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REFLECTIONS OF THE 347TH FIGHTER GROUP GUADALCANAL AND FLORIDA ISLANDS MALAIT/
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ROBERT LAWRENCE FERGUSON
GUADALCANAL THE ISLAND OF FIRE REFLECTIONS OF THE 347TH FIGHTER GROUP
to
My
Dearest
Mary
GUADALCANAL THE ISLAND OF FIRE REFLECTIONS OF THE 347TH FIGHTER GROUP ROBERT LAWRENCE FERGUSON
AERO A
division of
TAB BOOKS Inc. PA 17214
Blue Ridge Summit,
FIRST EDITION FIRST PRINTING Copyright
©
Printed
1987 by Robert Lawrence Ferguson the United States of America
in
Reproduction or publication of the content in any manner, without express permission of the publisher, is prohibited. No liability is assumed with respect to the use of the information herein. Library of
Congress Cataloging
in
Publication Data
Ferguson, Robert Lawrence.
Guadalcanal— the island of fire reflections of the 347th Fighter Group / by Robert Lawrence Ferguson, :
cm.
p.
Includes index.
ISBN 0-8306-8389-5 1
.
Ferguson, Robert Lawrence.
2.
(pbk.)
Guadalcanal Island (Solomon
1942-1943— Personal narratives, American. 3. United States. Army Air Forces Fighter Squadron, 347th-History. 4. World War, 1939-1945— Aerial operations, American. Islands), Battle of,
I.
Title.
87-15627 CIP
D767.98.F47 1987 940.54'4973— dc 19 Questions regarding the content of should be addressed to:
Reader
this
Branch Department
Inquiry
Editorial
TAB BOOKS
Inc.
P.O. Box 40
Blue Ridge Summit,
PA 17214
book
For
Tommy
it's
"Chuck But Yes,
it's
it's
this an'
Tommy
that' an'
'im out, the brute!
"savior of 'is country," when the guns begin to shoot.
Tommy
this,
an'
Tommy
that an'
any thing you please; But Tommy ain't a bloomin' fool— you bet that
Tommy
sees.
— Rudyard
Kipling
Contents Foreword
viii
Preface Introduction
Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter
xiii
1
Echoes of the Cry for Readiness
2 3
The "Game Cock" Is Hatched The Miracle Works
19
4
Hold the Line at New Caledonia Ready for an Offensive? Into the Solomons
28 41 59
Cactus in August September's Angry Response "It's a Dark Night on Guadalcanal" Life on the Target
73 83
5
6 7
8 9
Chapter 1 Chapter 1 1 Chapter 12 Chapter 1 3 Chapter 14 Chapter 15 Chapter 1 6
Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Index
x
"Goodbye and Good Luck" "Are You Still There, Cactusl" Block Their Sunday Punch A Switch to the Offensive Guadalcanal Secured "The Wild Blue Yonder" Letters of Gen* Harmon Citations Intelligence Reports Pilots of the Army Cactus Flight
1
7
100 118 136 147 1
58
175 185 1 95 211
226 236 246 248
Foreword Guadalcanal
— The Island of Fire
count of a part of World
War
II
is
an extremely moving firsthand ac-
that has received
little
attention from
on the war saw it from his position within the unit
historians. It has to be a valuable addition to existing literature in
the Pacific. Ferguson
tells it
as he
on the scene. He presents an accurate historical background of the early campaign and unfolds an intimate story of the early events that almost lead to disaster.
The ominous warnings tempts
exposure. so
is
of conflict
at readiness are failing
seem
to
come upon us when
and lack of readiness
is
at-
the root cause of the
unpopular to prepare for war, yet the failure to do on the adventurous probes of our potential enemies. It
It is politically
certain to bring
was during such a failure in national readiness that the "Game Cock" Squadron was activated, struggled to find its identity, went to the South Pacific and, with second-rate
The war
in
equipment, prepared
itself for battle.
the Pacific began in unthinkably impoverished conditions
armed forces. The national emphasis was on the war in Europe; the secondary consideration. Our initial efforts to stop the were undertaken with poorly prepared, poorly equipped, Japanese advance poorly trained and under-manned units. Generals and admirals thrust into war were in a sort of on-the-job training; the few who had old combat experience brushed up on their skills and those who did not know war did their best to learn. They faced a confident enemy accustomed to years of for our
Pacific theater got
victory.
viii
1942 the 67th Fighter Squadron, The "Game Cock," was committed, by war planners, to the First Marine Division, Reinforced, for an invasion of the Solomon Islands centered on Guadalcanal. There was hardly enough strength to justify the effort; in the early months of the campaign the issue was in doubt. Defeat of the American beachhead by the Japanese seemed almost certain. For weeks the men in the line and on Henderson Field fought with the barest minimum of poor equipment, short In July of
rations, low fuel supplies, inferior aircraft, malaria, and uncertain support from the rear. This lack of adequate preparedness and the consequent burden it placed on the men responsible for success of the campaign is the most striking feature of Ferguson's story. The fact that our heroic troops eked out a victory should not blind us to the need for constant vigilance and
readiness to deal with aggression. Participation of the Army Air Corps in the Guadalcanal Campaign is something few of us have heard much about. In this new and more personal viewpoint on the Guadalcanal experience, Bob Ferguson has provided just
the right mix of authority and personability, and has presented a lesson to
be learned by those
We
who have
not served in a major
conflict.
pray for the good sense as a nation to seek peace through
strength.
Major General John G. Bouker United States Marine Corps (Retired) Naples, Florida,
1983.
ix
Preface my earnest desire that this book be read as a memoir in tribute to the 67th Fighter Squadron, "The Game Cock," and the origins of the 347th
It is
Fighter Group.
It is
not intended to be a historically complete account of
the Solomon Islands Campaign. In assembling
my recollections of those wartime days of over 40 years
ago, an effort has been
made
to set
^sJ* logical order. Yet, as writing letters, diary, /
or pushed from that
I
in
something near chrono-
photographs, notes, and clippings of the time,
descended upon me
war
them down
my old my memories
proceeded, along with analysis of
in torrents. I recalled
events and details long forgotten
my mind in the old effort to delete from memory events of
previously refused to recall: the combat conditions at Hender-
son Field while on the verge of being overrun by the enemy, malaria,
dengue fever, amoebic dysentery, unending hours of duty, and a menu and meal schedule that cost 40 pounds in weight loss; the belief that our countrymen had given us up for lost until our determination never to surrender proved to them that Guadalcanal could be held; a fast trip to the Marine Corps Aid Station during the height of the September fighting to have a small shell fragment removed from my arm brought feelings of guilt about my tiny wound as I viewed at least 50 blanket- wrapped corpses outside the Marine dispensary and the clutter of litter casualties lying about awaiting treatment, all of them victims of the fierce fighting on the perimeter defense It is
With x
it
line
or air and naval bombardment attacks.
indeed a self-punishing ritual to recall the details of combat in war.
comes the
realization that
it
was
in
these circumstances that
,
we
gave up a substantial part of our youth. It seems that only those whose hearts have pumped the adrenalin of combat with a vicious enemy in
know the bonds that tie such comrades tohope the process has been a catharsis of memory that will remove forever the hurt and the intermittent stress that goes with such reflections. defense of their nation can gether.
I
In the task of writing this book, which has been a labor of love and perhaps an obligation, I am most grateful to my wife, Mary Ferguson, who
was my bride of less than a year when I left the United States for the South Pacific in January 1942. My diary started as a method of writing a long love letter to
Mary which
could keep; any other type of letter might be
I
censored. As a result,
became an avid diarist, and I kept it in detail throughout the war. Over the years Mary saved and stored letters, clippings, photographs, and
I
my diary,
which have contributed
in a
most
inter-
way to this book. Just as I was entering my assignment to the Guadalcanal Campaign I received a package from Mary containing a camera and many rolls of film. This made it possible for me to take many esting and personal
combat photographs, which also contribute to this book. As a writer I have saved notes for many years, and in reviewing these notes I must express my appreciation for help from early members of the Squadron. While at Tontouta Air Base, New Caledonia, Major Robert Foye (previously Master Sergeant), Technical Sergeants Enoch J. Dahlman and Charles N. Neblock, and Major John A. Thompson were very generous with their time and recollections, filling me in on many details of the earliest days of the 67th Squadron after it was activated out of the old First Pursuit Group.
During interviews
in
October 1980, Dale D. Brannon, John A.
Thompson, and James T. Jarman reviewed many events and recollections Fred V. Purnell, V.L. Head, P.M. Childress, R.E. Kaiser, B.W. Brown, R.M. Ferguson, N.F. Inciardi, A.W. Price, J.D. McLanahan, and A.B. Farquharson were also helpful in of the period of interest. Conversations with
recollection and clarification of events in the period. I
am also indebted to many others I have contacted while researching
old unit histories, General and Special Orders and official reports of action
conducted under the First Marine Division and the Army's United States Armed Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA). It would be impossi-
mention or even recall all of those contacted in my years of collecting material for this book. My work and research were casually assisted by many and a helping hand in solving some particular problems is gratefully ble to
Department of Air Force History, for assistance in locating microfilm files of early 1942 documents on the war in the South Pacific; Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Director of Marine Corps History, for his assistance on sources; Ms. Joyce Bonnette, Archivist, Department of Marine Corps History, who unpacked boxes of files on the campaign for my review; Ms. Regina Strother, Still Photo Archivist, Department of attributed to: Mr. William Heimdahl,
Marine Corps History, who found for me the two additional USMC photographs that I wished to use; Mr. John Cavalcante, Archivist, U.S. Navy Archives, for his guidance in seeking out key after-action reports; Mr. Paul X!
Photo Archivist, National Archives, who coached me on Lunga Plain, dating back to just before the landing at Guadalcanal. Finally I must express special appreciation to Jim Jarman, who read every word of the completed manuL. White,
Still
finding the early photo of the Japanese air field at
script.
His comments and suggestions were invaluable.
To review the chronology of events with which Fighter Squadron
is
the story of the 67th
interwoven, the rereading and study of a number of
source books and documents was helpful in tracing the background scenario on which to unfold the saga of
deeper reading on the origins of
"The Game Cock." To those who wish conflict and the war in the Pacific, I
recommend these among many available books and source materials on the general subject: U.S. Military Policy, A Study and Appraisal, by Dale 0. Smith, Brig. Gen. USAF (New York 1955); The Guadalcanal Campaign, a Monograph, by Major John L. Zimmerman USMCR, (Historical Division Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps 1949); Guadalcanal, The First Offensive and Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, The War In The Pacific
by John Miller 1949 and 1950); Unit
Series,
Jr. (Historical
Division
Department Of The Army, and 44th
histories of the 67th, 68th, 70th, 339th,
War Commander Air Forces South Pacific; Letters of General Millard F. Harmon; Guadalcanal and the Origins of The 13th Air Force, July 1945, Army Air Force Historical Studies No. 35, Air University Library, Simpson Historical Research Center; United States Air Force Dictionary, Fighter Squadrons and the daily action reports of these Squadrons;
Diary of
(Air University Press).
xii
Introduction This book honors the officers and enlisted
men of the 67th Fighter Squad-
ron, especially those of the original unit, attached to the First Marine
Division in August of British
Solomon
1942
Islands,
for the invasion and operations at Guadalcanal,
code named Cactus. In every war the active units
of the regular military establishment
go
first
to face the
enemy. The 67th
Fighter Squadron was one of these units and was ready for action fully
manned nor This
is
the story of the 67th Pursuit Squadron from the time of
activation in January canal.
— not
well-equipped, but nonetheless ready for action.
1941 through the early months
of
By then, Guadalcanal was considered to be secure
1943
its
at Guadal-
— which
is
to say,
we were no longer in that bitter daily struggle for survival, anticipating the repeated Japanese attempts to retake the
airfield
and the scant 11 -mile
perimeter held by the First Marine Division, Reinforced. The going would
be rough, but the Japanese would not retake Guadalcanal. The story is told from the viewpoint of a man who was there and who was part of the preparation.
If
the story seems biased in
some
respects, so be
it; it is
a
memoir.
Marine Corps is "Can Do," then for the 67th f Fighter Squadron it would be "Can Do With Less." Few people realize that in the invasion of Guadalcanal by the First Marine Division, Reinforced, the 67th Fighter Squadron, U.S. Army Air Corps, was the only Army element among the reinforcing units. Many people still believe that there was no If
a slogan for the
|
Army
participation at
with an airplane
all.
The 67th Fighter Squadron entered
— the P-39/P-400 —
the battle
that had already been tagged obso-
xiii
war was
lete before
declared, yet the squadron
made
a heroic
mark
for
Detached from the rest of the Army, the 67th was assigned to the of the First Marine Division, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift. The Marine Corps was happy to have them, but the Army seemed, for a while, to be focusing its attention elsewhere in the theater. The 67th fought on a shoestring until Guadalcanal was almost secure before better planes and more personnel began to arrive. Of the original element that went to Guadalcanal with the First Marines, not enough has itself.
commander
been
told;
they deserve a recognition that they have never received.
Because of its unique situation, the story of the 67th Fighter Squadron must be told in relation to the situation faced by the First Marine Division
from the time
of the invasion until Guadalcanal
was secured. The story
involves the 67th, 68th, 70th, and 339th Fighter Squadrons, which be-
came the 347th Fighter Group
in October of 1942, and their part in the most difficult days of the campaign. The emphasis is on action by the 67th Squadron and the other squadrons of the 347th Fighter Group. This is not 'with intent to downplay the more extensive air action by the Navy and Marine Corps; it is just that little has been written of the contribution by the U.S. Army Air Corps in the campaign and much has been written about the Navy and Marine air units.
The in
origins of the squadron and the circumstances leading to its part
the Solomon Islands Campaign have their high point in the Cactus
operation. The events are sometimes humorous or ironic, always heroic. These men learned to love the Marine Corps and sometimes wondered if anyone loved them. My own combat photos, never before published, are included in this book. Many were taken during the fierce Japanese attempts to retake Guadalcanal during September and October of 1942. Although some of
these photographs
may be
revolting to the reader at first glance, they
own airmen are victims of a similar end War is not romantic or wins anything but the ground or island or enemy
provide a reminder that in war our
when
attacking air bases held by the enemy.
chivalrous; ^aircraft, I
j
no one
really
and that at
far too
dear a price. In
its
clearest analysis,
instrument of national policy represents the ultimate political failure.
xiv
war as an
in diplomatic
and
CHAPTER
1
Echoes of the Cry for
Readiness
If it should be resolved to prohibit the raising of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraor-
dinary spectacle which the world has yet seen incapacitated by
was actually
its
— that ofa nation
constitution to prepare for defense before
it
attacked.
Alexander Hamilton
The
Federalist
After a military career that included three wars and having been born
during a previous war, with
its
many family losses, our nation's poor record
on readiness for defense occupies a prominent place in my thoughts. When conflicts are imposed upon us the nation rallies, and the nature of past warfare has made it possible for our democratic institutions to overcome its shortcomings, in time, because we have been able to withstand the initial onslaught, which has not been delivered directly upon our mainland. Now, on the threshold of more perilous times, we seem destined to repeat, as we have each 20 or 30 years in the past, these weaknesses in national readiness. We seem unable to learn from history. The effects of this peculiar national syndrome on the units and men obliged to seek victory in spite of weaknesses can be seen in the story of the 67th Fighter Squadron. My memories of operations with the squadron remain vivid because it was there that we gave a substantial part of our youth, blood, sweat, tears, and lives as
ransom
for that national
syndrome. 1
August of 1942 the 67th Fighter Squadron, U.S. Army Air Corps, was attached to the 1st Marine Division, Reinforced, for the invasion of Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands. This military operation, code named by the Navy as Watchtower, was put together with a shoestring capability, In
the result of years of national indifference to preparedness for defense.
The
American objective was to capture the Japanese airfield under construction on the Lunga Plain at Guadalcanal, code named Cactus, and the island of Tulagi, across the channel from Guadalcanal, code named Ringbolt, along with several small islands nearby. This move was intended to stop the Japanese threat to Allied supply lines in the Southwest Pacific. At the beginning of 1942 the strongest weapon in the American "Arsenal of Democracy" to achieve this ambitious goal was the tenacity of its fighting men. They were aroused by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the advance into the Pacific Ocean area, which threatened Allied possessions to the shores of Australia.
The fighting spirit of American military men has often been called upon to overcome weaknesses in quality of equipment, authorized manning, and readiness. As each conflict starts, the first armed forces into battle must take the punishment while the nation catches up. The generations that preceded World War II give clear examples of error in planning that our nation seems committed to repeat. Preparedness conditions resulting from this national weakness are of interest when considering the military circumstances under which the 67th Pursuit Squadron came into being to play out its role in the Guadalcanal Campaign and other campaigns during the war in the Pacific. Viewing the entire period in retrospect provides pause for serious re-evaluation of some key national policy. As the nation entered the decade of the 1940s the United States was struggling to catch up, and world conditions were such that the necessary time was allowed. As the nation proceeds through the decade of the 1980s, this pause seems to show that civilian heads of the Department of Defense, military departments, and their associated bureaucracies, as a class, have been incapable of securing the readiness of first-class armed forces for the defense of the United States.
Between World War I and World War
II
the United States, as a world
power, was just groping for the meaning of military aviation. The lessons of
—
World War I which the country entered without a military aircraft of its own even in the planning stage were forgotten. There was little support in the isolationist attitudes of Congress for a Military Air Service, yet another world war was all but guaranteed by the Armistice and peace treaty that ended the Great War to end all wars a peace treaty, humiliat-
—
—
ing to the vanquished, that contained the seeds of blitzkrieg.
As
a people,
Americans
military preparedness.
dislike the
They tend
to shy
thoughts of foreign wars and
away from even the most neces-
sary planning and involvement that would ensure the safety of the nation.
The civilian government
institutions of the U.S. are almost paranoid about
2 i
the possible rise of an elite military class.
They envision such a class, if allowed to develop, as taking over the government. It's a thought smoldering in the national psyche since the caution was raised by the Founding Fathers.
We
demonstrate
this phobia
by precipitous demobilization of
armed forces after each conflict. The result is a well-oiled defense machine in a
shambles, to be picked up and cared for by dedicated career military It follows, as well, that we treat our military establishment, military
men.
personnel, and veterans rather shabbily between wars
ment
of Kipling's
"Tommy
—a
classical
fulfill-
Tommy that."
this an'
In an atmosphere fostered by this peculiar national attitude, the
United States became weak between World Wars I and II. Amid a background of minimal attention to the armed forces, the nation was callow to the meaning of worldwide advancement in general, commercial, and military aviation in its future. Military men were studying its meaning in the
scheme of national defense. World progress in aviation seemed to be dragging the country along and support for military aviation came more from the enthusiastic civilian population and industry than from the
members of Congress responsible for funding the nation's defense. The growing national interest in aviation and the exploits of a few dedicated military aviators
made
it
clear to Congress that the nation
behind the rest of the world
in
the
was
A new National Defense Act was passed on June 4,
1920, revitalizing
the old act of 1916. In this legislation a Military Air Service was authorized. units for
It
falling
field of aviation.
finally
allowed for the organization of specific mission-oriented
bombardment,
attack, observation
legislation the First Pursuit
air
and pursuit. As a result of this
Group was reorganized
at Selfridge Field,
Michigan, and moved soon after to Kelly Field, Texas. This group was to be the granddaddy of the 67th Pursuit Squadron and other squadrons that
would be
hastily activated in later years.
In the years that followed, record-breaking flights by a few dedicated
airmen of the regular Air Service almost continually excited the public. It was this air-minded public and the news media, with its knowledge of the nation's position in world aviation, that pushed the need for military air
power. The of
New York-to-Paris flight by Charles A. Lindbergh in the spring
1927 grasped the imagination
of the entire world.
The early and contin-
uing development of commercial airlines helped advance the cause of aviation and greatly increased the number of qualified airmen. The impor-
tance of this
resource was, as yet, unimagined in the budgets of the Congress, which continued to make
critical national
clinch-fist military
expansion of military aviation a slow and laborious task.
Through the efforts of many dedicated air officers such as Billy Mitchell,
Jimmy
Doolittle, Carl Spaatz,
and Ira Eaker, the advancement of
tary aircraft and concepts continued.
mili-
An adequate bombing doctrine was in
use and influenced the design and development of bomber aircraft. In the development of a pursuit doctrine, the Air Service was not so fortunate. Aircraft type requirements
were in controversy because a pursuit doctrine
3
could not be agreed upon and
was further hindered by attempts to define a
separate mission role for attack aviation. aircraft
The development
of pursuit
proceeded around various mission profiles, many of them advanced
by the companies producing or designing the
were some good pursuit or
aircraft. Fortunately,
there
fighter aircraft in design development, but
acceptance and production development were slow, and these were put into tactical use in an unacceptable
mix of small quantities of various types.
The most startling fact, approaching the decade of the 1940s, was that the nation was in a game of 'catch up" in a world already being consumed by a *
major war, with only the Flying Fortress (B-17) and a mix of pursuit aircraft in
development production. In addition, the law of the land contained no
clear role for military aviation in the individual
armed
services.
The
readi-
ness problem was acute.
Over the entire pre- World War II period, the advancement of airpower had many enemies, even in the military establishment, going back to the
trial of Billy
Mitchell,
when General Hugh Drum
testified for the
prosecution, 'There will never be~a requirenTelltToTmilitary aircraft to
have a range beyond three days march of an army." Battleship admirals
were equally opposed to airpower. They all seemed to come around slowly and agree that airpower was good, but they were not in a hurry for it to happen during their career or, to use a Navy term, "Not on my watch." President Roosevelt was himself a skeptic. His office and desk were full of model ships and memorabilia from his days as Assistant Secretary of Navy; he loved ships. It was a hostile atmosphere for air officers trying to brief him on the necessity for advancement in airpower. But Roosevelt eventually reversed his opinion, became an advocate, and the airpower
—
planners enjoyed the relief of his unfamiliar support.
September
of
1939 produced
a shocked awakening
States learned, by actual performance, about
German
when
the United
air doctrine.
The
U.S. government and the American public were suddenly acquainted with
such
new words
smashed
as blitzkrieg,
Wehrmacht, and Luftwaffe, as the Nazis
into Poland using the Stuka dive
Less than a year
later,
France
fell
bomber with deadly
success.
under the pressure of the German war
machine.
Now
the United States realized that a fight
"Arsenal of Democracy" was again ill-prepared!
was shaping up and the The hasty exercise to
strengthen America for possible war began, playing catch-up stakes in national defense. Regular and National Guard lized
units
ball for big
were mobi-
and training maneuvers began to point out the depth of the deficien-
war games, the sign on an Army truck "Heavy Tank" simulated equipment the country did not have, as did an old observation plane with the observer throwing out flour bags by hand to simulate bombing. But the
cies. In
warning was there; the nation began to crank up
its
defense industry to
j
produce the machines and munitions of war. i
Long before its own entry into the war the United States was secretly and unlawfully committed by the President to
4
assist the
European
Allies to
\ defeat Germany. This policy, though controversial, served to accelerate mass production capability for producing war materials to serve the U S Armed Forces. As the war in Europe progressed, commitments to supply the Allies grew rapidly, and the United States began the approach to a war footing with the questionable support of the nation. In the rush to expand military capabilities, many
constructed and the training of
new airmen was
new
air
bases were
accelerated. In this great
extend airpower, the activation of numerous new air units was "Game Cock" of the 67th Pursuit Squadron began to stir in the egg. The Army Air Corps had now authorized plans to break out cadres of key personnel from the old First Pursuit Group to form new squadrons. effort to
planned and the
It
was then
that the 67th Pursuit Squadron
Pursuit Group, the 58th.
As
was activated as part of a new a part of this activity, the 68th and 69th
Pursuit Squadrons were also formed. suit
Squadron shook out
its
new
The "Game Cock" of the 67th Purfeathers at Selfridge Field, Michigan, on
16 January 1941, activated by direction of Special Order No. quarters First Pursuit Group.
3,
Head-
By the time of the Japanese attack on American territory, the nation's planning for war had improved our capabilities. Readiness was being pur-
sued at an ever-accelerating pace, but true readiness was
still
only a goal
yet to be reached. At that time the national strategy emphasized the war in
Europe, with defeat of Germany the
first priority. The war in the Pacific European effort. Preparations for the air war were proceeding according to a plan that had been prepared under the direction of General H. H. Arnold and approved and adopted by the president. It developed the expansion of forces, aircraft requirements, and logistics to execute the air war, and projected the buildup through the first half of 1944. For this outstanding military planning effort, the country owes a debt of gratitude to Lieutenant Colonels Harold L. George and Kenneth N. Walker and Majors Lawrence S.
was
to be subordinated to the
Kuter and Haywood leadership to the
S. Hansell, Jr., four
Army
men who
provided outstanding
Air Corps and the United States Air Force.
when preparations for war "You must fight with what we have," was a crushing reality. Better aircraft were on the drawing board, but those on hand and ready for mass production were such planes as the P-39 Airacobra and the P-40 Warhawk, which were already obsolete. These It is
unfortunate for pursuit aviation that
began to accelerate, our
tired axiom,
Ys
Y »
\/y
had been given too much praise, exaggerating their actual value as j(/ pursuit or fighter aircraft. Tight budgets had prevented the advancement \ of newer fighter aircraft in development, and Senators whose districts had
aircraft
\
contracts to manufacture the existing planes fought to keep the contracts going.
The equipment for the 67th Pursuit Squadron was destined to be the Bell P-39/P-400, an aircraft designed in
1936 and first flown about the end
of 1938. Since the inadequacy of this airplane at the time of its birth was a part of the national readiness problem, its entry into mass production
5
caused much finger-pointing around various agencies of government. Early in 1941, a Senate committee headed by Senator Harry S. Truman had
made some tough investigations of readiness subjects and zeroed in on the problem of the P-39; they gave special attention to other aircraft as well.
The Truman Committee
believed that the P-39, beginning with
its first
model, was obsolete and unfit for combat. They criticized the continued production of the plane while newer and better aircraft which were in development could have been forced into production. On this point, the
committee was critical of the politicians who were pushing for continuation
happened to be built in their districts. Army were justified on the grounds and perhaps improved that airplanes which could be mass-produced must be continued in production. This justification was correct, upon even though newer and better development prototypes had been tested. Early mass production of these newer aircraft to meet immediate war needs was impossible. The P-400 was the P-39 configured for export. It was identical to the P-39 modelsCand JJ except that it carried the high-pressure oxygen system compatible with British equipment.* The British declared the aircraft as not combat-capable and withdrew it from service after one combat mission. Britain would not accept the P-39/P-400 aircraft, even under "Lend-Lease" conditions. The Ru ssians, on the other hand, lovedthe airplane and would take all of contracts for the older aircraft that
Large orders for such
aircraft
by the
—
—
they^couja^getTTt was adequate for"tHeTr low^altitude mission
profile.
France, an intended user of the aircraft, had fallen and the British dislike for
many
planes intended for export available for other
of these planes
had the U.S. insignia painted over that of the
the P-39/P-400 use.
Most
left
intended recipient nation; they were assigned to the U.S.
Army Air Corps.
This set of circumstances had everything to do with the arrival of the
i
P-39/P-400 with the 67th Pursuit Squadron in the South Pacific. There it was soon assigned to support the Marines at Guadalcanal. The aircraft was brutally outclassed
by the enemy fighters
performed beyond
its
known
encountered there; yet,
it
hands of the outstanding and resourceful
pilots of the
capabilities. It excelled
port and dive-bombing missions for which
it
in
the
67th Squadron,
it
on close ground sup-
was never intended.
The major armament difference between the P-400s assigned to the 67th Fighter Squadron and the P-39s was the cannon, which fired through the prop hub. All of the P-400s had 20mm Oerlikon cannons, while the P-39s had the 37mm cannon.
CHAPTER
2
The "Game Cock" Is Hatched
The First Pursuit Group, activated in France during World War I out of the American Lafayette Escadrille, had been demobilized at the end of that war. By April of 1920 its reactivation was completed and, as the nation entered the critical decade of the 1940s, the group was the source of all available experience in pursuit aviation. its activation there was not an American military aircraft for its was equipped with French Spad aircraft, single-place biplanes of World War I. Fortunately, these were available, as some had been purchased by the American Expeditionary Force. Over the years, the First Pursuit Group had concentrated on development of pursuit tactics and
At
use;
it
doctrine and had flown such glamorous old pursuit planes as the Curtiss
P6-E Hawk. Having had experience with all other U.S. and foreign pursuit aircraft that were available, it was now splitting up its expertise to form new Pursuit Groups and Squadrons for expansion of the Army Air Corps. Then, in January 1941, the Game Cock of the 67th Pursuit Squadron finally wiggled out of the egg and became a part of the new 58th Pursuit Group at Selfridge Field, Michigan. The Squadron began its life with a new insignia, provided by Walt Disney, depicting a truculent game cock in a loud sweatshirt and boxing gloves. There were no aircraft to put it on; it was all a paper exercise.
Pursuit
Group
The 67th Squadron remained
attached to the First
for administration and general support.
The Squadron was fortunate in its activation to have assigned to it some of the best enlisted experts available in the Air Corps. These men were destined to become the technical backbone of the Squadron for 7
months and years to come. Their personalities, achievements, and leadership became a valuable source of strength to the organization. These key personnel included Master Sergeant Robert Foye, Line Chief; Staff Sergeants Ward Collins, Engineering Chief, Enoch Dahlman, Electrical Specialist,
Charles N. Nebloch, Aircraft Mechanic, and Arthur Nelson, Ar-
morer; Sergeants Paul Beachey, Radio, Willard Berger, Technical Supply
and Joseph Michaud, First Sergeant.
By May the enlisted strength of the Squadron was still under 100 men; new technical school graduates were arriving frequently. There were several temporary assignments of
taker status.
The Squadron
still
commanding
officers
had no airplanes of
on a sort of careown; the men
its
worked along with the First Pursuit Group on the flight line. During the month of May, First Lieutenant Dale D. Brannon was / assigned to the Squadron along with several other officers. Brannon was tall,
for a pursuit pilot, with
was an
sandy blond hair and a no-nonsense attitude; he
excellent choice for
command.
In Brannon, providence had given
man of experience to guide new organization for its tasks to come. He was destined to become the
the Squadron, at this very early time, a serious the
hub
of
life in
the 67th Squadron, a tower of strength, experience, and
integrity.
As I recall my military service, I can count the number of officers whose leadership and personality influenced the search for excellence in my own career on one hand. Brannon was one of them. His outlook on the coming conflict was neither apocalyptic nor flamboyant. He knew that it was coming, that there was an important job for him to do, that he was well qualified for
it,
and that he intended to do it to the very best of his ability.
If
Brannon had a fault, it was probably in the subtle politics of military life; he was totally honest. This probably accounted for the fact that he never had stars in his eyes nor on his shoulders. The time-honored tradition of "sucking up" was repulsive to him. An enlisted admirer commented on Brannon's ability to detect problems and correct them: "If it smells like it, that's what it is; he'll find it, expose it and correct it." The Squadron grew slowly and lost several members when a number of them were released from active duty to join the American Volunteer Group in China, the "Flying Tigers." On 14 August 1941, the Squadron was surprised by the sudden and unexpected reassignment of its commanding officer. First Lieutenant Brannon was assigned on temporary duty to Canada. The nature of the assignment appeared to be secret.
Rumor, with some element of truth, had it
that because of his experience in
various types of the latest pursuit aircraft he
was assigned
to
Canada as an
instructor.
Now Providence was again watching over the 67th Pursuit Squadron, 2nd Lieutenant John A. Thompson was transferred from the 68th Squadron and temporarily assumed command of the 67th during the absence of D.D. Brannon. Thompson was the handsome epitome of the American pursuit pilot blond, blue-eyed, with a pearly- white smile and as
—
8
"
an
air of quiet authority.
From this point on, Brannon and Thompson were
an unbeatable combination.
There was always some mystery about Brannon's temporary assignment to Canada. It was not until an interview with Brannon in October 1980 that the real details were revealed. The transfer did indeed come about because of Brannon's experience
in
late-model pursuit planes.
event, as told by D.D. Brannon, started with a
The
by the Chilean Ambassador to see his daughter at Michigan State University. The Ambassador was also planning an official visit to Selfridge Field. In honor of this visit, officials at Selfridge Field decided to stage an airshow. At the time, the U.S. Army Air Corps had two new YP-38 Lightning aircraft, two service test visit
models, stationed at Selfridge Field. Lieutenants D. D. Brannon and Oliver G. Cellini had been assigned to put the new YP-38 through a pursuit test
program, and
it
was decided
that they would
fly
them
in
the airshow.
planned their YP-38 demonstration. Brannon, being senior of the two, took the lead. A nice overall airshow had been planned
Brannon and
Cellini
featuring P-39s, P-40s, P-43s, and other miscellaneous aircraft.
The Group Commander, John Sterling, had added the YP-38s to the show and had told Brannon and Cellini to put on a good demonstration of this new pursuit plane.
Brannon took him do
in
literally
and planned
all
the things a good pilot will
such a legal opportunity to put on a flying demonstration
in place,
feathered fly-by, loops, speed runs across the
air
—
base
rolls, rolls
in front of
the pavillion, and other feats of airmanship.
There was no question about it being the hit of the show. Unfortunately the Base Commander, Brig. Gen. Clagett, was displeased at having such a demonstration using the audacity of the performance aircraft. Clagett
probably thought the risk to the
contacted higher headquarters, made an
new YP-38
official
report,
were grounded in an official order signed perby the Chief of Air Corps, General George H. Brett. The pilots lost
and eventually both sonally
new YP-38s. He
was an unnecessary
pilots
their flight pay while
grounded
— and, worst
of
all,
could do no flying.
Just after the airshow there occurred a requirement for a classified assignment at Clinton, Ontario, Canada. The RAF was building a secret training area there to teach specialists use of the
tronics gadget called
new "hush-hush" elec-/
RADAR. There was a requirement for a Detachment
for the U.S. students undergoing this training. Brannon, because of his record resulting from the airshow, was selected to go to Canada as Detachment Commander, a position that would normally have
Commander
been
filled
by a non-flying
officer.
The
resulting assignment gave
him
valuable experience lasting until just prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl
when he was really needed back at the 67th Pursuit Squadron. At this point in August of 1941, what the 67th Pursuit Squadron was to get away from as did the whole 58th Group needed most to get the feel of needed It Selfridge Field and the First Pursuit Group. Harbor,
—
being on
its
—
own as an entirely separate Pursuit Squadron. The opportunity 9
came
September with an
in
Louisiana, to a
new
air
alert to
move
the Group to Baton Rouge,
base being completed as part of the Air Base
Expansion Program. The base had not been sufficiently completed at the time the 58th Group was activated; it would now become their permanent
home. Packing up for the move turned out to be good experience and pracanother move not too far into the future. When the Group was
tice for
ready, most of the personnel
were sent with delay en route leave to travel by personal means and to report when the Group arrived at Baton Rouge. On 30 September, two officers and 25 enlisted men departed with the truck convoy moving the entire Group. Along the monotonous journey they practiced keeping the interval between trucks, simulating a precaution that
makes truck convoys
less vulnerable to air attack.
The Convoy
Commander stayed busy riding back and forth along the truck convoy in his jeep, witnessing this discipline.
There was no interstate highway system in
those days, and the monotony of the ride was relieved on the sions passing through small
towns and waving
many
at pretty girls
occa-
and other
The convoy stopped in relays each day at various bases en route making as much as 250 miles in a day. On 6 October the convoy reached Baton Rouge Air Base. The new base at Baton Rouge was far from complete. Roads and walkways were still dirt-covered— just great in rainy weather! The runway was still unsuitable for landing airplanes, and for a time the Group kept onlookers.
to rest for the night,
its
only aircraft
airport.
— three P-36s, one P-35, and one P-43 —
Assignment of a few
squadron to
its
at the municipal
additional enlisted personnel brought the
authorized strength of 157. Officer strength was
still
low;
there were only four assigned.
By November
the 67th Squadron was operating smoothly as a sepa-
Thompson, now a 1st Lieutenant, was still in command. 2nd Lieutenant James T. Jarman, about the size of a tall jockey, was transferred in from the 69th Squadron. Three 2nd Lieutenants just graduated from Kelly Field were assigned, Marty Haedtler, Bob Chilson, rate organization. John A.
and N.F.
Inciardi.
eight,
rated pilots and
all
This infusion of personnel brought the officer strength to all
destined to play an important part in the future
of the 67th Pursuit Squadron.
The emphasis was now on readiness training, ground and air. Yet the number of airplanes made it difficult to do much more than mini-
limited
mum flying.
Ground crew personnel and the various support departments were going well. Toward the end of November, following almost a year of hard work developing a smooth-running squadron, plans were being made by all
were
training to operate and function like a Pursuit Squadron; things
up the days over the Christmas and New Years holidays for everyone to have leave. Rosters were prepared allowing appropriate peo-
for dividing
ple to be present for duty at
all
time.
The world changed with an agonizing groan on Sunday morning, 7 December 1941. The crushing news of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the
10
Japanese brought personal plans back to zero. Everyone reacted with great anger over the sneak attack, and the level of anger increased as thoughts of interrupted personal lives and plans began to be understood. Almost immediately Lieutenant Brannon was back with the squadron. Readiness preparations for overseas duty
were the topic of daily conversation. Packing and was pushed at a breakneck pace.
crating of squadron equipment
The
unfolding events
made
it
Squadron would soon be detached
abundantly clear that the 67th Pursuit
for overseas service. Sixteen
new pilots
were assigned. Lieutenant, Dr. Bernard P Soehner, Medical Corps was assigned, along with four enlisted medical technicians. The non-rated officers of the squadron Lieutenants G.W. Phillips, A.W. Price, and R. Farrant were assigned for mess and supply, Adjutant and maintenance, respectively. A Quartermaster team and an Ordnance team were also
—
—
attached to the squadron.
Lieutenant Thompson, Master Sergeant Foye, and a team of several others departed on 16 January as an advance party to the port of embarkation in the Brooklyn
Army Terminal
at
New York. The best rumor at the
time was that the squadron must be going to England. That made sense
because everyone had been required to pack warm clothing. The rest of the squadron was to be packed, ready to depart by train on the morning of 17
0845 on the 17th the train pulled out in a quiet, unceremonious departure with 25 officers and 100 enlisted personnel. Forty-three enlisted men had been left behind to form the cadre of a new
January. Promptly at
squadron.
The cars. It
trip to the
Brooklyn
Army Terminal
took three days
in
Pullman
was a relatively comfortable way to travel, but the troops were both
bored and apprehensive, worrying about an overseas
knows where. The
train arrived the afternoon of
trip
ahead to heaven
19 January 1942
at
Fort
New Jersey, the staging area for loading military units at the Brooklyn Port. The entire outfit was put up in temporary barracks for the night. Two Dix,
additional pilot officers and nine enlisted
men, sent on from Selfridge Field,
joined the squadron there. Everyone spent a terrible night.
The next day the squadron was moved prepared to go aboard the U.S.
Army
to the Brooklyn Port and
Transport Thomas A. Barry. By
noon of 20 January the ship was already full of troops, and the men of the 67th Squadron moved aboard into space below decks which had been a cargo hold once used for refrigeration. The bunk areas for the enlisted men were close and stacked at least four high. Officer accommodations were no
better— just up a little higher in the ship, with a little more air. The ship was already overcrowded. The comfort factor for the officers was a little better than for the enlisted men, who stayed below decks. It was all complicated by the medical units aboard. It seemed that all the including nurses— for the whole task force were in this medical units one ship. Everyone had to be fully clothed when out on deck. The first hours aboard were mass confusion. It was like dropping 1500J rats into an oil drum and watching the pecking order being established.
—
11
Mess facilities, as well as their scheduling, were so confused that during the first 24 hours some of the men didn't get a chance to eat. The men stood in chowlines that went
in circles
through passageways of the
several days for the troop transport personnel to get the
ship. It
took
mess schedule
was spent by the men in These exciting experiences occurred aboard a troop transport
organized. Nevertheless, a large part of each day
mess still
lines.
tied
up
in
port waiting to depart.
morning of Friday, 23 January 1942, the ship finally began to move and left New York Harbor; it was a dreary and cloudy morning. Once at sea the entire convoy of Task Force No. 6814 and its Navy escort could be seen as it formed up and proceeded south along the Atlantic coast. As the convoy moved out, its positions were distributed in two columns, a total of seven ships. The Navy escort moved along on the flanks, one or two thousand yards from the troop transports. The ship at the head of the starboard column was the flagship of the convoy, the Argentina, with a Navy Commodore in command. Other ships in the convoy were Santa Rosa, Santa Elena, Cristobal, John Erickson, and the McAndrew. Among the forces carried by the convoy was most of the 26th Yankee Division, soon to make up a substantial part of the Americal Division. The escort was filled out to two light cruisers and four destroyers as the convoy moved south in the Atlantic. The weather was cold for several days and began to In the early
warm as the ships proceeded south. This was not the route to England, but where? Life aboard ship was dull and the temperature was getting warm. About 27 January the boredom was shattered by a submarine alert. The ships in the convoy changed course and began their zig-zag evasive maneuvers. The destroyers left formation at top speed and dropped depth charges for some time. The foaming geysers in the open sea around the depth charges were a thought-provoking sight. All was well again in a little while and the ships settled back into their routine. No one knew if an attacking submarine had been sunk rumor, of course, was that one had. There were always plenty of rumors about just anything. There was even a rumor that Betty Grable, a movie star and the favorite pin-up girl of the armed forces, was coming aboard the ships to visit with the troops at the Canal Zone. The following day a radio reported that an enemy submarine had sunk two of the ships in the convoy and that one of them was the Thomas A. Barry. Well, that certainly was not so, but it probably meant that the submarine got away and had identified the ships in the convoy. The dull, slow life settled on the ship again. The weather got continually warmer, and everyone now looked forward to the Panama Canal transit. There were even rumors that all personnel would be given passes to go ashore into the Canal Zone. Wrinkles were smoothed out of clean
—
summer uniforms in ship. For those who
anticipation of this break in the dull did not have khaki
bought for $100 from those
12
who had
summer
extras.
life
of the troop
uniforms, they could be
On
the morning of 31 January 1942, the ship arrived off Cristobal on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal and proceeded to transit. The trip
through the locks, at several points along the canal, was fascinating.
The weather was good and the look and smell of land was heavenly. Around the locks barrage balloons could be seen tethered out over the green hills. The ship reached its berth at Balboa in the afternoon around 1600. Here
everyone was disappointed, as there were no passes into the Canal Zone. On Sunday, 1 February, the convoy left the Canal Zone and headed out into the Pacific. The hot, dreary days around the Equator became an extra burden. Playing cards, checkers, chess, writing tablets, and pencils— anything to help pass the time were at a premium; conditions were too
—
crowded
any organized recreational activity. It was mess lines, sunboredom. Some people had only woolen clothes to wear in all that heat, due to that rumor about going to England. for
shine, and
The
ship
made
a fuel stop at the island of Bora Bora, taking on water
from one of the destroyer escorts plus oil and water from the USN tanker Ramopo. The itarry then joined the convoy and the dull routine continued. As the ships approached southern Australia to enter the Tasman Sea, heavy swells made the waters rough; seasickness broke the dull routine. Those who did not get motion sickness got sick just watching those who
By the night of 25 February, lights could be seen at a distance. The trip would soon be over. The ship finally pulled into its berth in Melbourne did!
harbor on the evening of 26 February.
The next morning everyone was packed and ready afternoon before the squadron
left
the dock area, boarded a train for
The
train, like
to debark.
It
was
the ship and, after a mile's walk in
Camp Darley, 35 miles from Melbourne.
the "Toonerville Trolly," provided a noisy, rickety ride to
army trucks moved the outfit down on bedticks filled with straw, Over a month at sea was all one could
the station at Bacchus Marsh. Australian
three miles to camp. Everyone bedded
happy to be on
solid
ground again.
take for a while. In February 1942, the
same month
as the Japanese air attack that
but destroyed Port Darwin on Australia's north coast, the arrival
in
bourne of a large convoy of Americans greatly bolstered the moral Australian public. There lia
was at that time
all
Mel-
of the
a great national fear that Austra-
was about to be invaded from the north by the Japanese. Fierce posters
they surveyed made the Australians ever sensitive to the threatening glow of the Japanese "Rising Sun." There were similar posters in the United States, breeding hatred for of Japanese infantrymen advancing at will over
some
of
own The Australians opened their arms to the Americans as individuals.
In
the Japanese to a point where
our
all
it
did not
seem immoral
to confine
citizens of Japanese ancestry in internment camps.
Men
this they were so like Americans that the relationship was from some American units were billeted with Australian families for a short time until their units moved on. Many fast friendships were formed and
simpatico.
13
some have
remember with great love and affection the home of Edna and Harry A. Deller and family, on
lasted until this day.
the 10 days
lived in
I
I
Somerville Street in Bendigo.
At that time the Americans were making things happen, while most of ANZAC," were engaged in the Mediterranean or North Africa. Through these February events Australians gained confidence, a tension release, and a chance to catch a second breath. Naturally the rumor was that the 67th Pursuit Squadron was to stay in Australia. Lieutenant Brannon roamed about checking on how everyone was doing. The general, but loose, responsibilities in the Squadron at the time were: 1st Lieutenant Brannon, Squadron Commander; John A. Thompson, Deputy or Executive Officer; Jim Jarman, Operations Officer; Albert Price, Adjutant; and G.W. Phillips, Mess and Supply. Brannon and Thompson were soon off, trying to find out what was next for the Squadron, as yet not committed to any particular place or operation. It became the Australian armed forces, "the
apparent, with a
the island of
little
New
digging, that the next stop
While following up on
mander
was back aboard a
ship to
Caledonia as a part of Task Force Poppy. information was received that the
this,
Com-
Squadron was wanted for a 9:00 p.m. meeting Melbourne. Brannon in was returning to Camp Darley on the 8:00 p.m. train. It was decided that Jim Jarman and Albert Price would attend for Brannon until he could arrive. At the appointed hour they found the hotel room and knocked on the door. It was opened by a tired-looking Major. "Who are you?" he asked. "We represent the 67th Pursuit Squadron," replied Jarman. "Good," said the Major. "Come in." He turned and called into the suite, "They're here, Sir." "Get the gentlemen a drink," said a voice from the back of the hotel of the 67th Pursuit
suite. It was temporary headquarters for the staff of Task Force Poppy, which had arrived by convoy from New York the previous week. After a few minutes of social amenities, the Task Force G-4 turned to discussion of
and airplanes.
logistics
"I can't tell
about those
Nandi and "If
you where your outfit is going, but I need some answers me," he continued, "could you assemble them at
aircraft. Tell
fly
them
in?"
you are talking about
replied Jarman.
"The
flying to
distance
is
"Could you assemble them air
New Caledonia,
the answer
is
no,"
too great."
in
the area of the docks and fly them to the
base?"
"No,
Sir,
there
is
no place
space for the required takeoff
in that
area where there would be enough
roll."
"Could you assemble them and tow them over the road to the airfield?"
"No,
Sir.
The wheels
of this airplane are in the wings and they have
too great a wingspan to pass over three of the bridges that exist along the
14
only route from the docks to the
airfield. Also,
the gravel roads would tear
Once we get those crates on a flatbed, we'd best head and assemble them there, where all of the squadron me-
the tires to ribbons. for the airfield
chanics and equipment will be."
"Lieutenant," said the G-4 colonel, "you seem to I haven't told you about."
know
a hell of a lot
about this place that
"Well, Sir," said Jarman, Caledonia, so
my
"We
heard
we might be
Squadron Commander and
I
going to
New
went to see the Aussie
[RAAF] project engineer responsible for airfield construction. We learned a lot
about the port, docks,
city, roads, bridges,
topography, and buildings, as
well as the air base itself."
"Lieutenant," the colonel replied, "you
will
go a long way
in this
army."
The
discussions
went
far into the night
and an appointment was
Commander to meet with Lieutenant General George H. Brett at 10:00 a.m. the following morning. The switchboard at Camp Darley was shut down for the night and it was impossible to notify scheduled for the Squadron
Brannon until it reopened. At the appointed time, Jarman and Price were waiting Brett's outer office. Captain Glen his Adjutant
were
in
General
Keim of the 65th Material Squadron and
also waiting for the meeting. Shortly they
were ushered
in.
who had arrived in Australia 31 December, was acting Commander, South West Pacific Area, pending the evacuation of General Douglas MacArthur from Corregidor. The General was studying a General Brett,
Allied
sheaf of papers that apparently represented the deployment of air units.
looked up from his worktable at Captain Keim, a World retread
— overweight,
in
over his head, and flustered
War
in the
I
He
infantry
presence of
the General.
"Are you the Commander of the 67th Pursuit Squadron?" asked Brett in a
rather astonished query.
Captain
Keim drew himself up to his full stubby height, "No Sir, I'm the Commander of the 65th."
shoulders
back, and said,
At that point General Brett looked back to his work table, going list of Air Corps units that had arrived or which he thought might be on their way from the Philippines. Not finding what he was looking for, he looked up at Keim and said, "The 65th Pursuit Squadron?" "No, Sir. The 65th Materiel Squadron," replied Keim. through a
"Well," said Brett, "that's probably a fine organization, and we are deal with the it in the theater, but right at the moment I need to
glad to have
67th Pursuit Squadron."
"Are you the commander
of the 67th?" he said, turning to the Adju-
tant of the 65th.
"No, Sir," he replied. "I'm the Adjutant of the 65th, Sir." "Huh," grunted Brett, only slightly amused as he turned to tenant Albert Price. "Are you the Commander of the 67th?"
1st Lieu-
15
"No,
Sir,
I'm the Adjutant of the 67th."
Then General Brett looked at 2nd Lieutenant Jim Jarman, 132 pounds and 23 years old. "For Christ's sake, son, are you the Commander of the 67th?" "No, Sir," said Jarman, "But I'm the Operations Officer. Our Commander could not be notified of the meeting until this morning and he is now enroute to the city from Camp Darley." "Well, let's talk anyway," said Brett. "Tell me about the experience level of your Squadron Commander, yourself, and the assigned pilots. Have any of them flown the P-400?" "Well, Sir," said Jarman, "except for our Commander and Exec, none have flown a P-39. All 29 line pilots and flight leaders are recent flying school graduates with only 10 to 35 hours in fighters, none in the P-400 or the equivalent P-39. Only Dale Brannon and John Thompson have flown that type aircraft. That was at Selfridge Field in early 1941." "What the hell is Washington thinking of?" said Brett to no one in particular. Then, looking at Jarman, he said "Son, you're going to one hell of fighter pilot
of a hot spot."
General Brett turned to one of his
staff
Colonels and said, "Scrape up
15 more experienced pilots and enough enlisted personnel to bring the Squadron up to wartime strength." Then, turning back to 2nd Lieutenant Jarman, he said, "Thanks, son, and good luck!"
Brannon never did make it to the meeting, but got filled in later by Jarman and Price. A personal meeting with General Brett was probably not the highest item on Brannon's list anyway. The hopes for staying in Australia were gone and the new move was imminent. The Squadron was now augmented by the assignment of 47
Twenty of these men who had volunteered for jobs with Now that war was a reality, they could not get to China and were inducted back into the Air Corps at Melbourne. This group of men were known as the "China Detail;" they augmented the squadron with some outstanding enlisted specialists at a time when the undermanned and poorly equipped Squadron needed their enlisted personnel.
the American Volunteer Group in China.
help.
Fifteen additional pilots were assigned to the 67th Squadron, although some did not remain. Among those assigned were Captains Jim Bruce, Tom
Hubbard, and Tom Christian, who had been in the Philippines and had been evacuated to Australia. The senior of these officers was Captain Jim Bruce, who assumed command of the 67th Pursuit Squadron. From this point on it was like a game of musical chairs for D.D. Brannon. As officers senior to
him were assigned, military regulations required that the senior assume command; when they left for other assignments, Brannon popped back into the command chair. In general, the "Philippine Group" as a whole turned out to be a chafing influence within the squadron until its weakening influences on command were settled. Brannon continued to remain the hub
16
2nd Lieutenant James T. Jarman. Shipped out as Squadron Operations Officer Squadron. Then and now a pillar of the organization. 1941 photo. (Jarman)
of the 67th Fighter
17
of Squadron
life and activity, as well as mentor to the young pilots who still had to learn their trade.
By 5 March the word was out, alerting the Squadron, and on 6 March Marsh for Melbourne. There the Squadron went aboard the USAT John Erickson and by morning of 7 March 1942 were again on the high seas, having hardly lost their sea legs. It was now certain it
entrained at Bacchus
was New Caledonia, an 800 miles northeast of Australia. With the great success
that the destination for the 67th Pursuit Squadron island lying about
of the Japanese in their advance
well as Australia
deep into the South
Pacific, this island as
was under direct threat of a Japanese attack and invasion.
After a dull but apprehensive voyage, the ships* arrived in the harbor at
Noumea,
New Caledonia, on 15 March 1942. The Squadron went ashore
late in the afternoon
and camped overnight at a velodrome in Noumea. The
next day the Squadron began to move by truck up the island to a camp in the vicinity of
Tontouta Air Base. The camp was a mosquito-infested area
about a mile or so from the airfield.
The camp location would seem ideal to a It had a grassy plain with some
reconnaissance team looking for campsites.
high ground toward the south, mountains rose to the east, and a stream ran
through the camp area. However, there had been heavy
rain,
and trucks
moving about the area made it a sea of mud. Yet the worst part of it was the constant and ravenous attack by mosquitoes, which were in such numbers that one could slap a man on the back and kill a hundred of them. Tents could not be put up because it would not be possible to camouflage them; there was a constant threat of Japanese invasion of New Caledonia. It rained so much that personal belongings were always wet, although men strung canvas shelter halves for protection. Above all, the mosquitoes were so thick that the men almost went crazy trying to work and keep them away. Between the pages of a diary written during the period, the mosquisnapped shut between the pages when the evetoes can still be found ning's entry was completed.
—
*The Squadron actually traveled to Noumea in three ships. The original complement from the U.S. were in USAT John Erickson, newly assigned people in USAT Thomas A. Barry, and Lieutenant Jim Jarman, Sergeant Charles Neblock, and eight other enlisted mechanics in HMS Athena with the crated aircraft. Forty P-400s in the Athena were bound elsewhere; these were diverted back to Melbourne
67th Pursuit Squadron.
18
when
the East Indies
fell
and were committed to the
CHAPTER
3
The Miracle Works
The
swiftness with which the Japanese extended their conquests into the Southwest Pacific had everyone convinced that a Japanese attempt on New
Caledonia was really an immediate threat. First priority for the 67th was
combat readiness to meet
this threat
— and the task was
Manpower to develop creature comforts in the camp,
new home,
gigantic.
the Squadron's
could not be immediately spared. For a while, miserable living
conditions for the
men
continued. Quarters for the officers were
They were crammed
little
room, bedroom, and
dirt base-
ment of an old farmhouse along the rutted road leading into the The 44 officers and 200 men found little time to improve their
comforts.
better.
into the living
campsite.
Lieutenants Phillips and Price, the First Sergeant, Joe Michaud, and the administrative personnel devoted as
much time
to
camp improvement
as
they could spare while supervising the administrative move, procuring
up the mess, and carrying on Squadron administration. For the next week or two, men in wet clothes, too exhausted to care, climbed into their beds in a blacked-out camp. Bedding was constantly wet. Flies laid eggs in the wool blankets, the eggs turned to maggots if not detected immediately, and above all was the constant harassment by the tents, setting
mosquitoes.
Many nights were spent in soaked clothes and blankets as rain
dripped through an inadequate shelter half stretched over a bed and mosquito netting. The drone of a thousand mosquitoes trying to penetrate the netting to
make a blood meal of the occupant sounded,
a deafening roar. kets, not seen in
in
the darkness, like
brought the realization that the blanthe dark the previous night, were infested with maggots.
To many, morning
19
The two
sea voyages, totaling about 50 days at sea, with associated
problems of poor food
had everyone
on the troop transports and limited physical activity,
reduced physical condition. The primitive conditions
in
brought on diarrhea and stomach cramps; everyone carried a wad of toilet paper, "bung wadding," in case of emergency.
The 67th
started
its
work
at
Tontouta
in
these nerve-wrecking
cumstances. There was not enough transportation. the mile or two distance to their place of
cir-
Men often had to walk
work on the
airfield,
with occa-
emergency. The uniform for everyone was a mosquito headnet, protecting the face and neck, gloves, boots, and heavy socks with the trousers tucked in. Mechanics who worked on detailed and sional off-road stops for
intricate electrical
and mechanical tasks often removed most of
tective dress in order to get
this pro-
on with the work.
For the 67th Pursuit Squadron, the first task toward combat readiness was to get to Noumea and bring the crated airplanes from the dock area to Tontouta Air Base. The prime mover and trailer for hauling aircraft had been procured for the Squadron in Melbourne through the direct help of General Brett. It was a 21,700-pound wrecker with a 28-foot trailer. Drivers belonged to the 67th and 65th Squadrons. Captain Bruce instructed Lieutenants Jarman and Dewey to find the vehicle and pick up a load of timbers to build A-frames for assembling the aircraft. When located, it was loaded with about 5000 cases of beer and they just drove off with the load. They were apprehended before they could get out of Noumea and forced to help unload the beer.
in
The task of moving the planes was enormous. There were 47 of them Noumea two P-39s and 45 P-400s.* In the
—
the hold of a ship at
interest of providing air support as soon as possible, these aircraft crates
were
among the first cargo to be placed on the dock. But "Army Game" to deal with; the 67th, with Captain the
to be unloaded
there was the old
highest rank in the squadron, of the plan.
were having
The Engineer, it
their way.
was unable
Artillery,
to push compliance with this part
and Infantry Colonels and Generals
Everyone was looking
for recognition
able to report his units in place and "combat-ready."
occur to any of them that air
It
when their units were in place,
did not
by being
seem
to
there would be no
cover for them.
The huge crates, gently lowered by the cranes of the big cargo ships, began to settle on the dock. Brannon, still a 1st Lieutenant and ever the mother hen of the "Game Cock," insisted that they be handled as if they were full of eggs. The big crates began to line up on the dock like little which they would soon become, after the airplanes in them were houses unpacked. With the loading equipment at the dock area, the crates were moved without much difficulty, secured on a trailer, and the truck moved
—
out for Tontouta. After Athena unloaded the 40 assigned P-400s and moved out, a U.S. freighter bound for She had some P-39s and P-400s deck-loaded and set them on our pile in order to open cargo holds. The 67th appropriated all of them.
Australia took her place.
20
It
was
similar load
a grueling drive over treacherous mountain roads, where a might be met on any curve. The pilots rode in the truck and in
the jeep riding point for the load, waving a red flag to warn oncoming moving traffic out of the way and keeping the right-of-way for the
traffic,
crated aircraft. Often they would get an argument from an officer or a sergeant moving another load; pecking order and priority would have to be settled.
The
pilots
became experts
at the delicate diplomacy so necessary to settle these often-complicated confrontations. In one such instance, an
approaching heavy load was encountered as the aircraft load rounded a start down grade. The approaching leader pulled up to the lead jeep of the 67th. The driver was a mature-looking Master
mountain curve about to Sergeant. Such
NCOs
are not afraid of a shavetail Lieutenant and the
conversation was interesting.
"What
outfit you with, Lieutenant?" the Master Sergeant asked. "67th Pursuit Squadron," was the reply.
"Well, I'm with the
equipment coming up
182nd Infantry and we have
this grade. You'll
a load of heavy
have to get over and
let
us pass."
The Lieutenant stepped out of the jeep, his silver wings shining in the sun. "Sergeant," he said, "we have a very heavy load on that trailer. It contains a hot pursuit plane,
and you guys
defense and you have no
air
in
the infantry need
it.
You're
cover and you won 't have any
these planes to Tontouta, put them together, and get them
in place for
until
we
flying.
get
Now,
you approach up to the curve. How about having your driver pull onto that and let us highball on down the grade? That should work out good." "Okay, Lieutenant," said the Master Sergeant, as he whipped his jeep there
is
a convenient shoulder out there as
around, shouted orders to the truck driver, and guided the truck onto the shoulder. With a big smile, a wave, and a snappy salute from the Master 'Sergeant, the aircraft load shifted into gear and rolled on
down
the grade.
The task of moving the aircraft crates continued on a 24-hour schedThe truck and trailer rig never stopped lugging up the narrow mountain roads and highballing down the grades. A round trip took eight hours; ule.
they averaged three trips a day, rain or shine, until the crates were all moved to Tontouta. Soldiers and Frenchmen often cheered as another plane passed by.
the "Little
It
was a tiring, dangerous trip over what became known as
Burma Road."
47 crates were delivered to their base. The unloading at Tontouta was far different from the loading at the dock area. There were no unloading facilities at the air base; the men carefully— almost lovingly —nudged, rolled, and pushed the crates off the trailer and into work position by brute force and the help of a truck winch. Each time, 10,000 Finally
all
pounds of crate and airplane were unloaded and placed in position for the work crew without a mishap or a serious injury. Only two of the 67th's pilots had any real experience in P-39 aircraft and none of the mechanics had ever worked on this type plane. When the no manuals for first crate was opened, it was discovered that there were
21
the P-400, just manuals on the P-39 models D,F, and K. This probably indicated that there
was never
a
manual on the P-400, since
it
was an
export version of the P-39, with its design status at about the model level of the P-39C and D.
The engineering section to handle aircraft assembly was getting orgawere brought up from Noumea. The engineering
nized as the big crates
were under the Master Sergeant Robert Foye. With production scope and complexity of the task well understood by this man of tremendous experience, work was organized and the sections for engineering tasks were section and the plan for production assembly of aircraft
direction of
established. While the chief mechanic, Technical Sergeant Charles N.
Neblock, and the other mechanics studied the manuals and examined the parts of the
first
unpacked airplane, others were shaping timbers into a lift an engine, a fuselage, or other
brute-force hoist rack with which to
heavy items during assembly. The only tools available were 10 kits of first echelon maintenance tools; these would have to do. Truck and automobile tools
were precious possessions. One of the mechanics, Hatfield, designed by cutting wrenches and welding on long handles for getting
special tools
into tight places peculiar to assembling the P-39/P-400.
There was no supply
Every fifth airplane was was uncrated. The planes were un-
of replacement parts.
designated as spare parts before
it
packed; the parts were sorted and assembled in a production fashion that was amazing for the conditions in which the men were obliged to work. They worked in the sun and soaking wet with rain running down their faces to assemble aircraft parts, toes.
all
the while tormented by ravenous mosqui-
They keep branches of leaves at their sides to brush the mosquitoes backs when they had a free hand. They passed the scant supply of
off their
from one to another, working with a determination and dedication What our democracy had failed to provide in the preparedness for this event, it had provided in the free-thinking innovative initiative of its people. What we were seeing was the partial fulfillment, in paraphrase, of that miracle foretold by Douglas tools
that had to be seen to be believed and understood.
MacArthur long before the war with the Japanese: "Democracy works and always work, because the people are allowed to think,
will
their
the
minds
initial
free, open,
onslaught,
it
talk,
and keep
and supple. As long as a democracy can withstand will find
ways
to strike back and eventually
it
will
money and at times does look inefficient, but in the final analysis, democracy as we know it in the United States is the best form of government that man has evolved." The Miracle Works operated from 0500 until dark, taking only a short break for chow (which was often cold), and then going right back to work. A night shift, made possible by stringing floodlights from a power unit, was attempted. On these occasions the mosquitoes almost drove them mad.
win.
It
costs
Lieutenant Brannon, hovering over the operation, stopped this effort for rest during the hours of darkness.
There were frequent problems, such as
22
a propeller missing
from a
crate, Scotch tape clogged in pressure and fuel lines, or electrical circuits hooked up incorrectly, causing the wheels to retract
when the flap switch was tripped. Such electrical troubles took time to analyze and correct but were usually solved by Enoch J. Dahlman, who turned out to be an aircraft
system genius. Every mechanic became production-conscious and section chiefs urged them on. Assembly smoothed out like a factory, all in the open in mud, rain, or sun, whatever the day brought. Master Sergeant Foye's organization would have put an air depot of its time to shame. There was a section for initial assembly, empennage, wing section, electrical
—
engine run-in, radio installation,
man
every
final inspection,
and
flight test. It
was
to his job and never a gripe.
Production moved smoothly, averaging better than one aircraft per The 67th Engineering Section truly became the "Miracle Works"
day.
where P-39s and P-400s appeared going smoothly the another. 'This
During
is
as
if
by magic. When production was calling from one section to
men pushed each other on,
war! Keep 'em rolling."
men began to come down with Some literally dropped to their knees with cramps, but stayed at their positions and would not ask for relief. Some had to be ordered back to camp to see "Doc" Soehner and even threatened with all
of this, the officers and
viruses and dysentery.
disobedience charges before sections. Fortunately,
New
finally leaving their places in
the production
Caledonia mosquitoes are not the anopheles
type, or malaria would have added to the problems.
A this
Pursuit Squadron such as the 67th
is
not normally required to do
type of aircraft assembly work, and certainly
is
not equipped to do
it.
The men assembled 30 aircraft in 29 days. When the 65th Materiel Squadron finally got their act together, they assembled 11. On one occasion, the 67th pushed an day. In the
the outstanding
through assembly from crate to
flight test in
one
would be impossible to pick 20 years in the Army I have
"It
men during this period, and in
The first airplane crate was delivered to Tonweek after the squadron disembarked at Noumea, New Caledonia,
never seen the touta a
aircraft
words of Master Sergeant Foye, like of it."
following the voyage from Australia; six days later the
ready for test
first
airplane
was
flight.
D.D. Brannon and John A. Thompson were the only experienced P-39 pilots. They took on the job of testing and passed on their experience to the other pilots, especially the young 2nd Lieutenants, who learned the pursuit pilot trade from them. On 28 March the pilots, mechanics, and anyone who could
make
it
out to the runway lined up to watch the
results of their hard labors.
Brannon went out
first test flight,
the
to the plane, put his para-
the cockpit seat, and did one last walk-around inspection. He climbed into the seat and started the engine. He ran the engine up while in place, checked the mags again, put flaps down, then up, moved the control
chute
in
He rolled out toward the end of the the brakes as he started to bring in held he runway. In takeoff position surfaces, and released the brakes.
engine power, then released the brakes. The plane rolled down the run-
23
"The Miracle Works," 67th Squadron Engineering, Tontouta Air Base, New Caledonia. Here in March of 1 942, the 67th Fighter Squadron assembled and tested their own aircraft, a major engineering
accomplishment
for
a fighter squadron.
way, gathering speed as
it
went on with full takeoff power. He let
long takeoff roll, gently raised the nose wheel, and the runway.
It
wings and nose.
He
and approached for a perfect landing.
line
and sat
at the
in
it
have a
fly itself off
climbed out of sight of the cheering
spectators along the runway. After 30 minutes of field
the plane
climbed and sounded perfect as the wheels folded up into
their places in the
the
let
flight,
he swung
in
over
He taxied back to the flight
the airplane while he talked to Sergeants Foye and Neblock
door as he wrote up a few items that would have to be done to the
aircraft as a result of the test flight. The production crew returned to their work with renewed vigor. It was about this time that Brannon's promotion to Captain came through, date of rank 1 March 1942. Also at about this time Army Air Corps Headquarters directed that all Pursuit Squadrons be renamed Fighter Squadrons, effective 15 May 1942 After a few airplanes were flying there was a request for a night mission over the defense positions around Noumea. A searchlight group
wanted to practice
finding and tracking an airplane in support of antiair-
craft artillery exercises.
On
a dark and starless night,
mission, tracking back and forth over
Noumea
Brannon took the
with the searchlight posi-
On one pass, a searchlight got on him and held the beam. Brannon moved out over Noumea Bay, hoping the operator would break off as was required for practice operations (because tions
working on him.
plane in
its
the powerful light difficult
24
beam filled the cockpit and blinded the pilot). He found it
to control the aircraft, and the light continued to hold him.
He
descended with the searchlight
still on him and finally had to bail out to avoid crashing into the bay, parachuting in the black waters while the plane crashed farther out in the bay. After a short time in the water he was picked
up by motor launch, but the 67th had lost one of its planes because a searchlight crew had failed to observe the 'timed break-off after light contact." "I was never so scared in my life," Brannon recalls. "That bay was full of sharks and as I waited in the water, hoping the motor launch would reach me in time, I swear I could see some of those devils swimming '
nearby."
As airplanes began to come off the production line, they were tested and put into service for the job of checking out all the Squadron pilots. This task fell mainly to Brannon and Thompson. Because there were no aircraft operation manuals to be studied, the experience had to be passed directly on to each of the pilots by Brannon or Thompson until other experienced pilots got
some time
in
the P-39/P-400. Most of the pilots were recent
graduates from flying school, with very airplane.
The
last
time they had been
in
little
time
in
any type of pursuit
an airplane was just before leaving
Baton Rouge for the voyage overseas. These pilots, with limited total flying to them, a hot time, approached their introduction to the P-39/P-400 with sensible caution and respect. The checkouts went pursuit plane well; pilots began to fly and become accustomed to the airplane at the same
—
—
time the production group was delivering new airplanes to the flight line. The whole checkout program was accomplished with only one acciwith dent. A pilot on a checkout ride made an approach he wasn't satisfied
and decided to go around for another try. He gave the engine full throttle, and not enough airspeed all at once, and with the steady high engine torque across the wing surfaces, the plane got out of control. of trees, cutting a
It
went
off
the
swath for about a
a grove When hundred yards, tearing off the landing gear and banging up the plane.
runway and roared through
25
the plane but a
bit
came
to a stop, the pilot stepped
shaken up.
He was awarded
wrecked plane and the
title
all
from the wreckage unharmed
the salvage spare parts from the
Lieutenant Lin wood Glazier, Air Corps Supply
Officer!
There were no other spare parts and requisitioning was a joke. All work was accomplished with parts from wrecked aircraft and the planes that had been designated as spare parts while still in the crates. Air Corps Supply became just a graveyard of wrecked airplanes and there weren't many of those to begin with. Whenever there was a crash, pilots and mechanics descended on the wreck like a pack of vultures, stripping repair
everything that could be easily and immediately removed. Aircraft instruments
P-400 export model were
were especially precious. The instruments in the of a poor grade. Many of the P-400s were flying
around without a complete set of instruments, a fault that would have grounded an airplane under normal circumstances. Defects written in the aircraft Form 1-A often carried remarks of a serious nature, such as "Fuel
gauge out, altimeter out." Any one of The clocks and gyro horizons almost never worked properly, a defect so universal that most pilots never bothered to make note of it. The mechanics responsible for these airplanes were always looking for a place to pick up a good instrument. Pilots learned to make the best of the planes as they were; flying and gauge out, tachometer
out, coolant
these defects should normally ground an airplane.
training had to
go on.
If
an altimeter was out, they estimated their altitude
or teamed up (during good weather) with a plane that had one.
If
a fuel
gauge was out, they flew by time, using the tanks in separate but equal periods during the flight. When a coolant temperature gauge was out, the pilot would carefully watch the oil temperature, since these instruments parallel information. When a tachometer was out, things were a little more difficult, but the pilots learned to cut back power and rpm
gave similar and after takeoff by
sound of the prop and engine, and by a look at the reduction
gear pressure gauge. Aircraft efficiency requires that set properly. tion,
rpm for
cruising be
When a pilot without a tachometer caught up with the forma-
he synchronized
his
rpm with the plane ahead of him by watching the
propeller and adjusting rpm until the propeller of the plane ahead seemed to
be standing through his
still,
own
or strobing very slowly in the direction of rotation, as seen
spinning propeller. All these tricks had to be learned by
trying them because the P-400 was a low-quality aircraft and its faults were
numerous.
The first planes out of assembly and test flight received rough treatment during the checkout training days; their mechanics worked wonders keeping them flying. One airplane seemed ready to go at all times and received a great deal of punishment during these early days of training and
bumpy landings. Finally it took a knockout punch, a wheels-up landing. A new pilot, returning from a familiarization flight, made a perfect approach, and as he rounded out for touchdown, he realized too late that his landing gear was not down. His flight companion, who landed and parked his
26
came out to the scene and while talking to the unfortunate pilot was taxiing back in and I could see your gear was not down 1 kept
airplane, said,
I
calling
-
you on the radio to get your gear down."
"I couldn't hear a
damn thing," said the bereaved pilot as he
looked at
damaged airplane, 'That damn horn was blowing so loud it was about to deafen me." There sat old Number 13 on its belly, skidded to a stop with his
the prop bent up and a wing crumbled, depleted in the center of the runway. It seemed "off to the graveyard" for the busted-up crate, but this was not to be. Diligent searching of the boneyard and supply provided the right set of parts to put Number 13 back to work. Soon, with a mongrel collection of parts, it was ready to go again. What a sight! One wing and some fuselage all
plates bore the dusty pastel of the British desert camouflage; the other
wing and fuselage plates were the olive drab of the U.S. Army Air Corps. The propeller had a mix of blades from different planes; it was field-balanced by drilling holes in a blade and filling them with lead, a precision task normally done only at the factory or air depot where three matched blades are precisely and delicately balanced. No job was too big or too delicate for the mechanics of the 67th.
Number 13 flew at first without a complete set of instruments, holes gaping where instruments should be. By normal means the pilot and crew chief eventually scrounged a full set of instruments for the airplane and christened this mongrel P-400 The Resurrection, which was painted on its side.
This beat-up P-400 kept
flying;
it
led a
charmed
life
at Guadalcanal
when most of the others of its vintage were shot up, shot down, or bombed and strafed out of existence. Artillery
shells and naval bombardment shells were duds; bombs dropped near it failed to explode. When its engine wore out, a more powerful engine from a P-39 was squeezed into it. The Resurrection just would not quit. As assembly and flight test delivered the remaining airplanes for operation, Brannon was convinced that the P-400 would never make it as
hitting near
it
an interceptor and pursuit fighter.
He had the engineering section strip one He hoped to lighten the plane
airplane of all the weight they could get off it.
by 700 to 1000 pounds to see if its performance as a fighter would improve. He especially wanted to shorten the time required to climb to altitude on an intercept mission.
ments, radio, all
The engineering
lights,
section took off armor plate, instru-
the starter system, and numerous other items.
When
the removed parts were weighed, they totaled close to 1000 pounds.
When
the job was finished and the plane rebalanced,
it
had to be
started by hand crank, winding up the inertial starter. Brannon flew the
plane on several tests and reported that
would not "make it"
planes, but
still
plane, nor
would
work and
it
in a
it
flew better than the heavier
curve of pursuit with a good fighter
get high enough, fast enough. With
all
the assembly
testing done on the airplanes, the pilots and ground crews of the
67th really knew everything that could be coaxed out of the P-39/P-400.
27
CHAPTER
4
Hold the Line at
New Caledonia While the crated aircraft were being delivered from "Miracle Works" was producing
aircraft,
Noumea and
the
other important business of the
Squadron was underway. By air observation and by jeep reconnaissance on the ground, the island was being closely examined for auxiliary airfield sites.
The
lessons of Pearl Harbor and the Philippines had
aircraft of the
shown
Squadron must be dispersed — not only on the
Tontouta, but to other
that
field at
as separate flights of the Squadron. Captains
fields,
Bruce, Hubbard, and Christian had been in the Philippines to see the
Japanese strafe and destroy their airplanes on the ground, do aerobatics over the field without opposition,
and slow-roll down the runway.
With the ever-present threat of a Japanese invasion of New Caledonia, the movement to other operational fields was of increasing importance as production numbers mounted. Of the three airfield sites on the island, Tontouta had been selected because air
it
was intended to be a relatively large
base and because one of the runways was
airfield site
was
at Plaines des Gaiacs,
struction had started.
The other was
now
completed. Another
midway up the
island,
where con-
a location in the northern, sparsely
Koumac; it was in the early stages of runway at Koumac was barricaded to prevent any
populated, end of the island at construction. At first the
possible landing there by the Japanese. Construction at Plaines des Gaiacs
was continued. All three of these fields
were
potentially high priority targets for the
Japanese and the squadron needed less conspicuous could be dispersed.
28
The
first
choice for a sub-base
fields to
was
which
flights
a location called
"Patsy," the the vicinity.
name taken from
It
was located
the
Army communications
switchboard
in
at Nepoui, eight or ten kilometers
from Plaines des Gaiacs. A detail of officers and men under John A. Thompson was sent to develop an airstrip for the first flight to be dispersed when planes came out of production and were test ready. As soon as checkout and familiarization for a pilot
Patsy for
final
were complete, the pilot and the plane were assigned to work and training. Here the planes had their guns
readiness
and boresighted on a homemade firing range; here each plane was made ready for combat operations. By air and ground reconnaissance, as aircraft production continued, fired
the 67th kept up
its
search for other locations that could be sub-base During these searches for suitable airfields,
airfields for additional flights.
the stunning beauty of the island of
from the
air,
was
New
pleasantly revealed.
Caledonia, as can only be seen
It lies in
peaceful waters protected
by the barrier reef like a sleeping stegosaurus with its central mountain peaks protruding skyward like the plates along its spinal column. The planes searched the entire island, often circling or flying low over the various military bivouac areas to let the troops know that the Air Corps was flying.
The 250-mile length and 30-mile width of New Caledonia is traversed over
The
its full
length by the rugged mountain range with few open passes.
pale blue waters of the coastline
lie
calm and undisturbed from the
white sand beaches of the shoreline to the barrier reef with white
surf.
The
plains
and
tain barrier in soothing
foothills rise sharply
shades of green.
its
foaming
toward the central moun-
On the mountains stand the white
towering cumulous clouds that invite a rat race through their lofty gray and
Fincher and flock. Lieutenant Deltis Fincher took an active interest in a he operated out of in New Caledonia. June 1942.
little
church near the sub-base
29
sunlit canyons.
Each peak, plateau,
67th Pursuit Squadron
The beauty
of
believe that
muddy, mosquito-infested hellholes airfields were chosen for the use
New
in
search of possible
Caledonia from the air
made
new airfield
sites.
almost impossible to
it
lay below.
As other officers
was examined by the
valley and plain
pilots of the
of
new
flights, details of
and men moved out to develop them as operational sub-bases. Each
new effort took more men away from Tontouta and the important work of assembling and testing the new aircraft. On top of these new burdens, the Tontouta began to increase, bringing additional work to the Squadron. Bombers were stopping on their long flights across the Pacific
air activity at
from Hawaii; these were B-17s enroute to some 5th Air Force Group, the first of many destined to be transferred to the South Pacific. They arrived low on gas and in a hurry to refuel for the flight on to Australia or other destinations. When they looked to the Air Corps for service, it was the 67th, the only Air Corps present. As with every other job, the 67th responded. Often the men worked long into the night, rolling out gasoline drums, hoisting them into position beside the wings, and pumping gas into the thirsty bombers' tanks with a hand-crank pump. little
The
pilots fixed
up a
shack abandoned by the runway construction crews on the airfield, set
up cots and mosquito nets, and established a place where the transient crews could get some rest. All of this involved duties never expected of a Fighter Squadron, but there was no Air Base Squadron that would normally do this work. The 67th established every air base function at Tontouta and operated them
until air
base units
finally
were formed
Along with the opening of new sub-base were spreading the 67th mighty thin. duties.
It
was
in April,
not quite a
month
to take over these
airfields,
after the
these extra tasks
Squadron had landed
in
New Caledonia, that Patsy, the first sub-base, became operational. It was a beautiful campsite along the Field, a beautifully
Nepoui River and across from
camouflaged
air strip. It
was
a
cow
it
was Patsy
pasture.
The base
by a slope leading down to the sea; on the other side it tucked up next to the mountains. The flat expanse of green pasture was left undisturbed, with no grading of bumps, so that the surface would
was bordered on one
side
be preserved and would retain the appearance of a cow pasture.
The pilots paced up and down the field for days seeking out the longest straight stretch, with the fewest bumps and dips. That dimension became the landing strip; it certainly could not be called a runway. The prevailing south wind kept a 45 degree cross wind on the landing strip at
an approach to land at Patsy was a tricky business. could not be
A
all
times and
landing approach
made over the mountains. The pilots developed a neat but On the downwind leg they skimmed along a
risky approach procedure.
ridge at
800
feet.
With the gear and
flaps
down, they would
start a steady
turn inside a bowl formed by the surrounding mountains. Staying as close as possible to the treetops, they gradually reduced speed to
drop through a
slot cut in the trees at the
120 mph
the throttle crossing the edge of the landing strip, and set her down.
30
to
approach end of the field, chopped
A spot
The Headquarters and Orderly Room of the 67th
Fighter
Squadron at Tontouta New Caledonia
1942.
few feet of the landing area with speed as low as possible was almost a necessity. There was just 3200 feet of rolling, dipping pasture ahead, and the plane behaved like a frightened kangaroo as the pilot wreslanding in the
first
it to a stop. The standard procedure for this type airplane would have been to glide at 150 mph and never make a turn with the wheels and flaps down. The 67th pilots at Patsy turned on the downwind leg at just above stalling speed, with wheels and flaps down, and glided at 120 mph. "That's
tled
the
way
roll,"
to get into Patsy without running out of airfield on the landing
Pete Childress
recalls.
Telephone wires had been lowered in the takeoff path. The runway was unmarked; on takeoff there was nothing ahead but grassy pasture. The aiming point was a brown tree at the far end of the field, in order to use the best part of the airstrip. The herd of cows drifted back and forth across the runway and cooperated by moving off the strip when they heard the aircraft engines running up. When conditions changed so that the field might lose its natural pasture camouflage, such as during wet weather, then the planes were taken over to Plaines des Gaiacs and maintained there until
the
field
dried out.
Across the island at Thio, another sub-base airstrip was opened in May. This new base took the name of "Shoe-Box" because it was a tight fit and because it was shaped like a shoe box. to put an airplane down on it
—
To a chance Japanese air observer, pasture at Patsy because field
was
it
didn't
it
would be as inconspicuous as the cow
make sense
to use
it
as an airfield.
The
a narrow, level, grassy strip in a valley with mountains on both
sides rising 3,000 to 5,000 feet at a sharp angle.
Shoe-Box had
its
own
individual tricky approach procedure.
The
ap-
31
proach started through a mountain pass about 10 miles from the runway at about 2000 feet.
The pilot would lower the landing gear and glide below the
it dropped steeply knob of a hill in the mountains, a landmark in the landing procedure, the flaps were lowered in a sharp 30-degree turn and the plane would land in the next hundred yards. The airfield, which could not be seen during the approach to the strip, was right beyond that little knob of a hill. The field at Shoe-Box was open only at the far end of its 3100 feet of runway. The landing strip was a ribbon of smooth ground about 30 feet wide in the center of the grassy area. The wings of an airplane stuck out over the edge of the smooth part of the strip; there were steep ruts on both sides. To keep the plane in one piece when landing, the pilot had to concentrate on staying in the smooth center of the strip. One pilot, returning from an early morning flight, was blinded by the rising sun and drifted off the narrow ribbon of smooth earth, wiping out the plane as he rolled off through the ruts. Another pilot, under the same circumstances, drifted off while making his approach, struck a mountainside, and was killed. Along with Shoe-Box, another field was being opened in May. This field, between Boulouparis and Bourake, was set up under the direction of D.D. Brannon. He took on the job to get away from Tontouta for a while
mountaintops, following the contour of the valley as
away. At a
little
m
The
32
old Air
Corps Supply area
at
Tontouta Air Base
New
Caledonia. 1942. (USAF)
and escape the problems of command being created by some of the "Philippines Group." When the field was opened, Brannon returned to Tontouta.
The area chosen for the strip was covered with scrubby brush growth, giving the field a naturally camouflaged location. It would be overlooked by an enemy as nothing but a wide spot in a country road. The trip was 3200 feet long with reasonably safe takeoff and landing path.
was
The main drawback
When
the brush was cleared for a runway area, the flat ground, resembling a flood plain, became a dustbowl. This quickly became the name dust.
The wind and propwash inundated the field with heavy dust. Pilots often made nearly blind takeoffs and landings in clouds of dust whipped up by the propwash from the preceding airplane.* of the base, "Dust-Bowl."
John Thompson was concerned that Patsy, supporting two full operational flights, was being overcommitted and overcrowded while waiting for
new
sub-bases to open. Plans for another base were pushed; by the end of fourth new sub-base was established. The base was at Dumbea; it
May a
completed the desired dispersal of the squadron's aircraft. The flight at Dumbea was called "Paradise" because of its comparatively ideal living conditions. Close to
Noumea, about 15
tages that had during the early days,
it
kilometers, with whatever advan-
was
certainly the paradise
among
the sub-bases operated by the 67th.
The sub-base at Dumbea was commanded by Jim Jarman and the flight usually had about 10 aircraft assigned. At Dumbea there was always a visitor or two from the other sub-bases for a quick shopping trip to Noumea or to the 9th Station Hospital on a more amorous quest. Paradise was field
enclosed by mountains with only a river valley opening out
Noumea
Bay. Dumbea/Paradise had a 2900 foot runway with very
another into
was
and mushy
weather. Because the far end of
wet weather and sandy in dry the runway was so soft, 300 feet of
Marsden
laid
slow ground.
It
soft
steel matting
had to be
in
over
it.
The
procedure was to hold the brakes, put on full power,
hope
was
only sensible takeoff let
go the brakes, and
getaway before reaching the soft ground. Once the pilot he started his gear up while making a 70-degree turn to go out
for a clean
off,
through the valley, slowly raising the
Dumbea had been planned
It
was
to be the
ever came to that, and was set up as a withdrawal the event of a Japanese invasion achieving some degree of success.
Bataan of the point in
flaps in the climbout.
as a base of last redoubt.
island,
if it
As the sub-bases began to operate in a coordinated defense effort, the pilots were required to become familiar with operation out of all airstrips operated by the Squadron, a precaution to ready the pilots in case it became necessary to redeploy or recover to one of these airstrips. Jim Jarman took a flight up to Patsy on one of these occasions; the trip was one of the highlights of the sub-base familiarization program.
*Shoe-Box, the little airstrip at Thio, was commanded by Lieutenant Al Dutton. Dust-Bowl, the airstrip near Boulouparis, was commanded by Lieutenant Bryan Brown.
33
Jarman, flying above a broken overcast, led his Patsy.
He found
and did a
down through
split-S
the vicinity of
the opening, in a typical fighter pilot's
letdown procedure, with the rest of the descent.
flight to
a break in the clouds over Plaines des Gaiacs, rolled over
race
flight following in a rat
He switched to the fullest tank for landing as they came down in a
screaming dive across the tion of Patsy.
field at
Plaines des Gaiacs, heading in the direc-
He was still throttled back to drop off speed as he approached
the Patsy airstrip.
As speed
diminished, he brought the throttle back in to
add power and enter the landing pattern. Nothing happened; his engine was dead. Jarman quickly decided on a downwind landing, since there was
no way he could make
it around to a normal approach. Heading for the landing strip, downwind, he got the gear down. Still at high speed, he put down a little flaps, then a little more flaps, and finally full
flaps.
He came
feet of
over the end of the
in
runway and, with the
strip,
tailwind,
touched down
his
the
first
used up every inch of the
turning off at the end into the deployment area.
back over his shoulder to see
in
As he
few
field,
turned, he looked
whole flight proceeding to land downwind
failed to pass on the word by radio that he was deadstick and making an emergency landing. Airplanes were land-
behind him. In his
ing,
difficulty,
he had
with pilots unfamiliar with the
field at
Patsy, and going in
all
directions
as they rolled, down the strip.
They all made it, but it was a hairy landing exercise. The full tank that to for landing was full of distillate instead of aviation gasoline. To correct the situation, it was only necessary to drain the tank
Jarman had switched and put
in
The
good gas.
net result of the total sub-base operations was a definite plus for
the 67th. Operating from different fields in a reasonably well-camouflaged
environment, the Squadron tied the island together defense operation, really learning
how to get
in a
coordinated air
the most out of the airplane.
point-to-point and air communications which smoothly
They developed
held the air defense operation together.
'The
New
four
Caledonia sub-bases tied together a significant de-
fense capability/' said Jarman in an October 1980 interview. "It covered a large geographical area; the flights
became
integrated, and a good, coordi-
nated operation was established.
"You have
called Philippines
believe
were happening fast and some command shortcomings; the so-
to realize that at the time things
the Squadron was really suffering
we were
Group gave us
a hard time in finding our identity, but
I
able to get in our training, handle the alerts, and develop
I don't know if we could have done better if we been on the same base. However, we did operate; it was a good idea and it worked." One might wonder why the 67th Fighter Squadron chose such difficult sub-bases from which to operate. The answer is that New Caledonia has such rugged terrain there are few locations on the island where any degree
an excellent island defense.
had
all
of natural camouflage
34
is
available, along with
enough
suitable
ground for a
camp and an airstrip. Detection by enemy observation was a distinct possibility in
the earliest days on
New Caledonia.
In July, the need for air cover at Dust-Bowl and Shoe-Box was ended and the fields were closed. These and the operations from Dumbea were
moved to Nehoui at the northern end of the island. The field at Nehoui, also commanded by Jim Jarman, was built by cutting a 3000-foot runway through a tree-covered area. The takeoff heading of the runway was the only direction available for construction. The prevailing wind placed a crosswind on the runway at
all times. It was necessary to take off toward the face of a mountain and turn 90 degrees after takeoff for climbout. After
operating out of
Dumbea and Shoe-Box,
this
procedure was accepted
without comment. After these sub-bases, the 67th pilots were prepared to operate from the most unimaginable airfield conditions.
Each
of the sub-bases operated with a flight of about 10 planes; Flight
Commanders ran them
like
separate
little
squadrons. These flights re-
ported to the Squadron Headquarters at Tontouta, which,
in reality,
was
operating like a Fighter Group Headquarters organization. At Tontouta
all
the administration, personnel, logistics, and major maintenance support for the Squadron
was accomplished,
as well as
many of the
air
base functions.
Intercept Officers for the island's Interceptor Control board, which oper-
ated at Noumea, were also provided.
The Air Corps Supply area of the 1 3th
Air
Depot Group
at
New Caledonia. 27 August
1
943. (USAF)
35
ity
Every airplane in the Squadron was kept in commission by the ingenuand resourcefulness of the ground crews. There were few spare parts, if
any, and as airplanes began to show wear, the crew chiefs made do with what they had (such as wrapping frayed ignition harness with common friction tape able).
Many
—
a violation of Technical Orders, but the only solution avail-
a pilot felt a screaming
lump
in his throat
when an engine
missed a few times due to a spark jumping through a leaky harness.
The aircraft radio equipment was cheap and inadequate to hold Squadron communications together over the length and breadth of the island
them their "Mickey Mouse Radios." It became common practice to zero-beat each aircraft radio with a frequency meter every day and with each ground station, thereby assuring accurate tuning. The cockpit-to-tail antenna was reluctantly removed from the airplanes and an antenna extending from the tail to the two wingtips was installed. This antenna was a better match for the transmitter, putting more available transmitter power out on the antenna. The extra length made reception possible for a plane operating anywhere in the island area. Results were good from a communications point of view. The antenna was area; the radio repairmen called
supported by considerably
flexible insulators at the tail
more drag than the
dive, the wire stretched out
and wingtips, but presented
old antenna. In a
gunnery or bombing
and sometimes came home dangling.
As the pilots of the Squadron gained experience and the sub-base were opened, a sort of competition developed. The pilots at Patsy-
fields
painted a fierce shark's mouth, similar to the symbol of the Flying Tigers in China, under the noses of their planes.
The Dumbea pilots painted a pair of
on a blue background near the tail of their planes; they called "Pair-a-dice." The Dust-Bowl planes had their prop spinners
rolling dice
their field
painted red. Painted on the doors of most of the planes
was the
colorful
"Game Cock" insignia designed for the 67th by Walt Disney. On many a day the red noses of Dust-Bowl were out, sliding down the backs of the beautiful cumulonimbus clouds that billow up over the mountains of New Caledonia. Sometimes the shark-mouthed gang from Patsy would jump them and a running dogfight would commence through the towering halls and corridors of the giant puffy clouds, a demonstration of
the dogfighting and gunnery tactics they were learning daily in their combat training.
As
became familiar with their planes and felt that they really belonged to them, names that told a little about the man flying them appeared on the sides of the fighters. Such names as Whistling Britches, Resurrection, Hell's Bell, Eager Eagle, Southern Belle, Flying Pole, Corkey, Cicero Kid, and L 'il Jo were coined. Training commenced as soon as checkouts were completed and flights began to operate from their bases. Brannon and Thompson tried to stanpilots
dardize operating procedures for handling and care of the aircraft, and to
schedule an even distribution of training time. Since there were no tow targets available for practicing aerial gunnery, arrangements
36
were made
with a Marine Fighter Squadron
in the
New
Hebrides for some training
Marine Corps Fighter Squadron VMF 212, stationed on the island of Efate, agreed to exchange planes and pilots to help in aerial gunnery training for pilots of the 67th. Over a period of about a month, approximately four planes per week from the 67th flew the 325 miles over water from Tontouta to Efate. The Marines also brought their Grumman F4F Wildcats to New assistance.
Caledonia. Their training
was passed on
to the pilots of the 67th as the up in dogfights, joining and breaking off simulated combat. Under the leadership of Major Harold
Wildcats and Airacobras mixed
engagements
in
it
W. Bauer, "Injun Joe," Commander taught the
of
VMF
212, the Marines patiently
Army pilots their techniques of overhead and high-side passes in
simulated attack.
The Marine pilots also taught the Army pilots to engage a fastmoving target approaching it from any angle, how to judge the lead when a target was in the gunsight in order to have the target and the tracer bullets meet in the same place while holding a curve of pursuit, and how to shoot with deadly accuracy. "If there was anything to be known about aerial gunnery, Joe Bauer knew it," Jim Jarman recalls. Many warm friendships, later to be renewed at Guadalcanal, were formed between the pilots of VMF 212 and the 67th. This intensive training continued after the sessions with the Marines were completed. The 67th obtained tow targets from the Marines and an old P-43 that showed up on New Caledonia was used to tow the target for aerial gunnery. Brannon or Thompson flew the towplane and the other flew gunnery to observe the performance. In addition, they frequently flew unique shadow gunnery missions. In these sessions, one plane flew at a constant altitude, casting a shadow on the water, and the other planes would dive down, shooting at the shadow. This was an excellent method for checking pilot accuracy. With proper allowance for lead in his gunsight, the pilot could see the splashes of his ammunition in or near the front of the shadow. "We learned shadow gunnery quite by accident," recalled Dale Brannon. "While out on a tow target mission, we realized that the shadow of an airplane could be seen clearly on the water. Our gunnery mission area was along the beach, not far from Tontouta. The water between the shore and the barrier reef was calm and clear, ideal for carrying the smooth shadow of an aircraft flying overhead. At this point the 67th discovered that it was possible to fire into the shadow as it carried along the water. Each pilot fired at the this
shadow, watching the lead and ammunition hitting the water. In could tell if his curve of pursuit was hitting the target, and he
way he
could adjust. After a few such missions a pilot could judge the curve of pursuit and lead to
make
sure he held his curve
when
his
ammunition was
sooner using on the target. It was necessary for the pilot to break off a this method, in order to pull out and miss the water. This exercise improved his judgment when later flying on the tow target. "Dive bombing and skip bombing were practiced on an old freighter little
37
gone aground. The remaining hulk was on the outer reef off Tontouta Bay. The 67th laid lots of sand-filled bombs on that old hulk, that had
them in or diving them in. The 67th got pretty good at dive bombing and skip bombing and, when aiming at Japanese ships and barges later on, that training paid off," Brannon recalls. Finally Brannon made each of them dogfight with him to size up the skipping
39
capability of each pilot, hoping
some
of
them would beat him
at his
own
game. Readiness of the 67th progressed with enthusiastic vigor in spite of game of musical chairs in the position of Squadron Com-
the fact that the
mander was ing. all,
Up
still
going on and that administration and policy were confus-
to this time there had
Brannon pushed the
around
New Caledonia,
been
pilots hard;
five
changes
in
command. Through
he knew they were not here just to
boring holes in the
air.
He wanted them
it
fly
ready for
what was coming. They were. Brannon 's position among the pilots could be understood by listening to them talk. As they discussed flying techniques, capabilities of aircraft, or mechanical problems, many opinions would be cast about in the conversa" When Brannon's opinion tion until someone said, "Well, D.D. says. was discussed, the subject was soon closed in unanimous agreement. John A. Thompson and Jim Jarman enjoyed a similar rapport with the officers and men of the squadron. Together, these three were the mentors of the developing fighter pilots and the strong, experienced group of enlisted .
.
specialists of the squadron.
In late July 1942, the
everyone moved play
its
in to
Squadron closed its sub-bases permanently, and
Tontouta. Planning was underway for the 67th to
role in the invasion of Guadalcanal. Special preparations
were being
who were now spending time in sessions. The 67th began its work of
studied by Captains Christian and Brannon,
Noumea
for briefings
scheduling the
and planning
movement
and logistic preparaground crewman and supplies to the island,
of airplanes to Guadalcanal
tions necessary to get the
which was now known to the men alerted for assignment to the operation only as Cactus, its code name.
40
CHAPTER
Ready
for
5
an Offensive?
Long before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, industrial production of the United States was supplying assistance to the European Allies facing the German war machine. Declaration of war only served to confirm that policy. The President's clandestine commitments had at least stimulated U.S. industry so that when war finally came, the lead time for obtaining equipment and trained troops had been shortened somewhat. Yet the wherewithal for fighting a war was still dangerously short. The British insisted that all war materiel be routed to Europe and the Middle East. President Roosevelt was so Europe-oriented that he
just
happen. Allocations from the American war potential to the Pacific probably never exceeded 10 percent. This emphasis on Europe, about
let
it
overplayed beyond
justifiable levels, severely penalized forces in the Pa-
who paid for every shortage with loss of opportunity for an advantage
cific,
and with extra loss of
By June
of 1942,
life.
even with the overpowering interest
in
Europe, the
necessary to admit that a limited offensive against the
Allies found it Japanese, whose advance deep into the South Pacific threatened supply lines to New Zealand and Australia, was now necessary. With a shoestring
transports, cargo ships, trained troops, and supplies, plans proceeded for a campaign which, by force of impoverished conditions, must be a limited one. An offensive move was necessary if Pacific Forces were to halt the Japanese threat to vital communications
complement of available war ships,
growing threat of Japanese moves into more island objectives scattered south toward New Zealand and Australia. Allied lines.
There was
a clear and
41
42
TABLE OF DISTANCES
Pearl
Horbor
3,087
Woke Aral PMOCMX
Nondi,
1,768 1,130
Fiji
i
•S'.AMOS
Sydney, Australia
1,547
Auddond, New Zealand
1,832
Manila, PM.pp.ne Itlonds
2,753
HonjKonj
3,303
Tontouta,
New
Caledonia
Gown k*o
834 557
Espmtv Santo
1,651
Jmn
2,328
Tmmwm
1^03
694 COOK ISLANDS 2,610
Port Moresby.
New Gu.noo
763
43
New Caledonia,
and the New Hebrides were already under direct threat. This reluctant decision led to a campaign to stop the Japanese in the British Solomon Islands and to the long and bloody struggle, holdings in the
Fijis,
manpower,
against terrible odds with limited equipment and
session of Guadalcanal.
It
was
for the pos-
which some national and military
a fight in
men on Guadalcanal, refusing to send more men, and planes for fear of loosing them when the island was retaken
leaders broke faith with the ships,
by the Japanese.
As early as March of 1942, the President directed General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz to share responsibility for the vast area of the Pacific Ocean. Their mission was to hold the islands already in hands and defend communications
Allied
lines to Australia. In addition,
they were to plan, when possible, to execute operations against the Japa-
The speed
nese.
of the Japanese offensive,
which began on 7 December
1941, was awesome and had placed Allied organization
in
the Pacific back
to zero.
After the capture of Rabaul on
New Britain Island, 23 January 1942, New Guinea and all the Solo-
the Japanese were within bombing range of
mon
Islands chain.
They began moving down
the Solomons in
March
of
1942, building fighter strips as they went. At the same time, they were assembling naval forces to attack Port Moresby, an Allied base
New
in
eastern
A
segment of this force landed at Tulagi, just across the Sealark Channel from Guadalcanal in the southern Solomons, 3 May 1942. Here they established a seaplane base, preparing strong defenses for the Guinea.
island
and
its
excellent harbor facilities.
As the Japanese expeditionary
force
was enroute
to attack Port
Moresby, their immediate objective, the force was intercepted by United States Naval and Air Forces in the Coral Sea (actually, the Solomon Sea). In this naval battle, though indecisive, the Japanese were taken by surprise and sustained heavy losses, including the loss of a Shoho.
The U.S. Navy
lost the aircraft carrier
light aircraft carrier, the
Lexington. The Japanese
Navy withdrew from
this engagement without pressing the attack on Port Moresby, which they rescheduled.
The commander
of the Japanese
Combined
Fleet, assisted by the
Japanese 17th Army, was charged with the invasion of Midway, to be followed by the invasion of
New Caledonia, Fiji,
and Samoa, bringing their
Midway did not go They were badly injured, losing four aircraft carriers, the Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu, with 250 aircraft and many experienced carrier pilots. They withdrew without pressing the invasion of direct threat closer to Australia. In June, the attack on
well for the Japanese.
Midway. Shortly after this disappointment, Japanese planners put the scheduled invasions of Midway,
New
began to strengthen the base
Caledonia,
at Tulagi
Fiji,
and Samoa on hold. They
and to build an
airfield
Lunga River on the grassy Lunga Plain. The Guadalcanal was scheduled to be completed by 15 August.
canal near the
44
on Guadalairfield
on
airfield at Lunga Plain, shortly before the invasion of Guadalcanal. Taken by a B-17 during a surveillance flight by the 1 1th Bombardment Group, U.S. Army Air Corps, in July of 1942. Mount Austen, known as the "Grassy Knoll," can be seen in the background. (National Archives)
The Japanese
Every move by the Japanese, from New Britain down along the Solochain, was watched and evaluated by the Australian Coast Watching Service. Their intelligence reports were speedily passed into Allied intelligence channels. Japanese movements as well as their progress on the airfield at Lunga Plain were regularly reported.
mon
Allied contingency planning for an offensive into the
Solomons had been underway since May. A number of plans were presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by both the Navy and Army planners. The most prominent of these was an Army plan for an offensive to take Rabaul, striking deep into the Japanese chain of islands and depriving the Japanese of the secure bases necessary to strike at Australia and the Allied-held island bases.
Army
plans differed considerably from those of the Navy, but the Chiefs
ulti-
mately agreed that the taking of Rabaul would be accomplished by a progressive advance beginning with a thrust into the Southern Solomons.
The "war dance" by the high brass over who would have overall command would have been considered comical if it had not been for the seriousness of the decision and the high stakes involved. (The story of of the offensive
this rivalry
would, in
The general
itself,
make an
interesting book.)
plan and matters of
command were
Admiral Ernest J. King and General George C. Marshall
settled
between
in a joint directive
on 2 July 1942. It was to be a Navy operation until the landing force development phase was completed and secured. Admiral Nimitz was directed to proceed with the operation, code name Watchtower, for an offensive into the Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands. He also received
45
guidance concerning the use of
Army
aircraft to support the operation.
Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, with headquarters at Noumea, was to
command the operation; Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher was to command the Naval task force, and Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commander of the 1st
Marine Division, was ordered to prepare for a landing
in
the
Solomons.
Marine Division had just arrived in Wellington, New Zealand. Because the Division had not been scheduled for a combat operation, the ships in which they arrived were not loaded for the sequential unloading necessary to support landing force development. The dock workers at Wellington had picked this time to strike in a labor dispute and would not handle the ships' cargo. The men of the 1st Marines unloaded the ships and reloaded them in landing-force combat order, working around the clock in eight-hour shifts until the job was done. The Marines had some colorful expletives punctuating their descriptions of the dockworkers at Welling-
The
ton,
1st
known
as the "warfies."
Navy command, Admirals King and Ghormley had implied a fear that the Army might not deliver full support to an operation commanded by the Navy. In describing events over 40 years past, with the ultimate outcome already known, there is danger that the full impact of events in detail, as they really happened in the most desperate In pressing their insistence for a
may not be appreciated.
days of the campaign, deliver
on
its
commitments
In retrospect, the
Army did
— Admiral Ghormley was the one
to give
fainthearted support.
Army
to renege in the eyes of the Army Air Cactus and unaware of the U.S. Army and Australian offensive opening in New Guinea. It is clear, however, that the actions by the 11th Bombardment Group (B-17s) in the sea battles and Initially
Corps
men
the
did
seem
biting the bullet at
over the islands represented enthusiastic support.
The immediate commitment of the 67th Fighter Squadron, as soon as operations off Henderson Field were possible, represents continued enthusiastic
support by the Army, as does the arrival of the 164th Infantry
October and,
later,
in
the arrival of the Americal Division under Major
General Alexander M. Patch. That someone was reneging seems clear, for the impoverished conditions under which the 67th Fighter Squadron and the Marines in the line conducted their
they can get for an offensive
enough fingerpointing
to
command
initial
operations were as bad as
that refused to give up.
go around regarding weak support
in
There
is
the early
days of the campaign.
When
the 67th Fighter Squadron
was placed digroup, MAG-23. They repre-
was committed,
it
Marine Division's air unit committed to the invasion of Guadalcanal and remained so until the 164th Infantry was committed in late October. The selection of Admiral Ghormley to command Watchtovjer is beyond comprehension. He was against the plan from the start, openly rectly under the 1st
sented the only
believing
46
it
Army
to have
little
chance of success.
Command of the
landing force
General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commander of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, during the Guadalcanal Campaign. Of all the "brass" in the task force team, he was the hero. Taken while he was Commandant of the Marine Corps. (USMC)
responsible for taking and holding Guadalcanal and Tulagi was General
Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding the 1st Marine Division, Reinforced.
Of
all
the brass responsible for taking and holding the
foothold in the Solomons, this
man was
the hero.
overextended from lack of support and sputtering to the
When
first
Allied
command was he made it look
his
in place,
enemy like a Cadillac even though he knew, for the time being, it was
running on a jeep engine.
47
Ghormley placed Admiral Frank J. Fletcher seaborne invasion force, with his
flag
command of the entire
in
on the Saratoga. This was another
command on the The other two commanders in the task force were Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, commanding the Naval Transport force directly supquestionable assignment, inflicting another layer of timid
operation.
porting the amphibious invasion, and Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, com-
manding the support
carriers, three
groups
built
around Saratoga, Enter-
and Wasp. This Watchtower plan was placed into operation over Ghormley's objection.
prise,
The immediate prospects for an active campaign and the need for a command organization to coordinate the support of the Army ground and air forces caused the establishment of a new command, United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, USAFISPA. On 14 July 1942, Major General Millard F. Harmon, an Air Corps Officer, was appointed Commanding General. He was later promoted to Lieutenant General.
Harmon took responsibility for all
of the
South
administration and supply of
Pacific Area. His headquarters
was
Noumea, New Caledonia; the two got along very well. Harmon's efforts were immediately positive; he was izer
and gave the
Army
Army units in
close to Ghormley's at
a brilliant organ-
activities in the theater the swift kick in the butt
they needed to become a smooth command.
He pushed Army support for
the campaign. His abilities later assured a smooth transition of command at
Guadalcanal to the Americal Division after the island was declared secure
by General Vandegrift.
As plans proceeded for the invasion, there were only 32,000 Army ground troops in the South Pacific. These could not be committed to was not enough shipmoved they were on.
reinforce the Marines to attack Guadalcanal; there
ping space available in the Pacific and troops in place could not be
without replacements to defend the islands
Admiral Nimitz, pulling as much strength as he could into the opera-
Marine Air Squadrons to the South Pacific, transferred 1 1th Bombardment Group (B-17) was moved from Hawaii to New Caledonia and other Army Air units were committed to area coverage. The 1st Marine Division was heavily reinforced, containing units of the 5th Marines, 2nd Marines 1st Battalion, and the 3rd Marine Defense Battalion, to provide antiaircraft and coast defense. The 67th Fighter Squadron, Army Air Corps (P-39/P-400 Airacobra), was committed to meet the Marine Fighter Squadron, VMF 223 (F4F Wildcat), and Dive Bomber Squadron VMSB 232 (SBD Dauntless), at Guadalcanal as soon as the airfield was captured and combat operations from the field were tion,
ordered
five
aboard aircraft carriers. The
possible.
For coordination
of ground-based air support to the operation,
all
were placed under Rear Admiral John S. McCain. About 100 aircraft were at his disposal: 35 B-17s and 22 B-26s in New Caledonia and the Fijis; 38 fighter planes, P-39/P-400s of the 67th Fighter Squadron at Tontouta Air Base, New Caledonia; and a mix of U.S. Navy and ground-based
48
air
forces
New Zealand Air Force aircraft based at New Caledonia, Fijis, and the New Hebrides. Taking this less-than-ideai scrub team, he squeezed the Royal
best coverage possible out of
it.
On 25 July, McCain divided his total resources into seven task groups. One group, comprising the 69th Army Bombardment Squadron, The 67th Army Fighter Squadron, a New Zealand Air Force Squadron, and two Navy PBY Catalinas, scouted 400-mile sectors from New Caledonia. The second group, consisting of the 11th Heavy Bombardment Group, Army, operating B-17s from New Caledonia, Efate, Espiritu Santo, and the Fijis, scouted
between New Caledonia and the Solomons, and west of the Solomons, also carrying out bombing attacks on Tulagi and Guadalcanal until D-Day. The third group,
two PBYs detached from the seaplane tender
ated out of Ndeni to search northeast of the Solomons.
Curtiss, oper-
The
fifth,
the
MacKinac and its PBY patrol planes, began a search of the east coast of Malaita on D Minus Three. The sixth group consisted of Marine Fighter Squadron VMF 212, F4F Wildcats, and Scouting Squadron D-14, SBD Dauntlesses, moved to Espiritu Santo to aid the bombing effort out of Efate. The seventh, Marine Observation Squadron 251, was asseaplane tender
bombardment effort out of Espiritu Santo. McCain planned that from D Minus Five to D Plus Four, aircraft would
signed to assist the
flights over eastern New Guinea, KaNew Georgia. Combat aircraft were ready to
be conducting daily reconnaissance vieng, and the eastern tip of
strike at Japanese naval vessels within a 550-mile radius of Port Moresby.
From D-Day
to
D Plus Four, when the transports would be unloading the
amphibious forces at Guadalcanal and Tulagi, Allied
aircraft
would attack
Rabaul and Kavieng area. At the same time, Buka was to be placed under attack to prevent the Japanese from refueling there.
The amphibious attack force that was to hit the beaches was split into two groups under General Vandegrift. The Guadalcanal group commanded by Vandegrift himself contained Combat Group A, the 5th Marines, Reinforced (less Combat Team Two), the 1st Marines, Reinforced, and a support group, a total strength of about 11,300 men. Intelligence indicated they would be facing an enemy force of up to 7,000. The northern group, concentrating on Tulagi, was commanded by Brigadier General Rupertus and contained the Florida Island group, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines, the
Combat Team Two of the 5th Marines, and a detachment of the 3rd Defense Battalion. The Gavutu Island group contained the 1st Parachute Battalion acting as infantry. The combined northern group strength was about 3900 men. Division reserve was the Tulagi group, 1st Raider Battalion,
2nd Marines, Reinforced, which were committed during the beachhead landing period.
As D-Day approached, Admiral Fletcher ordered the task force to rendezvous southeast of the Fiji Islands on 26 July. The expeditionary force practiced landing maneuvers and support operations, with aircraft carriers deparparticipating, at Koro Island in the Fijis. The ships then refueled for that fortunate is it ture on 31 July. With limited Navy strength available, 49
Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Commander of U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA), during the Guadalcanal Campaign. His importance to the campaign has never been fully appreciated. He was lost during a noncombat flight over the Pacific Ocean area; reported missing on 26 February, 1945. (USAF)
50
the three carriers
— Enterprise, Saratoga, and Wasp— were assigned
support the invasion.
to
The
task force regrouped after rehearsal and refueling operations and were at a position off Guadalcanal about 15 miles west of Cape Esperance very early in the morning on 7 August. The task force had proceeded to this point under concealing weather and radio silence.
tween 0600 and 0630 the transport groups
Be-
arrived, undetected, at their
respective objective locations to debark the amphibious landing forces off The Guadalcanal force stood off the beach
—
Tulagi and Guadalcanal.
—
Beach Red between Lunga Point and Koli Point. The Japanese were taken by surprise. Very little was known about the objective area in the Southern Solomons and no current maps and charts were available. From an intelligence point of view, it was a stab in the dark. Hurried aerial photo expeditions by B-17s helped produce updated maps for the invasion and battle planning; none of them ever reached Vandergrift's people. A mosaic of aerial photos prepared by General MacArthur's command was lost in the mails at, or enroute
to,
New Zealand and never reached the
first available battle
shown plans.
1st
Marine
sketched by a Marine
Division.
officer
The
based on
former Guadalcanal civilians and Australian coast covered the area of the beachhead, but turned out to be inaccurate. Mount Austen, referred to as the Grassy Knoll, was with
interviews
watchers. pitifully
map was one
It
as only
When
two miles
inland and
the landing was made,
was to be taken in Vandegrift's early Mount Austen was found to be over
was dropped as an immediate objective. In general, the Solomon Islands were a great unknown to the men of the invasion force. This island chain is made up of a double row of mounfour miles inland and
tainous islands rising out of the sea in a northwest-to-southeast direction
with a sheltered expanse of water lying between the double row of islands;
was known by everyone as "the slot." Beginning in the northwest with Buka and Bougainville, there is Shortlands, Choiseul, Santa Isabel, Malaita, this
Vella Lavella,
New
Georgia, Russels, with Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Florida,
Gavutu, San Cristobal, and Rennel at the southeastern end of the Slot. The north coast of Guadalcanal has beaches suitable for amphibious landing, but
no harbors. The waters lying nel, later
known
as "Iron
off
the beaches,
known
as the Sealark Chan-
Bottom Bay," are calm. They served
as an
anchorage for the supporting vessels.
At 0613, naval bombardment of the beachhead area commenced at both Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Carrier aircraft arrived on schedule and joined the attack. The landing at Guadalcanal was virtually unopposed. Carrier aircraft from the Enterprise and Saratoga were shielding the operation and received few requests from ground troops for air strikes. In a to encounter as many as 7,000 enemy troops and 1500 Korean coolies who 600 troops, the Marines found only had been working on the airfield. They all promptly took to the hills. Across Iron Bottom Bay, at Tulagi, resistance was fierce, Marines casualties were high, and the enemy was not mopped up for several days. situation
where they expected
51
I
By dusk, the Beach Red landing force had advanced about 3500 yards and by 2000 that evening 2000 troops were ashore. General Vandegrift ordered the 1st Marines to attack along the Lunga River the next morning and leave Mount Austen for another time. On the morning of 8 August they
and across the Lunga and took the village of Kokum By 1600 the airfield was taken by the 1st Battalion. Supplies, equipment, and facilities captured were most welcome in view of the meager supply situation. More would have been captured extended
lines along
against light
enemy
resistance.
except for the wanton destruction of everything in sight by the Marine troops as they moved in. By 9 August there were 10,900 troops ashore, about half of the supplies and materiel expected, and the beach was so clogged that the beachmaster had an impossible logistic situation.
The invasion was a surprise to the Japanese, but they were not long in delivering an angry response with both air and naval forces. These Japa-
nese attacks further delayed the snarled unloading operation and
efforts to
100 on 7 August, a Coast Watcher somewhere in the northern Solomons reported 'Eighteen bombers heading south over my station." Shortly after this, another report was received from Pilot Officer Cecil John Mason, RAAF, a Coast Watcher on Bougainville, that a large clear the beach. At
1
'
number
of planes
was
flying south.
At 1320 the
first
force of 18 bombers
flew over the landing area, striking at the ships in the transport area; one
Mugford, sustained light damage and 20 casualties. aircraft, 10 Aichi dive bombers, arrived at inflicted by these planes, but the necessary and boats denied valuable unloading the transports evasive maneuvers by ship, the destroyer
The second group of enemy 1500. There was no damage time.
At noon on the following day, 8 August, 40 twin-engine bombers Two ships were lost. The destroyer Jarvis, hit to leave the area under her own power and managed torpedo, by a forward attacked the transport area.
proceeded toward the southwest, hoping to make it to Noumea for repairs; she was never heard from again. The transport Elliotwas set afire when an enemy plane crashed on her deck. She was beached and destroyed; the
were taken aboard the Hunter Liggett. Twelve of the attacking planes were shot down in the vicinity of the ships, two more were downed by ground fire from the shore, and still others were shot down to the west, having been intercepted by carrier planes. Seven American planes were survivors
lost.
The burning
Elliot took with
that had not yet been unloaded.
it
The
a large store of materiel and supplies light of the fire
exposed cruisers and
destroyers that were later attached by an advancing
enemy
naval task
force.
task force had been reported as they gathered at Rabaul on the morning of 8 August. This force sailed down the Slot; at 1800, Fletcher reof their approach was received. At 1807 Admiral
The enemy
warning
that quested permission from Ghormley to withdraw the aircraft carriers He day. the during cover air providing had been operating to the south,
indicated that he
was low on fuel and air action had reduced his fighter force
53
from 99 to 78 planes. Ghormley consented; the carriers departed 8 August.
When informed that Fletcher and the carriers were to be withdrawn, Admiral Turner informed Vandegrift at a meeting aboard his flagship
McCawleydX about midnight on 8 August that without air cover, he would have to withdraw the transports. Upon hearing that Fletchers warships and transports were to be withdrawn, Vandegrift was livid. His plans called for the transports to
remain offshore
until 1 1
August.
He was
being
left
bare with some of his troops and half of his materiel and supplies still aboard the transports.
Meanwhile, the Japanese task force previously reported was approaching Savo Island undetected. At 0145, 9 August, a seaplane launched
from one of the Japanese cruisers dropped flares over the transport area and the Japanese warships slipped deep into the protected zone unde-
They fired torpedoes, illuminated the targets by flares from aircraft firing at will on the ships on both sides of Savo Island. The Japanese commander then departed north so as to be out of range of our tected.
and searchlights,
aircraft in daylight;
had he stayed around to press
his advantage, the result
would have been even more devastating to the U.S. Navy. The Battle of Savo Island was the worst defeat ever suffered by the U.S. Navy. The Vincennes, Quincy, Canberra, and Astoria were
lost.
The Chicago and
Ralph Talbot were damaged. Admiral Turner's warships and the transports departed from the Sealark Channel in the afternoon of 9 August.
support and the ships of the amphibious force
The departure
left
of the air
the 1st Marine Division,
alone in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area, exposed to Japanese attacks, without air
cover or naval surface support.
Enemy
bases at Rabaul, Buka, and
Shortlands were within easy striking distance and the 1st Marine Divison
was besieged. U.S. Marines are bitter to this day over this turn of events.
Fletcher had planned before
all
They know
along to pull out the carriers and the transports
D Plus Three. The ships were refueled after the rehearsal at Fiji; the
excuse of being low on fuel aircraft losses
is
questionable,
if
not ridiculous. In addition, his
had been within the acceptable range. One could strike up a
who was memories of being left exposed on the beach. In the words of one old Marine Colonel, "Ghormley and Fletcher screwed the Marines at Guadalcanal. They ran off with half of our equipment and left us bare-assed." "Always Fueling Fletcher," he was sometimes called, reminiscent of a similar departure from Guam for fuel, where he also left the conversation in any bar, bus station, or airport with a Marine there, with bitter
Marines to their
fate.
Ghormley now took the position that a carrier task force would not be risked until there were planes and aviation gas at Cactus to provide protection, the "chicken or egg" syndrome. He ordered the carrier groups to operate well south of Guadalcanal to strike against only priority Japanese targets, and protect the lines of
54
communication to Noumea and the
New
The Guadalcanal beachhead
in
early
August 1942.
Hebrides. Admiral McCain's land-based bombers and other aircraft continued as a scouting force. General Harmon was concerned that the invasion had been planned as an amphibious landing without sufficient means to follow up the beachhead advantage and without a central lishing
an
air
the Japanese-held territory.
mount an
theme
for estab-
base and American stronghold from which to continue against
He
believed that the American forces should
intensive air and surface operation to destroy Japanese forces;
should base fighters, dive bombers, and heavy bombers at Guadalcanal;
should build up supplies and send troops to reinforce General Vandegrift.
General Harmon's correspondence to General George C. Marshall, along may have hastened the replacement of Ghorm-
with other obvious events, ley,
whose position as commander of the entire operation Watchtowerwzs
taken over by Admiral William F. Halsey
in
October.
Conditions at Guadalcanal were serious and both Generals Douglas MacArthur and Harmon had doubts that the invasion could now be successful. Ghormley had all but written it off, and continued to hold doubts until he
55
was
later relieved
of the
Army
by Halsey. The great General H. H. (Hap) Arnold, head
more modern fighter planes to when the Japanese recaptured the ego was to show his disregard for American
Air Corps, refused to send
Guadalcanal because they would be lost island.
This
man
of colossal
on other occasions during the execution of the war. When Fletcher's Task Force ships departed on 8 and 9 August, Vandegrift had been strengthening his perimeter defenses and defense of the lives
beach against a possible Japanese invasion attempt. In addition, he ordered an all-out effort to complete the work on the
he announced that the
airfield,
airfield
runway.
now named Henderson
On 10 August
Field (for Major
Lofton Henderson, a Marine hero and commander of the dive bombers at the battle of Midway), was ready to receive fighter and dive bomber-type aircraft.
Ground
action against the Japanese
sent out on 12 August to the
mouth
was
still
limited.
One
patrol
was
Mataniku River because of a report by a Japanese prisoner that a group of Japanese under a white flag wanted to surrender. This group of Japanese ambushed and wiped out the patrol;
none
of the
of the
Marines were ever found.
A week later a Marine patrol,
three companies of the 5th Marines, attacked the village of Matanikau
from three sides and
killed
65 Japanese. The only thing gained from
this
Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, soon after its capture from the Japanese. Lunga Point can be seen left background and "Bloody Ridge" in the center foreground. November 1942. (USMC)
the
56
in
57
attack
was proof
west to the
that the limited Japanese forces at
vicinity of the
Lunga had retreated
Matanikau when the invasion
hit
the beach.
"Tokyo Express," were making fast runs landing troops east of the perimeter. They put a force of
Nightly, Japanese ships, the
down
the
slot,
about 1000 troops ashore with the intent to retake the
airfield
and disrupt
They estimated the force of the American invasion to have been about 1000 men and intended to make a surprise attack on the the beachhead.
perimeter and push south to take the
airfield.
Colonel Kiyono Ichiki, commanding the Japanese forces, organized for the attack in the concealment of the jungle.
On 14 August, a Marine patrol
detected a small patrol of Colonel Ichiki's men, four officers and 30 enlisted troops, attacked
them immediately and killed all but two, who escaped into
the jungle.
now detected, Ichiki decided to attack as soon as He assembled his force and deployed to strike the Marine line along the east bank of the Ilu River, then thought to be the Tenaru. When Their presence
possible.
the Marine listening posts on the east bank detected the sounds of deploying Japanese troops, they withdrew to the Marine line on the west bank and
prepared for the attack. In a fierce battle that lasted August, 800 Japanese were
killed,
130
of the Ilu River
1700 on 21
of their survivors disappeared into
the jungle, and Colonel Kiyono Ichiki took his
mouth
until
was covered with
own life. The sand spit at the
bodies. Thirty-five Marines had
been killed and 75 wounded. This first important action since the landing marked the beginning of an accelerating combat situation. On 12 August, Ghormley had authorized Admiral McCain to load all available
destroyer- transports with gasoline,
lubricants,
bombs, and
ground crews and to dispatch them from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal. They operated in the manner of blockade runners, moving fast, timing
Lunga Point for the afternoon, unloading in time to leave again in the morning before the usual mid-day bombing raids by the Japanese, "Tojo Time." At the height of all this action, on 20 August, two Marine Air Squadrons, to be stationed at Henderson Field to support the beachhead, were arriving at Cactus, and more planes from the 67th Army Air Corps Fighter Squadron were on the way. The "Cactus Air Force" was beginning to their arrival off
assemble.
58
—
CHAPTER
Into the
Events
6
Solomons
the marshalling of airpower to be actually stationed at Guadal-
in
canal in support of the 1st Marine Division
afterthought.
By
seemed
to
fall
together as an
the time aircraft actually arrived, the Marines had spent
the 12 days, following the 8 and 9 August withdrawal of Fletcher's surface forces, without attached air cover.
They just fought on and
waited.
Toward the end of July, flights of the 67th Fighter Squadron operating out of Tontouta accomplished their patrols and waited for orders. Captains
Tom Christian, then commanding the 67th, and Dale Brannon, having been in Noumea for planning sessions regarding the Cactus operation, now prepared for their next moves. Brannon started planning for the long
would take the P-39/P-400 aircraft, via the islands of Cactus. Others the New Hebrides, to Henderson Field at Guadalcanal laid out the requirements for supplies and ground crew personnel to be overwater
flight that
moved up. The first order of business was to fly several flight planning missions, simulating the overwater legs of the route to Guadalcanal. Along with Lieutenant Deltis Fincher, Brannon planned courses to fly around the island of
New Caledonia at distances that would be flown on the three flight
legs that
would take them to Cactus. They
also decided
on rpm and
manifold pressures settings to be used during the test runs for fuel economy cruise control. Brannon and Fincher, in P-39/P-400s, flew the legs and
courses planned around
New Caledonia, simulating the flights to Vila Field
on the island of Efate, to Espiritu Santo, and on to Henderson Field, Guadalcanal. Based on these flights, they estimated the flying time, fuel
59
consumption, and best engine cruise control settings to be used on the long
overwater
flight.
By the first days of August a plan for the movement to Guadalcanal,
in
two flights, was completed. D.D. Brannon with the first flight of five would be followed in a couple of days by John A. Thompson with a flight of 10. The plan was coordinated with the 11th Bombardment Group, which would provide navigation and safety escort in B-17s.
Captain Christian departed by B- 17 on 15 August for Efate and Espiritu
Santo in the
New Hebrides for advanced coordination of services for the
P-39/P-400s which were soon to be passing through on the way to Cactus. the trip to Guadalcanal from Espiritu Santo aboard the
He completed
destroyer McKeon, arriving there on 20 August.
On Monday, 17 listed
August, Lieutenant Robert E. Chilson, with 30 en-
ground crew members,
left
Navy Transport Fomalhaut for
Tontouta for Noumea to board the U.S.
a voyage timed to arrive at Guadalcanal
along with the arrival of Brannon's flight to Henderson Field. Chilson and
Navy Dock at Noumea harbor in the late afternoon. them out to the Fomalhaut, now standing out in Noumea Bay awaiting departure. They
his party arrived at the
A
rather small boat was at the dock waiting to take
boarded the boat, which promptly started out through the choppy waters of the bay.
The late afternoon was turning into dusk as the small craft proceeded, bobbing along toward the outer bay, and quit
— out
of gas.
in a
deafening silence the engine
The boat floundered around the bay for what seemed like
a very long time. Finally they hailed another small craft, transferred fuel,
and shortly got underway again. After more floundering around the bay,
darkened except for the
lights of
ultimately brought alongside the
Noumea and nearby ships, Fomalhaut, boarding
at
the
men were
about 10:00
in
the evening.
was treated royally aboard ship. The food was good! The cruise toward Guadalcanal was pleasant and comfortable except for the anticipation of entering what was now known to be a damn rough Chilson's group
situation.
No one aboard really knew much about Guadalcanal, even though
the ship had been a part of the invasion transport force.
One would almost
expect to arrive at a place where ships could be seen going through some kind of a canal
— the name conjured up
visions something like the
Panama
Canal.
There were
a
number
get back ashore at Cactus
of
Marines aboard the Fomalhaut who did not the transports were pulled out; they had
when
been in working parties unloading supplies that were badly needed ashore. There were many stories told by the Marines about the initial action, about the heavy casualties at Tulagi and the rough time they were having there, about the exciting air combat and the heavy Japanese losses in the ground and air action. They didn't know anything about the airfield except that the time they went out on their working party.
Marines had not taken
it
Navy personnel
Fomalhaut were very good
60
of the
at the
to the
Army Air Corps
people and did
they
they could to make the
all
trip
comfortable and interesting.
know
that theirs would be the last good food the Air Corps guys would get for months to come. Little did
There were many sea stories to tell; the funniest came from BoatsMate First Class Howecraft. The ship's bow plate, which channels
wain's
sea water breaking over the
some .50-caliber this came about.
bow to the sides of the ship in rough water, had
bullet holes in
it.
Howecraft had a good story as to how
"That happened in the battle of the swab handle," chuckled Howe"At about dusk one night a sailor on a ship ahead of us in the convoy was dunking a swab off the fantail to clean it. The line he had on it was loose and the swab slipped off, drifting back in our direction. It was noticed a little off the starboard bow, bobbing along, handle sticking straight up, by a seaman on watch who called out, 'Periscope in the water!' All hell broke loose. Everyone started firing at the swab handle; bullets were flying everywhere, ricocheting off the decks and winches. That's how those holes craft.
bow plate." The fierce battle remembered aboard the Fomalhaut. got in the
of the
swab handle
will
long be
On the afternoon of 20 August, the aircraft carrier Long Island made its
way
to a point
two Marine
air
200 miles southeast
of Guadalcanal.
There
squadrons to be stationed at Henderson
Fighter Squadron
it
launched
Field.
Marine
VMF 223, with 19 F4F Grumman Wildcat fighters, was
commanded by Major John L. Smith, the now legendary Marine fighter pilot. Dive Bomber Squadron VMSB 232, with 12 Douglas Dauntless dive bombers, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard C. Mangrum. The two squadrons flew to Henderson Field and landed at about 1700. At the time, the attack on the perimeter along the
by Colonel
The
Ilu
River was being pressed
Ichiki's force.
was still at its height. support by obserprovided squadrons Marine Aircraft of the newly arrived following day the fighting along the Ilu
vation and
some
strafing of the shoreline. Little could be seen through the
heavy jungle cover; the
aircraft
were
really of little use to the
troops except in strafing the shoreline and mouth of the
Ilu
ground
and in impress-
ing the Japanese force with the presence of American planes. At midday,
Japanese Zero fighters entered the area and were attacked by Major Smith's flight of four F4F Wildcat fighters. Smith shot down one of the Zeros. His four airplanes returned to the field. One plane, flown by pilot six
Jonny Lindly, badly shot up, crashed on landing. Major Smith's pilots had wasted no time getting into action. This same day, Marine Air Group 25, operating out of Espiritu Santo, began supply and evacuation flights in and out of Henderson Field in R-4D/C-47 transport aircraft. They brought in cargo loads of supplies and flew out 16 litter patients per
trip.
the morning of 21 August, the first flight of P-39/P-400s were at Plaines des Gaiacs, New Caledonia, with Captain Brannon and Lieutenants Davis, Erwin, Brzuska, and Fincher, contemplating their departure from
On
61
the familiar surroundings of their home island. At 1410, with wing and belly
B-17 escort for the 325-mile flight to Efate. After a short stop at Efate, they completed the remaining 180 miles to Espiritu Santo. These first legs of the trip were overwater flights that in peacetime would have been high-risk operations for Army planes. The final tanks
leg,
full,
they took
640 miles on
off to join their
to Guadalcanal, would be considered impossible for
single-engine aircraft.
Cactus on
just the
"Bad winds or weather could have us coming
in at
fumes," said Brannon.
The planes had to carry every ounce of fuel that could be squeezed into The engines were run up and checked near the end of the
their tanks.
runway
at
Santo
in
the early morning of 22 August; gas trucks stood by to
top off the tanks before takeoff. At
two B-17s: one
0725 the
flight
turned immediately
and heading to Guadalcanal under the escort of
after takeoff to the course
for navigation escort
and the other to stand by to drop a
rubber boat to any pilot bailing out because of engine failure during the long
overwater fuel
flight.
Even with
strict attention to cruise control
margin for navigation error, off-course
flying
there was no
due to bad weather, or
combat contact with enemy fighters near Guadalcanal. Ditching a P-39/P400 was never considered. The tight streamlined structure of this heavy fighter was a death trap; the pilot could not get out of the cockpit, even after a successful ditching, before the airplane would sink. The flight was one of those long hauls, with a fighter plane strapped to you, that make your bottom so numb it feels like part of the airplane. Most of the flight, in an attempt to avoid weather, was low over water at about 200 or 300 feet. When visibility was good they spread out and relaxed a little;
when the low-hanging scud and mist cut visibility, they had to tighten
formation and snuggle up close to the B-17 until the weather improved.
A short time out of Espiritu Santo, a pilot in formation remarked over little rough. A slightly amusing
the radio that his engine was running a
response from the B-17 came over the radio: 'Those single-engine
air-
when they get out of sight of land." They sped along through the scuddy weather, which improved as they
planes always run rough
proceeded north, listening to the whine of the reduction gearbox and the noisy short exhaust stacks of the Allison engine. There
over the radio, except little,
when an
were few remarks
airplane drifted off to the side, wobbled a
and emitted a white vapor
trail
under the airplane as the
pilot
used
the relief tube. ("It just scares the stuff out of you," was a remark heard on the radio.)
After flying just a
little
less than four
hours they reached Guadalcanal,
broke formation into a landing pattern, and rolled their wheels on the rocky crushed coral runway of Henderson Field. They were greeted with wild
jumping shouts of joy by the Marine ground troops, who lined the runway to watch the sleek shark-mouthed P-39/P-400s touch down and taxi to an area near one of the ugly Japanese hangars.
That
night, the U.S.
Navy Transport Fomalhaut steamed
into the
Sealark Channel and on the morning of 23 August was anchored off Beach
62
t
at Beach Red. To the far right beyond the palms, at the mouth of the llu River, the sandbar and beach were covered with bodies of Japanese soldiers after the battle on 20-21 August. Taken 24 August 1942.
The palm grove
Red. Lieutenant Bob Chilson and his
men
of the 67th ground
crew went
over the side, down cargo nets, into the landing craft, and were taken to the beach. Here Marine trucks were waiting to take them to the
67th put
its flight line
into operation in a space at the west
using one of the four Japanese hangars. canal; the first flight of
would
follow.
The 67th had
airfield.
end of the
The
field,
arrived at Guadal-
initiated a route that many aircraft work alongside the two Marine squad-
P-39/P-400s
They were ready
to
rons that arrived two days before. After operating out of the sub-bases in
New
Caledonia, the pilots of
the 67th looked on Henderson Field as "a pretty nice strip." The landing
was about 4000 feet long, built on the grassy Lunga Plain. The runway was rolled, crushed coral rock, soon to the covered with Marsden steel matting by the SeaBees. The west end of the runway, usually the approach end, was shielded by very high jungle trees where the plain dropped off toward the Lunga River. These trees were a hindrance to landing planes, as they did not allow the use of every inch of runway. The strip
SeaBees
felled these large trees
allowed a lower approach, making
with dynamite and cleared a slot that it
possible to touch
down on the first few
runway had a clear takeoff view, an grassy Lunga plain and a coconut the through area that had been cleared yards of runway.
The
east end of the
grove.
63
Shark-mouthed
P-39/P-400s, with markings of the Patsy Flight, at Henderson Field Guathe baggy coveralls in the center foreground, is John Orlich an armament specialist of the 67th Fighter Squadron. (USMC)
dalcanal.
fighters,
The man
in
The
airfield
surface that greeted the 67th pilots was a beat-up, shell in the center of the battle. On a little knoll off
and bomb-pockmarked area to the north side of the
runway stood a Japanese pagoda, now converted to operations building. The word from the Marines was, "Keep your eye on the pagoda, where the flagpole will tell you the alert conditon. When we get a warning of the oncoming Japanese aircraft, a captured Japanese an
air
flag is
run up to signal a scramble.
black flag left
When the raid Tojo Time' is upon us, the
run up, and,
if they have time, they crank a siren that the Japs behind to signal that the bombers and Zeros are about to come over the
is
field."
The Marine pilots showed the pilots of the 67th a palm grove with some scattered green tents "Our camp," they said. They provided them
—
with straw mats, courtesy of the departed Japanese, to bed down on. When asked where the Japs were, the Marines replied, "See that river over there?" pointing to a stream about 200 yards away. "They are on the other side."
As
was with many things, the defense perimeter established by the 1st Marine Division to protect their beachhead was short of artillery. Some of the most crucial items were still aboard the transports. What artillery it
had been landed, the Marines set up in central fire control areas from which they could get maximum use of the valuable guns to put fire in front of any
There were 75mm pack howitzers and short 105mm howitzers, but there were none of the larger 155mm howitzers for counter battery fire. Sound flash units, for locating enemy guns for effective counter battery fire, had not been brought ashore; the Marines later paid a high price for this deficiency. This limited firepower was destined to be augmented some by the heavy firepower and attack location along the defense perimeter.
capability of the P-39/P-400s.
Defense against surface and air attacks remained inadequate for weeks. The five-inch coastal guns and radar of the 3rd Defense Battalion had not been brought ashore before the hasty departure of the transports on 9 August. Automatic antiaircraft weapons, 90mm, and searchlights had been brought ashore. An air warning system was an obvious and immediate
65
necessity and one
was
was declared open
established at the pagoda about the time the field to receive planes.
During the first weeks on Guadalcanal the Australian Coast Watchers and their friendly native scouts were proving their value. The Coast Watchers provided an invaluable service to the defense of the beachhead by giving warnings of approaching
enemy aircraft. These warnings were sometimes received as much as three hours before the arrival of the enemy formations over the perimeter defenses and the
airfield.
In August, Coast
Watchers were stationed at Guadalcanal, Buka, Bougainville, New Georgia, Santa Isabel and Malaita, giving radio reports of Japanese aircraft and ship movements, which were passed to the intelligence section of the 1st Marine Division. Since most enemy bomber flights from Rabaul passed over New Georgia, the reports of the Coast Watcher on that island were extremely valuable. His reports usually enabled the fighter planes at
Henderson Field,
Guadalcanal, to take off and be at altitude before the bombers reached the
American beachhead
area. Coast
Watchers
at Bougainville often
gave
reports of Japanese aircraft formations taking off from there or coming
down from
Rabaul, as well as frequent reports on Japanese ship move-
ments. Shortly after the 1st Marine Division landed, Captain Martin Cle-
mens
Solomon Islands Defense Force, who was the British on Guadalcanal, in the protectorate Government, came out of hiding at Vungana in the hills south of Aola Bay. With 60 native scouts, Clemens entered the Marine lines and offered their services to General Vandegrift; he immediately accepted. of the British
District Officer
From
by the
this point on, the coordinated intelligence gathering
Coast Watching Service and their scouts played an important part success of the Marine, Navy, and Army Air Corps pilots fighting the
over Guadalcanal and
its
in the
air
war
surrounding area. Their reports often revealed
early evidence of assembling Japanese Naval
threaten the U.S. positions on Guadalcanal.
Task Forces
that
were
to
They provided many reports as
what was going on in various parts of the island and coordinated many an assist in the rescue of downed airmen. The native scouts on Guadalcanal were fiercely loyal to Clemens and the Marines. They often brought inforto
mation of the location of Japanese patrols, their strength and armament. They hid downed pilots and passed communication leading to their return. One native scout, Sergeant Major Jacob Vouza, was on a scouting
sweep and ran smack into a Japanese patrol. He was taken prisoner to their camp and was questioned. He told them nothing. They tied him up, beat him with rifle butts, and inflicted numerous bayonet wounds; he refused to talk. They left him unconscious and presumed dead. Vouza slipped his ropes and, severely weakened by loss of blood, crawled the three miles to the Marine lines. Believing he was near death, once inside the perimeter with Clemens and the Marines, he would not accept treatment until he had delivered his report of valuable information as to the strength, disposition, and armament of this Japanese force. His report was of great value to the
67
68
Marines, who surrounded and annihilated the attacking troops. It was a partrol of the Ichiki force that had captured Vouza as they were organizing
on the
Marine lines along the Ilu River. (Until his death in 1984, the aged Sergeant Major Vouza, later Sir Jacob Vouza, could be seen at his home on Guadalcanal, wearing the uniform of a U.S. Marine Sergeant their assault
Major.)
1942 the Japanese lived under a feudal totalitarian military society. Their soldiers were the crudest in the world. Cocky with years of victory, their nation had no respect for civilized conventions concerning the care of enemy wounded or prisoners of war. Captured soldiers were often used for In
bayonet practice, ultimately dying of loss of blood. Bodies were found with many as 50 bayonet wounds. They routinely employed all sorts of
as
torture, beatings, and bizarre acts including rape, castration, disembowelment, to name but a few, followed by decapitation. They could conceive the most unthinkable punishments for persons unlucky enough to fall into their hands. Corpses of infantrymen or downed flyers recovered in the field
showed evidence of torture to a degree that was an obscenity to God and mankind. In Europe, where prisoner of war conventions were observed, about one or two percent of men who actually became prisoners died. Of war prisoners in Japanese hands; over 50 perreversals of frontline positions
cent died.
was an impressive Japanese assembling near Rabaul on 23 August. The estimates indicated
Intelligence reports indicated that there
Naval
fleet
the presence of three or four aircraft carriers, one or two battleships,
seven to 15
light
addition, there
and heavy cruisers, and from 10 to 20 destroyers. In
were 15 or more cargo
ships, troop transports,
and fueling
and 160 land-based aircraft. Continued surveillance determined that a task force was assembling from the various harbors and airfields that ships,
would constitute a strong invasion force. When the task force got underway, it included three aircraft carriers, eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, 21 destroyers, and four troop transports carrying an invasion force that would reach Guadalcanal on 24 August. Their air cover was provided by the 25th Japanese Air Flotilla, moved to Rabaul to provide land-based air coverage. The magnitude and accuracy of these observations can be credited mostly to the Australian Coast
Watching Serivce.
The U.S.
Carrier Task force, under Admiral Fletcher, was following
the intelligence reports. Fletcher disposed forces, at a safe distance, to counter the approaching Japanese surface fleet that was about to attempt to retake the
American beachhead at Guadalcanal. Both fleets were discov-
ered by air reconnaissance on 24 August. There followed one of the key naval battles of the Solomons Campaign. The battle actually took place east of Guadalcanal, a battle
waged by
aircraft against ships.
The
surface war-
two fleets did not engage during the battle. Land-based aircraft Marine dive bomber squadron from Henderson Field and the 11th Bombardment Group from Espiritu Santo joined the carrier aircraft in ships of the
of the
69
attacking the Japanese fleet as
it
proceeded south, within their range, for
the scheduled recapture of Guadalcanal. Japanese bombers continued their daily
"Tojo Time" raids on Henderson Field during the
nese
lost a carrier,
battle.
The Japa-
the Ryujo, one light cruiser, one destroyer, and 90
Japanese planes. Their seaplane carrier, Chitose, and one cruiser were
damaged. The U.S. carrier Enterprise suffered damage; 20 U.S. planes
were
lost.
The Japanese withdrew on 26 August to get out of range of air attack. The battle did not prevent the landing of Japanese troops on Guadalcanal; it
Throughout the war, the fate of allied prisoners was a grim one. Here an allied prisoner of war is decapitated by a Japanese officer somewhere on a South Pacific Island. The Japanese observed no rules in the treatment of prisoners of war; a fact that we must never forget. (USAF)
70
served to postpone
it
and allowed the Marines to strengthen their defen-
sive positions.
By
the end of August, the 1st Marine Division was in a slightly it had been on 9 August, when Fletcher withdrew the surface forces. The defense of the airfield was established and the field
stronger position than
was
in operation.
retake the
airfield,
The
Ichiki force
and a
had been annihilated
in its
attempt to
line of communication
between Espiritu Santo and Guadalcanal was established although it was not yet effective. Marine Air Group 25 made daily C-47 flights to Henderson Field as part of this line of communication. In addition, there were daily arrivals of fast, blockade-running destroyer transports to Lunga Point. Yet the Americans were by no means firmly established on Guadalcanal.
From
the arrival of the
first
planes at Henderson Field, air operations
were carried on daily. Patrols were out dawn to dark, as well as interceptor flights for "Tojo Time." The bombing raids came regularly around midday, an exciting experience. The flight line, camp, and work area for the ground crew were right on the target. When the black flag went up, all ground activity
was
stopped and the crews took to the foxholes.
We could hear the steady drone of approaching bomber formations. It fascinating and about what you would expect to hear as the tight V
formations approach the target
—
us.
The bombs,
ing like you've been expecting for your first
as they
fall,
sound noth-
bombing attacks. The descend-
bombs do not scream like they do in the movies; they sound like the big of the universe saying 'SHUSH," with a shushing sound that can be heard throughout the island. The "shhhhhhhh" sound grows to a deafening intensity and then comes the deep "whump, whump, whump" as the stick of bombs walk toward your foxhole. You wait, scrunched into the smallest space you can occupy, waiting for that next "whump" that will hit beyond your foxhole position and you know that it's not that stick of bombs ing
'
mother
that will get you. In the hot afternoon of
24 August, when everyone was waiting for the
Japanese invasion force to get Japanese bombers came
in
range of Guadalcanal
in for a slightly
aircraft, a flight of
delayed 'Tojo Time." They had
taken a circuitous route to conceal themselves from the Coast Watchers
and the drone of their engines could be heard as the black flag went up. The pilots ran for their planes. Two of the 67th pilots made it. Captain Brannon and Lieutenant Fincher took off in a cloud of dust after the Marine F4Fs.
They had
hardly cleared the
field
when bombs dropped by
the Japa-
nese formation from 8000 feet began to hit. The P-39/P-400s climbed out across the palm trees to escape the accompanying Zeros diving in to make a
Above them, the 67th pilots could see the formation; eight bombers burst into bomber Marine F^Fs peel off into the flames as they tumbled to Earth. It was Marine Captain Marion Carl's first contact and victory at Guadalcanal. He personally shot down two bombers strafing run across the field.
and one Zero in that scrap, as did 2nd Lieutenant Zenneth A. Pond, USMC. Brannon and Fincher caught one of the Zeros climbing out after a strafing
71
run, dived in on him, and squirted bullets until the Zero exploded.
enemy force had been 15
The
bombers and 12 Zeros. The score was 10 bombers and seven Zero fighters. Three Marine pilots did not return from the mission. Diary: Aug.
We after
is
24 Monday
are here on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands; arrived yesterday,
some
island
trouble at sea during the night before with the Jap
fleet.
The
beautiful as far as travelog scenery goes, but there are a lot of
Jap snipers around.
Marines
single-engine
in
The
Japs have taken a
the past 10 days.
lot of
punishment from the
We set up shop at an ugly Jap hangar at the
west end of the field. Sidney Hudson and three other radio people are ground radio operators so I am having them operate the ground station. It
was like moving "JIG GROUND" up here.
going to do
all flight line
We are shorthanded so I am We had another air
radio maintenance myself.
We call that "Tojo Time." They come over regularly at midday and we are warned by a black flag that is raised at the pagoda in the middle of the airfield. That's where the ground radio station is being set up. In today's raid there were plenty of bombers and Zero fighters. Some of the Zeros strafed the field. We got a good look at them as they zoomed past our end of the field. They look innocent enough, but they are trying to kill us. Our planes arrived here in good shape and some of our flight were up during the raid. Captain Brannon and Lieutentant Fincher shot down one plane. I hear that the Cactus aircraft shot down a lot of enemy planes today; I'll get the score later. The Marine pilots and that F4F Wildcat are a great combination. They have one fighter squadron and one dive bomber squadron. Eleven more dive bombers (SBD) came in today from the carrier Enterprise to operate out of this base. [This was due to battle damage on Enterprise, a jammed flight deck raid today.
elevator.]
On 25
August, the 67th was up on dawn patrols.
On
the 26th, two
P-39/P-400s flew a reconnissance around the entire Guadalcanal coastline.
Now
operating under Marine command, the 67th was trying to take
share of the load.
72
i
its
CHAPTER
Cactus
The ground crews hangar and
in
7
August
in
of the 67th
camped
right
on the
airfield,
bunked
in
the
canvas shelters set up around the edge of the hangar. The
west end of Henderson Field was on high ground which Lunga River, just a few hundred yards south. In position
led
down
to the
just off the field
was a Marine artillery unit equipped with 75mm pack The 67th crew were guests of this artillery unit for their two meals a day. The only food available was captured Japanese rice. Rations were short; some had been lost during the landing, some were sunk with a supply ship, and some were still on the departed transports. Still, everyone
•toward the river
howitzers.
kept his sense of humor.
Serving a cup of rice twice a day, a Marine mess cook could look a straight in the eye and say,
"And what
will
you have,
sir,
man
the meat pie,
vegetable stew, or baked beans?"
Feigning anger, the
man would reply, "You promised I could have rice
today."
"Very
well, sir," the
later to select
mess cook would go
on,
"And you can return
your dessert."
"Up your bucket," was usually the reply to that. On the morning of 25 August, it became possible bombers
at
Henderson Field
retaking Guadalcanal and flight of
SBDs
for the
SBD
dive
to reach the Japanese task force intent on
now under attack by B-17s and carrier aircraft. A
under Lieutenant Colonel Mangrum,
task force with considerable success.
Mangrum's
VSB 232, attacked the
strike force destroyed a
14,000-ton troop transport and a cruiser; they severely damaged an
73
8,000-ton troop transport.
Upon
The
was escorted by F4Fs
flight
they could not get off in time to meet the usual "Tojo Time"
were
of
VMF 223.
return, due to the slowness of the hand-crank method of refueling, raid,
1115, but
able to get off just in time to prevent exposure of the planes to
bombing. No aircraft were destroyed on the ground; temporary repairs were made on the runway in time for the returning aircraft. The 67th spent the day on dawn-to-dusk patrols.
26 Wednesday we had a terrible air
Diary: August Yesterday
come
raid.
We
watched the 21 bombers
over, a beautiful formation, aiming right at the
field.
Most bombs
men. They may have been trying to hit the Marines who have been fighting for days along the Tenaru River. The perimeter defense line is not far from here. In fact, we hold only a beachhead enclosing about an 11 -mile area. It is a terrible feeling that missed the runway and
killed a lot of
cannot be described, just sitting there
dropping
all
around you.
It's
in a foxhole
watching the bombs
that helpless kind of situation, and the Nips
are really giving us hell here now.
We eat two meals a day with a Marine
They are in temporary position just off our edge of the airfield, along the Lunga River. The river is not far from the edge of the field, but it's the boundary to "no-man's-land" right now. The meals are small and rations are short. A lot of supplies were lost during the landing Artillery Unit.
or didn't get ashore and that
is full
we
of wevils in the
are eating mostly captured food
morning and Jap
kind of canned fruit mixed in with
way around? Our Marine cook
is
it
in
more
the afternoon.
Or
is it
rice
and some the other
a comic, he says, "Don't skim off the
weevils; they are very high in protein."
forces here and
— Jap
rice with weeevils
If
we don't get some more U.S. we could be goners.
supplies on the island,
air raid snipers were shooting at us from the wooded area along the edge of the field. It's sometimes difficult to work around the planes with them trying to pick us off. When we get a line on one, we grab our weapons and go into the edge of the woods and fire a hail of bullets up into the tree. They are usually tied up in the tree so they don't come down. They just stay there with their blood running down the tree. They are still around and are being spotted every now and then. Today about 50 bombers and 30 Zeros were on their way in but got intercepted. We stayed under alert for about two hours. The Marine and the 67 th planes are doing a good job and the Japs have been giving us hell. We have been bombed every day except one
Yesterday after the
trees in the
and have been shelled by Jap ships, standing It sure keeps our attention.
off
the island, just about
every night.
On 27
August, Captain Thompson's
Santo, less one P-400 nine aircraft
left at
flight
arrived from Espiritu
Santo for some minor repair. With him
were Lieutenants Head, Brown,
in
the
Childress, Dillon, Glazier,
Dutton, and Wythes. Lieutenant Fountain arrived from Santo later in the
74
day with another B-17 escort. When Thompson's flight arrived, there was no welcoming committee. The airfield was deserted, the black flag v/as up, and those on the ground were in foxholes. The men crept out of their shelters and serviced the planes. Thompson and his flight, already exhausted from their flight out of New Caledonia, hurriedly taxied out, watching the sky for bombers, and took off to sit out the raid in the air. The raid failed to materialize.
Diary: Aug. 27 Thursday "Tojo Time" was 1100 today. Nine of our planes with Captain Thompson landed at 1115, in from New Caledonia. Everyone pitched in
them gas up while watching the black flag and the sky bombers. They took right off to clear the field. The bombers never to help
reach the
down
field.
for
did
While on patrol, Lieutenants Chilson and Erwin shot
a four-motored seaplane or bomber.
To date, the mission assigned to the P-400s was patrol, patrol, patrol, at an altitude of
14,000
feet.
The
planes could struggle up a
little
higher,
but the pilots could go no higher for any length of time because they were flying without
oxygen. With their high-pressure oxygen systems, and no
way to fill them,
the P-400s were even
more handicapped. Every effort
to
oxygen had failed; oxygen is a must at 10,000 feet and 67th were flying two-hour patrols at 14,000 feet and becoming lightheaded and groggy after two hours. Often they flew two or three of these missions. On one occasion a pilot, who had lost sleep due to bombing and shelling the night before and then gone without breakfast because the kitchen was damaged, flew three of these patrols in succesfind high-pressure
above.
sion.
The
pilots of the
He was sleepy, groggy, hungry, and had to crank his gear up and down
each time because there was no time for repairs.
On 28 August the weather was getting poor and the SBD dive bomber squadron, VMSB 232, under Lieutenant Colonel Mangrum attacked three destroyers about 70 miles off Guadalcanal, with excellent results. Two of the destroyers were so badly damaged that they went to the bottom. The mission could not be repeated due to approaching weather and darkness. This strike was probably the reason for a night without shelling by Japa-
nese ships. the hardships of New Caledonia, sub-base operations and the heavy training activities, the 67th pilots hoped for an opportunity to make a After
all
real contribution to air operations at Cactus.
continuous
menu
Now
they were assigned a
of patrols because of the P-400's inability to reach suffi-
engage the attacking Japanese aircraft. Even with oxygen, you couldn't operate the P-400 above 16,500 feet. With a belly tank it was possible to get to 18,000, which took over half an hour. It had no two-stage high blower; the engine was starved for air and then the airplane would just mush along in a nose-high attitude and would do only one maneuver dive a fter you dropped the belly tank. Later in the war, more advanced cient altitude to
—
—
75
versions of the P-39 did a for a fighter.
But
much better job;
its pilots
it
was never an aviator's choice
grabbed every opportunity to
try.
on 29 August, there was a night bombing raid by a small flight of enemy bombers. Their bombs seemed to miss the field entirely. Later it was found that there were 29 bomb craters just east and south of the runway in an area held by the 1 1th Marines; three of their men were killed. There was no damage to the aircraft or aviation In the early morning, about 0430,
personnel.
Before 1000 an advanced warning was passed by the Coast Watchers on Bougainville Island that 18 Japanese bombers were heading southeast. Confirmation of this Georgia, and
flight
moments
was given at 1 105 by the Coast Watcher on New by the Henderson Field radar, now set up and
later
being checked out at the northwest corner of the airfield area. the warning, 10
bombers and
all
On receipt of
F4Fs and 12 P-400s of the 67th scrambled to intercept the other flyable aircraft took
off to clear
the
field until after
the raid.
The P-400s climbed to 14,000 feet, their absolute limit without oxyF4F Wildcats climbed a little above 17,000 feet to be slightly above the bombers. There were 18 enemy bombers with the usual Zero escort. Twelve P-400s moved around at 14,000, in flights of three or four. The pilots, getting headaches from lack of oxygen, watched the beautiful formation of enemy bombers above, with the Marines circling over them gen, and the
for the attack.
The bombs were dropped before walked across the
airfield,
initial
contact; neat sticks of
blowing up geysers of
dirt, debris,
Just 3,000 feet above, the 67th pilots could see the
bomber formation;
F4Fs
bombs
and smoke.
peel
off,
diving
bombers burst immediately into flames, falling to the island below. All the 67th could do was fly around helplessly watching the action above. Major Smith and his Wildcats were having another big day, as they did each day at "Tojo Time," building their score in a veritable turkey shoot. There was the 67th, flying around at too low an into the
four
altitude to reach the real action.
As the returning planes approached Henderson Field after the misit appeared that the entire field was on fire. There were grass fires in a number of places, two of the ugly Japanese hangars were burning, and ammunition was exploding. The sticks of bombs from each of the attacking bombers had been laid right across the field through the areas of aircraft sion,
maintenance. Regardless of attacking fighters and antiaircraft
Japanese
pilots
fire,
the
never wavered from their bomb runs. As the fighters
returned to make their approach to the field,
it
seemed to be swarming with
men and little trees moving about on the runway. The men were using branches to mark bomb craters in the runway so that landing planes could little
avoid
them on
their landing rolls.
They stood
at a crater with their tree
branches and jumped out of the way as a landing plane zigged or zagged past
them after touchdown. The runway had been pockmarked by bombs during the raid. Activity on the field was like that in an ant hill. Trucks and crews
76
i
looked like all of Henderson Field was on fire in the afternoon of 29 August 1 942. Efforts to save this F4F Wildcat were to no avail. Japanese bombing and strafing attacks inflicted heavy damage. 30 It
August 1942. fill in the bomb craters. Men were beating out grass own blankets; others were shoveling dirt with their hands on a burning F4F near hangar number two and an SBD burning near hangar
were hauling
fires
dirt to
with their
number
three, while occasional ammunition explosions
within the burning planes.
Crews
rolled oil
were heard from
and gas drums around to the
pumps. Gasoline was burning and ammunition was exploding everywhere. Snipers were in the trees at the edge of the field, trying, with some success, to pick off men working feverishly on the field. A few Marines and Air Corps men went into the bush and shot the snipers from their perches. airplanes, refueling with the hand-crank
The exhausting work was accomplished in silent fury that manifests hatred for the enemy. Amid all this was the tormenting question, "What is the 67th going to do with this damn P-400?" itself in bitter
Diary: Aug. 29, Saturday Last night
we were bombed by Jap
four in the morning.
Our
raid today
planes.
was
at
It
was just a little after it was one of the
1215, and
worst yet for the 67th, Bombs dropped on our hangars and gasoline, and set everything at our end of the field on fire. When we all came out of the
everyone helped with the fires and, as we were fighting fire on an F4F I looked around and saw another Marine F4F touch down on the runway and crack up in a small bomb crater. We worked like dogs
bomb
shelters,
with shovels, blankets, bare hands, anything we could find, and were exhausted, angry, and covered with dirt and soot. The Japs seemed to place their bombs right where they wanted them today.
on the
fires,
The next
day,
30 August, gave
little
opportunity to think about the
77
pressure and disappointments of the previous day. routinely enough, shortly after midnight,
holes.
The Navy
dive
bombers took
off to
remained on standby alert,
and sleepless
until
sitting
began
their
mats and
fox-
seek out the bombarding de-
stroyers reported to be standing off shore, shelling the pilots
activity
when the field was shelled by four
were aroused from
destroyers. All pilots and crews
The
airfield. All fighter
around on ammunition cases,
chilly
dawn; nothing happened.
At 0930 another report from the Coast Watchers on Bougainville was number of single-engine aircraft were flying southeast. The regular morning patrols were up but returned to the field early to refuel for "Tojo Time." Since the incoming enemy aircraft received indicating that a large
were said to be single-engine type, it was assumed that the beachhead area was in for a dive bombing attack. The intercept flight of eight F4Fs and 11 P-400s took off at 1105 in time to execute their plan for meeting the incoming attack by Japanese dive bombers. In one flight of P-400s, Captain Christian and Lieutenants Dutton,
Wythes, and Chilson were sent to the Tulagi area to shipping there; also, the
USS
fly cover over the Burroughs, which had been unloading per-
sonnel and supplies for Cactus the day before, had run aground after going to Tulagi harbor to anchor for the night. Captains
Brannon and Thompson,
and Lieutenants Fincher, Childress, Fountain, Dillon, and Johnston
in the
F4Fs to their usual 14,000 feet altitude; 28,000. The P-400s circled in around the towering
other P-400s climbed up with the the
F4Fs went on up to
cumulus clouds
at
around 14,000, hoping to catch the dive bombers as they
started their dive.
The 67 th pilots were already feeling oxygen deficiency when the What a surprise! There were no dive bombers; the single-en-
action began.
gine aircraft turned out to be
they dived
down around one
all
Zero
fighters.
of the towering
A flight of Zeros attacked;
cumulus clouds and up
in a
climbing attack at a flight of P-400s. There seemed to be 20 or more Zeros.
The P-400s began turning into a pursuit curve, but there were more Zeros in the circle than P-400s. At that time, the F4Fs came screaming down from above, out of the sun, taking the Zeros by complete surprise. The Zeros were expertly piloted and had superior maneuverability. They seemed to be able to make square turns. A mixed-up melee began in a rat-racing dogfight over the field, the Sealark Channel, and the Tulagi area.
There were Zeros everywhere you turned. Their performance was fantastic. They were zooming, darting, and climbing in aerobatic perfection and seemed to be able to turn inside a bumblebee as they performed amazing demonstrations of airmanship. The pilots in their heavy, lumbering P-400 clunkers felt like a herd of sheep under attack by a pack of ravenous wolves. In a pursuit curve it was impossible to shake or take a Zero. They tried all kinds of maneuvers but the Zero would hang on to the tail of the P-400. Even in a dive which the P-400 could do very well and which was said to be the best maneuver to shake off a Zero the Zero was still hard to leave behind. The only way was to head for a cloud, make a turn on instruments
—
78
—
and come out on top, hoping to get in a quick burst at a Zero before being jumped by the others. All over the sky the P-400s were heading for clouds with Zeros on their tails. Despite being so overwhelmingly outclassed, the P-400s got four Zeros confirmed and three probable. The Marines bagged 14; Major John L. Smith and his pack had another good day. Some of the dogfights ranged down to below 1000 feet over the field. One Zero chased an F4F, streaming oil from a punctured cooler, down to within 300 feet over the hangar and maintenance area of the 67th. A nearby .50-caliber antiaircraft machine-gun position could not fire because the F4F and Zero were too close together. The F4F skimmed along the
treetops and circled to land. perfect
The Zero, realizing where he was, executed a Immelmann turn at 300 feet and climbed out. He was close enough
to the watching ground crew for the on the Zero to be plainly seen.
pilot
and the red "meatball" insignia
As the action came to a close, the planes started back to the field. The flight over the shipping at Tulagi was making its way back to Henderson Field in weather that was now lowering to 1000 feet and one-quarter mile visibility over Iron Bottom Bay. As they passed out of a rain shower, they were suddenly attacked by six or seven Zeros. The Zeros tore the formation apart; two of the P-400s were shot down before the Zeros broke off to head for home.
When
the planes of the 67th landed, four of the P-400s had not
returned to the
field.
Captain John
Thompson came in with 15
bullet holes
About an hour later, one of the missing pilots who had bailed out about two miles from the field, Lieutenant Pete Childress, walked in with only his pride and one knee bruised. Lieutenant Dillon also bailed out and walked in later. Lieutenants Robert E Chilson and Keith W. Wythes were shot down on the flight back from in his airplane, plus
one
in his shoulder.
Tulagi; they did not return.
Of this crowded and fateful day, 30 August 1942, there was still more At about 1500 that afternoon, two B-17 mother hens provided escort into Cactus for 17 F4F Wildcats and 12 additional SBD Dauntless dive bombers. At 1530, the black flag was raised at the pagoda; at the same to come.
time, the engines of an incoming
As the steady drone that the
enemy formation could
of the approaching
bombers grew
already be heard.
louder,
Cactus planes were trapped on the ground by
enemy thrust. The events
that followed
this
it
was
clear
undetected
were beyond understanding. The
arriving
Japanese planes were dive bombers. They either ignored the juicy target of helpless aircraft on the airfield or their orders allowed only an attack on the shipping near Tulagi, also a vulnerable prize.
The
dive
bombers attacked
the shipping targets, sinking a destroyer, the Calhoun, about a half-mile off the beach, and striking the USS Burroughs, still aground near Tulagi.
bombers shot on the field were spared.
The Japanese aircraft
dive
their bolt
on the shipping targets. The
79
At 1645 there was another ominous occurrence
— the
islands of the
southern Solomons were shaken by two heavy earthquake tremors.
Good Lord saying "Stop the war"? Apparently
the
not, because
Was it it
kept
right on.
At 2100 the dive bombers
at
Henderson Field took
three cruisers and two destroyers shelling the
put
enemy
off to
search for
and attempting to
troops ashore east of the defense area. Rainy weather pre-
vented direct
and the
airfield
hits
on the
ships, but the
Japanese withdrew from the area
men were able to come out of their foxholes and rest. The shelling "Tokyo Express." On this
attack had been one of the regular visits of the
run they had landed an unknown number of troops east of the perimeter
in
the vicinity of Tasimboko.
On were back
the morning of 31 August, only three of the original 14 P-400s
in operation; in
the ground crews worked feverishly to bring others
commission. "Tojo Time" arrived as usual. Captain Christian and
Lieutenants Dutton and Davis flew cover at Tulagi to protect the
Burroughs,
still
surviving and
still
USS
aground. All flyable aircraft not already
on the intercept were flown to the east end of the island to wait out the attack. The approaching enemy, 18 bombers and 22 Zeros, turned back about 15 miles from the
field
because of heavy overcast. During the
flight
covering the shipping at Tulagi, the engine of Lieutenant Dutton's P-400 quit;
he bailed out and was brought back safely to the
field.
After the rough experience on 30 August for the P-400s, the regular
"Tojo Time" raids brought a more docile assignment for the 67th. The
P-400s
in
commission were sent on reconnaissance or to the end of the
was over. The morale of the 67th was Everyone kept thinking about it. The pilots were frantic with "get-up-and-go" and had nothing to go in. The constant course of conversation was a gloomy one: "We can't climb that P-400 or a P-39 high enough to reach the bombers; we have already lost some pilots; half our planes are gone, and what are we proving? We can't maneuver and dogfight with the Zero; what good are we? Our enlisted ground crewmen are risking their lives to keep the planes patched up, and for what? We are just using up food and burning up gas. We have just got to get a better airplane. We can't fight; when the Japs come, we are told to go on reconnaissance. You sometimes wonder what good we are!" The Marine Corps' high opinion of the 67th Fighter Squadron can be seen in the complimentary remarks about the squadron by Major John L. Smith, commander of the Marine fighter squadron, VMF 223, at Guadalcanal, during an intelligence interview at the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics on 10 November 1942. A quote from his remarks shows that he held the 67 th Fighter Squadron and its pilots in very high esteem: "That was the ideal situation where we came down on top of them and when they were already engaged with our P-400s. out of the sun The P-400s got four of them that day, I believe, and had very few of their own planes shot down. island to wait until the attack
beginning to
hit a
—
80
new
low.
—
'The Army Fighter Squadron Commander had volunteered to go up with us on this combat patrol because he was getting sick of not having a plane that could get up to 28,000 feet with the bombers and Zeros. "The first Army Squadron that came down there with P-400s had some of the finest pilots that I'd ever seen, even though they didn't have the best plane in the world. And they were certainly willing to do anything they were asked to do and cooperated well with the Marine Officer who was running the show there. The fact that the P-400 didn't get up high enough didn't bother them a great deal; they always wanted to go up every time they had the chance."
Although the
air battle of
30 August proved
that the
P-400 on Gua-
dalcanal could not perform as an interceptor fighter against the type aircraft used by the enemy, the 67th was willing, wanted to fight, and above all wanted very much to have a better airplane. They would soon realize the
great value of these superior pilots and this adaptable aircraft in the fighting on Guadalcanal. In spite of
its
attack aircraft and
shortcomings, the Airacobra had great prospects as an
was destined
to
the forces defending the perimeter. plate and
armament consisting of a
compensate
The
for the lack of artillery in
plane had good protective armor
20mm cannon, two .50-caliber machine
guns and four .30-caliber machine guns. performed well at low altitude. It could fly
It
could carry a bomb, and
fast, dive well,
and
its
it
day was
coming.
By
the end of August
it
was
clear
how
the Japanese tactics in the
Solomons were going to shape up. On Bougainville, Vella Lavella, and Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel, the Japanese had bases (for striking Guadalcanal) that were supplied from Truk and Rabaul. By the beginning of September, the 'Tokyo Express" was in full operation; enemy men and supplies were being loaded on fast destroyer transports and cruisers. These vessels, hiding from Henderson Field-based aircraft during daylight, Slot at high speed during the night in the protection of the the coast of parallel chain of islands and landed troops and supplies on shelling island, the off stood they After delivering their cargo,
came down the Guadalcanal.
rapid retreat the perimeter defenses and Henderson Field, then made their north, out of range of land-based aircraft by daylight. The Japanese reinforcements were slowly reforming in the bush.
strength, attack Their objective on Guadalcanal was to organize a force in Division, Marine 1st the by held and retake the beachhead area now of portion substantial very Reinforced. Their efforts were supported by a Japanese the as as long the Japanese Navy. They could continue these plans Solomons. If the U.S. Southern the around sea the of held control
Navy Navy toll,
and exact a heavier could exert greater force on the Japanese Navy Japanese invasion large of use and it might prevent the development
on were possible, the Japanese would be solely dependent Japanese of supply and trips by the 'Tokyo Express" for reinforcement Guadalcanal. on up building forces they were
forces.
If
this
81
With aircraft superior to anything the Americans had in the Pacific, heavy Japanese air attacks were carried out almost daily on Henderson Field with regularity in numbers of bombers and fighters, and tactics employed in these assaults. The formations of Japanese aircraft came from Rabaul via Kahili Field on the south end of Bougainville Island. Occasionally they took circuitous routes away from certain islands before climbing to altitude to avoid detection by Coast Watchers and the Henderson radar.
They could have saved the trouble and the fuel; not much escaped the eyes of the Coast Watchers.
The Japanese inflicted numerous other harassments as a steady diet on the unwanted occupants of the U.S. defense perimeter on Guadalcanal. Many of these were merely irritating sleep-destroyers. There was "Oscar," a Japanese submarine that surfaced frequently off the island at night and lobbed a few shells into the airfield and bivouac area, just to keep everyone on
his toes. Regularly a
two-engine bomber or seaplane came
over the field at night, throwing out a
bomb every now and then; it chugged
around up there keeping everyone worried and awake. This night mar-
numerous nick"Maytag Mike," "Louis the Louse," "Washing Machine Charlie," or "Tokyo Chug Chug." A few bombs dropped over a three or four-hour period seemed to create the desired irritation and loss of sleep. There was also the frequent shelling of the airfield by Japanese Naval auder, with his asthmatic low-powered engines, received
names such
as
forces, stopping
by on a regular basis to pay their respects. Shelling by
"Tokyo Express" were usually brief and of a caliber carried by destroyers and cruisers. The duration and magnitude of heavier Japanese naval bombardments was absolutely terrifying. The men of the 67th took these attacks while living and working right ships of the
at the
hangar and maintenance area with their planes
— the targets
attacks.
82
i
of the
CHAPTER
8
September's Angry
Response
Japanese efforts to build up their forces and the increasing tempo of air activity in the early days of September left no doubt that they were truly
enraged by the American beachhead on Guadalcanal; they were smarting under the loss of face. The Japanese were proceeding to throw brute force at the
beachhead area. The active 'Tokyo Express" had not yet brought
the strength of their ground forces to a level sufficient to attack the enclave, but the Japanese committed substantial naval and air power in
sustained daily attacks on the American-held positions on Guadalcanal.
General Vandegrift, with fewer than 20,000 troops
in
the area, was
limited to defending the presently held beachhead perimeter. Its front of
about 10,000 yards, along the north coast of Guadalcanal, tapered south to a depth of about 5,000 yards.
He hoped to extend this to a 45-mile stretch
of the north coast and a depth sufficient to ensure that the Japanese
would be out of range of Henderson Field. Until more troops were remained severely limited. Daily, Japanese bombers and fighters from Rabaul and Bougainville attacked Henderson Field on the midday "Tojo Time" schedule, and often artillery
available, his capability
with several such raids. Their naval forces shelled the ter defenses almost every night.
Cactus fighter
airfield
and perime-
made
the daily air
aircraft
attacks costly to the Japanese, but at night the naval shelling, firing continuously, salvo after salvo from their big guns, inflicted a special kind of
destruction and terror on the defenders of the American beachhead at
Guadalcanal.
For the Japanese, the invasion by the American landing force repre-
83
sented their
first real
setback since they started the war to impose their
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" on the world. In China, Southeast Asia, and the various islands, they
and
total
1st
Marine Division put
submission of the vanquished.
ready to take great in
risks,
were accustomed
to quick victories
The audacity of the invasion by the
painful pinpricks in their pride, and they were throwing in enough force to overkill the problem,
order to regain their property
— Guadalcanal. Frequent
visits
by the
'Tokyo Express" were now depositing Japanese reinforcements both east and west of the perimeter defenses. This effort was to establish strength in several areas for a coordinated attack that would carry out their grand
strategy for the recapture of the airfield and the entire beachhead area.
Since the battle along the
Ilu
River on 20 and 21 August, the Marines
had fought no major engagements, yet Japanese forces were being slowly
Around the end of August, native scouts reported that the Japanese, about 300 strong, were building substantial defense works near built up.
Tasimboko, 18 miles east of the perimeter.
Under cover of foul weather, the Japanese were landing troops off the Tasimboko on the morning of 1 September from two destroyer transports and two cargo transports. Weather prevented strikes before daylight by either P-400s of the 67th or the Marine SBD dive bombers. At 0500 the Japanese destroyers shelled the airfield. At 0600, Brannon, now a village of
Major, and Lieutenants Fountain, Davis, Fincher, and Childress took
off to
None were found, but five beached landing craft At 0800 Captain Thompson and Lieutenants Head, Brzuska,
attack the landing parties.
were sighted.
and Johnston took
off
and strafed Tasimboko
village
and the landing
craft.
The mission was repeated by Brannon's flight at 1130, during the "Tojo Time" raid, while 18 Japanese bombers and 21 Zeros hit the airfield. Brannon and
his flight
dropped bombs, strafed buildings
in
the village, and
Time" were three bombers and four Zeros shot down by F4Fs. On the field, a hangar was burning, three SBD Dauntless dive bombers were on fire, ammunition and gasoline had been hit, and several delayed-action bombs were deep in the ground around the parking and service area. The P-400s returned from Tasimboko to a bomb-cratered finished the destruction of the landing craft. Results of the "Tojo
attack on Henderson Field
runway; they had to land well down the
field.
These dive bombing and strafing missions now became commonplace not a very nice title, for the 67th, which was nicknamed the "JagstafTel" since it is a degeneration of the German word for fighter Squadron, Jagdstaffel. The 67th was still not getting up there where they wanted to aerial combat. This was a constant source of irritation to the pilots of go the P-400s. Daily at "Tojo Time," the 67th took the P-400s up near Tasimboko in support of Marine ground action or worked over suspected Japanese supply areas and other targets of opportunity. Often they were sent under cover of darkness or bad weather to bomb and strafe the inlets and coves of Santa Isabel, where the enemy was maintaining relay points for landing barges used to reinforce its troops on Guadalcanal.
—
—
84
The Japanese air raid of 1 September 1942 set many fires on Henderson Field. An SBD Dauntless dive bomber was consumed despite efforts by ground crews to put out the fires. 2 Sept. 1942.
On 4 September, despite the heroic work of ground crews, only three aircraft of the
Word was
67th were
in
commission; 13
received that the
enemy was
pilots
were around
to
fly
them.
putting troops ashore in landing
barges on Santa Isabel, at a point 75 miles northwest of Henderson Field. Captain Christian and Lieutenants along with one at 1440.
The
The P-400s
Brown and
F4F piloted by Major Robert E.
target,
30 landing
craft,
was
Glazier in three P-400s,
Galer of VMF 224, took
dived to attack a group of six boats loaded with
supplies heading for shore.
They
off
easily located in a small cove.
men and
placed two direct hits with their 500-
pound bombs among the group of boats. The other boats and men still attempting to unload were thoroughly strafed. Twenty-five out of 30 landing craft were destroyed and two machine guns were silenced. Return rifle fire
put a few bullet holes
The Japanese
in
the airplanes.
retaliated that night
by sinking the U.S. destroyer
transports Little and Gregory, off Savo Island, and Henderson Field was subjected to a night of heavy shelling by Japanese ships.
Diary: Sept. 4, Friday We had a good day today. The weather kept the bombers away. Our planes have been dive bombing and strafing the Japs that have made several landings around this and other islands. Capt. Christian got a bomb on a group of Jap barges carrying troops ashore.
direct hit with his
85
He said while diving down on the barges he could see the Jap soldiers looking up and could see the flashes and puffs of their return rifle fire; they looked so helpless. Plenty of them are getting ashore and
add to our problems fast
and do
airplane. It
aerial is
later.
The P-39/P-400 may
combat, but
it's
sure turning out to be a great attack
getting real praise from the Marines for
They like
will just
not be able to climb up
its
close ground
them with all guns and cannon blazing away. The Jap body count after such support missions shows it is doing a job never intended for it. support.
On
to see
it
dive in low in front of
5 September, after a sleepless night of shelling by the Japanese
Navy which killed three men on the airfield, Major Brannon and Lieutenant Fountain took off on dawn patrol. At 0700 the P-400s spotted a group of landing barges bringing Japanese troops ashore. Ten of the landing barges, heading for a landing between Visale and Levers Pass, were still about 500 yards off the northwest coast of Guadalcanal. The target was reported and the P-400s made repeated strafing attacks on the barges until they ran out of ammunition. The barges were loaded with troops and on the strafing passes, the faces of the Japanese soldiers looking up from the barges and
"The strafing guns of the P-400s left a bloody 'X' in the water," recalled Brannon and Fountain. They were joined over the target by a flight of F4Fs of VMF 224; six of them stayed on the scene, repeating the strafing passes started by the P-400s against the beached and unloading barges. During their attack, 2nd
flashes of return rifle fire could be clearly seen.
Lieutenant Robert Jefferies,
Jr.,
USMC,
an F4F, flew through
pilot of
heavy ground fire from the beaching landing parties of Japanese troops and
was seen
to
fall
out of control into the sea off the landing beach.
Thompson and Lieutenant Fincher repeated the mission, barges, which were now unloading along the shore. The land-
Captain strafing the
ing boats and
most of the supplies were destroyed;
it
was estimated that 50
percent of the Japanese troops were casualties. Only Lieutenant Jefferies' plane failed to return; bullet holes were found in
The firepower and
all
of the other aircraft.
low-altitude attack capability of the
P-400 were giving
excellent performance and the results of these attack missions gave a
much-needed boost to the morale
of the pilots and
crews of the 67th.
Diary: Sept. 6, Sunday Yesterday Mike Zavoski and I got a tent from the USMC supply. put
it
We
up today right beside the hangar and will be pretty comfortable and
the bombs and shells don't ruin it. We are sort of camped on the you might say. The Army forces back in New Caledonia all got together and sent up a lot of personal supplies for the men in the Solomons. It's nice to know they are thinking about us. The Americal
dry in
it if
target,
Division
Commander even
stinking jungle
is
fighting barefooted.
86
sent a supply of shoes for the Marines.
rotting their shoes and I
got to go to
Mass
some
of
them are
The
practically
today, in the morning.
The
was in the jungle just off the airfield near the Marine artillery Mike went too, and the island didn't sink under him. At "Tojo Time," bombs fell all around our hangar. Number four hangar was hit and a dive bomber, SBD, that was parked near it was burned up. We have some of the best aircraft mechanics in the Air Corps with us, and they work miracles trying to keep as many planes in commission as possible. Chuck Neblock and his guys have taken the wing from an unservicable service
position.
plane and used
it to replace a damaged wing on a good plane. They have even changed an engine from a damaged plane to a servicable plane to get another one into the air. They do all of this without equipment to lift an engine or wing into place. Everyone gets around and he directs the
brute force method of hoisting things into place.
The
September made operations from the field and the was during these conditions that the 'Tokyo Express" operated most successfully. The persistent Japanese buildup near Tasimboko was aided by the foul weather. Often they landed troops rains of early
search for targets
difficult. It
undetected and only the scouting patrol reports provided warning of the extent of their growing strength.
The force at Tasimboko was suspected of
being a small group of worn-out Japanese
left isolated by the invasion. Wanting to confirm the patrol reports of their continuous buildup, a landing
by a reconnissance
in force
was planned
for the
morning of 8 September.
On the night of 7 September, elements of Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Edson's 1st Raider Battalion were embarked for a landing near Taivu Point for an attack
on the enemy positions near Tasimboko. On the morning of met heavy resistance as they moved on Tasimboko.
the 8th, the Raiders
They were facing the strong rear guard of a much larger Japanese force. The main force did not counterattack because it had already departed inland to the southwest, threatening the southern boundary of the perimeter. Patrol action
by native scouts and Marine patrols
later estimated the
strength of the Japanese force at about 4000 troops. They were hacking
way through the jungle, remaining well east of the perimeter,
their
ing a route that would take
them
follow-
to an area south of the airfield.
Due to the strength and heavy resistance of the Japanese rear guard at Tasimboko, and the limited strength committed to the mission, Colonel Edson called for immediate close air support. Here the 67th Fighter Squadron made a significant support effort. As the Marines took up positions around Tasimboko, they tried to
was
a well-defended
enemy
fight their
way
to
what they now knew
supply dump.
At 0700 Major Brannon and Lieutenants Fincher, Head and Childress were overhead in P-400s. Diving in front of the Marines, they attacked Tasimboko village. There were still landing craft along the shore; there was plenty of return fire, and none of the Japanese were actually seen in the
The Marines called for air attack on the huts and other locations they knew the Japanese were holding. The mission was repeated by Captain Thompson and Lieutenants
open.
87
The P-400s were inflicting heavy damage on the Japanese positions with bomb and strafing attacks. The Marines were Davis, Johnston, and Glazier.
up against fresh and well-equipped Japanese troops protecting a rich cache of arms, artillery, communications, medical supplies, and rations.
The
Marines pressed the attack against heavy fire and called for repeated close air
support missions.
Because of the continuous and heavy schedule of operations and the preceding days of rain, conditions on the Henderson Field runway were almost impossible. In some places under the steel runway matting, in the filled-in
bomb craters, there was a sea of mud. At 1530, Major Brannon and
Lieutenants Fincher and Head responded to one of the
calls for close air
support at Tasimboko. Brannon lead his flight out to the runway, which was progressively deteriorating throughout the day. Fully loaded with ammunition, gas, field
were attempting to make short mud. to the end of the runway, followed by Head
and a 500-pound bomb, the
pilots
takeoff runs to avoid the sea of
Brannon taxied
On 8 September
carefully
Lt. V.L. Head, flying in support of Coi. Merritt Edson's Raiders at Tasimboko, crashed on takeoff from the muddy Henderson Field runway. Lt. Head survived by unbuckling and running out through the flames. He was burned, but recovered and was soon back on duty. The crash scene, after the fire was put out, looking east. 8 September 1942.
88
and Fincher. With half flaps and
full
power, he slithered through the mud, it. Lieutenant Head followed with
getting off before reaching the worst of
the same procedure, gave
it full
throttle, slithered on, gaining takeoff
A
speed.
sloppy area under his side of the runway matting splashed a geyser of mud over the plane. Gaining speed, he attempted to pull the airplane off as he
matting.
was hit by another spray of mud thrown up from under the
Mud covered
the airplane as
it
became airborne
in a near-stalled
Engine torque and loss of lift from mud on the wings twisted the as the wheels bounced on the runway. A landing gear broke off and
attitude. aircraft
the plane tumbled off to the left of the runway in a cloud of flame and smoke. Lieutenant Fincher, following Head, got off safely, flying through the
smoke of Head's burning plane. At this moment, Brannon and Fincher were certain that Head's crash had been fatal. Brannon and Fincher again attacked in front of the Marines at Tasimboko. The Japanese were all killed or routed; the Marines destroyed the supplies and arms. Brannon's flight remained over
Tasimboko to cover the Marines' withdrawal as they trooped aboard their landing craft, heavily loaded with personal supplies of Japanese canned crab meat and bottles of sake and Japanese beer. Brannon's flight returned to the field at 1730.
Wednesday
Diary: Sept. 9,
Monday it
all day and we did not get much done. Tuesday it was still raining. The runway is sloppy with mud under the steel matting, especially when you get down near the takeoff point. So many bomb
rained
craters have been filled in under the matting that the fill is now turning to mudholes and splashes up all over the place when a plane rolls over it. Our planes were out supporting the Raiders in an attack on the Japs in a village up the coast that the Marines are trying to take. Yesterday Lt. Head crashed on takeoff. The mudbath he got all over the wings on the
made
takeoff roll
it
impossible for
it
to get airborne.
when he lifted off and crashed off the left edge gear
off
caught
and the plane broke
fire.
The way
The
plane stalled
of the runway.
It
broke the
in half right in front of the pilot seat
the plane broke apart,
it
was
possible for Lt.
and
Head
away from was watching his takeoff
to unbuckle the safety belt and scramble out of the flames and
the wreck.
It's a
miracle that he got out
and saw the cloud of mud, the
was
all
over.
stall,
alive.
I
the crash, and the flames;
I
thought
it
down the field to the crash, the Marines, way to the hospital. He is burned but The fire was put out promptly and we got some
By the time
I
ran
or someone, had him already on the is
going to be
all
right.
parts and equipment off the plane, including the radio. pictures this morning
of the broken plane;
it is
I
took several
an amazing
sight. Lt.
Head was evacuated to New Caledonia. Last night I went to bathe in the river and we got an air raid before I could get back, but the bombs dropped in the ocean. Then we got ready about dark to receive planes, F4Fs returning from a long mission. We were trying to help the Navy people and the CBs to light the runway
89
The crash scene
We
of Lt. V.L. Head's plane; looking north. 8
September 1942.
making torches to set out as runway lights, using sake bottles and wicks. Finally we were able to get some trucks shining their lights down the runway to light the touchdown area. These planes had to try to make landings almost in darkness, because the lights from the trucks barely lighted the touchdown point. The planes finally found the field and circled to land. The first plane touched down, groundlooped, and went off the runway, broke the landing gear, and smashed up the plane. In the process, five F4Fs were lost in the night landing operation. Bill Schneider was in the group watching the landings and was yelling at each plane at the top of his voice, "Set 'em down easy, Davey, we need 'em all!" "Tojo Time" today is just over, and our planes are back but shot up pretty bad. Two F4Fs cracked up landing and one hit a dive bomber, SBD. The runway is so muddy from the continuous rain that it is causing a lot of damage. It's the direct cause of Lt. Head's crash. An airfoil covered with mud is just no good. A Marine Lt. who went down about a week ago came back today. (2nd Lieutenant R.R. Amerine of VMF 224, who bailed out of his plane on 31 Aug. over the northwest coast of Guadalcanal walked into a field artillery outpost in poor physical condition.) He went down in the ocean
somehow.
90
tried
He had to sneak 30 miles through Japaneseheld jungle to get here and he had nothing to wear but his shirt. The and got ashore somehow. story
He we
is
that he had to hit a Jap over the head with a rock to get his
rifle.
more on the way back. That's how the story goes. Anyway, are glad to hear about someone making it back against the odds.
shot six
The Marines had high praise for the support provided by the P-400s at Tasimboko. One report by a Marine returned from that action said, "In the buildings and surrounding bush, there must have been a hundred dead Japs from the strafing by the P-400s; arms and supplies were blown to bits by their bombs." An overly generous report, perhaps, but the raid demonstrated, effectively, the attack accuracy of the P-400s.
The 67th was soon requested missions to place lines of the
for
more and more
fire directly in front of
close air support
troops engaged along the front
perimeter defenses, as well as for the interdiction of enemy
dumps behind enemy many combat situations it would be impossible to place mortar and
troops, concentrations of supplies, and ammunition lines. In
on opposing Japanese forces; the 67th responded with accurate support using the heavy firepower of the P-400. They began to compensate for the shortage of artillery that had hampered the Marines. artillery fire
The crash scene
of Lt. V.L. Head's plane; looking south. 8
September
91
Vandegrift liked the P-400 for
its
work
support of his frontline troops
in
v
and asked for more of them.
— and
The frontline Marines on opposing enemy
strikes
along a stream, a jungle pointed out on a
trail,
—
Army would call for close air which they were in close combat
later the
units with
or a ridge of high ground.
The spot would be
map to the pilot and the Marine frontline troops would lay
out signal panels on the ground at the front indicating the point of contact
with the enemy.
The
diving P-400s would
bomb the
spot, pull out of their
dives and skim, in zig-zag evasive action, across the tree tops, sometimes clipping a
few leaves
off
the trees with a wingtip or prop blade.
They would
then swing back and strafe the area with their machine gun and cannon fire.
was sometimes blind work. There were times a pilot could see only the smoke of an enemy breakfast fire, or a few Japs along a jungle road or trail for a fleeting split second. Many times the mission was completed accordIt
ing to plan without seeing anything.
After-action reports by frontline units moving into the area attacked by the P-400s reported many Japanese bodies and signs of a hasty
departure.
Diary: Sept. 10, Thursday The pilots of the 67th are doing a great job of dive bombing and strafing Japanese forces
and targets in front of the Marines. They some-
times go after Jap landing barges or ships that are always trying to
move
troops ashore. After one of the close support missions, Lieutenant
Fountain came his engine.
in
and taxied up right
As the engine came
revolutions and the
20mm
in front of
to a stop,
cannon
in
hit
the hangar and shut off
kicked over a few additional
the nose of the airplane fired into
the steel plates on the roof of the hanger.
they
it
The 20mm shells exploded
the steel plates and shell fragments went flying in
—
all
as
directions.
Everyone in the hanger got off without being hit but me. I got a small shell fragment in my arm. I was going to pick it out with long-nosed pliers but Captain Thompson said to go over to the hospital and have a corpsman do it and disinfect the puncture wound. I went over to the Marine dispensary, had it taken care of and hurried back here. As I was leaving the hospital, I saw at least 50 bodies of Marines wrapped in blankets waiting to be buried; it may have been more than 50, but it was a lot. There were others wounded and on stretchers awaiting treatment. The sight brought home the sad facts of what the Marines have been going through here to hold this hot potato that we have taken from the Japs.
The P-39/P-400 supposed to be, and
it
certainly couldn't act like the fighter plane
was never intended
to be a dive
it
was
bomber. Yet the
67 th made it perform superbly in the close support and dive bombing roles, and perfected their own techniques. A card in the instrument panel of the airplane read: DO NOT RELEASE BOMB WHEN NOSE ANGLE 30 DEGREES UP OR DOWN OR WHEN AIR SPEED EXCEEDS pilots of the
92
280 MPH. They had discovered that the bomb would release safely at a nose angle of 70 degrees and would clear the propeller arc if a quick back pressure on the stick was made to pull the airplane away from the falling bomb. Routinely they made dives at 300 mph and some at 500 mph, a performance not believed possible in the Aircraft Technical Orders. The technique was developed by trying new ideas and exchanging comments on mission results. Pilots found feet release the ,
mass
rifle
or antiaircraft
indicated an
Day
it was best to start the dive at about 5,000 bomb, pull out over the treetops, and zig-zag away to avoid
enemy
fire,
then return to strafe where return
after day the pilots of the Jagstaffel
300-, or 500-pound
fire
presence.
bombs or
would take
off
with 100-,
a depth charge slung under their bellies.
Often they attacked by ground direction from the Marines against an unseen enemy target, where the jungle trees or palm groves could hide a whole army. Their success earned them the undying gratitude of the men in close combat on the ground. "I'm sure our performance was because we could pick up the target, terrain feature, or
marker
out of a wingover, lay the
at a reasonably
low altitude and start our dive
bomb on the target, recover, and get out," recalls
Jim Jarman.
The enemy grew
in strength on all sides in early September. There were continuous shuttles of dive bombing and strafing missions coming and going from Henderson Field. The beat-up airplanes were wearing out, but the ground crews always managed to have a few in commission to meet the
daily mission requirements.
The defenders of the beachhead on land and in the air became increasaware that the Japanese forces were gaining strength for a push to The daily attacks by the Japanese air formations and the nightly shelling by the Japanese Naval forces were causing a slow attrition on the initial assignment of aircraft. Although Japanese losses far outnumbered our Henderson Field losses, available aircraft were becoming ingly
retake Guadalcanal.
One example of this can be seen in the 8 September action report of the Marine Air Group 23, to which all aircraft operating out of Henderson Field were assigned: "At 1820 there was an air raid alarm and six F4Fs of VMF-223 and ten F4Fs of VMF-224 took off. too few to carry the load.
The
first
B-17s
arrive over
Henderson
Field,
Guadalcanal. 11 September 1942.
93
The
landing strip
use
.
.
.
was badly rutted and chewed up due to rain and heavy One cracked up on takeoff. The planes landed between 1900 and
1930, after dark and under poor lighting conditions due to ground fog developing
.
.
.
three airplanes cracked up on landing.
seriously injured but five
mentioned
in
my
F4Fs were
lost."
No
pilots
were
(These were the night landings
diary of 9 Sept.)
The 67th Fighter Squadron, which
was keepwas almost miraculous
started with 14 planes,
ing from three to six planes in commission. This
mechanical work, supported by cannibalization of unservicable aircraft for parts in a desperate effort to keep as many planes flying as possible. Everyone was fatigued, wore ragged clothing, ate two meals a day, and faced an extended period on short rations. With the departure of Lieutenant Head after his accident on the 9th, a relief exchange of the 67th's pilots began, and Captain Christian and Lieutenants Erwin and Brzuska were returned to Tontouta, New Caledonia, on 11 September. 11 September 1942 was a day full of hard work fighting, bombing, and preparation for the developing Japanese offensive. At 0930 Major Brannon and Lieutenants Fountain, Glazier, and Childress took off in
—
Bomb
Crater. A 1000-pound bomb hit near their shelter. The covering beams and steel were blown to the side. It dug the occupants out in a cloud of dirt. Miraculously, all survived. Occupants were: Brannon, Childress, Fincher, and Glazier. 11 September 1942.
Brannon's
roof plates
94
now reported to be five miles east of the field. Due to the dense jungle cover, they sighted nothing. To the west they again search of Japanese forces
searched the vicinity of Cape Esperance, where the day before Lieutenant Fincher had scored a direct hit with his bomb on a location identified as an
enemy radio station site. On the patrol they saw nothing but landing barges they had already destroyed.
At 1205, 26 Japanese bombers with an escort of eight Zeros attacked the airfield and placed a stick of bombs right along the ridge where Edson's 1st Raider Battalion were digging in, a sure sign that the Japanese had chosen this location for a thrust at Henderson Field, from the south, by their force that had moved inland from Tasimboko. At "Tojo Time," Captain Thompson and Lieutenants Davis, Fountain, Brown, and Johnston were out patrolling for attack on Japanese positions. The airfield received a very heavy air attack that destroyed one P-400 on the ground. Eleven Marines were killed and 17 injured in the vicinity of the airfield. Six bombers and one Zero were shot down. One F4F, piloted by Major R.E. Galer, after shooting down a bomber and a Zero, went down smoking. Galer landed in the water offshore and swam to the beach. During the raid, a 1000-pound bomb hit close to one of the 67th's bomb shelters. It penetrated the ground and exploded under the shelter, blowing the occupants into the
air
and leaving a gaping hole
in
the ground.
The occupants and all the parts and debris from the shelter fell back into or near the hole. Miraculously, no one was In anticipation of the developing
strength received a welcome
killed.
enemy ground
offensive,
Marine
air
— though temporary — reinforcement. At
VF5 Squadron, based on Saratoga, commanded by Simpler, arrived along with 10 B-17s of the 11th Leroy C. Lieutenant Bombardment Group just passing through. Operations for the day closed with the return of 30 SBD dive bombers from late afternoon patrol. The SBDs, led by Lieutenant T.F. Caldwell, had sighted one Japanese heavy cruiser and two destroyers. Visibility had been poor and contact was made by only four of the SBDs. No damaging hits 1620, 24 F4Fs of
—
were made. The night was again filled with fierce shelling by Japanese naval units and the surrounding sounds of battle.
Diary: Sept. 11, Friday Yesterday we had a bad air raid. The bombers came over and dropped bombs on Tulagi and our new runway at "Fighter-1" which is almost capable of steady operation; some F4Fs have used it already.
There were 26 bombers and at least 15 men were killed or injured. Today we had an air raid about 1230 and it was one of the worst yet. hell. The Again, 26 bombers dropped their bombs and our area caught the damage was heavy, with many men killed or injured in the vicinity of field.
that got Four of our people were in a bomb shelter, right near ours, the shook It bomb. a direct hit by what seemed like a thousand-pound
95
ground like an earthquake. This shelter was built just like ours (courtesy of the Japs), dug deep and covered with wood beams, sheet steel, and topped off with dirt and sandbags. There is a big hole where their shelter used to be and they all got out alive. The blast dug out the shelter and blew the people, beams, sheet
steel,
and
dirt
30
feet in the
air.
The
occupants, Major Brannon and Lieutenants Pete Childress, Fincher, and Glazier;
all
but Lieutenant Childress were blown clear.
into the hole
and got covered up to the neck with
He dropped back
falling dirt
and debris.
beams and sheet steel were carried off to the side. When the explosions were over, everyone ran to his aid. People were standing all over him, pressing the dirt down on him, and just about burying him. He couldn't talk because he was being crushed. He just kept waving his arms in anger, trying to tell people to get the hell off of him, while he struggled. A corpsman fumbled around trying to give him a shot of morphine, thinking that part of him that was buried must be injured or missing limbs. With some organized digging, he was removed from the mess and they all went to the hospital for a checkup. They are in good Fortunately, the
shape except for a few cuts and bruises.
I
will
take a picture of the hole
by the bomb tomorrow so you can see that the bomb shelter is not there, just a big hole in the ground; I call it Brannon's bomb crater. left
At 0500 on 12 September, Major Brannon, although scheduled to be evacuated, was back on duty with a patch on his chin and a thankful smile on his face.
Seated
96
There was a false scramble, but all planes were back on the ground
at the
bottom of Brannon's
Bomb
Crater
is
Robert
L.
Ferguson. 12 September 1942.
t
by 0830. Taut readiness and tense anticipation permeated the atmosphere around Henderson field. Occasional rifle fire and mortar fire could be heard in the distance and Marine artillery, registering on fire points they might use to fire on the Japanese troops in the expected attack, belched forth every now and then. "Tojo Time" arrived at 1100; 26 Japanese bombers escorted by 16 Zeros approached directly over the field. They were met by heavy flak patterns from the
90mm antiaircraft guns, which were now working well,
i
^
\^°^ \ll^ September
which he and Major Dale D. Brannon, standing in the bomb crater from bomb hit their the when occupants the to injury free. There was no serious 1942.
e
shelter.
12
t
r
97
and bagged several of the planes before the F4Fs took over. Eleven bombers and four Zeros were shot down. The radio shack received minor
damage; three SBDs were destroyed on the ground. The Marine 90mm antiaircraft performance was spectacular; one Japanese bomber received a direct hit and exploded in a bright orange flash which, except for the grim reality of the situation, was a thing of beauty against the blue of the midday sky. The aerial combat that followed was wild; enemy bombers, their parts and parts of their crews as well, were falling at numerous points around Henderson Field. The unbridled rage of the air engagement was incredibly brief for the amount of destruction that occurred.
by 1200. Several pilots were wounded during the fight, and Ensign C.E. Eichenburger was killed when his F4F crashed on the field as he attempted to make a deadstick landing. Afternoon search All fighters returned
patrols detected seven Japanese Navy vessels heading from various places in the search area.
for Guadalcanal
Diary: Sept. 12, Saturday "Tojo Time" today was 1130. The Japanese two-engine bombers
of the Lunga River can be seen in the background as this Japanese bomber, shot down by fighters near Henderson Field, lies burning on the river bank. A young Marine looks over the crash scene. 12 September 1942.
The waters
98
came over
over 23000 feet; they looked like gray ghosts up there in The Marine antiaircraft battery got five of them; they were right on today. Then we could hear on the radio and watch as the Marine F4Fs came in on them. We could see one of them explode and another started down in flames and disintegrated in midair; the parts tumbled down and flashed now and then as the shiny aluminum reflected the sun. Others crashed on the field in flames or smoking. Not much of the bomb at
the sunlight.
load hit the
field.
After the raid the
field
parts of their crewmembers.
was covered with parts of Jap planes and There was a leg from one of the Jap bomber
crew members lying out on the ground in front of the hangar just a short distance from our shelter. I went down through the Marine artillery position just off the edge of the field to the bank of the river to see the smoking bomber that crashed there. The plane was still burning and almost completely consumed. The body of the pilot or one of the crew was lying there burned and broken. There are several other planes and bodies nearby.
The
reality of
it all is
that this
is
just
how our own boys may be in
look when they crash and burn in combat, in places where they
contact over I
took
enemy
positions.
lots of pictures
today of these things
I
have described. The
Jap bombers and three Zeros destroyed. We found another body of a Jap flier a while ago; he is buried now. That is final
score today so far
is 1 1
about 15 this afternoon. (Several of these enemy airmen lie in a common grave at the bend of The Lunga River, South South East of the Hender-
son Field runway's West end; others were buried where they
fell.)
99
CHAPTER
9
a Dark Night on Guadalcanal" "It's
The
Tasimboko on 8 September was an ominous The main enemy force had already moved and was working its way southwest from Tasimboko through the
successful action at
victory for General Vandegrift. inland
jungle to threaten the perimeter defenses south of the airfield. Vandegrift
estimated that this force, under General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, would
an attempt to capture the
Where would most
airfield
make
from the south.
the attack hit the perimeter? Vandegrift decided the
brunt of the attack was a ridge of open hills 1700 yards south of the Henderson Field runway. The Marines
likely point to receive the
lying about
had been improving their defense positions all along the perimeter line, and Vandegrift ordered Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson's 1st Raider
by the Parachute Battalion, to take up positions beyond the outpost line on the ridge, dig in, and defend that approach to the airfield. Edson moved his force to the ridge and began to establish his Battalion, reinforced
defense as the
lines,
coordinate artillery support, and wire in his positions as well
meager supply
of wire
would allow. The ridge,
later
known
as
"Edson's Ridge" or "Bloody Ridge," was the scene of a crucial battle for Guadalcanal.
Kawaguchi, now somewhere
in
the jungle south of the ridge, had
received orders from his superiors not to attack unless he had assured himself that he and the other
beachhead had
commanders
sufficient strength to
to the west and east of the
accomplish their mission. Otherwise,
they were to await additional units already on the way.
100
During the night and early morning of 12 - 13 September, Henderson Marine bivouac area in the palm groves were heavily shelled, probably by ships spotted on the previous afternoon by Caldwell's SBD Field and the
search pilots. The Japanese naval bombardment, intended to neutralize Henderson Field, was heavy, lengthy, and destructive; battle sounds could
be heard at a high pitch through the night. The bombardment shifted several times, covering the general area of the airfield and beachhead, including the Marine Raider positions on the ridge. Casualties from the
bombardment were heavy in some areas of the beachhead. The shelling was direct support for the Japanese forces making their three-pronged attack on the Marine lines in an attempt to regain their property.
With supreme confidence, Kawaguchi began the attack toward the on the night of 12 - 13 September, hitting the Marine lines head-on.
airfield
The Raiders, meeting each wave of the attack, dropped slowly back along the ridge to hold their lines together. During the day of 13 September the raiders reconsolidated and wired in their lines. areas, and
The
sometimes the ridge were under heavy
ment during the
air
airfield,
the bivouac
and Naval bombard-
entire period.
At nightfall on the 13th, the Japanese renewed their attack. The Marine Raiders dug in on the northernmost knoll of the ridge for a final stand in defense of the
airfield, a
scant 1000 yards inside their
line.
the night the Japanese threw numerous attacks at the Marine
ported by mortar fire in front of
fire.
During
line,
sup-
Artillery of the 5th battalion, 11th Marines, placed
Edson's lines throughout the night, pounding a devastating
barrage on the Japanese attackers. The Marine Raiders engaged
in
hand-
to-hand combat with waves of onrushing Japanese infantry that penetrated their lines.
With bayonet,
knife,
handgun, and grenade they fought
in a
high
pitch of individual combat.
By dawn of 14 September line
on
the last knoll of
the Marine Raiders were
Bloody Ridge
in front of
south slope of the ridge, the Japanese were
still
Henderson
holding their Field.
On
the
regrouping to evaluate their
situation and to carry the attack. First light appeared to be ushering in another day of hard fighting on the ridge. Japanese troops were infiltrating the defense lines to snipe and cut communications. The attackers from the west of the perimeter brought the west end of the airfield under mortar fire
and Radio Tokyo announced that Guadalcanal was recaptured from the Americans.
At home, the United States Government was giving out little information, admitting nothing of their meager support for the defenders of Guadalcanal. The most popular radio commentators of the time, such as Gabriel Heatter, opened their newscasts with the ominous words, "It's a dark night on Guadalcanal," and mothers, fathers, wives, and sweethearts, valiant their ears pinned to the radio sets, uttered a sob of despair. In this on Guadalcanal knew that his was a precarious plight that
every man would end with Guadalcanal effort,
U.S. possession or every man would go Never to into the bush to fight a guerrilla war against the Japanese. still
in
101
surrender to the Japanese and never to be taken alive was a covenant as veracious as a knightly vow.
Diary: Sept. 13, Sunday It's morning now, and
I
never expected to see
The Japs
it.
are
attacking at several points but especially at a point just south of us where
the Marine Raider Battalion
advance.
I
shelled us
is
dug
in
on a ridge and trying to stop their
guess they have the situation still under control.
from ships
just offshore for
hours
last night.
The Jap Navy
We went to get
bomb shelter and it was jammed full, like sardines, with crewmembers from the B-17s that got caught on the ground here last night. into our
Kenneth Markel was going to pull his .45 on them for occupying our I grabbed him and we ran and jumped over the edge of an embankment leading down to the artillery position from our flight line area on the field. We stayed there all night. It was a great show of fireworks; as bad as shelling can get. They (enemy) had an observation shelter.
plane chugging back and forth across the
field,
dropping flares and
spotting fire for them, Markel chain-smoked until his pack of cigarettes
was gone and cussed the B-17 crew that took over our shelter. The Japs shot star shells, which were as bright as day, to light up the area and adjusted fire with the help of the observation plane.
For a while the shells hit in the coconut groves where troops are camped; then they lifted fire to the airfield and destroyed some planes.
They raised fire again and instead of the shells bursting near us with shell fragments whirring around us and cutting the limbs from trees above us, as they had been, the shells
They sound
were
like a freight train
traveling a
little
higher over our heads.
passing in the distance.
Fm
sure they
were trying to place a few on the ridge where the Raider Battalion is. We have had shellings before, but this one is beyond belief. It is hard to describe the feeling of helplessness during a shelling,
on the target
— there
is
nowhere
battle noises are terrible
A welcome
to go,
no one to
when you are right
fight
back
at,
and the
and continuous.
came in over the field (0700 hours). Twenty more F4Fs are coming in from a carrier and will be here for today's "Tojo Time" raid. That means we may be able to have 60 planes sight just
operational against Tojo today; that depends, of course, on
how bad the
damage to our planes from the shelling turns out. / The 4Fs were replacements delivered for VMF-223 and VMF-224. Seven were eventually delivered to each squadron; the rest were wrecked on landing or other-
wise destroyed.]
We had two air raids this afternoon, heavy with Zeros. This evening two Zeros came in and strafed the field and shot down an SBD that was on his landing approach. I was out on the field during one of the strafing attacks. There was nowhere to go. I ran and jumped into a shallow foxhole, landed on my back, and lay as low as possible. One plane came over the foxhole so low and so close that one of the metal
102
clips falling
Robert M. Ferguson. Standing by the wing of
his Bell
P-39/P-400
from his machine gun belts landed on got too good a look at that Zero.
I
Hell's Bell.
September 1942.
my chest as I lay there looking up.
I
could see the red ball and the rivets on
the skin of the airplane. I
took pictures this morning of a unit of the 5th Marines moving up
through our area to reinforce the Raider Battalion.
103
During the early hours of the morning on 14 September, Captain John A Thompson reported to the pagoda for a mission briefing. At that hour little was known by the aviation personnel on the airfield of the tide of battle
on the ridge to the south and
at other sectors of the
perimeter
— only that
the fate of the entire operation hung in the balance. In the dim light of a
Thompson was introduced to a young smudged with blood, with three days beard. He pointed out for Thompson on a crude map the south
lantern in the blacked-out pagoda,
Marine growth
officer
of
—
dirty, dog-tired,
slope of Bloody Ridge held by Edson's Raiders and described the general situation.
"We need to bring heavy fire from your P-400s here," said the Marine officer, pointing to
"We
the south slope of the ridge in front of the Marine
expect them to mount another drive at
Thompson agreed
lines.
first light."
that he could be off at first light with three P-400s
and be over the south slope of the ridge just minutes after takeoff. The distance
was
close
enough that the airplanes would not have
to leave the
traffic pattern.
In the early
morning darkness
Thompson and Lieutenants
at the 67th's flight line, Captain
B.E. Davis and B.W.
Brown
started the en-
gines of their P-400s and taxied slowly through the dusky darkness toward
they were in takeoff position. watched as they roared down the runway and off, the dancing blue flames from their short exhaust stacks twinkling in the early morning darkness. They circled over the field and climbed to no more than 1000 feet, swinging in a wide left turn to approach the ridge from the west in their first strafing pass. The entire time the planes could be seen from the work area of the 67th's flight line and even better by the few who climbed to the top of the hangar, braving sniper fire, to watch the P-400s until they disappeared behind the treetops and the the end of the runway. At the
first hint of light
The ground crews and other
pilots
south slope of the ridge.
The target area could be seen by Thompson's flight when they passed over the slope.
field,
swinging south to
ing for whatever action they to a
line
up for their
first
pass at the south
On the ridge, the slopes were covered with Japanese troops, reform-
little
above tree top
level.
were planning. Thompson's P-400s dropped They came out over the treetops, taking the
Men of the 5th Marines pass the burned-out decoy P-39/P-400, number 1 2, as they cross Henderson Field on their way to reinforce Edson's Raiders at Bloody Ridge. 13 September 1942.
104
1
Elements of the 5th Marines passed through the on Bloody Ridge.
flight line
area of the 67th Squadron on
their
way to
reinforce Col. Edson's troops
Japanese by surprise, dropping to 25 or 30 feet above the heads of the troops on the slope with all guns blazing.
The concentration of fire ripped into the formation of Japanese troops as the planes flashed across the ridge. The chatter of their guns could be heard on the airfield while the men of the 67th and others on the ground cheered as the planes zoomed up from behind the ridge. The P-400s pulled up
in a circle for
another attack. Strung out over the treetops, they dived
for another pass at the ridge,
knowing
it
would not be as easy as the
first
The Japanese officers and NCOs had quickly organized their troops for mass rifle and machine gun return fire. The P-400s again showered devasone.
tating firepower
on the
slope.
In the hail of return fire from the Japanese troops, Lieutenant Brown was the first to receive a critical hit on his aircraft. With a punctured engine
coolant radiator, he took advantage of the high speed from his strafing dive
and pulled up toward the
field,
gaining as
much
altitude
from the speed as
He held onto a little power before losing all of his engine coolant and when he could reach the runway, he cut the engine and landed possible.
deadstick.
On
the next strafing run, the same type
hit
was received by Thompsame
son's P-400; he pulled out of his strafing pass and executed the
procedure as Brown, landing deadstick. Lieutenant Davis continued to strafe the ridge
until
he was out of
ammunition. The strafing by the P-400s was devastating and demoralizing it inflicted heavy casualties on their attack on the Marine lines. In continued for marshal formations trying to to the now-exhausted Japanese troops;
turn of events, with 600 dead lying on the slope, General Kawaguchi gave the order to withdraw, conceding the victory to
the face of this
final
Edson and his Raiders. At a later time in the war and in a campaign commanded by the Army, Thompson's mission to attack Bloody Ridge would have been a Medal of Honor event. It was a mission in which the pilots were prepared to sacrifice their aircraft
and themselves
in their
determination to
inflict this final
blow
105
on the enemy battle force attempting to capture the tinely reported in the after-action
was roureport of the 23rd Marine Air Group as airfield. It
follows:
14 September 1942 Routine Patrols. Captain J. A.
Brown and 2nd
Thompson led two other P-400s (1st. Lt. B.E. Davis) of the
mission directed against an
enemy
67th
force on a
VF hill
Lt.
B.W.
in a strafing
south of Hen-
derson Field.
The enemy was prepared to attack a hard-pressed unit of Marine Raiders. The mission was successful and many enemy troops were hit and the enemy retired. Two of the planes were hit by ground fire and made deadstick landings. All pilots landed safely.
For
were later decorated. John A. Thompson Navy Cross and Lieutenants B.W. Brown and B.E. Davis
this action, the pilots
received the
received the Silver Star.*
Monday We got little sleep last night. The Japs were attacking all night and
Diary: Sept. 14,
many have
infiltrated to just across the river.
been helping to reinforce the Marine outpost the artillery position.
I
was out there
all last
On some
nights
we have
line
along the river near
night.
We work during the
much time for The outpost line is just about a rifle shot from here, where our planes are parked. The Marines have two lines of listening posts, some forward across the river, and some on this side of the river. At night when I go out there, I join a Marine to man one post. The posts are wired together by field telephones and every once in a day trying to keep rest and also not
flight
much
operations going, and there isn't
to eat.
while they whisper a reporting procedure, heavily punctuated with obscenities that a Jap listening
everything
on the
line could
is all
right along the line.
just shooting at
imaginary dangers.
not understand, to see that
There was sporadic firing, a lot of it
The artillery continuously pounded the Japs all last night, in support of Raiders who must be having a rough time out there. The Japs are well equipped and in great numbers. You can tell there is a battle raging, machine guns and
artillery are
barking continuously. Their bullets occa-
*In the late afternoon on 14 September, Generals Vandegrift and Geiger visited the 67th's They talked to John Thompson and with Jim Jarman, who would soon be taking over
flight line.
when Thompson departed. General Vandegrift told Thompson that "you'll never the papers, but that three-P-400 mission of yours that day [at Bloody Ridge] saved Guadalcanal." He then looked around to see no one was looking, took a bottle of Old Overholt the flight
read
it
in
rye whiskey from under the seat and handed his shirt
106
it
to
Thompson, admonishing him to put it under
because he didn't have enough for everyone.
come whistling through our area. The whole thing looks pretty rough to me. The battle sounds are out there all the time, and we get used to it. But now, there is firing as close as 300 yards from us on occasions. You can even identify the sounds of the weapons. A Jap rifle or machine gun sounds different from an American rifle, machine gun, sionally
BAR, be
or Rising gun.
identified
Even the various
sizes of
mortars and
artillery
can
by their sounds.
At 0930 this morning, Zeros came over and tangled with F4Fs above the field. The dogfights right over the field were really hot. There were Jap 20mm shells bursting all around us and we just watched the show. There were pursuit curves being flown right down to within 100
gaJt^v
Captain John A. Thompson September 1942.
in
*****
take a P-39/P-400 Airacobra prepares to
off
on an intercept
sortie.
107
feet of the ground, right over our heads. All four Zeros
were shot down. At "Tojo Time," the bombers and many Zeros stayed up high. Again they were intercepted by F4Fs and all were shot down. (Zeros waiting for a planned signal to land, thinking that the field had
been captured by
now.)
The battle is still going on but we know now (1515 hrs.) that the Marine lines have held and the Jap attack has been beaten back. We should have a quieter, safer night tonight. I have seen all of the frontline tension I want for a while. During the battle of the ridge, the perimeter was attacked from the two other segments of the Japanese force. Each of these
east and west by
was
on the line. The Japanese and resolute but uncoordinated because of inadequate
successfully beaten off by the Marines
attacks
were
fierce
communications and poor planning for force maneuvering
in the jungle
environment. Patrol action by the 1st Marines immediately after the battle of
Bloody Ridge proved that the enemy, though temporarily disorganized,
was present
in force
and would
fight
any contact by patrols. The Japanese
were contacted in frequent patrol engagements through 17 September. The Japanese were on the move, attempting to join their forces and consolidate their strength west of the
forces east and south of the perimeter
perimeter.
Pilots of the
L.H.
108
Ramp,
67th Fighter Squadron in the operations shack at Cactus. They are from left to Jarman, Capt. John A. Thompson. 1942. (U.S. Army Air Corps)
Lt. J.T.
right: Lt.
a
The 'Tokyo Express" operated as usual; air raids continued to pound Henderson field; fierce patrol actions were occurring frequently, and "Washing Machine Charlie" visited the airfield regularly, under cover of darkness, tossing out a few bombs now and then to keep the American defenders awake and on their toes. The experience of the recent past proved to everyone that large enemy forces could be moved to threatening positions around the perimeter under concealment of the jungle; vigilance
and a tight defense were of the utmost importance, but Vandegrift the problem of limited forces. In
the
Ilu
all
action by the Japanese thus far, beginning with the battle along
River
they faced
had
still
in
in
mid-August, they had underestimated the Marine enemy
the beachhead and the strength needed to defeat him. They
prepare adequate plans supported by detailed patrol evaluation of both the environment and the Marine lines. Their plans were hastily
failed to
executed and
failed to achieve the benefit of coordinated attack
their imprudent and arrogant attitude.
The
because of
rigors of the environment did
much toward denying them their objectives; the jungle, rain, dengue fever, malaria, unimanginably rugged terrain, and humid heat harassed
an additional enemy on their
them like
flanks.
Yet the common Japanese soldier, even a sick one, was a fierce enemy. Beginning with the early battles at the Ilu, Matanikau, and Tasimboko, it was clear to the Marines that the Japanese fighting man would neither accept nor give quarter. When a battle was not going well for him, he went too willingly to certain death.
Few prisoners were taken by either side;
in
combat, each accepted a fight to the finish. In many instances the Japanese, considering their situation, were foolhardy in not withdrawing to regroup
and
fight
another day.
By mid-September, following several difficult defense actions, the
1st
Marine Division had not received reinforcements or a resupply of ammunition. The battle of "Bloody Ridge" had proved to the skeptics that Guadalcanal could be held, and an effort to put in resupply and reinforcements was now viewed, from the rear, with a different attitude. It was clear that the
force of the 1st Marines, Reinforced, had to hold itself up by bootstraps before reinforcements and resupply would be risked
initial
its
—
is most difficult to recall and reswallow. the 7th Marines were landed, along with a supply of September On 18
thought that
rations and aviation gasoline. Admiral Turner,
who had been blockade-run-
ships in the early ning, was now darting into Lunga Point with supply which ruled the warships, morning; he departed by 1800 to avoid Japanese as well as waters of the Southern Solomons by night. Rations arrived, enough barbed wire to wire in the perimeter defense line.
Diary: Sept. 20,
There are alert to this at
Sunday
now. We have to be Jap snipers working us over off the edge of the times. There are two dead ones right
a lot of
all
109
field in
the trees.
They really smell. The artillery is still pounding away at
the Japs today, the remnants of the battle of the ridge,
Diary: Sept. 23,
We
got
I
suppose.
Wednesday
more planes
tively quiet for the past
in night before last. Things have been relafew days. The Japs are being bombed at their air
bases at Buka and Bougainville these days,
made another landing, and our them like a milk run.
I
hear. Several thousand Japs
planes have been bombing and strafing
made it possible for General Vandegrift to more complete defense in the perimeter and consider moving
Arrival of reinforcements
organize a
the west boundary to the Matanikau River and the eastern boundary to the
Tenaru. The southern boundary was more difficult to define;
was a sector formed through an almost impenetrable jungle, but a link was somehow devised. In his monograph The Guadalcanal Campaign, 1949, Major John L. Zimmerman, USMC, said of this sector: 'Time-distance factors were so distorted by the chaotic nature of the terrain that passing with any degree of confidence was out of the question for an attacking enemy force." Vandegrift' s situation was now further improved by the knowledge that the Army's 164th Infantry of the Americal Division in New Caledonia was scheduled to be committed to him in the near future. It
was
to the
west and northwest of the perimeter that enemy
strength was reforming; there was objective of the
little
'Tokyo Express" was
action to the east and south.
By
mount an
The
to reinforce the Japanese units in
that sector. Patrol action confirmed increasing intent to
it
enemy
strength, with an
offensive against the perimeter.
the end of September, replacements for Japanese losses at the
ridge and perimeter battles, plus
two
additional infantry regiments,
were
landed by the "Tokyo Express." Troop concentrations were well to the west, and so concealed by the jungle that an estimate of their strength and disposition
was impossible. Lack of intelligence gathering was costly in the
patrol actions to test the Japanese and determine their strength and disposition.
In the period
23-26 September,
the 1st Battalion 7th Marines ven-
tured to the west in a landing beyond the Matanikau River, toward Ko-
kumbona, coordinated with a sweep by the Raider Battalion to the east bank of the Matanikau. The two elements were to join in hope of establishing a reconnaissance base west of the perimeter. Both units met heavy resistance in unexpected force. With the 1st Battalion surrounded on a ridge and the Raiders meeting heavy resistance on the east bank of the Matanikau, they called for and received heavy close air support. The 1st Battalion received heavy casualties, but with the help of gunfire from the USS Ballard and close air support, they fought their way to the beach and were heroically evacuated in landing craft on the 27th. The Raider Battal-
110
Two
of the world's greatest aircraft mechanics, Charles N. Neblock
and Enoch
J.
Dahlman. Sep-
tember 1942.
withdrew to the perimeter. This was proof of the gathering strength of the Japanese west of the beachhead. Toward the end of September, opposing patrols clashed frequently along the east bank of the Matanikau. Japanese artillery pieces, 150mm, capable of reaching Henderson Field, were landed by the 'Tokyo Exion then
Ill
press."
The Marines were determined to keep the Japanese out of artillery
range of the
airfield.
Diary: Sept. 26, Friday
Our planes are bombing and strafing Japanese troops that are being landed west of the perimeter. B-17s are coming through and bombing farther north into Jap bases like Bougainville.
here tonight after a mission. visibility is terrible;
some
A
flight of
them landed
has been raining since about 1600 and
It
of the planes had a hard time getting
Loading bombs on our P-39/P-400s
is
quite a job.
We
in.
have no
equipment to hoist a bomb into place. The armament chief, Felix Gurbada, "Gunner," has it done by brute force. They roll a bomb onto two crowbars under the plane. Then everyone who can fit under the plane gets a hold on the bars and lifts it into place; someone in the cockpit trips the latch to hold it in place. One armament man, John Orlich, hurt his back so badly keeps on.
lifting
On one
that he
is
almost deformed with pain, but he just
occasion Orlich
latch; the latch didn't hold
The arming wire
was
and the
in
the cockpit working the
bomb
fell
bomb
under the plane on the
armed the rear fuse, which is a 45-second fuse. Kenneth Markel unscrewed the fuse with his hand and was able to throw it away before it exploded. The whole group loading the bomb would have been killed if he had not acted as he did. I was under the plane helping to load the bomb and saw what Markel did. He knew what to do; he was quick, and I appreciate it. ground.
pulled out and
The arrival of 4,262 fully equipped fresh troops of the 7th Marines on 18 September marked the point when Admiral Turner began to speed up his logistic support of Guadalcanal. The "Tokyo Express" and Japanese warships
in
general operated at will in the waters around Guadalcanal, yet
our resupply was steadily increasing with the daily arrival of ships off Lunga Point.
The
1800
to be out of range
ships would arrive, begin to unload about 0600, and depart at
warships arrived
off
when
the
'Tokyo Express" or other Japanese
the north coast to land troops and shell Henderson
Field.
Through all of this, the men on the airfield, sitting out the shell fire, were wondering, "Where in hell is our Navy? Why aren't they in here doing something to stop this?" The beefed-up logistic support began to show in every way and by the end of September, rations at Cactus began to improve. In air operations, additional aircraft eral
Roy
S. Geiger,
were making
it
possible for
Gen-
then commanding the Marine Air Wing, to assure
General Vandegrift of about 60 aircraft for daily operations by the "Cactus Air Force," the
Army
pseudonym given
air aircraft.
The
to this mixture of Marine, Navy, and
units then involved could usually promise in
mission rates to meet this requirement:
112
com-
Major John
L.
Smith,
USMC,
the legendary Marine Fighter Pilot and hero of Cactus
air action.
Sept.
1942 (USMC)
VMF-223 VMF-224 VF5 VMSB-232
(Lt. Col.
67th Sq., Army,
(John A.
(Major John L. Smith)
10 F4F
(Major Robert E. Galer)
15
(Lt.
Depending upon success
of
Cmdr. Leroy C. Simpler)
15
F4F F4F
Richard C. Mangrum) 12 SBD Thompson) 6 P-400*
ground crews patching up the worn-out, shot-up
P-400s.
In the early
morning of 14 September, Major Brannon and Lieuten-
ants Glasier and Childress had departed by C-47 to return to Tontouta,
New Caledonia.
In the late afternoon, Lieutenants J.T. Jarman,
R.M. Fer-
guson, E.H. Fernam, A.B. Farquharson, and D.C. Goerke arrived at Hen-
derson
field
aboard a C-47. This exchange
procedure for periodically relieving
pilots
initiated the 67th's
exchange
from combat duty.
The
nightly shelling continued and battle noises could be heard on all Marines made contact around the perimeter with the remnants of attempting to the Japanese attack force evidently in large numbers make their way to the west of the perimeter. John Thompson checked out sides as
—
—
the newly arrived pilots on the dive bombing and close support strafing
113
on numerous patrols and attacks on Japanese positions, landing boats, troops, supplies, and occupied villages. These close support raids were conducted in coordination with Marines, who reported that the attacks were very successful, especially in the destruction of supplies of food and ammunition. Scarcity of food was becoming a real problem for the tactics
Japanese troops.
On 16 September, tain,
Lieutenants B,W. Brown, D. Fincher, Z.D. Foun-
and R.B. Johnston returned to Tontouta. Lieutenants J. Sawyer, D.P.
Miller,
and
Morton arrived from
J.
Espiritu Santo in P-400s.
One P-400
had been lost at Santo in a landing accident; the pilot, Lieutenant Walsh was hospitalized. at
Another P-400, piloted by Lieutenant R.E. Kaiser, remained
Santo with engine trouble.
The new
arrivals
were immediately
initiated
the routine of close air support missions.
bombing and
They
by John Thompson into
all
got their
first licks in,
strafing Japanese front lines, destroying supplies, placing fire
in front of the
Marines, or shooting up landing boats.
An example
of a typical day following the battle of the ridge
was 19
September. Three P-400s attacked the village of Morovovo and vicinity on
Home plate for the 67th Squadron was the old Japanese hangar at the west end of Henderson Field. This tent, on the south side of the hangar, received much damage from shell fragments. The occupants, taking a break, are: front, Thomas Melton, Mike Zavoski; rear, unknown, R.L. Ferguson. September 1942.
114
the western end of Guadalcanal. A group of landing boats were attacked. Two were destroyed by bombs, two were exploded with tracer bullets, and the rest were put out of commission by heavy strafing. In addition, a building hit in a strafing attack near the village blew up in a tremendous
detonation
— obviously
a large
ammunition store
— that could be heard
back at the perimeter.
From a
on 22 September, Lieutenant E.H. Farnam did not return. Five P-400s along with some Marine dive bombers had bombed that area,* then the P-400s had strafed the area where many new huts had been constructed by the Japanese. When the flight joined up to return to the field, Farnam was missing. It was a day of bad weather, rain, and poor visibility that hindered an air search. similar mission to the Visale area,
Later, on 24 September, Lieutenant R. Waymouth of Navy Dive Bombing Squadron VS-3 reported seeing a P-400 down about 200 yards inland about five miles west of Kukum; it was believed to be Farnam's plane. Again, on 28 September, a more cheerful report was received; a Coast Watcher reported that Lieutenant Farnam was safe with him, but in poor health. Farnam returned to the base on 4 October, having been
missing for 12 days.
During the day on 22 September, General Millard F. Harmon Cactus.
visited
A jeep driver brought him down to the 67th's work area, where he
spoke for a few minutes with members of the ground crew.
It
was
a
The General was visibly moved by the spirit of the men and worried about their poor, ragged condition. He complimented them on the job they were doing. During the visit, one of the men surprisingly informal session.
said, "I'd
be happy to stay on here, General, but
my clothes are all wearing
out."
Close
air
support activity for the remainder of September was
in-
fluenced by the growing strength of the Japanese to the west and the
continuous landing of reinforcing troops by the "Tokyo Express." Their
growth in strength was fully realized when the action in the vicinity of the Matanikau by the 7th Marines and Raider Battalion met such overwhelming strength that the mission had to be withdrawn. During this episode, beginning 24 September, the 67th, along with Marine SBD dive bombers, gave significant support to the operation, its withdrawal, and its aftermath, proving that a Japanese force was assembling and preparing for a major counteroffensive.
During the period, Lieutenants Jarman and Sawyer led numerous flights, interdicting various parts of the area. On 27 September the sur-
rounded 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines, under heavy enemy fire, was fighting its way back to the beach west of Point Cruz, supported by gunfire from the USS Ballard. Lieutenants Miller, Goerke, Ferguson, Morton, and Farquharson made numerous strafing attacks in their P-400s in front of the landing area to help clear a path of retreat for the beleaguered
Marines. With the Marine SBDs, they covered the withdrawal to the beach, striking Japanese positions to ease the pressure on the evacuation.
115
Diary: Sept. 28, Sunday The Marines and Japs are engaged near Point Cruz, west of the Matanikau River. Our planes have been dive bombing and strafing in support. We had an air raid today; 18 Jap bombers came over and a lot of Zeros. Three
men were
killed
on the
field,
three in shock from
bomb
concussion, and about six wounded. Those air raids sure put terror in the soul.
Diary: Sept. 30,
Heavy
rain.
Wednesday
A B-17 came
in
with Admiral Nimitz and party.
Diary: Oct. 1, Thursday Admiral Nimitz left today. They took off in the afternoon. The B-17 couldn't get off in the morning because of the heavy mud on the runway. During his visit to Henderson Field, Adm. Nimitz awarded citations to Army, Navy, and Marine pilots. Major Smith, Major Galer, and Captain Carl of the Marine Squadrons received the Navy Cross. Eleven other pilots of the Army, Navy, and Marines received the Distinguished Flying Cross. The one Army pilot to receive it was our Lieutenant Jarman of the 67th. Some of the pilots already rotated, like Major Brannon and Captain Thompson, will probably receive citations at Tontouta. Missions to attack, bomb, and strafe the strengthening Japanese
Ground crew members of the 67th Fighter Squadron standing by a P-39/P-400 of the Cactus Flight. They are, from left to right: W.R. Williams, V.W. King, J.H. Miller, J.H. Hurford, F.J. O'Connell, D.V. Maupin,
116
F.
Gurbada, A.D. Fitzgerald, K. Markel. Sept. 1942.
forces west of the perimeter continued at a steady pace; ground crews
worked
a backbreaking schedule to keep the P-400s in commission for the
job.
The steady
traffic of
enemy destroyer
transports of the
"Tokyo Ex-
press" was frequently detected heading for Guadalcanal and attacked by
Cactus airplanes, but they continued to land troops and shell Henderson field under cover of darkness. The 11th Bombardment Group, under Colonel Laverne Saunders, out of Espiritu Santo, made valiant efforts to catch up with the "Express;" however, by the time his B-17s could fly to Guadalcanal, the "Express" would have dispersed and gone north, up patrolling
the
slot.
The Japanese Navy was still in control of the seas around the Southern Solomons.
117
V.
CHAPTER
Life
10
on the Target
Despite the temporary American successes of mid-September, there was indeed a Japanese grand strategy for recapturing Guadalcanal. Lieutenant
General Harukichi Hyakutake, his headquarters
still
Commander of the Japanese 17 Army, with had made in-depth plans for the task. The
at Rabaul,
elements of the Ichiki and Kawaguchi forces had merely been a part of the strength allocated to the mission and engaged too soon. Complacency and
poor planning had brought these two commanders to disaster at the
Ilu
and
Bloody Ridge. The buildup of Japanese strength continued uninhibited. Steady arrivals of the "Tokyo Express," west of the perimeter, were successfully landing troops and equipment on a nightly basis.
This increasing force,
now under
the local
command
of Lieutenant
General Masao Maruyama, reached a strength of over 20,000 by mid-Oc-
The
September clash with the Japanese along the Matanikau by the 7th Marines and the Raider Battalion had proved to General Vandegrift that the Japanese were there in force and growing rapidly in strength. As long as American air operations at Hendertober, and the process continued.
late
son Field continued, the Japanese could not safely bring large troop task forces in transports and cargo ships to Guadalcanal. Yet the
"Tokyo Ex-
press" delivered troops in relative safety and, over a period of time, built up a formidable force. Their only limitation, a very serious one,
was in trucks
and heavy equipment, for which large transport vessels were required.
To Field
118
the Japanese, under a rigid schedule, the recapture of Henderson was essential to the success of their offensive to eliminate the Ameri-
can beachhead. General Hyakutake had assembled the required force, lacking only some elements of the Japanese 38th Division, and they were enroute. His forces included an excellent selection of artillery and heavy weapons, but lacked large prime movers and other heavy equipment. In spite of this growing threat, Admiral Ghormley was continuing a plan to use badly needed troops and support resources to accomplish a
longstanding goal of occupying the island of Ndeni, in the Santa Cruz Islands, 335 miles east-southeast of Henderson Field, to deny it to the Japanese. Admiral Turner also favored the operation. General Vandegrift was openly against the diversion of such resources while Cactus-Ringbolt
(Guadalcanal and Tulagi) were in such a precarious plight. General Millard
Harmon, Army Commander of the South Pacific Area, regarded the affair as unsound and unnecessary. When Ghormley decided to go ahead with the Ndeni plan, General Harmon, in a letter to the Admiral F.
Ndeni
dated 6 October 1942, reviewed his reasons for scrapping the Ndeni operation as "not vital to the security of the South Pacific," the Japanese could not use
it,
and
it
was not needed by U.S. Forces
as a staging base.
Central to General Harmon's comments, he stated: "It conviction that the Jap
do so
will
in the
is
is
my
personal
capable of retaking Cactus-Ringbolt and that he
near future unless
it is
materially strengthened."
Ghormley held a conference with Admiral Turner and General Harmon on 6 October in which Harmon's views were discussed. After the meeting, Ghormley announced his intention to proceed with the Ndeni operation but agreed to Harmon's recommendation to send reinforcements to Cactus immediately. As a result, the 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division, then in New Caledonia, was committed for duty at Guadalcanal.
Harmon was the most perceptive and commander on the Watchtower headquarters scene. He enjoyed
In these crucial days, General intelligent
excellent rapport with Admiral Ghormley, to whom he reported in the local
chain of
command, and had many
opportunities to present beneficial sug-
gestions and observations to the Admiral. General his
Army
Harmon
sent letters to
superiors in Washington on a regular basis, reporting progress
and conditions
in his
command. These
status reports
were frequently
General George C. Marshall,
mentioned to or seen by the Chief frequently conferred with Admiral Ernest J. King. King was well aware of opinion on both sides of the Ndeni question. In his wisdom, King replaced Ghormley as commander on 18 October sending Admiral William F. Halsey to the Pacific to review the situation by of Staff,
who
and to relieve Ghormley as overall commander of Operation Watchtower. After assuming command, Halsey directed that "the operation to occupy Ndeni be cancelled." Halsey had already adopted an approach that would provide vigorous reinforcement of ground and air forces on Guadalcanal
and beef up Naval and supply support to the operation.
It
was some time
before this vigorous policy was to actually strengthen the forces at Cactus,
but the news of
it
was heartening
to
all
of us.
119
1
Farquhar son Jarman Willi am s(Armorerj Sawyer,
Fitzgerald (Armorer F
j
e
1
st ad
Dewey Ferguson Campbe 1
J
10 11 !
2
13 14 15 16 17
Ramp Holmes B Morton J D. Goerke D. Canning L
.
.
.
Kerstetter Head t 1 er P. Miller
R. W.
M. D
.
The P-39/P-400 Hell's Bell and some of the pilots of the 347th Fighter Group, Cactus Flight. The plane is one of the original P-39/P-400 aircraft assigned to the 67th Fighter Squadron. November 1942. (Jarman)
120
General Vandegrift clung persistently to his goal of moving his perimeter boundary west, to the east bank of the Matanikau, and keeping the artillery out of range of the airfield. He believed he could accommove, while waiting for the promised reinforcement by the 164th Infantry, by placing diversionary pressure on the Japanese buildup west of
Japanese plish this
An operation to accomplish this plan was mounted during 7-9 October, using elements of the 5th, 2nd, and 7th Marines.
the Matanikau. the period
The
plan followed roughly that used in the late September affair along the Matanikau, from which the Marines had to be extricated under difficult circumstances. With main enemy forces well west of the Matanikau,
toward Kokumbona and Tassafaronga, considerably
To
more
this
new
operation went off with
success, heavily assisted by close air support.
the 67th Fighter Squadron and the Marine and
Navy air units on came a new phase of "Life on the Target." The climax of mid-September, when the Japanese attacks on Bloody Ridge and the perimeter were pushed back, was merely the preliminary bout. The Henderson
new
Field, there
threat by the Japanese buildup to the west and their support by
Japanese
"Tokyo Express" brought almost unbearable attack conditions for those stationed on the airfield. The air,
most crucial come.
naval surface forces, and the
battles for
The pressure
Henderson Field and the beachhead were yet
for the
67th to operate above
its
to
capacity as a Fighter
Squadron continued, with its associated shortages of planes and equipment relief of personnel from combat to rest at Tontouta. The 67th
and sporadic
was operating over
combat flight at At the home base in New Caledonia, the 67th busied itself with supplying pilots, ground crews, and parts for the fighter planes at Guadalcanal. It had the additional responsibility of maintaining a sort of rest camp for war-weary pilots and crewmen, a pursuit school for replacement pilots newly arrived from the a broad area of the theater, with
Guadalcanal and a fighter base at Tontouta,
United States, and an
The 67th had never
air
defense system for the island of
New Caledonia.
operated in an orthodox fashion, within the prescribed
operational duties of a fighter squadron, nor had
manned according
its
New Caledonia.
it
been equipped or
to the directed organizational tables for a fighter
squadron.
The 67th, weak from the frequent thinning of its organizational blood, was due for another complication. This was to expand fighter operations by new Fighter Group with headquarters at Tontouta, New Caledonia. On 3 October the new 347th Fighter Group was activated under the command of Major George McNeese, who had just arrived. To those watching this organizational drama unfold and who had come this far with the 67th, it seemed that Major Dale D. Brannon, with his vast on-the-scene experience, would have been the proper choice. It puzzles some members activating a
of the squadron to this day.
However, Brannon was assigned to command the new squadron, was to receive P-38 Lightning
started from scratch at Tontouta, which
121
Cheap
in the P-39/P-400s had to be set on frequency daily with a frequency meter. R.L. seen here performing this maintenance. 4 October 1 942.
radios
Ferguson
is
aircraft, after first starting
military service,
it
with P-39s. In the omnipotent wisdom of the
was probably the best
choice. Brannon's
tremendous
experience, insight, and personal integrity were again destined to produce it on a record 339th Fighter Squadron, the "Sun
a fine squadron, take the organization into combat, and start of outstanding performance as the
Setter Squadron."
122
The 347th Fighter Group had assigned to it four Fighter Squadrons, the 67th, the 68th (then stationed at Tonga), the 70th (then stationed at Fiji), and the new squadron, the 339th, made up of a cadre of about half the
move to Tontouta and rotate men to the fighter pool in the Army Cactus Flight.
veteran personnel of the 67th. All would soon
some
of their planes and
New airplanes and new pilots were arriving at Tontouta, New Caledonia. The planes were new P-39s, models D-l L, and K still P-39s, but better
—
,
than the clunkers previously assigned to operations at Cactus. As soon as the aircraft were assembled and tested, each was assigned to a pilot who finished his training in
it
and prepared to take
it
over the
now
well-estab-
lished route to Guadalcanal.
At Henderson
Field, the
67th had developed close
air
support bomb-
ing and strafing with the P-39/P-400 into a formidable frontline weapons
They continued
system.
business as usual, with the P-400s on close air
support and the P-39s flying a mixed bag of close
air
support and fighter
Navy and Marine dive bombers and torpedo bombers, or scrambling with the F4Fs in hope of making contact with the Japanese fighters and bombers. The developing situation of early October escort missions with the
only served to intensify the schedule of close air support missions covering
operations by the Marines in the vicinity of the Matanikau. Pressure from
the Japanese naval and air forces, bombing, strafing, and shelling the airfield,
effort.
grew in intensity;
flight
(a short distance to
maximum new fighter strip
operations were maintained at a
Rains kept the runway at Henderson Field and the
the east and south) saturated; takeoff and landing
were hazardous, with thick gumbo mud everywhere. On 1 October there seemed to be a break in the weather. Lieutenants Sawyer, Morton, Jarman, Farquharson, and Miller, carrying 100 pound bombs, hit Japanese occupied areas to the west of the perimeter, bombing conditions
and strafing any enemy object they could find.
A newly constructed building
by strafing gunfire; it was a store of volatile material. There was return gunfire; on returning to the field, Lieutenant Farquharson found his electrical system was partially out. He in
the vicinity of Visale was set on
was
fire
able to get the electrically operated landing gear
down by cranking it
As the flight came in to land, Farquharson, making a no-flap approach, decided to land as short as possible since without flaps it was a "hot" approach and he needed all the landing roll he could get. He touched down a few feet short of the steel matting; the muddy condition of the ground tore off the landing gear. The plane bellied in, a perfect wheels-off touchdown, skidding along the matting and turning as it skidded until the plane was facing the other direction as it came to a stop. Meanwhile, Farquharson cut the switches, into the
down
position, but could not get the flaps to operate.
kicked off the right door, stepped out onto the wing, and ran from the plane before it came to a full stop. Farquharson was uninjured, and the three planes
still
in
the landing pattern landed at the fighter
strip.
"Washing Machine Charlie" was again overhead, but gave the tired
men
in
That
little
night,
trouble to
the beachhead.
123
A
wrecked P-39/P-400 was set up at the shelter as a ground station. It was on the air combat. R.L. Ferguson (standing), E. Vaughn, W. H. Schneider R.W. Kerstetter (standing). October 1942.
radio stripped from a
used
regularly to listen in
(seated),
Each day the
Jagstaffel squeezed in as
New
many bombing and
strafing
from Tontouta. Everyone talked about the new P-39s being assembled back there and hoped that October's fighter activity for the 67th would improve when the new planes arrived. Japanese attacks on the field were heavy and persistent, but "Keep 'em flying" was the war cry; ground crews were continually workmissions as daylight would allow.
ing to the point of exhaustion to have as
primitive conditions would allow.
124
pilots arrived
many planes ready each day as the
The F4Fs continued fighters;
to score big against the Japanese bombers and everyone was conscious of the steady buildup of enemy forces to
the west. Daily, the patrolling
SBD
dive
bombers sighted Japanese
enroute to Guadalcanal to land troops and shell the
airfield.
ships
The SBDs and
TBF
torpedo bombers went out to attack them, sometimes knocking one or two. Still they came.
off
For the ground crews of the 67th living on the target, the work load and environment were wearing and the schedule left no time for real rest. Working on aircraft to keep them flying by daylight, and often volunteering
augment the Marines to man a forward listening post at night when a Japanese breakthrough became imminent, there were not enough of them for this kind of combat maintenance. Their tools were limited and there were few new spare parts. Parts taken from a wreck involved double retrieving the part from the wreck and then installing it on an work out-of-commision plane. The crews were skilled in the "boneyard" approach to spare parts supply; it had been their original method in the early days at Ton tout a, and here it was sometimes their only hope to get another to
—
airplane flying.
When
watching a taxiing
aircraft
on the move around the
bomb-cratered field, they knew when a wing or nose took a sudden dip that a main gear or a nose wheel had dropped into a aircraft
became the
first
bomb
crater.
One such
source of supply at Cactus,
The ugly Japanese hangar at the west end of the field continued to be a target for the Japanese and home plate for the 67th Fighter Squadron. Ugly but
practical, constructed of
heavy poles with
steel sheets laid over
October 1 942, while on a dive bombing and strafing sortie, ground fire knocked out the system of Lt. A.B. Farquharson's plane. Complications led to landing gear failure and he skidded in on a belly landing.
On
1
electrical
125
A member of the SeaBee Battalion at Henderson Field. Trucks were kept loaded with rode back and forth filling in bomb craters in the runway to keep Henderson Field
dirt
fill
in
September 1942.
the top as a roof,
it
was obviously
and assembled on the spot
—
prefabricated, transported to the island
a breezy, open-air structure built like a pole
barn on an American farm. Since arriving at Henderson Field with 14 P-400s, the 67th established
broad space
in front of
its
work and
flight line
in
August
area in the
the hangar. Marine air units occupied the other
three hangars, which after repeated damage by bombing, shelling, and fire, had to be torn down. Living on the target required many qualities, among them a sense of
humor. Most people
126
in
the unit were able to preserve theirs even under the
and they
operation.
most
stressful conditions. Sitting out the first
target
bombing
raid right
not what one expects; the reality of it is a surprise.
is
on the
Men sitting in a
shelter, sweating out the "whump, whump, whump" of bombs walking toward them, retained a sense of humor or they didn't last. They made such
remarks
as,
"Here comes death and destruction!" and "Do you think they
are trying to
kill
us?"
Beyond the work area, at the west end of the clearing, along the edge of the trees, was a latrine box, a two-holer. It had no class, but a great view. Early one morning during the first couple of weeks at Cactus, a mechanic wearing an Air Corps Technical Supply work hat was sitting on the latrine. The Japanese soldiers wore a cap with a baseball-type peak similar to the Tech Supply hat. Two young Marines were passing by and saw this fellow sitting
on the
latrine enjoying the view.
Never having seen
The Marines
this Jap.
a
Tech Supply hat before, they decided to capture him as they approached in deadly earnest.
yelled at
The mechanic jumped up and danced around, holding his pants at half mast, threw his cap on the ground, and issued some obscenities that were sure to convince the two Marines he was an American. The disturbance brought other members of the 67th, who helped convince them. The men's shoes and clothing were ragged from working in the that There were serious questions spoken aloud, such as: "Where in hell is our Navy? When are we going to see some real help? Why
stinking climate.
We need However, there were also the occasional humorous events. Kenneth Markel, an armament specialist, often acted like a comic American politician, using his best Senator Clagghorn voice. One of the other men would approach Markel as if to interview him and the doesn't our
Navy get
in
here and stop that shelling by the Japs?
supplies and reinforcements!"
conversation would begin, "Senator, do you have something to say about sending help to our men on Guadalcanal?" "Why, Suh, Ah say, you bet Ah have somethin' to say. There's nothin' too good for our men on Guadalcanal. So, that's what we shall send them, nothin'."
"But, Senator, don't you have something in mind to be done for our fighting
men on
Guadalcanal?"
the men on Guadalcanal." "Why, Suh, Ah say, f These events were resentful and ironic but humorous at the time and
would often go on for a
half
hour before Markel ran out of wisecracking
repartee.
The armament men worked under backbreaking rapid pace.
Everyone pitched
in
labor, at a steady
to help them. Short messages were often
scratched on the bombs with a piece of chalk as a humorous tension release. The messages were neat little one-liners: Now Hear This; If No Bang,
Twist Rear Fuse; Our Best to Tojo;
This'll Kill
You;
If
No Bang,
Wait, and
so forth.
Machine guns had
to be pulled out and cleaned.
When the guns began
127
P-39/P-400 number 1 2 got a flat tire while taxiing and became a victim of Japanese Zeros strafing the It was left in position as a decoy and often drew the fire of strafing Zeros. September 1 942.
airfield.
to
jam
at altitude,
Armament
Chief Felix "Gunner" Gurbada discovered
He stopped using oil. The guns were removed almost every day and every moving part was wiped clean. Condensation and dampness increased the number of cleanings per machine gun far beyond normal, further increasing the workload for the limited number of armament specialists, but the guns worked. It was necessary to set the cheap radios in the P-400s with a frequency meter every day to assure that the pilots could communicate during combat missions. As it was on many Pacific Islands, the rat population on Guadalcanal was high. Often during an air raid they could be seen scurrying to hide when the men rushed into a shelter. The rats were very bold, staying in the shelter with the occupants. On one occasion, when about five men were in a shelter, one of them noticed a rat hiding near a beam supporting the roof. that the
oil
got cold and hardened.
He pulled out his .45 and fired a shot at the rat. The sound inside the foxhole was deafening.
"Gimme
that
damn gun!"
"There's a rat
in
"There's always rats too.
said
one of the men as he grabbed
it
away.
here!" said the owner of the gun. in here!
Leave the
Put the damn gun away, now that we're
SOB alone; all
deaf. If
he's gotta' hide,
you ever
pull that
I'll make you a new holster for it!" Around the area near the hangar some odd-shaped barrels were found. They were about 2V2 feet high, with a little metal box cleverly inserted through the wood at the low end of the oval-shaped barrel. They
stunt again,
turned out to be Japanese
was
field
bathtubs and the metal box cut into the end
a charcoal stove for heating the water in the tub. These portable
bathtubs allowed the Japanese to bathe while the water was being heated,
128
enjoying the high temperature bath that was such a pleasure for them in their homeland. Since conditions made it impossible to put the tubs to test,
they were used as trashcans while the River
— when they could
men of the 67th bathed in the Lunga
find time.
Diary: Oct. 3, Saturday Another raid last night, but he didn't drop bombs on the field. I think Charlie is just trying to keep us awake. We had an air raid about 1300; the bombers turned back;
we could see them in and out of broken clouds was not good enough for a bomb run. We
in the overcast but visibility
were
on our resurrection radio but couldn't figure out the we heard over the radio that three Zeros were
listening
situation.
coming
in
Later today
from the north to strafe the
field.
We
looked and could see
them come in and turn up the field heading west, making a strafing run. They were not lined up with our position, so we stood there and watched them as they headed up the field to strafe the old burned-out decoys. silver planes with the red ball on the fuselage, strafing, What a sight flashing past our position. Ground fire from nearby .50-caliber machine guns got all of them. I saw two of them showing smoke and we could see the smoke from their crash just west of us. Lt. Miller and I and a couple of others went over to the crash site. A pilot or what was left of him could be seen among the burning wreckage all torn up and burned. I took
—
several pictures of the crash scene.
On 4 October, increasing enemy activity was evident as the Jagstaffel carried attacks into every area west of the perimeter.
landing craft,
new
They were
hitting
buildings that continually appeared near the villages,
ammunition stores, and Japanese personnel wherever they were detected. Lieutenant R.E. Kaiser finally arrived on 6 October from his stopover at Espiritu Santo with engine trouble. On that day Major Hubbard also arrived
crewmen aboard a C-47. By 7 October the Marine task force, which was to attempt to move the
with some additional ground
west boundary of the perimeter to the east bank of the Matanikau, began to take up positions along the approaches and the east bank of the river. Contact with the enemy on the coast road was light; the enemy withdrew Matanikau as the Marines approached, except for the west bank near the mouth of the river;
across the
mouth
about 150
who remained on
of the
these were surrounded while attempting to hold the position as their forward point on the east bank. The Raiders and the 5th Marines gained a
bridgehead on the west bank as part of the encirclement; fighting with the of pocketed Japanese continued until they were wiped out. Although torrential rain slowed the operation, the 7th Marines and
company
the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Marines forced a crossing up-river, deployed along the ridges with the river on their right, and attacked north toward the coast at the east base of Point Cruz. Fighting their way across rugged terrain and occasionally trapping large elements of Japanese infantry in ravines, they called for artillery and close air support strikes.
The
ravines
129
were bombed and
strafed on direction from the Marine ground troops as they continued to advance through these areas, discovering large numbers
The Marines were bombardment. Unfortunately, the objective of establishing a forward reconnissance base west of the perimeter had to be abandoned and the task group, after some mopping up operations, returned in a few days to the perimeter. Warning had been received from the Coast Watchers that a strong attack on the beachhead and perimeter was expected. Concentrations of ships at Rabaul indicated the attack would be well-supported, perhaps as an assault landing directly at the beachhead. A document captured during the Matanikau operation revealed the presence of Japanese troops to the east and west of the Matanikau River. Some of these had been the force just struck and annihilated by the Marines. The Japanese had been at the point of launching a similar offensive against the Marine lines. The objective of their offensive plan was to force the movement of a line east of the river to of Japanese killed
by close
air
support bombardment.
lavish in their praise of the support
bring the airfield under direct artillery
The
effort
was
to be the
initial
fire.
move
of a larger Japanese offensive to
retake the beachhead. During the operation, the entire area west of the perimeter, especially in the vicinity of action on the Matanikau, was cov-
ered by the 67th like a blanket. Patrolling P-400s spotted breakfast fires or other signs of
enemy presence and strafed the areas. Everything that hit. The effort gave maximum possible coverage on
looked suspicious was
the scene of the fighting and adjacent areas.
A detail note in the Squadron
one of the breakfast fire sightings, records: "Jarman saw a Jap crawling on his hands and knees dressed only in his underwear." Observation was really close, and an attack was placed on after-action report, referring to
anything that moved.
Diary: Oct. 7,
Bombing
Wednesday
raids
have been lighter
in
the past few days. B-17s are
working through here and giving them a taste
at their bases north of us.
Some men came in from Tontouta last night. Several of our men took the plane back, including Mike Zavoski. The Squadron has been supporting the formation of a new Fighter Group back at Tontouta. I guess I received a promotion while on vacation to this beautiful tropical island. I'll
hear the details about
it
later,
I
suppose.
No one wears rank here;
it
just helps the Jap snipers in their selection process.
On 8 October, 1 1 pilots in new P-39s arrived; eight of the pilots had been transferred from the 70th Fighter Squadron, now a part of the new 347th Fighter Group. It was planned that the new P-39s would work with the F4F fighters from the fighter strip, and the P-400s would work out of the main base in the close air support role. This proved impossible. The close air support role, with the heavy firepower and bombing capability, had become so important to General Vandegrift that the P-39s had to be
130
much of the time. They ended up doing everything: flying escort for SBD dive bombers, flying with the F4Fs in fighter actions, and in the close air support role of the Jagstaffel. They were not long in discovering that the new P-39s still would not quite reach the altitude diverted to this action
necessary to meet the Japanese bombers. This was no help morale of the 67th Fighter Squadron.
Diary: Oct. 8, Thursday Eleven new P-39s came better than what
we
at all to the
They are still P-39s but a lot They are really nice new them which is a help.
in last night.
started with, the P-400.
new type radio in There will not be much doing today; it's raining cats and dogs. This
planes.
They have
a
is loaded with Jap souvenirs, collected by the Marines on the front and traded for anything they need and can get. Money is no good here; you have to trade something of local value. If one is not out there to
place
lines
shoot the Jap at close range and take his property as souvenirs, then you pick them up by trade. I have no interest in their stuff. I hear that one way to get souvenirs is to see a friend off who is leaving for some reason, usually an injury. At that time among the lucky passengers there are always a few loaded down with souvenirs they have traded. At departure time, the pilot will usually say to these people, "I'm carrying a heavy
—
you or your damn souvenirs? I'm not taking man will just dump his stuff on the ground and get the plane, leaving it for anyone who wants it. Lt. Danny Miller jokes about it; he's not a collector either. He says
load, so
who
is
going
both." With that, the into
by many of the Japanese soldiers were inscribed with poems and good and friends when they left home for service in the war. October 1942.
Japanese
flags carried
wishes of
their family
131
he overheard a Jap prisoner being interrogated say, 'The Japanese fight for the Emperor and the Rising Sun. The Italians fight for Fascism and Mussolini. The Germans fight for Hitler and the Party. The British fight
King and Country, but the Americans fight for Souvenirs and the Hell could trade a commando knife that I have for enough stuff to equip a Jap squad. I'll just keep my knife. Typical of the problems of maximum effort operations in the rainy muddy environment were the days of 9- 12 October. On the morning of the 9th the Squadron was supporting ground operations near the Matanikau River. P-400s bombed and strafed the area around Kokumbona from for
Of
It." I
0545
On
to 0700.
this mission,
Lieutenants Sawyer, Holmes, Kerstetter,
Patterson, Morton, and Kaiser were scheduled for the
Sawyer broke saturated
off a
airfield.
flight.
Lieutenant
nosewheel when he taxied into a muddy hole on the
Lieutenant Holmes got two
flat tires
tenant Kaiser had a rough engine and could not get
off.
while taxiing. Lieu-
The others dropped
bombs and area-strafed in front of the Marines. The second close air support mission for the P-400s was
for three
planes scheduled for 0845. Major Hubbard and Lieutenants Kaiser and
Stern taxied out for takeoff. Lieutenant Kaiser's plane
built
up heavy
mud
under the wheels, dragging the plane to a stop; he shut down rather than put undue strain on the landing gear.
The others
got
strafed the frontline area, and returned to the field
—
off, still
bombed and muddy, but
improving under a hot sun at 0945. The aircraft were refueled and rearmed
and Lieutenants Sawyer, Kaiser, Miller, and Holmes flew another mission
bombs and strafing an area from the Matanikau to Kokumbona. The enemy could not be seen. The attacks were executed by
at 1100, dropping
signal panels set out
by the Marines
at the front
and by ground-to-air radio
direction.
The
flight
returned at 1200 with an
dispersed the aircraft on the
north without striking the
air raid alert flag flying
and
The attacking bomber force returned The P-400s were readied for another
field.
field.
Between 1410 and 1500 Major Hubbard and Lieutenants Canning and Ramp bombed and strafed west of Point Cruz. Marine ground troops continued to tell the P-400 pilots, again attacking an unseen enemy on the ground, of the tremendous effect these attacks were having on the opposmission.
ing Japanese forces.
The
There was a change of mission assignment for the P-39s on 9 October. mission, seven P-39s, took off from Henderson Field at 0545
—
first
Captains Mitchell and Sharpsteen and Lieutenants Farron, Purnell, Jacobson, Gillon, and Shaw.
The P-39s flew as escort fighters for nine SBDs led
by Lieutenant Commander John Eldridge of VS-71. The mission was to search for Japanese ships that had been attacked by SBDs the night before. Lieutenant Jacobson returned after 45 minutes with a faulty belly tank. The Japanese ships, five destroyers and a cruiser, were sighted 150 miles from Cactus in the
New Georgia channel. The cruiser was smoking
and the destroyers were screening as the SBDs began their attack, scoring
132
several hits on the ships.
and
The task group was attacked by Japanese aircraft,
which were intercepted by the P-39s. Captain Mitchell dived in on a Japanese floatplane from behind and above, hitting the aircraft with his 37mm cannon and blowing it to pieces. His guns five float biplanes
five Zeros,
jammed, causing him to miss several subsequent opportunities. He thought the guns jammed excessively because of their newness. Lieutenants
Shaw and
Gillon also had trouble with jammed guns. Captain Sharpsteen got a shot at a Japanese plane while passing in a dive. He pulled up and met another in a head-on attack. All his guns jammed. He
was
many times
two planes approached head-on. Flying glass him about the face and hands. Lieutenant Purnell stayed on the tail of one Japanese plane, firing his .50-caliber and 20mm guns until pieces were flying off the plane. It went hit
as the
from
a shot through the windshield cut
down
in a spin as Purnell's
guns jammed and he had to leave the fight. P-39 missions of eight planes were flown during the day in close air support of Marine ground troops. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Dinn, Purnell, Farron, Shaw, Dews, Jacobson, Gillon, Banfield, and Stern bombed and strafed the Morovovo district using demolition and incendiary bombs, followed up by strafing. The attacks were coordinated with Marine forward observers. Light antiaircraft fire was encountered, and all planes returned safely to Henderson Field.
Two
On
additional
11
October, the P-400s flew ground attack missions and the P-39s
scrambled with the F4Fs at "Tojo Time." Oxygen
failure
prevented the
P-39s from climbing above 19,000 feet. They could only observe the action. The new P-39s would not get to the required 27,000 feet even when the pilot had oxygen and could spend 30 to 45 minutes attempting to climb to that altitude. The enemy attack force was 16 Zeros followed by
two
flights of
18 and 16 two-engine bombers. The bombs were released field. Four Zeros and seven bombers were shot
before they reached the
down. One bomber, taking evasive action to get out of the fight, came down to a lower altitude and was shot down by Captain Sharpsteen; the others were all F4F kills. Lieutenant Howard Stern of the 67th failed to return
from the flight. Events leading up to the promised arrival of the 164th Infantry began with their embarkation at Noumea, New Caledonia, on 8 October. With the Naval task that covered the flanks of their convoy, Admiral Norman Scott began a mission to disrupt enemy supply and reinforcement efforts from the Northern Solomons and Rabaul.
San Francisco and Salt Lake with the destroyers BuBoise, and Helena City, and the light cruisers This was one of three McCalla. chanan, Duncan, Farenholt, Laffey, and U.S. task forces now in the lower Solomons. Another was a carrier group Scott's
was
a force of heavy cruisers
formed around the Hornet, in position west of Guadalcanal, and another formed around the battleship Washington. At 1345 on 11 October, Scott's force was cruising off Rennel Island when B-17s from Espiritu Santo and SBDs, searching from Guadalcanal,
133
reported
enemy naval forces on their way down the slot. At 1810 a second enemy 10 miles distant. Scott set course for a position off
report placed the
Cape Esperance, the western
tip of
Guadalcanal, setting his plans to inter-
cept about midnight.
By 2200 the two forces were converging on the Sealark Channel,
the
waters along the north coast of Guadalcanal. Scott's cruisers launched
from the Salt Lake City crashed
their floatplanes for local search; a plane
and burned
in
the water
some
distance from the ship.
The glare of the fire
was thought by the Japanese to be a signal fire from the shore; they answered with searchlights. Searchplanes spotted the Japanese and radar contact was made at about the same time at a distance of 18,000 yards. Moments later, Scott's force found themselves in a most advantageous position, crossing the "T" of an oncoming enemy line of battle. They opened fire at will as the guns of his force bore on the approaching enemy column. In the battle that followed, the destroyer Duncan was lost; there was light damage to the Farenholt and the Salt Lake City. For the Japanese the losses were severe; two cruisers were sunk and heavy damage was inflicted on another. Two others were sunk the next day by planes from Henderson Field, a mixed force of SBD, TBF, and P-39 aircraft. During the night battle, the men on Henderson Field could hear the noise of naval gunfire and see the rosy reflection of exploding shells and
burning ships on the horizon. This battle, which was fought
off
Cape
Esperance, not only failed to stop the "Tokyo Express," but had hardly any effect
on the regular nightly deliveries of Japanese troops and supplies to
Guadalcanal.
On 12 October
the P-400s of the 67th Fighter Squadron flew the
regular ground support attack missions, striking the growing enemy forces
west of the perimeter and strafed landing boats that had just appeared between Tassafaronga and Kokumbona. The P-39s flew cover for SBD dive
bombers and
TBF
torpedo bombers on several missions to attack
Japanese ships heading north
off
Cape Esperance from the
previous night. After several missions one ship was victim of a torpedo from a
effort flying
runway wet and muddy; hazardous.
dead
TBF. The other was sunk due
attacks by the mixed force of
Maximum
left
SBDs and
battle of the in
the water,
to repeated
P-39s.
and heavy rain
in early
October had made the
takeoff and landing conditions
were extremely
On 12 October the conditions were at their worst as the heavy
mission schedule of the day against the retreating Japanese ships took toll
on the wet runway. Lieutenant
of the day, crashed
on
Gillon, taking off
takeoff. His accident
accident involving Lieutenant V.L. Head.
on
was very
The
his
its
second mission
similar to a previous
plane, covered by a bath of
mud forced up through the matting, stalled as he attempted to pull it off the off the left side of the runway not far from the place where Lieutenant Heads's plane had come to a stop. The plane landed smoking and upside down. Lieutenant Gillon was immediately extracted from the wreckage by some nearby Marines and taken to the hospital. He
ground and tumbled
134
Taken minutes after the crash of a P-39/P-400 piloted by Lieutenant Gillon. On his second mission of the day on 1 2 October, mud on the Henderson Field runway splashed and covered the wings and the plane stalled and crashed similar to the accident of Lt. V.L. Head. Gillon was pulled from the wreckage by some nearby Marines. He was burned but recovered and returned to duty. r
was burned, but survived and was evacuated the next day. The Marines who pulled Gillon from the wreckage worked very fast and in danger of being consumed with Gillon if the smoking plane had exploded. It did not, and the fire was extinguished immediately after the rescue. Diary: Oct. 10, Saturday
Our planes are doing just and
this
fine.
They went
out yesterday morning
morning, escorting SBDs. They got a few Zeros.
We had an air
bombers turned back over Tulagi. I am installing new planes and I am not sure if we will get the equipment for
raid yesterday but the
IFF all
in
the
planes.
The new pilots
are good and fresh and anxious to get up there and one plane in the scrap this morning and they have just gone out again escorting dive bombers that are attacking Jap ships scrap.
We
lost
enroute here.
The wing insignia on our planes is a blue circle with a white star in it circle in the middle of the white star, but no more. Some time
and a red
ago the Marine pilots told us that anything with a red ball gets shot at; it even happened in one air engagement. Now the red circle is painted out and the star
is all
white.
135
CHAPTER
11
"Goodbye and Good Luck"
Following the successful operation by the Marines along the Matanikau,
7-9
enemy temporarily abandoned
October, the
territory along the
west bank.
his idea of holding the
All signs indicated that
center for offensive preparations to the area of
he had shifted his
Kokumbona and
further
west. During the battle off Cape Esperance on the night of 11 October,
Japanese reinforcements were successfully landed by ships of the "Tokyo
Express" near Tassafaronga while the battle was in progress. In addition to troops, the ships carried four artillery
150mm howitzers,
along with
some
lighter
and antiaircraft weapons.
The aftermath of the
battle brought the
heavy combat schedule of 12
October and the missions to sink the Japanese ships leaving the battle area. The Japanese losses in the battle of Cape Esperance had little effect on their plans;
the
'Tokyo Express" continued
to operate with
little
interference.
On 13 October
the mixed aircraft of General Geiger's Cactus Air
Force numbered 90 operational planes; SBDs, F4Fs, P-400s, P-39s, with occasionally a few TBFs. These were ready as a result of superhuman effort on the part of everyone involved.
Two months rations,
of continuous
and severe combat conditions, reduced
and no rest brought serious effects on health and moral by another
determined enemy, malaria. Of two
—
men
sick with malaria,
one might
become a patient and the other with perhaps a better physical condition, better morale, or a more tenacious attitude would remain on duty until
136
—
carried
away
delirious
from
its effects.
malaria cannot possibly perceive what
unconsciousness, or
its
A person who has not experienced it is
like to shiver into
debilitating effects. It
began to take
exhausted
its toll
on the
defenders of Guadalcanal.
The first reinforcements of Army troops, the 164th Infantry, arrived on 13 October aboard the McCawley and Zeilin. The ships were off Lunga Point at 0547 and immediately commenced unloading. The 164th Infantry, fully
equipped and supplied, 3200 tons of
The
area.
1st Raider Battalion
it, was put ashore in the landing was embarked for a well-earned rest and the
ships departed, clearing the Sealark Channel before nightfall, enroute to
New
Caledonia. Arrival of the 164th Infantry
made it
possible for General Vandegrift
to put in place his plan for strengthening the perimeter. This he did by
manning adjoining sectors in a complete perimeter defense that included the east bank of the Matanikau in the western boundary. Flight operations on 13 October began routinely in good flying weather. At 0530 Major Hubbard and Lieutenants Holmes, Patterson, and Sawyer, on dawn patrol, bombed and strafed landing boats and Japaneseoccupied villages. The early morning search missions by SBDs saw only two large oil slicks, floating gear, and life rafts south of Rendova, where attacks had been made the day before on Japanese ships. At "Tojo Time," 1130, 42 F4Fs, seven P-39s, and six P-400s scrambled. The Japanese attack force was a formation of 24 bombers escorted by 15 Zeros. The bombs did slight damage to the field, setting a small store of gasoline on fire. The P-400s climbed to 12,000 feet; the P-39s eventually got up to 27,000 where they again helplessly watched the neat formations all show above them. That P-39 Airacobra just would not get up there and no go. The F4Fs shot down a Zero. Lieutenant W.B. Freman, USMC, VMF-121, shot down a bomber; his own plane was so badly shot up that he went down in the water off the beach. He was later rescued uninjured. The planes were on the ground being refueled as the black flag went up again. Twelve F4Fs of VMF-121 had taken off on first warning; the others were caught on the ground in a refueling operation as the bombers hit the field, almost unopposed. There was some damage to aircraft on the ground and some casualties among the 164th Infantry, who were at the
—
height of disembarking the regiment at the unloading beach and arranging to deploy their units and equipment. Of the 15
bombers and 10 Zeros
the beachhead, one Zero was shot
came over to bomb USMC, VMF-121.
Foss,
that
down by Captain Joe
Antiaircraft guns put up heavy fire during the raid
and accounted for one bomber.
150mm guns that the Japanese At first the shells were airfield. the on fire to began had brought ashore field and the runway. the of end west short, but soon they were hitting the Their fire was at irregular intervals and was thought to be one gun or heavy For the
mortar.
The
special treat of the day, the
irritating schedule,
averaging about three to four rounds per
hour, caused nerve-shattering anticipation; the gun
was nicknamed
"Pistol
137
crewmen readied the old P-400s for a mission to seek out and silence "Pistol Pete" before he could damage the runway. The mission was suddenly called off because aviation gas was running short. There was still plenty of Japanese gas left, but it was good only in motor vehicles. The 100-octane aviation gas was very low and there was Pete." Pilots and
concern because resupply appeared to be impossible at the time. the SeaBee Battalion kept trucks loaded with steel matting.
They raced back and
fill
dirt
Men
of
and precut pieces of
forth after a hit by "Pistol Pete"
repairing the runway, just barely keeping the field in operation.
For "Pistol Pete," firing from positions near Kokumbona, the airfield seemed to be at extreme range. He was easily reaching Kukum Beach, making it untenable, and doing some real damage to the extreme west end of the runway, but was most effective as a source of harassment. Later, Marine artillery, poorly equipped for counter battery detection, moved to counter "Pistol Pete" without success. Later attempts to dive
bomb
the
gun were no better because the exact location of the gun was unknown. In fact, "Pistol Pete," thought at the time to be one gun, was in reality several guns, dispersed and firing at irregular intervals. At about 2300 on 13 October a Japanese naval task force moved unopposed into the Sealark Channel. It included two battleships (Haruna and Kongo), eight cruisers, and eight destroyers. A scout floatplane was launched from a cruiser and proceeded to a position just west of the Henderson Field runway. The night was pitch black and the aircraft, thought to be just another "Washing Machine Charlie," could be heard as it approached just west of the field. The pilot cut his engine in a deafening silence, gliding toward the airfield. Suddenly a bright red flare blossomed and descended slowly over the west end of the runway, followed by a green flare over the east end. The night visitor then put full power to his engine, swung around, and crossed the center of the runway, marking it with a white flare as he headed west at full power, hastening away from the vicinity of the field.
In a
moment the first salvo of naval shelling exploded with devastating
ferocity and overhead the scoutplane could again be heard spotting fire for
the bombardment. their foxholes and
The ground shook with every salvo as men waited in bomb shelters. Large fragments of exploding shells
could be heard whirring or screaming as they flew and struck objects on the field,
around the hangar, or cut branches
The observation
off trees at
the edge of the
field.
plane was guiding the pattern shelling and dropping occa-
sional flares as a guide to shift fire.
For hours the shells raked the area, salvo after salvo,
shifting
now and
then to pattern-shell the entire beachhead area and every corner of the airfield.
tion
Star shells
dumps were
lit
up the night sky
burning; airplanes
noonday. Gasoline and ammuniwere wrecked and burned; men
like
cringed in their shelters, both cursing and praying, as helplessly they
absorbed the punishment.
138
On through the night and into the early morning
hours the shelling continued at a high pitch of sustained the big
thought to be 16-inch
stuff,
stop coming
fire.
in;
Only once did
for a short while
gun tubes. Then the big stuff roared accompanying the smaller shells which had not ceased at all.
the Japanese again,
Navy cooled
shells,
its
big
in
Once, a star shell burst directly over a bomb shelter. It seemed to light up even the inside of the shelter as members of the 67th looked out on the devastation. They knew the Japanese would now adjust fire on the location of the star shell and the next salvo would be close and "beat hell out of us."
The next salvos were indeed close and killed five Marine dive bomber pilots in a nearby bomb shelter. The dead were Major G.A. Bell, Captain E.F. Miller, Captain R.A. Abbott,
2nd Lieutenant H.F. Chaney Jr., and Lieuten-
VMSB-141. With them were Navy Lieutenant W.P. Kephart, of VS-7 1 and four enlisted crewmen of MAG-23, all wiped out by ant Haley,
of
all
,
There was nothing to do but sit in the and flashes of the bombardment. Many a stalwart soul in the shelters joked and carried on a continuous comic banter a direct salvo of high-explosive shells.
shelter and
watch the
flares
to help ease the pressure of the situation; others at times turned into
gibbering idiots.
The
At 0400 the
noise and concussion were shocking.
shelling stopped,
and the warships headed north out of
the Sealark Channel. Then, after a hardly noticeable interval of quiet, three
Japanese bombers crossed the field to lay a stick of bombs right through the work and hangar areas at the southwest end of the runway. They were followed by three more, selecting another section of the
three more, continuing the ritual until just before
first light
field,
and then
on the morning
The bombardment had covered the arrival of the "Tokyo a night's work of landing troops and equipment near
of 14 October.
Express"
in
Tassafaronga.
The foxholes.
quiet of first light brought everyone out of their shelters and
The damage they surveyed was
were large jagged
shell
ground; these could have cut a limb
bombardment, one
a disheartening sight.
There
shells lying about
on the
fragments from 14-inch
shell
off a tree
fragment ricocheted
off
or a man. During the
the hangar, flew into a
blow on the leg, and fell to the muddy his hand on the hot fragment as he burning dark, the floor. He reached in picked it up, fumbled it from hand to hand, wrapping it in his shirt. Today the fragment, molded in plastic, is a paperweight on the desk of a Maryland shelter, struck an occupant a sharp
businessman.
The
effects of the shelling left the
men badly shaken.
All
had acoustic
trauma, making it necessary to speak loudly to each other for days because of the ringing in their ears. Mostly they were tired and hungry. There was no chow because the cooks were also in the foxholes all night and some of the kitchens were torn up by shell fragments. Tents and personal belongings were torn to shreds; the airfield was burned to a shambles.
General Geiger 's Cactus Air Force had been dealt a nearly fatal blow,
and the defenses of Henderson Field were almost shattered. Fifty-seven
139
aircraft
had
hit
had been destroyed or damaged and, here and there where shells the runway, holes were decorated around the edges by jagged
pieces of steel matting bent straight up fronrthe explosions.
Without sleep or breakfast the crews threw themselves into the job of
damaged
repairing the
beginning with those damaged least, in
aircraft,
order to increase operational numbers as soon as possible for what was to
To search out the "Tokyo Express," four SBDs The TBFs were damaged beyond repair. The 67th had been
be another brutal day.
were
readied.
fortunate, for miraculously, parked amid
all
of the flying shell fragments,
damage and the P-400s escaped clean. Many of the F4Fs were damaged; repair work on them proceeded at a feverish pace, with admirable cooperation between the Marine and 67th only two P-39s sustained minor
ground crews.
By "Tojo Time," between aircraft
the
F4Fs and the
planes of the 67th, 24
scrambled at 1145 to meet 25 enemy bombers in time,
Bomb damage
the runway,
to the airfield
was
light;
in
two
flights of
16
and no contact was made.
and nine, but they did not reach altitude
now
repaired by the
SeaBees, was not damaged.
morning patrol had discovered new gun positions, both antiaircraft and field artillery, on the beach west of the perimeter. The P-400s had gone out to look for "Pistol Pete;" the gun had already started
The
early
day of lobbing in occasional shells. They also searched for other targets, Major Hubbard and Lieutenants Sawyer, Dewey, and Morton bombed and strafed landing boats and Japanese troops along the beach, setting fire to gasoline and destroyed supplies. The search for "that damn gun" was its
without success.
The mission was repeated by Lieutenants Dewey, Kaiser,
Kerstetter, Goerke, and Holmes.
During the day on 13 October, Colonel Saunders' B-17s returned to Henderson Field after bombing over Buka and Tonolei. In the night of shelling, two of the B-17s were so damaged that they were abandoned. In the midst of the early morning devastation and confusion, Saunders led out five of the six remaining B-17s. The bomber crews had loaded up to "get the hell out of Cactus" and back to Espiritu Santo. With 2000 feet of usable runway, the bombers took off several of them on three engines in about 1800 feet of runway, drawing 70 inches of manifold pressure. They
—
—
cleared the
field
without "blowing a jug" (cylinder).
In the afternoon, a remaining B-17, patched
up enough to fly, left Cactus on three engines; there were two B-17s too damaged to make it. Later, when the Japanese offensive seemed close to retaking Henderson Field, a message was received from General Harmon's headquarters directing the removal of the Norden bombsights from the two derelict B-17s. Several of us inspected the planes, removed the bombsights, detonated the
IFF (an electronic box
for identifying friendly aircraft), and
removed other
electronic items for destruction to prevent capture by the Japanese, should
they succeed
in
retaking the
airfield.
In the afternoon of 14 October the air raid alert
140
was
raised. Fifteen
Japanese bombers and 10 Zeros were intercepted over the airfield. Nine bombers and three Zeros were shot down. The attack on the bombers during their bomb run may have prevented damage to the airfield. It is
more
bombers were aiming for the unloading area of the beach and the 164th Infantry. During the shelling the night before, the 164th Infantry, newly arrived and under fire for the first time, was hit hard, likely the
moving ashore. The bombing raid placed a few bombs among the men who were just about ready to move out of that area lacking time to dig in after
to take up their assigned positions to hold a lengthy stretch of the perimeter defenses.
As the day wore on, everyone was punchy from lack of sleep; they managed to get a little cold chow from the field kitchens and continued to fly and work on aircraft. They were concerned about aircraft repair, food, in that order. The known presence of Japanese reinforcements and rest
—
(indicated by the previous night's shelling) and that a major offensive to
retake the beachhead could soon begin seemed to be of secondary concern.
Missions were continually flown to strike the Japanese troops and supplies, and to search for "Pistol Pete." The planes took off at random whenever the pilots could get to their planes. Often, as a shell from "that damn gun" hit, a pilot crouched in a foxhole with parachute buckled on would run to his plane, start the engine, taxi out, and take off, hoping to get off before the next round hit the field. When there was no source of loud
noise nearby, the muzzle blast of the Japanese howitzer could be heard on
the field as
it
fired.
With the high trajectory of the howitzer shell, the sound
on the night of 13 Caught on the ground at Henderson Field during the heavy Japanese shelling that they could no October 1 942, several B-1 7s of the 1 1 th Bombardment Group were so damaged this plane sent shell of wing the under bursting shell A depart with the others for Espiritu Santo. and covered the airplane fragments through the fuselage and left wing. The explosion tore off a flap with clods of earth.
141
Bomb delivery to the 67th's flight line. This bomb handling equipment was finally landed at the end of October 1942.
would reach the
field a
few seconds before the
projectile, allowing a pilot
running for his plane to flop on his face before the shell for his plane
hit,
then again run
and be off on the search. Since "Pistol Pete" was really several
well-concealed guns, such attempts were a waste of gasoline and were
abandoned, awaiting more gas and better information on the location of "Pistol Pete."
The continuous bombing, shelling, and attention from "Pistol Pete" were preventing aircraft from using the Henderson Field runway. The order was given to move temporarily to the fighter strip (now capable of supporting fighter operations) until the gun could be annihilated. Henderson Field was declared out of operation; aircraft repair, of necessity, continued at the regular location at the west end of the field. SeaBees continued to repair the runway and by superhuman effort stayed up with "Pistol Pete's" damage.
The "Tokyo Express" was again enroute to Guadalcanal, moving both warships and transports to reinforce the Japanese troops massing for the
coming 1600.
offensive.
A
They were spotted by SBDs 180 miles from Cactus at low on aviation gas was readied. The 67th
strike force critically
P-400s with gas, ammunition, and 100-pound bombs; the P-39s carried 300-pound bombs. Captain Sharpsteen and Lieutenants Farron, Dinn, Sawyer, Miller, and Haedtler joined four SBDs to strike the Japanese warships and transports. loaded
its
The enemy
force
was found east
of Santa Isabel Island. All aircraft
dived in to bomb and strafe through heavy antiaircraft fire.
A hit was scored
on a transport by 2nd Lieutenant J.M. Waterman, USMC, VMSB-141, in an SBD. The other planes scored near misses on the other ships, which broke formation in violent evasive action.
Someone remembered the gas
142
in
the wing tanks of the B-17s. This
was drained; there was enough for another mission against the oncoming enemy task force. At 1715 Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Shaw and and Lieutenants Sawyer, Miller, Holmes, Barr, and P-400s, each carrying 500-pound bombs, joined SBDs and Haedtler F4Fs for another strike at the task force, which had now reached the
Farron
in P-39s, in
southeastern
tip of
Santa Isabel Island. Lieutenant Sawyer returned with
plane trouble shortly after takeoff. Lieutenant Haedtler had electrical trouble,
made an
made one
early pass on a transport, and returned to the
runway, hit a stack of which killed a Marine
The other
steel matting off
airfield attendant;
planes attacked with
near misses were seen. the
field individually
strip
He
field.
on the Henderson Field the right edge and tore off a wing,
of those poorly lighted night landings
as
Haedtler came out uninjured.
bombs and
strafed the ships. Several
Due to the shortage of fuel, each plane returned to its ammunition ran out. They landed at the fighter
because Haedtler's accident was not yet cleared from the edge of the
main runway. Lieutenant Barr of the 67th was bombing pass and was thought to have been hit by not return to the
last to
make
his dive
antiaircraft fire.
He did
field.
Diary: Oct. 14, Wednesday We had two heavy air raids yesterday and
five last night after the
Jap Navy shelled the field. They shelled us just about all night long again; real heavy shells. Also the Jap artillery fired on us many times during the
evening and again this morning. That gun ("Pistol Pete")
is
close
enough to us to be able to reach our end of the field with its shells. We don't know what to expect and when to expect it. 1730 hrs.: We were bombed twice today and shelled at times by that Jap artillery gun. Sometimes it sounds like an 80mm mortar. If it's quiet,
we can hear it fire and then in a short time the shell hits right in our
They are putting maximum effort into bombing raids and they are Our planes are bombing and strafing a Jap invasion task force bad. very area.
that
is still
150 miles out and heading
on gas for the airplanes; the
bomb
the Jap ships.
around
in
We
last of
it
for Guadalcanal.
We are very low
may be in the planes that are out to
are scrounging a few extra barrels
left
laying
the bush and the palm groves.
bombing mission against the enemy task force, nearly all aviation gas was used and enemy pressure was increasing on land, sea, and in the air. Earlier in the day, as preparations for the strike at the Japanese ships got underway, a Marine Colonel came down With the completion
of the dive
from the Pagoda to the 67th Fighter Squadron position at the hangar. His words were reminiscent of past situations in the Philippines, still fresh in everyone's minds: "We don't know whether we'll be able to hold the field or not. There's a Jap task force of destroyers, cruisers, and troop transports heading our way. We have enough gas for one other mission against
them. Load your planes with bombs and go out with the dive bombers and
143
them. After the gas
hit
is
gone, we'll have to
Then your officers and men outfit. Goodbye and good luck." over.
will attach
let
the ground troops take
themselves to some infantry
Certain in the knowledge there would be another night of shelling, serious thoughts and preparations
were formulated by groups around the
beachhead; everyone kept his personal arms and belongings close at hand. "Pistol Pete" closed the final hours of daylight with flurries of shots at the airfield.
The word was
around the
airfield for
out to search the palm groves and
drums
of gasoline dispersed earlier,
were brought ashore after the wreck in the boneyard.
By nightfall the off
landing,
six transports of the
wooded areas when supplies
and to drain the tanks
in
every
'Tokyo Express" were standing
Tassafaronga, discharging fresh troops and supplies while their escort
war ships prepared to shell the beachhead. At 0150, 15 October, "Washing Machine Charlie" glided in over the airfield, dropped flares, and set the stage for another night of heavy shelling. It commenced immediately, a demonstration of fireworks exactly
like
the night before, lasting only until
0220.
American torpedo boats, newly arrived at Tulagi, had made their way through the darkness of the Sealark Channel as the Japanese cruisers Chokai and Kinugasa and other craft were identifying themselves to the torpedo boats by flashing their signature toward the beachhead. As the torpedo boats moved in for attack runs, their wake was sighted by lookouts on the Japanese ships, which began evasive action immediately. The torpedo attacks interrupted the shelling, and, due to the audacity of the attacking torpedo boats (Motor Torpedo Squadron 3), firing at the beachhead did not commence again that night. Gasoline found around the area amounted to the equivalent of 400 drums, enough to keep those aircraft in commission flying for two days. Word was received that additional gas was on the way. By mid-morning it began to arrive, ferried in by C-47s of the Marine Air Transport Squadron and the Army 13th Troop Carrier Squadron, each carrying 12 drums of aviation gasoline.
If
they had been jumped by a Japanese plane approaching
Guadalcanal, one tracer bullet or piece of hot shell fragment would have
blown the plane to bits. One by one the planes touched down on the Henderson Field runway, braked to a stop, the drums were rolled onto the ground, and the pilots turned and took off before shell fragments could stop them. For a week the C-47s supplied Henderson Field with aviation gasoline.
The morning search mission
at
0640 reported
additional Japanese
ships enroute to Guadalcanal. Yesterday's warships and six transports
were
still
off
the beach unloading troops and supplies. Four single plane
were made on the transports between Kokumbona, Doma Reef, and Tassafaronga before 0700. One was flown by Lieutenant D. Miller in a P-400. Throughout the day the transports and warships were hit by P-39s, attacks
P-400s, SBDs, B-17s, and by a
144
PBY that made a torpedo attack. Fire from
antiaircraft guns, just put ashore by the Japanese, was heavy and Japanese Zero fighters were flying cover over the landing operation. At 0900 Captains Mitchell and Sharpsteen, in P-39s carrying 500-
pound bombs, attacked the transports. Captain Sharpsteen got a probable hit on a transport and shot down a Zero flying over the landing operation. P-400s flown by Lieutenants Sawyer, Campbell, Dewey, and Holmes also attacked with 100-pound bombs. Sawyer made a hit on a transport. Holmes dropped his bomb on a transport, starting a fire which later was put out. At 1225, Captain Sharpsteen and Lieutenants Purnell, Jacobson, Dinn, and Farron in P-39s and Lieutenants Sawyer, Kerstetter, Kaiser, and Dews in P-400s repeated the attack. Lieutenant Dinn got a direct hit with a 500-pound bomb on one of the transports, which caught fire and
who rendezvoused with the formation about 10 minutes after the attack, did not make it back to the field. The "Tojo Time" raid, which occurred while the flight was out, was finally sank.
Lieutenant Farron,
not intercepted by the F4Fs. There were 24 bombers and an unknown number of Zeros. The antiaircraft guns put up heavy fire and downed one of the bombers. Strafing attacks and bombing near misses were credited to
Captains Mitchell and Sharpsteen and Lieutenants Campbell, Shaw, Haedtler, Holmes, Dinn, Sawyer, Dewey, Purnell, Kerstetter, and Miller.
This day's work by the 67th did not appear
The combined
in
ports inflicted continuous and heavy damage.
where one was In spite of
all
Navy press
releases.
operation by the "Cactus Air Force" over the trans-
while burning; a third was sunk. sea,
the
hit
Two
of the ships
beached
The three remaining transports put out to
and set on
fire
by a B- 17 attack near Savo
Island.
the air attacks, the Japanese transports succeeded
in
4500 troops ashore with most of their equipment. Much of ammunition were destroyed by dive bombing and strafing attacks on the beach. The Japanese landing was successful. It was now clear that the Japanese offensive beginning to unfold was to be putting about
their equipment, gasoline, and
carried out by a formidable force.
The punishment taken by the Japanese landing force during the day repaid at midnight. The eight-inch guns of the Japanese cruisers Maya and Miyako and their accompanying destroyers battered Henderson Field for over an hour. The light of the burning transports off Tassafaronga was
fully
could be seen in the night sky along with the flashes of naval guns shelling Henderson Field. The attack was long and fierce, but less so than "that
long night" of 13 October, ever to be
Men were was depressing.
canal. light
killed,
remembered by veterans
planes wrecked, and the sight of the
of Guadal-
airfield at first
Department of Navy was telling the Ameriof what was going on. The news media were sniffing
In Washington, D.C., the
can people very
little
out a story and doing their best to report
newspapers. Opening that Guadalcanal
it
in radio
broadcasts and in
were ominous in their doubt Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox could
lines of radio newscasts
was still holding.
say only: "Our boys on Guadalcanal
will
do their best."
145
The American people began to believe that another experience The men on Guadalcanal recognized
Corregidor was approaching. situation for
what
The defenders
it
was
—
like
the
a grave military situation against terrible odds.
of Guadalcanal held
on to their personal firearms and pre-
pared for a period of conflict even worse than they had already experienced.
146
CHAPTER
12
"Are You Still There, Cactus?"
To bring additional forces to bear, the Navy was scraping the barrel. On
15
October, the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the battleship South Dakota, and nine destroyers were ordered from Pearl Harbor into the South Pacific.
Bomber
operations out of Espiritu Santo were augmented and operated
against Rabaul and Japanese air bases in the northern Solomons. Increased
search and patrol activities were ordered.
More
assistance for besieged
Guadalcanal would require a decision at the highest national
level,
where
preoccupation with Europe and North Africa was clouding the issue and British insistence
on
all-out U.S.
support for Europe was denying us that
assistance.
On the morning of 16
October, Henderson Field was a bustling com-
munity: aircraft repairs, runway repairs,
movement
of
newly found gaso-
drums, arrival of C-47s from Espiritu Santo loaded with drums of gasoline, bombs being loaded under the bellies of P-39s, P-400s, and line
SBDs
— and everyone
in his turn
scrounging something to eat
in
the
makeshift kitchens as "Pistol Pete" lobbed in his occasional greeting.
The Japanese
transports beached or sunk off Tassafaronga were
smoking hulks as the morning attack missions began. The task now was to bomb and strafe the Japanese troops and their supplies concentrated on the beaches, in coconut groves, and in the nearby jungle growth. Their supplies were stacked in supply and ammunition dumps along the boundaries of the
beach assembly areas until they could be moved inland to a more protected area. Missions were flown, like "milk runs," throughout the day from
147
Kokumbona to Tassafaronga, attacking the landing areas. The routine was to dive in, drop a bomb, come back and strafe the troops, attempting to destroy as much of their equipment, supplies v and ammunition as possible. There were Zeros around during the first morning flights, but they were not a significant deterrent to the ground attack sorties. The seaplane tender McFarland stood off Lunga Point during the day unloading aviation gasoline into gas barges, a welcome drink for the thirsty Cactus Air Force. At about 1730 Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Bauer of VMF-212, finally released for operations at Henderson Field, led his 19 F4Fs to Cactus from Espiritu Santo. For too long Admiral Ghormley had insisted they be held back to guard the New Hebrides. While the F4Fs were making their approach to the field, the McFarland was attacked by Japanese Aichi type 99 dive bombers, damaging the ship and setting fire to a gas barge. Before landing, Bauer became aware of the situation and chased a flight of eight Japanese
dive bombers, shot
down four of them, and returned
to the field to land. Lieutenant Colonel Bauer, the great aerial
aviator
who
programs
in
helped the 67th Fighter Squadron start the early days at Tontouta, was
now
its
gunnery
gunnery training
landing at Cactus with
four Japanese planes scored to his credit before landing and reporting in to
General Geiger,
Commander
of the
Marine Air Wing and the Cactus Air
Force.
Diary: Oct. 16, Friday I guess the Jap task force was able to land much of its strength, in spite of the damage our planes have been inflicting on them by burning and sinking their transports. They got plenty of troops and equipment ashore and some antiaircraft guns. They are just a
little
to the
west of us,
and when our planes dive in to bomb and strafe them we can see the black puffs of antiaircraft fire bursting over the Jap positions.
We
have been shelled for the past three nights. They are
really
maximum effort to retake Guadalcanal. The shelling was terrifying; it seemed like they were using 16-inch guns. There were many casualties as a result of all this enemy action. The 164th Infantry, which making
a
just arrived
here from
New Caledonia, was not
settled in yet and got a
bad taste of it as a welcome. Our planes bombed the transports as they came in to unload, but the Japs were able to beach some of the transports and boats and got most of their force unloaded even though they were taking a lot of punishment along the beaches.
on the task force,
in its
I
hear that
in all that action
approach, during their landing and during their
departure, they lost six ships.
The bombing raids are bad and frequent. The Jap buildup is deploying somewhere to the west of the perimeter and it looks like it will be real
rough here for a while. Occasionally on a night watch, Sidney
Hudson and Thomas Melton, made contact
operating the ground station for the 67th's Cactus station,
with the 67tlrs radio station Jig Ground, at Tontouta,
148
New
Caledonia.
They would tune a receiver to the frequency of the Jig Ground station and call. News of the heavy shelling and the hard-pressed plight of their Henderson Field was a matter of grave concern to the rest of the outfit at Tontouta. At regular intervals they would try very hard to get a return call from their men at Cactus. During a shelling, the radio operator would dive into a nearby bomb shelter; when the worst was over he would come out and guard the Henderson Field operational channel. On one occasion during a heavy night shelling, Thomas Melton got back into his chair and listened on the Jig Ground frequency. He heard the worried voice of Master Sergeant Joe Melton (no relation to Thomas Melton),
await a unit at
calling
"Cactus, Cactus, Cactus, are you
still
there,
Cactus? Over."
Thomas Melton caught the call, switched over, and after a brief reply to let them know that Cactus was still holding on, signed off and guarded the regular Cactus operational frequency.
The Japanese position on 16 October was one of supreme confidence. General Hyakutake was assured by his senior commander on the scene, Lieutenant General Maso Maruyama, that plans were in place for a threepronged, coordinated attack on the boundaries of the American beachhead.
A tentative date of
18 October was set for the attack. Maruyama, leading airfield, would move with a force of about
the force that would capture the
nine infantry battalions to a line of departure southeast of the
airfield;
Major General Kawaguchi, of Bloody Ridge fame, would command the right (Vandegrift's east boundary); and Major General Yumio Nasu would command the left (Vandegrift's west boundary). Major General Tadashi Sumiyoshi was to cover the rear, bringing his attack against the Matanikau line.
Sumiyoshi commanded
including the infamous
tank company. This was attacks by forces
the perimeter.
A
all
of the artillery of the Japanese 17th
Army
150mm howitzers, five battalions of infantry, and a all
to be accomplished concurrently in coordinated
now located in the vicinity of Kokumbona,
to the west of
code word, "Banzai," was to signal the jumpoff for the
attacking elements. Detailed instructions were issued for accepting the
surrender of General A.A. Vandegrift. For some time, Maruyama's engineers had been preparing trails from the west to a point southeast of the airfield, in the cover of the jungle, over
which his force could move to the
line of departure.
The
activity of the
engineering parties went undetected by Marine patrols or aircraft observation; however, frequent observation of the unsuspecting airfield was
made by Japanese officers from the ridges to the
south. In a
most remark-
able display of confidence, complacency, and arrogance, the jungle terrain
over which they had to maneuver a large force and heavy equipment was not previously reconnoitered; not enough time was allowed in the plan for preparation of
moved
trails. It
was only with extreme
difficulty that forces
were
into place. Everything had to be brought forward by manpower,
with infantry soldiers often carrying two artillery shells in addition to their pack. The effort continued, in an attempt to adhere to the schedule. The landing of the large force of Japanese had alerted the Marines to
149
expect an attack, but disposition of the Japanese forces and the place of their attack
were unknown. Vandegrift was
able to deploy his forces to
protect the entire perimeter with emphasis in strength on the west, place his artillery to bring fire in front of
advantage of defending inner
lines.
any sector, and generally exploit
The Japanese moved over
his
the chosen
routes more slowly than they had expected, often abandoning artillery and heavy weapons along the trail to maintain their schedule. In the face of this difficulty, Maruyama postponed the assault until the 22nd, and, ultimately, to 24 October. Their entire preparation and approach to the assault was marked by cocky arrogance and failure to understand and appreciate their enemy and the environment. their inflexible
A
chain reaction of circumstances adversely affected
maneuvers; steady rain made
trails
almost impassable and
saturated communications equipment. Here the inflexibility of a totalitarian society,
where innovation and replanning were necessary, emasculated
their plans,
which called for coordinated attacks, but resulted
in
maximum
which were launched separately and lacked the punch of their
efforts
abandoned weapons for supporting fire. These separately executed attacks gave General Vandegrift flexibility in the use of his forces and the attacks, although very close to achieving the goal, were separately squashed. In the great difficulty of airfield,
moving
Maruyama had postponed
his forces into position south of the
the jump-off date several times.
munications were poor and probably contributed to the failure
On 23
Com-
in timing.
October, having failed to receive the change in plans, Sumiyoshi's
Number 22, a workhorse P-39/P-400 Airacobra, stands ready for another Jagstaffel sortie. October 1942.
150
which had been regularly firing on Henderson Field and the fire a heavy concentration of artillery on the Matanikau line. When the firing ceased, a column of Japanese tanks came out of the jungle and crossed the sandbar at the mouth of the river in an assault on the Marine lines. Just west of the river, Japanese infantry were ready to follow artillery,
perimeter, began to
the tanks and gain a position on the east shore. Artillery of the 11th Marines immediately placed fire between the river and Point Cruz, blanketing the Japanese infantry waiting to
The
move up behind
the tanks.
effects of the artillery barrage
on the Japanese infantry was devastating. Marine antitank guns wrecked the tanks. Four separate assaults by the tanks and Japanese infantry were attempted against the
Marine
line.
Each time the Marine
lines held, inflicting
heavy losses on the
attacking Japanese.
After regrouping during the night, the Japanese again attacked the
Matanikau
line at
dawn on 24 October. Close
air
support missions were
flown throughout the day as numerous additional Japanese attacks were
beaten back; heavy rain grounded the aircraft for most of the afternoon. The Japanese thrust across the Matanikau failed. Air operations leading up to the battle had not detected the presence of Japanese engineers preparing jungle trails for the
movement
of their
Marine patrols had not extended to the depth the trails were being prepared, and the greatest threat was considered to be along the Matanikau. Dive-bombing and strafing of assembling forces to the west continued, with Japanese Zeros overhead at frequent intervals. Attempts were being made to find and destroy "Pistol Pete." A strange report was received during the day on 16 October that a German ME 109 fighter was strafing Marine positions. Flight operations up to 22 October were steady "milk forces.
runs," bombing and strafing Japanese ships, landing boats, troops, sup-
and antiaircraft positions near Kokumbona. On these missions the from the Matanikau to Cape Esperance and along the Matanikau and area Lunga was covered in search of Japanese movements, which were indeed active but concealed by the jungle and continued unobserved. The P-400s were literally falling apart. Guns often would not fireplies,
engines, flaps, electrical systems, and propellers failed frequently. The P-400s were in no condition to go on long overwater missions, but out they
went with the SBDs and P-39s
to
bomb and
strafe Japanese ships, trans-
went with complete disregard for the condition of the planes and out of respect for the superhuman effort of the crewmen who kept them in commission to fly. Japanese antiaircraft gun ports, or personnel barges.
The
pilots
were thick near Kokumbona and were frequently attacked during the sorties. On 21 October, Lieutenant Haedtler put two of them out of commission with bombs; another was wiped out by Lieutenant Dewey. The 67th's hangar, the last to remain standing, was knocked out and positions
Captain Mitchell ordered everyone moved to the fighter strip except for some mechanical work that was to be completed before several of the planes could be moved. The most pleasant collapsed from Japanese artillery
fire.
151
occurrence of 21 October was the return of Lieutenant Barr, shot down a
week before in an attack on a Japanese troop transport. He was returned from the Russell Islands in a Higgins boat and was in good health except for a wrenched knee and lower back. Barr was evacuated on a C-47 the next day without his personal belongings, which had all been stolen from his storage place in the palm grove by Marines, so accustomed to looting the Japs that anything they came across was fair game. "Pistol Pete" continued to get an inordinate amount of attention; daily the P-39s and F4Fs met the "Tojo Time" raid; the F4Fs continued to rack up a good score against the Japanese Zeros and bombers. On 23 October the regular attack missions continued until about 0800, when word was received that the expected Japanese offensive along the Matanikau had started; it was considered to be the main threat to the perimeter. The attack began with heavy concentrations of Japanese artillery fire placed on the Marine lines in preparation for the assault. Along with this, the heavy return fire from Marine artillery created fierce battle sounds, making it clear to those on the airfield that a major engagement was in progress. These sounds could be heard on the airfield throughout the night. As Marine antitank guns gutted and burned Japanese tanks attempting to cross the sandbar at the mouth of the river, the glow of fires could be seen to the west during the intervals when heavy rain let up. The artillery exchange continued and the 1 1th Marines placed their fire just west of the sandbar at the mouth of the river, inflicting heavy casualties on the Japanese infantry massed for an attack across the sandbar. The Marines called for close air support; at first light on the morning of 24 October the P-39s, P-400s, and SBDs began a day of bombing and strafing Japanese troops in front of the Marines on the Matanikau and on targets further west. At 0645 Lieutenants Haedtler and Holmes put 100pound bombs into the Japanese troop concentrations and strafed until their ammunition was expended. The Marines had ground panels laid out but code cards had not been provided for the early flight. However, there was no problem identifying and attacking the enemy. The entire day was spent in similar attacks on the Matanikau break. The heavy schedule of sorties again brought the supply of aviation gas to a dangerously low point. The Marine artillery had fired so many rounds that a resupply of ammunition was needed. The gasoline and ammunition urgently called for soon began to arrive in the heroic C-47 transport aircraft. It was a day of heavy clouds and frequent rain showers in the southern Solomons, and 'Tojo Time" did not materialize for Henderson Field. Everything was swimming in flash floods and mud. The expected shelling for that night did not occur.
General Sumiyoshi's attack on the Matanikau, delivered before Mar-
uyama was in position to the south of the perimeter, was a costly deviation from plan for the Japanese. The failure of the attack freed up Marine forces, moved from the perimeter south of the airfield as reinforcements on the
152
Matanikau, to be returned to strengthen the southern line when they were needed.
On
the day following the failure of Sumiyoshi's attack, the perimeter was relatively quiet. Japanese artillery continued to fire throughout the day, killing or
wounding about 30 Marines;
pressure on the entire Marine its
it
was
successful in holding
The 67th Fighter Squadron continued heavy "milk run" schedule to bomb and strafe the Matanikau, Kokumline.
bona, Cape Esperance areas, as well as general patrols searching the
perimeter. Air operations were curtailed at about 1630
when heavy rain began again. During the early afternoon, men of the 7th Marines, holding the far left-forward position of the Matanikau line, spotted a column of Japanese infantry moving eastward along a Mount Austen trail. The sighting of this column, which later proved to be a force under Japanese Colonel Oka, caused a reassessment that the Japanese could be present in force at any point along the perimeter from the mouth of the Matanikau to a point along the Lunga southeast of the
airfield.
A late afternoon patrol reported seeing
a Japanese officer studying Bloody Ridge through field glasses and
smoke
rising
from "many
rice fires" south of the
Lunga and the
saw
ridge.
Vandegrift was thus alerted to the possible need to reinforce the 7th
Marines and the 164th Infantry, holding the line southeast of the airfield. Maruyama's forces had finally moved into position; their heaviest weapons were now machine guns, for they had abandoned their artillery pieces along the treacherous line of march, a route that the general had
himself
named the Maruyama Road
before experiencing
its
treachery. In
the early evening of the 24th they were deploying for attack, heavy rain
adding to their problems.
morning on the 25th the attack began. The predawn strikes on the line south of Henderson Field were vigorous and suicidal, executed with skill and bravery in their utmost determination to breach and gain a hold on the airfield. The lines of the 7th Marines and the In the early hours of the
164th Infantry were penetrated in several places, with the Japanese absorbing ghastly losses under heavy rifle, mortar, and artillery fire. The groups of penetrating Japanese, accepting their fate
in
the true tradition of
Samurai, were surrounded and annihilated.
Marines laid heavy concentrations of artillery fire in front of the perimeter defenses through the night, taking a heavy toll on the
The
1 1th
Japanese infantry; each wave of the attack resulted in fierce hand-to-hand combat. By 0700 on 25 October the lines of the 164th Infantry and the Marines had held fast, and Maruyama withdrew to regroup his force and repeat the attack.
The heavy
rains had flash-flooded
Henderson Field and the
fighter
strip; Marines and men of the 67th were searching about for infiltrating Japanese, fearing they might get on the field to destroy parked aircraft.
Japanese
artillery shelled the area all day;
Japanese
air activity
was so
153
day became known to veterans of Guadalcanal as "Dugout The Sunday." Japanese bombed and strafed in numerous attacks during plentiful that the
the day.
At 0800,
five
Zeros were seen circling over the
field.
The Japanese
begun with heavy shelling on the night of 13 October planned, by now, to have the airfield in Japanese control; their aircraft were awaiting a signal to land. These were joined by others, and by a two-engined German Heinkel bomber which had markings that looked like III-K. It crossed the airfield at about 10,000 feet, from east to west, circling to look everything over. By 0900 the mud that held the planes on the ground had baked enough in the hot sun for the pilots to try a takeoff. Eight F4Fs slithered off, climbing to meet the Zeros. Later, five more Zeros appeared, and four more F4Fs were able to get off. The two-engine Heinkel bomber came back across the field from east to west, flying at about 1000 feet to get a closer look at the airfield that was supposed to be in Japanese hands. It got a good look at about 0945, when heavy fire from .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns hit the plane. It started smoking and crashed in a flaming explosion between Henderson Field and the Matanikau. All Zeros that appeared overhead were shot down by F4Fs. During the day, Japanese dive bombers struck a row of parked airplanes on Henderson field, destroying many of them. However, this row of aircraft was made up of hulks from the boneyard, dragged into line to draw Japanese fire away from other aircraft dispersed and hidden in the edge of the trees around the fighter strip. By evening, 22 Japanese aircraft were shot down. Of these, 17 were Zeros. Captain Joe Foss accounted for four of offensive schedule which had
them, repeating his score of the previous day.
From mid-morning on, the planes of the 67th were joined with SBDs bomb Japanese warships in the vicinity. An early SBD patrol had
to dive
reported a Japanese task force of one heavy cruiser, three light carriers,
and two destroyers, 105 miles from Cactus, a report that was confirmed by Coast Watchers. At 1300 this force was attacked by five SBDs led by Lieutenant direct hit
Commander John
on a
Eldridge,
cruiser, stopping
were scored by the
it
dead
Jr.,
of VS-71. Eldridge
in the water; several
made
a
near-misses
flight.
In a follow-up attack by P-39s, Lieutenants Dinn, Purnell, and Jacob-
500-pound bombs, attacked at 1400, scoring two near-misses on a cruiser. At 1500 a third attack by SBDs, P-39s, and F4Fs hit the task force. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Purnell, Dinn, and Jacobson dropped 500-pound bombs. Lieutenant Jacobson made a direct hit on a cruiser, inflicting fatal damage; it was the Japanese cruiser Yura, later sent to the bottom by her escort. The other bombs were damaging near-misses. As the flight returned, the ships were heading north with two cruisers trailing heavy oil slicks, and six B-17s were on the scene for an attack; they son, with
did
no additional damage to the
force.
The mission
of the Japanese task
force had been to land troops at Koli, east of the perimeter. Its
154
commander
Kenneth Markel, armament specialist, makes a fast reload of the machine guns on a P-39 of the 67th Fighter Squadron. October 1942.
had received incorrect information that the airfield had been neutralized or captured, and the vicious dive bombing attacks were totally unexpected.
Throughout the day submarine nel.
of attacks
Amberjack was
on the Japanese task forces, the U.S. way into the Sealark Chan-
slowly making her
Exercising caution and taking an occasional look at the surface action,
the crew of the
A mberjack could feel the throb of bombs in the water as she
made her way into the harbor at Tulagi carrying precious cargo. Her spare tanks carried thousands of gallons of aviation gasoline; she carried a supply
100-pound bombs, and torpedoes for the PT boat squadron at Tulagi. For the 67th Fighter Squadron she carried 15 aircraft mechanics and armorers from New Caledonia to augment and replace personnel in the
of
tired squadron.
In the heavy attacks of Dugout Sunday, the forces on the perimeter, both U.S. and Japanese, were regrouping and preparing for the next assault. After sundown, flashes of lights could be seen in the hills south of the
heavy Japanese activity. Maruyama's forces were reorganized and making ready for a maximum effort to break through the perimeter defenses and capture the airfield. After dark the assault began. Maruyama threw wave after wave of airfield, signaling
screaming infantry, shouting "Banzai," in direct frontal attack against the perimeter line held by the 164th Infantry and the 5th and 7th Marines. The Japanese pressed their attack through a hail of rifle, artillery, and heavy-
155
weapons
fire.
They took heavy casualties; their fighting was every bit as They made repeated charges, at times stand-
fierce as the previous night.
ing in the U.S. lines in close individual combat, only to be repulsed or annihilated. In the early morning they withdrew from this macabre scene of no-quarter battle, gathering the remnants of their force as they faded into the jungle.
During the night an additional attack was thrown the Colonel
Oka force
that had
been seen on a
trail
at the
crossing
perimeter by
Mount Austen
the day before. At one point this force broke through the lines of the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Marines, only to be thrown back by a counterattack.
Except for infiltrating groups of Japanese infantry that actually got as far as the airfield, Colonel Oka's force probably drove their attack closest to the objective before being squashed.
On 26 at
October, the 67th flew numerous missions
major battle points south and west of the
airfield.
in close air
support
Bombing and
strafing
by ground control, they attacked Japanese concentrations the line south of the antiaircraft
guns
at
airfield.
the bush at
were flown against the
Additional attacks
Kokumbona
in
beach, where three guns were knocked
out.
The same effort was repeated on 27 October. On 28 October, Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Dinn and Jacobson, carrying 100-pound bombs,
accompanied SBDs to Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel Island. Five Japanese floatplanes on the beach were strafed and destroyed. The bombing and strafing attacks
on the Japanese seaplane base also destroyed gasoline and
ammunition supplies, which were left burning as the flight departed. The attack encountered heavy antiaircraft fire. Lieutenant Dinn's plane was hit, smoking heavily as he bailed out. Pilots of VMF 212 saw his parachute
open and go down
in
the trees on the south coast of Santa Isabel. Later in
the day, Captain Mitchell and Lieutenant Jacobson strafed Rekata Bay and
looked for Lieutenant Dinn; they encountered heavy antiaircraft
both planes received
hits.
They destroyed
a floatplane and
saw
fire,
and
six others
destroyed by the previous attack. Daily attacks
were made on
frontline positions through
with good results reported by Marine and
Army
troops.
The
31 October, attacks con-
tinued to destroy landing boats, ammunition, and antiaircraft guns near
Kokumbona.
The
unsuccessful attacks of 25 and 26 October brought an end to the
Japanese October offensive on Guadalcanal. that their losses
were 3,568
officers
A
detailed survey reported
and men. The shelling of Henderson
Field on "that long night" of 13 October, which their schedule for capturing the beachhead,
marked the opening
of
had been very successful and at
one point had actually closed down Henderson Field operations. Had the bombardments and ground offensive been well -coordinated, the outcome might have been
different. In reality, their efforts
rately and failed miserably
poorly formulated plan.
156
when measured
were delivered sepa-
against their over-detailed and
At his headquarters at Rabaul, Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake monitored operations with confidence as the Japanese ground attack continued on 25 and 26 October. An erroneous message that Henderson Field
was in Japanese hands had been received and conditions
at the
scene
by headquarters nor correction from the field. The large Japanese force to clinch the fight, destroy the American forces retreating from Guadalcanal, and occupy the island, started down the Slot did not allow verification
to claim their prize.
Admiral Halsey scraped together every vessel he could claim
in the
meet this threat. The Enterprise, still recovering from previous wounds, and the new South Dakota were rushed from Pearl Harbor. With the carrier Hornet, these made up the main ships of a task force with which Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid was approaching the Santa Cruz Islands on 26 October, ready to intercept the south-bound Pacific for the task force to
enemy force. The Japanese
fleet
was sighted by
Espiritu Santo. This formidable
a
PBY and B-17s patrolling out
of
enemy force included four aircraft carriers,
four battleships, nine heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, along with auxiliary ships
and three cargo transports.
In the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands that followed, the Americans
20 planes to the enemy and 54 from other causes. The carrier Hornet and destroyer Porter were sunk. The Enterprise, and South Dakota, the lost
cruiser
San Juan, and the destroyer Smith were damaged. Two Japanese and a battleship were damaged; none were sunk. The
aircraft carriers
lost at least 100 planes, a severe blow to their dwindling complement of experienced pilots. The damage was not, however, responsible for the withdrawal of the Japanese fleet. They had learned that the American
Japanese
troops could
still
still
held their beachhead at Guadalcanal and that Henderson Field
strike with aircraft.
The
forces within the beachhead at Cactus
had saved themselves.
157
*
CHAPTER
13
Block Their
Sunday Punch
At the end of October, the situation in the Pacific depended upon the outcome of the Guadalcanal Campaign. To the surprise of many in Washington,
General
Guadalcanal shall's
Vandegrift
— with
and
his
team
still
held
possession
of
shamefully limited national support. General Mar-
orders had been to keep the emphasis on Europe and North Africa.
Admiral King kept right on insisting that more emphasis be placed on winning a decisive victory
in
the southern Solomons. General Millard F.
Harmon kept up continuous pressure in his regular reports to Washington, calling for the strengthening of Guadalcanal to secure
it
as a base for future
In his study of the situation, President Roosevelt
became convinced
rollback of the Japanese in the Pacific.
that the possession of Guadalcanal had
nese planners
in
Roosevelt
it
a prerequisite of the Japa-
continuing their war in the Pacific.
test of Japanese military
To
become
It
was now becoming
a
performance before the Emperor and the world.
became an
equally important and prestigious base to be
held and used as a stepping stone to exploit the victory.
Roosevelt settled the continuing squabble among the 'Top Brass" regarding support for the Pacific. that every possible
On 24
October, the President ordered
weapon and appropriate support be sent to the Pacific if commitments must be reduced else-
and that Guadalcanal be held, even
where. Marshall and King began immediately to plan for augmentation of the area with troops, planes, and ships, expecting this support to be in use
before the end of November.
158
The aggressive Admiral Halsey put pressure
on to make it happen as soon as possible. General Douglas MacArthur ultimately agreed that the 25th Division in Hawaii and additional fighter planes that were due to arrive in his area could be diverted to the South Pacific.
The heavy
combat damage, bombing and shelling wear and tear continually reduced the airpower available at Henderson Field. In addition, the defenders were still plagued with a constant shortage of fuel. The October Japanese offensive came close to destroying Henderson Field and the "Cactus Air Force." As the month drew to a close, there were only 29 aircraft on the "in commission" list. This situation was greatly improved by mid-November. The 347th Fighter Group, which was activated in October, along with the 339th Fighter Squadron, had absorbed the 70th and 68th as well as the flying schedule,
losses, plus just plain
67th Fighter Squadrons. Pilots of the 70th squadron had been added to the
Cactus Flight as early as 8 October, when eight of them arrived in a flight of 11 new P-39s. Four pilots of the 68th arrived on 7 November as their squadron moved from Tonga to
New
Caledonia.
The
operation of the
Cactus Flight continued to be reported, in daily action reports, under the 67th Fighter Squadron until 2 December, when the daily action report
159
heading changed to read "347th Fighter Group." Elements of
squadrons
all
active
group were actually rotating and operating
in the Cactus mid-November. (Many writers of today like to refer to these Army Fighter Squadrons of late 1942 as part of the 13th Fighter Command, which they were at a later time. However, it was not until January 1943 that 13 Fighter Command came into existence.) Early in November, during a time of critical personnel needs within the beachhead, Admiral Turner pursued another of his headstrong pet
in the
Flight as early as
projects, the building of an additional airfield near Aola Bay.
He diverted The force
forces newly assigned to Guadalcanal to cover his operation.
included the 147th Infantry, 1st Battalion, two companies of the 2nd
Marine Raider Battalion, a detachment of the 5th Defense Battalion, BatK of the 246th Field Artillery, and 500 Naval construction troops. Taking troops and construction capability critically needed within the perimeter, he wasted a month in a place totally unsuited for an airfield. This fact had been previously determined by Vandegrift's engineers, who had chosen a site at Koli Point where, in fact, an airfield was later built. The job was abandoned after a costly waste of effort. It would have been better if Turner had stuck with Naval operations, a job at which he was at least tery
tolerable.
The net result of the event was that Vandegrift could have better
utilized the units to
strengthen his perimeter defenses
and to improve Henderson
Ships were beginning to arrive
and supplies
off
Lunga
in
the beachhead
Field.
more frequently with reinforcements
Point. Additional infantry, artillery, and support
units of the Americal Division continued to arrive, along with similar units of the
Marine Corps.
With the failure of their attack of 23 - 24 October, the Japanese began preparing for another offensive against the American beachhead. General Hyakutake decided to send a Japanese Division under command of Lieutenant General Tadayoshi Sano and
heavy equipment to Guadalcanal in troop transports rather than by 'Tokyo Express." At Rabaul, a new Japanese 8th Area Army was created. Hyakutake, now under this command, could, as commander of the 17th Army, concentrate his effort on the recapture of Guadalcanal from a command post near Kokumbona. With a its
separate army he was organizationally free of problems elsewhere in the
Area Army.
To
accomplish this next offensive, four Japanese naval task forces
were organized. Two bombardment forces would neutralize Henderson Field by naval shelling. Another would transport a Japanese division and its heavy equipment to Guadalcanal, and a fourth would provide general support. The Japanese had been very successful thus far in the use of their aircraft carriers, but did not commit them to support these task forces. This was a surprising element in their plan, even though they were in a position to provide air cover from cruiser-launched aircraft and land-based aircraft.
Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, after being defeated
160
i
in their
mid-Oc-
tober attacks on the perimeter, began to reassemble west of the perimeter A smaller number attempted to assemble east of the
near Kokumbona. perimeter
in
the vicinity of Koli. Vandegrift was determined to strike while
they were off-balance, attempting to recover and regroup. cross the Matanikau again, to take the
He planned to Kokumbona area, about 8000 yards
He
then planned to push on 26,000 yards farther west to Poha River. Moving the line west to this point would artillery out of range of the Lunga area airfields.
farther west.
establish a line at the
keep enemy
Infantry forces
were prepared
to
move
eral places, using foot bridges prefabricated
neers. At
first light
on
1
November,
across the Matanikau in sev-
and put
artillery of the
in place
by the engi-
11th Marines and the
3rd Defense Battalion, assisted by cruisers offshore, shelled the area at the base of and west of Point Cruz. Close air support attacks by P-39s and
SBDs from Henderson
Field delivered attacks against opposing Japanese
19 B- 17s from Espiritu Santo bombed Kokumbona. When the bombardment fire was lifted, the 5th Marines moved across the Matanikau at a point just south of the coast road. Another force, under artillery positions;
Colonel William J. Whaling,
USMC, crossed up-river covering the left flank
west along the grassy knolls and ravines. The Marines gained 1000 yards the
day.
first
day.
A vehicular bridge was constructed across the river the next
As the move proceeded, additional units of the 5th Marines and 164th were moved forward. The 5th Marines successfully eliminated a
Infantry
pocket of Japanese resistance at the base of Point Cruz, capturing their artillery
and heavy weapons. In
this action,
350 Japanese were
killed in
action involving several bayonet assaults by the 5th Marines.
an
The 5th
Marines and the Whaling Group were then relieved and returned to the perimeter.
The following morning, 3 November, the 1st Battalion 164th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion 2nd Marines continued the advance, and by the end of the day were 2000 yards beyond Point Cruz, with 4000 yards to go to Kokumbona; close supporting P-39s bombed and strafed in front of them as they advanced. The advance was halted at this point on orders from General Vandegrift's Headquarters.
Enemy troops had been landed east of the
perimeter. Until this threat could be evaluated and eliminated, no further
movement west would be attempted. At
this time, the
2nd Battalion
of the 7th
Marines was
in position at
the Matapona River east of Koli Point, in front of a Japanese landing force of battalion size. The force had landed at Tetere, a little east of the
Matapona. This Japanese landing force had been ordered by General Hyakutake to join with the remnants that had retreated east after the October and to attempt to build a landing strip. For several days around the first part of November, the daily log of the 67th Fighter Squadron opened with the words, "No bombing, no shelling, no relief." Typical, then, of a mission day was 1 November. The 67th, along with the SBDs, flew close air support attacks missions in front of the push by ground forces across the Matanikau. A mission was flown at 0615 by battle
161
Lieutenants Jacobson, Shaw, Haedtler, and Holmes.
They
strafed areas
near Point Cruz. After the B-17s bombed Kokumbona, they thoroughly strafed the
Kokumbona
area. Lieutenant Jacobson broke
away
early be-
cause of propeller trouble on his beat-up airplane and Lieutenant returned because of high
oil
Dewey
temperature.
The second
mission, flown by Lieutenants Kerstetter and Patterson, gun positions west of Kokumbona. Lieutenant Kerstetter reported getting an excellent view of two new gun positions. The third mission, flown by Captain Mitchell and Lieutenant Jacobson, bombed and hit artillery
strafed in the
mission,
still
Kokumbona
in
area; their
bombs
failed to explode.
The
fourth
support of the ground advance to the west, was flown by
Lieutenants Holmes, Patterson, Dewey, and Haedtler, strafing the ground action.
in front of
The Marine and Army troops were meeting stiff resist-
ance but making good progress, indicating by signal panels on the ground the location of the front lines where they wanted bombing and strafing
support to be placed. Lieutenant Haedtler broke away early with jammed
guns and Patterson with propeller trouble. Lieutenants Kerstetter and Patterson, on the fifth mission, bombed and strafed Japanese movements
on the road between Point Cruz and Kokumbona. On the sixth mission of the day, Lieutenants Shaw and Purnell bombed and strafed the Kokumbona area and started four or five fires, several of which exploded like ammunition stores. in
The missions encountered varying amounts of antiaircraft fire
and around Kokumbona. Day-long schedules of close
air
support continued as on
1
November;
they attacked bivouac areas, camouflaged artillery guns, antiaircraft positions,
enemy
vehicles and personnel on-the-move, ammunition stores,
landing boats and supply dumps.
Numerous unseen targets (identified only
by direction from signal panels set out by infantry troops on the front lines) were hit in front of the ground troops. Airplanes and people were wearing out.
On 3 November the close air
support sorties began to include missions to the east as well, because of the
Japanese landing at Koli Point near the village of Tetere.
A
force of 15
SBDs, four P-39s, one TBF, and four F4Fs strafed and bombed the area of the enemy force. They dropped 20 500-pound bombs, 76 100-pound bombs, and one 325-pound depth charge in the attack area while receiving heavy return small arms and antiaircraft fire. Members of the 67th on the flight were Captain Mitchell, Lieutenants Jacobson, Purnell, Shaw, Dews, in P-39s and Lieutenants Dewey and Patterson in P-400s. During the Koli operation these missions were continued whenever called for. The American forces of the 7th Marines and 164th Infantry attempted to surround the Japanese. Support missions were stopped for a time because of poor communications; the dense jungle
made it impossible
where the changing front line was, and some American casualties had been sustained from strafing American planes. By 10 November, 450 Japanese had been killed; the rest escaped the trap through a gap in the line between two battalions of the 164th Infantry. Less than half
to determine
162
the Japanese in the Koli pocket survived the trek through the jungle to assemble with their forces near Kokumbona. During this heavy schedule of activity, a local ship known as "Horton's
Lunga Point on 4 November carrying five pilots. had been picked up by friendly natives and Coast Watchers. One of the survivors was Lieutenant Wally Dinn, seen parachuting from his smoking P-39 about a week before, in good health and ready for action. After parachuting from his plane, Lieutenant Dinn had been found by four friendly natives. One of them, having had some mission Schooner" arrived
at
These men, missing
in action,
school education, spoke English.
They took Dinn
in their
the long relay trip to bring him back to Guadalcanal.
boat and started
One
stop was on a
small island where, according to the English-speaking native, a Japanese pilot
pilot
was hiding. With the help of the natives, Dinn captured the Japanese and took him along. At one of their stops a couple of days later, the Jap
capsized the boat in shallow water and escaped.
He was captured the next
morning. The prisoner was placed on a diet of one banana a day and a sugar cane; he was closely guarded for the remainder of the Guadalcanal, Dinn turned him over as a prisoner of war.
little
trip.
At
Then Lieutenant
Dinn immediately joined the heavy schedule of close air support missions. With the close of the Koli operation it was possible to renew the offensive to the west toward Kokumbona. By 1 1 November the line was pushed beyond the position they had gained on 4 November. Their efforts were supported by naval gunfire from offshore and close air support sorties. On that day the advance was again canceled by General Vandegrift, after receiving word that the Japanese were preparing a large force of warships and transports to attack Guadalcanal. With insufficient forces the advance was abandoned; the troops were withdrawn to the perimeter to
meet the
threat.
An early November accounting of the heavily used aircraft shows the struggling
"Cactus Air Force"
still
waiting for reinforcements. In com-
mission were:
12 out of
39 22
P-400 P-39
2 out of
4
5 out of
5
TBF
1
out of
2
F4F-7
lout
F4F-4
36 out
SBD
of
of
1
On 7 November, some relief (10 pilots in new P-39s) arrived for the 67th. Among the group were two pilots of the 67th on their second tour at 68th squadron. Captain Mitchell and most of to his remaining pilots were scheduled for rest at Tontouta and assignment P-38 Lockheed the into the new 339th Fighter Squadron to transition
Cactus and
five pilots of the
Lightnings, newly arrived at Tontouta.
The heavy schedule continued. Each mission made successful attacks 163
on enemy troops, ammunition dumps, ment. "Pistol Pete" was receiving a
pound the
airfield at will. Artillery
arrived in the perimeter and
artillery guns,
and ground equip-
lot of -attention;
he could no longer
with counter battery capability had
was having some success
in locating
the guns
of "Pistol Pete."
In the afternoon,
SBD
patrol planes observed a Japanese force of 11
warships northeast of Santa Isabel Island heading for Guadalcanal.
A com-
The flight was made up of seven SBDs carrying 1000-pound bombs, three TBFs carrying torpedoes, and eight P-39s led by Captain Mitchell and including three of the pilots who had just arrived. Each P-39 carried a 500-pound bomb. The escort for this flight was 22 F4F Wildcats. The 67th pilots were performing a dual role; they were to dive bomb the warships and climb back up to join the F4Fs flying fighter cover. The P-39s were last to depart on the flight and would bined strike force was assembled to attack.
overtake the others enroute.
As Mitchell's flight was catching up with the formations, they encoun-
The P-39s
tered four float Zeros and a large lumbering float biplane. jettisoned their bombs, attacked and shot
down
all
five of the
Japanese
aircraft.
Meanwhile, the composite force was having some success. The TBFs put two torpedoes into a cruiser and another into a destroyer.
succeeded
in putting a
1000-pound bomb on a
The SBDs
cruiser. In the air battle, the
enemy lost 15 aircraft over the battle area. The Marines lost four F4Fs. One Wildcat, Lieutenant D. Doyl, USMC, went down in a violent spin with wing missing and crashed into the sea; another, Lieutenant J.B. Maas, landed on the water, out of gas, to be picked up later by a PT boat. Captain Joe Foss and Lieutenant O.M. Bate, USMC, went down near Malaita. Foss was later found and returned to Henderson Field. Mitchell's flight included J.T. Jarman and R.M. Ferguson, who had just arrived for a second tour, plus W. Dinn, W. Shaw, F. Purnell, J. Jacobson, and J. Geyer. The five Japanese planes shot down by the Army pilots were credited to Mitchell, Shaw, Dinn, Purnell, and Ferguson. For the next few days Captain Mitchell and a few of the pilots to be relieved stayed around to start the newly arrived pilots off right. Secondtimers like Jim Jarman and Robert M. Ferguson needed no indoctrination; they just dropped back into the routine. An established routine was just what it was for the next few days. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Williams, McLanahan, Jarman, Inciardi, Kellum, Ferguson, Shambrook, Bauer, Hull, Ryan, Patterson, Waldmire, Novak, and Norris divided up the close support missions. They continually bombed and strafed the area west a
USMC,
of Tassafaronga.
On
11
November they
strafed landing boats in
Tassafaronga and supported Marine occasional
bombing and
artillery firing
Doma Cove
and near
on Kokumbona with
strafing runs. Lieutenants Clark and
McLanahan The
spotted a Zero in the area; they pursued him, getting in a few shots.
plane looked like a Zero with a long canopy to accommodate a rear-seat
164
observer.
McLanahan got
in a long burst,
shooting him down. The plane, and went straight into the sea, bursting parts and flames across the waters of the channel. The warning of an approaching Japanese invasion task force diverted the squadron to other
smoking and
in flames, did a half-roll
business.
Coast Watchers had been reporting unusually heavy Japanese activity the Shortlands Harbor and other assembly areas. Sixty-one ships were observed assembling there. By 11 November it was clear from the mix of in
ships that a powerful task force to take Guadalcanal had ation.
commenced operThey had started an effort to put the reinforced 38th Division under
Lieutenant General Tadayoshi Sano and heavy equipment ashore at Guawas estimated that if they achieved complete success, 30,000
dalcanal. It
additional troops
would be facing the Americans
the Guadalcanal
in
beachhead. Air reconnaissance, by B-17s, of the harbors between Buin and Rabaul
developed the content of the force.
On 12 November
it
was reported
to
contain two aircraft carriers, four battleships, five heavy cruisers, and 30
was a large number of cargo ships for a total 60 vessels. As the Japanese task force moved out to assemble, they withheld the aircraft carriers, not committing them to the immediate destroyers. In addition, there of over
support of the task force.
For the pending operation, the U.S. had two naval task forces available: a carrier task force under Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, and Admiral Richard Kelly Turner's force, responsible for reinforcement and defense of Guadalcanal. Unless these limited forces could stop the Japanese at sea, the
U.S.
Navy
could be driven out of the Solomons, where
them two battleships, two cruisers, and eight destroyers
difficult for
prise,
it
to operate. Admiral Kinkaid's task force
was already
— the Enter-
— was
to support
Admiral Turner. Turner's force consisted of three groups: three transports, one cruiser, and four destroyers under Admiral Norman Scott, carrying Marines, ammunition, and supplies from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal; Admiral Daniel Callaghan, with the second group of 10 destroyers
and
five cruisers
directly
operated out of Espiritu Santo to cover the third group
commanded by Turner with
four transports carrying the 182nd
Infantry to Guadalcanal. Turner departed Noumea on 8
November and was
joined by Scott and Callaghan. successfully reinforce Guadalcanal, troops and supplies had to be landed off Lunga Point and the ships safely withdrawn before the Japanese task force descended upon the Sealark Channel. Time was severely limited,
To
requiring the landing schedule to go off like clockwork. Fortunately, Allied Japanese intelligence had provided Turner an excellent assessment of the Japanese the that learned he situation and invasion schedule; it was here
been committed to the task force. The predicted enemy timetable indicated land-based bombing of Henderson Field, beginon the ning with a maximum effort 10 November, naval bombardment November, on 12 Field Henderson on night of 11 November, air attacks carriers had, as yet, not
165
and naval bombardment and landing of Japanese troops that night. The landing force was to be completely ashore during the early morning hours of Friday, 13
November.
off Lunga Point at 0530 on 11 November; the transports Zeilin, Libra, and Betelgeuse began unloading. At 0930 the ships were attacked by 10 Aichi-99 dive bombers escorted by 12
Admiral Scott's group arrived
F4Fs were lost fighting saved. They accounted for at least only damage was to the Zeilin.
two of the pilots were four Zeros and one dive bomber. The
Zeros. Six
off this attack;
At 1127 a high-altitude bombing raid by two-engine Japanese bombers struck the area. They inflicted no damage, but interrupted the unloading because the ships had to get under way for their
The 67th gasping,
own protection.
P-39s reached 26,000 feet and, with engines well below the bombers. Two of the 17 F4Fs attacking
pilots in eight
were
still
down six of the enemy bombers. At 1800, the transports, almost completely unloaded, departed east for the night. The damage to the Zeilin proved more serious than had been the bombers were lost while shooting
initially
assessed; she departed for Espiritu Santo with a destroyer escort.
Admiral Turner's other ships, protected by Admiral Callaghan' group, joined before midnight. Scott's warships joined Callaghan's and Callaghan
cruised the Sealark channel during the night without incident.
At 0530 on 12 November all transports were again unloading off Lunga Point under cover of the warships. The 67th was on its usual daily close air support bombing and strafing missions. At 0740, Lieutenants Hansen and Kellum dropped 100-pound bombs, attacking and strafing aiong the Tambelego River. In a low strafing run, Hansen's wing caught a treetop and the airplane cartwheeled across a clearing to crash in a flaming explosion.
At 1340 an
air raid
warning was raised for "Tojo Time." The transway for their protection and formed
ports stopped unloading and got under into an antiaircraft formation.
Foss and
his
F4Fs, a welcome
close support routine for
A
flight of eight
P-39s scrambled with Joe
combat opportunity and a break from the the 67th they were pleased with any opportuair
—
gunnery as a change. The flight climbed up, taking their assigned positions around the area to intercept the bombers. At 1405, 25 Japanese torpedo bombers came in low over the Sealark nity for fighter
Channel to attack the transports. While cruising around up high, looking for Zeros, the P-39s heard by radio that there
with a Zero escort on the ships
toward the torpedo bombers,
still
F4Fs were already on the scene. of the
P-39s fogged with mist
off
in
Lunga
was
a raid
Point.
by torpedo bombers
The P-39s
dived
down
descending for their torpedo attacks;
In the dive from altitude, the cool canopies
the descent into the hot, humid air below.
The sudden condition so blinded one of the pilots, Lieutenant Frank Clark, that he dove into the sea.
on the scene, the torpedo bombers were taken by surprise. The strength of the opposition caused many of them to drop
As the P-39s roared
166
in
their torpedoes too high, causing
The
them
to tumble into the water and sink.
San Francisco, Admiral Callaghan's flagship, and the desBuchanan were damaged. None of the transports were hit; their
cruiser
troyer
only loss was two hours of unloading time.
Navy flak and fighters from Henderson Field accounted for 24 torpedo bombers out of 25 and for five Zeros out of eight. The 67th did not make an outstanding showing in air victories; Lieutenant McLanahan shot down a bomber and Lieutenant Ryan shot down a Zero. Their big contribution to the scrap was their diving entry on the scene in time to chase five Zeros off the tails of the F4Fs; the F4Fs simply twisted around and polished them off.
When the pilots of the Army flight landed, Captain Joe Foss and his Marine were waiting
at the
runway
meet the
There was a
lot of
handshaking and back-slapping as they praised and thanked the P-39
pilots
pilots
to
for their timely intrusion into the air battle.
flight.
"You
fellows can play ball on
our team any day," said Foss. Earlier in the day, patrol planes reported a Japanese task force, in-
two battleships, moving south in the Slot, a threat to the U.S. transports off Lunga Point. Farther north, another sighting reported a cluding
convoy of transports carrying the Japanese landing
force.
With Turner's
transports almost completely unloaded by 1815, they prepared to with-
A total of 6000 men had been put ashore, including 3358 men of the 182nd Infantry and 245th field Artillery. Callaghan's and Scott's warships escorted the convoy east to Indispensable Strait, then reversed course to protect Guadalcanal and meet the oncoming Japanese warships. Activities of the Army Cactus Flight, still referred to as the 67th Fighter Squadron, were now beginning to take on a distinct 347th Fighter Group mix. At 0700 on 12 November, a flight of eight P-38 Lightnings of the 339th Fighter Squadron departed Tontouta, New Caledonia, for Hendraw.
derson Field, Guadalcanal. After a stop at Espiritu Santo, the flight arrived by 1530 at Cactus. The flight was led by Major Dale D. Brannon, now
commander of the 339th; he was the old 67th Fighter Squadron hand who, back
in
August, had led the
Squadron from
flight of five
P-400s of the 67th Fighter Four of his flight had been
New Caledonia to Guadalcanal.
members of his pioneer hop to Cactus with the P-400s. Their B-17 escort, carrying ground personnel for the P-38s, turned back because of a radio Cactuses under attack. The P-38s were received with wild
report that
new twin-engine fighters taxied into the flight line area; everyone turned out to help service the new fighters. From here on, all squadrons of the 347th Fighter Group were mixed in the Army Cactus Flight operations, flying both types with little squadron excitement as the
For some time the daily combat logs continued to be headed 'The 67th Fighter Squadron." Brannon, in command of the 339th, had turned over command of the 67th to John A. Thompson, now a Major, who had followed him to Henderson Field by just a few days, in August, with the second flight of P-400s. Brannon had been assigned to command the 339th when it was formed from a cadre of 67th squadron veterans. When he identity.
167
P-38 Lightnings for the 339th Fighter Squadron, 347th Fighter Group, are transported from the docks through Noumea, New Caledonia, enroute to Tontouta Air Base. In the background is a famous landmark and watering hole of the South Pacific, the Grand Hotel DuPacifique. October 1942. (USAF)
received the P-38s, he transitioned his P-39 pilots to the
brought their
Commander
first flight
in
to
Henderson
Field;
new
he was the
planes and
first
Squadron
the Pacific to bring the P-38 into combat.
Air strength at Henderson Field was further strengthened on 11 and
12 November by the arrival of new SBDs, TBFs, and F4Fs for the expected Japanese offensive.
in
preparation
Nine B-26 Marauders and four more
New Caledonia on 14 November to augment the "Cactus Air Force." Fireworks on the horizon were witnessed by the defenders of Henderson Field during the night of 12-13 November. The Japanese task force, sighted earlier in the day far up the Slot, comprised the battleships P-38s were alerted and departed
Hiei and Kirishima, one
light cruiser,
and 15 destroyers. The force had
orders to enter the Sea Lark Channel and carry out the invasion plan
—
neutralize
Henderson
first
Field, Guadalcanal,
phase of their
by naval bom-
bardment. Once accomplished, the Japanese troop transports could approach Guadalcanal
in safety.
This superior task force was met Admirals Callaghan and Scott were the battle
168
in a night battle in
which both
Both sides suffered heavy losses; was more costly to the Japanese. The defenders of Henderson killed.
On specially constructed trailers, these P-38 Lightnings pass through Noumea, New Caledonia, enroute to the 339th Fighter Squadron at Tontouta Air Base. October 1942. (USAF) Field,
watching the glow of battle and burning ships on the horizon, were
spared the brutal period of naval shelling that had been
Dawn
of Friday,
in store for
13 November, found the morning search
them.
flight look-
ing over the waters of the battle area. Surviving vessels and local boats
were looking for survivors. The Japanese battleship Hiei was sighted smoking and badly damaged eight miles northwest of Savo Island, proceeding at 5 knots with a cruiser and two destroyers protecting her. The Hiei had been hit 85 times during the night battle and became the principal
liiiB Fueling a B-17 at
Henderson
Field.
November 1942.
169
An F4F Wildcat arrives back at Henderson
Field after a morning be Captain Joe Foss, USMC. Late November, 1942. (USMC)
The pilot is believed to
fighter sortie.
target for attack during the day. Admiral Kinkaid's task force
was now
south of Guadalcanal, and, because of the still-damaged elevator on Enterprise,
some
of her planes
were sent
to
Henderson Field
after the first air
attack on the Hiei.
Throughout the day, continuous attacks were made on the disabled Japanese battleship, with the 67th flying
and
flying
cover for other attacking
aging near-misses on the Japanese escort attack on the battleship
SBDs
torpedo.
67th
was by four TBFs, making one
with 1000-pound bombs,
in a dual role
dropping bombs The P-39s scored some damdestroyers. The first successful
in its duel role of
aircraft.
TBFs
direct hit with a
with torpedoes, and the
continued until bad weather and darkness stopped the
attacks.
The Hiei was dead later scuttled
the Hiei
in
the water and red from internal
by her crew. There
was towed
is
fires;
she was
a popular story, never confirmed, that
into position to take part in the shelling of
Henderson
Field that night. Nevertheless, she had taken 11 torpedoes and four 1000-
pound bomb
hits during the day's operation against her.
Continuing with their schedule for neutralizing Henderson Field, a night force, regrouped and augmented, shelled the airfield for at least 80
minutes, pounding Henderson and the fighter strips until interrupted by
PT
boats from Tulagi. Shells of
all
destroyers, and a battleship (which
sizes
poured
may have been
in
from the
cruisers,
the Hiei or the Kiri-
shima or both). Foxholes and shelters were torn open, trees were split and were torn to shreds, and fragments ripped through planes standing in the 67th work area and flight line, which seemed to take the
felled, tents
brunt of the shelling.
was killed; only four ground crew members were Of the airplanes in commission at the close of operations the day before, morning found only one undamaged. It was that old P-400 that led a charmed life, The Resurrection, rewarded for the love and care lavished Miraculously, no one
injured.
upon
it
by the ground crews, the "Society for the Preservation of the
Resurrection." Of the other aircraft, some were total losses; others, with
minor damage, were restored to
170
flying condition.
Three were soon opera-
tional
were
by cannibalizing those more seriously damaged. None of the P-38s but one SBD and 15 F4Fs were slightly damaged by flying shell
hit,
fragments; two
F4Fs were burned
up.
Disregarding the indecisiveness of the night battle and the threat of Henderson Field, which they must have known had not been neutralized as
they planned, the Japanese transports, which were holding back up in the Slot, set course for Guadalcanal. Patrolling SBDs and B-17s continued to report the position of the task force.
P-38s came
from
in
New
The
nine B-26s and four additional
Caledonia late in the day.
The Japanese invasion task group was made up of 12 transports and 12 escorting destroyers, the largest force of its kind to be employed by the Solomons. At 0800 on 14 November, patrol planes were in contact with this enemy group 150 miles from Guadalcanal. Without air-
Japanese
in the
craft carriers in support, the convoy's air cover
was provided only by
land-based aircraft, which probably arrived in relays over the convoy, and
perhaps some cruiser-launched floatplanes.
morning hours of 14 November, Cactus aircraft were being refueled and rearmed. Bombs and gas drums were rolled through the mud, making ready for a heavy attack schedule. Both the Japanese convoy of troop transports and their warships, proceeding north to regroup after their night battle, were under surveillance by patrol planes from HenderIn the early
son Field, the carrier Enterprise, and Espiritu Santo. The warships, as they regrouped and reorganized, as well as the convoy of transports, were attacked by
many
aircraft could
flights
from Henderson
Field.
As
rapidly as the attack
be refueled and rearmed, they went out again to attack,
concentrating on the troop transports, which were not yet rejoined by the
regrouping Japanese warships.
The F4Fs and P-39s flew escort and high cover above the holocaust, making occasional contact with Zero fighters in the attack area. TBFs put three torpedoes into a light cruiser;
SBDs made direct hits on another light
cruiser with 1000-pound bombs. Five attacks
transports with devastating results.
The
were made on the troop
transports were
jammed
full
of
Japanese infantrymen. They were helpless; the slaughter was awesome. The attacks continued until nightfall against the convoy of transports protected only by destroyers, which were also being badly mauled. At dusk, five of the transports had been sunk; three were burning and dead in the
The four that remained were still heading for Guadalcanal; two of them were slightly damaged. During the day over the attack area there had
water.
been a few periods of air combat with Zeros. Six Zeros were shot down, six SBDs were lost, and two F4Fs failed to return, one of them piloted by the great Marine gunnery aviator and friend of the 67th, Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Bauer, "Injun Joe." A special search failed to locate any of the missing
pilots.
The Japanese task force engaged by Admiral Callaghan on the night of 12-13 November was now regrouped and returned to the scene to protect the remaining transports enroute to Guadalcanal and to meet whatever U.S. Navy ships were left to attack them. The task force now consisted of
171
the battleship Kirishima, two heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers.
To
meet them, Admiral Halsey detached the battleships Washington and South Dakota and four destroyers from Admiral Kinkaid, under Admiral Willis A. Lee, Jr. At midnight on the morning of 15 November, near Savo Island, Lee made radar contact and commenced firing. The long-range battleship duel lasted until 0142. Flashes of the heavy exchange could be seen on the night horizon from Henderson Field; the airfield received some shelling before the naval battle heated up. The Japanese retired northward, again having failed to bombard and neutralize Henderson Field. The battleship Kirishima was knocked out and scuttled by her crew; one Japanese destroyer was sunk. Three American destroyers were sunk; the South Dakota and the other destroyer were damaged.
On dawn flight
the morning of 15 November, the earliest possible takeoff for
patrol
was scheduled.
In the pitch darkness Jim
— R.M. Ferguson, M. Ryan, and W, Norris —
Jarman readied for the patrol.
his
The
planes were dispersed on the field at the new fighter strip, Fighter II, which was now capable of some operation. As they checked their planes in the dark, Ferguson discovered someone had removed his parachute; he decided to go without
They
it.
started up and followed Jarman, taxiing in the darkness using
wing lights to see each other; they proceeded toward the end of the runway. As they taxied, Jarman noticed occasional flashes in the dark, like a photo flash. When he reached the end of the runway and looked back, he realized they were under direct fire from a Japanese artillery gun. The Jap observer had seen the running lights of the planes making their way along the field and, using them as a reference, opened fire. The shells were tracking along behind Ferguson as he taxied; the Japs were taking pot shots at the first fighter planes to actually
Jarman,
in takeoff position,
cover as he gave
Jarman saw,
in
it
use Fighter
ordered the
II.
flight to
shut
down and
take
the gun for takeoff. Shortly after takeoff and climbout
the predawn darkness, the shadow and running lights of a
He approached
to look over the visitor and received a burst machine gun fire over his canopy as a warning not to come closer. He backed away and to the side; in a moment he was able to make out the
large aircraft. of
markings of a
New Zealand Lockheed Hudson bomber, just coming in from
somewhere and awaiting
daylight to land.
Jarman then proceeded northwest toward Savo Island, with the first light of early morning outlining the surf along the shoreline around Point Cruz under his left wing, looking for remnants of the naval battle of the night before. What he saw as he looked off to the west toward Kokumbona and Tassafaronga was four large transports just offshore. They were the Japanese transports that survived the attacks of the day before and had indeed reached Guadalcanal.
He crossed over the transports at about 1200 feet and in the morning dusk was not able to identify them as friend or foe. In a high-speed descending turn, he lined up to cross over the transports at about 500 feet; they 172
opened fire with everything. One of the ships got up speed and, as Jarman watched, the big ship ran aground on the beach, pushing its bow well into the step-to of the shore. It was still half an hour before sunup. He landed back at Henderson Field, giving radio reports of his find as he returned. He picked up the rest of his again to get
first
flight,
Ferguson, Ryan, and Norris, and got
off
cut at the targets.
As they passed Point Cruz they could see the transports in the process of beaching; the second and third had already beached, and the fourth
was making its run in. They dived immediately to attack the transports. Ferguson and Ryan made perfect passes; each got a direct hit on a transport. Norris got a near miss and Jarman's result of the explosion.
causing
fire
The
bomb fell short or was a dud; he saw no
by Ferguson and Ryan were already and destruction as they left the scene to reload. Both later hits
received the Distinguished Flying Cross for the attack.
They returned to Henderson Field and rearmed without refueling. They shared the credit on another transport, hitting the one that had beached last because it had not yet been able to start unloading. From then on, traffic over the four transports was heavy. SBDs and P-39s continued to bomb them and the P-39s strafed the unloading operation against heavy return fire. Even the B-26s made an attack on the transports before departing for Espiritu Santo. At 0900 the 67th attacked the only transport not yet burning. Lieutenants Williams, Geyer, Kellum, Conrad, McLanahan, Novak, and Waldmire hit the transports and surrounding area with
500-pound bombs. At 1045 Lieutenants Jarman, Patterson, Ryan, and Inciardi dive bombed and strafed Kokumbona, dropping 500-pound bombs on the fourth transport, with one direct hit. All four transports were raging infernos. Because attack traffic was heavy over the transports and beaches, Jarman led his flight out over the channel to look for remnants of the sea battle. They found the bow of a destroyer, the USS Walke, sunk in the battle the night before. The sea around it was covered with heavy black oil slick and numerous items of flotsam and jetsam. Crowded on and around the bow protruding from the waters of the Sealark Channel were many oil-covered survivors. Jarman radioed Henderson Field for a query on friendly or enemy status on the survivors. The reply was that there were no reported American losses in that vicinity: the flight was free to attack. As the flight swung away to establish a strafing run, another hurried call from Henderson Operations was received, directing them to hold fire. In a few minutes they came back with information that there had been American losses in the area and not to attack. Off the beach at
Kokumbona, Jarman had seen the destroyer Meade
shelling the area of the burning transports.
Meade and approached
The flight returned to the down across her bow in a
in a friendly fashion, flew
low, wing-rocking pass, strung out in the direction of the survivors of the sunken destroyer, about 12 miles away. The Meade continued to shell the
beach.
A second try was made and got the same reaction. Jarman then told
the flight to hold back in case the
commander of the Meade misunderstood 173
low pass across the bow, firing all guns. When he felt sure Meade knew it was the same flight overhead, he dropped down and crossed the bow in the direction of the survivors on the floating bow section. The Meade took the hint and got underway toward the bow of the his next action, a
the
Walke, with the planes flying back and forth along the path to be followed. At the scene, the Meade put out boats and rescued 264 survivors, bringing the event to a much better conclusion than might have been.* "So you can imagine that we were greatly relieved to know that we had not attacked these friendly survivors and that the rescue had worked out. Because at the time everyone was trying to outdo everyone else at being atrocious and it would have been terrible to have attacked. There were a lot of people saved and I am as thankful as they are," recalls Jarman. With the transports blazing, the planes turned their attention to the troops and supplies on the beach near Kokumbona, to bomb and strafe what the Japanese had brought ashore, knocking out gun positions, strafing, and setting fires along their supply storage area. They received heavy return fire from small arms and antiaircraft guns. One blaze of enemy stores was a
thousand yards long. All day, during takeoffs
and landings, the planes were harassed by
One pilot started his engine and looked out to his crew chief "thumbs up" signal. The crew chief was running away from the plane to jump into a foxhole. The pilot taxied out for takeoff and felt his plane shake with concussion as one of "Pistol Pete's" shells exploded where his "Pistol Pete."
for a
plane had just been.
He
debris blowing away.
A
looked around to see a shell hole with dust and
second
shell hit
behind him as he took
off.
by Lieutenants McLanahan and Geyer went out after "Pistol Pete." They had a location report on a gun, marked by a Immediately a
flight
smoke bomb from an SBD. They strafed the area around the gun and McLanahan's 500-pound bomb landed about five feet from the gun position. Both planes strafed again; Geyer caused an ammunition explosion. During the day several attacks were made by SBDs and TBFs on the transports, 95 miles out from Guadalcanal, which had been left burning and dead in the water the day before. These attacks left one with uncontrollable fires, one sunk, and one sinking. A fighter scramble at 1530 shot down six out of eight Zeros and the 12 Aichi 99 dive bombers they were escorting. Two P-38s were sent south to cover the departing battleships South Dakota and Washington. After encountering a severe weather front, they returned to Cactus.
The powerful Japanese
Many were
task force succeeded in landing about
4000
many were rescued by Japanese ships. Of their supplies brought ashore, much was destroyed by constant air attacks. The destruction of their convoy brought their plans for the November troops.
lost at sea;
counteroffensive to an abrupt end. Their naval losses were heavy along
with the costly loss of the transport convoy
The 174
— 77,609 shipping
264 survivors were from the Walke and the Preston. Both were sunk
tons.
that night.
CHAPTER
A Switch
The crushing
14
to the Offensive
of the Japanese
November
counteroffensive marked their
major effort to recapture the American beachhead on Guadalcanal, although this was not apparent to its defenders until much later. The last
"Tokyo Express" continued its operations, landing and resupplying troops on the western third of the island. The November action was the turning point and was indeed their last strong attempt to regain position. The landing of the 182nd Infantry during the early stages of the Japanese
November
effort
was the last movement of troops to Guadalcanal in the American troops could be landed regularly with good
face of enemy forces.
surface security, although Japanese air attacks continued to be heavy.
By mid-November the strength of aviation units at Cactus began to The second fighter strip, just a little north and west of Henderson Field, Fighter II, was completed by the end of November. The fighter increase.
aircraft
operated from there, on higher and dryer ground. B-17s were
using Henderson Field regularly, although aviation gas was
still
in
short
supply and they could not be based there for some time, awaiting the
development of larger fuel storage facilities. Additional air reinforcements continued to arrive through the end of November. On 16 November, eight P-39s arrived at Cactus from New Caledonia, led by Major John A. Thompson, commander of the 67th Fighter Squadron. Of these, seven of the pilots had seen Cactus before. They had been among the first pilots to arrive in August with the P-400s. Now they were back for a second tour. The Marine pilots they had lived and fought
175
with on their
USA;
first
tour at Henderson Field were
fresh squadrons had been
now back in
the good old
sent out to relieve them.
On their previous tour, John Thompson had landed after a tough fight with Zeros with 15 bullet holes in his plane and one in his shoulder. Lieutenant Head had cracked up taking off on a muddy runway and had been burned. Lieutenant Childress had bailed out of his shot-up plane over the jungle and walked in. Two of them had been blown out of a bomb shelter by a 1000-pound bomb that hit just five feet from the shelter and buried them in dirt and debris. Another had been shipped out exhausted from the living conditions and rigorous combat schedule. The combat tour schedule
was
rotating
all
pilots available.
too rapidly among the limited number of Army Air Corps When they were relieved for a rest at Tontouta, there was
no place to go for real relaxation or vacation. Very few ever got to Australia or New Zealand, to the beaches and cities for real rest and relaxation. Their arrival at Cactus placed the number of aircraft in commission immediate duty at 25 F4Fs, 25 SBDs, 2 P-400s, 8 TBFs, and a total of 36 other Army planes on fighter duty P-38s and P-39s.
for
—
Air operations were divided into fighter and attack missions. Aircraft
and
pilots assigned to fighter missions
scrambled with the F4Fs on
air raid
warnings. Those on attack status kept up the tradition of the Jagstaffel,
bombing and strafing in front of the advancing infantry and attacking ground targets needing special attention. It was an admitted fact in discussions by the U.S. Marines (and later with Japanese officers interviewed after the war) that their
bombing and
along the frontlines accounted for
strafing missions in close air support
more Japanese
casualties than infantry
engagements.
The P-39s on fighter status often flew long escort missions covering SBDs. P-38s flew the long escort missions in support of the B-17s. On 18 November, nine P-38s escorted 10 B- 17s to Tonalei Harbor at the southern tip of Bougainville. The flight was led by Major Dale D. Brannon, Commander of the 339th Fighter Squadron, with Captain Sharpsteen and Lieutenants Fincher, Goerke, Farquharson, Miller, Canning, Brzuska, and
Reagh. The
flight
was attacked
in
the target area by float biplanes and
land-based and float Zero fighters.
maneuvering with great difficulty against the Japanese fighters, Lieutenant Reagh, who had flown up with the supercharger on his right engine inoperative, made one pass at a float biplane, hit it in the cockpit, and saw it spin in as he hastened out of the area because of the poor performance of his right engine. Major Brannon shot a float biplane down in flames and got another probable. Captain Sharpsteen got one probable float Zero. Lieutenant Brzuska was hit by 20mm shells, which knocked out his right engine. Lieutenant Farquharson was hit eight times, six of approximately .50-caliber in the tail, one 20mm through the flap, and another In the air combat,
20mm exploded in his wing, leaving a large hole. All aircraft returned safely to
Henderson
An
176
Field.
additional mission the next day, led
by Captain Sharpsteen, also
Lightning of the 339th Fighter Squadron departs Tontouta Air Base, New Caledonia for Guadalcanal. The number 1 10 is often associated with Captain Tom Lamphier, a fighter Ace of the 339th Fighter Squadron. Here Lamphier is departing in No. 110 on a flight to Cactus. December 1942.
A P-38
encountered enemy fighters over the target. Lieutenant Fincher shot down two Zeros and Lieutenant Obermiller got one.
These early missions resulted not an escort fighter. in fact,
at
it
all. It
It
depressing lesson. it
The P-38 was
could not maneuver with a Zero;
had two big right and left gyros that did not want the plane to turn
could not turn like a fighter aircraft; the only reason for the degree
of success aviators.
it
By
did enjoy
was
that
it
was flown by some
of the world's best
taking advantage of the built-in strength and advantage that
the P-38 did have, they masked
combat
in a
had blind spots,
its
shortcomings by perfecting their unique
tactics.
Recognizing the fact that there was no combat maneuver that could be performed better than a Japanese fighter in a one-on-one combat, flights
were flown
in
mutually protective and cooperative formations. Flights of
were spread out in echelon to the right or left, leaving a maneuvering space of several aircraft lengths to protect each other. Mission formations were made up of as many flights of four as the mission called for. Each flight leader might have a wingman or element leader on his left, with the other two in echelon to the right, consisting of an element leader and a wingman to his right in the "tail-end Charlie" position. 'Tailend Charlie" was usually a fighter pilot of considerable combat experience.
four P-38s
were spread out with the planned interval between aircraft for mutual protection. Four flights made up an ideal size formation of 16 All
Adhering to flight discipline, they avoided being unnecessarily sucked into individual combat and engaged the enemy fighters on their own terms. If it was a fighter sortie, even when the aircraft for escort or a fighter sortie.
177
was engaged by the enemy and the formation eventually broke up, every effort was made to keep the breakdown to no less than elements of two leader and wingman. Even this was not possible at times. If it was a bomber escort, they held protective formation over the bombers and fired only on enemy fighters entering the formation to pick off entire formation
—
the plane ahead.
When engaged, they could escape from a Japanese fighter
with their advantage of climb or could dive and lose him. They could then turn back into the fight at better advantage to their
own
aircraft's fire-
power and speed, against the Japanese fighter, which normally favored individual combat over disciplined formations. Major Brannon turned over command of the 339th Squadron's P-38s to Captain John W. Mitchell, an old Cactus hand and an outstanding commander, and transferred to Headquarters of the 347th Fighter Group at Tontouta, New Caledonia, on 25 November. Shortly after arriving at the Group Headquarters, Brannon attended a meeting at Headquarters USAFISPA in Noumea. General H.H. (Hap) Arnold was visiting and receiving on various aspects of the war. Brannon had the opportunity to tell General Arnold just how poorly the P-39/P-400 aircraft had performed as a fighter aircraft at Cactus, and of the protective tactics necessary for success with the P-38 against the superior Japanese fighters. Brannon, as always, laid it right on the line. The unvarnished truth was a surprise to Arnold, who did not believe that the Zero could operate effectively at altitudes well above 20,000 feet. Impressed as Arnold was with the sleek, streamlined beauty of the P-39 Airacobra and the P-38 Lightning, he couldn't believe what Brannon was briefings
telling him.
The
November Kokumbona and
naval victory and defeat of the Japanese
allowed General Vandegrift's offensive toward
River to resume.
It
was determined by
offensive
the Poha
infantry patrols and aerial recon-
naissance that the Japanese were not occupying the west bank of the
A drive to the west across the Matanikau was planned for 18 November. General Hyakutake, with about 25,000 troops remaining, was also planning an offensive. His plan was to advance east from Kokumbona Matanikau.
and take the high ground to the east of the river for artillery positions, a line of departure for an assault
on the Lunga
airfields,
Austen, which overlooked Henderson Field and
all
and to occupy Mount of the contested area.
On 18 November, the 182nd Infantry, covered by the 8th Marines, began the move across the Matanikau. They were followed by other units on the 19th, and the force advanced toward Point Cruz where at noon they were dug
along a frontline with
in
its
right anchored
on the east base of
enemy resistance. Numerous close air these made it possible for the Americans
Point Cruz and were meeting heavy
support missions were called to hold
some
of the
Efforts to
in;
ground they had gained.
move
farther west
were
stalled
by heavy Japanese
ance, artillery fire at their front, and Japanese troops
178
still
resist-
holding the mass
With the help of air attack missions by the 67th and SBDs, Point Cruz was reduced; the American line did not move forward, however! of Point Cruz.
until the
164th Infantry passed through. In
ravines one at a time, their advance
Japanese
fire;
bitter fighting to take hills
was soon
and
halted again by heavy
the Japanese were dug in in shallow pits on the side of the
ravines with cover above and in foxholes.
The engagement was
a stale-
mate; further advance could not be made without undue losses. The force was ordered to dig in on the Point Cruz line, which ran south through a number of American-held hills and ravines. Interdiction of the
Japanese held positions by air attack and artillery continued. As the Americans held this line, there had been but one advantage gained: The planned Japanese offensive to cross the Matanikau had been upstaged, and the Americans held a perimeter position west of the Matanikau.
The Americans and the Japanese faced each other on high ground with ravines between them. Each had the other covered by tight interlocking Although the Americans called in a devastating schedule of air on the Japanese positions, as well as artillery, a stalemate on this
fields of fire.
strikes
line existed until
the beginning of the January offensive by the total Ameriwhich was by then part of the new XIV Corps. From the jump-off across the Matanikau on the 18th until well into December, the Army Cactus Flight continued a grueling schedule of close
cal Division,
air
support and search-and-destroy flights, attacking any target designated
or spotted in the Japanese area.
On many
missions, pilots got fleeting
glances at Japanese troops on a road, on a ridge, or at the edge of a ravine.
They attacked in front of the Point Cruz line on ground direction by radio or ground signal panels, rarely seeing the enemy they were attacking. On 21 November, Lieutenants Patterson and Tullis, in P-39s, observed approximately 12 river.
They were
enemy
troops at a beach road crossing a small
either eating or washing clothes; they had large camou-
and straw mats spread on the river bank. They made no move they were sure they were observed. The area was strafed and a
flage nets until
100-pound bomb was dropped;
it
was
a dud.
The
flight
was
typical of the
detailed attention given to everything on these search-and-destroy flights of the Jagstaffel
On 23 November,
Lieutenant McLanahan bombed and strafed about
Kokumbona. This must have been difficult for McLanahan as he thought of the large number of cattle back on his home ranch. Every truck, cart, or column of troops was strafed when found. For weeks the Jagstaffel kept up its daily pounding of the Japanese troops and supplies. They worked coordinated attacks with the infantry efforts to move the line farther west. They dropped demolition, fragmentation, and incendiary bombs, as well as depth charges— which made a 60 head
of cattle near
great grass cutter and concussion bomb. a
"Rube Goldberg,"
a belly-tank
with an incendiary to set
it off; it
They even dropped a device called
with a mixture of gasoline and oil a great fire when placed in the right
filled
made
179
area.* This neat arrangement turned out to be a napalm
bomb later in the
war.
The term "search-and-destroy," so frequently used in the Vietnam was coined at Cactusby the Jagstaffel. It was probably coined
operations,
by Lieutenant Danforth P. Miller
in a
diet of close air support operations:
bored statement about the steady
"Ho hum, ho hum, search and destroy,
search and destroy."
Although close air support bombing and strafing attacks accounted for
most enemy
battle casualties, there
was
any other combat
of this or
little
contribution by the 67th Fighter Squadron and other operations by the
347th's Cactus Flight mentioned in Navy communiques, an omission that
made no mention of the Marine and Navy F6Fs at Leyte in December of 1944. The P-38s and P-39s on fighter duty waited for a scramble and flew patrols. One 67th pilot described the patrol duties as "three disagreeable patrol assignments. On the dawn patrol you rise in the middle of the night, cold and damp from the humidity of the tropical night, take off while it's still too dark to see the end of the runway, and ride around for two hours, boring holes in the air, without breakfast. The cigarette that keeps you company expands the void in your fuzzy, empty stomach. "For the noon patrol you hop on the wing, now heated to 130 degrees in the hot sun, climb into a cockpit that is like an oven, sweat in your already stinking flying togs and helmet, and taxi out onto the hot runway, dripping with sweat, with a rag stuffed into the heater duct that never stops putting out hot air. The glare of the sun, sea, and even the green island stings your eyes until your head aches, and when you land there is some second chow so irritated General Douglas MacArthur that he
left for
you,
"On
if
you're lucky.
the dusk patrol you
fly
around for two hours
in the dark,
hoping
who have knocked off for the day will save you some of whatever it is they are having. When you land, if the field is dusty, the lights seem to make a false runway about 20 feet high in the dust above the touchdown that those
point."
The Japanese seemed to be building strength west of Point Cruz line and the entire area west to Cape Esperance, the west end of the island. The area was under continuous close surveillance and attack.
continued to go out, striking from
with empty guns and
bomb
Kokumbona
The
Jagstaffel
to the Cape, and returning
racks.
Thursday, 26 November, brought a change
in food;
it
was Thanksgiv-
The 67th had been switched from one unit to another for messing. The chow with the 164th Infantry was good perhaps because it was ing Day.
—
upon the leaves
The
arrival of the
much
164th that supplies improved and the starvation
to be desired, but Thanksgiving
incendiary
bomb was
Day was
different.
General
invented and tested by Lieutenant Jim McLanahan. At
first he worked. What he did to the vegetation along the enemy side of the Matanikau River was dramatic. In fact, it had not grown back by March of 1981, when the area was visited by members of the 347th Fighter Group Alumni
received a
lot of
razzing from the other pilots, but
it
Association.
180 i
Harmon and Admiral Halsey pulled together to get a real Thanksgiving dinner to the men on Guadalcanal; it was good in every mess. The Japanese shelling of Henderson Field was becoming infrequent because the 'Tokyo Express" was busy trying to deliver supplies and replacements and watching for the U.S. Navy. Even "Washing Machine Charlie" and "Pistol Pete"
were
erratic in their performance. Thanksgiving
Day was
a relatively
comfortable day.
To further the spirit of celebration, air attack was carried far afield enemy territory. The target was the Japanese seaplane base at Rekata Bay at the north end of Santa Isabel. The mission marked a new change in into
attitude.
and
this
Japanese plans were severely upset by the mid-November defeat mission was a switch to the offensive.
At Rekata Bay there was a large and thriving base with several thousand Japanese troops, a seaplane base, gasoline and ammunition dumps, and seaplane support facilities. The target on Santa Isabel was 165
A strike force of nine SBDs, each carrying a 1000-pound bomb and two 100-pound bombs, was escorted by 15 P-39s of the Army Cactus Flight, each carrying a 100-pound bomb. miles from Henderson Field.
The slower SBDs took off in the late afternoon;
Lieutenants McLana-
han, Williams, Bauer, Patton, Norris, Waldmire, Tullis, Ryan, Brewster,
and some other newly arrived
pilots took off at 1735 and would overtake rendezvous time near the east coast of Santa Isabel. They planned a dusk attack on the Japanese base. Rendezvous was on time; the
the
SBDs
at
SBDs proceeded across the island to Rekata Bay,
with the P-39s speeding
back and forth above their path for protection against
float Zeros.
There
was no opposition.
A crimson setting sun was touching the ocean horizon in the west; its red rays across the waters of the Pacific and the scattered clouds called to
mind that the Japanese "Rising Sun" might soon be setting in the southern Solomons. Below, the first haze of dusk was settling around the Japanese base as the dive bombers screamed down in their almost-vertical dives, releasing their loads into the base and seaplane facility in the now shadowy harbor. It was light enough for the aircraft above to see that there were no seaplanes or flying boats on the water. Resupply of the base by flying boat almost assured the presence of some aircraft on the water at the time of the
There were none, but the base caught hell. After the dive bombers finished their passes, the P-39s started dive bombing runs into the darkening Japanese base below. It was a fireworks attack.
all guns firing in the dive; the tracer bullets glowed candles as they penetrated the palm grove covering the base. bombing, strafing, and red tracers penetrating the base would give the
demonstration, with like
The
Roman
Japanese occupants a frightening experience. Tracers from their 20mm antiaircraft and small machine guns sent up an equally beautiful tracer
stream of return diving pilots.
past the diving aircraft, a threatening sight to the were released low over the base; the P-39s zigged and
fire
Bombs
rations of captured Japanese rice twice a day
were
finally
augmented.
It is
sufficient to observe that messing with strange units as a tenant often
181
zagged away across the palm trees to evade the heavy antiaircraft fire. The P-39s then strafed the base, climbed out, and rejoined in a protective formation above the SBDs, escorting them put of the danger area. Then, with minimum fuel remaining, they picked up regular cruising speed and
headed for Cactus. When they had climbed out after the bombing and strafing Bay, the P-39s took up position
whatever plane had arrived newly-arrived
pilot,
in
at
Rekata
the escort formation on the wing of
ahead of them.
happened that a Lieutenant Bauer, had climbed out first and followed in position
It
the SBDs; the others as they arrived in the escort formation took up position
on him. As they
the radio,
left
the
'yardbird' in this lead plane." It
airplanes
SBDs to head for home, Bauer called over
"How about taking over the lead, one of you, somebody, there's a managed
was a night ride home to Cactus, but all 15
to find the island and the field, to land safely in the
darkness of the dusty fighter
strip.
The mission was a turnaround event in now on the offensive.
both action and attitude. Cactus was
The Japanese had
not given up their plans to heavily reinforce and
supply their remaining troops on Guadalcanal. Patrol and intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese
were gathering a strong force
"Tokyo Express," preparing another attempt
of the
to put substantial supply
support ashore at Guadalcanal along the western third of the island.
An
American force of five cruisers and six destroyers under Rear Admiral C.H. Wright was assigned to counter this Japanese attempt. The U.S. Navy task force departed Espiritu Santo at 2300 on 29 November and arrived in the Cactus-Ringbolt area the next evening. The "Tokyo Express," eight enemy destroyers under Admiral Raizo Tanaka, was entering the area at about the same time.
The weather was bad, and air search and night illumination was denied made radar contact, his radar being a distinct advantage over the enemy. While Tanaka was floating supplies ashore in both Admirals. Wright's force
connected chains of sealed casks, he was under radar observation by Wright.
Wright held in
off taking
such battle conditions.
any action for a quarter of an hour, an eternity
He went to the attack with much of his advantage
of surprise frittered away.
maneuvered
brilliantly
The
Japanese, although taken by surprise,
with precise and deadly effect, abandoning their
flotation supply chains off Tassafaronga.
The
results
were serious
for the
Americans. Despite having achieved surprise at close range, they suc-
ceeded
in sinking
heavily damaged.
only one
The
notwithstanding, this
enemy
destroyer. Four American ships
were
lessons of previous naval battles off Guadalcanal
final
naval engagement, close to Guadalcanal,
was
botched.
Almost immediately the Japanese began to form another naval force of the
"Tokyo Express"
to help the troops of the Japanese 17th
holding the northwest sector of Guadalcanal. force
was observed
Guadalcanal.
182
The
in
On
the afternoon proceeding
force comprised six destroyers,
Army
still
3 December this task
down two
the Slot toward
light cruisers,
and
two heavy cruisers, deployed in columns for antiaircraft defense. This threat was met with land-based airpower from Henderson Field. Based on the reported position and speed of the enemy attack force, it would not cruise into striking range until darkness was approaching and had the added protection of poor weather conditions. Planning an attack with a flying distance of 180 miles, a force of eight SBD dive bombers, seven TBF torpedo bombers, four F4Fs, and six P-39s was alerted for the mission.
At 1730 the attack force took off in cloudy, misty weather and visibilabout one mile. For well over an hour this task force of assorted "Cactus Air Force" planes flew westward in search of the enemy task
ity of
They reached
force.
the limit of their radius of action with
spare for fruitless search.
little fuel
to
When they were all but past the turn-back time,
they spotted white streaks below —the wake of the Japanese ships. The weather was murky and misty and the haze below the clouds carried the gray nothingness to the surface of the ocean with no horizon. The white streaks marking the wake of the Japanese ships actually improved their visual reference to the ocean's surface.
The tor^
attack began. Torpedo bombers descended to take positions for
runs; dive
*
bombers screamed down
nese ships broke formation
in
to drop their loads.
The Japa-
high-speed evasive action, churning up a
wake which made visual reference to the ocean surface more elusive. The P-39s followed the dive bombers, immediately climbing back after their bombs were dropped to join the F4Fs in fighter cover. Antiaircraft fire over the ships was heavy. Flashes of larger and whiter
better but the targets
exploding bombs, torpedoes, and antiaircraft could be plainly observed
below
in the
The
gathering gloom of the evening dusk.
was diverted to attacking floatplanes, which had been launched by the cruisers. The F4Fs turned to meet the attack. The P-39s, now at 8,000 feet and climbing, could not maneuver with the float biplanes. They climbed to 11,000 feet, turned, and made a diving attack. The float biplanes, which were relatively slow, were extremely maneuverable and turned to meet the P-39s head on, firing light caliber machine guns and attempting to crash head-on with their attackers. attention of the fighters
When passing,
the biplanes would pull up into a vertical climb, giving their
rear gunners an excellent "going-away" shot at the P-39s.
The P-39 would
and renew the diving attack. The execute guns of the P-39 jammed with exasperating regularity, and often a pilot maneuvered into a perfect position for a sure shot, only to press a dead a steep chandelle to gain altitude
for four of the attacking planes and two credited with two. Lieutenants Founwas Glazier Lieutenant probables.
trigger.
tain
The P-39s accounted
and Childress had one each, confirmed. The four F4F pilots shot down
three each.
Below, Japanese ships were burning. The strike had put two 1000pound bombs on separate ships; there were several 100-pound hits, two torpedo hits, and two probable torpedo hits. Two of the warships were in flames and stood dead in the water; others were still in evasive maneuver-
183
The Japanese task force was repulsed by land-based aircraft from Henderson Field, and the field was spared ; another shelling. It was dark as the planes began their long night flight back to Hendering.
son Field. The exhilaration of battle faded into exhausted anxiety over the flight and critically low fuel. The drizzling rain made the long over-
return
water return
flight a black and lonely experience. Finding the island with instruments hardly adequate for daylight operation, and in these condi-
tions,
was
a task that justified their concern.
With their best cruise control settings, they proceeded cautiously toward Henderson Field, ever mindful of the mountainous islands of the Slot which could be in their path if they strayed off course. There was continuous radio chatter by the 67th pilots as they tried to gather a return formation.
They
called their course, altitude,
and a guess
at their position
to each other, switched on their running lights or landing lights, but in the
darkness, spread out as they were after the combat engagement, their
attempts to assemble a formation were to no
avail.
They proceeded appre-
hensively, thinking about the rock-filled clouds, of running out of gas, and of bailing out
over the ocean or an equally unfriendly and unmarked jungle.
Later, there
were
frantic radio calls to
Field to turn on the lights.
Cactus control
at
Henderson
The beams of the powerful searchlights, capable
of poking a shaft of light for miles into the night sky, pointed their powerful
beams, a
north of west, into the drizzling blackness.
little
Still
the calls
came: "Cactus, turn on the searchlights." Over the dark ocean a scattered attack flight was hunting for that piece of mountain-covered land called Guadalcanal.
One by one Field,
67th
the returning planes began to
come
in across
Henderson out.
One
in the
dark
dropped their gear, and landed while the fumes of fuel held
pilot, his
windshield covered with
oil,
became disoriented
He gave it make it around again
descent and found himself at stalling speed over the palm trees. the gun, fortunately having enough fuel remaining to
Another almost missed the runway because of the billowing clouds of dirt, debris, and mist blown up by the propwash of the preceding plane. The ground crew fired a red flare; he, too, made a successful to land safely.
go-around.
With lots of prayer and flier's luck, all of the 67th's planes made it back Henderson Field. Others were not so fortunate. Although the searchlights stayed on for hours, one dive bomber and one F4F were lost and the great Marine Aviator, Major Joe Sailer of VMSB-132, failed to return. The pilots of the 67th welcomed these opportunities for air combat despite the fact that the P-39 was an absolute dog as a fighter plane. At a later time, many of them had the chance to fly the Bell P-63 King Cobra, a to
redesigned Airacobra (P-39) with a laminar-flow
airfoil
supercharged engine. "While the P-63 was never tested the get-up-and-go
we needed.
If it
had been
have had more aces than any other had the targets
184
we
and a powerful
in
combat,
at Guadalcanal, the
outfit in the
had," Jim Jarman explained.
it
had
67th would
war, because no one ever
CHAPTER
15
Guadalcanal Secured
December 1942 brought
Early
weary
the long-promised relief of the combat-
Marine Division. This commitment had been preceded by assurances that additional forces would be landed to take the place of the units being relieved and to build up sufficient strength to resume the offensive. Additional units were committed and the 25th Division, commanded by Major General J. Lawton Collins, was alerted to move out of Hawaii. Major General Alexander M. Patch, commanding the Americal Division, was 1st
Harmon to direct the tactical operations at GuadalHe assumed command from General Vandegrift on 9 December. The
selected by General canal.
Marine Division Reinforced received a citation, in the name of the President, by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. The citation was presented to each individual member of the initial Cactus operation at a later 1st
date.
At that time Guadalcanal was declared secured. Although the remaining Japanese were still to be defeated and cleared from the island, the daily threat of a large Japanese invasion force attempting to retake Guadalcanal
had passed. Offensive pressure on the enemy
still
on Guadalcanal was
continued with increasing vigor.
On
5 December,
advised they would
quarters at
all
Army
become
New Caledonia.
Air Force units in the South Pacific were
part of the
This
new 13th
Air Force with Head-
new Air Force was officially activated on
13 January 1943, commanded by General Nathan B. Twining. Colonel
Dean
C. Strother
was assigned
as
commander
of the 13th Fighter
Com-
185
mand. At Guadalcanal, Army Air Corps units continued under control of the Marine Air Wing now commanded by General Louis E. Woods, USMC, who had taken over from his boss, General Geiger, in early November. Woods
was relieved from his long stay at Guadalcanal in late December by General
USMC. In February, all air units at Guadalcanal became a Command Solomons (COMAIRSOLS) under Rear Admiral
Francis Mulcahy, part of Air
Charles P. Mason.
General Patch remained responsible to Admiral Halsey for completion
Turner was out of this picture, but remained responsible for naval defense of Guadalcanal and the transport of of operations at Guadalcanal. Admiral
It was still a Navy show! The growing troop strength through December placed such a burden
troops and supplies.
on Americal Division Headquarters (which was duties of a Corps Headquarters) that
The Corps
Patch, 2 January 1943.
virtually
performing the
XIV Corps was formed under General
included the 2nd Marine Division and
other Marine Corps ground forces, the 25th Division, and the Americal Division,
now commanded by General Edmund
B. Sebree. In January,
troop strength at Guadalcanal reached the desired level to resume the offensive as a
full
XIV Corps
operation.
During December, the Cactus Flight established by the 67th Fighter Squadron began reporting daily operations as a detachment of the "347th Fighter Group, Cactus Flight," and continued to include pilots from
Squadrons
in the
Army
Group. Other
Air units on Henderson Field
all
in-
cluded a detachment of the 44th Fighter Squadron flying P-40s, which arrived at Cactus on
20 January; the 70th Medium Bombardment Squadsome B-17s of the 11th and 19th Bom-
ron, with B-26s; and, frequently,
bardment Groups, stopping at Guadalcanal during their far-reaching operations. In addition, a few P-40s were added to the 347th's Cactus Flight for middle-air cover. The growth in air strength could already be seen by the end of November, when the in-commission list for the day of 27 November showed 116 aircraft, with perhaps 20 percent more out for repair or other reasons.
As the month
of
December opened, there was
tropical rain. It flooded the strip.
Conditions were severe and personal belongings, arms,
and parachutes were
in
clinched the decision to
move
planes out of Fighter field
a period of continuous
Army Cactus Flight from its camp at the fighter
— with
its
I
flight gear,
danger of permanent damage. This torrent all
to the
Army and Marine fighter pilots and their new fighter strip, Fighter II. The new
higher ground, excellent campsite, and a runway of crushed
and rolled coral covered with steel matting
— was
a real
improvement. The
was abandoned. Henderson Field was receiving a major facelift: new runway surface and matting and taxiways to better support B-17s for their strikes further north in the Solomons. Enemy air raids continued, but Henderson Field was well defended by antiaircraft whenever the bombers were able to get by the fighters. "Washing Machine Charlie" continued his occasional night original fighter strip
186
bomb now and then. The routine of close air support and search-and-destroy flights continued for the P-39s and the remaining P-400s. interruptions, tossing out a
On 4 December,
Lieutenants McLanahan and Tullis discovered what looked like strings of gasoline drums tied together floating just offshore between Tassafaronga and Kokumbona. Fifteen new landing barges were discovered near Tassafaronga by Captain Williams. All of this was the
remains of the supply attempt by the 'Tokyo Express" interrupted by Admiral Wright. The chains of sealed drums, containing supplies for the Japanese troops, had not been recovered by the addressee. All were bombed, strafed, and destroyed by the P-39s shuttling between the airfield
and the various target areas to the west. The next day, Japanese dugouts in front of the troops along the Point Cruz line
were bombed and strafed; much activity behind enemy lines was observed and thoroughly strafed. On 6 December, Lieutenants McLanahan, Brewster, Patterson, and Kellum flew P-39s to Munda Point, New Georgia Island. There they made low-altitude reconnaissance to check out reports that a Japanese airfield
was being built. They found the airfield in its early stages of construction two fighter strips with Japanese workers using trucks, rollers, and hand carts, working on the runways. The area was strafed, setting fire to the equipment and disrupting the construction. "The field was cleverly camouflaged by palm trees propped up on the runway. The field could not be seen on an aerial photo," reported McLanahan. Although the field was subjected
—
to frequent attack, Japanese planes operated from
it
as early as 9 De-
cember. The base was placed under regular attack, day and night, by B-17s
and the Cactus
aircraft.
Attacks on other islands as well as Guadalcanal continued
in this
manner throughout December. As part of these missions, flights of P-39s were sent on a series of daily searches of Santa Isabel and New Georgia islands. The flights were beautiful sightseeing tours; however, the planes were sitting ducks for any flight of Zeros that might happen along as they sped over the coastal areas of these pilots
islands. Stiff
necks resulted from the
keeping their heads "on a swivel" to watch the sky for an enemy They flew low along the coastal
surprise and to examine the search areas.
new
areas looking for
signs of landing boats, Japanese observation posts,
warships put in to resupply or land troops, campsites, or any signs of new
Japanese
activity.
There was
also a sickening gratuitous duty to perform.
planes on the Santa Isabel search were to
went
to
fly
The two
over Rekata Bay; the two that
New Georgia were to fly over Munda. When the Japanese antiair-
opened fire on them, they were to judge whether the flak barrage was heavy or light. This judgment became a report from which all theater intelligence officers could draw red arrows on craft protecting these strongholds
Munda and mark "A/A Light" or "A/A sitting duck mission to the unnecessary Heavy." This side trip seemed an pilots risking their necks for a flak demonstration. their
maps
pointing to Rekata and
187
The P-39s concentrated on staffel
the traditional mission style of the Jag-
and escorted dive bombers. The P-38s flew a heavy December
schedule escorting B-17s striking the Central Solomons.
Two missions in
example of the tactical advantage gained by approaching the
particular give
On 10 December, escorting a B-17 on Tonolei Harbor at Bougainville, the Zero interceptors did not have the altitude advantage not because the bombing mission was being flown at high altitude, but because the Zeros were not up in time. The target at high altitude in a P-38 escort.
strike
—
P-38s caught the Zeros on their way up and met them with a descending advantage.
They met some head-on
and heavy firepower, All
five
Zeros
fell
as they climbed; with this advantage
burning into the sea and one probable.
P-38s returned from the mission, although one made the return trip on
one engine.
A
December was an
mission on 20
identical strike.
However, the
Zeros were waiting at high altitude for the arrival of the P-38s. In the aerial combat, two Zeros were flamed and three probable.
No P-38s were
because of their disciplined, mutually protective combat
tactics,
lost
but sev-
were pretty well shot up and got home only because the P-38 was a it home from a long pull on one engine. The mission emphasized the disadvantage of conducting bombing raids at low altitude below 20,000 feet rather than at altitudes that were optimum for the operation of both the bombers and the P-38 fighters. It was a useless sacrifice of tactical advantage, but the bombers preferred eral
rugged two-engine fighter that could make
—
—
the lower altitudes because of an imagined advantage in occasionally
it
was necessary due
On 24 December
to
bomb
accuracy;
weather conditions.
— Christmas Eve — the Japanese
airfield at
Munda
was attacked by nine SBD dive bombers, escorted by nine bomb-carrying P-39s and four F4Fs. It was an early morning strike, hitting Munda Point base just before daylight. Twenty-four Zeros were caught on the ground as they taxied out for takeoff. All the Zeros were destroyed on the ground or in
the air shortly after takeoff. In the last
December ground
situation, the
Americans faced a Japa-
nese force of 25,000. The Japanese had not received any major resupply or reinforcement since some fragmentary resources reached shore when the Japanese task force was destroyed on 15 November. How much resupply was being accomplished by night visits of the "Tokyo Express" and landing boats shuttling
down from other
islands
was not known. They were
thought to be a formidable force. They were,
in reality, a starving, malaria-
weakened army, cut off from their supporting forces and incapable of an effective offensive move. The Japanese were prepared, however, to give up no ground except at great cost to the Americans. Their sick and wounded manned forward machine gun positions, holding and defending their ground in the strictest devotion of Bushido.
To dislodge the Japanese from their hardened individual pockets along their prepared
network
Mount Austen,
the
188
full
of defenses,
which stretched from Point Cruz to XIV Corps was committed.
force of General Patch's
i
The Japanese
fortress of
Mount Austen stood
Corps offensive across the
on the
island.
hill
in the
way
of a full-scale
masses and ravines to eliminate the enemy
Mount Austen, the southern anchor of the Japanese line, was
a labyrinth of pockets,
hills,
peaks, caves, and ravines that concealed great
numbers of wary defenders in every possible niche like a veritable prairie dog town. This stronghold was a constant threat to Henderson Field. The airfield actually could be watched by the Japanese, who reported to their bases in the northern Solomons when missions departed to attack them much the same as the Coast Watchers passed warning to Guadalcanal of approaching Japanese bombers or surface forces. Japanese patrols from Mount Austen worked south to cover the entire western third of the island and posed a constant threat to the
airfield.
On 12 December, a raiding party of Japanese infiltrated the lines and made their way onto the airfield at Fighter II, where they destroyed a P-39 and set fire to a gas truck. The roaring fire resulted in complete destruction, creating a diversion that
allowed the patrol to escape. American
met heavy fire; the forces Mount Austen, did not at first expose
patrols probing at points along the Japanese line
on the southern end, concealed
in
themselves.
On 17 December, preparatory maneuvers to occupy Mount Austen started. The action supported plans for the general offensive by the total XIV Corps, scheduled for 10 January, with the planned drive anchored on the north coast. The offensive would move west in a line until all enemy were
resistance was overcome. With the preliminary effort to occupy Mount Austen and establish a southern anchor for the American line, it was discovered that this fortress was more heavily defended than had been
suspected. Bitter fighting and heavy casualties slowed the operation.
As soon
as the assault on
Mount Austen achieved some
definition,
close air support missions switched from their general roving nature to
focus on the specific
enemy strongpoints in front of the advancing infantry
bombing and
heavy schedule of "milk run" sorties. The infantry units, supported by artillery and close air support, stormed the Japanese positions at great cost in dead, wounded, and morale. assault,
strafing in a
The maneuver
to occupy Mount Austen, thought at first to be virfound an unexpected bristling fortress. This effort, which began on 17 December, did not find Mount Austen successfully in American hands until 15 January; mopping up to secure its many parts took tually unoccupied,
was a period during which combat infantry soldiers and superhuman efforts from themselves and their men in acts of heroism that will live as long as the Guadalcanal Campaign is remembered. They were supported every inch of the way by a heavy until
22 January.
It
officers extracted
schedule of close air support missions by the P-39s of the 347th Fighter Group, Cactus Flight. During missions into the ravines around Mount Austen and the hill strongholds to the north and west, such as "Galloping
Horse
Hill"
and "The Gifu," the P-39s, carrying 500-pound bombs,
hit
189
specific
enemy
strongpoints and returned to drop below the level of con-
cealing treetops to thoroughly strafe these positions.
From Christmas
to
22 January, veteran pilots of the 67th were reBy 29 January they were rotating back into
lieved for rest and relaxation.
the Cactus Flight; operations continued with 67th, 68th, 70th, and 339th Squadrons. air
support work and missions to escort
all
squadrons represented
The P-39s continued
—
their close
SBD dive bombers or B-17s. The
P-38s flew long escort missions covering the B-17s
in their attacks
on
where they encountered continuous heavy fighter resistance. The P-38s were shooting down Zeros and were pretty well shot up themselves in the process. Diving from higher altitudes gave the opening advantage to enemy fighters. Aside from its shortcomings as a fighter, the P-38 was not used at the higher altitudes, where it could perform to best advantage. The mutually protective fighter tactics of the 339th Squadron made up for the disadvantage to some extent. The Squadron, with its Bougainville,
P-38s, had destroyed 21 Japanese planes with seven probable, at a loss of its own pilots, during December. Many of the veteran pilots of the 339th got off for the famous Christmas leave along with the 67th and were back at Cactus by the end of January. The P-40s, added to the 347th's Cactus Flight, were doing their part in middle air protection of B-17s. On 18 January a flight of P-40s flown by pilots of the 68th Squadron escorted B-17s to the Shortlands area. They were sighted early by two casual enemy planes; one was towing a target in gunnery practice. Soon there was an air battle, with the P-40s holding their positions for close protection of the B-17s and to augment the forward firepower of the bombers. During the confusion of the Japanese fighter attacks, Captain Stanley A. Palmer was accidentally fired on by a B-17 gunner. His plane was forced down; he bailed out, landing in the water within sight of the enemy base. A lifer aft and canteen of water were dropped to him, everyone hoping for a later rescue. Twenty-four hours later a Navy PBY, with a covering escort of P-38s and P-40s, landed on the water under the nose of the enemy to pick up Palmer. During the rescue, a P-40 flown by Lieutenant Lynch had engine failure and he ditched in the ocean. Both pilots were rescued by the PBY and were taken to Cactus. Captain Palmer suffered from exposure; Lieutenant Lynch struck his eye on the gunsight when his P-40 nosed over as he went into the water. After ground fighting had reduced Mount Austen and with the southern flank secure, the western line, running south from Point Cruz, was moved gradually forward aided continually by air support strikes and artillery. Progress against pockets of heavy enemy resistance was slow. The rock-solid line defense by the Japanese was changing to heavy resistance by
three of
defiant pockets.
On
the afternoon of 23 January, elements of the 27th Infantry, 25th
Kokumbona, encircled by the 182nd and 147th Infantry, which had advanced on the right along the coast road. With Kokumbona captured, the push was continued westward toward the Poha River as the Division, entered
190
Japanese withdrew to the west. The American effort was to move rapidly west and around to the south to encircle the Japanese forces.
By
early February, with confusingly heavy operation by the 'Tokyo it was suddenly realized that the Japanese were evacuating their
Express,"
veterans of Guadalcanal.
On 9 February the Army moved into Tenaro and
organized resistance by the Japanese was at an end. Only scattered stragglers remained on the island.
On
the night of 22 January, General Hyakutake, having received
instructions to concentrate on the evacuation of as
many of the remaining troops as possible, began to withdraw the remnants of his army toward Cape Esperance. Beginning 1 February, nightly evacuations were carried out. In the rainy darkness, the
Japanese destroyers of the 'Tokyo Express" removed the tired and emaciated veterans of the 17th Army. With the evacuation on the night of 8 February, the deed was done. The American envelopment had moved too slowly, and the Navy was confused. About 13,000 Japanese troops had been brilliantly evacuated. Hundreds of sick,
wounded, and starving Japanese soldiers, still resisting, were killed or swept up by U.S. infantrymen. Throughout the steady diet of patrols, dive bombing, strafing, and escort cover for strike forces, an interesting and humorous practice devel-
oped among the
pilots of the
Cactus Flight.
A description of it was contrib-
uted to the 67th Fighter Squadron Unit History.
It is
quoted here
in
memory of its contributor, Lieutenant Barclay Dillon, Jr.: "One of the boys found, among the torn and thumb-smeared books and magazines labeled 'Reading Material,' a paperbacked edition of The Best Of Damon Runyon. Soon
all
and sundry began to notice the strange
behavior of this party every time he takes a gander into this book, as he lolls in his
sack and laughs out loud, although nobody
in
the tent makes any
funny remarks to him. Pretty soon they investigate and
find this
book very
fact, they become so enthusiastic over these characters of named Runyon that they find themselves talking like these
funny indeed. In this scribe
tough customers, saying what they have to say
in this historic
present
many days pass they carry this business to they become known to all, not by their names on their
tense, or Runyonese. Before
such an extent that
Handaxe Jack, Harry Dave the Dude, and their tent
birth certificates, but as Spanish John, Little Isadore,
the Horse, Big Nig, Guinea Mike, and
becomes Good Time Charly's. "Then one day it comes to pass that these guys are out flying around looking for some characters they would like very much to cool off, when all of a sudden the radios emit some words as follows: "'Harry the Horse to Big Nig. Harry the Horse to Big Nig. Several jokers at 3 o'clock.'
'"Big Nig to Harry the Horse. Roger Dodger. Let us push the stick
down and take
a look-see.'
happens that these particular jokers are legitimate and friendly, and it does not do to cool them off, and they pass on and look for other meat. "It so
191
However, they return to the
field
and
find several radio
guys from control
much perturbed and confused no end, and waiting to goes on. They see no percentage in such talk. But
waiting for them, very
know what
the hell
Spanish John and his friends see a very high percentage
in
it,
especially for
one reason. If the guys in control cannot understand the talk, then neither can the Japs, who, as everyone knows, are very good at savvying our lingo.
So they decide that they are keeping it up. (By this time these characters, all they've been through, are becoming very tough and are taking
with
nothing
off
nobody.)
"On another day, February
1st to be exact, four of them are providing low cover for the dive bombers as they attack the Tokyo Express' coming
down the Slot, when suddenly they're set upon by no fewer than 20 Zeros. The following conversation takes place: "'Little Isadore to Spanish John. Little Isadore to Spanish John. Some jokers are shooting at me.'
'"Spanish John to Little Isadore, sure enough, better
we
should be
shooting at them.' '"Little Isadore to Spanish John. Better hurry, like
my crate already looks
Swiss cheese.'
'"Roger Dodger. Stand clear while "This results
in
I
pass amongst these characters.'
Spanish John shooting
others. Little Isadore's plane
he counts 30 bullet holes
is
down one and dispersing the when he gets home
indeed breezy because
in it."
(Spanish John was Captain Jerome Sawyer. Little Isadore was Lieu-
tenant Nilo F. Inciardi.)
On four separate days at the beginning of February, the P-39s of the Cactus Flight escorted Navy and Marine SBD dive bombers and TBF torpedo bombers up the Slot to attack strong groups of Japanese warships of the "Tokyo Express." These convoys of Japanese destroyers were obviously coming to Guadalcanal to shell Henderson Field and to land Japanese troops and supplies in the rain and darkness of the north coast. The convoys originated from Short lands Harbor, near the tip of Bougainville Island, during the day and were routinely reported by the Coast Watchers as they got underway. There were as many as 20 ships, including light cruisers; they traveled in perfect formation for antiaircraft defense. They proceeded down the Slot with a cover of 20 to 30 Zeros flying cover over them. Nightfall would be near before they would be in range of aircraft from Henderson Field. On each day that they were reported, the weather was poor with heavy clouds, mist, and low visibility. When the strike force reached them, always about dusk, the ships of the "Express" would maneuver in violent evasive action during the attack, then rejoin formation to proceed to Guadalcanal, leaving behind any casualties crippled by the dive bombing attack. When these convoys reached the dark and rainy northwest coast of the island, they loaded troops for evacuation and were out of range by daylight. The fighters flew cover for strikes against these ships of the "Ex-
192
press" on 30 January and
1, 2, and 4 February, convinced they were "Express" on the usual mission of resupply and reinforcement of the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.
striking an
The
ruse that screened the Japanese evacuation plan began the later
December. The Japanese had moved a large number of troops and the 4th Air Army to Rabaul; an airstrip was under construction at Munda point on New Georgia Island, all of which presaged another attempt to retake Guadalcanal. With the heavy loss of ships and aircraft, the Japanese were unable to mount another offensive. The observation of their preparations may have been the feint they needed to use the "Tokyo Express" to evacuate rather than resupply and land troops. In retrospect, it is interestpart of
Navy in the Action Report of the dated 17 April 1943: "Until almost the last
ing to note the aura of surprise to the U.S.
Commander-in-Chief,
Pacific,
moment, it appeared that the Japanese were attempting a major reinforcement effort. Only skill in keeping their plans disguised and bold celerity in carrying them out enabled the Japanese to withdraw the remnants of the Guadalcanal Garrison. Not until after all organized forces had been evacuated on 8 February did we realize the purpose of their air and naval dispositions; otherwise with the strong forces available to us ashore
Guadalcanal and our powerful fleet in the South
Pacific,
on
we might have
converted the withdrawal into a disastrous rout."
To the Japanese, Guadalcanal was now a threatening Allied base, one was capable of being built to strength to become an invasion base to menace their position in the central and northern Solomons. They inthat
creased their air attacks on Guadalcanal to prevent the Allied buildup,
throwing in aircraft as
if
there were no end to their supply. They increased
the night raids over Henderson Field, causing irritation and loss of sleep for the "Cactus Air Force."
On 27
January a report was received that 30 Zeros escorting 10
twin-engine Mitsubishi bombers were heading toward Guadalcanal. fighter force
was scrambled
A
to intercept. Captain John Mitchell with six
P-38s climbed to 30,000 feet to meet the attack. Twelve F4Fs were also scrambled. They were followed by 10 P-40s of the 44th Squadron. Enroute to Guadalcanal the bombers descended to the surface to come in under the radar screen and were not intercepted. Captain Mitchell's
flight
sighted
the Zeros about 10,000 feet below him. In their usual manner, the Japanese was trailing along, doing loops, rolls, and lazy eights to slow their
escort
pace over the bombers. The Japanese escorts,
in general,
chose this sort of
cavorting along in aerobatics, rather than a disciplined form of escort formation.
the Zeros in a diving attack. He met the first Zero coming in on him with all guns firing; Mitchell turned into him. the Zero with a short burst into the cockpit and midsection, flaming Mitchell led his formation
down on
The Zero spun out and crashed. The P-40s, still climbing, were hit hard in a diving attack and, joined by broad area the P-38s and F4Fs, they engaged in a running dogfight over a
193
of the north coast and the Sealark Channel, often to within inches of the
water
— a poor position
caught
in that position
for
maneuvering the P-38. One P-38
with a fuel tank that would not drop
As he
pilot
off,
was
further
away from the water, he was who was nearby, pulled in behind the Zero and with one short burst flamed him into the water. Mitchell became the first ace of the 339th Squadron; this was his limiting his maneuverability.
caught
in the fire of a
pulled up,
Zero and went
in.
Captain Mitchell,
sixth victory.
The P-40s of the 44th Squadron, caught in their climb, had to dive away to shake off the Zeros. Two of them were shot down; a third was badly shot up. Lieutenant Robert Westbrook, in a P-40, found himself in trouble in a fight
with a Zero.
He broke away in a high-speed dive, crossed the field, flight of three Zeros. He turned
and came up on the other side looking at a
one and, with a long burst, shot him down in flames. (Lieutenant Westbrook was soon to become one of the top scoring aces in the Pacific; in 1944 he led the "Game Cock" 67th Fighter Squadron.) The P-40s accounted for four of the Zeros that day; one Zero each for Lieutenants Tarbet, Westbrook, Wheaden, and Captain Taylor. The net result was nine Zeros shot down and a loss of two P-40s and two P-38s, Captain Shaw and Lieutenant McDaniel of the 339th Squadron. The insufferable irritation of the night bombing by the Japanese caused numerous attempts to make a night intercept and "flame the bastard." On the night of 29 January the men on the ground at Guadalcanal watched eagerly to see if Captain Mitchell, in a P-38, would be able to into
locate the intruder. Mitchell, slowly cruising around in the dark, located the
bomber just as he dropped his load. He gradually moved up behind the tail of fire, and squirted everything at him until the bomber burst into flames and fell like a torch into Iron Bottom Bay. There were wild cheers of satisfaction from the men looking on from the the twin-engine bomber, opened
ground.
With the end of organized resistance on Guadalcanal, the island was hustled into an offensive posture in every respect. Units of the 347th Fighter Group now aimed at cleaning up the remaining pockets of Japanese on the island and carrying the war north would ultimately end the war.
194
in a roll-up of Japanese
bases that
CHAPTER
16
The Wild Blue Yonder War, like most things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice.
Alexander Hamilton
The
Federalist
Many battles have changed the course of war, even the nature of war as an instrument of national policy. Yet there are few such violent conflicts of
which man can be proud. With Thermopylae, Agincourt, and Muese-Argonne, Guadalcanal ranks with the great battles of history, fought against great odds.
It
stands
among these that have changed the course of history
like the Spartans, the Americans at Guadaloutnumbered and with shamefully inadequate support by their unprepared nation, were determined to hold their ground at all cost. Guadalcanal and Thermopylae stir the same emotions and pride in all who hold liberty and democracy sacred.
and the nature of conflict. For,
canal, brutally
In the laudation recorded in Herodotus, and in the to the Spartans at
Thermopylae,
lies
hymn of Simonides
a kindred insight to the meaning of
Guadalcanal:
Four thousand men Peloponnesus brought Who 'gainst three hundred myriads nobly fought.
Of those
at
famed Thermopylae who
lie
Glorious the fortune, bright the destiny.
Their tomb an alter
A fond
is;
remembrance
their noble
name
of ancestral fame.
Their death, a song of triumph; neither rust Nor time that turns all mortal things to dust, Shall
dim the splendor
Where Greece
of that holy shrine,
forever sees her native virtues shine.
195
As
a nation,
we do
not yet comprehend the meaning of the epoch
devotion to duty that was Guadalcanal, nor to
its
veterans and dead. Only
the Japanese sincerely maintain a shrine" and conserve battle sites on Guadalcanal to honor the memory of those who fell in that great battle.
How can we
possibly do less?
This crusade succeeded against an enemy accustomed to victory. The Americans, poorly prepared, threw themselves into the battle ready for
any
The condition is almost amusing in the Americans hate war. They eschew the thoughts of prepar-
sacrifice to hold their gain.
realization that
edness and duty to serve
in favor of
the
more peace-loving viewpoint. As a
consequence, their readiness for conflict has a record of inadequacy. But
when this giant,
feigning
unselfish and relentless.
drowsy indifference, is provoked, the response is The good sense to recognize the warning signs
and to seek peace through strength
we
pray
shall
be ours
in
the future.
The significance of Guadalcanal is that the campaign began in a nick of many were the creation of our own nation. The Japanese, to whom defeat was all but unknown, consistently underestimating their enemy and their environment, were defeated and time against great odds, of which
war to the chastened 67th Fighter Squadron and the 347th Fighter
the Americans gained a base from which to carry the
Japanese.
The men
of the
Group gave full measure of their effort,
blood, and their youth and are justly
proud of their contribution. In matters of
command,
tactics,
and organization for naval combat,
in
the near waters off Guadalcanal, the performance of American admirals in
these early engagements can be described out-admiraled by the Japanese,
who
in a
word: inept. They were
did not have the benefit of advanced
radar and often lacked the advantage of surprise, an anomalous fact that
was fortunately not true
of the U.S.
Navy performance elsewhere.
In the
execution of the entire Guadalcanal operation, both sides were guilty of
many mistakes. Success in the overall ground, sea, and air operation can be made more mistakes than the
attributed to the fact that the Japanese
Americans. Essentially, the victory was achieved through the tenacity of
who made their temporary home in the beachhead and on Henderson Field. As 1943 began, there was still much to be done to remove all Japanese presence from the island. The war was now an offensive one and being carried with growing strength to the Japanese bases in the middle and the Americans
northern Solomons. The Japanese, with their seemingly endless supply of aircraft,
put up strong resistance as the Americans were striving to build
air superiority in
the area.
347th Fighter Group was on Fighter status, forsaking the old duties of the JagstaffeL The P-39s and P-40s flew long patrols searching enemy territory and flew escort for B-26s or B- 17s which were daily bombing the Japanese, striving to keep their airfield at Munda in operation. The 44th Fighter Squadron had arrived on 20 January, flying their share of the mixed bag of fighter operations. The pressure on the Japanese in the All of the
196
Men examine a wrecked P-38 of the 339th Fighter Squadron that crash-landed on Vella Lavella, Solomon Islands, on 7 October 1 943. A 20mm shell burst in the left engine, making it impossible for the pilot, Lt. D.W. Livesey, of El Cajon California, to lower his landing gear. (USAF)
northern Solomons gained strength; the P-38s flew escort for strikes at
Munda on New Georgia. The P-38s of the 339th "Sun Setter" Squadron had a steady diet of bomber escort or photo reconnaissance. Holding their disciplined formaBuin and Shortlands at Bougainville, and
tions to protect the
streaked
in
bombers, they were
at a disadvantage as
Zeros
and out, taking pot shots. Their teamwork brought them
through with few losses and their tactics were rewarded with an occasional victory
when
a
Zero ventured
in for a
pass at one of the P-38s, only to be
flamed by the next covering P-38 behind
in
the escort formation.
On just
such a mission on 2 February, Captain Mitchell, leading a four-P-38 escort sticking to their business of protecting the bombers, bagged three Zeros
without loss to themselves. Captain Mitchell got one, Lieutenant Holmes another, and Lieutenant Jim Shubin shot
down his first Zero,
the beginning
of an illustrious record.
February, four P-38s, Lieutenants Morton, Cramer, Rist, and Lockridge flying, escorted B-24 Liberators to bomb installations on Bougainville. The regular intercept action by Zeros was repeated. Lieutenant
On 13
Lockridge accounted for one; Lieutenant Robert P. Rist was shot down down another Zero. The mission was repeated to the Short-
after shooting
lands area the next day, 14 February.
197
St. Valentine's
day was a bad day for the 339th. The mission included
10 P-38s escorting nine B-24 Liberators (actually PB4Y models) and 12 Marine F4U Corsair fighters. The P-38s stayed in close to cover the bombers in their usual protective formation. Thirty Japanese Zeros took off from Bougainville's Kahili Field and were in the target area. They began their attack on the P-38 escort formation. The P-38s held position, occasionally feinting a turn into an attacking Zero in an effort to cause him to break off, but resumed position immediately in the escort. A violent air battle with the intercepting Zeros took its toll on the defensive P-38 formation. Captain Griffith shot down one and another probable. Lieutenant J.A. Geyer flamed two and another probable; Lieutenant F.S. Brown got one probable. The 339th lost three pilots, Lieutenants Mulvey, White, and Finkenstein. Mulvey was later recovered. Two Zeros were flamed by the F4Us, who lost two of their own. The mission was termed "a costly but successful lesson." In
February the
Allies
moved into the Russell Islands, a small group of
islands northwest of Guadalcanal, the Japanese having evacuated the lands. P-39s, P-40s,
is-
and P-38s patrolled the Russells to cover construction
were able to spare an attack effort from Munda, which was under constant attack by Cactus
of an airfield, in case the Japanese their protection of
Under this protection the were completed in March. aircraft.
airfield
and
installations at the Russells
On 5 March, four P-39s of the 67th Squadron were patrolling over the The flight was routine and two new arrivals were sent along to
Russells.
become familiar with the area. During the flight, they heard Control at Henderson Field scrambling the fighters. A large enemy formation was heading for Henderson Field. The flight continued its routine patrol of the Russells. As the enemy formation approached Guadalcanal, it was seen on the radar to break into several smaller groups and turned back toward the
Navy TBF Avenger torpedo Bombers are parked 1943. (USAF)
198
at
a newly constructed
air strip
on
New Caledonia,
Russells, apparently to attack the
new American
warning was heard by the patrolling P-39
flight
installations there.
on the
radio:
The
"Recon
to
Clean Slate, bogies approaching you."
By that
time, the attack
was
on. Fifteen Japanese dive
bombers were
making runs on the new Army facilities; 25 Zeros were overhead to cover them. The four P-39 pilots were very concerned; they were outnumbered and the enemy was between them and home. Smoke from the bombs was rising in several places
bombers.
when the P-39s started their dive to attack the dive
Two of the Japanese planes passed under the P-39s as they came
bombing passes. The P-39 formation turned in its dive and down both planes. Two more dive bombers completed their dive, scooting away across the water. The P-39s dropped in behind them and sent them flaming into the sea. The four P-39s, attacking 15 dive bombers, off their dive
shot
had already flamed four before attracting the attention of the 25 Zeros overhead, who were entertaining themselves with their aerobatic cavorting.
The smoke from
the dive bombers hitting the water attracted their
attention and the sky around the Airacobras
was suddenly filled with angry
Zeros.
The Zeros made passes at fast
the P-39s but the
first of
them came
in too
and overshot the mark; they then began to undershoot in their attacks.
The P-39 flight leader chased off after a crippled dive bomber. The second element leader and his wingman kept running across the Russells base with Zeros on their tails. They flew right into dive bombers that were coming off a dive
bombing run with Zeros
still
chasing them. With the Zeros firing on
the P-39s, they in turn were attacking the dive bombers; two
more were
flamed into the water.
The two new men,
their first
day on the
job, out to get familiar
the area, thought this was really something for a routine to the wings of their element leaders and fired
flight.
when they did.
with
They stuck They flew a
beautiful tight formation; they couldn't afford to separate because they didn't
know which direction was home. As the two dive bombers went into
the water in flaming crashes, the Zeros went racing past the two P-39s,
overshooting their attack.
The P-39s broke
off in
the other direction,
losing them.
was four enemy planes and two down in the presence of a total of 40 Japanese planes. The patrol returned home without a bullet hole. In April, enemy air effort continued to build. Daily the large formations of dive bombers escorted by Zeros proceeded down from Bougain-
The
day's bag for the routine patrol
probable, shot
ville.
for
With ample warning, the fighters from Henderson Field were ready off in waves, they engaged the approaching enemy over
them. Taking
much of his incoming flight path. On one such day, 1 April, in a lengthy air battle, 20 Japanese fighters were shot down with a loss of six of the Cactus airplanes. Again on 7 April, the Japanese delivered attacks with a large force of dive bombers and fighters;
over 150 enemy aircraft took part. The 347th Fighter Group's
199
A
view of Tontouta
Air
Base,
New
Caiedonia. 7 October 1943. (USAF)
P-38s, P-39s, and P-40s, along with the F4Fs,
moved against the attacking
Japanese formations. Captain Lamphier and Lieutenants Barber, McLanahan, and Moore, in P-38s, dived on the disciplined tactics
enemy from
above. Holding their
and protecting one another, they shot down seven out of
a flight of 11 Japanese planes. Captain Lamphier got three; Lieutenant
Barber shot down two, and Lieutenants Moore and McLanahan each accounted for one. In that long day, with opposing forces meeting
in
waves,
12 Japanese dive bombers and 27 Zeros were shot down by the fighters
from Henderson
Field.
On 9 April, the 67th Squadron was alerted to move its entire organizapresaged a series of island-hopping moves by units of the 347th Fighter Group as the roll-up of the Japanese began. A mission by the 339th Fighter Squadron on 18 April 1943 was one of the most remarkable of World War II. It was preceded by a period of Allied intelligence-gathering in which several intelligence windfalls came to the advantage of the Allies. U.S. Intelligence had at its disposal the Japanese codes, which American Navy cryptanalysts had broken. This invaluable tion, a notice that
tool allowed intelligence officers to follow the activities of the Japanese,
identifying their intentions with
A
amazing
celerity.
study of messages concerning the movements of Admiral Yama-
moto, chief of Japanese Naval Forces, had taught them that the Admiral
was a man of precise schedules and timing in his every action. Early in April a series of messages concerning an inspection tour by Yamamoto were under study by intelligence personnel. It was determined that the inspection tour ville.
would bring the Admiral to Buin,
From
at the
followed by the Japanese inspection team
determined that Yamamoto would arrive April. Secretary of the
200
southern end of Bougain-
this intelligence analysis, a schedule that
in
would be precisely
was worked out and it was the Buin area at 0935 on 18
Navy Frank Knox directed that a mission be planned
to intercept and shoot
down
the plane carrying Admiral Yamamoto's
in-
spection party
The only aircraft capable of a mission of this type from a land base was W. Mitchell, Commander of the 339th Fighter Squad-
the P-38. Major John
was assigned to plan and lead the mission. Mitchell, an outstanding fighter commander, deserves the credit for planning and carrying out a ron,
flawless mission. details
down
He planned a
16-plane sortie, working out the timing and
to the takeoff times of aircraft and possible replacement of
ground aborts. The 16 P-38s began their takeoffs planes
was
led
by Captain
at
0725. The attack section of four
Tom Lamphier, who was then still a member of
Rex Barber, Jim McLanahan, and Joe Moore. McLanahan's plane blew a tire and he was out of it. Jim was an excellent pilot and an aggressive fighter, and this disappointment was a bitter one for him. He just shut down his engines and cussed the tire problem. (Jim still cusses that blown tire. If it had just happened a little later, with flying speed, he could have got off and gone on the mission. Even in an October 1980 discussion, during a 347th Fighter Group reunion, McLanahan still showed his disappointment. "I could have worried about the 70th Squadron, with Lieutenants
landing with a
flat tire
when
I
returned.")
Major John W. Mitchell being decorated by Brig. Gen. Dean C. Strother. The outstanding success of the mission to Bougainville on 18 April 1943 was based on impeccable planning by Major Mitchell, then commanding the 339th Fighter Squadron. It was during this mission that the Japanese aircraft carrying Admiral Yamamoto was shot down in flames. (USAF)
201
Lieutenant
Moore developed engine
trouble just after takeoff and
returned. Having planned for possible aborts, Lieutenant Besby Holmes and Raymond Hine were ready. They took off and joined Lamphier, restoring the attack section to four aircraft. Major John W. Mitchell with Julius
Jacobson and Lieutenants Douglas Canning, Del ton Goerke, Gordon Whittaker,
Roger Ames, Lawrence Gnaebner, Everett Anglin, William Smith,
Albert Long, Eldon Stratton, and Major Louis Kittel provided escort and
cover for the attack section.
410 miles to Bougainville at 30 feet above The flight was approaching the south coast at the designated time, 0935. As the flight approached the coast, the enemy formation was sighted at about three miles, heading down the coast toward Kahili Field. There were two twin-engine bombers at 4500 feet with an Mitchell took his flight the
the water to avoid detection.
escort of three Zeros covering each at about
The P-38 formation was
still
1500
feet above them.
undetected. Mitchell, according to plan,
climbed his cover section rapidly to 15,000 feet and there leveled provide cover for the attack. to attack
was almost
off to
The temptation for pilots in Mitchell's section
uncontrollable; yet a disciplined protective cover
was
maintained without deviation.
The fierce air combat that now took place has been the subject numerous controversial analyses. Evaluation of intelligence debriefings hot pursuit combat which often takes place in a matter of seconds
of of is
vague and incomplete. The events of the seconds that followed seem to have ticked difficult,
away
and
historical accounts in unit histories are often
as told here.
Captain Lamphier led the attack section in a climb to the level of the
bombers as they dropped their belly tanks for combat. Lamphier and Barber, his wing man, were within a mile of the bombers before being observed. Lieutenant Holmes had difficulty dropping a tank. Hine stayed with him until it dropped off. The bombers nosed over and started descending in evasive action.
intercept the P-38s.
The Zeros dropped their belly The diving Zeros intervened
tanks and dived to in
Lamphier' s and
Barber's attack on the bombers. Lamphier turned into them,
fired,
and
flamed one as they passed. This diversion brought Lamphier to 6000 feet. Lieutenant Barber continued his run on one of the bombers
in a
high-speed pass; he overshot his target. Under attack by a Zero, he pulled his plane sharply around,
the fuselage, and saw the
made another attack on the bomber, firing into section come off in parts. The bomber turned
tail
on its back and plummeted to the ground as he passed. Lamphier, having been delayed by the intrusion of the Zeros, dived into the fray, and with a
bomber that was fleeing the scene along the side in a A wing tore off in an outbreak of fire and the bomber crashed in
deflection shot raked a
long burst. flames.
With their scene at this
202
belly tank
problem solved, Holmes and Hine arrived on the
moment and attacked the Zeros that were after Lamphier and
Thomas
G. Lamphier Jr. was leader of the attack section on the 18 April 1943 mission to Lamphier was officially credited with destroying the Japanese aircraft carrying Admiral Yamamoto. (USAF)
Captain
Bougainville.
Barber.
much
A
racing dogfight
was engaged
in
by
all
for several minutes, with
shooting and unconfirmed results.
While making his way out of the attack area, which had extended over the Kahili and Shortlands regions of Bougainville, Lieutenant Holmes,
203
low over the water, spotted a bomber near Moila Point. He dived in on the bomber, followed by Lieutenant Hine. Holmes fired a burst that started the left engine smoking and Hine followed with another firing pass. flying
tail of the bomber and put a long bomber crash-landed on the water. With the bombers destroyed they broke off to head home; Zeros were everywhere. In the dogfights that followed, Holmes and Barber each shot down a Zero. Lieutenant Hine's left engine began to smoke and he was last
Lieutenant Barber then dived in on the
burst into the fuselage, and the flaming
seen losing altitude south of Shortlands, having shot down a Zero before receiving the hit in his
made an emergency
left
engine. Lieutenant
Holmes ran low on
fuel
and
landing at the Russells air strip. Lieutenant Barber's
coolant system took several hits, which slowed his otherwise safe return.
Lieutenants Barber and Holmes were added to the
list
of aces that day.
On the mission, the 339th was credited with three bombers and three Yamamoto's bomber was the mission was made possible first by a
Zeros, with the loss of Lieutenant Hine; Admiral
one of the three. The success of
fortuitous intelligence situation and then by
its perfect planning and execuby the Commander of the 339th Fighter Squadron, Major John W. Mitchell. Each of his pilots was so well briefed that he knew exactly how each pilot on the mission was to perform. The timing was exact and
tion
Admiral Yamamoto made a precisely planned rendezvous with his destiny.*
The Japanese continued to send heavy air attacks to Guadalcanal and new airstrips at the Russells, fully realizing that the American attempt roll up the islands to Bougainville and Rabaul was a certainty. The U.S.
the to
heavy bombers kept up the pressure on Bougainville and the other Japanese bases to the north; the 347th Fighter Group covered the bombers in their attacks.
Guadalcanal received constant attention from the Japanese as the
need for intelligence secrecy concerning the Yamamoto mission had passed, the identified Lt. Col. Thomas G. Lamphier, Jr., as the man who had shot down the plane carrying Admiral Yamamoto. That combat involving Tom Lamphier and Rex Barber still remains controversial and at that time it was not possible to know which of the Betty bombers shot down had been carrying Admiral Yamamoto. Military security suppressed any open discussion, and it was not known until after the war that there were survivors in the Betty that had crashed on the water. The Admiral was definitely in the one that crashed in flames in the jungle. John W. Mitchell, commander of the mission, gives equal credit. Various visitors to the crash site on Bougainville have came out with "corroborating evidence" for one side or the other based on disposition of wreckage and angle and location of bullet holes in the airframe. Both men have described their experiences on the flight many times, including attack profiles, altitudes, attitudes, and firing angles. At the Admiral Nimitz Museum, Fredericksburg, Texas there is a videotape made to cover the history of the mission. Part of this is an interview conducted in Japan with the last surviving Zero pilot in Admiral Yamamoto's escort flight. His description of the attack and destruction of the Admiral's Betty aircraft tracks closely to Rex Barber's descriptions and lends credence to his claim. The brilliant planning and execution of the mission by its commander, John W. Mitchell, has never received the deserved recognition for his outstanding leadership and airmanship on that day. There is much support for his position that dual credit for the kill should be given to Tom Lamphier and Rex Barber. The bottom line here is that this mission was a total success and John W. Mitchell is the real hero. * After the
War Department
204
Looking East toward
Munda Airdrome on New Georgia Island in the Solomons Group,
1
943. (USAF)
all their troubles. Their strikes were met by Cactus which continued to take heavy tolls on them. The Japanese appeared willing to make sacrifices from their seemingly endless supply of
marshalling base for
fighters,
aircraft,
June.
accepting such losses as 16 aircraft on 13 May, 7 June, and 23
On 16 June, the Japanese sent more than 100 planes down the Slot in
a series of flights. Sixty-six Japanese planes
were shot down with the loss of
Continuous upgrading made a major Allied Air Base out of Tontouta. Here steel matting is stacked for work on runways, 1944. (USAF)
205
Cleaning guns and performing maintenance on a P-39 at an airfield on Bougainville Island are crew members of the 68th Fighter Squadron. They are, left to right, Sgt. Adolph Tavani, Sgt. Mendus R. Western, S/Sgt. Guba, Pfc. Misha Mazur, Sgt. Joe Raburn, and Sgt. Armond Davis. 5 March 1944.
(USAF)
Cactus aircraft. On that day, Lieutenant Murray Shubin of the 339th Squadron accounted for five of them. Some damage was inflicted by the bombers, but the air victory soundly defeated their maximum effort. These six
fierce efforts
by the enemy were
buildup and the
moves
that
P-39s needing repair are parked (USAF)
Air Base, 1944.
206
typical of their resistance to the Allied
were sure
in
front of
to
come.
hanger #1 at 1 3th
Air
Depot on
New Caledonia, Tontouta
Lt. Colonel Robert Westbrook, of Hollywood California, leading ace of the 13th Fighter Command, shot down his 1 7th Japanese plane on 30 September 1 944 over enemy-held Kendari Field in the southern Celebes. Flying a P-38 Lightning, Col. Westbrook led seven fighters of the "Game Cock"
Squadron on a long
1
500-mile
bomber escort
On 30 June
mission. (USAF)
1943, Rendova Island was invaded by the
cover was so effective that
it
The
air
accounted for 20 to 30 enemy planes on each
of the several days of the operation.
crossed and landed on
Allies.
Using Rendova as a base, troops
New Georgia in July to begin their drive to capture
the Japanese airfields at Munda. Within a
month the Americans were using
207
The 67th
Fighter Squadron's
Philippine Islands.
"Game Cock"
insignia
on a tree outside
their
camp
at Palawan,
9 October 1945. (USAF)
Munda strip as an emergency field while it was being put in condition more extensive use. The 67th Squadron, the "Game Cock," had now arrived at Gerney Field, Milne Bay, New Guinea, on 17 June, preparatory to a July move to the
for
Woodlark
208
Island,
which
lies
between the southern
tip of
New
Guinea and
An F-4 Phantom of the 68th Tactical
Fighter
Squadron
at
Moody Air Force Base,
This aircraft took part in the recent Operation Proud Phantom Tactical Fighter Wing exercise. (USAF)
Bougainville.
There were plenty
in flights
Valdosta, Georgia.
to Cairo-West, Egypt, a 347th
of attack sorties and scrambles there for
much air action, although Captain Joe Berkow did shoot down a two-engine enemy reconnaissance bomber on 24 August. By October, all of the 347th Fighter Group was operating out of Munda or the 67th but not
Guadalcanal, supporting the invasion of Bougainville in November.
The
story of the
"Game Cock"
through the end of the war.
It
takes the 67th Fighter Squadron
played a significant role in the
life
of the
347th Fighter Group and the detailed exploits of the 347th Fighter Group in its move through the Pacific, which deserves a more complete treatment in a
separate book.
Beginning with the Guadalcanal invasion
An F-15 Eagle of the 67th Kadena Okinawa. (USAF)
Tactical Fighter Squadron, the
in
August of 1942, the 67th
"Game Cock," now on
fighter duty at
209
Fighter Squadron (and later, the 347th Fighter Group) went on to become
Command. They island : hopped through the South and joined with the 5th Fighter Command, advancing up through the Southwest Pacific, at the Philippines. From there they were to begin
part of the 13th Fighter Pacific
—
Ryukus to the home islands of Japan a plan became unnecessary when the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan hastened the end of the war and saved hundreds of thousands of lives that their approach through the
that
would have been sacrificed in an invasion of the home Islands of Japan. The 67th Fighter Squadron remained overseas after the end of World War II, receiving occasional changes in aircraft and personnel. The Squadron took part in the Korean War, where many of its former pilots, veterans of Guadalcanal, returned to combat. The "Game Cock" played its part in the Vietnam War as well; and, later, was stationed at various bases in the Pacific and the Far East. Today the "Game Cock" carries on, with the F-15 Eagles of the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Kadena Air Base,
Okinawa.
The other Squadrons of the old 347th Fighter Group, the 68th, 70th, Moody Air Force Base, Valdosta, Georgia, in the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing. The 347th, reactivated at Moody AFB in 1976, is the consistent winner of awards and and 339th Tactical Fighter Squadrons, are stationed at
honors, including the coveted Air Force Outstanding Unit Award. Flying their F-4
Phantoms in readiness for global operations, they deploy on short Most recently, the
notice to any part of the world, assisted by air refueling.
68th and 70th Squadrons moved their
aircraft in flights to Cairo- West,
Egypt, where they operated for 90 days
Proud Phantom. The spirit of the "Game Cock" Squadron and
210
in
in
lives
desert maneuvers, Operation
on
in
the 67th Tactical Fighter
the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing.
APPENDIX
Letters of Gen.
A
Harmon
Below are some appropriate letters of General Millard F. Harmon, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area;(USAFISPA). Letter to General George C. Marshall, 11 August, 1942; expresses
1.
doubt that Guadalcanal can be held by the Navy operation
in
progress
unless reinforcing efforts are immediately forthcoming.
2.
Letter to General H.H. Arnold, 18 August, 1942; discusses
Army com-
mitments to support Cactus. 3.
Letter to General H.H. Arnold, 28 September, 1942; provides an
tial
ini-
summary of action by the P-39/P-400s of the 67th Fighter Squadron at
Cactus.
4.
Letter to Admiral Ghormley, 6 October, 1942; outlines to Ghormley
areas of caution and disagreement on the pending operation to occupy the Island of Ndeni.
211
5.
Letter to General H.H. Arnold, 20 October, 1942; a general report on
activities of personal
importance, includes word on the replacement of
Admiral Ghormley as Commander of Operation Watchtower, by Admiral Chester Nimitz.
Major General Millard F. ("Miff") Harmon, U.S. Army Air Force, deserves substantial credit for the successful conquest of the Solomon Islands.
A polished
gentleman, an aggressive commander and a genius at
planning and organization, he was a suave and competent diplomat
who
tiptoed through the thorny morass of organization set up by the Navy. His
guidance was sought, respected, and followed by his Navy superiors.
Harmon was one of the most competent and least apprecommanders of the Pacific War. Little has been presented in histori-
Millard F. ciated
cal writing of this quiet genius, probably
The
due to
his early
and untimely
which he was making a noncombat flight was depresumed lost on 26 February, 1945, somewhere in the Pacific Ocean Area. It is sad indeed that he did not live on to serve his country as Commanding General Army Air Force, or as Chief Of Staff death.
aircraft in
clared missing and
United States Air Force.
212
EXTRACT SECRET HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA Noumea,
New
Caledonia
11 August 1942
General George C. Marshall Chief of Staff
United States
Army
Washington, D.C.
Dear General Marshall: 10.
Our estimate
of Jap forces in the Bismark-Solomon area
is
as
follows:
2 Divisions and about 5,000 miscellaneous
40 Bombers 50 Fighters 45 Miscellaneous
aircraft
10 Cruisers
20 Destroyers AP, AK etc, capable of transporting one Above does not take into account losses suffered Rapid reenforcement of
air
division. in
recent action.
and surface craft from Truk area must
be considered. 13.
The
thing that impresses
me more
connection with the Solomon action
is
that
than anything else
we
in
are not prepared to
"follow up." At great effort, with a strong array of Naval force and with
Army Bombardment
support,
we succeeded
in
occupying Cactus -
Ringbolt with a Marine Division (Reinforced). Certain losses were all forces participating. We have seized a strategic position from which future operations against the Bismarks can be strongly supported. Can the Marines hold it? There is considerable room for doubt. Certainly they will receive every possible support from forces
suffered by
213
available.
The Japanese
force that can be quickly brought to bear
theoretically sufficient to retake Cactus-Ringbolt before
it
is
can be
consolidated and reenforced by aircraft, antiaircraft, and additional
That they
troops.
will
make
the attempt
I
have no doubt for the
concentration of forces in the Rabaul-Solomon area
The
resourcefulness and determination of our
own
is
rapid and heavy.
forces will
I
trust
foil
this attempt.
A
capable construction unit with the landing forces to improve
airdromes, provide dispersion and camouflage; proper logistic provisions for fuel,
bombs
etc and the availability of three squadrons of P-38 type
Fighters to protect our
own Bombers and
critical installations
would
almost assure retention of what has been gained.
Navy can get airdrome construction personnel and fuel, bombs and ammunition and the Marine Fighter and Scout Bomber Squadrons into Cactus we can augment with the P-400 and then be all set to operate our medium and heavy bombers from Cactus initially, at least as an advanced airdrome. Under these conditions I believe the position can be held. It is the procedure I propose to recommend to Admiral Ghormley. If
the
equipment, forward echelons of ground crews,
,
,
M.F. HARMON Major General, U.S.A.
214
HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA Noumea,
New
Caledonia
18 August 1942 Lieut. Gen.
H.H. Arnold
Commanding General
Army
Air Forces
Washington, D.C.
Dear General Arnold:
Am operating with temporary headquarters here in Noumea. me
With
are Twining, Breene, Jamison, Glasgow, Adj. Gen. Sherman G-2,
Wilson, Anti-aircraft, Evans
Ground G-3, Beadle, Engr., Ankenbrandt,
Barnes, Ord. Colonels Everest and Strother
I
sent along with Admiral
(Comairsopac) on his flag-ship up to Buttons to serve for
on
his staff as
Bomber and Fighter
that capacity. Lt. Col. Saunders is
also at Buttons.
McCain
him —
Officer,
and as
my
McCain
this operation
representatives in
commanding the 11th Group and he consults them all and they have been
is
freely
this he told me himself. I am sure also that they have helped him a lot and that they have contributed materially to the proper employment of our Bomber forces. Saunders has done a splendid
invaluable to
I am sure before this goes much further he will be in order for an appropriate decoration. All of his crews and personnel have done equally well in their own niche. Operating out of narrow dusty fields,
job and
eating
when they
could,
working and sleeping
airplanes; often without cots or tents.
in
Through
and around their
it all
cheerful and doing
They are a bit of alright. Was up at Buttons a few days ago and they were just unloading their dunnage off the ship and were getting their camp set up and were all O.K. by the following three
mens work
each.
evening. Boats can't keep up with this kind of a war, unless the needs
215
are forseen and then only in certain circumstances. That
one reason are going to U.K. but what a godsend just a few would be out here. Could "for example, with two of them send the ground crews for the P-400s into Cactus without the risk of having them sunk on the way up by plane or torpedo, and a
we need
C-47s. Yes
know they
I
is
all
thousand other jobs.
On
returning from Buttons on this past trip
gave Purple Hearts to two
officers
I
stopped at Roses and
and one Sergeant wounded over
—
combat with Zero yet they got the Zero. Had the band and three companies of my old 24th Infantry to do the honors. After it was over I gave the dark boys a talk in regard to their responsibilities as Cactus
in
front line representatives of the military efforts of the Colored People
Hope
of America.
it
did
some good but am not
blinded with optimism.
Strother went out on a reconnaissance mission with the Bombers
one day. The B-17 he was
was
in
lost in foul
weather and they
finally
landed in the water off the coast of Buttons. All reached ashore eventually and
were brought
in,
but Strother had a bad cut on one leg
bay (you see what the Navy has done to me) for a while. As usual the B-17 broke just aft of the radio compartment and and
be
will
in the sick
sank quickly, but not before they got a
raft out.
you McCain is conducting operations from his ship at Buttons. I have Everest and Strother with him and Saunders is on shore close by. So I keep in touch through them and have been up twice myself. McCain is very reasonable, accepts advice and suggestions and is properly concerned as to the welfare of the operating personnel. Nevertheless it is a bit more difficult for the Group Commander than it would be if he were directly under familiar experienced Air Force control. However everyone concerned is doing his utmost for efficient, harmonious operation and the situation at Buttons with Marines, Army and Navy working together with but one purpose in mind is a most
As
I
told
encouraging thing to see.
Here Twining and I are in daily contact with Ghormley. He never comes ashore but we go out and board him practically every day, frequently have lunch, and go over the whole works.
and complete information. plans, thoughts
I
could not ask for a
more
and confidences than he accords.
I
He
only wish
I
smart enough to be more sure of the soundness of the advice
when he
asks for
me
gives
full
free access to his
were I
give him
it.
With the help of
my
staff;
through a personal knowledge of the
Roses and Buttons; by frequent contact with Ghormley and McCain as well as our Air Force Commanders I am situation in Fantan, Poppy,
in every possible way to keep the machine oiled so as to smooth functioning. Adequacy of supplies, proper command
endeavoring assist in its
functioning, operational procedure, communications and individual
demand attention. Airdrome construction and special emphasis on dispersion and camouflage are a daily concern. Mine is a rather
fitness
216
peculiar status, particularly during this period prior to assuming responsibility for supply
and administration, but
I
am
confident that
we
have been of assistance. Am having prepared a very brief estimate of the situation which I hope to be able to mail to General Marshall within the next few days. It will
not be a polished document, but
resume
of the situation as
should be done about
Right
—
now we
it
are
full
out to get
.
Hope we
do hope
it
will
serve to present a
what
I
believe
it.
into Cactus Early operation of
Cactus.
I
exists in this area, and
some Fighters
B-17
will, of
— and then Bombers
course, be by staging at
get out P-400s through without any losses. Every
care will be exercised and they have the range. With the Bombers able to top off at Cactus
we
can give Kieta and Buka a good plastering.
I
we must take emergency measures to help out the Marines and secure that Cactus base for
hate to deplete Poppy of Fighters but
Bomber
offensive operations.
Kind regards to
all.
M.F. HARMON Major General, U.S.A. Note:
Code Name Poppy
New
Buttons
Espiritu Santos,
Roses Fantan
Efate,
Location Caledonia
New
New
Hebrides
Hebrides
Fiji
217
HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA Noumea, New Caledonia 28 September 1942
MEMORANDUM: TO: Lieutenant General Arnold. 1.
The
following
is
a
summary
of our fighter operations at Cactus
The dates and in some cases
during the period, August 22nd to September 15th 1942.
given for different actions are estimates of the pilots are not exact.
The account
of these operations
is
based on the
consolidated reports of pilots engaged. 14 P-400s, 17 Officers, 30 enlisted
men
of the
67th Fighter Squadron completed their move to
Cactus on August 22nd 1942. The
flight of P-400s from Poppy to Roses to Button to Cactus was accomplished without incident, with navigational escort being furnished by B-17 airplanes. 2.
Air Action
The
:
when two P-400s attacked and P-400s attacked an enemy four engine flying boat and made a total of six passes upon it. The enemy airplane was left smoking and losing altitude when the P-400s were compelled to return to base due to fuel shortage. Seven P-400s were attacked at 14,000 feet by 15 Zeros. Our fighters accounted for three sure and three probable Zeros. Two P~400s were lost, both pilots parachuted to safety, while three other P-400s were damaged by enemy fire. A flight of four P-400s were attacked by six or seven Zeros at an altitude of 100 feet near Tulagi. No enemy airplanes were shot down but two P-400s with pilots are missing. In air action the P-400s were first air
action
was
destroyed a Zero fighter.
218
initiated
Two
unable to reach 23,000 feet where the Japanese bombardment habitually operate.
Support of Marines at Tasimboko
3.
The Marine
:
Tasimboko was supported by P-400s low altitude missions. on Four bombing and strafing missions were flown one day by flights of three P-400s. Our airplanes inflicted severe personnel casualties and damaged a considerable store of supplies. The Marines were loud in their praise of this supporting action and stated that the mission could not have been successfully completed without the landing action at
fighter support.
Santa Isabel Island
3.
:
On
about September 8th Japanese landing barges were discovered near Santa Isabel Island. A total of 27 boats were seen, some of which
were beached and others being off shore. Two dive bombing and strafing missions of four P-400s each were completed against this objective. At least 20 landing boats with their supplies were destroyed and the others damaged and an estimated 300 Japanese killed. Three landing boats, closely spaced and full of personnel and supplies, were attacked by Captain T.J.J. Christian. A direct hit was scored on the center boat by a 500 pound bomb and the two adjacent boats with their cargos were destroyed. Each boat was estimated to be carrying 75 Japanese.
Cape Esperance
4.
:
Japanese landing boats were discovered at Cape Esperance, when supplies and barges
were seen on the beach. P-400s attacked
this
position for three days, using a flight of four airplanes. Approximately
20 barges and a considerable store of supplies and an unknown number of personnel were destroyed. 5. Tenaru River The Marines were stopped in the action at Tenaru River on September 14th by a Japanese strong point. They asked our fighters to clean out the strong point as they were unable to reach it by ground action. Captain J.F. Thompson with two other P-400s attacked the Japanese position, which was in a valley, and necessitated our forces threading their way up and down the valley in bombing and strafing :
attacks.
The Marines completed
action had killed at least
due to our 6.
their mission
300 Japs and
and reported that our
that the success of the action
air
was
fighters.
Almost
daily
Japanese positions
bombing and
in
strafing action has
been taken against
the Jungle, however, results are
estimate because of the thick vegetation. In
all
difficult to
of these actions the
Marines have been most grateful and complimentary to our P-400 action. In a statement at Cactus General Geiger stated that without ,
exception the P-400 was the best attack type ship at the that
field.
Further,
Major Brannon and Captain Thompson were excellent and able
219
squadron commanders, that
performed 8.
in
all
pilots
an outstanding manner.
engaged
in
these actions
*
A recapitulation of these operations
indicate that our
P-400s
destroyed over 40 landing barges, large quantities of stores, supplies,
and ammunition and
killed
over 600 Japanese,
in addition to
the 4 Zeros
certain and the 3 Zeros probable.
M.F. HARMON Major General, U.S.A.
220
HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA (Forward Echelon)
Noumea,
New
Caledonia
6 October 1942
SUBJECT: Occupation TO: Comsopac 1.
From
of Ndini
a military viewpoint the occupation of Ndini at this time
under the existing strategic situation has not appealed to
measure best I
utilizing the capabilities of
me
as a
our forces.
have not previously more completely expressed subject. While fully prepared to support to the utmost
regret that
myself on this
I
final decision it does not appear that it is even now too late to review the plan, as action for its accomplishment has but just been initiated.
your
Attention
is
therefore invited to the following considerations:
understood that the primary reasons for the occupation
a. It is
of Ndini are: (1) To provide a base for airplane operation for: Antisubmarine patrol; extension of patrols to the North and Northeast and protection of east flank of Line of Communication to the Solomons. (2) (3)
To deny it to the enemy. To afford an intermediate
Cactus for staging short range
Reference in
a. (1)
field
between Button and
aircraft.
These are
all
admittedly important reasons
favor of this line of action but cannot afford our forces any benefit or
influence
the
enemy
final analysis
action for at least
two and probably three months.
they are not individually or cumulatively
vital to
In
the
success of main offensive operation or accomplishment of primary mission of maintaining security of South Pacific bases and lines of
communication.
221
Reference
develop Ndini or occupy intensive
not probable that the
a. (2) It is it
we
long as
in force as
enemy
will
are able to conduct
bomber operations from Buttons. Reference
practically
all
aircraft
b. (1)
While desirable
a. (3)
can make the
The occupation
this is not a necessity as
Button-Cactus direct.
flight
of Ndini at this time represents a
diversion from the main effort and dispersion of force.
The
situation in
Cactus-Ringbolt cannot be regarded as anything but "continuingly critical." Infiltration
enemy
continues and recent additions probably give the
Pack or other employed could a serious danger. With or without augmentation by
a force ashore in the neighborhood of 3,500.
mobile artillery
develop into
the hands of this force
in
infiltration, this force
victory
if
skillfully
if
could well tip the scales in favor of an
enemy
used against our Southern and Western front
skillfully
in
conjunction with a determined night attack from the seaward
approaches. There
is
no effective defense against
his support of
such an
attack by fire from warships. If
we do
not succeed in holding Cactus-Ringbolt our effort in
the Santa Cruz will be a total waste
The
— and
loss.
The Solomons has
to be
would be a four way victory for the Jap provide a vanguard for his strong Bismarck position, deny us a jumping off place against that position, give him a jumping off place against the New Hebrides, effectively cover his our main
effort.
—
operations against It is
my
loss of Cactus-Ringbolt
New
Guinea.
personal conviction that the Jap
Cactus-Ringbolt and that he materially strengthened.
I
will
do so
in
is
capable of retaking
the near future unless
it is
further believe that appropriate increase in
strength of garrison, rapid improvement of conditions for air operation
and increased surface action,
if
accomplished
operation so costly that he will not attempt (2)
The airdrome
in time, will
make
the
it.
(including both fields) cannot be considered
suitable for continuous operation.
The
the character of the surface on which
durability of the mat, considering it is
laid,
for continuous operation
heavy ships is open to doubt. The mat is not completed on the runway, and there are no taxiways or standings. With any considerable of
degree of cease.
rain, air operations
The Jap has
under present conditions
will practically
not shown himself unskillful at forecasting
meteorological conditions nor slow in taking advantage of them. (3) There may be some plan behind his recent method of Fighter-Bomber approach. Is there perhaps the idea that on the right
day, at the appropriate time, after having exhausted our Fighters and
apparently withdrawn his Bombers, he heavily? Dispersion at Cactus
there
is
relatively none.
to operate
them
in
We
is
will
do not have
two echelons
sufficient Fighters or facilities
of sufficient strength.
well executed, would be a stunning blow.
222
return with them and strike
poor. Of concealment and protection
Such an attack,
(4)
The
to permit the
runway and adequate facilities B-17 squadron would go far
availability of a suitable
full
effective operation of
toward the security of our position by extending the range of daylight reconnaissance and by providing a ready striking force to be used against appropriate objectives as far northwest as Buka. 2. It is
recommended
that any reconsideration of plans take
cognisance of the following proposed lines of action:
The abandonment
a.
of the Ndini operation until such time as a
condition of reasonable stability and security
is
achieved
in
the Southern
Solomons.
The immediate reinforcement of Cactus by not less than the Combat Team. The intensification, as means and conditions permit, of naval
b.
equivalent of one Infantry Regimental c.
surface action in South Solomon waters.
The prompt
d.
dispatch to Cactus of
all
the airdrome
construction personnel, equipment and construction supplies that can be
employed and used, with the initial mission of: (1) Completing one all-weather runway with taxiways and
effectively
dispersed standings. (2)
Completing a second all-weather runway with taxiways
and dispersed standings. (3)
Improvement
and protection of
Material augmentation of fuel supply to a
e.
250,000
of fueling system, dispersal, camouflage
aircraft.
minimum
level of
gallons.
Conduct of intensive
f.
air
operations from Cactus against
Bui-Tonolei-Faisi and Buka. g. air,
Continuation of intensive short range
air
operations against
land and sea objectives. h.
Occupation of
tactical localities in the
New
Georgia group by
infiltration.
3.
Appreciating that
may have I
I
have not exhausted
important considerations
in
this subject
and that you
mind that are not covered
herein,
nevertheless feel obligated to present these views to you.
M.H.
HARMON
Major General, U.S.A.
Commanding
223
HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA
MFH/DY/kl 1
APO
502, San Francisco, 20 October 1942
Lt.
Calif
Gen. H.H. Arnold,
Commanding General, Army
Air Forces
Munitions Bldg.
Washington, D.C.
Dear General Arnold:
Your letter of September 15 concerning information desired of combat participation, individual combats and experiences together with pictures is being given my personal attention. We will do our best to comply, but it is difficult due to operating conditions and distances. Anything I send in officially for publication, pictures and all, has to go through Cincpac. I note Eddie Rickenbacker and Hans Adamson are coming out this way soon. I will try to collect as much data and pictures in the meantime as possible and, while routing officially through Cincpac, will give them all I can personally to bring back for "y° ur information." Inclosed
is
recommending
a note to Saunders who, incidentally,
I
am
D.S.M. Will also award him a D.F.C. for specific air missions, but also feel he well merits a D.S.M. for the fine job of leadership he has done under extremely difficult conditions. Have finally for a
prevailed upon him to take a short rest in
leave in a few days. off for
five
We
of Cactus
who
Willis
Zealand, and he will
got three of his combat crews, nine
Aukland today and
days interval.
New
will follow
The same
men
each,
with others on a schedule of about
also for the tired
P-400 and P-39 boys out
surely have done a bang up job.
Hale
is
here for a day or two and
we have worked
out a
pretty good understanding of our mutual problems. Things are definitely
224
looking up in regard to the attainment of the ground and air (including ground echelons) forces I visualize as necessary for this area.
Cactus remains a most disturbing question.
It is right where it has our surface forces can stop the Jap freedom of action, particularly at night, and if we get the landing field operating
been from the beginning. for
B-17
ferried
— with enough
bombs
in
by
air
If
fuel
on the beach and bombs
— we can
yesterday
Halsey relieved Ghormley today. Perhaps there in
method or
the bush
— we
will
be a difference
There are some I hope for the best.
intensity of surface force action.
from Pearl.
additional surface forces enroute All
in
pull the fat out of the fire.
our P-39s are set up.
We
lost
about seven as a result of one
Most of the P-38s are set up and we have six good pilots with about 100 hours each and about ten real good P-39 pilots all of whom have had two engine time, under training. Should have a good tight little P-38 flight soon, but I am not going to unleash them night shelling at Cactus
until
Strother and
Cactus
from
is
.
McNeese
OK, some
fuel
say they are "ready to go," and the
shell fire.
Don't think there goes
I
will
ever spend
my Rainbow
back there than
I
and
it
field at
ashore and a reasonable expectation of security
fishing.
much time
in
New
Zealand
— and
Halsey seems no more inclined to move
appears that
we may be moving more and more
up here. Will keep the purely administrative part back there under Lincoln with enough to carry out our contacts with the New Zealand Army and Air Force. For the time being Breene as
of our headquarters
Commanding General Service Command will have to be there but move him up here later on. We have about 250 four second fuses on hand but no change to try them out. Art Goebel
I
I
may
as yet
brought up from Aukland and took him to Button with
us a few days ago with the idea of sending him back up as Base Commanding Officer of Saunders Bomber Field. Unfortunately he
is
having a lot of trouble with his ears. We have our best medics working on him, and we have some good ones, but I am worried about him. If they can't correct the trouble we will just have to send him back to a dry climate. if it is
Wanted you
to
know about
necessary to return him you
With kind regards from
this, as I
will
know
of your interest and
understand the reason.
all,
M.F. HARMON Major General, U.S. Army, Commanding.
225
APPENDIX
B
Citations
1.
Letter of commendation, 18 September, 1942, from Major Dale D.
Brannon,
Commander
of the 67th's
Cactus
Flight, to the
Commander,
67th Fighter Squadron. The letter commends the 30 enlisted ground crew
members assigned in the first contingent of the squadron sent to Guadalcanal. As a result of this letter, each of these men was decorated with the Legion of Merit, by order of General Harmon, May, 1943, Headquarters USAFISPA. 2.
in
General Order #123, 24
Americal Division General Order, authorizing the Presidential Distin-
guished Unit Citation to
all
of the initial
members of the Cactus contingent
of the 67th Fighter Squadron.
3. Letter from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 17 November, 1942, a commendation by Admiral William F. Halsey to all participants on the November 1942 action at Guadalcanal and surrounding area.
4.
A letter of commendation from General A.A. Vandegrift, Commander of
the 1st Marine Division, to
aviation units at Guadalcanal, dated
23
5. A commendation by Brig. General L.E. Woods, Commander of the Marine Air Wing, to all air units on Guadalcanal.
1st
all
November, 1942.
226
6. Citation
by the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, dated 4 February,
1943, to the 1st Marine Division Reinforced, authorizes that the citation
be issued to each individual who served in the initial invasion and Guadalcanal was secured and the 1st Marine Division was relieved.
until
227
SIXTY-SEVENTH FIGHTER SQUADRON 18 September 1942.
SUBJECT: Commendation. Commanding Officer, 67th Fighter Squadron. TO :
1. For an extremely hazardous mission, flight operations at Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, the following men the 67th Fighter Squadron were selected.
Tech
Sgt.
"
"
Stf.
" " "
Enoch
Dalhman
J.
Charles N. Neblock
James M. Crawford Floyd D. Cunningham " Edwin M. Czerniakowski " Felix Gurbada
Sgt.
"
"
"
"
"
Thomas W. Hurford Verne W.King
"
"
Francis
Sgt.
" "
J.
O'Connell
Kermit Carnes Robert L. Ferguson
"
JohnOhrlich Arnold H. Phillips
"
Franklin A. Ryder
"
William H. Schneider
"
Duane
"
Hugh
"
William R. Williams
E.
F.
Shumway
Slimmer
Cpl Sidney G. Hudson "
Harvey J. Lein
"
Jack H.Miller
"
Kenneth Markel DaleV. Maupin " Thomas 0. Melton "
6557048 6828715 6914288 6912728 6913315 6803475-RAR 6765109 17016117 6667896 35129349 20123249 35167031 12022235 16014023 6998385 18017856 18000754 17027535 7002119 36216711 35040022 18029384 17027324 14029208
228 i
of
Pfc William E. Flynn
11011642 17027532 17021079 14077692 20846565 16014052
Jr.
Vernard H. Trebon Fred L. Williams Pvt Archie A. Fitzgerald ff
Tony
ft
Michael Zavoskey
F.
Lopez
2. These men were transported by Navy Sea Vessel, through dangerous waters, to their destination. From the moment of debarkation
on August 23, until the undersigned was relieved of command on September 14, the services of these men were outstanding.
Through
bombing raids, sniper fire, cruiser and submarine men worked unhesitatingly in order that the airplanes would be mechanically fit as humanly possible, that they would 3.
daily
shelling at night, these
be gassed, armed, loaded with bombs,
all
set to go, in order that
all
missions could be successfully accomplished.
4.
Under conditions
of barely
enough
food, very
little
sleep,
burned, bombed, or damaged equipment, lack of equipment, these
worked up to and beyond the yet worked on and on. 5. In
limit of
the midst of death and destruction, tropic heat, hunger, and
physical weariness, these
men gave
cannot describe or appreciate. not the normal once but
6.
men
normal physical endurance, and
The
a devotion to duty that words
They were
called to give
and they gave,
five-fold.
side that has
men
like
these just cannot loose.
DALE
D.
BRANNON,
Major, Air Corps, Flight
Commander.
1st Ind.
HQ. 67th Fighter Squadron, AAF, Americal
Division,
September 19,
1942.
TO:
Commanding 1.
Officer,
The Commanding
AAF, Americal
Division.
Officer of the 67th Fighter
Squadron
is
extremely proud to pass on this information concerning the loyalty and fine spirit
with which these
men
accomplished their mission.
THOMAS H. HUBBARD, Major, Air Corps,
Commander.
229
HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION AP0 716 31 December 1943.
GENERAL ORDERS
)
NUMBER
)
67
Awards
By
of the Presidential Unit Citation
direction of the President, and authority contained in paragraph
5, Letter,
War Department, The
(29 Jul 43), subject:
Eligibility of
Adjutant General's Office,
Army Personnel
Unit Citation and ribbon bar with star, dated 5
Endorsement, Headquarters USAFISPA, the following-named officers and enlisted
APO men
200.6
November 1943, and 502,
AG
dated 10 December 1943, the Presidential Unit Citation
who served
AG
to the Presidential 1st
200.6 (7)1, is awarded to
of the Americal Division
combat with the First Marine Division, Reinforced, on Guadalcanal at any time during the period 7 August 1942 to 9 December 1942: in actual
(Sent to each individual with
name
entered here)
By command
of
Major General
HODGE:
CM. McQUARRIE Colonel, General Staff Corps
Chief of Staff
OFFICIAL: W.H.
BIGGERSTAFF
Lieutenant Colonel, Adjutant General's Department Adjutant General
230
KV10/A3-2(6)/her (C-132)
HEADQUARTERS, FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FLEET MARINE FORCE, c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. November
17, 1942.
WING MEMORANDUM) :
NUMBER 1.
The
Southern
Commendation.
2C-1942) following radio message received from the
Pacific, is
quoted for the information of
all
Commander,
aircraft units
attached to this base:
17
NOVEMBER
1942
TO THE SUPERB OFFICERS AND MEN ON LAND — ON SEA— IN THE AIR— AND UNDER THE SEA WHO HAVE PERFORMED SUCH MAGNIFICENT FEATS FOR OUR COUNTRY IN THE PAST FEW DAYS X YOU HAVE WRITTEN YOUR NAMES IN GOLDEN LETTERS ON THE PAGES OF HISTORY AND WON THE
UNDYING GRATITUDE OF YOUR COUNTRYMEN X MY — NO HONOR FOR
PRIDE IN YOU IS BEYOND EXPRESSION YOU COULD BE TOO GREAT X
MAGNIFICENTLY DONE X GOD BLESS EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU X TO THE GLORIOUS DEAD — HAIL HEROES— REST WITH GOD X SIGNED HALSEY
BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL WOODS: OFFICIAL:
M. SANPAS Major,
USMC,
W-2 231
1990-5-30 Headquarters, First Marine Division
066/216
Fleet Marine Force,
C/O Postmaster, San
Francisco, Calif.
November
DIVISION CIRCULAR) :
NUMBER 1.
.
.
—
Commendation
23, 1942
of certain Aviation Units
30a-42)
The Commanding General
takes pride and pleasure in
transmitting herewith the following
commendatory dispatch from the
Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet:
"CONVEY MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS TO EACH 01 THE WILDCAT AND AIRCOBRA PILOTS WHO TOOK PART IN THE ATTACK ON ENEMY AIRCRAFT ON 12 NOVEMBER DURING WHICH 16 TORPEDO BOMBERS AND 5 ZEROS WERE SHOT DOWN WHILE ATTEMPTING TO ATTACK FRIENDLY SHIPPING OFF GUADALCANAL" 2. It is
the pilots
directed that a copy of this Circular be delivered to each of
who took
part in the above-mentioned action.
s/
A.A. Vandegrift
A. A.
Distribution: All units.
VANDEGRIFT
HEADQUARTERS SECTION FIRST MARINE AIR WING, CACTUS To
all
Cactus based First Marine Aircraft Wing units and other
attached units (VT-8, VB-10, VF-10, 67th Pursuit Squadron, 39th Pursuit Squadron, and 339th Pursuit Squadron) at Guadalcanal:
On November German
11th, the anniversary of our final defeat of the
forces, the Japanese
struck in an
all
Navy,
Army and
their air forces,
out attempt to retake this island. So intent and
determined was the enemy to accomplish this objective that it gathered together over a period of weeks an armada of not less than two airplane carriers, two battleships, three heavy cruisers, six light cruisers,
twenty destroyers, and
transports, capable of carrying supplies;
and
this
at least twelve large
more than 30,000 troops and
their
armada was reinforced by numerous land-based
aircraft.
After five days of furious fighting off this
we
have, almost unaided, beaten
formidable force by our airpower, and in so doing, have
destroyed sixty-five
enemy
airplanes, a battleship, twelve
numbers of troops and quantities have heavily damaged four enemy cruisers. transports, large
of supplies, and,
This feat of arms was accomplished by the combined Marine, Navy and Army pilots and their ground crews, who had already
performed on
enemy
planes,
this island
heavy
weeks
of ardous
combat duty. Neither
anti-aircraft fire, miserable flying conditions,
no intense fatigue halted our pilots from pushing home attack after attack until even a powerful and persistent enemy was forced to
233
give way.
The
planes with which these tremendous tasks have
been carried out were kept in operation only by the unremitting persistence, ingenuity and courage of our ground crews, who worked day and night, under bombing and shell fire, to keep our planes flying.
Every man has
in
in
the First Marine Air Wing, and
these past five days lived up
traditions of our flying force;
its
attached units,
to, in fact exalted,
the finest
and has thereby insured us the
possession of this island, and the
final
defeat of the enemy.
/s/
L.E.
Woods
/t/
L.E.
WOODS,
Brigadier General,
Commanding
234
USMC,
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington 4 February 1943 (Sent to each individual, with
name
entered here) Cited in the
THE
Name
of
The President of the United States FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED Under Command
of
Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, U.S.M.C.
CITATION: "The
and enlisted
officers
men
of the First
Marine Division,
Reinforced, on August 7 to 9, 1942, demonstrated outstanding gallantry
and determination against a
number
in successfully
executing forced landing assaults
of strongly defended Japanese positions
on Tulagi,
Gavutu, Tanambogo, Florida and Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands, completely routing
base and Pacific
airfield
Ocean.
all
the
enemy forces and seizing a most valuable enemy zone of operations in the South
within the
From
the above period until 9 December, 1942, this
Reinforced Division not only held their important strategic positions despite determined and repeated Japanese naval, air and land attacks,
but by a series of offensive operations against strong enemy resistance drove the Japanese from the proximity of the airfield and inflicted great losses on them by land and air attacks. The courage and determination displayed in these operations
were
of an inspiring order."
/s/
Frank Knox
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
235
APPENDIX
C
Intelligence Reports
A selection of Intelligence Reports relating to air actions in which the Army Cactus Flight took 1.
part.
An interview, dated 16 October,
Fighter Squadron, concerning
2. Intelligence
1942, with Captain Mitchell of the 67th
air action
on 9 October, 1942.
report on a P-38 mission by the 339th Fighter Squadron
over Tonolei, Bougainville, led by Major Dale D. Brannon on 18 November, 1942.
3.
An interview dated 6 March, 1943, with Captain Jerome R. Sawyer, and
his flight,
236
concerning
air action
over the Russell Islands, near Guadalcanal.
United States Pacific Fleet
AIRCRAFT SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE A8 071
Serial
CONFIDENTIAL To:
Commander Aircraft, South Pacific Force Commander South Pacific Force
Subject:
Naval Air Combat Intelligence.
From:
EXTRACT (C)
Memorandum
of interview
by Lieut. Gail Burck, Naval Air Combat
Intelligence with Captain Mitchell and other pilots of 67th Pursuit
Squadron
in
regard to combat with
enemy
(9 Oct 42)
planes.
C.McK. LYNCH,
By Copy
Jr.
Direction
to:
BuAer. CinCPac.
ComAirPac.
1.
Date: 9 October 1942 Time: 0655 Love Place: Lat. 08°oo S., Long. 158°E.
2.
Weather: Clear at altitude of contact
3.
Unit Reporting: Lieut. Gail Mitchell,
4.
AAF, and
five five
J.
— 6/10 clouds 1200
ft.
Burck interview with Captain
other pilots of 67th Pursuit Squadron.
Nature of Operation: Protection for SBDs in attack on surface vessels.
237
5.
Forces engaged
P-39D-2s with
7.
8.
20mm
P-39Ks with 37mm cannon, 4 cannon) Enemy: 5 serial 33 float biplanes
bomber 95) and 2
(recon.
6.
— Own: 6 P-39s
(2
floatplane zeros.
— Own: Generally from above — See Paragraph #16 Type Enemy Tactics — Remarkable maneuvering — see #16 Brief Description Action: Capt. Mitchell P-39s — Types
of Attack
of
of
led flight of six
approached target area at 12,000'. Spotted Jap planes below and peeled off for individual dogfights, choosing opponet at randum. #16 9.
—
Weapons Employed Own: .50-cal and cannon) Enemy: 7.7 machine gun.
10. Evasive Action
11.
Employed: See
20mm
cannon (or
37mm
PP #16
Ammunition Expended: Comparatively small amount, because
of
many jams. 12. Results
—
certain: 1 serial
33 destroyed and probably 2
additional
serial 33's.
13.
Damage
to
own
aircraft:
4 planes
— none. Shaw — 2 7.7 — many 7.7 Lt.
prop and cowling. Capt Sharpsteen wings,
tail
—
pilot
wounded
in face
hits in
hits in cockpit,
by glass splintered from cockpit
window. 16.
Remarks: Capt. Mitchell dove on Jap biplane from behind and 3000 on 3rd shot with 37mm cannon hit biplane just under rear gun position, which blew it to pieces. His cannon then jammed, as did .50-cal., so missed several subsequent set-ups. Feels that all jams
feet above Jap twisted and turned, but Mitchell followed in and
due to newness of guns and that would otherwise have destroyed all in speed and climb, the P-35s wonderfully maneuverable. The latter were dark colored
Jap planes, since P-39s had decided advantage
2-place single float biplanes, with top speed of 170 mph.
Capt. Sharpsteen dived past a biplane from 5000' above and
behind but probably missed with .50-cal
full
deflection shot.
head on attack —
—
Came back
all his up met another biplane in he was hit many times by Jap who came straight in so close Sharpsteen
had to dodge
— he
Lieut. Purnell
guns jammed, and
left fight.
dove from 500' above and behind S-53 which turned
sharply but could not dodge
— Purnell followed shooting
.50-cal as
20mm cannon was jammed — saw pieces fly off Jap plane — down in spin. Lieut.
238
Shaw
— Made head on attack on biplane
at
8000' coming so
close together that
Shaw had
to
dodge
off,
Jap never wavered. Shaw's
plane hit in prop by 7.7 machine gun bullets. .50-cal
and
20mm
him again as he Lt.
Farron
guns; Jap
fell in spin.
Shaw
hit
Jap both with
Lieut. Farron 2000'
below
hit
saw him continue fall into clouds. His only burst was into Shaw's cripple. All his guns
fell
past and
— — Made 3 head on passes, one on Float Zero and 2
then jammed and he
left fight.
Lieut. Gillon
(one each) on 2 biplanes. Undership target every time. Guns jammed on
3rd pass so
left fight.
He
feels
he should have
hit all
3 planes except for
poor gunnery.
The P-39s proved faster in every way then Jap biplanes, the latter can out manouver them. The Jap biplanes were 2-place jobs, top speed 170 mph with 2 or more guns, probably all 7.7 machine guns, all in nose, none in wings.
The Jap
aviators
were expert, getting every inch
out of their inferior planes, and twisting to give hardest possible shots, or else carrying an attack clean home.
239
347th
FIGHTER DETACHMENT CACTUS December
SUBJECT: Report on P-38 Escort Mission
20,
to Bougainville (on 18
1942
No-
vember, 1942)
TO: G-2, USAFISPA, POPPY At 1400, nine P-38s took off to escort Harbor on the southern tip of Bougainville.
B-17s to Tonolei were Major Dale D. Brannon, Capt. Wm. C. Sharpsteen, 1st Lts. D.N. Fincher, D.C. Goerke, A.B. Farquarson, D.P. Miller, D.G. Canning, E.E. Brzuska, and 2nd Lt. G.L. Reagh. Soon after takeoff Lt. Miller returned due to five
Pilots
engine trouble.
The P-38s flight circled
flew in formation at
16000
feet over the B-17s.
out over the Coral Sea area in order to
over the target area on the
home
were
was cloudy and
unlimited, however,
Upon reaching
it
stretch.
Enroute
make one ceiling
The
pass
and
visibility
rainy over the target area.
the target our air task force was jumped by at least
some float Zeros, the majority of the planes being float biplanes, the same as previously encountered in this area. The enemy planes made for our fighters and did not seem to attempt to work on our bombers which immediately left thirty planes, a
few land-based square wing
tip
Zeros,
the area without dropping their bombs. However, three phosphorous
bombs were seen
to explode near our
bombers evidently dropped from
planes above. In the ensuing struggle, Lt.
Reagh who had flown up with
supercharger on his right engine out made one pass at a
made in.
Lt.
made
240
a hit in top of the
Reagh came on
enemy
in to
cockpit, and thinks he
float biplane,
saw the plane
Cactus Major Brannon, leading the
a pass at a float biplane and
.
saw
it
go down
in flames, also
spin
flight,
another probable
float biplane. Lt.
Fincher shot a
float biplane
flames. Capt. Sharpsteen got one probable float biplane.
observed. Lt. Brzuska was hit by a coolant system in his
Farquarson was
left
down
No AA
fire
in
was
20MM shell which knocked out the
engine which rendered
hit eight times, six in
the
tail
it
useless. Lt.
of approximately .50-
through his flap, and one 20MM which wing leaving a large hole. However, all P-38s came away safely leaving the final score two enemy fighters shot down (confirmed), and three probable. Our P-38s picked up the B-17s near Lambeti, New Georgia, area and saw the B-17s unload their bombs on the fighter strip there. All P-38s landed safely at Cactus The conclusions drawn are the same as submitted in all previous the P-38 is not an escort fighter the plane is too reports unmanouverable and blind. The P-38 has not yet been sent out at its proper altitude, and the B-17s are always at a poor altitude for the P-38. If our pilots had some P-40s or P-51s, they could have had a field caliber size,
exploded
one
20MM.
in his right
.
—
day over Tonoli and given the Japs a real shellacing.
GEORGE W. PHILLIPS Captain Air Corps Actg. Gp. G-2
241
347TH FIGHTER GROUP
ADVANCED ECHELON APO 709
—
Interception. SUBJECT: Combat Report TO: Commanding General, USAFISPA.
1.
— March 1943. 1230, land 1450. Place — Area Russell Northwest Date
6,
Time— Take
off
Islands
to Eastern end of
New
Georgia.
—
2.
Weather
3.
Combat Forces
Visibility
and
ceiling unlimited.
— Own: Four P-39Ks. Enemy: 12 Dive Bombers
(Vals),
25 Fighters
(ZEKES).
— Patrol over Russell two Vals — Four Vals — Bombing Russells with undetermined
4.
Operation
5.
Enemy
6.
Our
7.
Information data:
Islands.
losses
losses
(sure),
of
(Probable).
results.
Japanese forces had completed their evacuation of the Russell
on February 7th, and our reconnaissance of the islands began shortly afterward. A dawn-to-dusk patrol to cover our landing operations was begun on February 21st. Islands
242
8.
Geographical data: Russell Islands (Pavavu and Banika) are about 100 square miles in size, and are approximately 30 miles W-NW of Henderson Field. Buraku Island is in the same direction and about 80 miles from Henderson. Getukai Island is the nearest of the New Georgia group, and about 115 miles from Henderson.
9.
Fighter Pilots Involved: Capt.
JEROME
1st Lt
R.
ARNOLD
SAWYER
M.
1st Lt WALLACE D. MCCLENDON Jr.
PATTERSON
1st Lt
ISSAAC
L.
LALLONDE Capt Sawyer was the flight leader with McClendon his wing man. Lt Patterson led the second element with Lallonde on his wing. 10.
Combat Account: Lt Patterson's report (paraphrased): "Capt Sawyer was leading us in our regular Russells patrol at about 9,000 feet. 'Recon'
Sawyer and told him that enemy aircraft and apparently headed for Guadalcanal or Tulagi and to remain on station. I looked in that direction
(fighter director) called
was
in the vicinity
(Florida Islands),
and saw a
flight of
close formation.
enemy
flight
attacking an
about 30 planes at about 12,000
From
this I conclude that this
feet, all in
was the
one
entire
(excepting five Zeros who,
I
SBD
my former experience,
on anti-sub
patrol). In
understand, were the
Zeros usually were considerably above the TBs making lazy
maneuvers, lazy eights, etc.; this time they flew straight away, with no scissoring whatsoever, and right on top of the bombers.
"We
until Recon advised us that the enemy up over the Russells. Capt Sawyer was unaware of all this as his receiver was out, and his first sight of the bombers was when the enemy was heading Northwest towards home. "The first element of bombers, the fixed landing gear type, had outrun their protection and were going hell-bent about 200 feet over the water. Sawyer, at a wing dip, led us into a left echelon, and we swooped down and made a standard gunnery run (high side pass) on them. All four of us hit the first, which went away smoking and burning. Sawyer hit the second, McClendon and I set it afire, and Lallonde got what was left. It exploded on contact with the water. As we completed this, four more bombers in groups of two, came our way, and our same tight, concentrated offensive was repeated. Sawyer's element took the first group, and mine the
was
maintained patrol
splitting
must have killed the pilot, for the plane plummeted right into the water, no smoke, no fire. "Then came the Zeros: About fifteen of them dove down into my element. They were a little late though, because we had second.
I
hit
one and
it
243
already contacted six bombers and there were
more
to come.
We
turned right into and under them, and Ihey overshot us considerably and never came in closer than 700 - 800 yards. It was a funny situation.
We were proceeding from the sea,
East toward the
bombers passing us and going the other way. So, while diving under the Zeros, we were able to fire into the passing bombers, and set one of them smoking. I didn't see him go down. "The Zeros didn't pursue us, the bombers had all left, so we Russells with Zeros after us and
cruised around for several minutes looking for Capt. Sawyer.
During
this
time
I
saw four planes
in
that the Bogies had left the area and
And
the water.
we were
I
advised Recon
ordered to pancake.
that's that!"
Capt Sawyer's report (paraphrased): "Patterson has covered it up to the 'Zero point.' I didn't see their fighters at all. After we had accounted for the first two bombers, each element, mine and Patterson's, contacted another pair.
and he went down.
We
I
hit
one
in the right
started then to chase his partner,
wing-root
who was
smoking. What evasive maneuvers he took!
He went around Baruka
Island three times with us right after him.
called Patterson to
around and meet him on the other contact.
I
assume he was
I
side, but could not
also quite
busy
at the time.
go
make The VB was
barely 50 feet off the water constantly changing direction by decisive turns. (He could turn inside a P-39).
and hedgehopped the
reefs.
He ducked
into coves
We had killed his rear-gunner,
but
we
ran out of ammunition and had to abandon the chase at Gatukai Island.
bombers could do well to use that pilot's evasive tactics. He was damned good he kept as low possible over the water, thus preventing us from making any "I believe that
all
dive
—
as
he constantly made sharp turns, and always had his gunner in a good shooting position. It was fortunate for us that this tail gunner had been killed early in the chase. "After abandoning the chase, I went back to the Russells, and inasmuch as we were receiving some AA fire from our own ground positions there, I thought it might be a good idea to get back home. "I can't complete this though without giving unstinted praise to our two wing men, Lts Lellande and McClendon. This was their first combat hour, and their combat flying was excellent. They followed every rule of air discipline and followed their element altitude passes; tail
leaders at
11.
all
times.
They deserve
all
the credit in the world,"
Comment:
From an interview with Fighter Director representative and from diagnosis of their plot sheet, the following was learned: (Data is in relation to Henderson Field.)
244
a.
Contact at 1323; course 295 degrees; distance 80 mi; 5 or
more
aircraft.
b.
Contact at 1333; course 285 degrees; distance 70 mi; 10
c.
Contact at 1344; course 270 degrees; distance 40
d.
A
or
more
aircraft.
series of small plots, indicating that the
up into groups and were
at
low
mi;.
enemy had
split
altitudes.
The last large plot was at 140 degrees when the bogies were home on a course of 300 degrees. Conclusion: the flight
heading
approached the Russells from the Northeast, went South to Southwest of the Russells, then went East to a position Southeast of the Russells,
from which point they swept
into the attack.
12. Conclusions:
Credit must be given to Capt Sawyer for one sure and one probable to Lt Patterson one sure and one probable; and tolhe ;
whole
flight
— two
sure; In view of the circumstances,
absolutely perfect interception.
power accounted
The whole
flight's
it
was an
concentrated
fire
two bombers. Even when the elements separated, the teamwork within the elements left nothing for the first
to be desired.
Postscript:
This report would not show the true picture if it did not include an item of honest-to-goodness
human interest. The P-39 pilots, during their stay at
Guadalcanal, had "nicknamed" each other, using the names of personali-
from the writings of Damon Runyan: "Big Nig," "Harry the Horse," "Guinea Mike," "Handaxe John," "Dancing Dan," "Sorrowful," etc. These names were always used in their ordinary conversation. Hence, when Capt Sawyer, in the episode around Buraku Is, called Lt ties
Patterson, he actually said
this:
"Spanish John to Little Isadore. Have
chased this character around the island to get this joker in
until
I
am tired.
It
would be greatly
you went around the other side of the island the middle." Which would have been very confusing to
appreciated by Spanish John
if
the enemy, no doubt.
American spirit which, evidenced sense of humor, does not allow itself to be smothered even when it is
It
in its
seems
enveloped
in
to be characteristic of the
such 'Delicate' circumstances as herein described. /s/ Lt. (jg)
Air
Joseph E. McGuigan,
Combat
USNN,
Intelligence.
245
APPENDIX
Pilots of the
Cactus
D
Army
Flight
of pilots in the Army Cactus Flight are listed in the order in which they first appear in the daily action report, during early operations at
The names Henderson
TJJ.
Field, Guadalcanal,
Christian
Sawyer
J.R.
D.D. Brannon
D.P. Miller
B.E. Davis
J.K.
W.H.B. Erwin E.E. Brzuska D.H. Fincher
JJ. Walsh
R.E. Chilson
G.G.
Dewey
Thompson V.L. Head
B.F.
Holmes
L.H.
Ramp
P.M. Childress
K.S. Fjelstad
B.H. Dillon
D.S. Canning
R.B. Johnston
R.W. Kerstetter A.M. Patterson M.C. Haedtler T.H. Hubbard
J.A.
Z.D. Fountain
L.M. Glazier B.W. Brown A.H. Dutton
Jarman R.M. Ferguson
246
through December 1942.
Morton
R.E. Kaiser J.R.
Campbell
J.W. Mitchell
Jacobson
J.T.
J.
E.H. Farnam
W.C. Sharpsteen W.L. Dinn
A.B. Farquharson
F.V. Purnell
D.C. Goerke
E.L.
Dews
O.G. Gillon TT T f»i H.L. Stern
F. Clark
K. Banneld
E. Conrad
L.K. Barron
P.M. Hansen T T TTT TTT H.W. Waldmeyer E. Novak
V. Harter
1
E.E. Barr J.N.
Geyer
R.C. Williams J.D. VT
T~>
McLanahan T
J*
•
N.F. Inciardi E.L. Norris t7 TTT
TT
11
<
Boots B.B. Toland Baker S.A. Palmer 1~» T"»
TVI
K.W. Kellum R.D. Shambrook R. Bauer TTT T> TT 11 W.T. Hull M.E. Ryan 11 TTT R.W. Tulhs C. Brewster
Hancock R.D, Kennedy
W.W. Patton
J.E. Obermiller
•
F.F. Ploetz
R. Hilken
G.A. Heckert T>
TT*
R. Hine
L.G. Huff T*
P.
TT
1
247
Index 11th
Bombardment Group,
45-49,
60, 69, 95, 117, 141
11th Marines, 76, 152, 153, 161 5th Battalion of, 101 5th Air Force Group, South Pacific,
30 5th Defense 5th Fighter
Battalion,
1st Battalion,
48
58th Pursuit Group, 5, Division,
7, 9,
59,
Group,
Marine Division, Reinforced, 2, 47, 49, 81, 185 1st Parachute Battalion, 49 1st Raider Battalion, 49, 87, 95, 100-106, 110, 115-118, 129, 137 44th Fighter Squadron, 186, 194, 196 46th Field Artillery, 160 1st
164th Infantry, 46, 110, 121, 137, 153-155, 161-162, 179-180 Infantry, 167,
exchange procedure for, 113 Game Cock insignia for, 66, 208 Jagstaffel nickname for, 84
movement of, 175 photo of, 39 67th Pursuit Squadron, 2-24 offensive
MAG-23, 46
9th Station Hospital,
70th Medium Bombardment Squadron, 186 65th Material Squadron, 15 65th Pursuit Squadron, 20 67th Fighter Squadron (May 15,
bomb
10
46-54,
65-67, 71, 84, 108-109 1st Marine Division Air
190
Noumea,
N.C.,
33 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, 160 2nd Marines, 121, 129
248
Battalion of, 156
1942), 24-210 delivery to, 142
5th Marines, Reinforced, 49
182nd
161-162
2nd
159
160
Command, 210
Combat Team Two, 49
Marine
49
70th Fighter Squadron, 123, 130,
5th Marines, 104, 105, 121, 129, 155, 161
1st
1st Battalion of, 48,
3rd Battalion of, 129, 161 7th Marines, 112-121, 129, 153-155,
renaming
of,
24
67th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 209 68th Fighter Squadron, 123, 159, 163, 206
68th Pursuit Squadron, 8 68th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 209 69th Pursuit Squadron, 5, 10, 49 3rd Marine Defense Battalion, 48, 49, 161 13th Air Depot Group, New Caledonia, 35,
206
13th Fighter
207, 210
Command,
160, 185,
38th Division, 165 339th Fighter Squadron, 122-123, 159, 163-169, 176-178, 190-206 347th Fighter Group, 120-123, 130, 159-168, 178-180, 186, 190, 196-201, 210 347th Tactical Fighter Wing, 209 25th Division, 159, 185 25th Japanese Air Flotilla, 69 27th Infantry, 190 26th Yankee Division, 12 23rd Marine Air Group, after-action report on, 106
245th Field
Artillery,
167
A USMC, 139
Abbot, Capt. R.A. Aichi dive
bombers "VAL," 53
Air
Base Expansion Program, 10
Air
Command, COMAIRSOLS, 186
Air
Corps Technical Supply, 127 210
Air Force, 13th, 160, 185, 207,
Wing, 1 st Marine, 46, 61,71, 93, 139 Akagi(Japanese aircraft carrier), 44
Air
Aleutian Islands, 43 Amberjack (submarine), 155
Americal Division, 12, 46, 48, 110, 186 American Expeditionary Force (World War I), 7 American Volunteer Group (China), 8, 16 Amerine, Lt. R.R. USMC, 90 Ames, Lt. Roger, 202 Anglin,
Lt.
202
Everett,
ANZAC, 14 Aola Bay, 160 Argentina, 12 Army 13th Troop Carrier Squadron, 144 Army Air Corps, 5 Arnold, Gen. H.H. (Hap), 5, 56, 178, 211-218, 224 Astoria (cruiser), 54
Athena,
HMS
Balboa,
20
44
67-69, 76, 130, 154, 165, 189,
192
"Banzai," 149 Lt. Rex, 200-204 Barr, Lt. Edger E., 143, 152 Bate, Lt. O.M., 164 Baton Rouge Air Base, 10 Bauer, Maj. Harold W., 37, 148, 171 Bauer, Lt. Robert, 164, 181, 182 Beach Red, 51, 53, 62, 63 Beachey, Sgt. Paul, 8 Bell, Maj. G.A. USMC, 139 Berger, Sgt. Willard, 8 Betelgeuse (transport), 166
Barber,
BF109 German
fighter, 151
biplanes, 7
4 Bloody Ridge, 56-57, 100-109, 118, 121, 149, 153 hand-to-hand combat on, 101 Boise (cruiser), 133 Bombardment Group, 11th, 45-49, blitzkrieg,
60, 69, 95, 117, 141
Bora Bora, 13 Borneo, 42 Bougainville, 51, 67, 76, 81, 110-112, 176, 188, 192, 197-206 Boulouparis, New Caledonia, 32 Bourake, New Caledonia, 32 Brannon, Maj. Dale D., 8, 14-27, 32-40, 59-62, 71-72,78,84-89, 94-97, 113-116, 121, 167, 176-
178 Brannon's Bomb Crater, 94, 96 Brett, Gen. George H., 9, 15, 20 Brewster, Lt. Gordon, 181 British Solomon Islands Defense Force, 67 Brooklyn Army Terminal, 11 Brown, Lt. Bryan, 33, 104, 114 Brown, Lt. F.S., 198 Bruce, Capt. James, 16, 28 Brzuska, Lt. Edmund E., 39, 61, 84,
Buchanan
(destroyer), 133,
167
Buka, 49, 51, 54, 67, 110, 140 Burroughs (transport), 78-80
C C-47transport,61,71, 113, 144, 147 Cactus Air Force, 58, 112,1 36-1 39, 145-148, 159, 163
Cactus
B
Flight, 120,
pilots of, 4, 30,
46-51,
60-62, 73, 93-95, 102,112-117, 130, 140-141, 154, 165, 169,
186 B-24 Liberator, 198
13
Buin, 165, 197, 200
American reinforcement of, 13 armed forces of (ANZAC), 14 Japanese advance on, 2 Japanese threat to, 41 Australian Coast Watchers, 45,
B-17 Flying Fortress,
Panama Canal Zone,
Ballard (destroyer), 110, 115 Banfield, Lt. Kenneth C, 133
94, 176
(transport), 18,
Australia, 13, 42,
B-26, 48, 186
123
246-247
Cactus, Operation, 2, 40, 46, 54-62, 72-79, 115, 119, 211 August 1942, 73 Japanese sniping attacks on, 109 September 1942, 83
249
Cactus-Ringbolt, Operation, 213, 222 Caldwell, Lt. T.F., 95, 101
Calhoun
(destroyer),
Callaghan, R.
Camp
Adm.
119,
79
Daniel, 165-171
Darley, Australia, 13, 14, 15
Campbell, Lt. James R., 120, 145 Canal Zone, 12, 13 Canberra (cruiser), 54 Canning, Lt. Douglas S., 120, 132, 176, 202
Cape Esperance,
51, 95, 134-136,
151-153, 180, 191, 219 Carl, Capt. Marion, 71,
116
Dillon, Lt. Barclay, Jr., 74-79, 191
Dinn, Lt. Wallace S., 133, 142-145, 154-156, 163-164 Dive Bomber Squadron VMSB 232, 48, 61, 75
Doma
Cove, 144, 164 Jimmy, 3 Doyle, Lt. D., 164 Drum, Gen. Hugh, 4 Dugout Sunday, 154, 155 Doolittle,
Dumbea, New Caledonia, 33-36 Duncan (destroyer), 133, 134 Dust-Bowl
Field, 33, 35,
Dutton,
Albert H, 33, 74, 78-80
Lt.
36
Celebes, 42
Chaney, Chicago
Lt.
H.F., Jr.,
(cruiser),
E
139
54
Childress, Lt. Peter H., 31, 74-79, 84-87, 94-96, 113, 176, 183 Chilson,
Robert
Lt.
E., 10, 39, 60, 63,
75-79
China Detail, 16 Chitose (seaplane Choiseul, 51 Chokai
100-105 carrier),
70
144
(cruiser),
Christian, Capt.
Thomas
28, 40, 59-60, 78-85,
J., Jr. 16,
94
Cicero Kid, 36
Efate Island, 37, 49, 59-62 Eichenburger, Ensign C. E., 98 Eldridge, Lt. Cmdr. John, Jr., 132,
154 Ellice Islands,
Clagett, Brig. Gen., 9
,
W.H. Bruce,
Erwin,
COMSOPAC,
F4F Grumman
221
43 Coral Sea, 42, 44 Corkey, 36 Corregidor, 15, 146 Corsairs (F-4U), 198 Cramer, Lt., 197 Cristobal, Panama Canal Zone, 13 Islands,
53
Enterprise (carrier), 48, 51 70-72, 147, 157, 165, 170-171
Lt. Frank, 164, 166 Clemens, Capt. Martin, 67 Clinton, Ontario, 9 Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton, 185 Collins, Sgt. Ward, 8 COMAIRSOLS, 186 Combat Group A, 49 Combat Team Two, 5th Marines, 49
Clark,
Cook
43
Elliot (transport),
226-235
citations,
Eager Eagle, 36 Eaker, Lt. Gen. Ira C, 3 East China Sea, 42 Edson's Ridge, 100 Edson, Lt. Col. Merritt, 87, 95,
Lt.
F F-15 Eagle, 209 F-4 Phantom, 209 Wildcat, 37, 48-49, 61, 71-79, 84-86, 93, 98, 123,
136-140, 154, 164, 166, 170
F4U
Corsairs, 198
Fantan, 217 Farenholt (destroyer), 133, 134
Farnam,
Lt.
Ellery
H.,
Cristobal (transport), 12
Curtiss (seaplane tender), 49
Farrant,
Dauntless (SBD), 48-49, 61, 72-79, 84-85, 95-98, 101, 115 Davis,
Lt.
B.E., 61, 80, 84, 88, 95,
104-106 Davis, Sgt.
Defense
Battalion, 3rd Marine, 48,
49, 161
Edna and Harry A., 14 Dewey, Lt. George B., 20, 120, 140, Deller,
145, 151, 162
Dews,
250
Lt.
Edwin L, 133, 145
Richard., 11
Lt.,
Ferguson,
fighter
Lt.
commands,
U.S.
Army
Air
Corps. 5th,
Armond, 206
Lt.
115 B., 113, 115,
132, 133, 142-145 Robert M., 39, 96, 103, 113-115, 120-124, 164, 172 Fernam, E.H., 113
Farron,
Dahlman, S/Sgt. Enoch, 8
94
114-117, 129-133, 140, 147-148, 157-166, 171, 173, 182
Farquharson, Lt. Albert 120-125, 176
D
61, 75,
Espiritu Santo, 49, 58-61, 69-74,
210
13th, 160, 185, 207,
210
fighter group, 347th, 120-123, 130,
159-168, 178-180, 186, 190, 196-201, 210 Fighter Group Headquarters, New Caledonia, 35 Fighter-1 runway, 95
1
1
squadrons VF-5, 95, 113 VMF-121, 137 VMF-212, 148, 156 VMF-223, 74, 93, 102, 113 VMF-224, 85, 86, 90, 93, 102, 113 Fiji Islands, 43-49, 54
fighter
Fincher, Lt. Deltis, 29, 39, 59-61, 71-78, 84-89, 96, 114, 176-177
Finkenstein, Lt., 198 First Pursuit Group, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 Fitzgerald, A.A., 116, 120
120 Fletcher, Adm. Frank
Felix
"Gunner,"
Haedtler, Lt. Martin C, 10, 142-145, 151, 152, 162
39,
Hale, Willis, 224
Haley,
Lt.
USMC, 139
Halmahera Island, 42 Halsey, Adm. William
F.,
55, 56,
119, 157, 158, 172, 181, 186
Fjelstad, F.S.,
46-54, 69,
J.,
Gurbada, S/Sgt. 112, 116, 128
71
Hansen, Lt. Donald, 166 Harmon, Maj. Gen. Millard F., 48-55, 115-119,140,158,181,185, 212 letters of, 21
Florida Island, 49, 51 Flying Fortress, 4
Haruna, 138 Hawaiian Islands, 43 Hawk, 7 Head, Lt. Vernon L, 74, 84-89, 94, 134, 176
Flying Pole, 36 Flying Tigers, 8, 16 (transport), 60-62
Fomalhaut
New
Fort Dix,
Foss,
Jersey,
1
Joseph,
Capt.
Heatter, Gabriel, 101
137,
154,
164-167 Fountain, Lt. Zed D., 74, 78, 84, 86, 92-95, 114, 183 Foye, Major Robert, 8, 11, 22-24 France, Nazi invasion of, 4
Freeman,
W.B. USMC, 137
Lt.
189
Hill,
7, 20, 36,
66
Island, 49, 51
Gavutu
Geyer,
Field, Lt.
New
Guinea, 208
James A.,
164, 173, 174,
198
Henderson
53-58, 119, 148, 211, 212
42
Gillon, Lt. O.G.,
132-135
Glazier, Lt. Linwood, 26, 74, 85, 88,
94, 96, 113, 183
1942, 141 radar installation on, 76 strafing attack on, 77 Henderson, Maj. Lofton, 56 Hiryu (carrier), 44
Holmes,
Lt.
Goerke,
Delton
Lt.
C,
Lt.
Besby, 132, 137-145,
152, 162, 202-204 Hornet (carrier), 133, 157
Horton's Schooner, 163 Howecraft, Boatswain's Mate 1st Cl.,61
Hubbard, Capt. Thomas, 129, 132, 137, 140 Hudson, Cpl. Sidney, 148 Hull, Lt. William T. 164 Hunter Liggett
(transport),
16,
28,
53
Hurford, J.H., 116
Lawrence, 202
Gnaebner,
120
Field, 46, 56-83, 95-98,
109-112, 123
Ghormley, Vice Adm. Robert, 46-48, Gifu, The, 189 Gilbert Islands,
133
Hiei (battleship), 168-170
Geiger, Gen. Roy S., 106, 112, 136-139, 148, 186 George, Lt. Col. Harold L., 5
Gerney
(cruiser),
Hell's Bells, 36, 103,
September 1942 air raid on, 85 armaments on, 65 Japanese shelling of 13 October
116
Game Cock insignia,5,
Helena
1
Galer, Maj. Robert E., 85, 95, 113,
Galloping Horse
Heine, Lt. Raymond, 202, 204 Heinkel bomber, 154
113, 115, 120,
Hyakutake, Lt. Gen. Harukichi, 118-119,149,157,160,178,191
140, 176
Grand Hotel Du Grassy
Pacifique, 168 I
Knoll, 45, 51
East Asia Co-Prosperity
Greater Sphere, 84
Gregory (transport), 85 Griffith, Capt. W., 198 Guadalcanal, 44-71
beachhead invasion
map Guba,
of,
of,
of,
55,
2
68
S.Sgt.,
206
57
Ichiki, Col.
Kiyono, 58, 61, 69, 71,
118 140
IFF,
River, 84, 109, 118 incendiary bombs, 179 llu
Inciardi, Lt. Nilo F., 10, 39, 164,
173
infantry divisions,
67, 1st Marine, 2, 46-54, 59, 65, 71, 81, 84, 108-109, 185
251
,
Americal (Army), 12, 46, 48, 110,
Kinkaid, R.
Adm. Thomas,
Kinugasa, 144
25th (Army), 159, 185 1st (Marines), 2, 46-54, 59, 65, 67,
Kirishima, 168, 170, 172 Kittel, Maj. Louis, 202
71, 81, 84, 108-109, 185 2nd (Marines), 48, 49, 121, 129,
Kokumbona,
infantry regiments
160, 161 5th (Marines), 48, 49, 104, 105, 121, 129, 155, 161
7th (Marines), 112-121, 129, 153-155, 161-162 11th (Marines), 76, 101, 152, 153, 161 27th (Army), 190 164th (Army), 46, 110, 121, 137, 153- 155, 161, 162, 179-180
J Lt.
Julius, 132-133, 145,
154- 156, 162-164, 202 176, 179, 188 Japan, 42 Japan Sea, 42 Japanese 17th Army, 44, 118, 149,
191
Japanese 38th Division, 119 Japanese 8th Area Army, 160 Japanese Combined Fleet, 44 Japanese flag, 131 Japanese Naval Task Force, 67 Jarman, Lt. James T., 10, 14-20, 33-40, 108, 113-123, 159, 164, 172-173, 184
Lawrence
Kuter, Maj.
S.,
5
L
Lamphier, Capt. 177, 200-204
Adm.
Thomas
Willis A., Jr.,
G., Jr.,
172
Levers Pass, 86 Lexington (carrier), 44 Leyte, 180 Liberators (B-24/PBY-4), 198 Libra (transport), 166 Lightning aircraft (P-38), 9, 121
Lindberg, Charles A., 3 Lindley, Sgt. John, 61 Little Burma Road, 21 Little (transport),
85
Livesey, Lt. D. W., 197 Lockridge, Lt. 197
Long Island Long,
Lunga Lunga
86 148
Ground radio station, John Erickson (transport), Jig
Richard
154-163 Kongo, 138 Koro Island, 49 Koumac Island, 28 Kukum, 115, 138
Lt.
(carrier),
61
202
Albert,
Luftwaffe, 4
Jarvis (destroyer), 53 Jefferies, Lt. Robert, Jr.,
Lt.
187-190 Koli Point, 51,
Lee, R.
Jagstaffel, 84, 93, 124, 129, 131,
Johnston,
110, 121, 134-138, 144, 149-164, 172-174, 178-180,
L'il
Bottom Bay, 51, 79
Jacobson,
Knox, Frank, 145, 185, 200
Joe, 36 Lafayette Escadrille, 7 Laffey (destroyer), 133
intelligence reports, 236-245 Iron
157, 165,
170, 172
186
12,
18
B., 25, 78, 84,
88, 95, 114
Plain, 2, 44, 45,
63
Point, 51, 56, 58, 71, 109,
112, 137, 148, 153, 160-167, 178
Lunga Luzon
Straits,
Lynch,
Lt. J.,
99 42 190
River, 98,
K Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, 210 Kaga (carrier), 44 Kahili Field, 198,
Kaiser,
Lt.
202
R.E., 114, 129, 132, 140,
145 Kavieng, 49 Kawaguchi, Gen. Kiyotake, 100-105, 118, 149
Keim, Capt. Glen, 15 Kellum, Lt., 164, 166, 173 Kelly Field, Texas, 3, 10 Kerstetter, R.W., 120, 124, 132, 140,
145, 162
King Cobra, 184 King, Adm. Ernest 158 King, V.W., 116
J.,
45, 46, 119,
M Maas,
164 MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 44, 51, 55, 159, 180 MacKinac (tender), 49 Malaita, 49, 51 67 Lt. J.B.,
A., 15, 22,
,
Mangrum,
Lt.
Col. Richard
C,
61,
73, 75, 113 Marine Air Group
23 (MAG-23), 93, 139 Marine Air Group 25 (MAG-25), 61 71
Marine Air Squadrons, 48 Marine Air Transport Squadron, 144 Marine Air Wing, 112, 148 Marine Fighter Squadron VMF 212, 37, 49
252 i
1
,
Marine Fighter Squadron,
VMF 223,
80
48, 61,
119, 158, 211, 213
Gen. Masao, 118,
Lt.
149-155
Maruyama Road, 153
Matanikau River, 110, 116 River, 161
Maupin, D.V., 116 Maya (cruiser), 145 Mazur, Pfc. Misha, 206 McAndrew, 12 McCain, R. Adm. John S., 48, 55-58 McCalla (destroyer), 133 McCawley (carrier), 54, 137 McDaniel, Lt., 194 McFarland (seaplane tender), 148 McKeon (destroyer), 60 Lt.
N
James, 164, 167,
173-174, 179-181, 187, 200-201 McNeese, Maj. George, 121
Meade
(destroyer), 173, 174 Melbourne, Australia, 20 Melton, M/Sgt. Joseph, 149 Melton, Cpl. Thomas, 114, 148 Michaud, Sgt. Joseph, 8, 19 Mickey Mouse radios, 36 Midway, 44 Military Air Service, 2, 3 milk runs, 147-153, 189 Miller, Capt. E.F., 139
DP., 114, 115, 120, 123, 132, 142-145, 176, 180 Miracle Works, 22, 24, 28 Mitchell, Gen. William, 3, 4 Mitchell, Maj. John W., 132, 133, 143, 145, 151, 156, 162-164,
1 1
Nehoui, New Caledonia, 35 Nelson, S/Sgt. Arthur, 8
Nepoui River, 29, 30
New New
149-154, 161, 178-179
McLanahan,
Britian Island, 44,
75, 110, 133, 137 Japanese attack on, 19
New Georgia
Island, 49-51
Guinea, 42, 44, 49 Hebrides, 37, 42, 44, 49, 54, 59, 60, 148 New Zealand, 46, 51
Japanese Nimitz,
threat to, 41
Adm. Chester,
Norris, Lt. W.P., 164, 172, 181
Noumea,
18-28, 33, 46, 48, 54-60, 133, 165, 178 Novak, Lt. Emile, 164, 173
Noyes, R. Adm. Leigh, 48
O O'Connell,
Air Force Base, 209, 210 Moore, Lt. Joseph, 200-202 Morovovo, 114, 133
Morton, Lt. James K., 114-115, 120-123, 132, 140, 197
Mount Austen,
116
F.J.,
Obermiller, Lt. James, 177 Oka, Col. Akinosuka, 153, 156 Orlich, Sgt. John, 65,
112
Oscar (Japanese submarine), 82
P P-35, 10 P-36, 10 P-38 Lightning, 121, 163-169, 177,
197 P-39/400 Airacobra,
3,
144
45, 51, 53, 153, 156,
188, 189, 190 Mugford (destroyer), 53 Mulcahy, Gen. Francis, 186 Mulvey, Lt., 198 Munda Airdrome, 205
6
22
122 6 Number 22, 150 oxygen failure in, 133 problems with, 26 Russian use of, 6 P-40 Warhawk, 5, 9 P-43, 9, 10, 37 P-63 King Cobra, 184 P6-E Hawk, 7 Pacific Ocean, 42
French use
Moody
Motor Torpedo Squadron
44-48, 116,
212
faulty radios
145
67, 76,
New New
(C, D, F, K),
Moila Point, 204
,
132, 187, 193, 197, 205
British configuration of,
193-197, 201, 204 Mitsubishi bomber, 159 (cruiser),
45
Caledonia, 14, 18-49, 59-63,
Miller, Lt.
Miyako
197
Nasu, Maj. Gen. Yumio, 149 National Defense Act of 1920, 3 Navy Dive Bombing Squadron VS-3, 115 Ndeni, 49, 119, 211, 221 Neblock, S/Sgt. Charles N., 8, 18, 22, 24, 87,
Mason, Cecil J. (RAAF), 53 Mason, R. Adm. Charles P., 186 Matanikau, 109-123, 129-137,
Matapona
Point, 187, 188, 193,
198
Marine Observation Squadron 251 49 Markel, Kenneth, 102, 112, 116 Marshall Islands, 42 Marshall, Gen. George C, 45, 55,
Maruyama,
Munda
in,
of,
Japanese advance
in,
2
Pair-of-Dice Field, 36 Palawan, Philippine Islands,
208
253
The
Palmer, Capt. Stanley A., 190 Canal, 12, 13
Resurrection,
Parachute Battalion, 100
Ringbolt, Operation, 2, 119
Panama
Paradise, 33 Patch, Gen.
Rist, Lt.
Alexander
M.,
(P-400), 27, 36,
170
46,
185-188 Patsy Field, 29-36 Patsy Flight, 65 Patterson, Lt. Arnold M., 132, 137, 162, 164, 173, 179 Boats, 49, 144,
PBY Catalina Flying 190
Robert
P.,
"Rube Goldberg," 180 Rupertus, Brig. Gen. William H., 49 Russell Islands, 51, 152, 198, 199, 204 Ryan,
Pearl Harbor, 2, 5, 9, 10, 28, 41 Philippine Islands, 16, 42
Japanese attack on, 28
197
Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 41, 158 Roses, Operation, 217 Royal New Zealand Air Force, 49
Lt. Martin 172-173, 181
Ryujo
(carrier),
Ryuku
Islands,
E.,
164,
167,
70 210
Philippines Group, 33, 34, 42
G.W., 11, Phoenix Islands, 43 Phillips, Lt.
14,
S
19 Sailer, Maj.
Lake City
Pistol Pete, 138-147, 151-152, 164,
Salt
174, 181 Plaines des Gaiacs, 28, 29, 34, 61
Samo New Caledonia,
Poha
River, 161, 178, 190 Point Cruz, 115-116, 129-132, 161,
172-173, 178-180, 187, 190 Point Lunga, 151
Poland, Nazi invasion
of,
Pond, 2nd Lt. Kenneth Poppy, Operation, 217
4
A., 71
Japanese attack on, 13 Port Moresby, New Guinea, 44, 49 Porter (destroyer), 157 Preston, 174 Port Darwin,
Price, Lt. Albert, 11, 14, 19
prisoners of war, Japanese atrocities against, 69 Proud Phantom, Operation, 209, 210 PT Boats, 155, 170 Purnell, Lt. Fred, 132, 133, 145, 154,
Q
R-4D transport RAAF, 15
aircraft,
61
Rabaul, 44-49, 54, 69, 81 1 18, 133, 147, 157, 160, 165, 204 ,
Raburn, Sgt. Joseph, 206 radar, 9 RAF, 9 Raiders, 87-89, 95, 100-118, 129, 137, 160 Ralph Talbot (destroyer), 54
Ramopo
(tanker),
13
Lt. Leland, 108, 120, 132 Reagh, Lt., 176 Rekata Bay, 81, 156, 181, 182, 187 Rendova Island, 137, 207 Rennel Island, 51, 133
254
134
43
Samoa, 44 San Cristobel, 51 San Francisco (cruiser), San Juan (cruiser), 157
133, 167
Sano, Lt. Gen. Tadayoshi, 160 Santa Cruz Islands, 45, 119, 157 Santa Elena (cruiser), 12 Santa Isabel, 51, 67, 81-85, 143, 156, 164, 181, 187, 219 Santa Rosa (cruiser), 12 Saratoga (carrier), 48, 51, 95 Saunders, Col. Laverne, 117, 140 Savo Island, 54, 85, 145, 169, 172 Sawyer, Lt. Jerome, 114-115, 120, 123, 132, 137, 140-145 SBD Dauntless dive bomber, 48, 49, 61, 72-79, 84, 85, 95-101, 115,
125, 131-142, 151, 154 Schneider, Sgt. William, 90, 124 Scott,
Adm. Norman,
133,
134,
D-14, SBD Dauntless, 49 VS-7, 132, 139, 154
54
(cruiser),
R
Ramp,
(cruiser), 133,
Islands,
165-168 scout bombing squadrons
164
Quincy
Joseph, 184
VMSB-132, 184 VMSB-141, 139, 142 VMSB-232, 73, 113 SeaBees, 126, 142 Sealark Channel, 44, 51, 62, 78, 134-139, 144,155,165-168,173,
194 search-and-destroy missions, 180 Sebree, Gen. Edmund B., 186 Selfridge Field, Michigan, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11
Shambrook,
Lt.
Russell, 164
Sharpsteen, Capt. Wm, 132, 133, 142, 145, 176 Shaw, Lt. W.S., 132-133, 143, 145, 162, 164, 194 Sherman, Adj. Gen., 215
Shoe-Box
Field, 31, 32,
35
Shoho
14, 23, 25, 33-40, 60, 74-79,
44
(carrier),
Shortlands, 51, 54, 165, 190, 192,
Shubin, Shubin,
Lt.
Simpler,
Lt.
Slot,
Lt.
James, 197 Murray, 206 Cmdr. Leroy C, 95,
The, 51 -53,
1
57,
1
67,
1
71
1 1
,
13
84,
192 Smith, Lt. William, 202 Smith, Maj. John L, 76, 79, 61
Smith (destroyer), 157 Soehner, Lt. Bernard P. (MD),
Solomon
,
1
13
1 1
,
23
Islands, 44-51, 109, 133,
113-114, 121-124, 130, 148, 163,168-169, 176-178, 200-206
Truman Committee, 6 Truman, Harry
6
S.,
Tulagi, 2, 44, 47-54, 78-80, 95, 119,
in, 80 64 Solomon Sea, 44 Soryu (carrier), 44 South China Sea, 42 South Dakota (battleship), 147, 157, 172, 174 South Pacific Ocean Japanese advances in, 19, 41 table of distances for, 43 Southern Belle, 36 Spaatz, Gen. Carl, 3
of,
58, 80-87, 109-121, 134-144, 160, 175, 182, 187-192 Tonga Islands, 43, 123, 159 Tonolei Harbor, 140, 176, 188 Tontouta, 18-37, 48, 59-60, 94,
Truk, 81
147 earthquakes
map
84-87, 92-95,104-108,113-116, 167, 175 Tokyo Express,
197, 204
52,
aircraft, 7 spare parts, boneyard approach 125 Sterling, Col. John, 9 Stern, Lt. Howard, 132-133
144, 155, 170 R.W., 179, 181, 187 Turner, R. Adm. Richard K., 48, 54,
Tullis, Lt.
109-112, 119, 160-166, 186 Twining, Gen. Nathan B., 185, 215
U Army Air Corps, 6, 9 U S Army Forces in the South Pa-
U.S.
cific
Area (USAFISPA), 48-50 178, 211
USAFISPA,
Union Group, 43
Spad
Stratton, Lt. Eldon, 202 Strother, Brig. Gen. Dean
201 Sumiyoshi, 149-153
Sun
Maj.
C,
to,
185,
Gen Tadashi,
Setter Squadron, 122, 197
T Tail-end Charlie, 177
Taivu Point, 87
Tambelego River, 166 Tanaka, Adm. Raizo, 182 Lt. D., 194 Tasimboko, 80-100, 109, 219 Task Force No. 6814, 12 Task Force Poppy, 14 Tasman Sea, 13 Tassafaronga, 121, 134, 136, 144, 147, 164, 182, 187 Tavani, Sgt. Adolph, 206 Taylor, Capt., 194 TBF Avenger torpedo bombers, 1 25,
Tarbet,
134-140, 198 Tenaro, 191
Tenaru
River, 110,
219
Tetere, 162 Thio, 31
Thomas
11, A. Barry (transport),
12,18 Thompson,
Lt.
John
A., 8, 10, 11,
V Vandegrift, Maj. Gen. Alexander A., 46-55, 67, 83, 92, 100-112,
118-185
Vaughn,
124
E.,
Vella Lavella, 51, 81, 197 VF5 Squadron, 95, 113
59
Vila Field, Efate,
Vincennes
(cruiser),
54
Visale, 86, 115, 123
VMF 121, 137 VMF 212, 148, 156 VMF 223, 74, 93, 102, 113 VMF 224, 85, 86, 90, 93, 102, VMSB 132, 184 VMSB 141, 139, 142 VMSB 232, 73, 113 Sir
Vouza, Sgt. Maj.
113
Jacob, 67-69
VS-7, 132, 139, 154
W Waldmire,
Lt.
Henry W., 164, 173,
181 Walker,
Walke Walsh,
5 Lt. Col. Kenneth N., (destroyer), 173, 174 Lt. J.J.,
114
Warhawk, 5 Washing Machine
Charlie, 109, 123,
138, 181, 186
Washington 174
Wasp
(battleship), 133, 172,
(carrier), 48, 51
Watchtower, Operation, 55, 119, 212
2,
45, 46,
255
World War
Waterman, Lt. J.M., 142 Waymouth, Lt. R., 115 Wehrmacht, 4
Wright, R.
Wythes,
New Zealand, 46 Westbrook, Lt. Robert, 194, 207 Western, Sgt. Mendus R., 206 Whaling Group, 161 Whaling, Col. William J., 161 Wheaden, Lt., 194 Whistling Britches, 36 White, Lt., 198 Whittaker, Lt. Gordon, 202 Williams, F.L., 120 Williams, Lt. W.R., 116, 164, 173, 181, 187
I,
7
Adm.
Lt.
C.H., 182 Keith W., 74-79
Wellington,
Woodlark Island, 208 Woods, Brig. Gen. Louis
256
Y Yamamoto, 200, 204 Yellow Sea, 42 YP-38 Lightning, 9 Yura (cruiser), 154
Z Zavoski, Mike, 86, 114, 130 Zeilin, 137, 166 Zero (Zekes) fighters, 61 76, 78, 84, ,
98, 154 E.,
186
Zimmerman,
Maj.
i
John
L.,
110
Edited by Steven Mesner
Guadalcanal— The Island
of Fire:
Reflections of the 347th Fighter Group Robert Lawrence Ferguson
A first-hand account of the Battle of Guadalcanal
from a member of the famed "Game Cock" Squadron.
August 7, 1987 marked the 45th anniversary of one of the hardest fought battles in history— the six-month campaign for control of the Solomon Island of Guadalcanal. This gripping on-thescene report captures not only the almost constant action, but the impossible conditions under which the beleaguered Americans withstood a larger and better equipped Japanese army. This book is different from others covering the Guadalcanal campaign because it was written by a man who himself was among the first combat troops to arrive. You'll see the original maps and never before published combat pictures and relive those events sometimes humorous, sometimes ironic but always strikingly heroic. More than just a true story of action and suspense, this book honors the men of the 67th Fighter Squadron, "The Game Cock," and the other squadrons that became the 347th Fighter Group. In August of 1942, despite months of shelling, bombing, and sniper attacks, the Americans dug in just outside the airfield perimeter and repulsed repeated Japanese counter attacks. Not until January, 1943 was Guadalcanal at last declared "secure" by the American commander, The Guadalcanal campaihn> provides us with a unique view of those desperate months. Ferguson presents not only an accurate historical account of the early 'disastrous events but a criTTSal analysis of the origins, errors and/ccbnsequences for a nation unprepared for waging a war in the\ Pacific. A true story of the bold ef(FOr,t§ of ordinary men, this boo|
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