As the fighting raged across the snow-covered steppe, east of the Dnieper River the Crimean Front, in its Kerch position, went over to the offensive on 27 February. When the first attacks began columns of infantry, supported by tanks, were slaughtered by wellentrenched German and Romanian machine-gunners. Another two weeks of bloodletting achieved very little but Stalin was determined to relieve Sevastopol and reinforcements were ferried in from the Caucasus. By mid-March it was clear that the men of the Crimean Front were dying for no worthwhile result, but its two armies, Forty-Fourth and Fifty-Fourth, were still a very definite threat to Manstein. This came into sharp focus when it appeared that the SW Front was likely to break into the rear of the Crimean Front. The last serious attempt to break out of the Kerch Peninsula took place on 9 April when 6 rifle divisions and 150 tanks again failed to crack the Axis line. The SW Front found itself in a

similar situation as it was making slow progress expanding the Izyum Salient to 80km deep at it most western point. Attacks and counterattacks from Kursk to Belgorod to Kharkov to the Izyum position swayed to and fro for some seventy days. By the middle of March Timoshenko considered it necessary to approach Stalin with a fresh set of proposals. He planned to renew his offensive in May and for this he would require large numbers of men and machines. However, this decision would be made in Moscow and was predicated on the success or possibility of success elsewhere, but what of Leningrad and Moscow? The grandiose, sweeping envelopments hoped for in the south had not yielded a great harvest. At the other extreme, around Leningrad, the front commanders had not shared Timoshenko’s early optimism. The intention from late December to early January had been a thrust into AGN’s southern flank by Sixteenth Army with the NW Front’s Eleventh Army directed at Staraya Russa to the north, while Toropets at the junction of AGN and AGC was the objective of Third and Fourth Shock armies. The latter units attacked on 9 January, the former on 7 January. In some parts of the German line cavalry screens were the only means of covering gaps. As these fell back or were overrun, the two Shock armies’ progress varied and they lost alignment. Eleventh Army ran directly into 18th Motorized Infantry Division near Staraya Russa, rapidly isolating the town but for an 800m-wide corridor to the west. General P.A. Kurochin, commanding the NW Front, reinforced this area but found himself pressed to send scarce resources to support other units around similar hedgehog positions at Cholm and Demyansk. In mid-January the situation in the Demyansk Pocket gave rise to grave concern for the NW Front. It was held by upwards of 100,000 men from Sixteenth Army, too big a force merely to contain and one that swallowed men and materiel at an alarming rate. A similar position at Cholm, to the south west, contained 5,000 troops and while these positions and Staraya Russa held, AGN’s rear was relatively secure. However, the attack on Toropets had succeeded magnificently and the town, along with mountains of food, fuel and other supplies, fell on 20 January. Now there was very little standing between the NW Front and Vitebsk on the Dvina River. A 97km hole had been ripped into AGC’s left flank. During the last week of January Stalin intervened with dramatic effect. He reshuffled the armies to make better use of them. Third and Fourth Shock armies were transferred to the Kalinin Front and First Shock Army was to be moved from the W Front to support the effort at Staraya Russa.

Cholm, it was assumed at Stavka, would collapse shortly and Demyansk would be crushed by the combined efforts of the NW and Kalinin fronts. It must have looked so simple on a map in the Kremlin. Therefore why had Konev’s Kalinin Front failed to take Rhzev from Ninth Army, now led by General Walther Model, by 11 January as required? Directly north of Vyazma, Rhzev, by mid-January, stood at the northern tip of a salient based on Dorogobuzh to the west and Vyazma to the east, its survival depended on the Vitebsk–Rhzev railway, control of which Model dare not relinquish as it would spell the end of Ninth Army. This salient also threatened Konev’s position. Therefore, to cut this salient at its base around Vyazma Konev ordered XI Cavalry Corps to link up with Belov’s mobile troops, reportedly moving up from the south west. Simultaneously, Twenty-Ninth Army would attack Rhzev. Neither effort succeeded as the forces engaged were too weak. Reinforced and regrouped, the Kalinin Front’s armies now began to encounter newly arrived German units from the West while a refreshed Third Panzer Army returned to support the connection of Sixteenth and Ninth armies. As men drained away from the Soviets fresh troops joined the depleted German ranks. To oversee matters Stalin appointed Zhukov as coordinator of the W and Kalinin fronts. Up to that point the W Front had been continually engaged with AGC, its right wing advancing from Volokolamsk to engage in the encirclement of Third Panzer and Ninth armies. The central armies, led by Twentieth and First Shock armies, were expected to take Vyazma. To the south, west of recently liberated Kaluga, Soviet units milled about jockeying for position. Their attention was held by a variety of hedgehog positions known as the Führer Line which stubbornly prevented rapid advances into the 100km gap between Second Panzer and Fourth armies. The W Front’s assault on the Vyazma position, defended mainly by Fourth Army, was costly but effective and pushed the Germans back. However, with the transfer of First Shock Army Zhukov’s operations here stopped almost immediately due to lack of resources. Despite this transfer, Mozhaisk fell on 20 January to Fifth Army. From this point ThirtyThird Army led the push on Vyazma. As the strength of his rifle divisions wore away, Zhukov attempted a series of airborne missions to maintain the impetus of the advance. Although these air drops succeeded in putting more men on the ground, the tactical results were not worth the wastage of such specialist troops. Tenth Army, part of the W Front’s follow up of Second Panzer Army

and a vital link with the Bryansk Front, was subjected to a powerful counterattack by Second Panzer Army in late January. The effect of this on Zhukov’s mind and his reaction was, with hindsight, greater than what was merited on the ground. To Zhukov an apparently shattered force had struck back with, seemingly, lethal effect. Such an augury played on the minds of those at Stavka, particularly as Model had also conducted a similar attack near Rhzev. It was important for Stavka to reassess its objectives in the light of these apparently unconnected but shocking events. One aspect of these talks was Zhukov adopting the coordinator role. A fresh attack on Vyazma began on 4 February supported by groups of isolated paratroopers. When this failed cavalry was ordered to ride west and co-operate with partisans and paratroopers to destroy the Dnieper River railway bridge to interrupt the flow of reinforcements from Germany along the Smolensk–Vyazma railway. Third Army, again with partisan help, was to mount an attack on Dorogobuzh. Naturally, Rhzev was also a major target, particularly since Model had severely damaged both Twenty-Ninth and Thirty-Ninth armies, almost encircling the latter. Zhukov now ordered the Vyazma–Rhzev line broken by 5 March as well as the liberation of Bryansk by Sixteenth and Sixty-First armies to the south. Large infantry reinforcements were brought up along with 200 tanks. In addition 400 aircraft from the Moscow Defensive Zone were allocated to provide air cover. The offensive began in mid-February, supplemented with further paratroop insertions. The battering went on, German Ninth Army almost bleeding Twenty-Ninth and Thirty-Ninth armies dry by the end of the month. Nor did the W and Kalinin fronts link up despite their tremendous efforts. Bryansk remained firmly in German hands. Acknowledging his forces’ limitations on 20 March, Zhukov revised his objectives. One last attempt was to be made against the Rhzev–Vyazma line and wipe out the salient with Fiftieth Army as the spearhead. Fiftieth Army was to link up with I Guard Cavalry Corps advancing east out of Dorogobuzh, which was now held by partisans and Red Army stragglers from previous campaigns and all under Belov’s command. The Kalinin Front would then complete the isolation of the Rhzev Salient by linking up with Fiftieth Army. Despite considerable confusion, this attempt came within 750m of achieving its goal. Luftwaffe intervention bought time for a counterattack to restore the status quo. Both the Kalinin and W fronts had shot their bolts, their part in the offensive over. The Leningrad and Volkhov fronts had both started badly and achieved

little during operations until 24 January when Second Shock Army broke into German positions and made for Lyuban. However, they bogged down, getting stuck at the head of an 800m-wide passage. With every other unit in the region committed or on their way to the maelstrom whirling about Staraya Russa, there was little that could be done. Nor were the Germans capable of cutting the passage at its neck. In early March Stalin placed General A.A. Vlasov in command of Second Shock Army and his arrival spurred the men forwards. The neck of the supply corridor was first cut on 19 March for a week. Nevertheless, Vlasov’s men slogged forward, surrounded by forest and bog, the latter not always frozen solid. When the corridor finally slammed shut they were completely isolated, the last men finally surrendering on 23 June 1942. To say that the Soviet plan had succeeded would be incorrect, but neither could it be said to have failed. What it had achieved was stability from north to south and Moscow was safe, it was its own over ambitious scale that was wrong. Losses on both sides in men and equipment were astronomic. Exhaustion and the lack of resources forced a halt as both sides, gratefully, dug in where they were. But neither Stalin nor Hitler were lacking in ideas or ambition. Convinced that Moscow was still the invaders’ main priority, vast numbers of men were provided to prevent its capture while other large forces were sent to the SW Front in preparation for Timoshenko’s offensive. The tacit implication for both sides was that they were incapable of launching nationwide operations such as those of the previous June and December. Reality had begun to creep into both sets of calculations.

Despite the seriousness of the situation, some recent arrivals from the West find time to amuse themselves. Clad in a selection of regulation issue and scavenged Soviet clothing, they are, so the caption reads, ‘playing traditional German folk songs’.

Readings from Pravda by their unit’s political officer (politruk) are a little

less diverting for this group of men, who all appear to be armed with SVT 40 automatic rifles. Mainly issued to NCOs, the type was sometimes used by snipers.

With such an abundance of captured vehicles the Soviets often pressed those in working condition into service. This mixed unit of Panzer III and Stug III assault guns is typical. The capture of the massive supply dump at Toropets yielded several usable Panzer II and IIIs.

Nor were the Germans averse to using Soviet tanks. This T-26 is clearly marked as German with the large cross on the turret sides.

The appalling terrain is obvious. Tanks of 4th Panzer Division roll forward during the third week of January to attack Tenth Army. Keeping their vehicles operational was a herculean task for crews and mechanics on both sides.

A Soviet 280mm mortar waits to fire with the next round on its trolley nearby. The position of the muzzle cover accounts for the bare metal at the end of the barrel. Capable of one shot every 2 minutes, it was usually reserved for use in breakthrough operations.

Many ski-troops were deployed during the early months of 1942. This lucky group are being towed to their jump-off point behind a T-34 accompanied by a T-26. Excellently equipped, these men performed very well in the deep penetration role.

Judging by the kill markings on the shield of this 88mm gun it has

enjoyed a very successful war. Luftwaffe flak units were deployed wherever necessary and more frequently in an anti-tank role during this period.

Crossing Red Square in Kharkov these Germans, issued with skis, prepare to board trucks to go up to the line. Kharkov’s position, above the Izyum Salient, was a constant threat to the SW Front’s rear.

‘Stalin’s blood sacrifice has been mowed down. During the last attacks in the Donets (Izyum) salient the Soviets tried to take a village without regard for their own casualties. And this was the end.’ The German propaganda machine’s view of poor Red Army attacking tactics.

Romanian infantry pull back in good order during the winter of 1941–2. These men belong to 4th Mountain Division, deployed in support of German operations against the Crimean Front.

Casualty evacuation by sled.

Armoured sledges, aerosans, spearheaded some of the Eleventh Army’s attacks. Supported by skitroops and tanks, these vehicles were lightly armoured but fast.

Smashed KV-1 tanks around a position in the Demyansk Pocket. Although the wide tracks improved their snow-crossing abilities, the KV-1

was employed carelessly, in small groups, and failed to achieve its potential.

A fleet of Junkers 52s kept the pockets supplied when surrounded. As well as casualty evacuation, specialist equipment and clothing was flown in. Here a 75mm mountain howitzer, on ski carriage, prepares to fire.

Skiing and towing an M1910 Maxim machine gun, Soviet troops move up in support of the attack line. Snow camouflage was available but these men in greatcoats are more typical.

Shuffling the armies like cards was easy on a situation map. First Shock Army’s move to the north used up all its rations and fuel rendering it an immediate liability on arrival. Here a 150mm howitzer is towed to a new position with the crew seemingly enjoying the exercise.

Even during retreats the German communications network proved vastly superior to its Soviet counterpart. The NW Front was reduced to using captured motorcycles to pass messages such was its lack of radios.

The chaotic nature of the Soviet advance had led to many units becoming detached from their rear echelons. Here men receive a warm meal, possibly the first in several days.

A German position, still snow covered, stands watch over Second Shock Army rotting away in the now-thawing marshlands. All was quiet on the Eastern Front.

Chapter Nine Lend-Lease Lend-Lease came into being when British assets were at such a low ebb that an alternative method of paying for vital war materials from the USA had to be found. Initially a separate body, the Office of the Lend-Lease Administration, oversaw all transactions until it was absorbed by the Foreign Economic Administration in 1943. The Lend-Lease Bill passed into American law on 11 March 1941 permitting President Roosevelt to ‘sell … lease, lend … to any such government (whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the USA) any defense article’. Limited at first to the UK and Canada, it was extended to the USSR in October 1941. Prior to that date British aid to the Soviets had begun to flow within weeks of the Axis invasion on 22 June 1941. The first convoy left the UK for the Arctic ports of Archangel and Murmansk in late August, arriving at the latter on 1 September. It was carrying 40 Hawker Hurricanes along with 550 pilots and ground crew. Their objective was two-fold: first to support the defenders in the area and secondly to help the Soviet air force personnel accustom themselves in the use of what were the first of over 3,000 Hurricanes to be delivered. During 1941 British aid provided the bulk of aid shipments to the USSR, utilizing convoys into the Arctic and White seas. General N. I. Biriukov, responsible for the distribution of armour to the front from August 1941, noted in his diary that some twenty British tanks were delivered to the armoured warfare training school at Kazan on 28 October 1941. Another 120 were being unloaded at Archangel for shipment south. Supported by British teachers, the training of Soviet ‘tankers’ began in early November. Estimates vary but it would appear reasonable to conclude that upwards of 30 per cent of the armour deployed in and around Moscow in December 1941 was of British manufacture. The Germans first noted contact with British tanks on 26 November. Both the UK and the USSR were well aware of the problems that relying on the northern ports would bring. Therefore it was decided that an all-weather land conduit should be quickly established. The only possibility that provided a direct route was from the Persian Gulf up through Iran to the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus. With their country invaded from north and south, Iranian forces put up little resistance and hostilities were concluded on 29 August 1941 following four days of combat. From then until the end of the Second World War Iran was

occupied by Allied troops and its road and rail network exploited to provide the USSR with vital supplies which reached the border to the west of the Caspian Sea in Soviet Azerbaijan. This route was known as the Persian Corridor. With Iran divided into British and Soviet spheres of control a system was put in place to utilize the roads and railways, particularly the Trans-Iranian Railway. Recently completed, it ran from the Persian Gulf via Teheran to the Caspian Sea. The line was split, at Teheran, with the British responsible for the southern sector and the Soviets the northern. British military engineers found their sector to be inadequate in all respects, particularly locomotives and rolling stock. At first only one train per day was possible. Improvements increased the capacity to just under 1,000 tons per day by January 1942. Locomotives and freight wagons were imported from the UK, leading to less down time due to maintenance requirements and increased reliability. In December 1942 the US Army Transport Corps took over the British sector. More locomotives and freight wagons were brought in and by 1944 daily capacity had increased to 6,500 tons. Operations here concluded in May 1945. However, the railway was not the only method of moving goods into the USSR. Convoys of American lorries towing trailers plied back and forth, fuelled by the products of the Abadan oil refinery. The Iranian oil fields also supplied crude and refined oil products to the USSR to supplement its own domestic production. The bulk of aviation fuel sent to the USSR was used by Anglo-American aircraft as they had a different fuel requirement to Soviet types. General Motors set up assembly lines in Iran that, according to post-Soviet research, provided over 180,000 vehicles to the USSR. The other major aid route was also the longest, through the port of Vladivostok on the Pacific Ocean, home to the Soviet Pacific Fleet. Usefully Japan and the USSR did not go to war until August 1945. Consequently, Soviet merchant vessels could travel back and forth to the west coast of the USA freely. This so-called Pacific route was used mainly to transport nonmilitary goods due to the strict neutrality observed between Moscow and Tokyo. To increase Soviet-flagged shipping twentyseven American cargo boats were re-registered in 1942 as ships of the Soviet merchant fleet. Desperate to preserve good relations with Stalin, the Japanese navy interfered very little with Soviet convoys as they made the 18–20-day voyage. Despite the sinking of some ships during the period 1942–5, this was the safest of all sea-going supply lanes. Cargoes from the Soviet Pacific ports were transported via the Trans-Siberian

Railway to Moscow and points west, an 8,000km trek. Vladivostok alone forwarded over 400,000 freight wagon loads by this method. Also pouring into the eastern USSR were American made aircraft along the Alaska–Siberia route, later known by the Russians as the ‘Route of Courage’. This was operational from 1942–5. American ferry pilots flew the aircraft to Ladd Airfield in Anchorage, Alaska, where they were serviced and then inspected by Soviet personnel. When accepted the aircraft, equipped with minimal instrumentation and armament, were flown off to the Soviet training facility at Krasnoyansk. This city in central Siberia was also the site of many re-located armaments factories. The Red Air Force allocated five air regiments to ferrying duties, each covering a sector of the route. As flying conditions were often very difficult, particularly with barely adequate instruments, the success of each leg depended on the local knowledge as well as the skill of the pilots. The formation adopted was simple but effective. The head and tail of each convoy was either a B-25 Mitchell or A-20 Havoc bomber. The forward aircraft led the way and the backstop herded any of the fighters being convoyed that may have strayed. Heavier aircraft such as bombers or transport planes could fly singly. VIPs were sometimes ferried along this flight path, including the Patriarch of Russia and the Vice-President of the USA. It is believed that over 100 Soviet airmen died flying these missions. A Bell P-39 Airacobra delivered via this method gained renown when flown by Soviet ace A.I. Pokryshkin, who claimed fifty-five victories in this machine alone. Another American built machine, the Tomahawk, saw service around Leningrad, giving cover to the vehicles using the frozen waters of Lake Ladoga – the route across the lake was called ‘The Road of Life’ as it meant supplies kept flowing into Leningrad. Boston bombers, as the A-20 Havoc was known to the British, appeared over the Eastern Front from late June 1942. Over 3,400 were delivered to the Red Air Force. The armament was often changed to the 7.62mm ShKAS machine gun. Simple to fly, it was popular with Soviet crews and enjoyed great success in the ground attack role. However, it was not just aircraft and tanks that Lend-Lease provided. In addition 15 million pairs of boots, 1.5 million greatcoats, almost 2,000 locomotives, almost 400,000 trucks and over 120,000 automatic weapons were shipped into the USSR. Along with these items machine tools, radios and even buttons arrived. Processed foodstuffs such as corned beef and egg powder added another 4.5 million tons. Among the

more unusual items were energy rations including something that translates as ‘turkey in chocolate’ specifically for the elite scout troops. When Stavka re-introduced gold braided shoulder straps (pogoni) for senior officers the order had to be placed with a British company as there was no local supplier with sufficient spare capacity in early 1943 when the regulations changed. To this day controversy surrounds the importance of the part played by Lend-Lease in the USSR’s victories over the Axis. All manner of statistics have been bandied about since the scheme ended in late September 1945. Of one thing there can be no doubt. Shod in American boots, with a British greatcoat, a Red Army recruit clutching an American Tommy gun with a belly full of Spam would have been a happier soldier than one who lacked those items. Indeed, air and armoured support from a Hurricane and a Matilda was clearly better than facing the enemy without them.

One of the earliest encounters the Germans had with Lend-Lease equipment occurred on the Klin–Moscow railway line on 25 November 1941. British made Matilda Mk 2 tanks were deployed by 146th Tank Brigade against 2nd Panzer Division.

More British made armour, this time a Valentine, heads east. The speaker on the platform is the Soviet Ambassador, I.M. Maisky, and the official caption states that this is the first British tank produced for the USSR. Several sources note that British workers used to hide bottles of spirits in the gun barrels as unofficial gifts for the Russians.

A Katyusha rocket launcher mounted on a Studebaker US6 truck heads for the front. Thousands of these 2.5-ton vehicles were supplied to the USSR, mainly via the Persian Corridor. Known to the Soviet troops as the ‘Studer’, it was well-liked for its rugged reliability.

The amphibious version of the Jeep, the Seep was used extensively by

Soviet reconnaissance and security personnel to cruise incompletely pacified waterways as well as for river crossings. Supplied mainly to the Soviets from 1943 onwards, they were useful if not popular.

A Churchill with passengers pursues enemy forces in 1943. Over 300 Churchills Mk III and IV were supplied to the USSR. It was unpopular with its Soviet crews as it was poorly armed and slow. At Kursk thirty-five Mk IIIs fought with Fifth Guards Army but performed badly in the face of the SS Panzers.

Known to the British as the Stuart, the American M-3 Light Tank was used extensively by Soviet forces in the Caucasus. However, it was not popular as its engine was sensitive to fuel quality with a tendency to catch fire.

Presenting Guards colours to a P-39 Airacobra unit outside of Leningrad in 1943. American made aircraft were generally flown to the USSR via the Alaska–Siberia Air Road, known as ALSIB. It became operational on 7 October 1942. A joint Soviet-American operation, it moved some 8,000 aircraft during the war.

This Matilda has been purposely driven into a German gun during the fighting west of Stalingrad.

A pair of Canadian built Universal Carriers, some 200 of which went to the USSR. Their value was negligible. The troops are seen surveying the Kursk region for potential defensive positions.

Of much more use was the M3A1 White Scout Car, precursor of the M3 Half Track. Over 3,000 were supplied to the Red Army with some, as seen here, issued to paratrooper reconnaissance units.

The grotesque M3 Grant tank supplied to the Red Army from the USA.

Over 1,300 served on the Eastern Front. This pair is going through its paces in the build up to the battle of Kursk. Such were its failings that Soviet tank crews nicknamed it the ‘grave for seven brothers’. Following their poor showing they were relegated to the Arctic Front.

The fate of many an M3 Grant, abandoned and captured. First used on the Caucasian Front, they were unequal to experienced German troops operating Panzer III and IV machines.

Folded wings and engine protection cannot disguise this Hawker Hurricane Mk 2 on its flat car. A total of 3,000 of this aircraft were delivered but, again, it was unpopular with the Soviet aircrew who felt it to be poorly armed.

Ice on a ship of an Arctic convoy symbolizes the horror of the voyages thousands of sailors endured. During the years 1941–5 there were seventy-eight convoys to the northern ports of the USSR. The outbound convoys were numbered and prefixed, for example, the tragic PQ 17

which lost twenty-four of thirty-five merchant ships.

First Baltic Front commander General I.K. Bagramyan takes his seat in the rear of his personal Jeep during the summer offensive of 1944. Thousands of this popular vehicle went to the USSR.

Aside from the Jeep, without doubt the most popular Lend-Lease vehicle

was the Sherman M4A2 tank. More than 4,000 Emcha, as they were known to the Red Army, were shipped to the USSR. Very popular with crews due to the relative comfort of the interior, they served in several units from 1944 onwards.

On to victory, a Valentine tank drives down towards the Dnieper River during the autumn of 1943.

A Studebaker tows a 76mm field gun across a river in Germany during the final drive to Berlin.