Guadalcanal The Island of Fire Reflections of the 347th Fighter Group

REFLECTIONS OF THE 347TH FIGHTER GROUP GUADALCANAL AND FLORIDA ISLANDS MALAIT/

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ROBERT LAWRENCE FERGUSON

GUADALCANAL THE ISLAND OF FIRE REFLECTIONS OF THE 347TH FIGHTER GROUP

to

My

Dearest

Mary

GUADALCANAL THE ISLAND OF FIRE REFLECTIONS OF THE 347TH FIGHTER GROUP ROBERT LAWRENCE FERGUSON

AERO A

division of

TAB BOOKS Inc. PA 17214

Blue Ridge Summit,

FIRST EDITION FIRST PRINTING Copyright

©

Printed

1987 by Robert Lawrence Ferguson the United States of America

in

Reproduction or publication of the content in any manner, without express permission of the publisher, is prohibited. No liability is assumed with respect to the use of the information herein. Library of

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in

Publication Data

Ferguson, Robert Lawrence.

Guadalcanal— the island of fire reflections of the 347th Fighter Group / by Robert Lawrence Ferguson, :

cm.

p.

Includes index.

ISBN 0-8306-8389-5 1

.

Ferguson, Robert Lawrence.

2.

(pbk.)

Guadalcanal Island (Solomon

1942-1943— Personal narratives, American. 3. United States. Army Air Forces Fighter Squadron, 347th-History. 4. World War, 1939-1945— Aerial operations, American. Islands), Battle of,

I.

Title.

87-15627 CIP

D767.98.F47 1987 940.54'4973— dc 19 Questions regarding the content of should be addressed to:

Reader

this

Branch Department

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Editorial

TAB BOOKS

Inc.

P.O. Box 40

Blue Ridge Summit,

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book

For

Tommy

it's

"Chuck But Yes,

it's

it's

this an'

Tommy

that' an'

'im out, the brute!

"savior of 'is country," when the guns begin to shoot.

Tommy

this,

an'

Tommy

that an'

any thing you please; But Tommy ain't a bloomin' fool— you bet that

Tommy

sees.

— Rudyard

Kipling

Contents Foreword

viii

Preface Introduction

Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter

xiii

1

Echoes of the Cry for Readiness

2 3

The "Game Cock" Is Hatched The Miracle Works

19

4

Hold the Line at New Caledonia Ready for an Offensive? Into the Solomons

28 41 59

Cactus in August September's Angry Response "It's a Dark Night on Guadalcanal" Life on the Target

73 83

5

6 7

8 9

Chapter 1 Chapter 1 1 Chapter 12 Chapter 1 3 Chapter 14 Chapter 15 Chapter 1 6

Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Index

x

"Goodbye and Good Luck" "Are You Still There, Cactusl" Block Their Sunday Punch A Switch to the Offensive Guadalcanal Secured "The Wild Blue Yonder" Letters of Gen* Harmon Citations Intelligence Reports Pilots of the Army Cactus Flight

1

7

100 118 136 147 1

58

175 185 1 95 211

226 236 246 248

Foreword Guadalcanal

— The Island of Fire

count of a part of World

War

II

is

an extremely moving firsthand ac-

that has received

little

attention from

on the war saw it from his position within the unit

historians. It has to be a valuable addition to existing literature in

the Pacific. Ferguson

tells it

as he

on the scene. He presents an accurate historical background of the early campaign and unfolds an intimate story of the early events that almost lead to disaster.

The ominous warnings tempts

exposure. so

is

of conflict

at readiness are failing

seem

to

come upon us when

and lack of readiness

is

at-

the root cause of the

unpopular to prepare for war, yet the failure to do on the adventurous probes of our potential enemies. It

It is politically

certain to bring

was during such a failure in national readiness that the "Game Cock" Squadron was activated, struggled to find its identity, went to the South Pacific and, with second-rate

The war

in

equipment, prepared

itself for battle.

the Pacific began in unthinkably impoverished conditions

armed forces. The national emphasis was on the war in Europe; the secondary consideration. Our initial efforts to stop the were undertaken with poorly prepared, poorly equipped, Japanese advance poorly trained and under-manned units. Generals and admirals thrust into war were in a sort of on-the-job training; the few who had old combat experience brushed up on their skills and those who did not know war did their best to learn. They faced a confident enemy accustomed to years of for our

Pacific theater got

victory.

viii

1942 the 67th Fighter Squadron, The "Game Cock," was committed, by war planners, to the First Marine Division, Reinforced, for an invasion of the Solomon Islands centered on Guadalcanal. There was hardly enough strength to justify the effort; in the early months of the campaign the issue was in doubt. Defeat of the American beachhead by the Japanese seemed almost certain. For weeks the men in the line and on Henderson Field fought with the barest minimum of poor equipment, short In July of

rations, low fuel supplies, inferior aircraft, malaria, and uncertain support from the rear. This lack of adequate preparedness and the consequent burden it placed on the men responsible for success of the campaign is the most striking feature of Ferguson's story. The fact that our heroic troops eked out a victory should not blind us to the need for constant vigilance and

readiness to deal with aggression. Participation of the Army Air Corps in the Guadalcanal Campaign is something few of us have heard much about. In this new and more personal viewpoint on the Guadalcanal experience, Bob Ferguson has provided just

the right mix of authority and personability, and has presented a lesson to

be learned by those

We

who have

not served in a major

conflict.

pray for the good sense as a nation to seek peace through

strength.

Major General John G. Bouker United States Marine Corps (Retired) Naples, Florida,

1983.

ix

Preface my earnest desire that this book be read as a memoir in tribute to the 67th Fighter Squadron, "The Game Cock," and the origins of the 347th

It is

Fighter Group.

It is

not intended to be a historically complete account of

the Solomon Islands Campaign. In assembling

my recollections of those wartime days of over 40 years

ago, an effort has been

made

to set

^sJ* logical order. Yet, as writing letters, diary, /

or pushed from that

I

in

something near chrono-

photographs, notes, and clippings of the time,

descended upon me

war

them down

my old my memories

proceeded, along with analysis of

in torrents. I recalled

events and details long forgotten

my mind in the old effort to delete from memory events of

previously refused to recall: the combat conditions at Hender-

son Field while on the verge of being overrun by the enemy, malaria,

dengue fever, amoebic dysentery, unending hours of duty, and a menu and meal schedule that cost 40 pounds in weight loss; the belief that our countrymen had given us up for lost until our determination never to surrender proved to them that Guadalcanal could be held; a fast trip to the Marine Corps Aid Station during the height of the September fighting to have a small shell fragment removed from my arm brought feelings of guilt about my tiny wound as I viewed at least 50 blanket- wrapped corpses outside the Marine dispensary and the clutter of litter casualties lying about awaiting treatment, all of them victims of the fierce fighting on the perimeter defense It is

With x

it

line

or air and naval bombardment attacks.

indeed a self-punishing ritual to recall the details of combat in war.

comes the

realization that

it

was

in

these circumstances that

,

we

gave up a substantial part of our youth. It seems that only those whose hearts have pumped the adrenalin of combat with a vicious enemy in

know the bonds that tie such comrades tohope the process has been a catharsis of memory that will remove forever the hurt and the intermittent stress that goes with such reflections. defense of their nation can gether.

I

In the task of writing this book, which has been a labor of love and perhaps an obligation, I am most grateful to my wife, Mary Ferguson, who

was my bride of less than a year when I left the United States for the South Pacific in January 1942. My diary started as a method of writing a long love letter to

Mary which

could keep; any other type of letter might be

I

censored. As a result,

became an avid diarist, and I kept it in detail throughout the war. Over the years Mary saved and stored letters, clippings, photographs, and

I

my diary,

which have contributed

in a

most

inter-

way to this book. Just as I was entering my assignment to the Guadalcanal Campaign I received a package from Mary containing a camera and many rolls of film. This made it possible for me to take many esting and personal

combat photographs, which also contribute to this book. As a writer I have saved notes for many years, and in reviewing these notes I must express my appreciation for help from early members of the Squadron. While at Tontouta Air Base, New Caledonia, Major Robert Foye (previously Master Sergeant), Technical Sergeants Enoch J. Dahlman and Charles N. Neblock, and Major John A. Thompson were very generous with their time and recollections, filling me in on many details of the earliest days of the 67th Squadron after it was activated out of the old First Pursuit Group.

During interviews

in

October 1980, Dale D. Brannon, John A.

Thompson, and James T. Jarman reviewed many events and recollections Fred V. Purnell, V.L. Head, P.M. Childress, R.E. Kaiser, B.W. Brown, R.M. Ferguson, N.F. Inciardi, A.W. Price, J.D. McLanahan, and A.B. Farquharson were also helpful in of the period of interest. Conversations with

recollection and clarification of events in the period. I

am also indebted to many others I have contacted while researching

old unit histories, General and Special Orders and official reports of action

conducted under the First Marine Division and the Army's United States Armed Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA). It would be impossi-

mention or even recall all of those contacted in my years of collecting material for this book. My work and research were casually assisted by many and a helping hand in solving some particular problems is gratefully ble to

Department of Air Force History, for assistance in locating microfilm files of early 1942 documents on the war in the South Pacific; Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Director of Marine Corps History, for his assistance on sources; Ms. Joyce Bonnette, Archivist, Department of Marine Corps History, who unpacked boxes of files on the campaign for my review; Ms. Regina Strother, Still Photo Archivist, Department of attributed to: Mr. William Heimdahl,

Marine Corps History, who found for me the two additional USMC photographs that I wished to use; Mr. John Cavalcante, Archivist, U.S. Navy Archives, for his guidance in seeking out key after-action reports; Mr. Paul X!

Photo Archivist, National Archives, who coached me on Lunga Plain, dating back to just before the landing at Guadalcanal. Finally I must express special appreciation to Jim Jarman, who read every word of the completed manuL. White,

Still

finding the early photo of the Japanese air field at

script.

His comments and suggestions were invaluable.

To review the chronology of events with which Fighter Squadron

is

the story of the 67th

interwoven, the rereading and study of a number of

source books and documents was helpful in tracing the background scenario on which to unfold the saga of

deeper reading on the origins of

"The Game Cock." To those who wish conflict and the war in the Pacific, I

recommend these among many available books and source materials on the general subject: U.S. Military Policy, A Study and Appraisal, by Dale 0. Smith, Brig. Gen. USAF (New York 1955); The Guadalcanal Campaign, a Monograph, by Major John L. Zimmerman USMCR, (Historical Division Headquarters U.S. Marine Corps 1949); Guadalcanal, The First Offensive and Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul, The War In The Pacific

by John Miller 1949 and 1950); Unit

Series,

Jr. (Historical

Division

Department Of The Army, and 44th

histories of the 67th, 68th, 70th, 339th,

War Commander Air Forces South Pacific; Letters of General Millard F. Harmon; Guadalcanal and the Origins of The 13th Air Force, July 1945, Army Air Force Historical Studies No. 35, Air University Library, Simpson Historical Research Center; United States Air Force Dictionary, Fighter Squadrons and the daily action reports of these Squadrons;

Diary of

(Air University Press).

xii

Introduction This book honors the officers and enlisted

men of the 67th Fighter Squad-

ron, especially those of the original unit, attached to the First Marine

Division in August of British

Solomon

1942

Islands,

for the invasion and operations at Guadalcanal,

code named Cactus. In every war the active units

of the regular military establishment

go

first

to face the

enemy. The 67th

Fighter Squadron was one of these units and was ready for action fully

manned nor This

is

the story of the 67th Pursuit Squadron from the time of

activation in January canal.

— not

well-equipped, but nonetheless ready for action.

1941 through the early months

of

By then, Guadalcanal was considered to be secure

1943

its

at Guadal-

— which

is

to say,

we were no longer in that bitter daily struggle for survival, anticipating the repeated Japanese attempts to retake the

airfield

and the scant 11 -mile

perimeter held by the First Marine Division, Reinforced. The going would

be rough, but the Japanese would not retake Guadalcanal. The story is told from the viewpoint of a man who was there and who was part of the preparation.

If

the story seems biased in

some

respects, so be

it; it is

a

memoir.

Marine Corps is "Can Do," then for the 67th f Fighter Squadron it would be "Can Do With Less." Few people realize that in the invasion of Guadalcanal by the First Marine Division, Reinforced, the 67th Fighter Squadron, U.S. Army Air Corps, was the only Army element among the reinforcing units. Many people still believe that there was no If

a slogan for the

|

Army

participation at

with an airplane

all.

The 67th Fighter Squadron entered

— the P-39/P-400 —

the battle

that had already been tagged obso-

xiii

war was

lete before

declared, yet the squadron

made

a heroic

mark

for

Detached from the rest of the Army, the 67th was assigned to the of the First Marine Division, Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift. The Marine Corps was happy to have them, but the Army seemed, for a while, to be focusing its attention elsewhere in the theater. The 67th fought on a shoestring until Guadalcanal was almost secure before better planes and more personnel began to arrive. Of the original element that went to Guadalcanal with the First Marines, not enough has itself.

commander

been

told;

they deserve a recognition that they have never received.

Because of its unique situation, the story of the 67th Fighter Squadron must be told in relation to the situation faced by the First Marine Division

from the time

of the invasion until Guadalcanal

was secured. The story

involves the 67th, 68th, 70th, and 339th Fighter Squadrons, which be-

came the 347th Fighter Group

in October of 1942, and their part in the most difficult days of the campaign. The emphasis is on action by the 67th Squadron and the other squadrons of the 347th Fighter Group. This is not 'with intent to downplay the more extensive air action by the Navy and Marine Corps; it is just that little has been written of the contribution by the U.S. Army Air Corps in the campaign and much has been written about the Navy and Marine air units.

The in

origins of the squadron and the circumstances leading to its part

the Solomon Islands Campaign have their high point in the Cactus

operation. The events are sometimes humorous or ironic, always heroic. These men learned to love the Marine Corps and sometimes wondered if anyone loved them. My own combat photos, never before published, are included in this book. Many were taken during the fierce Japanese attempts to retake Guadalcanal during September and October of 1942. Although some of

these photographs

may be

revolting to the reader at first glance, they

own airmen are victims of a similar end War is not romantic or wins anything but the ground or island or enemy

provide a reminder that in war our

when

attacking air bases held by the enemy.

chivalrous; ^aircraft, I

j

no one

really

and that at

far too

dear a price. In

its

clearest analysis,

instrument of national policy represents the ultimate political failure.

xiv

war as an

in diplomatic

and

CHAPTER

1

Echoes of the Cry for

Readiness

If it should be resolved to prohibit the raising of armies in time of peace, the United States would then exhibit the most extraor-

dinary spectacle which the world has yet seen incapacitated by

was actually

its

— that ofa nation

constitution to prepare for defense before

it

attacked.

Alexander Hamilton

The

Federalist

After a military career that included three wars and having been born

during a previous war, with

its

many family losses, our nation's poor record

on readiness for defense occupies a prominent place in my thoughts. When conflicts are imposed upon us the nation rallies, and the nature of past warfare has made it possible for our democratic institutions to overcome its shortcomings, in time, because we have been able to withstand the initial onslaught, which has not been delivered directly upon our mainland. Now, on the threshold of more perilous times, we seem destined to repeat, as we have each 20 or 30 years in the past, these weaknesses in national readiness. We seem unable to learn from history. The effects of this peculiar national syndrome on the units and men obliged to seek victory in spite of weaknesses can be seen in the story of the 67th Fighter Squadron. My memories of operations with the squadron remain vivid because it was there that we gave a substantial part of our youth, blood, sweat, tears, and lives as

ransom

for that national

syndrome. 1

August of 1942 the 67th Fighter Squadron, U.S. Army Air Corps, was attached to the 1st Marine Division, Reinforced, for the invasion of Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands. This military operation, code named by the Navy as Watchtower, was put together with a shoestring capability, In

the result of years of national indifference to preparedness for defense.

The

American objective was to capture the Japanese airfield under construction on the Lunga Plain at Guadalcanal, code named Cactus, and the island of Tulagi, across the channel from Guadalcanal, code named Ringbolt, along with several small islands nearby. This move was intended to stop the Japanese threat to Allied supply lines in the Southwest Pacific. At the beginning of 1942 the strongest weapon in the American "Arsenal of Democracy" to achieve this ambitious goal was the tenacity of its fighting men. They were aroused by the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the advance into the Pacific Ocean area, which threatened Allied possessions to the shores of Australia.

The fighting spirit of American military men has often been called upon to overcome weaknesses in quality of equipment, authorized manning, and readiness. As each conflict starts, the first armed forces into battle must take the punishment while the nation catches up. The generations that preceded World War II give clear examples of error in planning that our nation seems committed to repeat. Preparedness conditions resulting from this national weakness are of interest when considering the military circumstances under which the 67th Pursuit Squadron came into being to play out its role in the Guadalcanal Campaign and other campaigns during the war in the Pacific. Viewing the entire period in retrospect provides pause for serious re-evaluation of some key national policy. As the nation entered the decade of the 1940s the United States was struggling to catch up, and world conditions were such that the necessary time was allowed. As the nation proceeds through the decade of the 1980s, this pause seems to show that civilian heads of the Department of Defense, military departments, and their associated bureaucracies, as a class, have been incapable of securing the readiness of first-class armed forces for the defense of the United States.

Between World War I and World War

II

the United States, as a world

power, was just groping for the meaning of military aviation. The lessons of

—

World War I which the country entered without a military aircraft of its own even in the planning stage were forgotten. There was little support in the isolationist attitudes of Congress for a Military Air Service, yet another world war was all but guaranteed by the Armistice and peace treaty that ended the Great War to end all wars a peace treaty, humiliat-

—

—

ing to the vanquished, that contained the seeds of blitzkrieg.

As

a people,

Americans

military preparedness.

dislike the

They tend

to shy

thoughts of foreign wars and

away from even the most neces-

sary planning and involvement that would ensure the safety of the nation.

The civilian government

institutions of the U.S. are almost paranoid about

2 i

the possible rise of an elite military class.

They envision such a class, if allowed to develop, as taking over the government. It's a thought smoldering in the national psyche since the caution was raised by the Founding Fathers.

We

demonstrate

this phobia

by precipitous demobilization of

armed forces after each conflict. The result is a well-oiled defense machine in a

shambles, to be picked up and cared for by dedicated career military It follows, as well, that we treat our military establishment, military

men.

personnel, and veterans rather shabbily between wars

ment

of Kipling's

"Tommy

—a

classical

fulfill-

Tommy that."

this an'

In an atmosphere fostered by this peculiar national attitude, the

United States became weak between World Wars I and II. Amid a background of minimal attention to the armed forces, the nation was callow to the meaning of worldwide advancement in general, commercial, and military aviation in its future. Military men were studying its meaning in the

scheme of national defense. World progress in aviation seemed to be dragging the country along and support for military aviation came more from the enthusiastic civilian population and industry than from the

members of Congress responsible for funding the nation's defense. The growing national interest in aviation and the exploits of a few dedicated military aviators

made

it

clear to Congress that the nation

behind the rest of the world

in

the

was

A new National Defense Act was passed on June 4,

1920, revitalizing

the old act of 1916. In this legislation a Military Air Service was authorized. units for

It

falling

field of aviation.

finally

allowed for the organization of specific mission-oriented

bombardment,

attack, observation

legislation the First Pursuit

air

and pursuit. As a result of this

Group was reorganized

at Selfridge Field,

Michigan, and moved soon after to Kelly Field, Texas. This group was to be the granddaddy of the 67th Pursuit Squadron and other squadrons that

would be

hastily activated in later years.

In the years that followed, record-breaking flights by a few dedicated

airmen of the regular Air Service almost continually excited the public. It was this air-minded public and the news media, with its knowledge of the nation's position in world aviation, that pushed the need for military air

power. The of

New York-to-Paris flight by Charles A. Lindbergh in the spring

1927 grasped the imagination

of the entire world.

The early and contin-

uing development of commercial airlines helped advance the cause of aviation and greatly increased the number of qualified airmen. The impor-

tance of this

resource was, as yet, unimagined in the budgets of the Congress, which continued to make

critical national

clinch-fist military

expansion of military aviation a slow and laborious task.

Through the efforts of many dedicated air officers such as Billy Mitchell,

Jimmy

Doolittle, Carl Spaatz,

and Ira Eaker, the advancement of

tary aircraft and concepts continued.

mili-

An adequate bombing doctrine was in

use and influenced the design and development of bomber aircraft. In the development of a pursuit doctrine, the Air Service was not so fortunate. Aircraft type requirements

were in controversy because a pursuit doctrine

3

could not be agreed upon and

was further hindered by attempts to define a

separate mission role for attack aviation. aircraft

The development

of pursuit

proceeded around various mission profiles, many of them advanced

by the companies producing or designing the

were some good pursuit or

aircraft. Fortunately,

there

fighter aircraft in design development, but

acceptance and production development were slow, and these were put into tactical use in an unacceptable

mix of small quantities of various types.

The most startling fact, approaching the decade of the 1940s, was that the nation was in a game of 'catch up" in a world already being consumed by a *

major war, with only the Flying Fortress (B-17) and a mix of pursuit aircraft in

development production. In addition, the law of the land contained no

clear role for military aviation in the individual

armed

services.

The

readi-

ness problem was acute.

Over the entire pre- World War II period, the advancement of airpower had many enemies, even in the military establishment, going back to the

trial of Billy

Mitchell,

when General Hugh Drum

testified for the

prosecution, 'There will never be~a requirenTelltToTmilitary aircraft to

have a range beyond three days march of an army." Battleship admirals

were equally opposed to airpower. They all seemed to come around slowly and agree that airpower was good, but they were not in a hurry for it to happen during their career or, to use a Navy term, "Not on my watch." President Roosevelt was himself a skeptic. His office and desk were full of model ships and memorabilia from his days as Assistant Secretary of Navy; he loved ships. It was a hostile atmosphere for air officers trying to brief him on the necessity for advancement in airpower. But Roosevelt eventually reversed his opinion, became an advocate, and the airpower

—

planners enjoyed the relief of his unfamiliar support.

September

of

1939 produced

a shocked awakening

States learned, by actual performance, about

German

when

the United

air doctrine.

The

U.S. government and the American public were suddenly acquainted with

such

new words

smashed

as blitzkrieg,

Wehrmacht, and Luftwaffe, as the Nazis

into Poland using the Stuka dive

Less than a year

later,

France

fell

bomber with deadly

success.

under the pressure of the German war

machine.

Now

the United States realized that a fight

"Arsenal of Democracy" was again ill-prepared!

was shaping up and the The hasty exercise to

strengthen America for possible war began, playing catch-up stakes in national defense. Regular and National Guard lized

units

ball for big

were mobi-

and training maneuvers began to point out the depth of the deficien-

war games, the sign on an Army truck "Heavy Tank" simulated equipment the country did not have, as did an old observation plane with the observer throwing out flour bags by hand to simulate bombing. But the

cies. In

warning was there; the nation began to crank up

its

defense industry to

j

produce the machines and munitions of war. i

Long before its own entry into the war the United States was secretly and unlawfully committed by the President to

4

assist the

European

Allies to

\ defeat Germany. This policy, though controversial, served to accelerate mass production capability for producing war materials to serve the U S Armed Forces. As the war in Europe progressed, commitments to supply the Allies grew rapidly, and the United States began the approach to a war footing with the questionable support of the nation. In the rush to expand military capabilities, many

constructed and the training of

new airmen was

new

air

bases were

accelerated. In this great

extend airpower, the activation of numerous new air units was "Game Cock" of the 67th Pursuit Squadron began to stir in the egg. The Army Air Corps had now authorized plans to break out cadres of key personnel from the old First Pursuit Group to form new squadrons. effort to

planned and the

It

was then

that the 67th Pursuit Squadron

Pursuit Group, the 58th.

As

was activated as part of a new a part of this activity, the 68th and 69th

Pursuit Squadrons were also formed. suit

Squadron shook out

its

new

The "Game Cock" of the 67th Purfeathers at Selfridge Field, Michigan, on

16 January 1941, activated by direction of Special Order No. quarters First Pursuit Group.

3,

Head-

By the time of the Japanese attack on American territory, the nation's planning for war had improved our capabilities. Readiness was being pur-

sued at an ever-accelerating pace, but true readiness was

still

only a goal

yet to be reached. At that time the national strategy emphasized the war in

Europe, with defeat of Germany the

first priority. The war in the Pacific European effort. Preparations for the air war were proceeding according to a plan that had been prepared under the direction of General H. H. Arnold and approved and adopted by the president. It developed the expansion of forces, aircraft requirements, and logistics to execute the air war, and projected the buildup through the first half of 1944. For this outstanding military planning effort, the country owes a debt of gratitude to Lieutenant Colonels Harold L. George and Kenneth N. Walker and Majors Lawrence S.

was

to be subordinated to the

Kuter and Haywood leadership to the

S. Hansell, Jr., four

Army

men who

provided outstanding

Air Corps and the United States Air Force.

when preparations for war "You must fight with what we have," was a crushing reality. Better aircraft were on the drawing board, but those on hand and ready for mass production were such planes as the P-39 Airacobra and the P-40 Warhawk, which were already obsolete. These It is

unfortunate for pursuit aviation that

began to accelerate, our

tired axiom,

Ys

Y »

\/y

had been given too much praise, exaggerating their actual value as j(/ pursuit or fighter aircraft. Tight budgets had prevented the advancement \ of newer fighter aircraft in development, and Senators whose districts had

aircraft

\

contracts to manufacture the existing planes fought to keep the contracts going.

The equipment for the 67th Pursuit Squadron was destined to be the Bell P-39/P-400, an aircraft designed in

1936 and first flown about the end

of 1938. Since the inadequacy of this airplane at the time of its birth was a part of the national readiness problem, its entry into mass production

5

caused much finger-pointing around various agencies of government. Early in 1941, a Senate committee headed by Senator Harry S. Truman had

made some tough investigations of readiness subjects and zeroed in on the problem of the P-39; they gave special attention to other aircraft as well.

The Truman Committee

believed that the P-39, beginning with

its first

model, was obsolete and unfit for combat. They criticized the continued production of the plane while newer and better aircraft which were in development could have been forced into production. On this point, the

committee was critical of the politicians who were pushing for continuation

happened to be built in their districts. Army were justified on the grounds and perhaps improved that airplanes which could be mass-produced must be continued in production. This justification was correct, upon even though newer and better development prototypes had been tested. Early mass production of these newer aircraft to meet immediate war needs was impossible. The P-400 was the P-39 configured for export. It was identical to the P-39 modelsCand JJ except that it carried the high-pressure oxygen system compatible with British equipment.* The British declared the aircraft as not combat-capable and withdrew it from service after one combat mission. Britain would not accept the P-39/P-400 aircraft, even under "Lend-Lease" conditions. The Ru ssians, on the other hand, lovedthe airplane and would take all of contracts for the older aircraft that

Large orders for such

aircraft

by the

—

—

they^couja^getTTt was adequate for"tHeTr low^altitude mission

profile.

France, an intended user of the aircraft, had fallen and the British dislike for

many

planes intended for export available for other

of these planes

had the U.S. insignia painted over that of the

the P-39/P-400 use.

Most

left

intended recipient nation; they were assigned to the U.S.

Army Air Corps.

This set of circumstances had everything to do with the arrival of the

i

P-39/P-400 with the 67th Pursuit Squadron in the South Pacific. There it was soon assigned to support the Marines at Guadalcanal. The aircraft was brutally outclassed

by the enemy fighters

performed beyond

its

known

encountered there; yet,

it

hands of the outstanding and resourceful

pilots of the

capabilities. It excelled

port and dive-bombing missions for which

it

in

the

67th Squadron,

it

on close ground sup-

was never intended.

The major armament difference between the P-400s assigned to the 67th Fighter Squadron and the P-39s was the cannon, which fired through the prop hub. All of the P-400s had 20mm Oerlikon cannons, while the P-39s had the 37mm cannon.

CHAPTER

2

The "Game Cock" Is Hatched

The First Pursuit Group, activated in France during World War I out of the American Lafayette Escadrille, had been demobilized at the end of that war. By April of 1920 its reactivation was completed and, as the nation entered the critical decade of the 1940s, the group was the source of all available experience in pursuit aviation. its activation there was not an American military aircraft for its was equipped with French Spad aircraft, single-place biplanes of World War I. Fortunately, these were available, as some had been purchased by the American Expeditionary Force. Over the years, the First Pursuit Group had concentrated on development of pursuit tactics and

At

use;

it

doctrine and had flown such glamorous old pursuit planes as the Curtiss

P6-E Hawk. Having had experience with all other U.S. and foreign pursuit aircraft that were available, it was now splitting up its expertise to form new Pursuit Groups and Squadrons for expansion of the Army Air Corps. Then, in January 1941, the Game Cock of the 67th Pursuit Squadron finally wiggled out of the egg and became a part of the new 58th Pursuit Group at Selfridge Field, Michigan. The Squadron began its life with a new insignia, provided by Walt Disney, depicting a truculent game cock in a loud sweatshirt and boxing gloves. There were no aircraft to put it on; it was all a paper exercise.

Pursuit

Group

The 67th Squadron remained

attached to the First

for administration and general support.

The Squadron was fortunate in its activation to have assigned to it some of the best enlisted experts available in the Air Corps. These men were destined to become the technical backbone of the Squadron for 7

months and years to come. Their personalities, achievements, and leadership became a valuable source of strength to the organization. These key personnel included Master Sergeant Robert Foye, Line Chief; Staff Sergeants Ward Collins, Engineering Chief, Enoch Dahlman, Electrical Specialist,

Charles N. Nebloch, Aircraft Mechanic, and Arthur Nelson, Ar-

morer; Sergeants Paul Beachey, Radio, Willard Berger, Technical Supply

and Joseph Michaud, First Sergeant.

By May the enlisted strength of the Squadron was still under 100 men; new technical school graduates were arriving frequently. There were several temporary assignments of

taker status.

The Squadron

still

commanding

officers

had no airplanes of

on a sort of careown; the men

its

worked along with the First Pursuit Group on the flight line. During the month of May, First Lieutenant Dale D. Brannon was / assigned to the Squadron along with several other officers. Brannon was tall,

for a pursuit pilot, with

was an

sandy blond hair and a no-nonsense attitude; he

excellent choice for

command.

In Brannon, providence had given

man of experience to guide new organization for its tasks to come. He was destined to become the

the Squadron, at this very early time, a serious the

hub

of

life in

the 67th Squadron, a tower of strength, experience, and

integrity.

As I recall my military service, I can count the number of officers whose leadership and personality influenced the search for excellence in my own career on one hand. Brannon was one of them. His outlook on the coming conflict was neither apocalyptic nor flamboyant. He knew that it was coming, that there was an important job for him to do, that he was well qualified for

it,

and that he intended to do it to the very best of his ability.

If

Brannon had a fault, it was probably in the subtle politics of military life; he was totally honest. This probably accounted for the fact that he never had stars in his eyes nor on his shoulders. The time-honored tradition of "sucking up" was repulsive to him. An enlisted admirer commented on Brannon's ability to detect problems and correct them: "If it smells like it, that's what it is; he'll find it, expose it and correct it." The Squadron grew slowly and lost several members when a number of them were released from active duty to join the American Volunteer Group in China, the "Flying Tigers." On 14 August 1941, the Squadron was surprised by the sudden and unexpected reassignment of its commanding officer. First Lieutenant Brannon was assigned on temporary duty to Canada. The nature of the assignment appeared to be secret.

Rumor, with some element of truth, had it

that because of his experience in

various types of the latest pursuit aircraft he

was assigned

to

Canada as an

instructor.

Now Providence was again watching over the 67th Pursuit Squadron, 2nd Lieutenant John A. Thompson was transferred from the 68th Squadron and temporarily assumed command of the 67th during the absence of D.D. Brannon. Thompson was the handsome epitome of the American pursuit pilot blond, blue-eyed, with a pearly- white smile and as

—

8

"

an

air of quiet authority.

From this point on, Brannon and Thompson were

an unbeatable combination.

There was always some mystery about Brannon's temporary assignment to Canada. It was not until an interview with Brannon in October 1980 that the real details were revealed. The transfer did indeed come about because of Brannon's experience

in

late-model pursuit planes.

event, as told by D.D. Brannon, started with a

The

by the Chilean Ambassador to see his daughter at Michigan State University. The Ambassador was also planning an official visit to Selfridge Field. In honor of this visit, officials at Selfridge Field decided to stage an airshow. At the time, the U.S. Army Air Corps had two new YP-38 Lightning aircraft, two service test visit

models, stationed at Selfridge Field. Lieutenants D. D. Brannon and Oliver G. Cellini had been assigned to put the new YP-38 through a pursuit test

program, and

it

was decided

that they would

fly

them

in

the airshow.

planned their YP-38 demonstration. Brannon, being senior of the two, took the lead. A nice overall airshow had been planned

Brannon and

Cellini

featuring P-39s, P-40s, P-43s, and other miscellaneous aircraft.

The Group Commander, John Sterling, had added the YP-38s to the show and had told Brannon and Cellini to put on a good demonstration of this new pursuit plane.

Brannon took him do

in

literally

and planned

all

the things a good pilot will

such a legal opportunity to put on a flying demonstration

in place,

feathered fly-by, loops, speed runs across the

air

—

base

rolls, rolls

in front of

the pavillion, and other feats of airmanship.

There was no question about it being the hit of the show. Unfortunately the Base Commander, Brig. Gen. Clagett, was displeased at having such a demonstration using the audacity of the performance aircraft. Clagett

probably thought the risk to the

contacted higher headquarters, made an

new YP-38

official

report,

were grounded in an official order signed perby the Chief of Air Corps, General George H. Brett. The pilots lost

and eventually both sonally

new YP-38s. He

was an unnecessary

pilots

their flight pay while

grounded

— and, worst

of

all,

could do no flying.

Just after the airshow there occurred a requirement for a classified assignment at Clinton, Ontario, Canada. The RAF was building a secret training area there to teach specialists use of the

tronics gadget called

new "hush-hush" elec-/

RADAR. There was a requirement for a Detachment

for the U.S. students undergoing this training. Brannon, because of his record resulting from the airshow, was selected to go to Canada as Detachment Commander, a position that would normally have

Commander

been

filled

by a non-flying

officer.

The

resulting assignment gave

him

valuable experience lasting until just prior to the Japanese attack on Pearl

when he was really needed back at the 67th Pursuit Squadron. At this point in August of 1941, what the 67th Pursuit Squadron was to get away from as did the whole 58th Group needed most to get the feel of needed It Selfridge Field and the First Pursuit Group. Harbor,

—

being on

its

—

own as an entirely separate Pursuit Squadron. The opportunity 9

came

September with an

in

Louisiana, to a

new

air

alert to

move

the Group to Baton Rouge,

base being completed as part of the Air Base

Expansion Program. The base had not been sufficiently completed at the time the 58th Group was activated; it would now become their permanent

home. Packing up for the move turned out to be good experience and pracanother move not too far into the future. When the Group was

tice for

ready, most of the personnel

were sent with delay en route leave to travel by personal means and to report when the Group arrived at Baton Rouge. On 30 September, two officers and 25 enlisted men departed with the truck convoy moving the entire Group. Along the monotonous journey they practiced keeping the interval between trucks, simulating a precaution that

makes truck convoys

less vulnerable to air attack.

The Convoy

Commander stayed busy riding back and forth along the truck convoy in his jeep, witnessing this discipline.

There was no interstate highway system in

those days, and the monotony of the ride was relieved on the sions passing through small

towns and waving

many

at pretty girls

occa-

and other

The convoy stopped in relays each day at various bases en route making as much as 250 miles in a day. On 6 October the convoy reached Baton Rouge Air Base. The new base at Baton Rouge was far from complete. Roads and walkways were still dirt-covered— just great in rainy weather! The runway was still unsuitable for landing airplanes, and for a time the Group kept onlookers.

to rest for the night,

its

only aircraft

airport.

— three P-36s, one P-35, and one P-43 —

Assignment of a few

squadron to

its

at the municipal

additional enlisted personnel brought the

authorized strength of 157. Officer strength was

still

low;

there were only four assigned.

By November

the 67th Squadron was operating smoothly as a sepa-

Thompson, now a 1st Lieutenant, was still in command. 2nd Lieutenant James T. Jarman, about the size of a tall jockey, was transferred in from the 69th Squadron. Three 2nd Lieutenants just graduated from Kelly Field were assigned, Marty Haedtler, Bob Chilson, rate organization. John A.

and N.F.

Inciardi.

eight,

rated pilots and

all

This infusion of personnel brought the officer strength to all

destined to play an important part in the future

of the 67th Pursuit Squadron.

The emphasis was now on readiness training, ground and air. Yet the number of airplanes made it difficult to do much more than mini-

limited

mum flying.

Ground crew personnel and the various support departments were going well. Toward the end of November, following almost a year of hard work developing a smooth-running squadron, plans were being made by all

were

training to operate and function like a Pursuit Squadron; things

up the days over the Christmas and New Years holidays for everyone to have leave. Rosters were prepared allowing appropriate peo-

for dividing

ple to be present for duty at

all

time.

The world changed with an agonizing groan on Sunday morning, 7 December 1941. The crushing news of the attack on Pearl Harbor by the

10

Japanese brought personal plans back to zero. Everyone reacted with great anger over the sneak attack, and the level of anger increased as thoughts of interrupted personal lives and plans began to be understood. Almost immediately Lieutenant Brannon was back with the squadron. Readiness preparations for overseas duty

were the topic of daily conversation. Packing and was pushed at a breakneck pace.

crating of squadron equipment

The

unfolding events

made

it

Squadron would soon be detached

abundantly clear that the 67th Pursuit

for overseas service. Sixteen

new pilots

were assigned. Lieutenant, Dr. Bernard P Soehner, Medical Corps was assigned, along with four enlisted medical technicians. The non-rated officers of the squadron Lieutenants G.W. Phillips, A.W. Price, and R. Farrant were assigned for mess and supply, Adjutant and maintenance, respectively. A Quartermaster team and an Ordnance team were also

—

—

attached to the squadron.

Lieutenant Thompson, Master Sergeant Foye, and a team of several others departed on 16 January as an advance party to the port of embarkation in the Brooklyn

Army Terminal

at

New York. The best rumor at the

time was that the squadron must be going to England. That made sense

because everyone had been required to pack warm clothing. The rest of the squadron was to be packed, ready to depart by train on the morning of 17

0845 on the 17th the train pulled out in a quiet, unceremonious departure with 25 officers and 100 enlisted personnel. Forty-three enlisted men had been left behind to form the cadre of a new

January. Promptly at

squadron.

The cars. It

trip to the

Brooklyn

Army Terminal

took three days

in

Pullman

was a relatively comfortable way to travel, but the troops were both

bored and apprehensive, worrying about an overseas

knows where. The

train arrived the afternoon of

trip

ahead to heaven

19 January 1942

at

Fort

New Jersey, the staging area for loading military units at the Brooklyn Port. The entire outfit was put up in temporary barracks for the night. Two Dix,

additional pilot officers and nine enlisted

men, sent on from Selfridge Field,

joined the squadron there. Everyone spent a terrible night.

The next day the squadron was moved prepared to go aboard the U.S.

Army

to the Brooklyn Port and

Transport Thomas A. Barry. By

noon of 20 January the ship was already full of troops, and the men of the 67th Squadron moved aboard into space below decks which had been a cargo hold once used for refrigeration. The bunk areas for the enlisted men were close and stacked at least four high. Officer accommodations were no

better— just up a little higher in the ship, with a little more air. The ship was already overcrowded. The comfort factor for the officers was a little better than for the enlisted men, who stayed below decks. It was all complicated by the medical units aboard. It seemed that all the including nurses— for the whole task force were in this medical units one ship. Everyone had to be fully clothed when out on deck. The first hours aboard were mass confusion. It was like dropping 1500J rats into an oil drum and watching the pecking order being established.

—

11

Mess facilities, as well as their scheduling, were so confused that during the first 24 hours some of the men didn't get a chance to eat. The men stood in chowlines that went

in circles

through passageways of the

several days for the troop transport personnel to get the

ship. It

took

mess schedule

was spent by the men in These exciting experiences occurred aboard a troop transport

organized. Nevertheless, a large part of each day

mess still

lines.

tied

up

in

port waiting to depart.

morning of Friday, 23 January 1942, the ship finally began to move and left New York Harbor; it was a dreary and cloudy morning. Once at sea the entire convoy of Task Force No. 6814 and its Navy escort could be seen as it formed up and proceeded south along the Atlantic coast. As the convoy moved out, its positions were distributed in two columns, a total of seven ships. The Navy escort moved along on the flanks, one or two thousand yards from the troop transports. The ship at the head of the starboard column was the flagship of the convoy, the Argentina, with a Navy Commodore in command. Other ships in the convoy were Santa Rosa, Santa Elena, Cristobal, John Erickson, and the McAndrew. Among the forces carried by the convoy was most of the 26th Yankee Division, soon to make up a substantial part of the Americal Division. The escort was filled out to two light cruisers and four destroyers as the convoy moved south in the Atlantic. The weather was cold for several days and began to In the early

warm as the ships proceeded south. This was not the route to England, but where? Life aboard ship was dull and the temperature was getting warm. About 27 January the boredom was shattered by a submarine alert. The ships in the convoy changed course and began their zig-zag evasive maneuvers. The destroyers left formation at top speed and dropped depth charges for some time. The foaming geysers in the open sea around the depth charges were a thought-provoking sight. All was well again in a little while and the ships settled back into their routine. No one knew if an attacking submarine had been sunk rumor, of course, was that one had. There were always plenty of rumors about just anything. There was even a rumor that Betty Grable, a movie star and the favorite pin-up girl of the armed forces, was coming aboard the ships to visit with the troops at the Canal Zone. The following day a radio reported that an enemy submarine had sunk two of the ships in the convoy and that one of them was the Thomas A. Barry. Well, that certainly was not so, but it probably meant that the submarine got away and had identified the ships in the convoy. The dull, slow life settled on the ship again. The weather got continually warmer, and everyone now looked forward to the Panama Canal transit. There were even rumors that all personnel would be given passes to go ashore into the Canal Zone. Wrinkles were smoothed out of clean

—

summer uniforms in ship. For those who

anticipation of this break in the dull did not have khaki

bought for $100 from those

12

who had

summer

extras.

life

of the troop

uniforms, they could be

On

the morning of 31 January 1942, the ship arrived off Cristobal on the Atlantic side of the Panama Canal and proceeded to transit. The trip

through the locks, at several points along the canal, was fascinating.

The weather was good and the look and smell of land was heavenly. Around the locks barrage balloons could be seen tethered out over the green hills. The ship reached its berth at Balboa in the afternoon around 1600. Here

everyone was disappointed, as there were no passes into the Canal Zone. On Sunday, 1 February, the convoy left the Canal Zone and headed out into the Pacific. The hot, dreary days around the Equator became an extra burden. Playing cards, checkers, chess, writing tablets, and pencils— anything to help pass the time were at a premium; conditions were too

—

crowded

any organized recreational activity. It was mess lines, sunboredom. Some people had only woolen clothes to wear in all that heat, due to that rumor about going to England. for

shine, and

The

ship

made

a fuel stop at the island of Bora Bora, taking on water

from one of the destroyer escorts plus oil and water from the USN tanker Ramopo. The itarry then joined the convoy and the dull routine continued. As the ships approached southern Australia to enter the Tasman Sea, heavy swells made the waters rough; seasickness broke the dull routine. Those who did not get motion sickness got sick just watching those who

By the night of 25 February, lights could be seen at a distance. The trip would soon be over. The ship finally pulled into its berth in Melbourne did!

harbor on the evening of 26 February.

The next morning everyone was packed and ready afternoon before the squadron

left

the dock area, boarded a train for

The

train, like

to debark.

It

was

the ship and, after a mile's walk in

Camp Darley, 35 miles from Melbourne.

the "Toonerville Trolly," provided a noisy, rickety ride to

army trucks moved the outfit down on bedticks filled with straw, Over a month at sea was all one could

the station at Bacchus Marsh. Australian

three miles to camp. Everyone bedded

happy to be on

solid

ground again.

take for a while. In February 1942, the

same month

as the Japanese air attack that

but destroyed Port Darwin on Australia's north coast, the arrival

in

bourne of a large convoy of Americans greatly bolstered the moral Australian public. There lia

was at that time

all

Mel-

of the

a great national fear that Austra-

was about to be invaded from the north by the Japanese. Fierce posters

they surveyed made the Australians ever sensitive to the threatening glow of the Japanese "Rising Sun." There were similar posters in the United States, breeding hatred for of Japanese infantrymen advancing at will over

some

of

own The Australians opened their arms to the Americans as individuals.

In

the Japanese to a point where

our

all

it

did not

seem immoral

to confine

citizens of Japanese ancestry in internment camps.

Men

this they were so like Americans that the relationship was from some American units were billeted with Australian families for a short time until their units moved on. Many fast friendships were formed and

simpatico.

13

some have

remember with great love and affection the home of Edna and Harry A. Deller and family, on

lasted until this day.

the 10 days

lived in

I

I

Somerville Street in Bendigo.

At that time the Americans were making things happen, while most of ANZAC," were engaged in the Mediterranean or North Africa. Through these February events Australians gained confidence, a tension release, and a chance to catch a second breath. Naturally the rumor was that the 67th Pursuit Squadron was to stay in Australia. Lieutenant Brannon roamed about checking on how everyone was doing. The general, but loose, responsibilities in the Squadron at the time were: 1st Lieutenant Brannon, Squadron Commander; John A. Thompson, Deputy or Executive Officer; Jim Jarman, Operations Officer; Albert Price, Adjutant; and G.W. Phillips, Mess and Supply. Brannon and Thompson were soon off, trying to find out what was next for the Squadron, as yet not committed to any particular place or operation. It became the Australian armed forces, "the

apparent, with a

the island of

little

New

digging, that the next stop

While following up on

mander

was back aboard a

ship to

Caledonia as a part of Task Force Poppy. information was received that the

this,

Com-

Squadron was wanted for a 9:00 p.m. meeting Melbourne. Brannon in was returning to Camp Darley on the 8:00 p.m. train. It was decided that Jim Jarman and Albert Price would attend for Brannon until he could arrive. At the appointed hour they found the hotel room and knocked on the door. It was opened by a tired-looking Major. "Who are you?" he asked. "We represent the 67th Pursuit Squadron," replied Jarman. "Good," said the Major. "Come in." He turned and called into the suite, "They're here, Sir." "Get the gentlemen a drink," said a voice from the back of the hotel of the 67th Pursuit

suite. It was temporary headquarters for the staff of Task Force Poppy, which had arrived by convoy from New York the previous week. After a few minutes of social amenities, the Task Force G-4 turned to discussion of

and airplanes.

logistics

"I can't tell

about those

Nandi and "If

you where your outfit is going, but I need some answers me," he continued, "could you assemble them at

aircraft. Tell

fly

them

in?"

you are talking about

replied Jarman.

"The

flying to

distance

is

"Could you assemble them air

New Caledonia,

the answer

is

no,"

too great."

in

the area of the docks and fly them to the

base?"

"No,

Sir,

there

is

no place

space for the required takeoff

in that

area where there would be enough

roll."

"Could you assemble them and tow them over the road to the airfield?"

"No,

Sir.

The wheels

of this airplane are in the wings and they have

too great a wingspan to pass over three of the bridges that exist along the

14

only route from the docks to the

airfield. Also,

the gravel roads would tear

Once we get those crates on a flatbed, we'd best head and assemble them there, where all of the squadron me-

the tires to ribbons. for the airfield

chanics and equipment will be."

"Lieutenant," said the G-4 colonel, "you seem to I haven't told you about."

know

a hell of a lot

about this place that

"Well, Sir," said Jarman, Caledonia, so

my

"We

heard

we might be

Squadron Commander and

I

going to

New

went to see the Aussie

[RAAF] project engineer responsible for airfield construction. We learned a lot

about the port, docks,

city, roads, bridges,

topography, and buildings, as

well as the air base itself."

"Lieutenant," the colonel replied, "you

will

go a long way

in this

army."

The

discussions

went

far into the night

and an appointment was

Commander to meet with Lieutenant General George H. Brett at 10:00 a.m. the following morning. The switchboard at Camp Darley was shut down for the night and it was impossible to notify scheduled for the Squadron

Brannon until it reopened. At the appointed time, Jarman and Price were waiting Brett's outer office. Captain Glen his Adjutant

were

in

General

Keim of the 65th Material Squadron and

also waiting for the meeting. Shortly they

were ushered

in.

who had arrived in Australia 31 December, was acting Commander, South West Pacific Area, pending the evacuation of General Douglas MacArthur from Corregidor. The General was studying a General Brett,

Allied

sheaf of papers that apparently represented the deployment of air units.

looked up from his worktable at Captain Keim, a World retread

— overweight,

in

over his head, and flustered

War

in the

I

He

infantry

presence of

the General.

"Are you the Commander of the 67th Pursuit Squadron?" asked Brett in a

rather astonished query.

Captain

Keim drew himself up to his full stubby height, "No Sir, I'm the Commander of the 65th."

shoulders

back, and said,

At that point General Brett looked back to his work table, going list of Air Corps units that had arrived or which he thought might be on their way from the Philippines. Not finding what he was looking for, he looked up at Keim and said, "The 65th Pursuit Squadron?" "No, Sir. The 65th Materiel Squadron," replied Keim. through a

"Well," said Brett, "that's probably a fine organization, and we are deal with the it in the theater, but right at the moment I need to

glad to have

67th Pursuit Squadron."

"Are you the commander

of the 67th?" he said, turning to the Adju-

tant of the 65th.

"No, Sir," he replied. "I'm the Adjutant of the 65th, Sir." "Huh," grunted Brett, only slightly amused as he turned to tenant Albert Price. "Are you the Commander of the 67th?"

1st Lieu-

15

"No,

Sir,

I'm the Adjutant of the 67th."

Then General Brett looked at 2nd Lieutenant Jim Jarman, 132 pounds and 23 years old. "For Christ's sake, son, are you the Commander of the 67th?" "No, Sir," said Jarman, "But I'm the Operations Officer. Our Commander could not be notified of the meeting until this morning and he is now enroute to the city from Camp Darley." "Well, let's talk anyway," said Brett. "Tell me about the experience level of your Squadron Commander, yourself, and the assigned pilots. Have any of them flown the P-400?" "Well, Sir," said Jarman, "except for our Commander and Exec, none have flown a P-39. All 29 line pilots and flight leaders are recent flying school graduates with only 10 to 35 hours in fighters, none in the P-400 or the equivalent P-39. Only Dale Brannon and John Thompson have flown that type aircraft. That was at Selfridge Field in early 1941." "What the hell is Washington thinking of?" said Brett to no one in particular. Then, looking at Jarman, he said "Son, you're going to one hell of fighter pilot

of a hot spot."

General Brett turned to one of his

staff

Colonels and said, "Scrape up

15 more experienced pilots and enough enlisted personnel to bring the Squadron up to wartime strength." Then, turning back to 2nd Lieutenant Jarman, he said, "Thanks, son, and good luck!"

Brannon never did make it to the meeting, but got filled in later by Jarman and Price. A personal meeting with General Brett was probably not the highest item on Brannon's list anyway. The hopes for staying in Australia were gone and the new move was imminent. The Squadron was now augmented by the assignment of 47

Twenty of these men who had volunteered for jobs with Now that war was a reality, they could not get to China and were inducted back into the Air Corps at Melbourne. This group of men were known as the "China Detail;" they augmented the squadron with some outstanding enlisted specialists at a time when the undermanned and poorly equipped Squadron needed their enlisted personnel.

the American Volunteer Group in China.

help.

Fifteen additional pilots were assigned to the 67th Squadron, although some did not remain. Among those assigned were Captains Jim Bruce, Tom

Hubbard, and Tom Christian, who had been in the Philippines and had been evacuated to Australia. The senior of these officers was Captain Jim Bruce, who assumed command of the 67th Pursuit Squadron. From this point on it was like a game of musical chairs for D.D. Brannon. As officers senior to

him were assigned, military regulations required that the senior assume command; when they left for other assignments, Brannon popped back into the command chair. In general, the "Philippine Group" as a whole turned out to be a chafing influence within the squadron until its weakening influences on command were settled. Brannon continued to remain the hub

16

2nd Lieutenant James T. Jarman. Shipped out as Squadron Operations Officer Squadron. Then and now a pillar of the organization. 1941 photo. (Jarman)

of the 67th Fighter

17

of Squadron

life and activity, as well as mentor to the young pilots who still had to learn their trade.

By 5 March the word was out, alerting the Squadron, and on 6 March Marsh for Melbourne. There the Squadron went aboard the USAT John Erickson and by morning of 7 March 1942 were again on the high seas, having hardly lost their sea legs. It was now certain it

entrained at Bacchus

was New Caledonia, an 800 miles northeast of Australia. With the great success

that the destination for the 67th Pursuit Squadron island lying about

of the Japanese in their advance

well as Australia

deep into the South

Pacific, this island as

was under direct threat of a Japanese attack and invasion.

After a dull but apprehensive voyage, the ships* arrived in the harbor at

Noumea,

New Caledonia, on 15 March 1942. The Squadron went ashore

late in the afternoon

and camped overnight at a velodrome in Noumea. The

next day the Squadron began to move by truck up the island to a camp in the vicinity of

Tontouta Air Base. The camp was a mosquito-infested area

about a mile or so from the airfield.

The camp location would seem ideal to a It had a grassy plain with some

reconnaissance team looking for campsites.

high ground toward the south, mountains rose to the east, and a stream ran

through the camp area. However, there had been heavy

rain,

and trucks

moving about the area made it a sea of mud. Yet the worst part of it was the constant and ravenous attack by mosquitoes, which were in such numbers that one could slap a man on the back and kill a hundred of them. Tents could not be put up because it would not be possible to camouflage them; there was a constant threat of Japanese invasion of New Caledonia. It rained so much that personal belongings were always wet, although men strung canvas shelter halves for protection. Above all, the mosquitoes were so thick that the men almost went crazy trying to work and keep them away. Between the pages of a diary written during the period, the mosquisnapped shut between the pages when the evetoes can still be found ning's entry was completed.

—

*The Squadron actually traveled to Noumea in three ships. The original complement from the U.S. were in USAT John Erickson, newly assigned people in USAT Thomas A. Barry, and Lieutenant Jim Jarman, Sergeant Charles Neblock, and eight other enlisted mechanics in HMS Athena with the crated aircraft. Forty P-400s in the Athena were bound elsewhere; these were diverted back to Melbourne

67th Pursuit Squadron.

18

when

the East Indies

fell

and were committed to the

CHAPTER

3

The Miracle Works

The

swiftness with which the Japanese extended their conquests into the Southwest Pacific had everyone convinced that a Japanese attempt on New

Caledonia was really an immediate threat. First priority for the 67th was

combat readiness to meet

this threat

— and the task was

Manpower to develop creature comforts in the camp,

new home,

gigantic.

the Squadron's

could not be immediately spared. For a while, miserable living

conditions for the

men

continued. Quarters for the officers were

They were crammed

little

room, bedroom, and

dirt base-

ment of an old farmhouse along the rutted road leading into the The 44 officers and 200 men found little time to improve their

comforts.

better.

into the living

campsite.

Lieutenants Phillips and Price, the First Sergeant, Joe Michaud, and the administrative personnel devoted as

much time

to

camp improvement

as

they could spare while supervising the administrative move, procuring

up the mess, and carrying on Squadron administration. For the next week or two, men in wet clothes, too exhausted to care, climbed into their beds in a blacked-out camp. Bedding was constantly wet. Flies laid eggs in the wool blankets, the eggs turned to maggots if not detected immediately, and above all was the constant harassment by the tents, setting

mosquitoes.

Many nights were spent in soaked clothes and blankets as rain

dripped through an inadequate shelter half stretched over a bed and mosquito netting. The drone of a thousand mosquitoes trying to penetrate the netting to

make a blood meal of the occupant sounded,

a deafening roar. kets, not seen in

in

the darkness, like

brought the realization that the blanthe dark the previous night, were infested with maggots.

To many, morning

19

The two

sea voyages, totaling about 50 days at sea, with associated

problems of poor food

had everyone

on the troop transports and limited physical activity,

reduced physical condition. The primitive conditions

in

brought on diarrhea and stomach cramps; everyone carried a wad of toilet paper, "bung wadding," in case of emergency.

The 67th

started

its

work

at

Tontouta

in

these nerve-wrecking

cumstances. There was not enough transportation. the mile or two distance to their place of

cir-

Men often had to walk

work on the

airfield,

with occa-

emergency. The uniform for everyone was a mosquito headnet, protecting the face and neck, gloves, boots, and heavy socks with the trousers tucked in. Mechanics who worked on detailed and sional off-road stops for

intricate electrical

and mechanical tasks often removed most of

tective dress in order to get

this pro-

on with the work.

For the 67th Pursuit Squadron, the first task toward combat readiness was to get to Noumea and bring the crated airplanes from the dock area to Tontouta Air Base. The prime mover and trailer for hauling aircraft had been procured for the Squadron in Melbourne through the direct help of General Brett. It was a 21,700-pound wrecker with a 28-foot trailer. Drivers belonged to the 67th and 65th Squadrons. Captain Bruce instructed Lieutenants Jarman and Dewey to find the vehicle and pick up a load of timbers to build A-frames for assembling the aircraft. When located, it was loaded with about 5000 cases of beer and they just drove off with the load. They were apprehended before they could get out of Noumea and forced to help unload the beer.

in

The task of moving the planes was enormous. There were 47 of them Noumea two P-39s and 45 P-400s.* In the

—

the hold of a ship at

interest of providing air support as soon as possible, these aircraft crates

were

among the first cargo to be placed on the dock. But "Army Game" to deal with; the 67th, with Captain the

to be unloaded

there was the old

highest rank in the squadron, of the plan.

were having

The Engineer, it

their way.

was unable

Artillery,

to push compliance with this part

and Infantry Colonels and Generals

Everyone was looking

for recognition

able to report his units in place and "combat-ready."

occur to any of them that air

It

when their units were in place,

did not

by being

seem

to

there would be no

cover for them.

The huge crates, gently lowered by the cranes of the big cargo ships, began to settle on the dock. Brannon, still a 1st Lieutenant and ever the mother hen of the "Game Cock," insisted that they be handled as if they were full of eggs. The big crates began to line up on the dock like little which they would soon become, after the airplanes in them were houses unpacked. With the loading equipment at the dock area, the crates were moved without much difficulty, secured on a trailer, and the truck moved

—

out for Tontouta. After Athena unloaded the 40 assigned P-400s and moved out, a U.S. freighter bound for She had some P-39s and P-400s deck-loaded and set them on our pile in order to open cargo holds. The 67th appropriated all of them.

Australia took her place.

20

It

was

similar load

a grueling drive over treacherous mountain roads, where a might be met on any curve. The pilots rode in the truck and in

the jeep riding point for the load, waving a red flag to warn oncoming moving traffic out of the way and keeping the right-of-way for the

traffic,

crated aircraft. Often they would get an argument from an officer or a sergeant moving another load; pecking order and priority would have to be settled.

The

pilots

became experts

at the delicate diplomacy so necessary to settle these often-complicated confrontations. In one such instance, an

approaching heavy load was encountered as the aircraft load rounded a start down grade. The approaching leader pulled up to the lead jeep of the 67th. The driver was a mature-looking Master

mountain curve about to Sergeant. Such

NCOs

are not afraid of a shavetail Lieutenant and the

conversation was interesting.

"What

outfit you with, Lieutenant?" the Master Sergeant asked. "67th Pursuit Squadron," was the reply.

"Well, I'm with the

equipment coming up

182nd Infantry and we have

this grade. You'll

a load of heavy

have to get over and

let

us pass."

The Lieutenant stepped out of the jeep, his silver wings shining in the sun. "Sergeant," he said, "we have a very heavy load on that trailer. It contains a hot pursuit plane,

and you guys

defense and you have no

air

in

the infantry need

it.

You're

cover and you won 't have any

these planes to Tontouta, put them together, and get them

in place for

until

we

flying.

get

Now,

you approach up to the curve. How about having your driver pull onto that and let us highball on down the grade? That should work out good." "Okay, Lieutenant," said the Master Sergeant, as he whipped his jeep there

is

a convenient shoulder out there as

around, shouted orders to the truck driver, and guided the truck onto the shoulder. With a big smile, a wave, and a snappy salute from the Master 'Sergeant, the aircraft load shifted into gear and rolled on

down

the grade.

The task of moving the aircraft crates continued on a 24-hour schedThe truck and trailer rig never stopped lugging up the narrow mountain roads and highballing down the grades. A round trip took eight hours; ule.

they averaged three trips a day, rain or shine, until the crates were all moved to Tontouta. Soldiers and Frenchmen often cheered as another plane passed by.

the "Little

It

was a tiring, dangerous trip over what became known as

Burma Road."

47 crates were delivered to their base. The unloading at Tontouta was far different from the loading at the dock area. There were no unloading facilities at the air base; the men carefully— almost lovingly —nudged, rolled, and pushed the crates off the trailer and into work position by brute force and the help of a truck winch. Each time, 10,000 Finally

all

pounds of crate and airplane were unloaded and placed in position for the work crew without a mishap or a serious injury. Only two of the 67th's pilots had any real experience in P-39 aircraft and none of the mechanics had ever worked on this type plane. When the no manuals for first crate was opened, it was discovered that there were

21

the P-400, just manuals on the P-39 models D,F, and K. This probably indicated that there

was never

a

manual on the P-400, since

it

was an

export version of the P-39, with its design status at about the model level of the P-39C and D.

The engineering section to handle aircraft assembly was getting orgawere brought up from Noumea. The engineering

nized as the big crates

were under the Master Sergeant Robert Foye. With production scope and complexity of the task well understood by this man of tremendous experience, work was organized and the sections for engineering tasks were section and the plan for production assembly of aircraft

direction of

established. While the chief mechanic, Technical Sergeant Charles N.

Neblock, and the other mechanics studied the manuals and examined the parts of the

first

unpacked airplane, others were shaping timbers into a lift an engine, a fuselage, or other

brute-force hoist rack with which to

heavy items during assembly. The only tools available were 10 kits of first echelon maintenance tools; these would have to do. Truck and automobile tools

were precious possessions. One of the mechanics, Hatfield, designed by cutting wrenches and welding on long handles for getting

special tools

into tight places peculiar to assembling the P-39/P-400.

There was no supply

Every fifth airplane was was uncrated. The planes were un-

of replacement parts.

designated as spare parts before

it

packed; the parts were sorted and assembled in a production fashion that was amazing for the conditions in which the men were obliged to work. They worked in the sun and soaking wet with rain running down their faces to assemble aircraft parts, toes.

all

the while tormented by ravenous mosqui-

They keep branches of leaves at their sides to brush the mosquitoes backs when they had a free hand. They passed the scant supply of

off their

from one to another, working with a determination and dedication What our democracy had failed to provide in the preparedness for this event, it had provided in the free-thinking innovative initiative of its people. What we were seeing was the partial fulfillment, in paraphrase, of that miracle foretold by Douglas tools

that had to be seen to be believed and understood.

MacArthur long before the war with the Japanese: "Democracy works and always work, because the people are allowed to think,

will

their

the

minds

initial

free, open,

onslaught,

it

talk,

and keep

and supple. As long as a democracy can withstand will find

ways

to strike back and eventually

it

will

money and at times does look inefficient, but in the final analysis, democracy as we know it in the United States is the best form of government that man has evolved." The Miracle Works operated from 0500 until dark, taking only a short break for chow (which was often cold), and then going right back to work. A night shift, made possible by stringing floodlights from a power unit, was attempted. On these occasions the mosquitoes almost drove them mad.

win.

It

costs

Lieutenant Brannon, hovering over the operation, stopped this effort for rest during the hours of darkness.

There were frequent problems, such as

22

a propeller missing

from a

crate, Scotch tape clogged in pressure and fuel lines, or electrical circuits hooked up incorrectly, causing the wheels to retract

when the flap switch was tripped. Such electrical troubles took time to analyze and correct but were usually solved by Enoch J. Dahlman, who turned out to be an aircraft

system genius. Every mechanic became production-conscious and section chiefs urged them on. Assembly smoothed out like a factory, all in the open in mud, rain, or sun, whatever the day brought. Master Sergeant Foye's organization would have put an air depot of its time to shame. There was a section for initial assembly, empennage, wing section, electrical

—

engine run-in, radio installation,

man

every

final inspection,

and

flight test. It

was

to his job and never a gripe.

Production moved smoothly, averaging better than one aircraft per The 67th Engineering Section truly became the "Miracle Works"

day.

where P-39s and P-400s appeared going smoothly the another. 'This

During

is

as

if

by magic. When production was calling from one section to

men pushed each other on,

war! Keep 'em rolling."

men began to come down with Some literally dropped to their knees with cramps, but stayed at their positions and would not ask for relief. Some had to be ordered back to camp to see "Doc" Soehner and even threatened with all

of this, the officers and

viruses and dysentery.

disobedience charges before sections. Fortunately,

New

finally leaving their places in

the production

Caledonia mosquitoes are not the anopheles

type, or malaria would have added to the problems.

A this

Pursuit Squadron such as the 67th

is

not normally required to do

type of aircraft assembly work, and certainly

is

not equipped to do

it.

The men assembled 30 aircraft in 29 days. When the 65th Materiel Squadron finally got their act together, they assembled 11. On one occasion, the 67th pushed an day. In the

the outstanding

through assembly from crate to

flight test in

one

would be impossible to pick 20 years in the Army I have

"It

men during this period, and in

The first airplane crate was delivered to Tonweek after the squadron disembarked at Noumea, New Caledonia,

never seen the touta a

aircraft

words of Master Sergeant Foye, like of it."

following the voyage from Australia; six days later the

ready for test

first

airplane

was

flight.

D.D. Brannon and John A. Thompson were the only experienced P-39 pilots. They took on the job of testing and passed on their experience to the other pilots, especially the young 2nd Lieutenants, who learned the pursuit pilot trade from them. On 28 March the pilots, mechanics, and anyone who could

make

it

out to the runway lined up to watch the

results of their hard labors.

Brannon went out

first test flight,

the

to the plane, put his para-

the cockpit seat, and did one last walk-around inspection. He climbed into the seat and started the engine. He ran the engine up while in place, checked the mags again, put flaps down, then up, moved the control

chute

in

He rolled out toward the end of the the brakes as he started to bring in held he runway. In takeoff position surfaces, and released the brakes.

engine power, then released the brakes. The plane rolled down the run-

23

"The Miracle Works," 67th Squadron Engineering, Tontouta Air Base, New Caledonia. Here in March of 1 942, the 67th Fighter Squadron assembled and tested their own aircraft, a major engineering

accomplishment

for

a fighter squadron.

way, gathering speed as

it

went on with full takeoff power. He let

long takeoff roll, gently raised the nose wheel, and the runway.

It

wings and nose.

He

and approached for a perfect landing.

line

and sat

at the

in

it

have a

fly itself off

climbed out of sight of the cheering

spectators along the runway. After 30 minutes of field

the plane

climbed and sounded perfect as the wheels folded up into

their places in the

the

let

flight,

he swung

in

over

He taxied back to the flight

the airplane while he talked to Sergeants Foye and Neblock

door as he wrote up a few items that would have to be done to the

aircraft as a result of the test flight. The production crew returned to their work with renewed vigor. It was about this time that Brannon's promotion to Captain came through, date of rank 1 March 1942. Also at about this time Army Air Corps Headquarters directed that all Pursuit Squadrons be renamed Fighter Squadrons, effective 15 May 1942 After a few airplanes were flying there was a request for a night mission over the defense positions around Noumea. A searchlight group

wanted to practice

finding and tracking an airplane in support of antiair-

craft artillery exercises.

On

a dark and starless night,

mission, tracking back and forth over

Noumea

Brannon took the

with the searchlight posi-

On one pass, a searchlight got on him and held the beam. Brannon moved out over Noumea Bay, hoping the operator would break off as was required for practice operations (because tions

working on him.

plane in

its

the powerful light difficult

24

beam filled the cockpit and blinded the pilot). He found it

to control the aircraft, and the light continued to hold him.

He

descended with the searchlight

still on him and finally had to bail out to avoid crashing into the bay, parachuting in the black waters while the plane crashed farther out in the bay. After a short time in the water he was picked

up by motor launch, but the 67th had lost one of its planes because a searchlight crew had failed to observe the 'timed break-off after light contact." "I was never so scared in my life," Brannon recalls. "That bay was full of sharks and as I waited in the water, hoping the motor launch would reach me in time, I swear I could see some of those devils swimming '

nearby."

As airplanes began to come off the production line, they were tested and put into service for the job of checking out all the Squadron pilots. This task fell mainly to Brannon and Thompson. Because there were no aircraft operation manuals to be studied, the experience had to be passed directly on to each of the pilots by Brannon or Thompson until other experienced pilots got

some time

in

the P-39/P-400. Most of the pilots were recent

graduates from flying school, with very airplane.

The

last

time they had been

in

little

time

in

any type of pursuit

an airplane was just before leaving

Baton Rouge for the voyage overseas. These pilots, with limited total flying to them, a hot time, approached their introduction to the P-39/P-400 with sensible caution and respect. The checkouts went pursuit plane well; pilots began to fly and become accustomed to the airplane at the same

—

—

time the production group was delivering new airplanes to the flight line. The whole checkout program was accomplished with only one acciwith dent. A pilot on a checkout ride made an approach he wasn't satisfied

and decided to go around for another try. He gave the engine full throttle, and not enough airspeed all at once, and with the steady high engine torque across the wing surfaces, the plane got out of control. of trees, cutting a

It

went

off

the

swath for about a

a grove When hundred yards, tearing off the landing gear and banging up the plane.

runway and roared through

25

the plane but a

bit

came

to a stop, the pilot stepped

shaken up.

He was awarded

wrecked plane and the

title

all

from the wreckage unharmed

the salvage spare parts from the

Lieutenant Lin wood Glazier, Air Corps Supply

Officer!

There were no other spare parts and requisitioning was a joke. All work was accomplished with parts from wrecked aircraft and the planes that had been designated as spare parts while still in the crates. Air Corps Supply became just a graveyard of wrecked airplanes and there weren't many of those to begin with. Whenever there was a crash, pilots and mechanics descended on the wreck like a pack of vultures, stripping repair

everything that could be easily and immediately removed. Aircraft instruments

P-400 export model were

were especially precious. The instruments in the of a poor grade. Many of the P-400s were flying

around without a complete set of instruments, a fault that would have grounded an airplane under normal circumstances. Defects written in the aircraft Form 1-A often carried remarks of a serious nature, such as "Fuel

gauge out, altimeter out." Any one of The clocks and gyro horizons almost never worked properly, a defect so universal that most pilots never bothered to make note of it. The mechanics responsible for these airplanes were always looking for a place to pick up a good instrument. Pilots learned to make the best of the planes as they were; flying and gauge out, tachometer

out, coolant

these defects should normally ground an airplane.

training had to

go on.

If

an altimeter was out, they estimated their altitude

or teamed up (during good weather) with a plane that had one.

If

a fuel

gauge was out, they flew by time, using the tanks in separate but equal periods during the flight. When a coolant temperature gauge was out, the pilot would carefully watch the oil temperature, since these instruments parallel information. When a tachometer was out, things were a little more difficult, but the pilots learned to cut back power and rpm

gave similar and after takeoff by

sound of the prop and engine, and by a look at the reduction

gear pressure gauge. Aircraft efficiency requires that set properly. tion,

rpm for

cruising be

When a pilot without a tachometer caught up with the forma-

he synchronized

his

rpm with the plane ahead of him by watching the

propeller and adjusting rpm until the propeller of the plane ahead seemed to

be standing through his

still,

own

or strobing very slowly in the direction of rotation, as seen

spinning propeller. All these tricks had to be learned by

trying them because the P-400 was a low-quality aircraft and its faults were

numerous.

The first planes out of assembly and test flight received rough treatment during the checkout training days; their mechanics worked wonders keeping them flying. One airplane seemed ready to go at all times and received a great deal of punishment during these early days of training and

bumpy landings. Finally it took a knockout punch, a wheels-up landing. A new pilot, returning from a familiarization flight, made a perfect approach, and as he rounded out for touchdown, he realized too late that his landing gear was not down. His flight companion, who landed and parked his

26

came out to the scene and while talking to the unfortunate pilot was taxiing back in and I could see your gear was not down 1 kept

airplane, said,

I

calling

-

you on the radio to get your gear down."

"I couldn't hear a

damn thing," said the bereaved pilot as he

looked at

damaged airplane, 'That damn horn was blowing so loud it was about to deafen me." There sat old Number 13 on its belly, skidded to a stop with his

the prop bent up and a wing crumbled, depleted in the center of the runway. It seemed "off to the graveyard" for the busted-up crate, but this was not to be. Diligent searching of the boneyard and supply provided the right set of parts to put Number 13 back to work. Soon, with a mongrel collection of parts, it was ready to go again. What a sight! One wing and some fuselage all

plates bore the dusty pastel of the British desert camouflage; the other

wing and fuselage plates were the olive drab of the U.S. Army Air Corps. The propeller had a mix of blades from different planes; it was field-balanced by drilling holes in a blade and filling them with lead, a precision task normally done only at the factory or air depot where three matched blades are precisely and delicately balanced. No job was too big or too delicate for the mechanics of the 67th.

Number 13 flew at first without a complete set of instruments, holes gaping where instruments should be. By normal means the pilot and crew chief eventually scrounged a full set of instruments for the airplane and christened this mongrel P-400 The Resurrection, which was painted on its side.

This beat-up P-400 kept

flying;

it

led a

charmed

life

at Guadalcanal

when most of the others of its vintage were shot up, shot down, or bombed and strafed out of existence. Artillery

shells and naval bombardment shells were duds; bombs dropped near it failed to explode. When its engine wore out, a more powerful engine from a P-39 was squeezed into it. The Resurrection just would not quit. As assembly and flight test delivered the remaining airplanes for operation, Brannon was convinced that the P-400 would never make it as

hitting near

it

an interceptor and pursuit fighter.

He had the engineering section strip one He hoped to lighten the plane

airplane of all the weight they could get off it.

by 700 to 1000 pounds to see if its performance as a fighter would improve. He especially wanted to shorten the time required to climb to altitude on an intercept mission.

ments, radio, all

The engineering

lights,

section took off armor plate, instru-

the starter system, and numerous other items.

When

the removed parts were weighed, they totaled close to 1000 pounds.

When

the job was finished and the plane rebalanced,

it

had to be

started by hand crank, winding up the inertial starter. Brannon flew the

plane on several tests and reported that

would not "make it"

planes, but

still

plane, nor

would

work and

it

in a

it

flew better than the heavier

curve of pursuit with a good fighter

get high enough, fast enough. With

all

the assembly

testing done on the airplanes, the pilots and ground crews of the

67th really knew everything that could be coaxed out of the P-39/P-400.

27

CHAPTER

4

Hold the Line at

New Caledonia While the crated aircraft were being delivered from "Miracle Works" was producing

aircraft,

Noumea and

the

other important business of the

Squadron was underway. By air observation and by jeep reconnaissance on the ground, the island was being closely examined for auxiliary airfield sites.

The

lessons of Pearl Harbor and the Philippines had

aircraft of the

shown

Squadron must be dispersed — not only on the

Tontouta, but to other

that

field at

as separate flights of the Squadron. Captains

fields,

Bruce, Hubbard, and Christian had been in the Philippines to see the

Japanese strafe and destroy their airplanes on the ground, do aerobatics over the field without opposition,

and slow-roll down the runway.

With the ever-present threat of a Japanese invasion of New Caledonia, the movement to other operational fields was of increasing importance as production numbers mounted. Of the three airfield sites on the island, Tontouta had been selected because air

it

was intended to be a relatively large

base and because one of the runways was

airfield site

was

at Plaines des Gaiacs,

struction had started.

The other was

now

completed. Another

midway up the

island,

where con-

a location in the northern, sparsely

Koumac; it was in the early stages of runway at Koumac was barricaded to prevent any

populated, end of the island at construction. At first the

possible landing there by the Japanese. Construction at Plaines des Gaiacs

was continued. All three of these fields

were

potentially high priority targets for the

Japanese and the squadron needed less conspicuous could be dispersed.

28

The

first

choice for a sub-base

fields to

was

which

flights

a location called

"Patsy," the the vicinity.

name taken from

It

was located

the

Army communications

switchboard

in

at Nepoui, eight or ten kilometers

from Plaines des Gaiacs. A detail of officers and men under John A. Thompson was sent to develop an airstrip for the first flight to be dispersed when planes came out of production and were test ready. As soon as checkout and familiarization for a pilot

Patsy for

final

were complete, the pilot and the plane were assigned to work and training. Here the planes had their guns

readiness

and boresighted on a homemade firing range; here each plane was made ready for combat operations. By air and ground reconnaissance, as aircraft production continued, fired

the 67th kept up

its

search for other locations that could be sub-base During these searches for suitable airfields,

airfields for additional flights.

the stunning beauty of the island of

from the

air,

was

New

pleasantly revealed.

Caledonia, as can only be seen

It lies in

peaceful waters protected

by the barrier reef like a sleeping stegosaurus with its central mountain peaks protruding skyward like the plates along its spinal column. The planes searched the entire island, often circling or flying low over the various military bivouac areas to let the troops know that the Air Corps was flying.

The 250-mile length and 30-mile width of New Caledonia is traversed over

The

its full

length by the rugged mountain range with few open passes.

pale blue waters of the coastline

lie

calm and undisturbed from the

white sand beaches of the shoreline to the barrier reef with white

surf.

The

plains

and

tain barrier in soothing

foothills rise sharply

shades of green.

its

foaming

toward the central moun-

On the mountains stand the white

towering cumulous clouds that invite a rat race through their lofty gray and

Fincher and flock. Lieutenant Deltis Fincher took an active interest in a he operated out of in New Caledonia. June 1942.

little

church near the sub-base

29

sunlit canyons.

Each peak, plateau,

67th Pursuit Squadron

The beauty

of

believe that

muddy, mosquito-infested hellholes airfields were chosen for the use

New

in

search of possible

Caledonia from the air

made

new airfield

sites.

almost impossible to

it

lay below.

As other officers

was examined by the

valley and plain

pilots of the

of

new

flights, details of

and men moved out to develop them as operational sub-bases. Each

new effort took more men away from Tontouta and the important work of assembling and testing the new aircraft. On top of these new burdens, the Tontouta began to increase, bringing additional work to the Squadron. Bombers were stopping on their long flights across the Pacific

air activity at

from Hawaii; these were B-17s enroute to some 5th Air Force Group, the first of many destined to be transferred to the South Pacific. They arrived low on gas and in a hurry to refuel for the flight on to Australia or other destinations. When they looked to the Air Corps for service, it was the 67th, the only Air Corps present. As with every other job, the 67th responded. Often the men worked long into the night, rolling out gasoline drums, hoisting them into position beside the wings, and pumping gas into the thirsty bombers' tanks with a hand-crank pump. little

The

pilots fixed

up a

shack abandoned by the runway construction crews on the airfield, set

up cots and mosquito nets, and established a place where the transient crews could get some rest. All of this involved duties never expected of a Fighter Squadron, but there was no Air Base Squadron that would normally do this work. The 67th established every air base function at Tontouta and operated them

until air

base units

finally

were formed

Along with the opening of new sub-base were spreading the 67th mighty thin. duties.

It

was

in April,

not quite a

month

to take over these

airfields,

after the

these extra tasks

Squadron had landed

in

New Caledonia, that Patsy, the first sub-base, became operational. It was a beautiful campsite along the Field, a beautifully

Nepoui River and across from

camouflaged

air strip. It

was

a

cow

it

was Patsy

pasture.

The base

by a slope leading down to the sea; on the other side it tucked up next to the mountains. The flat expanse of green pasture was left undisturbed, with no grading of bumps, so that the surface would

was bordered on one

side

be preserved and would retain the appearance of a cow pasture.

The pilots paced up and down the field for days seeking out the longest straight stretch, with the fewest bumps and dips. That dimension became the landing strip; it certainly could not be called a runway. The prevailing south wind kept a 45 degree cross wind on the landing strip at

an approach to land at Patsy was a tricky business. could not be

A

all

times and

landing approach

made over the mountains. The pilots developed a neat but On the downwind leg they skimmed along a

risky approach procedure.

ridge at

800

feet.

With the gear and

flaps

down, they would

start a steady

turn inside a bowl formed by the surrounding mountains. Staying as close as possible to the treetops, they gradually reduced speed to

drop through a

slot cut in the trees at the

120 mph

the throttle crossing the edge of the landing strip, and set her down.

30

to

approach end of the field, chopped

A spot

The Headquarters and Orderly Room of the 67th

Fighter

Squadron at Tontouta New Caledonia

1942.

few feet of the landing area with speed as low as possible was almost a necessity. There was just 3200 feet of rolling, dipping pasture ahead, and the plane behaved like a frightened kangaroo as the pilot wreslanding in the

first

it to a stop. The standard procedure for this type airplane would have been to glide at 150 mph and never make a turn with the wheels and flaps down. The 67th pilots at Patsy turned on the downwind leg at just above stalling speed, with wheels and flaps down, and glided at 120 mph. "That's

tled

the

way

roll,"

to get into Patsy without running out of airfield on the landing

Pete Childress

recalls.

Telephone wires had been lowered in the takeoff path. The runway was unmarked; on takeoff there was nothing ahead but grassy pasture. The aiming point was a brown tree at the far end of the field, in order to use the best part of the airstrip. The herd of cows drifted back and forth across the runway and cooperated by moving off the strip when they heard the aircraft engines running up. When conditions changed so that the field might lose its natural pasture camouflage, such as during wet weather, then the planes were taken over to Plaines des Gaiacs and maintained there until

the

field

dried out.

Across the island at Thio, another sub-base airstrip was opened in May. This new base took the name of "Shoe-Box" because it was a tight fit and because it was shaped like a shoe box. to put an airplane down on it

—

To a chance Japanese air observer, pasture at Patsy because field

was

it

didn't

it

would be as inconspicuous as the cow

make sense

to use

it

as an airfield.

The

a narrow, level, grassy strip in a valley with mountains on both

sides rising 3,000 to 5,000 feet at a sharp angle.

Shoe-Box had

its

own

individual tricky approach procedure.

The

ap-

31

proach started through a mountain pass about 10 miles from the runway at about 2000 feet.

The pilot would lower the landing gear and glide below the

it dropped steeply knob of a hill in the mountains, a landmark in the landing procedure, the flaps were lowered in a sharp 30-degree turn and the plane would land in the next hundred yards. The airfield, which could not be seen during the approach to the strip, was right beyond that little knob of a hill. The field at Shoe-Box was open only at the far end of its 3100 feet of runway. The landing strip was a ribbon of smooth ground about 30 feet wide in the center of the grassy area. The wings of an airplane stuck out over the edge of the smooth part of the strip; there were steep ruts on both sides. To keep the plane in one piece when landing, the pilot had to concentrate on staying in the smooth center of the strip. One pilot, returning from an early morning flight, was blinded by the rising sun and drifted off the narrow ribbon of smooth earth, wiping out the plane as he rolled off through the ruts. Another pilot, under the same circumstances, drifted off while making his approach, struck a mountainside, and was killed. Along with Shoe-Box, another field was being opened in May. This field, between Boulouparis and Bourake, was set up under the direction of D.D. Brannon. He took on the job to get away from Tontouta for a while

mountaintops, following the contour of the valley as

away. At a

little

m

The

32

old Air

Corps Supply area

at

Tontouta Air Base

New

Caledonia. 1942. (USAF)

and escape the problems of command being created by some of the "Philippines Group." When the field was opened, Brannon returned to Tontouta.

The area chosen for the strip was covered with scrubby brush growth, giving the field a naturally camouflaged location. It would be overlooked by an enemy as nothing but a wide spot in a country road. The trip was 3200 feet long with reasonably safe takeoff and landing path.

was

The main drawback

When

the brush was cleared for a runway area, the flat ground, resembling a flood plain, became a dustbowl. This quickly became the name dust.

The wind and propwash inundated the field with heavy dust. Pilots often made nearly blind takeoffs and landings in clouds of dust whipped up by the propwash from the preceding airplane.* of the base, "Dust-Bowl."

John Thompson was concerned that Patsy, supporting two full operational flights, was being overcommitted and overcrowded while waiting for

new

sub-bases to open. Plans for another base were pushed; by the end of fourth new sub-base was established. The base was at Dumbea; it

May a

completed the desired dispersal of the squadron's aircraft. The flight at Dumbea was called "Paradise" because of its comparatively ideal living conditions. Close to

Noumea, about 15

tages that had during the early days,

it

kilometers, with whatever advan-

was

certainly the paradise

among

the sub-bases operated by the 67th.

The sub-base at Dumbea was commanded by Jim Jarman and the flight usually had about 10 aircraft assigned. At Dumbea there was always a visitor or two from the other sub-bases for a quick shopping trip to Noumea or to the 9th Station Hospital on a more amorous quest. Paradise was field

enclosed by mountains with only a river valley opening out

Noumea

Bay. Dumbea/Paradise had a 2900 foot runway with very

another into

was

and mushy

weather. Because the far end of

wet weather and sandy in dry the runway was so soft, 300 feet of

Marsden

laid

slow ground.

It

soft

steel matting

had to be

in

over

it.

The

procedure was to hold the brakes, put on full power,

hope

was

only sensible takeoff let

go the brakes, and

getaway before reaching the soft ground. Once the pilot he started his gear up while making a 70-degree turn to go out

for a clean

off,

through the valley, slowly raising the

Dumbea had been planned

It

was

to be the

ever came to that, and was set up as a withdrawal the event of a Japanese invasion achieving some degree of success.

Bataan of the point in

flaps in the climbout.

as a base of last redoubt.

island,

if it

As the sub-bases began to operate in a coordinated defense effort, the pilots were required to become familiar with operation out of all airstrips operated by the Squadron, a precaution to ready the pilots in case it became necessary to redeploy or recover to one of these airstrips. Jim Jarman took a flight up to Patsy on one of these occasions; the trip was one of the highlights of the sub-base familiarization program.

*Shoe-Box, the little airstrip at Thio, was commanded by Lieutenant Al Dutton. Dust-Bowl, the airstrip near Boulouparis, was commanded by Lieutenant Bryan Brown.

33

Jarman, flying above a broken overcast, led his Patsy.

He found

and did a

down through

split-S

the vicinity of

the opening, in a typical fighter pilot's

letdown procedure, with the rest of the descent.

flight to

a break in the clouds over Plaines des Gaiacs, rolled over

race

flight following in a rat

He switched to the fullest tank for landing as they came down in a

screaming dive across the tion of Patsy.

field at

Plaines des Gaiacs, heading in the direc-

He was still throttled back to drop off speed as he approached

the Patsy airstrip.

As speed

diminished, he brought the throttle back in to

add power and enter the landing pattern. Nothing happened; his engine was dead. Jarman quickly decided on a downwind landing, since there was

no way he could make

it around to a normal approach. Heading for the landing strip, downwind, he got the gear down. Still at high speed, he put down a little flaps, then a little more flaps, and finally full

flaps.

He came

feet of

over the end of the

in

runway and, with the

strip,

tailwind,

touched down

his

the

first

used up every inch of the

turning off at the end into the deployment area.

back over his shoulder to see

in

As he

few

field,

turned, he looked

whole flight proceeding to land downwind

failed to pass on the word by radio that he was deadstick and making an emergency landing. Airplanes were land-

behind him. In his

ing,

difficulty,

he had

with pilots unfamiliar with the

field at

Patsy, and going in

all

directions

as they rolled, down the strip.

They all made it, but it was a hairy landing exercise. The full tank that to for landing was full of distillate instead of aviation gasoline. To correct the situation, it was only necessary to drain the tank

Jarman had switched and put

in

The

good gas.

net result of the total sub-base operations was a definite plus for

the 67th. Operating from different fields in a reasonably well-camouflaged

environment, the Squadron tied the island together defense operation, really learning

how to get

in a

coordinated air

the most out of the airplane.

point-to-point and air communications which smoothly

They developed

held the air defense operation together.

'The

New

four

Caledonia sub-bases tied together a significant de-

fense capability/' said Jarman in an October 1980 interview. "It covered a large geographical area; the flights

became

integrated, and a good, coordi-

nated operation was established.

"You have

called Philippines

believe

were happening fast and some command shortcomings; the so-

to realize that at the time things

the Squadron was really suffering

we were

Group gave us

a hard time in finding our identity, but

I

able to get in our training, handle the alerts, and develop

I don't know if we could have done better if we been on the same base. However, we did operate; it was a good idea and it worked." One might wonder why the 67th Fighter Squadron chose such difficult sub-bases from which to operate. The answer is that New Caledonia has such rugged terrain there are few locations on the island where any degree

an excellent island defense.

had

all

of natural camouflage

34

is

available, along with

enough

suitable

ground for a

camp and an airstrip. Detection by enemy observation was a distinct possibility in

the earliest days on

New Caledonia.

In July, the need for air cover at Dust-Bowl and Shoe-Box was ended and the fields were closed. These and the operations from Dumbea were

moved to Nehoui at the northern end of the island. The field at Nehoui, also commanded by Jim Jarman, was built by cutting a 3000-foot runway through a tree-covered area. The takeoff heading of the runway was the only direction available for construction. The prevailing wind placed a crosswind on the runway at

all times. It was necessary to take off toward the face of a mountain and turn 90 degrees after takeoff for climbout. After

operating out of

Dumbea and Shoe-Box,

this

procedure was accepted

without comment. After these sub-bases, the 67th pilots were prepared to operate from the most unimaginable airfield conditions.

Each

of the sub-bases operated with a flight of about 10 planes; Flight

Commanders ran them

like

separate

little

squadrons. These flights re-

ported to the Squadron Headquarters at Tontouta, which,

in reality,

was

operating like a Fighter Group Headquarters organization. At Tontouta

all

the administration, personnel, logistics, and major maintenance support for the Squadron

was accomplished,

as well as

many of the

air

base functions.

Intercept Officers for the island's Interceptor Control board, which oper-

ated at Noumea, were also provided.

The Air Corps Supply area of the 1 3th

Air

Depot Group

at

New Caledonia. 27 August

1

943. (USAF)

35

ity

Every airplane in the Squadron was kept in commission by the ingenuand resourcefulness of the ground crews. There were few spare parts, if

any, and as airplanes began to show wear, the crew chiefs made do with what they had (such as wrapping frayed ignition harness with common friction tape able).

Many

—

a violation of Technical Orders, but the only solution avail-

a pilot felt a screaming

lump

in his throat

when an engine

missed a few times due to a spark jumping through a leaky harness.

The aircraft radio equipment was cheap and inadequate to hold Squadron communications together over the length and breadth of the island

them their "Mickey Mouse Radios." It became common practice to zero-beat each aircraft radio with a frequency meter every day and with each ground station, thereby assuring accurate tuning. The cockpit-to-tail antenna was reluctantly removed from the airplanes and an antenna extending from the tail to the two wingtips was installed. This antenna was a better match for the transmitter, putting more available transmitter power out on the antenna. The extra length made reception possible for a plane operating anywhere in the island area. Results were good from a communications point of view. The antenna was area; the radio repairmen called

supported by considerably

flexible insulators at the tail

more drag than the

dive, the wire stretched out

and wingtips, but presented

old antenna. In a

gunnery or bombing

and sometimes came home dangling.

As the pilots of the Squadron gained experience and the sub-base were opened, a sort of competition developed. The pilots at Patsy-

fields

painted a fierce shark's mouth, similar to the symbol of the Flying Tigers in China, under the noses of their planes.

The Dumbea pilots painted a pair of

on a blue background near the tail of their planes; they called "Pair-a-dice." The Dust-Bowl planes had their prop spinners

rolling dice

their field

painted red. Painted on the doors of most of the planes

was the

colorful

"Game Cock" insignia designed for the 67th by Walt Disney. On many a day the red noses of Dust-Bowl were out, sliding down the backs of the beautiful cumulonimbus clouds that billow up over the mountains of New Caledonia. Sometimes the shark-mouthed gang from Patsy would jump them and a running dogfight would commence through the towering halls and corridors of the giant puffy clouds, a demonstration of

the dogfighting and gunnery tactics they were learning daily in their combat training.

As

became familiar with their planes and felt that they really belonged to them, names that told a little about the man flying them appeared on the sides of the fighters. Such names as Whistling Britches, Resurrection, Hell's Bell, Eager Eagle, Southern Belle, Flying Pole, Corkey, Cicero Kid, and L 'il Jo were coined. Training commenced as soon as checkouts were completed and flights began to operate from their bases. Brannon and Thompson tried to stanpilots

dardize operating procedures for handling and care of the aircraft, and to

schedule an even distribution of training time. Since there were no tow targets available for practicing aerial gunnery, arrangements

36

were made

with a Marine Fighter Squadron

in the

New

Hebrides for some training

Marine Corps Fighter Squadron VMF 212, stationed on the island of Efate, agreed to exchange planes and pilots to help in aerial gunnery training for pilots of the 67th. Over a period of about a month, approximately four planes per week from the 67th flew the 325 miles over water from Tontouta to Efate. The Marines also brought their Grumman F4F Wildcats to New assistance.

Caledonia. Their training

was passed on

to the pilots of the 67th as the up in dogfights, joining and breaking off simulated combat. Under the leadership of Major Harold

Wildcats and Airacobras mixed

engagements

in

it

W. Bauer, "Injun Joe," Commander taught the

of

VMF

212, the Marines patiently

Army pilots their techniques of overhead and high-side passes in

simulated attack.

The Marine pilots also taught the Army pilots to engage a fastmoving target approaching it from any angle, how to judge the lead when a target was in the gunsight in order to have the target and the tracer bullets meet in the same place while holding a curve of pursuit, and how to shoot with deadly accuracy. "If there was anything to be known about aerial gunnery, Joe Bauer knew it," Jim Jarman recalls. Many warm friendships, later to be renewed at Guadalcanal, were formed between the pilots of VMF 212 and the 67th. This intensive training continued after the sessions with the Marines were completed. The 67th obtained tow targets from the Marines and an old P-43 that showed up on New Caledonia was used to tow the target for aerial gunnery. Brannon or Thompson flew the towplane and the other flew gunnery to observe the performance. In addition, they frequently flew unique shadow gunnery missions. In these sessions, one plane flew at a constant altitude, casting a shadow on the water, and the other planes would dive down, shooting at the shadow. This was an excellent method for checking pilot accuracy. With proper allowance for lead in his gunsight, the pilot could see the splashes of his ammunition in or near the front of the shadow. "We learned shadow gunnery quite by accident," recalled Dale Brannon. "While out on a tow target mission, we realized that the shadow of an airplane could be seen clearly on the water. Our gunnery mission area was along the beach, not far from Tontouta. The water between the shore and the barrier reef was calm and clear, ideal for carrying the smooth shadow of an aircraft flying overhead. At this point the 67th discovered that it was possible to fire into the shadow as it carried along the water. Each pilot fired at the this

shadow, watching the lead and ammunition hitting the water. In could tell if his curve of pursuit was hitting the target, and he

way he

could adjust. After a few such missions a pilot could judge the curve of pursuit and lead to

make

sure he held his curve

when

his

ammunition was

sooner using on the target. It was necessary for the pilot to break off a this method, in order to pull out and miss the water. This exercise improved his judgment when later flying on the tow target. "Dive bombing and skip bombing were practiced on an old freighter little

37

gone aground. The remaining hulk was on the outer reef off Tontouta Bay. The 67th laid lots of sand-filled bombs on that old hulk, that had

them in or diving them in. The 67th got pretty good at dive bombing and skip bombing and, when aiming at Japanese ships and barges later on, that training paid off," Brannon recalls. Finally Brannon made each of them dogfight with him to size up the skipping

39

capability of each pilot, hoping

some

of

them would beat him

at his

own

game. Readiness of the 67th progressed with enthusiastic vigor in spite of game of musical chairs in the position of Squadron Com-

the fact that the

mander was ing. all,

Up

still

going on and that administration and policy were confus-

to this time there had

Brannon pushed the

around

New Caledonia,

been

pilots hard;

five

changes

in

command. Through

he knew they were not here just to

boring holes in the

air.

He wanted them

it

fly

ready for

what was coming. They were. Brannon 's position among the pilots could be understood by listening to them talk. As they discussed flying techniques, capabilities of aircraft, or mechanical problems, many opinions would be cast about in the conversa" When Brannon's opinion tion until someone said, "Well, D.D. says. was discussed, the subject was soon closed in unanimous agreement. John A. Thompson and Jim Jarman enjoyed a similar rapport with the officers and men of the squadron. Together, these three were the mentors of the developing fighter pilots and the strong, experienced group of enlisted .

.

specialists of the squadron.

In late July 1942, the

everyone moved play

its

in to

Squadron closed its sub-bases permanently, and

Tontouta. Planning was underway for the 67th to

role in the invasion of Guadalcanal. Special preparations

were being

who were now spending time in sessions. The 67th began its work of

studied by Captains Christian and Brannon,

Noumea

for briefings

scheduling the

and planning

movement

and logistic preparaground crewman and supplies to the island,

of airplanes to Guadalcanal

tions necessary to get the

which was now known to the men alerted for assignment to the operation only as Cactus, its code name.

40

CHAPTER

Ready

for

5

an Offensive?

Long before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, industrial production of the United States was supplying assistance to the European Allies facing the German war machine. Declaration of war only served to confirm that policy. The President's clandestine commitments had at least stimulated U.S. industry so that when war finally came, the lead time for obtaining equipment and trained troops had been shortened somewhat. Yet the wherewithal for fighting a war was still dangerously short. The British insisted that all war materiel be routed to Europe and the Middle East. President Roosevelt was so Europe-oriented that he

just

happen. Allocations from the American war potential to the Pacific probably never exceeded 10 percent. This emphasis on Europe, about

let

it

overplayed beyond

justifiable levels, severely penalized forces in the Pa-

who paid for every shortage with loss of opportunity for an advantage

cific,

and with extra loss of

By June

of 1942,

life.

even with the overpowering interest

in

Europe, the

necessary to admit that a limited offensive against the

Allies found it Japanese, whose advance deep into the South Pacific threatened supply lines to New Zealand and Australia, was now necessary. With a shoestring

transports, cargo ships, trained troops, and supplies, plans proceeded for a campaign which, by force of impoverished conditions, must be a limited one. An offensive move was necessary if Pacific Forces were to halt the Japanese threat to vital communications

complement of available war ships,

growing threat of Japanese moves into more island objectives scattered south toward New Zealand and Australia. Allied lines.

There was

a clear and

41

42

TABLE OF DISTANCES

Pearl

Horbor

3,087

Woke Aral PMOCMX

Nondi,

1,768 1,130

Fiji

i

•S'.AMOS

Sydney, Australia

1,547

Auddond, New Zealand

1,832

Manila, PM.pp.ne Itlonds

2,753

HonjKonj

3,303

Tontouta,

New

Caledonia

Gown k*o

834 557

Espmtv Santo

1,651

Jmn

2,328

Tmmwm

1^03

694 COOK ISLANDS 2,610

Port Moresby.

New Gu.noo

763

43

New Caledonia,

and the New Hebrides were already under direct threat. This reluctant decision led to a campaign to stop the Japanese in the British Solomon Islands and to the long and bloody struggle, holdings in the

Fijis,

manpower,

against terrible odds with limited equipment and

session of Guadalcanal.

It

was

for the pos-

which some national and military

a fight in

men on Guadalcanal, refusing to send more men, and planes for fear of loosing them when the island was retaken

leaders broke faith with the ships,

by the Japanese.

As early as March of 1942, the President directed General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz to share responsibility for the vast area of the Pacific Ocean. Their mission was to hold the islands already in hands and defend communications

Allied

lines to Australia. In addition,

they were to plan, when possible, to execute operations against the Japa-

The speed

nese.

of the Japanese offensive,

which began on 7 December

1941, was awesome and had placed Allied organization

in

the Pacific back

to zero.

After the capture of Rabaul on

New Britain Island, 23 January 1942, New Guinea and all the Solo-

the Japanese were within bombing range of

mon

Islands chain.

They began moving down

the Solomons in

March

of

1942, building fighter strips as they went. At the same time, they were assembling naval forces to attack Port Moresby, an Allied base

New

in

eastern

A

segment of this force landed at Tulagi, just across the Sealark Channel from Guadalcanal in the southern Solomons, 3 May 1942. Here they established a seaplane base, preparing strong defenses for the Guinea.

island

and

its

excellent harbor facilities.

As the Japanese expeditionary

force

was enroute

to attack Port

Moresby, their immediate objective, the force was intercepted by United States Naval and Air Forces in the Coral Sea (actually, the Solomon Sea). In this naval battle, though indecisive, the Japanese were taken by surprise and sustained heavy losses, including the loss of a Shoho.

The U.S. Navy

lost the aircraft carrier

light aircraft carrier, the

Lexington. The Japanese

Navy withdrew from

this engagement without pressing the attack on Port Moresby, which they rescheduled.

The commander

of the Japanese

Combined

Fleet, assisted by the

Japanese 17th Army, was charged with the invasion of Midway, to be followed by the invasion of

New Caledonia, Fiji,

and Samoa, bringing their

Midway did not go They were badly injured, losing four aircraft carriers, the Kaga, Akagi, Soryu, and Hiryu, with 250 aircraft and many experienced carrier pilots. They withdrew without pressing the invasion of direct threat closer to Australia. In June, the attack on

well for the Japanese.

Midway. Shortly after this disappointment, Japanese planners put the scheduled invasions of Midway,

New

began to strengthen the base

Caledonia,

at Tulagi

Fiji,

and Samoa on hold. They

and to build an

airfield

Lunga River on the grassy Lunga Plain. The Guadalcanal was scheduled to be completed by 15 August.

canal near the

44

on Guadalairfield

on

airfield at Lunga Plain, shortly before the invasion of Guadalcanal. Taken by a B-17 during a surveillance flight by the 1 1th Bombardment Group, U.S. Army Air Corps, in July of 1942. Mount Austen, known as the "Grassy Knoll," can be seen in the background. (National Archives)

The Japanese

Every move by the Japanese, from New Britain down along the Solochain, was watched and evaluated by the Australian Coast Watching Service. Their intelligence reports were speedily passed into Allied intelligence channels. Japanese movements as well as their progress on the airfield at Lunga Plain were regularly reported.

mon

Allied contingency planning for an offensive into the

Solomons had been underway since May. A number of plans were presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by both the Navy and Army planners. The most prominent of these was an Army plan for an offensive to take Rabaul, striking deep into the Japanese chain of islands and depriving the Japanese of the secure bases necessary to strike at Australia and the Allied-held island bases.

Army

plans differed considerably from those of the Navy, but the Chiefs

ulti-

mately agreed that the taking of Rabaul would be accomplished by a progressive advance beginning with a thrust into the Southern Solomons.

The "war dance" by the high brass over who would have overall command would have been considered comical if it had not been for the seriousness of the decision and the high stakes involved. (The story of of the offensive

this rivalry

would, in

The general

itself,

make an

interesting book.)

plan and matters of

command were

Admiral Ernest J. King and General George C. Marshall

settled

between

in a joint directive

on 2 July 1942. It was to be a Navy operation until the landing force development phase was completed and secured. Admiral Nimitz was directed to proceed with the operation, code name Watchtower, for an offensive into the Solomons and Santa Cruz Islands. He also received

45

guidance concerning the use of

Army

aircraft to support the operation.

Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, with headquarters at Noumea, was to

command the operation; Vice Admiral Frank Fletcher was to command the Naval task force, and Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commander of the 1st

Marine Division, was ordered to prepare for a landing

in

the

Solomons.

Marine Division had just arrived in Wellington, New Zealand. Because the Division had not been scheduled for a combat operation, the ships in which they arrived were not loaded for the sequential unloading necessary to support landing force development. The dock workers at Wellington had picked this time to strike in a labor dispute and would not handle the ships' cargo. The men of the 1st Marines unloaded the ships and reloaded them in landing-force combat order, working around the clock in eight-hour shifts until the job was done. The Marines had some colorful expletives punctuating their descriptions of the dockworkers at Welling-

The

ton,

1st

known

as the "warfies."

Navy command, Admirals King and Ghormley had implied a fear that the Army might not deliver full support to an operation commanded by the Navy. In describing events over 40 years past, with the ultimate outcome already known, there is danger that the full impact of events in detail, as they really happened in the most desperate In pressing their insistence for a

may not be appreciated.

days of the campaign, deliver

on

its

commitments

In retrospect, the

Army did

— Admiral Ghormley was the one

to give

fainthearted support.

Army

to renege in the eyes of the Army Air Cactus and unaware of the U.S. Army and Australian offensive opening in New Guinea. It is clear, however, that the actions by the 11th Bombardment Group (B-17s) in the sea battles and Initially

Corps

men

the

did

seem

biting the bullet at

over the islands represented enthusiastic support.

The immediate commitment of the 67th Fighter Squadron, as soon as operations off Henderson Field were possible, represents continued enthusiastic

support by the Army, as does the arrival of the 164th Infantry

October and,

later,

in

the arrival of the Americal Division under Major

General Alexander M. Patch. That someone was reneging seems clear, for the impoverished conditions under which the 67th Fighter Squadron and the Marines in the line conducted their

they can get for an offensive

enough fingerpointing

to

command

initial

operations were as bad as

that refused to give up.

go around regarding weak support

in

There

is

the early

days of the campaign.

When

the 67th Fighter Squadron

was placed digroup, MAG-23. They repre-

was committed,

it

Marine Division's air unit committed to the invasion of Guadalcanal and remained so until the 164th Infantry was committed in late October. The selection of Admiral Ghormley to command Watchtovjer is beyond comprehension. He was against the plan from the start, openly rectly under the 1st

sented the only

believing

46

it

Army

to have

little

chance of success.

Command of the

landing force

General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Commander of the First Marine Division, Reinforced, during the Guadalcanal Campaign. Of all the "brass" in the task force team, he was the hero. Taken while he was Commandant of the Marine Corps. (USMC)

responsible for taking and holding Guadalcanal and Tulagi was General

Alexander A. Vandegrift, commanding the 1st Marine Division, Reinforced.

Of

all

the brass responsible for taking and holding the

foothold in the Solomons, this

man was

the hero.

overextended from lack of support and sputtering to the

When

first

Allied

command was he made it look

his

in place,

enemy like a Cadillac even though he knew, for the time being, it was

running on a jeep engine.

47

Ghormley placed Admiral Frank J. Fletcher seaborne invasion force, with his

flag

command of the entire

in

on the Saratoga. This was another

command on the The other two commanders in the task force were Rear Admiral Richard K. Turner, commanding the Naval Transport force directly supquestionable assignment, inflicting another layer of timid

operation.

porting the amphibious invasion, and Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes, com-

manding the support

carriers, three

groups

built

around Saratoga, Enter-

and Wasp. This Watchtower plan was placed into operation over Ghormley's objection.

prise,

The immediate prospects for an active campaign and the need for a command organization to coordinate the support of the Army ground and air forces caused the establishment of a new command, United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area, USAFISPA. On 14 July 1942, Major General Millard F. Harmon, an Air Corps Officer, was appointed Commanding General. He was later promoted to Lieutenant General.

Harmon took responsibility for all

of the

South

administration and supply of

Pacific Area. His headquarters

was

Noumea, New Caledonia; the two got along very well. Harmon's efforts were immediately positive; he was izer

and gave the

Army

Army units in

close to Ghormley's at

a brilliant organ-

activities in the theater the swift kick in the butt

they needed to become a smooth command.

He pushed Army support for

the campaign. His abilities later assured a smooth transition of command at

Guadalcanal to the Americal Division after the island was declared secure

by General Vandegrift.

As plans proceeded for the invasion, there were only 32,000 Army ground troops in the South Pacific. These could not be committed to was not enough shipmoved they were on.

reinforce the Marines to attack Guadalcanal; there

ping space available in the Pacific and troops in place could not be

without replacements to defend the islands

Admiral Nimitz, pulling as much strength as he could into the opera-

Marine Air Squadrons to the South Pacific, transferred 1 1th Bombardment Group (B-17) was moved from Hawaii to New Caledonia and other Army Air units were committed to area coverage. The 1st Marine Division was heavily reinforced, containing units of the 5th Marines, 2nd Marines 1st Battalion, and the 3rd Marine Defense Battalion, to provide antiaircraft and coast defense. The 67th Fighter Squadron, Army Air Corps (P-39/P-400 Airacobra), was committed to meet the Marine Fighter Squadron, VMF 223 (F4F Wildcat), and Dive Bomber Squadron VMSB 232 (SBD Dauntless), at Guadalcanal as soon as the airfield was captured and combat operations from the field were tion,

ordered

five

aboard aircraft carriers. The

possible.

For coordination

of ground-based air support to the operation,

all

were placed under Rear Admiral John S. McCain. About 100 aircraft were at his disposal: 35 B-17s and 22 B-26s in New Caledonia and the Fijis; 38 fighter planes, P-39/P-400s of the 67th Fighter Squadron at Tontouta Air Base, New Caledonia; and a mix of U.S. Navy and ground-based

48

air

forces

New Zealand Air Force aircraft based at New Caledonia, Fijis, and the New Hebrides. Taking this less-than-ideai scrub team, he squeezed the Royal

best coverage possible out of

it.

On 25 July, McCain divided his total resources into seven task groups. One group, comprising the 69th Army Bombardment Squadron, The 67th Army Fighter Squadron, a New Zealand Air Force Squadron, and two Navy PBY Catalinas, scouted 400-mile sectors from New Caledonia. The second group, consisting of the 11th Heavy Bombardment Group, Army, operating B-17s from New Caledonia, Efate, Espiritu Santo, and the Fijis, scouted

between New Caledonia and the Solomons, and west of the Solomons, also carrying out bombing attacks on Tulagi and Guadalcanal until D-Day. The third group,

two PBYs detached from the seaplane tender

ated out of Ndeni to search northeast of the Solomons.

Curtiss, oper-

The

fifth,

the

MacKinac and its PBY patrol planes, began a search of the east coast of Malaita on D Minus Three. The sixth group consisted of Marine Fighter Squadron VMF 212, F4F Wildcats, and Scouting Squadron D-14, SBD Dauntlesses, moved to Espiritu Santo to aid the bombing effort out of Efate. The seventh, Marine Observation Squadron 251, was asseaplane tender

bombardment effort out of Espiritu Santo. McCain planned that from D Minus Five to D Plus Four, aircraft would

signed to assist the

flights over eastern New Guinea, KaNew Georgia. Combat aircraft were ready to

be conducting daily reconnaissance vieng, and the eastern tip of

strike at Japanese naval vessels within a 550-mile radius of Port Moresby.

From D-Day

to

D Plus Four, when the transports would be unloading the

amphibious forces at Guadalcanal and Tulagi, Allied

aircraft

would attack

Rabaul and Kavieng area. At the same time, Buka was to be placed under attack to prevent the Japanese from refueling there.

The amphibious attack force that was to hit the beaches was split into two groups under General Vandegrift. The Guadalcanal group commanded by Vandegrift himself contained Combat Group A, the 5th Marines, Reinforced (less Combat Team Two), the 1st Marines, Reinforced, and a support group, a total strength of about 11,300 men. Intelligence indicated they would be facing an enemy force of up to 7,000. The northern group, concentrating on Tulagi, was commanded by Brigadier General Rupertus and contained the Florida Island group, 1st Battalion 2nd Marines, the

Combat Team Two of the 5th Marines, and a detachment of the 3rd Defense Battalion. The Gavutu Island group contained the 1st Parachute Battalion acting as infantry. The combined northern group strength was about 3900 men. Division reserve was the Tulagi group, 1st Raider Battalion,

2nd Marines, Reinforced, which were committed during the beachhead landing period.

As D-Day approached, Admiral Fletcher ordered the task force to rendezvous southeast of the Fiji Islands on 26 July. The expeditionary force practiced landing maneuvers and support operations, with aircraft carriers deparparticipating, at Koro Island in the Fijis. The ships then refueled for that fortunate is it ture on 31 July. With limited Navy strength available, 49

Lt. Gen. Millard F. Harmon, Commander of U.S. Army Forces in the South Pacific Area (USAFISPA), during the Guadalcanal Campaign. His importance to the campaign has never been fully appreciated. He was lost during a noncombat flight over the Pacific Ocean area; reported missing on 26 February, 1945. (USAF)

50

the three carriers

— Enterprise, Saratoga, and Wasp— were assigned

support the invasion.

to

The

task force regrouped after rehearsal and refueling operations and were at a position off Guadalcanal about 15 miles west of Cape Esperance very early in the morning on 7 August. The task force had proceeded to this point under concealing weather and radio silence.

tween 0600 and 0630 the transport groups

Be-

arrived, undetected, at their

respective objective locations to debark the amphibious landing forces off The Guadalcanal force stood off the beach

—

Tulagi and Guadalcanal.

—

Beach Red between Lunga Point and Koli Point. The Japanese were taken by surprise. Very little was known about the objective area in the Southern Solomons and no current maps and charts were available. From an intelligence point of view, it was a stab in the dark. Hurried aerial photo expeditions by B-17s helped produce updated maps for the invasion and battle planning; none of them ever reached Vandergrift's people. A mosaic of aerial photos prepared by General MacArthur's command was lost in the mails at, or enroute

to,

New Zealand and never reached the

first available battle

shown plans.

1st

Marine

sketched by a Marine

Division.

officer

The

based on

former Guadalcanal civilians and Australian coast covered the area of the beachhead, but turned out to be inaccurate. Mount Austen, referred to as the Grassy Knoll, was with

interviews

watchers. pitifully

map was one

It

as only

When

two miles

inland and

the landing was made,

was to be taken in Vandegrift's early Mount Austen was found to be over

was dropped as an immediate objective. In general, the Solomon Islands were a great unknown to the men of the invasion force. This island chain is made up of a double row of mounfour miles inland and

tainous islands rising out of the sea in a northwest-to-southeast direction

with a sheltered expanse of water lying between the double row of islands;

was known by everyone as "the slot." Beginning in the northwest with Buka and Bougainville, there is Shortlands, Choiseul, Santa Isabel, Malaita, this

Vella Lavella,

New

Georgia, Russels, with Guadalcanal, Tulagi, Florida,

Gavutu, San Cristobal, and Rennel at the southeastern end of the Slot. The north coast of Guadalcanal has beaches suitable for amphibious landing, but

no harbors. The waters lying nel, later

known

as "Iron

off

the beaches,

known

as the Sealark Chan-

Bottom Bay," are calm. They served

as an

anchorage for the supporting vessels.

At 0613, naval bombardment of the beachhead area commenced at both Guadalcanal and Tulagi. Carrier aircraft arrived on schedule and joined the attack. The landing at Guadalcanal was virtually unopposed. Carrier aircraft from the Enterprise and Saratoga were shielding the operation and received few requests from ground troops for air strikes. In a to encounter as many as 7,000 enemy troops and 1500 Korean coolies who 600 troops, the Marines found only had been working on the airfield. They all promptly took to the hills. Across Iron Bottom Bay, at Tulagi, resistance was fierce, Marines casualties were high, and the enemy was not mopped up for several days. situation

where they expected

51

I

By dusk, the Beach Red landing force had advanced about 3500 yards and by 2000 that evening 2000 troops were ashore. General Vandegrift ordered the 1st Marines to attack along the Lunga River the next morning and leave Mount Austen for another time. On the morning of 8 August they

and across the Lunga and took the village of Kokum By 1600 the airfield was taken by the 1st Battalion. Supplies, equipment, and facilities captured were most welcome in view of the meager supply situation. More would have been captured extended

lines along

against light

enemy

resistance.

except for the wanton destruction of everything in sight by the Marine troops as they moved in. By 9 August there were 10,900 troops ashore, about half of the supplies and materiel expected, and the beach was so clogged that the beachmaster had an impossible logistic situation.

The invasion was a surprise to the Japanese, but they were not long in delivering an angry response with both air and naval forces. These Japa-

nese attacks further delayed the snarled unloading operation and

efforts to

100 on 7 August, a Coast Watcher somewhere in the northern Solomons reported 'Eighteen bombers heading south over my station." Shortly after this, another report was received from Pilot Officer Cecil John Mason, RAAF, a Coast Watcher on Bougainville, that a large clear the beach. At

1

'

number

of planes

was

flying south.

At 1320 the

first

force of 18 bombers

flew over the landing area, striking at the ships in the transport area; one

Mugford, sustained light damage and 20 casualties. aircraft, 10 Aichi dive bombers, arrived at inflicted by these planes, but the necessary and boats denied valuable unloading the transports evasive maneuvers by ship, the destroyer

The second group of enemy 1500. There was no damage time.

At noon on the following day, 8 August, 40 twin-engine bombers Two ships were lost. The destroyer Jarvis, hit to leave the area under her own power and managed torpedo, by a forward attacked the transport area.

proceeded toward the southwest, hoping to make it to Noumea for repairs; she was never heard from again. The transport Elliotwas set afire when an enemy plane crashed on her deck. She was beached and destroyed; the

were taken aboard the Hunter Liggett. Twelve of the attacking planes were shot down in the vicinity of the ships, two more were downed by ground fire from the shore, and still others were shot down to the west, having been intercepted by carrier planes. Seven American planes were survivors

lost.

The burning

Elliot took with

that had not yet been unloaded.

it

The

a large store of materiel and supplies light of the fire

exposed cruisers and

destroyers that were later attached by an advancing

enemy

naval task

force.

task force had been reported as they gathered at Rabaul on the morning of 8 August. This force sailed down the Slot; at 1800, Fletcher reof their approach was received. At 1807 Admiral

The enemy

warning

that quested permission from Ghormley to withdraw the aircraft carriers He day. the during cover air providing had been operating to the south,

indicated that he

was low on fuel and air action had reduced his fighter force

53

from 99 to 78 planes. Ghormley consented; the carriers departed 8 August.

When informed that Fletcher and the carriers were to be withdrawn, Admiral Turner informed Vandegrift at a meeting aboard his flagship

McCawleydX about midnight on 8 August that without air cover, he would have to withdraw the transports. Upon hearing that Fletchers warships and transports were to be withdrawn, Vandegrift was livid. His plans called for the transports to

remain offshore

until 1 1

August.

He was

being

left

bare with some of his troops and half of his materiel and supplies still aboard the transports.

Meanwhile, the Japanese task force previously reported was approaching Savo Island undetected. At 0145, 9 August, a seaplane launched

from one of the Japanese cruisers dropped flares over the transport area and the Japanese warships slipped deep into the protected zone unde-

They fired torpedoes, illuminated the targets by flares from aircraft firing at will on the ships on both sides of Savo Island. The Japanese commander then departed north so as to be out of range of our tected.

and searchlights,

aircraft in daylight;

had he stayed around to press

his advantage, the result

would have been even more devastating to the U.S. Navy. The Battle of Savo Island was the worst defeat ever suffered by the U.S. Navy. The Vincennes, Quincy, Canberra, and Astoria were

lost.

The Chicago and

Ralph Talbot were damaged. Admiral Turner's warships and the transports departed from the Sealark Channel in the afternoon of 9 August.

support and the ships of the amphibious force

The departure

left

of the air

the 1st Marine Division,

alone in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area, exposed to Japanese attacks, without air

cover or naval surface support.

Enemy

bases at Rabaul, Buka, and

Shortlands were within easy striking distance and the 1st Marine Divison

was besieged. U.S. Marines are bitter to this day over this turn of events.

Fletcher had planned before

all

They know

along to pull out the carriers and the transports

D Plus Three. The ships were refueled after the rehearsal at Fiji; the

excuse of being low on fuel aircraft losses

is

questionable,

if

not ridiculous. In addition, his

had been within the acceptable range. One could strike up a

who was memories of being left exposed on the beach. In the words of one old Marine Colonel, "Ghormley and Fletcher screwed the Marines at Guadalcanal. They ran off with half of our equipment and left us bare-assed." "Always Fueling Fletcher," he was sometimes called, reminiscent of a similar departure from Guam for fuel, where he also left the conversation in any bar, bus station, or airport with a Marine there, with bitter

Marines to their

fate.

Ghormley now took the position that a carrier task force would not be risked until there were planes and aviation gas at Cactus to provide protection, the "chicken or egg" syndrome. He ordered the carrier groups to operate well south of Guadalcanal to strike against only priority Japanese targets, and protect the lines of

54

communication to Noumea and the

New

The Guadalcanal beachhead

in

early

August 1942.

Hebrides. Admiral McCain's land-based bombers and other aircraft continued as a scouting force. General Harmon was concerned that the invasion had been planned as an amphibious landing without sufficient means to follow up the beachhead advantage and without a central lishing

an

air

the Japanese-held territory.

mount an

theme

for estab-

base and American stronghold from which to continue against

He

believed that the American forces should

intensive air and surface operation to destroy Japanese forces;

should base fighters, dive bombers, and heavy bombers at Guadalcanal;

should build up supplies and send troops to reinforce General Vandegrift.

General Harmon's correspondence to General George C. Marshall, along may have hastened the replacement of Ghorm-

with other obvious events, ley,

whose position as commander of the entire operation Watchtowerwzs

taken over by Admiral William F. Halsey

in

October.

Conditions at Guadalcanal were serious and both Generals Douglas MacArthur and Harmon had doubts that the invasion could now be successful. Ghormley had all but written it off, and continued to hold doubts until he

55

was

later relieved

of the

Army

by Halsey. The great General H. H. (Hap) Arnold, head

more modern fighter planes to when the Japanese recaptured the ego was to show his disregard for American

Air Corps, refused to send

Guadalcanal because they would be lost island.

This

man

of colossal

on other occasions during the execution of the war. When Fletcher's Task Force ships departed on 8 and 9 August, Vandegrift had been strengthening his perimeter defenses and defense of the lives

beach against a possible Japanese invasion attempt. In addition, he ordered an all-out effort to complete the work on the

he announced that the

airfield,

airfield

runway.

now named Henderson

On 10 August

Field (for Major

Lofton Henderson, a Marine hero and commander of the dive bombers at the battle of Midway), was ready to receive fighter and dive bomber-type aircraft.

Ground

action against the Japanese

sent out on 12 August to the

mouth

was

still

limited.

One

patrol

was

Mataniku River because of a report by a Japanese prisoner that a group of Japanese under a white flag wanted to surrender. This group of Japanese ambushed and wiped out the patrol;

none

of the

of the

Marines were ever found.

A week later a Marine patrol,

three companies of the 5th Marines, attacked the village of Matanikau

from three sides and

killed

65 Japanese. The only thing gained from

this

Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, soon after its capture from the Japanese. Lunga Point can be seen left background and "Bloody Ridge" in the center foreground. November 1942. (USMC)

the

56

in

57

attack

was proof

west to the

that the limited Japanese forces at

vicinity of the

Lunga had retreated

Matanikau when the invasion

hit

the beach.

"Tokyo Express," were making fast runs landing troops east of the perimeter. They put a force of

Nightly, Japanese ships, the

down

the

slot,

about 1000 troops ashore with the intent to retake the

airfield

and disrupt

They estimated the force of the American invasion to have been about 1000 men and intended to make a surprise attack on the the beachhead.

perimeter and push south to take the

airfield.

Colonel Kiyono Ichiki, commanding the Japanese forces, organized for the attack in the concealment of the jungle.

On 14 August, a Marine patrol

detected a small patrol of Colonel Ichiki's men, four officers and 30 enlisted troops, attacked

them immediately and killed all but two, who escaped into

the jungle.

now detected, Ichiki decided to attack as soon as He assembled his force and deployed to strike the Marine line along the east bank of the Ilu River, then thought to be the Tenaru. When Their presence

possible.

the Marine listening posts on the east bank detected the sounds of deploying Japanese troops, they withdrew to the Marine line on the west bank and

prepared for the attack. In a fierce battle that lasted August, 800 Japanese were

killed,

130

of the Ilu River

1700 on 21

of their survivors disappeared into

the jungle, and Colonel Kiyono Ichiki took his

mouth

until

was covered with

own life. The sand spit at the

bodies. Thirty-five Marines had

been killed and 75 wounded. This first important action since the landing marked the beginning of an accelerating combat situation. On 12 August, Ghormley had authorized Admiral McCain to load all available

destroyer- transports with gasoline,

lubricants,

bombs, and

ground crews and to dispatch them from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal. They operated in the manner of blockade runners, moving fast, timing

Lunga Point for the afternoon, unloading in time to leave again in the morning before the usual mid-day bombing raids by the Japanese, "Tojo Time." At the height of all this action, on 20 August, two Marine Air Squadrons, to be stationed at Henderson Field to support the beachhead, were arriving at Cactus, and more planes from the 67th Army Air Corps Fighter Squadron were on the way. The "Cactus Air Force" was beginning to their arrival off

assemble.

58

—

CHAPTER

Into the

Events

6

Solomons

the marshalling of airpower to be actually stationed at Guadal-

in

canal in support of the 1st Marine Division

afterthought.

By

seemed

to

fall

together as an

the time aircraft actually arrived, the Marines had spent

the 12 days, following the 8 and 9 August withdrawal of Fletcher's surface forces, without attached air cover.

They just fought on and

waited.

Toward the end of July, flights of the 67th Fighter Squadron operating out of Tontouta accomplished their patrols and waited for orders. Captains

Tom Christian, then commanding the 67th, and Dale Brannon, having been in Noumea for planning sessions regarding the Cactus operation, now prepared for their next moves. Brannon started planning for the long

would take the P-39/P-400 aircraft, via the islands of Cactus. Others the New Hebrides, to Henderson Field at Guadalcanal laid out the requirements for supplies and ground crew personnel to be overwater

flight that

moved up. The first order of business was to fly several flight planning missions, simulating the overwater legs of the route to Guadalcanal. Along with Lieutenant Deltis Fincher, Brannon planned courses to fly around the island of

New Caledonia at distances that would be flown on the three flight

legs that

would take them to Cactus. They

also decided

on rpm and

manifold pressures settings to be used during the test runs for fuel economy cruise control. Brannon and Fincher, in P-39/P-400s, flew the legs and

courses planned around

New Caledonia, simulating the flights to Vila Field

on the island of Efate, to Espiritu Santo, and on to Henderson Field, Guadalcanal. Based on these flights, they estimated the flying time, fuel

59

consumption, and best engine cruise control settings to be used on the long

overwater

flight.

By the first days of August a plan for the movement to Guadalcanal,

in

two flights, was completed. D.D. Brannon with the first flight of five would be followed in a couple of days by John A. Thompson with a flight of 10. The plan was coordinated with the 11th Bombardment Group, which would provide navigation and safety escort in B-17s.

Captain Christian departed by B- 17 on 15 August for Efate and Espiritu

Santo in the

New Hebrides for advanced coordination of services for the

P-39/P-400s which were soon to be passing through on the way to Cactus. the trip to Guadalcanal from Espiritu Santo aboard the

He completed

destroyer McKeon, arriving there on 20 August.

On Monday, 17 listed

August, Lieutenant Robert E. Chilson, with 30 en-

ground crew members,

left

Navy Transport Fomalhaut for

Tontouta for Noumea to board the U.S.

a voyage timed to arrive at Guadalcanal

along with the arrival of Brannon's flight to Henderson Field. Chilson and

Navy Dock at Noumea harbor in the late afternoon. them out to the Fomalhaut, now standing out in Noumea Bay awaiting departure. They

his party arrived at the

A

rather small boat was at the dock waiting to take

boarded the boat, which promptly started out through the choppy waters of the bay.

The late afternoon was turning into dusk as the small craft proceeded, bobbing along toward the outer bay, and quit

— out

of gas.

in a

deafening silence the engine

The boat floundered around the bay for what seemed like

a very long time. Finally they hailed another small craft, transferred fuel,

and shortly got underway again. After more floundering around the bay,

darkened except for the

lights of

ultimately brought alongside the

Noumea and nearby ships, Fomalhaut, boarding

at

the

men were

about 10:00

in

the evening.

was treated royally aboard ship. The food was good! The cruise toward Guadalcanal was pleasant and comfortable except for the anticipation of entering what was now known to be a damn rough Chilson's group

situation.

No one aboard really knew much about Guadalcanal, even though

the ship had been a part of the invasion transport force.

One would almost

expect to arrive at a place where ships could be seen going through some kind of a canal

— the name conjured up

visions something like the

Panama

Canal.

There were

a

number

get back ashore at Cactus

of

Marines aboard the Fomalhaut who did not the transports were pulled out; they had

when

been in working parties unloading supplies that were badly needed ashore. There were many stories told by the Marines about the initial action, about the heavy casualties at Tulagi and the rough time they were having there, about the exciting air combat and the heavy Japanese losses in the ground and air action. They didn't know anything about the airfield except that the time they went out on their working party.

Marines had not taken

it

Navy personnel

Fomalhaut were very good

60

of the

at the

to the

Army Air Corps

people and did

they

they could to make the

all

trip

comfortable and interesting.

know

that theirs would be the last good food the Air Corps guys would get for months to come. Little did

There were many sea stories to tell; the funniest came from BoatsMate First Class Howecraft. The ship's bow plate, which channels

wain's

sea water breaking over the

some .50-caliber this came about.

bow to the sides of the ship in rough water, had

bullet holes in

it.

Howecraft had a good story as to how

"That happened in the battle of the swab handle," chuckled Howe"At about dusk one night a sailor on a ship ahead of us in the convoy was dunking a swab off the fantail to clean it. The line he had on it was loose and the swab slipped off, drifting back in our direction. It was noticed a little off the starboard bow, bobbing along, handle sticking straight up, by a seaman on watch who called out, 'Periscope in the water!' All hell broke loose. Everyone started firing at the swab handle; bullets were flying everywhere, ricocheting off the decks and winches. That's how those holes craft.

bow plate." The fierce battle remembered aboard the Fomalhaut. got in the

of the

swab handle

will

long be

On the afternoon of 20 August, the aircraft carrier Long Island made its

way

to a point

two Marine

air

200 miles southeast

of Guadalcanal.

There

squadrons to be stationed at Henderson

Fighter Squadron

it

launched

Field.

Marine

VMF 223, with 19 F4F Grumman Wildcat fighters, was

commanded by Major John L. Smith, the now legendary Marine fighter pilot. Dive Bomber Squadron VMSB 232, with 12 Douglas Dauntless dive bombers, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Richard C. Mangrum. The two squadrons flew to Henderson Field and landed at about 1700. At the time, the attack on the perimeter along the

by Colonel

The

Ilu

River was being pressed

Ichiki's force.

was still at its height. support by obserprovided squadrons Marine Aircraft of the newly arrived following day the fighting along the Ilu

vation and

some

strafing of the shoreline. Little could be seen through the

heavy jungle cover; the

aircraft

were

really of little use to the

troops except in strafing the shoreline and mouth of the

Ilu

ground

and in impress-

ing the Japanese force with the presence of American planes. At midday,

Japanese Zero fighters entered the area and were attacked by Major Smith's flight of four F4F Wildcat fighters. Smith shot down one of the Zeros. His four airplanes returned to the field. One plane, flown by pilot six

Jonny Lindly, badly shot up, crashed on landing. Major Smith's pilots had wasted no time getting into action. This same day, Marine Air Group 25, operating out of Espiritu Santo, began supply and evacuation flights in and out of Henderson Field in R-4D/C-47 transport aircraft. They brought in cargo loads of supplies and flew out 16 litter patients per

trip.

the morning of 21 August, the first flight of P-39/P-400s were at Plaines des Gaiacs, New Caledonia, with Captain Brannon and Lieutenants Davis, Erwin, Brzuska, and Fincher, contemplating their departure from

On

61

the familiar surroundings of their home island. At 1410, with wing and belly

B-17 escort for the 325-mile flight to Efate. After a short stop at Efate, they completed the remaining 180 miles to Espiritu Santo. These first legs of the trip were overwater flights that in peacetime would have been high-risk operations for Army planes. The final tanks

leg,

full,

they took

640 miles on

off to join their

to Guadalcanal, would be considered impossible for

single-engine aircraft.

Cactus on

just the

"Bad winds or weather could have us coming

in at

fumes," said Brannon.

The planes had to carry every ounce of fuel that could be squeezed into The engines were run up and checked near the end of the

their tanks.

runway

at

Santo

in

the early morning of 22 August; gas trucks stood by to

top off the tanks before takeoff. At

two B-17s: one

0725 the

flight

turned immediately

and heading to Guadalcanal under the escort of

after takeoff to the course

for navigation escort

and the other to stand by to drop a

rubber boat to any pilot bailing out because of engine failure during the long

overwater fuel

flight.

Even with

strict attention to cruise control

margin for navigation error, off-course

flying

there was no

due to bad weather, or

combat contact with enemy fighters near Guadalcanal. Ditching a P-39/P400 was never considered. The tight streamlined structure of this heavy fighter was a death trap; the pilot could not get out of the cockpit, even after a successful ditching, before the airplane would sink. The flight was one of those long hauls, with a fighter plane strapped to you, that make your bottom so numb it feels like part of the airplane. Most of the flight, in an attempt to avoid weather, was low over water at about 200 or 300 feet. When visibility was good they spread out and relaxed a little;

when the low-hanging scud and mist cut visibility, they had to tighten

formation and snuggle up close to the B-17 until the weather improved.

A short time out of Espiritu Santo, a pilot in formation remarked over little rough. A slightly amusing

the radio that his engine was running a

response from the B-17 came over the radio: 'Those single-engine

air-

when they get out of sight of land." They sped along through the scuddy weather, which improved as they

planes always run rough

proceeded north, listening to the whine of the reduction gearbox and the noisy short exhaust stacks of the Allison engine. There

over the radio, except little,

when an

were few remarks

airplane drifted off to the side, wobbled a

and emitted a white vapor

trail

under the airplane as the

pilot

used

the relief tube. ("It just scares the stuff out of you," was a remark heard on the radio.)

After flying just a

little

less than four

hours they reached Guadalcanal,

broke formation into a landing pattern, and rolled their wheels on the rocky crushed coral runway of Henderson Field. They were greeted with wild

jumping shouts of joy by the Marine ground troops, who lined the runway to watch the sleek shark-mouthed P-39/P-400s touch down and taxi to an area near one of the ugly Japanese hangars.

That

night, the U.S.

Navy Transport Fomalhaut steamed

into the

Sealark Channel and on the morning of 23 August was anchored off Beach

62

t

at Beach Red. To the far right beyond the palms, at the mouth of the llu River, the sandbar and beach were covered with bodies of Japanese soldiers after the battle on 20-21 August. Taken 24 August 1942.

The palm grove

Red. Lieutenant Bob Chilson and his

men

of the 67th ground

crew went

over the side, down cargo nets, into the landing craft, and were taken to the beach. Here Marine trucks were waiting to take them to the

67th put

its flight line

into operation in a space at the west

using one of the four Japanese hangars. canal; the first flight of

would

follow.

The 67th had

airfield.

end of the

The

field,

arrived at Guadal-

initiated a route that many aircraft work alongside the two Marine squad-

P-39/P-400s

They were ready

to

rons that arrived two days before. After operating out of the sub-bases in

New

Caledonia, the pilots of

the 67th looked on Henderson Field as "a pretty nice strip." The landing

was about 4000 feet long, built on the grassy Lunga Plain. The runway was rolled, crushed coral rock, soon to the covered with Marsden steel matting by the SeaBees. The west end of the runway, usually the approach end, was shielded by very high jungle trees where the plain dropped off toward the Lunga River. These trees were a hindrance to landing planes, as they did not allow the use of every inch of runway. The strip

SeaBees

felled these large trees

allowed a lower approach, making

with dynamite and cleared a slot that it

possible to touch

down on the first few

runway had a clear takeoff view, an grassy Lunga plain and a coconut the through area that had been cleared yards of runway.

The

east end of the

grove.

63

Shark-mouthed

P-39/P-400s, with markings of the Patsy Flight, at Henderson Field Guathe baggy coveralls in the center foreground, is John Orlich an armament specialist of the 67th Fighter Squadron. (USMC)

dalcanal.

fighters,

The man

in

The

airfield

surface that greeted the 67th pilots was a beat-up, shell in the center of the battle. On a little knoll off

and bomb-pockmarked area to the north side of the

runway stood a Japanese pagoda, now converted to operations building. The word from the Marines was, "Keep your eye on the pagoda, where the flagpole will tell you the alert conditon. When we get a warning of the oncoming Japanese aircraft, a captured Japanese an

air

flag is

run up to signal a scramble.

black flag left

When the raid Tojo Time' is upon us, the

run up, and,

if they have time, they crank a siren that the Japs behind to signal that the bombers and Zeros are about to come over the

is

field."

The Marine pilots showed the pilots of the 67th a palm grove with some scattered green tents "Our camp," they said. They provided them

—

with straw mats, courtesy of the departed Japanese, to bed down on. When asked where the Japs were, the Marines replied, "See that river over there?" pointing to a stream about 200 yards away. "They are on the other side."

As

was with many things, the defense perimeter established by the 1st Marine Division to protect their beachhead was short of artillery. Some of the most crucial items were still aboard the transports. What artillery it

had been landed, the Marines set up in central fire control areas from which they could get maximum use of the valuable guns to put fire in front of any

There were 75mm pack howitzers and short 105mm howitzers, but there were none of the larger 155mm howitzers for counter battery fire. Sound flash units, for locating enemy guns for effective counter battery fire, had not been brought ashore; the Marines later paid a high price for this deficiency. This limited firepower was destined to be augmented some by the heavy firepower and attack location along the defense perimeter.

capability of the P-39/P-400s.

Defense against surface and air attacks remained inadequate for weeks. The five-inch coastal guns and radar of the 3rd Defense Battalion had not been brought ashore before the hasty departure of the transports on 9 August. Automatic antiaircraft weapons, 90mm, and searchlights had been brought ashore. An air warning system was an obvious and immediate

65

necessity and one

was

was declared open

established at the pagoda about the time the field to receive planes.

During the first weeks on Guadalcanal the Australian Coast Watchers and their friendly native scouts were proving their value. The Coast Watchers provided an invaluable service to the defense of the beachhead by giving warnings of approaching

enemy aircraft. These warnings were sometimes received as much as three hours before the arrival of the enemy formations over the perimeter defenses and the

airfield.

In August, Coast

Watchers were stationed at Guadalcanal, Buka, Bougainville, New Georgia, Santa Isabel and Malaita, giving radio reports of Japanese aircraft and ship movements, which were passed to the intelligence section of the 1st Marine Division. Since most enemy bomber flights from Rabaul passed over New Georgia, the reports of the Coast Watcher on that island were extremely valuable. His reports usually enabled the fighter planes at

Henderson Field,

Guadalcanal, to take off and be at altitude before the bombers reached the

American beachhead

area. Coast

Watchers

at Bougainville often

gave

reports of Japanese aircraft formations taking off from there or coming

down from

Rabaul, as well as frequent reports on Japanese ship move-

ments. Shortly after the 1st Marine Division landed, Captain Martin Cle-

mens

Solomon Islands Defense Force, who was the British on Guadalcanal, in the protectorate Government, came out of hiding at Vungana in the hills south of Aola Bay. With 60 native scouts, Clemens entered the Marine lines and offered their services to General Vandegrift; he immediately accepted. of the British

District Officer

From

by the

this point on, the coordinated intelligence gathering

Coast Watching Service and their scouts played an important part success of the Marine, Navy, and Army Air Corps pilots fighting the

over Guadalcanal and

its

in the

air

war

surrounding area. Their reports often revealed

early evidence of assembling Japanese Naval

threaten the U.S. positions on Guadalcanal.

Task Forces

that

were

to

They provided many reports as

what was going on in various parts of the island and coordinated many an assist in the rescue of downed airmen. The native scouts on Guadalcanal were fiercely loyal to Clemens and the Marines. They often brought inforto

mation of the location of Japanese patrols, their strength and armament. They hid downed pilots and passed communication leading to their return. One native scout, Sergeant Major Jacob Vouza, was on a scouting

sweep and ran smack into a Japanese patrol. He was taken prisoner to their camp and was questioned. He told them nothing. They tied him up, beat him with rifle butts, and inflicted numerous bayonet wounds; he refused to talk. They left him unconscious and presumed dead. Vouza slipped his ropes and, severely weakened by loss of blood, crawled the three miles to the Marine lines. Believing he was near death, once inside the perimeter with Clemens and the Marines, he would not accept treatment until he had delivered his report of valuable information as to the strength, disposition, and armament of this Japanese force. His report was of great value to the

67

68

Marines, who surrounded and annihilated the attacking troops. It was a partrol of the Ichiki force that had captured Vouza as they were organizing

on the

Marine lines along the Ilu River. (Until his death in 1984, the aged Sergeant Major Vouza, later Sir Jacob Vouza, could be seen at his home on Guadalcanal, wearing the uniform of a U.S. Marine Sergeant their assault

Major.)

1942 the Japanese lived under a feudal totalitarian military society. Their soldiers were the crudest in the world. Cocky with years of victory, their nation had no respect for civilized conventions concerning the care of enemy wounded or prisoners of war. Captured soldiers were often used for In

bayonet practice, ultimately dying of loss of blood. Bodies were found with many as 50 bayonet wounds. They routinely employed all sorts of

as

torture, beatings, and bizarre acts including rape, castration, disembowelment, to name but a few, followed by decapitation. They could conceive the most unthinkable punishments for persons unlucky enough to fall into their hands. Corpses of infantrymen or downed flyers recovered in the field

showed evidence of torture to a degree that was an obscenity to God and mankind. In Europe, where prisoner of war conventions were observed, about one or two percent of men who actually became prisoners died. Of war prisoners in Japanese hands; over 50 perreversals of frontline positions

cent died.

was an impressive Japanese assembling near Rabaul on 23 August. The estimates indicated

Intelligence reports indicated that there

Naval

fleet

the presence of three or four aircraft carriers, one or two battleships,

seven to 15

light

addition, there

and heavy cruisers, and from 10 to 20 destroyers. In

were 15 or more cargo

ships, troop transports,

and fueling

and 160 land-based aircraft. Continued surveillance determined that a task force was assembling from the various harbors and airfields that ships,

would constitute a strong invasion force. When the task force got underway, it included three aircraft carriers, eight battleships, four heavy cruisers, 21 destroyers, and four troop transports carrying an invasion force that would reach Guadalcanal on 24 August. Their air cover was provided by the 25th Japanese Air Flotilla, moved to Rabaul to provide land-based air coverage. The magnitude and accuracy of these observations can be credited mostly to the Australian Coast

Watching Serivce.

The U.S.

Carrier Task force, under Admiral Fletcher, was following

the intelligence reports. Fletcher disposed forces, at a safe distance, to counter the approaching Japanese surface fleet that was about to attempt to retake the

American beachhead at Guadalcanal. Both fleets were discov-

ered by air reconnaissance on 24 August. There followed one of the key naval battles of the Solomons Campaign. The battle actually took place east of Guadalcanal, a battle

waged by

aircraft against ships.

The

surface war-

two fleets did not engage during the battle. Land-based aircraft Marine dive bomber squadron from Henderson Field and the 11th Bombardment Group from Espiritu Santo joined the carrier aircraft in ships of the

of the

69

attacking the Japanese fleet as

it

proceeded south, within their range, for

the scheduled recapture of Guadalcanal. Japanese bombers continued their daily

"Tojo Time" raids on Henderson Field during the

nese

lost a carrier,

battle.

The Japa-

the Ryujo, one light cruiser, one destroyer, and 90

Japanese planes. Their seaplane carrier, Chitose, and one cruiser were

damaged. The U.S. carrier Enterprise suffered damage; 20 U.S. planes

were

lost.

The Japanese withdrew on 26 August to get out of range of air attack. The battle did not prevent the landing of Japanese troops on Guadalcanal; it

Throughout the war, the fate of allied prisoners was a grim one. Here an allied prisoner of war is decapitated by a Japanese officer somewhere on a South Pacific Island. The Japanese observed no rules in the treatment of prisoners of war; a fact that we must never forget. (USAF)

70

served to postpone

it

and allowed the Marines to strengthen their defen-

sive positions.

By

the end of August, the 1st Marine Division was in a slightly it had been on 9 August, when Fletcher withdrew the surface forces. The defense of the airfield was established and the field

stronger position than

was

in operation.

retake the

airfield,

The

Ichiki force

and a

had been annihilated

in its

attempt to

line of communication

between Espiritu Santo and Guadalcanal was established although it was not yet effective. Marine Air Group 25 made daily C-47 flights to Henderson Field as part of this line of communication. In addition, there were daily arrivals of fast, blockade-running destroyer transports to Lunga Point. Yet the Americans were by no means firmly established on Guadalcanal.

From

the arrival of the

first

planes at Henderson Field, air operations

were carried on daily. Patrols were out dawn to dark, as well as interceptor flights for "Tojo Time." The bombing raids came regularly around midday, an exciting experience. The flight line, camp, and work area for the ground crew were right on the target. When the black flag went up, all ground activity

was

stopped and the crews took to the foxholes.

We could hear the steady drone of approaching bomber formations. It fascinating and about what you would expect to hear as the tight V

formations approach the target

—

us.

The bombs,

ing like you've been expecting for your first

as they

fall,

sound noth-

bombing attacks. The descend-

bombs do not scream like they do in the movies; they sound like the big of the universe saying 'SHUSH," with a shushing sound that can be heard throughout the island. The "shhhhhhhh" sound grows to a deafening intensity and then comes the deep "whump, whump, whump" as the stick of bombs walk toward your foxhole. You wait, scrunched into the smallest space you can occupy, waiting for that next "whump" that will hit beyond your foxhole position and you know that it's not that stick of bombs ing

'

mother

that will get you. In the hot afternoon of

24 August, when everyone was waiting for the

Japanese invasion force to get Japanese bombers came

in

range of Guadalcanal

in for a slightly

aircraft, a flight of

delayed 'Tojo Time." They had

taken a circuitous route to conceal themselves from the Coast Watchers

and the drone of their engines could be heard as the black flag went up. The pilots ran for their planes. Two of the 67th pilots made it. Captain Brannon and Lieutenant Fincher took off in a cloud of dust after the Marine F4Fs.

They had

hardly cleared the

field

when bombs dropped by

the Japa-

nese formation from 8000 feet began to hit. The P-39/P-400s climbed out across the palm trees to escape the accompanying Zeros diving in to make a

Above them, the 67th pilots could see the formation; eight bombers burst into bomber Marine F^Fs peel off into the flames as they tumbled to Earth. It was Marine Captain Marion Carl's first contact and victory at Guadalcanal. He personally shot down two bombers strafing run across the field.

and one Zero in that scrap, as did 2nd Lieutenant Zenneth A. Pond, USMC. Brannon and Fincher caught one of the Zeros climbing out after a strafing

71

run, dived in on him, and squirted bullets until the Zero exploded.

enemy force had been 15

The

bombers and 12 Zeros. The score was 10 bombers and seven Zero fighters. Three Marine pilots did not return from the mission. Diary: Aug.

We after

is

24 Monday

are here on Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands; arrived yesterday,

some

island

trouble at sea during the night before with the Jap

fleet.

The

beautiful as far as travelog scenery goes, but there are a lot of

Jap snipers around.

Marines

single-engine

in

The

Japs have taken a

the past 10 days.

lot of

punishment from the

We set up shop at an ugly Jap hangar at the

west end of the field. Sidney Hudson and three other radio people are ground radio operators so I am having them operate the ground station. It

was like moving "JIG GROUND" up here.

going to do

all flight line

We are shorthanded so I am We had another air

radio maintenance myself.

We call that "Tojo Time." They come over regularly at midday and we are warned by a black flag that is raised at the pagoda in the middle of the airfield. That's where the ground radio station is being set up. In today's raid there were plenty of bombers and Zero fighters. Some of the Zeros strafed the field. We got a good look at them as they zoomed past our end of the field. They look innocent enough, but they are trying to kill us. Our planes arrived here in good shape and some of our flight were up during the raid. Captain Brannon and Lieutentant Fincher shot down one plane. I hear that the Cactus aircraft shot down a lot of enemy planes today; I'll get the score later. The Marine pilots and that F4F Wildcat are a great combination. They have one fighter squadron and one dive bomber squadron. Eleven more dive bombers (SBD) came in today from the carrier Enterprise to operate out of this base. [This was due to battle damage on Enterprise, a jammed flight deck raid today.

elevator.]

On 25

August, the 67th was up on dawn patrols.

On

the 26th, two

P-39/P-400s flew a reconnissance around the entire Guadalcanal coastline.

Now

operating under Marine command, the 67th was trying to take

share of the load.

72

i

its

CHAPTER

Cactus

The ground crews hangar and

in

7

August

in

of the 67th

camped

right

on the

airfield,

bunked

in

the

canvas shelters set up around the edge of the hangar. The

west end of Henderson Field was on high ground which Lunga River, just a few hundred yards south. In position

led

down

to the

just off the field

was a Marine artillery unit equipped with 75mm pack The 67th crew were guests of this artillery unit for their two meals a day. The only food available was captured Japanese rice. Rations were short; some had been lost during the landing, some were sunk with a supply ship, and some were still on the departed transports. Still, everyone

•toward the river

howitzers.

kept his sense of humor.

Serving a cup of rice twice a day, a Marine mess cook could look a straight in the eye and say,

"And what

will

you have,

sir,

man

the meat pie,

vegetable stew, or baked beans?"

Feigning anger, the

man would reply, "You promised I could have rice

today."

"Very

well, sir," the

later to select

mess cook would go

on,

"And you can return

your dessert."

"Up your bucket," was usually the reply to that. On the morning of 25 August, it became possible bombers

at

Henderson Field

retaking Guadalcanal and flight of

SBDs

for the

SBD

dive

to reach the Japanese task force intent on

now under attack by B-17s and carrier aircraft. A

under Lieutenant Colonel Mangrum,

task force with considerable success.

Mangrum's

VSB 232, attacked the

strike force destroyed a

14,000-ton troop transport and a cruiser; they severely damaged an

73

8,000-ton troop transport.

Upon

The

was escorted by F4Fs

flight

they could not get off in time to meet the usual "Tojo Time"

were

of

VMF 223.

return, due to the slowness of the hand-crank method of refueling, raid,

1115, but

able to get off just in time to prevent exposure of the planes to

bombing. No aircraft were destroyed on the ground; temporary repairs were made on the runway in time for the returning aircraft. The 67th spent the day on dawn-to-dusk patrols.

26 Wednesday we had a terrible air

Diary: August Yesterday

come

raid.

We

watched the 21 bombers

over, a beautiful formation, aiming right at the

field.

Most bombs

men. They may have been trying to hit the Marines who have been fighting for days along the Tenaru River. The perimeter defense line is not far from here. In fact, we hold only a beachhead enclosing about an 11 -mile area. It is a terrible feeling that missed the runway and

killed a lot of

cannot be described, just sitting there

dropping

all

around you.

It's

in a foxhole

watching the bombs

that helpless kind of situation, and the Nips

are really giving us hell here now.

We eat two meals a day with a Marine

They are in temporary position just off our edge of the airfield, along the Lunga River. The river is not far from the edge of the field, but it's the boundary to "no-man's-land" right now. The meals are small and rations are short. A lot of supplies were lost during the landing Artillery Unit.

or didn't get ashore and that

is full

we

of wevils in the

are eating mostly captured food

morning and Jap

kind of canned fruit mixed in with

way around? Our Marine cook

is

it

in

more

the afternoon.

Or

is it

rice

and some the other

a comic, he says, "Don't skim off the

weevils; they are very high in protein."

forces here and

— Jap

rice with weeevils

If

we don't get some more U.S. we could be goners.

supplies on the island,

air raid snipers were shooting at us from the wooded area along the edge of the field. It's sometimes difficult to work around the planes with them trying to pick us off. When we get a line on one, we grab our weapons and go into the edge of the woods and fire a hail of bullets up into the tree. They are usually tied up in the tree so they don't come down. They just stay there with their blood running down the tree. They are still around and are being spotted every now and then. Today about 50 bombers and 30 Zeros were on their way in but got intercepted. We stayed under alert for about two hours. The Marine and the 67 th planes are doing a good job and the Japs have been giving us hell. We have been bombed every day except one

Yesterday after the

trees in the

and have been shelled by Jap ships, standing It sure keeps our attention.

off

the island, just about

every night.

On 27

August, Captain Thompson's

Santo, less one P-400 nine aircraft

left at

flight

arrived from Espiritu

Santo for some minor repair. With him

were Lieutenants Head, Brown,

in

the

Childress, Dillon, Glazier,

Dutton, and Wythes. Lieutenant Fountain arrived from Santo later in the

74

day with another B-17 escort. When Thompson's flight arrived, there was no welcoming committee. The airfield was deserted, the black flag v/as up, and those on the ground were in foxholes. The men crept out of their shelters and serviced the planes. Thompson and his flight, already exhausted from their flight out of New Caledonia, hurriedly taxied out, watching the sky for bombers, and took off to sit out the raid in the air. The raid failed to materialize.

Diary: Aug. 27 Thursday "Tojo Time" was 1100 today. Nine of our planes with Captain Thompson landed at 1115, in from New Caledonia. Everyone pitched in

them gas up while watching the black flag and the sky bombers. They took right off to clear the field. The bombers never to help

reach the

down

field.

for

did

While on patrol, Lieutenants Chilson and Erwin shot

a four-motored seaplane or bomber.

To date, the mission assigned to the P-400s was patrol, patrol, patrol, at an altitude of

14,000

feet.

The

planes could struggle up a

little

higher,

but the pilots could go no higher for any length of time because they were flying without

oxygen. With their high-pressure oxygen systems, and no

way to fill them,

the P-400s were even

more handicapped. Every effort

to

oxygen had failed; oxygen is a must at 10,000 feet and 67th were flying two-hour patrols at 14,000 feet and becoming lightheaded and groggy after two hours. Often they flew two or three of these missions. On one occasion a pilot, who had lost sleep due to bombing and shelling the night before and then gone without breakfast because the kitchen was damaged, flew three of these patrols in succesfind high-pressure

above.

sion.

The

pilots of the

He was sleepy, groggy, hungry, and had to crank his gear up and down

each time because there was no time for repairs.

On 28 August the weather was getting poor and the SBD dive bomber squadron, VMSB 232, under Lieutenant Colonel Mangrum attacked three destroyers about 70 miles off Guadalcanal, with excellent results. Two of the destroyers were so badly damaged that they went to the bottom. The mission could not be repeated due to approaching weather and darkness. This strike was probably the reason for a night without shelling by Japa-

nese ships. the hardships of New Caledonia, sub-base operations and the heavy training activities, the 67th pilots hoped for an opportunity to make a After

all

real contribution to air operations at Cactus.

continuous

menu

Now

they were assigned a

of patrols because of the P-400's inability to reach suffi-

engage the attacking Japanese aircraft. Even with oxygen, you couldn't operate the P-400 above 16,500 feet. With a belly tank it was possible to get to 18,000, which took over half an hour. It had no two-stage high blower; the engine was starved for air and then the airplane would just mush along in a nose-high attitude and would do only one maneuver dive a fter you dropped the belly tank. Later in the war, more advanced cient altitude to

—

—

75

versions of the P-39 did a for a fighter.

But

much better job;

its pilots

it

was never an aviator's choice

grabbed every opportunity to

try.

on 29 August, there was a night bombing raid by a small flight of enemy bombers. Their bombs seemed to miss the field entirely. Later it was found that there were 29 bomb craters just east and south of the runway in an area held by the 1 1th Marines; three of their men were killed. There was no damage to the aircraft or aviation In the early morning, about 0430,

personnel.

Before 1000 an advanced warning was passed by the Coast Watchers on Bougainville Island that 18 Japanese bombers were heading southeast. Confirmation of this Georgia, and

flight

moments

was given at 1 105 by the Coast Watcher on New by the Henderson Field radar, now set up and

later

being checked out at the northwest corner of the airfield area. the warning, 10

bombers and

all

On receipt of

F4Fs and 12 P-400s of the 67th scrambled to intercept the other flyable aircraft took

off to clear

the

field until after

the raid.

The P-400s climbed to 14,000 feet, their absolute limit without oxyF4F Wildcats climbed a little above 17,000 feet to be slightly above the bombers. There were 18 enemy bombers with the usual Zero escort. Twelve P-400s moved around at 14,000, in flights of three or four. The pilots, getting headaches from lack of oxygen, watched the beautiful formation of enemy bombers above, with the Marines circling over them gen, and the

for the attack.

The bombs were dropped before walked across the

airfield,

initial

contact; neat sticks of

blowing up geysers of

dirt, debris,

Just 3,000 feet above, the 67th pilots could see the

bomber formation;

F4Fs

bombs

and smoke.

peel

off,

diving

bombers burst immediately into flames, falling to the island below. All the 67th could do was fly around helplessly watching the action above. Major Smith and his Wildcats were having another big day, as they did each day at "Tojo Time," building their score in a veritable turkey shoot. There was the 67th, flying around at too low an into the

four

altitude to reach the real action.

As the returning planes approached Henderson Field after the misit appeared that the entire field was on fire. There were grass fires in a number of places, two of the ugly Japanese hangars were burning, and ammunition was exploding. The sticks of bombs from each of the attacking bombers had been laid right across the field through the areas of aircraft sion,

maintenance. Regardless of attacking fighters and antiaircraft

Japanese

pilots

fire,

the

never wavered from their bomb runs. As the fighters

returned to make their approach to the field,

it

seemed to be swarming with

men and little trees moving about on the runway. The men were using branches to mark bomb craters in the runway so that landing planes could little

avoid

them on

their landing rolls.

They stood

at a crater with their tree

branches and jumped out of the way as a landing plane zigged or zagged past

them after touchdown. The runway had been pockmarked by bombs during the raid. Activity on the field was like that in an ant hill. Trucks and crews

76

i

looked like all of Henderson Field was on fire in the afternoon of 29 August 1 942. Efforts to save this F4F Wildcat were to no avail. Japanese bombing and strafing attacks inflicted heavy damage. 30 It

August 1942. fill in the bomb craters. Men were beating out grass own blankets; others were shoveling dirt with their hands on a burning F4F near hangar number two and an SBD burning near hangar

were hauling

fires

dirt to

with their

number

three, while occasional ammunition explosions

within the burning planes.

Crews

rolled oil

were heard from

and gas drums around to the

pumps. Gasoline was burning and ammunition was exploding everywhere. Snipers were in the trees at the edge of the field, trying, with some success, to pick off men working feverishly on the field. A few Marines and Air Corps men went into the bush and shot the snipers from their perches. airplanes, refueling with the hand-crank

The exhausting work was accomplished in silent fury that manifests hatred for the enemy. Amid all this was the tormenting question, "What is the 67th going to do with this damn P-400?" itself in bitter

Diary: Aug. 29, Saturday Last night

we were bombed by Jap

four in the morning.

Our

raid today

planes.

was

at

It

was just a little after it was one of the

1215, and

worst yet for the 67th, Bombs dropped on our hangars and gasoline, and set everything at our end of the field on fire. When we all came out of the

everyone helped with the fires and, as we were fighting fire on an F4F I looked around and saw another Marine F4F touch down on the runway and crack up in a small bomb crater. We worked like dogs

bomb

shelters,

with shovels, blankets, bare hands, anything we could find, and were exhausted, angry, and covered with dirt and soot. The Japs seemed to place their bombs right where they wanted them today.

on the

fires,

The next

day,

30 August, gave

little

opportunity to think about the

77

pressure and disappointments of the previous day. routinely enough, shortly after midnight,

holes.

The Navy

dive

bombers took

off to

remained on standby alert,

and sleepless

until

sitting

began

their

mats and

fox-

seek out the bombarding de-

stroyers reported to be standing off shore, shelling the pilots

activity

when the field was shelled by four

were aroused from

destroyers. All pilots and crews

The

airfield. All fighter

around on ammunition cases,

chilly

dawn; nothing happened.

At 0930 another report from the Coast Watchers on Bougainville was number of single-engine aircraft were flying southeast. The regular morning patrols were up but returned to the field early to refuel for "Tojo Time." Since the incoming enemy aircraft received indicating that a large

were said to be single-engine type, it was assumed that the beachhead area was in for a dive bombing attack. The intercept flight of eight F4Fs and 11 P-400s took off at 1105 in time to execute their plan for meeting the incoming attack by Japanese dive bombers. In one flight of P-400s, Captain Christian and Lieutenants Dutton,

Wythes, and Chilson were sent to the Tulagi area to shipping there; also, the

USS

fly cover over the Burroughs, which had been unloading per-

sonnel and supplies for Cactus the day before, had run aground after going to Tulagi harbor to anchor for the night. Captains

Brannon and Thompson,

and Lieutenants Fincher, Childress, Fountain, Dillon, and Johnston

in the

F4Fs to their usual 14,000 feet altitude; 28,000. The P-400s circled in around the towering

other P-400s climbed up with the the

F4Fs went on up to

cumulus clouds

at

around 14,000, hoping to catch the dive bombers as they

started their dive.

The 67 th pilots were already feeling oxygen deficiency when the What a surprise! There were no dive bombers; the single-en-

action began.

gine aircraft turned out to be

they dived

down around one

all

Zero

fighters.

of the towering

A flight of Zeros attacked;

cumulus clouds and up

in a

climbing attack at a flight of P-400s. There seemed to be 20 or more Zeros.

The P-400s began turning into a pursuit curve, but there were more Zeros in the circle than P-400s. At that time, the F4Fs came screaming down from above, out of the sun, taking the Zeros by complete surprise. The Zeros were expertly piloted and had superior maneuverability. They seemed to be able to make square turns. A mixed-up melee began in a rat-racing dogfight over the field, the Sealark Channel, and the Tulagi area.

There were Zeros everywhere you turned. Their performance was fantastic. They were zooming, darting, and climbing in aerobatic perfection and seemed to be able to turn inside a bumblebee as they performed amazing demonstrations of airmanship. The pilots in their heavy, lumbering P-400 clunkers felt like a herd of sheep under attack by a pack of ravenous wolves. In a pursuit curve it was impossible to shake or take a Zero. They tried all kinds of maneuvers but the Zero would hang on to the tail of the P-400. Even in a dive which the P-400 could do very well and which was said to be the best maneuver to shake off a Zero the Zero was still hard to leave behind. The only way was to head for a cloud, make a turn on instruments

—

78

—

and come out on top, hoping to get in a quick burst at a Zero before being jumped by the others. All over the sky the P-400s were heading for clouds with Zeros on their tails. Despite being so overwhelmingly outclassed, the P-400s got four Zeros confirmed and three probable. The Marines bagged 14; Major John L. Smith and his pack had another good day. Some of the dogfights ranged down to below 1000 feet over the field. One Zero chased an F4F, streaming oil from a punctured cooler, down to within 300 feet over the hangar and maintenance area of the 67th. A nearby .50-caliber antiaircraft machine-gun position could not fire because the F4F and Zero were too close together. The F4F skimmed along the

treetops and circled to land. perfect

The Zero, realizing where he was, executed a Immelmann turn at 300 feet and climbed out. He was close enough

to the watching ground crew for the on the Zero to be plainly seen.

pilot

and the red "meatball" insignia

As the action came to a close, the planes started back to the field. The flight over the shipping at Tulagi was making its way back to Henderson Field in weather that was now lowering to 1000 feet and one-quarter mile visibility over Iron Bottom Bay. As they passed out of a rain shower, they were suddenly attacked by six or seven Zeros. The Zeros tore the formation apart; two of the P-400s were shot down before the Zeros broke off to head for home.

When

the planes of the 67th landed, four of the P-400s had not

returned to the

field.

Captain John

Thompson came in with 15

bullet holes

About an hour later, one of the missing pilots who had bailed out about two miles from the field, Lieutenant Pete Childress, walked in with only his pride and one knee bruised. Lieutenant Dillon also bailed out and walked in later. Lieutenants Robert E Chilson and Keith W. Wythes were shot down on the flight back from in his airplane, plus

one

in his shoulder.

Tulagi; they did not return.

Of this crowded and fateful day, 30 August 1942, there was still more At about 1500 that afternoon, two B-17 mother hens provided escort into Cactus for 17 F4F Wildcats and 12 additional SBD Dauntless dive bombers. At 1530, the black flag was raised at the pagoda; at the same to come.

time, the engines of an incoming

As the steady drone that the

enemy formation could

of the approaching

bombers grew

already be heard.

louder,

Cactus planes were trapped on the ground by

enemy thrust. The events

that followed

this

it

was

clear

undetected

were beyond understanding. The

arriving

Japanese planes were dive bombers. They either ignored the juicy target of helpless aircraft on the airfield or their orders allowed only an attack on the shipping near Tulagi, also a vulnerable prize.

The

dive

bombers attacked

the shipping targets, sinking a destroyer, the Calhoun, about a half-mile off the beach, and striking the USS Burroughs, still aground near Tulagi.

bombers shot on the field were spared.

The Japanese aircraft

dive

their bolt

on the shipping targets. The

79

At 1645 there was another ominous occurrence

— the

islands of the

southern Solomons were shaken by two heavy earthquake tremors.

Good Lord saying "Stop the war"? Apparently

the

not, because

Was it it

kept

right on.

At 2100 the dive bombers

at

Henderson Field took

three cruisers and two destroyers shelling the

put

enemy

off to

search for

and attempting to

troops ashore east of the defense area. Rainy weather pre-

vented direct

and the

airfield

hits

on the

ships, but the

Japanese withdrew from the area

men were able to come out of their foxholes and rest. The shelling "Tokyo Express." On this

attack had been one of the regular visits of the

run they had landed an unknown number of troops east of the perimeter

in

the vicinity of Tasimboko.

On were back

the morning of 31 August, only three of the original 14 P-400s

in operation; in

the ground crews worked feverishly to bring others

commission. "Tojo Time" arrived as usual. Captain Christian and

Lieutenants Dutton and Davis flew cover at Tulagi to protect the

Burroughs,

still

surviving and

still

USS

aground. All flyable aircraft not already

on the intercept were flown to the east end of the island to wait out the attack. The approaching enemy, 18 bombers and 22 Zeros, turned back about 15 miles from the

field

because of heavy overcast. During the

flight

covering the shipping at Tulagi, the engine of Lieutenant Dutton's P-400 quit;

he bailed out and was brought back safely to the

field.

After the rough experience on 30 August for the P-400s, the regular

"Tojo Time" raids brought a more docile assignment for the 67th. The

P-400s

in

commission were sent on reconnaissance or to the end of the

was over. The morale of the 67th was Everyone kept thinking about it. The pilots were frantic with "get-up-and-go" and had nothing to go in. The constant course of conversation was a gloomy one: "We can't climb that P-400 or a P-39 high enough to reach the bombers; we have already lost some pilots; half our planes are gone, and what are we proving? We can't maneuver and dogfight with the Zero; what good are we? Our enlisted ground crewmen are risking their lives to keep the planes patched up, and for what? We are just using up food and burning up gas. We have just got to get a better airplane. We can't fight; when the Japs come, we are told to go on reconnaissance. You sometimes wonder what good we are!" The Marine Corps' high opinion of the 67th Fighter Squadron can be seen in the complimentary remarks about the squadron by Major John L. Smith, commander of the Marine fighter squadron, VMF 223, at Guadalcanal, during an intelligence interview at the Navy Bureau of Aeronautics on 10 November 1942. A quote from his remarks shows that he held the 67 th Fighter Squadron and its pilots in very high esteem: "That was the ideal situation where we came down on top of them and when they were already engaged with our P-400s. out of the sun The P-400s got four of them that day, I believe, and had very few of their own planes shot down. island to wait until the attack

beginning to

hit a

—

80

new

low.

—

'The Army Fighter Squadron Commander had volunteered to go up with us on this combat patrol because he was getting sick of not having a plane that could get up to 28,000 feet with the bombers and Zeros. "The first Army Squadron that came down there with P-400s had some of the finest pilots that I'd ever seen, even though they didn't have the best plane in the world. And they were certainly willing to do anything they were asked to do and cooperated well with the Marine Officer who was running the show there. The fact that the P-400 didn't get up high enough didn't bother them a great deal; they always wanted to go up every time they had the chance."

Although the

air battle of

30 August proved

that the

P-400 on Gua-

dalcanal could not perform as an interceptor fighter against the type aircraft used by the enemy, the 67th was willing, wanted to fight, and above all wanted very much to have a better airplane. They would soon realize the

great value of these superior pilots and this adaptable aircraft in the fighting on Guadalcanal. In spite of

its

attack aircraft and

shortcomings, the Airacobra had great prospects as an

was destined

to

the forces defending the perimeter. plate and

armament consisting of a

compensate

The

for the lack of artillery in

plane had good protective armor

20mm cannon, two .50-caliber machine

guns and four .30-caliber machine guns. performed well at low altitude. It could fly

It

could carry a bomb, and

fast, dive well,

and

its

it

day was

coming.

By

the end of August

it

was

clear

how

the Japanese tactics in the

Solomons were going to shape up. On Bougainville, Vella Lavella, and Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel, the Japanese had bases (for striking Guadalcanal) that were supplied from Truk and Rabaul. By the beginning of September, the 'Tokyo Express" was in full operation; enemy men and supplies were being loaded on fast destroyer transports and cruisers. These vessels, hiding from Henderson Field-based aircraft during daylight, Slot at high speed during the night in the protection of the the coast of parallel chain of islands and landed troops and supplies on shelling island, the off stood they After delivering their cargo,

came down the Guadalcanal.

rapid retreat the perimeter defenses and Henderson Field, then made their north, out of range of land-based aircraft by daylight. The Japanese reinforcements were slowly reforming in the bush.

strength, attack Their objective on Guadalcanal was to organize a force in Division, Marine 1st the by held and retake the beachhead area now of portion substantial very Reinforced. Their efforts were supported by a Japanese the as as long the Japanese Navy. They could continue these plans Solomons. If the U.S. Southern the around sea the of held control

Navy Navy toll,

and exact a heavier could exert greater force on the Japanese Navy Japanese invasion large of use and it might prevent the development

on were possible, the Japanese would be solely dependent Japanese of supply and trips by the 'Tokyo Express" for reinforcement Guadalcanal. on up building forces they were

forces.

If

this

81

With aircraft superior to anything the Americans had in the Pacific, heavy Japanese air attacks were carried out almost daily on Henderson Field with regularity in numbers of bombers and fighters, and tactics employed in these assaults. The formations of Japanese aircraft came from Rabaul via Kahili Field on the south end of Bougainville Island. Occasionally they took circuitous routes away from certain islands before climbing to altitude to avoid detection by Coast Watchers and the Henderson radar.

They could have saved the trouble and the fuel; not much escaped the eyes of the Coast Watchers.

The Japanese inflicted numerous other harassments as a steady diet on the unwanted occupants of the U.S. defense perimeter on Guadalcanal. Many of these were merely irritating sleep-destroyers. There was "Oscar," a Japanese submarine that surfaced frequently off the island at night and lobbed a few shells into the airfield and bivouac area, just to keep everyone on

his toes. Regularly a

two-engine bomber or seaplane came

over the field at night, throwing out a

bomb every now and then; it chugged

around up there keeping everyone worried and awake. This night mar-

numerous nick"Maytag Mike," "Louis the Louse," "Washing Machine Charlie," or "Tokyo Chug Chug." A few bombs dropped over a three or four-hour period seemed to create the desired irritation and loss of sleep. There was also the frequent shelling of the airfield by Japanese Naval auder, with his asthmatic low-powered engines, received

names such

as

forces, stopping

by on a regular basis to pay their respects. Shelling by

"Tokyo Express" were usually brief and of a caliber carried by destroyers and cruisers. The duration and magnitude of heavier Japanese naval bombardments was absolutely terrifying. The men of the 67th took these attacks while living and working right ships of the

at the

hangar and maintenance area with their planes

— the targets

attacks.

82

i

of the

CHAPTER

8

September's Angry

Response

Japanese efforts to build up their forces and the increasing tempo of air activity in the early days of September left no doubt that they were truly

enraged by the American beachhead on Guadalcanal; they were smarting under the loss of face. The Japanese were proceeding to throw brute force at the

beachhead area. The active 'Tokyo Express" had not yet brought

the strength of their ground forces to a level sufficient to attack the enclave, but the Japanese committed substantial naval and air power in

sustained daily attacks on the American-held positions on Guadalcanal.

General Vandegrift, with fewer than 20,000 troops

in

the area, was

limited to defending the presently held beachhead perimeter. Its front of

about 10,000 yards, along the north coast of Guadalcanal, tapered south to a depth of about 5,000 yards.

He hoped to extend this to a 45-mile stretch

of the north coast and a depth sufficient to ensure that the Japanese

would be out of range of Henderson Field. Until more troops were remained severely limited. Daily, Japanese bombers and fighters from Rabaul and Bougainville attacked Henderson Field on the midday "Tojo Time" schedule, and often artillery

available, his capability

with several such raids. Their naval forces shelled the ter defenses almost every night.

Cactus fighter

airfield

and perime-

made

the daily air

aircraft

attacks costly to the Japanese, but at night the naval shelling, firing continuously, salvo after salvo from their big guns, inflicted a special kind of

destruction and terror on the defenders of the American beachhead at

Guadalcanal.

For the Japanese, the invasion by the American landing force repre-

83

sented their

first real

setback since they started the war to impose their

"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere" on the world. In China, Southeast Asia, and the various islands, they

and

total

1st

Marine Division put

submission of the vanquished.

ready to take great in

risks,

were accustomed

to quick victories

The audacity of the invasion by the

painful pinpricks in their pride, and they were throwing in enough force to overkill the problem,

order to regain their property

— Guadalcanal. Frequent

visits

by the

'Tokyo Express" were now depositing Japanese reinforcements both east and west of the perimeter defenses. This effort was to establish strength in several areas for a coordinated attack that would carry out their grand

strategy for the recapture of the airfield and the entire beachhead area.

Since the battle along the

Ilu

River on 20 and 21 August, the Marines

had fought no major engagements, yet Japanese forces were being slowly

Around the end of August, native scouts reported that the Japanese, about 300 strong, were building substantial defense works near built up.

Tasimboko, 18 miles east of the perimeter.

Under cover of foul weather, the Japanese were landing troops off the Tasimboko on the morning of 1 September from two destroyer transports and two cargo transports. Weather prevented strikes before daylight by either P-400s of the 67th or the Marine SBD dive bombers. At 0500 the Japanese destroyers shelled the airfield. At 0600, Brannon, now a village of

Major, and Lieutenants Fountain, Davis, Fincher, and Childress took

off to

None were found, but five beached landing craft At 0800 Captain Thompson and Lieutenants Head, Brzuska,

attack the landing parties.

were sighted.

and Johnston took

off

and strafed Tasimboko

village

and the landing

craft.

The mission was repeated by Brannon's flight at 1130, during the "Tojo Time" raid, while 18 Japanese bombers and 21 Zeros hit the airfield. Brannon and

his flight

dropped bombs, strafed buildings

in

the village, and

Time" were three bombers and four Zeros shot down by F4Fs. On the field, a hangar was burning, three SBD Dauntless dive bombers were on fire, ammunition and gasoline had been hit, and several delayed-action bombs were deep in the ground around the parking and service area. The P-400s returned from Tasimboko to a bomb-cratered finished the destruction of the landing craft. Results of the "Tojo

attack on Henderson Field

runway; they had to land well down the

field.

These dive bombing and strafing missions now became commonplace not a very nice title, for the 67th, which was nicknamed the "JagstafTel" since it is a degeneration of the German word for fighter Squadron, Jagdstaffel. The 67th was still not getting up there where they wanted to aerial combat. This was a constant source of irritation to the pilots of go the P-400s. Daily at "Tojo Time," the 67th took the P-400s up near Tasimboko in support of Marine ground action or worked over suspected Japanese supply areas and other targets of opportunity. Often they were sent under cover of darkness or bad weather to bomb and strafe the inlets and coves of Santa Isabel, where the enemy was maintaining relay points for landing barges used to reinforce its troops on Guadalcanal.

—

—

84

The Japanese air raid of 1 September 1942 set many fires on Henderson Field. An SBD Dauntless dive bomber was consumed despite efforts by ground crews to put out the fires. 2 Sept. 1942.

On 4 September, despite the heroic work of ground crews, only three aircraft of the

Word was

67th were

in

commission; 13

received that the

enemy was

pilots

were around

to

fly

them.

putting troops ashore in landing

barges on Santa Isabel, at a point 75 miles northwest of Henderson Field. Captain Christian and Lieutenants along with one at 1440.

The

The P-400s

Brown and

F4F piloted by Major Robert E.

target,

30 landing

craft,

was

Glazier in three P-400s,

Galer of VMF 224, took

dived to attack a group of six boats loaded with

supplies heading for shore.

They

off

easily located in a small cove.

men and

placed two direct hits with their 500-

pound bombs among the group of boats. The other boats and men still attempting to unload were thoroughly strafed. Twenty-five out of 30 landing craft were destroyed and two machine guns were silenced. Return rifle fire

put a few bullet holes

The Japanese

in

the airplanes.

retaliated that night

by sinking the U.S. destroyer

transports Little and Gregory, off Savo Island, and Henderson Field was subjected to a night of heavy shelling by Japanese ships.

Diary: Sept. 4, Friday We had a good day today. The weather kept the bombers away. Our planes have been dive bombing and strafing the Japs that have made several landings around this and other islands. Capt. Christian got a bomb on a group of Jap barges carrying troops ashore.

direct hit with his

85

He said while diving down on the barges he could see the Jap soldiers looking up and could see the flashes and puffs of their return rifle fire; they looked so helpless. Plenty of them are getting ashore and

add to our problems fast

and do

airplane. It

aerial is

later.

The P-39/P-400 may

combat, but

it's

sure turning out to be a great attack

getting real praise from the Marines for

They like

will just

not be able to climb up

its

close ground

them with all guns and cannon blazing away. The Jap body count after such support missions shows it is doing a job never intended for it. support.

On

to see

it

dive in low in front of

5 September, after a sleepless night of shelling by the Japanese

Navy which killed three men on the airfield, Major Brannon and Lieutenant Fountain took off on dawn patrol. At 0700 the P-400s spotted a group of landing barges bringing Japanese troops ashore. Ten of the landing barges, heading for a landing between Visale and Levers Pass, were still about 500 yards off the northwest coast of Guadalcanal. The target was reported and the P-400s made repeated strafing attacks on the barges until they ran out of ammunition. The barges were loaded with troops and on the strafing passes, the faces of the Japanese soldiers looking up from the barges and

"The strafing guns of the P-400s left a bloody 'X' in the water," recalled Brannon and Fountain. They were joined over the target by a flight of F4Fs of VMF 224; six of them stayed on the scene, repeating the strafing passes started by the P-400s against the beached and unloading barges. During their attack, 2nd

flashes of return rifle fire could be clearly seen.

Lieutenant Robert Jefferies,

Jr.,

USMC,

an F4F, flew through

pilot of

heavy ground fire from the beaching landing parties of Japanese troops and

was seen

to

fall

out of control into the sea off the landing beach.

Thompson and Lieutenant Fincher repeated the mission, barges, which were now unloading along the shore. The land-

Captain strafing the

ing boats and

most of the supplies were destroyed;

it

was estimated that 50

percent of the Japanese troops were casualties. Only Lieutenant Jefferies' plane failed to return; bullet holes were found in

The firepower and

all

of the other aircraft.

low-altitude attack capability of the

P-400 were giving

excellent performance and the results of these attack missions gave a

much-needed boost to the morale

of the pilots and

crews of the 67th.

Diary: Sept. 6, Sunday Yesterday Mike Zavoski and I got a tent from the USMC supply. put

it

We

up today right beside the hangar and will be pretty comfortable and

the bombs and shells don't ruin it. We are sort of camped on the you might say. The Army forces back in New Caledonia all got together and sent up a lot of personal supplies for the men in the Solomons. It's nice to know they are thinking about us. The Americal

dry in

it if

target,

Division

Commander even

stinking jungle

is

fighting barefooted.

86

sent a supply of shoes for the Marines.

rotting their shoes and I

got to go to

Mass

some

of

them are

The

practically

today, in the morning.

The

was in the jungle just off the airfield near the Marine artillery Mike went too, and the island didn't sink under him. At "Tojo Time," bombs fell all around our hangar. Number four hangar was hit and a dive bomber, SBD, that was parked near it was burned up. We have some of the best aircraft mechanics in the Air Corps with us, and they work miracles trying to keep as many planes in commission as possible. Chuck Neblock and his guys have taken the wing from an unservicable service

position.

plane and used

it to replace a damaged wing on a good plane. They have even changed an engine from a damaged plane to a servicable plane to get another one into the air. They do all of this without equipment to lift an engine or wing into place. Everyone gets around and he directs the

brute force method of hoisting things into place.

The

September made operations from the field and the was during these conditions that the 'Tokyo Express" operated most successfully. The persistent Japanese buildup near Tasimboko was aided by the foul weather. Often they landed troops rains of early

search for targets

difficult. It

undetected and only the scouting patrol reports provided warning of the extent of their growing strength.

The force at Tasimboko was suspected of

being a small group of worn-out Japanese

left isolated by the invasion. Wanting to confirm the patrol reports of their continuous buildup, a landing

by a reconnissance

in force

was planned

for the

morning of 8 September.

On the night of 7 September, elements of Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Edson's 1st Raider Battalion were embarked for a landing near Taivu Point for an attack

on the enemy positions near Tasimboko. On the morning of met heavy resistance as they moved on Tasimboko.

the 8th, the Raiders

They were facing the strong rear guard of a much larger Japanese force. The main force did not counterattack because it had already departed inland to the southwest, threatening the southern boundary of the perimeter. Patrol action

by native scouts and Marine patrols

later estimated the

strength of the Japanese force at about 4000 troops. They were hacking

way through the jungle, remaining well east of the perimeter,

their

ing a route that would take

them

follow-

to an area south of the airfield.

Due to the strength and heavy resistance of the Japanese rear guard at Tasimboko, and the limited strength committed to the mission, Colonel Edson called for immediate close air support. Here the 67th Fighter Squadron made a significant support effort. As the Marines took up positions around Tasimboko, they tried to

was

a well-defended

enemy

fight their

way

to

what they now knew

supply dump.

At 0700 Major Brannon and Lieutenants Fincher, Head and Childress were overhead in P-400s. Diving in front of the Marines, they attacked Tasimboko village. There were still landing craft along the shore; there was plenty of return fire, and none of the Japanese were actually seen in the

The Marines called for air attack on the huts and other locations they knew the Japanese were holding. The mission was repeated by Captain Thompson and Lieutenants

open.

87

The P-400s were inflicting heavy damage on the Japanese positions with bomb and strafing attacks. The Marines were Davis, Johnston, and Glazier.

up against fresh and well-equipped Japanese troops protecting a rich cache of arms, artillery, communications, medical supplies, and rations.

The

Marines pressed the attack against heavy fire and called for repeated close air

support missions.

Because of the continuous and heavy schedule of operations and the preceding days of rain, conditions on the Henderson Field runway were almost impossible. In some places under the steel runway matting, in the filled-in

bomb craters, there was a sea of mud. At 1530, Major Brannon and

Lieutenants Fincher and Head responded to one of the

calls for close air

support at Tasimboko. Brannon lead his flight out to the runway, which was progressively deteriorating throughout the day. Fully loaded with ammunition, gas, field

were attempting to make short mud. to the end of the runway, followed by Head

and a 500-pound bomb, the

pilots

takeoff runs to avoid the sea of

Brannon taxied

On 8 September

carefully

Lt. V.L. Head, flying in support of Coi. Merritt Edson's Raiders at Tasimboko, crashed on takeoff from the muddy Henderson Field runway. Lt. Head survived by unbuckling and running out through the flames. He was burned, but recovered and was soon back on duty. The crash scene, after the fire was put out, looking east. 8 September 1942.

88

and Fincher. With half flaps and

full

power, he slithered through the mud, it. Lieutenant Head followed with

getting off before reaching the worst of

the same procedure, gave

it full

throttle, slithered on, gaining takeoff

A

speed.

sloppy area under his side of the runway matting splashed a geyser of mud over the plane. Gaining speed, he attempted to pull the airplane off as he

matting.

was hit by another spray of mud thrown up from under the

Mud covered

the airplane as

it

became airborne

in a near-stalled

Engine torque and loss of lift from mud on the wings twisted the as the wheels bounced on the runway. A landing gear broke off and

attitude. aircraft

the plane tumbled off to the left of the runway in a cloud of flame and smoke. Lieutenant Fincher, following Head, got off safely, flying through the

smoke of Head's burning plane. At this moment, Brannon and Fincher were certain that Head's crash had been fatal. Brannon and Fincher again attacked in front of the Marines at Tasimboko. The Japanese were all killed or routed; the Marines destroyed the supplies and arms. Brannon's flight remained over

Tasimboko to cover the Marines' withdrawal as they trooped aboard their landing craft, heavily loaded with personal supplies of Japanese canned crab meat and bottles of sake and Japanese beer. Brannon's flight returned to the field at 1730.

Wednesday

Diary: Sept. 9,

Monday it

all day and we did not get much done. Tuesday it was still raining. The runway is sloppy with mud under the steel matting, especially when you get down near the takeoff point. So many bomb

rained

craters have been filled in under the matting that the fill is now turning to mudholes and splashes up all over the place when a plane rolls over it. Our planes were out supporting the Raiders in an attack on the Japs in a village up the coast that the Marines are trying to take. Yesterday Lt. Head crashed on takeoff. The mudbath he got all over the wings on the

made

takeoff roll

it

impossible for

it

to get airborne.

when he lifted off and crashed off the left edge gear

off

caught

and the plane broke

fire.

The way

The

plane stalled

of the runway.

It

broke the

in half right in front of the pilot seat

the plane broke apart,

it

was

possible for Lt.

and

Head

away from was watching his takeoff

to unbuckle the safety belt and scramble out of the flames and

the wreck.

It's a

miracle that he got out

and saw the cloud of mud, the

was

all

over.

stall,

alive.

I

the crash, and the flames;

I

thought

it

down the field to the crash, the Marines, way to the hospital. He is burned but The fire was put out promptly and we got some

By the time

I

ran

or someone, had him already on the is

going to be

all

right.

parts and equipment off the plane, including the radio. pictures this morning

of the broken plane;

it is

I

took several

an amazing

sight. Lt.

Head was evacuated to New Caledonia. Last night I went to bathe in the river and we got an air raid before I could get back, but the bombs dropped in the ocean. Then we got ready about dark to receive planes, F4Fs returning from a long mission. We were trying to help the Navy people and the CBs to light the runway

89

The crash scene

We

of Lt. V.L. Head's plane; looking north. 8

September 1942.

making torches to set out as runway lights, using sake bottles and wicks. Finally we were able to get some trucks shining their lights down the runway to light the touchdown area. These planes had to try to make landings almost in darkness, because the lights from the trucks barely lighted the touchdown point. The planes finally found the field and circled to land. The first plane touched down, groundlooped, and went off the runway, broke the landing gear, and smashed up the plane. In the process, five F4Fs were lost in the night landing operation. Bill Schneider was in the group watching the landings and was yelling at each plane at the top of his voice, "Set 'em down easy, Davey, we need 'em all!" "Tojo Time" today is just over, and our planes are back but shot up pretty bad. Two F4Fs cracked up landing and one hit a dive bomber, SBD. The runway is so muddy from the continuous rain that it is causing a lot of damage. It's the direct cause of Lt. Head's crash. An airfoil covered with mud is just no good. A Marine Lt. who went down about a week ago came back today. (2nd Lieutenant R.R. Amerine of VMF 224, who bailed out of his plane on 31 Aug. over the northwest coast of Guadalcanal walked into a field artillery outpost in poor physical condition.) He went down in the ocean

somehow.

90

tried

He had to sneak 30 miles through Japaneseheld jungle to get here and he had nothing to wear but his shirt. The and got ashore somehow. story

He we

is

that he had to hit a Jap over the head with a rock to get his

rifle.

more on the way back. That's how the story goes. Anyway, are glad to hear about someone making it back against the odds.

shot six

The Marines had high praise for the support provided by the P-400s at Tasimboko. One report by a Marine returned from that action said, "In the buildings and surrounding bush, there must have been a hundred dead Japs from the strafing by the P-400s; arms and supplies were blown to bits by their bombs." An overly generous report, perhaps, but the raid demonstrated, effectively, the attack accuracy of the P-400s.

The 67th was soon requested missions to place lines of the

for

more and more

fire directly in front of

close air support

troops engaged along the front

perimeter defenses, as well as for the interdiction of enemy

dumps behind enemy many combat situations it would be impossible to place mortar and

troops, concentrations of supplies, and ammunition lines. In

on opposing Japanese forces; the 67th responded with accurate support using the heavy firepower of the P-400. They began to compensate for the shortage of artillery that had hampered the Marines. artillery fire

The crash scene

of Lt. V.L. Head's plane; looking south. 8

September

91

Vandegrift liked the P-400 for

its

work

support of his frontline troops

in

v

and asked for more of them.

— and

The frontline Marines on opposing enemy

strikes

along a stream, a jungle pointed out on a

trail,

—

Army would call for close air which they were in close combat

later the

units with

or a ridge of high ground.

The spot would be

map to the pilot and the Marine frontline troops would lay

out signal panels on the ground at the front indicating the point of contact

with the enemy.

The

diving P-400s would

bomb the

spot, pull out of their

dives and skim, in zig-zag evasive action, across the tree tops, sometimes clipping a

few leaves

off

the trees with a wingtip or prop blade.

They would

then swing back and strafe the area with their machine gun and cannon fire.

was sometimes blind work. There were times a pilot could see only the smoke of an enemy breakfast fire, or a few Japs along a jungle road or trail for a fleeting split second. Many times the mission was completed accordIt

ing to plan without seeing anything.

After-action reports by frontline units moving into the area attacked by the P-400s reported many Japanese bodies and signs of a hasty

departure.

Diary: Sept. 10, Thursday The pilots of the 67th are doing a great job of dive bombing and strafing Japanese forces

and targets in front of the Marines. They some-

times go after Jap landing barges or ships that are always trying to

move

troops ashore. After one of the close support missions, Lieutenant

Fountain came his engine.

in

and taxied up right

As the engine came

revolutions and the

20mm

in front of

to a stop,

cannon

in

hit

the hangar and shut off

kicked over a few additional

the nose of the airplane fired into

the steel plates on the roof of the hanger.

they

it

The 20mm shells exploded

the steel plates and shell fragments went flying in

—

all

as

directions.

Everyone in the hanger got off without being hit but me. I got a small shell fragment in my arm. I was going to pick it out with long-nosed pliers but Captain Thompson said to go over to the hospital and have a corpsman do it and disinfect the puncture wound. I went over to the Marine dispensary, had it taken care of and hurried back here. As I was leaving the hospital, I saw at least 50 bodies of Marines wrapped in blankets waiting to be buried; it may have been more than 50, but it was a lot. There were others wounded and on stretchers awaiting treatment. The sight brought home the sad facts of what the Marines have been going through here to hold this hot potato that we have taken from the Japs.

The P-39/P-400 supposed to be, and

it

certainly couldn't act like the fighter plane

was never intended

to be a dive

it

was

bomber. Yet the

67 th made it perform superbly in the close support and dive bombing roles, and perfected their own techniques. A card in the instrument panel of the airplane read: DO NOT RELEASE BOMB WHEN NOSE ANGLE 30 DEGREES UP OR DOWN OR WHEN AIR SPEED EXCEEDS pilots of the

92

280 MPH. They had discovered that the bomb would release safely at a nose angle of 70 degrees and would clear the propeller arc if a quick back pressure on the stick was made to pull the airplane away from the falling bomb. Routinely they made dives at 300 mph and some at 500 mph, a performance not believed possible in the Aircraft Technical Orders. The technique was developed by trying new ideas and exchanging comments on mission results. Pilots found feet release the ,

mass

rifle

or antiaircraft

indicated an

Day

it was best to start the dive at about 5,000 bomb, pull out over the treetops, and zig-zag away to avoid

enemy

fire,

then return to strafe where return

after day the pilots of the Jagstaffel

300-, or 500-pound

fire

presence.

bombs or

would take

off

with 100-,

a depth charge slung under their bellies.

Often they attacked by ground direction from the Marines against an unseen enemy target, where the jungle trees or palm groves could hide a whole army. Their success earned them the undying gratitude of the men in close combat on the ground. "I'm sure our performance was because we could pick up the target, terrain feature, or

marker

out of a wingover, lay the

at a reasonably

low altitude and start our dive

bomb on the target, recover, and get out," recalls

Jim Jarman.

The enemy grew

in strength on all sides in early September. There were continuous shuttles of dive bombing and strafing missions coming and going from Henderson Field. The beat-up airplanes were wearing out, but the ground crews always managed to have a few in commission to meet the

daily mission requirements.

The defenders of the beachhead on land and in the air became increasaware that the Japanese forces were gaining strength for a push to The daily attacks by the Japanese air formations and the nightly shelling by the Japanese Naval forces were causing a slow attrition on the initial assignment of aircraft. Although Japanese losses far outnumbered our Henderson Field losses, available aircraft were becoming ingly

retake Guadalcanal.

One example of this can be seen in the 8 September action report of the Marine Air Group 23, to which all aircraft operating out of Henderson Field were assigned: "At 1820 there was an air raid alarm and six F4Fs of VMF-223 and ten F4Fs of VMF-224 took off. too few to carry the load.

The

first

B-17s

arrive over

Henderson

Field,

Guadalcanal. 11 September 1942.

93

The

landing strip

use

.

.

.

was badly rutted and chewed up due to rain and heavy One cracked up on takeoff. The planes landed between 1900 and

1930, after dark and under poor lighting conditions due to ground fog developing

.

.

.

three airplanes cracked up on landing.

seriously injured but five

mentioned

in

my

F4Fs were

lost."

No

pilots

were

(These were the night landings

diary of 9 Sept.)

The 67th Fighter Squadron, which

was keepwas almost miraculous

started with 14 planes,

ing from three to six planes in commission. This

mechanical work, supported by cannibalization of unservicable aircraft for parts in a desperate effort to keep as many planes flying as possible. Everyone was fatigued, wore ragged clothing, ate two meals a day, and faced an extended period on short rations. With the departure of Lieutenant Head after his accident on the 9th, a relief exchange of the 67th's pilots began, and Captain Christian and Lieutenants Erwin and Brzuska were returned to Tontouta, New Caledonia, on 11 September. 11 September 1942 was a day full of hard work fighting, bombing, and preparation for the developing Japanese offensive. At 0930 Major Brannon and Lieutenants Fountain, Glazier, and Childress took off in

—

Bomb

Crater. A 1000-pound bomb hit near their shelter. The covering beams and steel were blown to the side. It dug the occupants out in a cloud of dirt. Miraculously, all survived. Occupants were: Brannon, Childress, Fincher, and Glazier. 11 September 1942.

Brannon's

roof plates

94

now reported to be five miles east of the field. Due to the dense jungle cover, they sighted nothing. To the west they again search of Japanese forces

searched the vicinity of Cape Esperance, where the day before Lieutenant Fincher had scored a direct hit with his bomb on a location identified as an

enemy radio station site. On the patrol they saw nothing but landing barges they had already destroyed.

At 1205, 26 Japanese bombers with an escort of eight Zeros attacked the airfield and placed a stick of bombs right along the ridge where Edson's 1st Raider Battalion were digging in, a sure sign that the Japanese had chosen this location for a thrust at Henderson Field, from the south, by their force that had moved inland from Tasimboko. At "Tojo Time," Captain Thompson and Lieutenants Davis, Fountain, Brown, and Johnston were out patrolling for attack on Japanese positions. The airfield received a very heavy air attack that destroyed one P-400 on the ground. Eleven Marines were killed and 17 injured in the vicinity of the airfield. Six bombers and one Zero were shot down. One F4F, piloted by Major R.E. Galer, after shooting down a bomber and a Zero, went down smoking. Galer landed in the water offshore and swam to the beach. During the raid, a 1000-pound bomb hit close to one of the 67th's bomb shelters. It penetrated the ground and exploded under the shelter, blowing the occupants into the

air

and leaving a gaping hole

in

the ground.

The occupants and all the parts and debris from the shelter fell back into or near the hole. Miraculously, no one was In anticipation of the developing

strength received a welcome

killed.

enemy ground

offensive,

Marine

air

— though temporary — reinforcement. At

VF5 Squadron, based on Saratoga, commanded by Simpler, arrived along with 10 B-17s of the 11th Leroy C. Lieutenant Bombardment Group just passing through. Operations for the day closed with the return of 30 SBD dive bombers from late afternoon patrol. The SBDs, led by Lieutenant T.F. Caldwell, had sighted one Japanese heavy cruiser and two destroyers. Visibility had been poor and contact was made by only four of the SBDs. No damaging hits 1620, 24 F4Fs of

—

were made. The night was again filled with fierce shelling by Japanese naval units and the surrounding sounds of battle.

Diary: Sept. 11, Friday Yesterday we had a bad air raid. The bombers came over and dropped bombs on Tulagi and our new runway at "Fighter-1" which is almost capable of steady operation; some F4Fs have used it already.

There were 26 bombers and at least 15 men were killed or injured. Today we had an air raid about 1230 and it was one of the worst yet. hell. The Again, 26 bombers dropped their bombs and our area caught the damage was heavy, with many men killed or injured in the vicinity of field.

that got Four of our people were in a bomb shelter, right near ours, the shook It bomb. a direct hit by what seemed like a thousand-pound

95

ground like an earthquake. This shelter was built just like ours (courtesy of the Japs), dug deep and covered with wood beams, sheet steel, and topped off with dirt and sandbags. There is a big hole where their shelter used to be and they all got out alive. The blast dug out the shelter and blew the people, beams, sheet

steel,

and

dirt

30

feet in the

air.

The

occupants, Major Brannon and Lieutenants Pete Childress, Fincher, and Glazier;

all

but Lieutenant Childress were blown clear.

into the hole

and got covered up to the neck with

He dropped back

falling dirt

and debris.

beams and sheet steel were carried off to the side. When the explosions were over, everyone ran to his aid. People were standing all over him, pressing the dirt down on him, and just about burying him. He couldn't talk because he was being crushed. He just kept waving his arms in anger, trying to tell people to get the hell off of him, while he struggled. A corpsman fumbled around trying to give him a shot of morphine, thinking that part of him that was buried must be injured or missing limbs. With some organized digging, he was removed from the mess and they all went to the hospital for a checkup. They are in good Fortunately, the

shape except for a few cuts and bruises.

I

will

take a picture of the hole

by the bomb tomorrow so you can see that the bomb shelter is not there, just a big hole in the ground; I call it Brannon's bomb crater. left

At 0500 on 12 September, Major Brannon, although scheduled to be evacuated, was back on duty with a patch on his chin and a thankful smile on his face.

Seated

96

There was a false scramble, but all planes were back on the ground

at the

bottom of Brannon's

Bomb

Crater

is

Robert

L.

Ferguson. 12 September 1942.

t

by 0830. Taut readiness and tense anticipation permeated the atmosphere around Henderson field. Occasional rifle fire and mortar fire could be heard in the distance and Marine artillery, registering on fire points they might use to fire on the Japanese troops in the expected attack, belched forth every now and then. "Tojo Time" arrived at 1100; 26 Japanese bombers escorted by 16 Zeros approached directly over the field. They were met by heavy flak patterns from the

90mm antiaircraft guns, which were now working well,

i

^

\^°^ \ll^ September

which he and Major Dale D. Brannon, standing in the bomb crater from bomb hit their the when occupants the to injury free. There was no serious 1942.

e

shelter.

12

t

r

97

and bagged several of the planes before the F4Fs took over. Eleven bombers and four Zeros were shot down. The radio shack received minor

damage; three SBDs were destroyed on the ground. The Marine 90mm antiaircraft performance was spectacular; one Japanese bomber received a direct hit and exploded in a bright orange flash which, except for the grim reality of the situation, was a thing of beauty against the blue of the midday sky. The aerial combat that followed was wild; enemy bombers, their parts and parts of their crews as well, were falling at numerous points around Henderson Field. The unbridled rage of the air engagement was incredibly brief for the amount of destruction that occurred.

by 1200. Several pilots were wounded during the fight, and Ensign C.E. Eichenburger was killed when his F4F crashed on the field as he attempted to make a deadstick landing. Afternoon search All fighters returned

patrols detected seven Japanese Navy vessels heading from various places in the search area.

for Guadalcanal

Diary: Sept. 12, Saturday "Tojo Time" today was 1130. The Japanese two-engine bombers

of the Lunga River can be seen in the background as this Japanese bomber, shot down by fighters near Henderson Field, lies burning on the river bank. A young Marine looks over the crash scene. 12 September 1942.

The waters

98

came over

over 23000 feet; they looked like gray ghosts up there in The Marine antiaircraft battery got five of them; they were right on today. Then we could hear on the radio and watch as the Marine F4Fs came in on them. We could see one of them explode and another started down in flames and disintegrated in midair; the parts tumbled down and flashed now and then as the shiny aluminum reflected the sun. Others crashed on the field in flames or smoking. Not much of the bomb at

the sunlight.

load hit the

field.

After the raid the

field

parts of their crewmembers.

was covered with parts of Jap planes and There was a leg from one of the Jap bomber

crew members lying out on the ground in front of the hangar just a short distance from our shelter. I went down through the Marine artillery position just off the edge of the field to the bank of the river to see the smoking bomber that crashed there. The plane was still burning and almost completely consumed. The body of the pilot or one of the crew was lying there burned and broken. There are several other planes and bodies nearby.

The

reality of

it all is

that this

is

just

how our own boys may be in

look when they crash and burn in combat, in places where they

contact over I

took

enemy

positions.

lots of pictures

today of these things

I

have described. The

Jap bombers and three Zeros destroyed. We found another body of a Jap flier a while ago; he is buried now. That is final

score today so far

is 1 1

about 15 this afternoon. (Several of these enemy airmen lie in a common grave at the bend of The Lunga River, South South East of the Hender-

son Field runway's West end; others were buried where they

fell.)

99

CHAPTER

9

a Dark Night on Guadalcanal" "It's

The

Tasimboko on 8 September was an ominous The main enemy force had already moved and was working its way southwest from Tasimboko through the

successful action at

victory for General Vandegrift. inland

jungle to threaten the perimeter defenses south of the airfield. Vandegrift

estimated that this force, under General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, would

an attempt to capture the

Where would most

airfield

make

from the south.

the attack hit the perimeter? Vandegrift decided the

brunt of the attack was a ridge of open hills 1700 yards south of the Henderson Field runway. The Marines

likely point to receive the

lying about

had been improving their defense positions all along the perimeter line, and Vandegrift ordered Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson's 1st Raider

by the Parachute Battalion, to take up positions beyond the outpost line on the ridge, dig in, and defend that approach to the airfield. Edson moved his force to the ridge and began to establish his Battalion, reinforced

defense as the

lines,

coordinate artillery support, and wire in his positions as well

meager supply

of wire

would allow. The ridge,

later

known

as

"Edson's Ridge" or "Bloody Ridge," was the scene of a crucial battle for Guadalcanal.

Kawaguchi, now somewhere

in

the jungle south of the ridge, had

received orders from his superiors not to attack unless he had assured himself that he and the other

beachhead had

commanders

sufficient strength to

to the west and east of the

accomplish their mission. Otherwise,

they were to await additional units already on the way.

100

During the night and early morning of 12 - 13 September, Henderson Marine bivouac area in the palm groves were heavily shelled, probably by ships spotted on the previous afternoon by Caldwell's SBD Field and the

search pilots. The Japanese naval bombardment, intended to neutralize Henderson Field, was heavy, lengthy, and destructive; battle sounds could

be heard at a high pitch through the night. The bombardment shifted several times, covering the general area of the airfield and beachhead, including the Marine Raider positions on the ridge. Casualties from the

bombardment were heavy in some areas of the beachhead. The shelling was direct support for the Japanese forces making their three-pronged attack on the Marine lines in an attempt to regain their property.

With supreme confidence, Kawaguchi began the attack toward the on the night of 12 - 13 September, hitting the Marine lines head-on.

airfield

The Raiders, meeting each wave of the attack, dropped slowly back along the ridge to hold their lines together. During the day of 13 September the raiders reconsolidated and wired in their lines. areas, and

The

sometimes the ridge were under heavy

ment during the

air

airfield,

the bivouac

and Naval bombard-

entire period.

At nightfall on the 13th, the Japanese renewed their attack. The Marine Raiders dug in on the northernmost knoll of the ridge for a final stand in defense of the

airfield, a

scant 1000 yards inside their

line.

the night the Japanese threw numerous attacks at the Marine

ported by mortar fire in front of

fire.

During

line,

sup-

Artillery of the 5th battalion, 11th Marines, placed

Edson's lines throughout the night, pounding a devastating

barrage on the Japanese attackers. The Marine Raiders engaged

in

hand-

to-hand combat with waves of onrushing Japanese infantry that penetrated their lines.

With bayonet,

knife,

handgun, and grenade they fought

in a

high

pitch of individual combat.

By dawn of 14 September line

on

the last knoll of

the Marine Raiders were

Bloody Ridge

in front of

south slope of the ridge, the Japanese were

still

Henderson

holding their Field.

On

the

regrouping to evaluate their

situation and to carry the attack. First light appeared to be ushering in another day of hard fighting on the ridge. Japanese troops were infiltrating the defense lines to snipe and cut communications. The attackers from the west of the perimeter brought the west end of the airfield under mortar fire

and Radio Tokyo announced that Guadalcanal was recaptured from the Americans.

At home, the United States Government was giving out little information, admitting nothing of their meager support for the defenders of Guadalcanal. The most popular radio commentators of the time, such as Gabriel Heatter, opened their newscasts with the ominous words, "It's a dark night on Guadalcanal," and mothers, fathers, wives, and sweethearts, valiant their ears pinned to the radio sets, uttered a sob of despair. In this on Guadalcanal knew that his was a precarious plight that

every man would end with Guadalcanal effort,

U.S. possession or every man would go Never to into the bush to fight a guerrilla war against the Japanese. still

in

101

surrender to the Japanese and never to be taken alive was a covenant as veracious as a knightly vow.

Diary: Sept. 13, Sunday It's morning now, and

I

never expected to see

The Japs

it.

are

attacking at several points but especially at a point just south of us where

the Marine Raider Battalion

advance.

I

shelled us

is

dug

in

on a ridge and trying to stop their

guess they have the situation still under control.

from ships

just offshore for

hours

last night.

The Jap Navy

We went to get

bomb shelter and it was jammed full, like sardines, with crewmembers from the B-17s that got caught on the ground here last night. into our

Kenneth Markel was going to pull his .45 on them for occupying our I grabbed him and we ran and jumped over the edge of an embankment leading down to the artillery position from our flight line area on the field. We stayed there all night. It was a great show of fireworks; as bad as shelling can get. They (enemy) had an observation shelter.

plane chugging back and forth across the

field,

dropping flares and

spotting fire for them, Markel chain-smoked until his pack of cigarettes

was gone and cussed the B-17 crew that took over our shelter. The Japs shot star shells, which were as bright as day, to light up the area and adjusted fire with the help of the observation plane.

For a while the shells hit in the coconut groves where troops are camped; then they lifted fire to the airfield and destroyed some planes.

They raised fire again and instead of the shells bursting near us with shell fragments whirring around us and cutting the limbs from trees above us, as they had been, the shells

They sound

were

like a freight train

traveling a

little

higher over our heads.

passing in the distance.

Fm

sure they

were trying to place a few on the ridge where the Raider Battalion is. We have had shellings before, but this one is beyond belief. It is hard to describe the feeling of helplessness during a shelling,

on the target

— there

is

nowhere

battle noises are terrible

A welcome

to go,

no one to

when you are right

fight

back

at,

and the

and continuous.

came in over the field (0700 hours). Twenty more F4Fs are coming in from a carrier and will be here for today's "Tojo Time" raid. That means we may be able to have 60 planes sight just

operational against Tojo today; that depends, of course, on

how bad the

damage to our planes from the shelling turns out. / The 4Fs were replacements delivered for VMF-223 and VMF-224. Seven were eventually delivered to each squadron; the rest were wrecked on landing or other-

wise destroyed.]

We had two air raids this afternoon, heavy with Zeros. This evening two Zeros came in and strafed the field and shot down an SBD that was on his landing approach. I was out on the field during one of the strafing attacks. There was nowhere to go. I ran and jumped into a shallow foxhole, landed on my back, and lay as low as possible. One plane came over the foxhole so low and so close that one of the metal

102

clips falling

Robert M. Ferguson. Standing by the wing of

his Bell

P-39/P-400

from his machine gun belts landed on got too good a look at that Zero.

I

Hell's Bell.

September 1942.

my chest as I lay there looking up.

I

could see the red ball and the rivets on

the skin of the airplane. I

took pictures this morning of a unit of the 5th Marines moving up

through our area to reinforce the Raider Battalion.

103

During the early hours of the morning on 14 September, Captain John A Thompson reported to the pagoda for a mission briefing. At that hour little was known by the aviation personnel on the airfield of the tide of battle

on the ridge to the south and

at other sectors of the

perimeter

— only that

the fate of the entire operation hung in the balance. In the dim light of a

Thompson was introduced to a young smudged with blood, with three days beard. He pointed out for Thompson on a crude map the south

lantern in the blacked-out pagoda,

Marine growth

officer

of

—

dirty, dog-tired,

slope of Bloody Ridge held by Edson's Raiders and described the general situation.

"We need to bring heavy fire from your P-400s here," said the Marine officer, pointing to

"We

the south slope of the ridge in front of the Marine

expect them to mount another drive at

Thompson agreed

lines.

first light."

that he could be off at first light with three P-400s

and be over the south slope of the ridge just minutes after takeoff. The distance

was

close

enough that the airplanes would not have

to leave the

traffic pattern.

In the early

morning darkness

Thompson and Lieutenants

at the 67th's flight line, Captain

B.E. Davis and B.W.

Brown

started the en-

gines of their P-400s and taxied slowly through the dusky darkness toward

they were in takeoff position. watched as they roared down the runway and off, the dancing blue flames from their short exhaust stacks twinkling in the early morning darkness. They circled over the field and climbed to no more than 1000 feet, swinging in a wide left turn to approach the ridge from the west in their first strafing pass. The entire time the planes could be seen from the work area of the 67th's flight line and even better by the few who climbed to the top of the hangar, braving sniper fire, to watch the P-400s until they disappeared behind the treetops and the the end of the runway. At the

first hint of light

The ground crews and other

pilots

south slope of the ridge.

The target area could be seen by Thompson's flight when they passed over the slope.

field,

swinging south to

ing for whatever action they to a

line

up for their

first

pass at the south

On the ridge, the slopes were covered with Japanese troops, reform-

little

above tree top

level.

were planning. Thompson's P-400s dropped They came out over the treetops, taking the

Men of the 5th Marines pass the burned-out decoy P-39/P-400, number 1 2, as they cross Henderson Field on their way to reinforce Edson's Raiders at Bloody Ridge. 13 September 1942.

104

1

Elements of the 5th Marines passed through the on Bloody Ridge.

flight line

area of the 67th Squadron on

their

way to

reinforce Col. Edson's troops

Japanese by surprise, dropping to 25 or 30 feet above the heads of the troops on the slope with all guns blazing.

The concentration of fire ripped into the formation of Japanese troops as the planes flashed across the ridge. The chatter of their guns could be heard on the airfield while the men of the 67th and others on the ground cheered as the planes zoomed up from behind the ridge. The P-400s pulled up

in a circle for

another attack. Strung out over the treetops, they dived

for another pass at the ridge,

knowing

it

would not be as easy as the

first

The Japanese officers and NCOs had quickly organized their troops for mass rifle and machine gun return fire. The P-400s again showered devasone.

tating firepower

on the

slope.

In the hail of return fire from the Japanese troops, Lieutenant Brown was the first to receive a critical hit on his aircraft. With a punctured engine

coolant radiator, he took advantage of the high speed from his strafing dive

and pulled up toward the

field,

gaining as

much

altitude

from the speed as

He held onto a little power before losing all of his engine coolant and when he could reach the runway, he cut the engine and landed possible.

deadstick.

On

the next strafing run, the same type

hit

was received by Thompsame

son's P-400; he pulled out of his strafing pass and executed the

procedure as Brown, landing deadstick. Lieutenant Davis continued to strafe the ridge

until

he was out of

ammunition. The strafing by the P-400s was devastating and demoralizing it inflicted heavy casualties on their attack on the Marine lines. In continued for marshal formations trying to to the now-exhausted Japanese troops;

turn of events, with 600 dead lying on the slope, General Kawaguchi gave the order to withdraw, conceding the victory to

the face of this

final

Edson and his Raiders. At a later time in the war and in a campaign commanded by the Army, Thompson's mission to attack Bloody Ridge would have been a Medal of Honor event. It was a mission in which the pilots were prepared to sacrifice their aircraft

and themselves

in their

determination to

inflict this final

blow

105

on the enemy battle force attempting to capture the tinely reported in the after-action

was roureport of the 23rd Marine Air Group as airfield. It

follows:

14 September 1942 Routine Patrols. Captain J. A.

Brown and 2nd

Thompson led two other P-400s (1st. Lt. B.E. Davis) of the

mission directed against an

enemy

67th

force on a

VF hill

Lt.

B.W.

in a strafing

south of Hen-

derson Field.

The enemy was prepared to attack a hard-pressed unit of Marine Raiders. The mission was successful and many enemy troops were hit and the enemy retired. Two of the planes were hit by ground fire and made deadstick landings. All pilots landed safely.

For

were later decorated. John A. Thompson Navy Cross and Lieutenants B.W. Brown and B.E. Davis

this action, the pilots

received the

received the Silver Star.*

Monday We got little sleep last night. The Japs were attacking all night and

Diary: Sept. 14,

many have

infiltrated to just across the river.

been helping to reinforce the Marine outpost the artillery position.

I

was out there

all last

On some

nights

we have

line

along the river near

night.

We work during the

much time for The outpost line is just about a rifle shot from here, where our planes are parked. The Marines have two lines of listening posts, some forward across the river, and some on this side of the river. At night when I go out there, I join a Marine to man one post. The posts are wired together by field telephones and every once in a day trying to keep rest and also not

flight

much

operations going, and there isn't

to eat.

while they whisper a reporting procedure, heavily punctuated with obscenities that a Jap listening

everything

on the

line could

is all

right along the line.

just shooting at

imaginary dangers.

not understand, to see that

There was sporadic firing, a lot of it

The artillery continuously pounded the Japs all last night, in support of Raiders who must be having a rough time out there. The Japs are well equipped and in great numbers. You can tell there is a battle raging, machine guns and

artillery are

barking continuously. Their bullets occa-

*In the late afternoon on 14 September, Generals Vandegrift and Geiger visited the 67th's They talked to John Thompson and with Jim Jarman, who would soon be taking over

flight line.

when Thompson departed. General Vandegrift told Thompson that "you'll never the papers, but that three-P-400 mission of yours that day [at Bloody Ridge] saved Guadalcanal." He then looked around to see no one was looking, took a bottle of Old Overholt the flight

read

it

in

rye whiskey from under the seat and handed his shirt

106

it

to

Thompson, admonishing him to put it under

because he didn't have enough for everyone.

come whistling through our area. The whole thing looks pretty rough to me. The battle sounds are out there all the time, and we get used to it. But now, there is firing as close as 300 yards from us on occasions. You can even identify the sounds of the weapons. A Jap rifle or machine gun sounds different from an American rifle, machine gun, sionally

BAR, be

or Rising gun.

identified

Even the various

sizes of

mortars and

artillery

can

by their sounds.

At 0930 this morning, Zeros came over and tangled with F4Fs above the field. The dogfights right over the field were really hot. There were Jap 20mm shells bursting all around us and we just watched the show. There were pursuit curves being flown right down to within 100

gaJt^v

Captain John A. Thompson September 1942.

in

*****

take a P-39/P-400 Airacobra prepares to

off

on an intercept

sortie.

107

feet of the ground, right over our heads. All four Zeros

were shot down. At "Tojo Time," the bombers and many Zeros stayed up high. Again they were intercepted by F4Fs and all were shot down. (Zeros waiting for a planned signal to land, thinking that the field had

been captured by

now.)

The battle is still going on but we know now (1515 hrs.) that the Marine lines have held and the Jap attack has been beaten back. We should have a quieter, safer night tonight. I have seen all of the frontline tension I want for a while. During the battle of the ridge, the perimeter was attacked from the two other segments of the Japanese force. Each of these

east and west by

was

on the line. The Japanese and resolute but uncoordinated because of inadequate

successfully beaten off by the Marines

attacks

were

fierce

communications and poor planning for force maneuvering

in the jungle

environment. Patrol action by the 1st Marines immediately after the battle of

Bloody Ridge proved that the enemy, though temporarily disorganized,

was present

in force

and would

fight

any contact by patrols. The Japanese

were contacted in frequent patrol engagements through 17 September. The Japanese were on the move, attempting to join their forces and consolidate their strength west of the

forces east and south of the perimeter

perimeter.

Pilots of the

L.H.

108

Ramp,

67th Fighter Squadron in the operations shack at Cactus. They are from left to Jarman, Capt. John A. Thompson. 1942. (U.S. Army Air Corps)

Lt. J.T.

right: Lt.

a

The 'Tokyo Express" operated as usual; air raids continued to pound Henderson field; fierce patrol actions were occurring frequently, and "Washing Machine Charlie" visited the airfield regularly, under cover of darkness, tossing out a few bombs now and then to keep the American defenders awake and on their toes. The experience of the recent past proved to everyone that large enemy forces could be moved to threatening positions around the perimeter under concealment of the jungle; vigilance

and a tight defense were of the utmost importance, but Vandegrift the problem of limited forces. In

the

Ilu

all

action by the Japanese thus far, beginning with the battle along

River

they faced

had

still

in

in

mid-August, they had underestimated the Marine enemy

the beachhead and the strength needed to defeat him. They

prepare adequate plans supported by detailed patrol evaluation of both the environment and the Marine lines. Their plans were hastily

failed to

executed and

failed to achieve the benefit of coordinated attack

their imprudent and arrogant attitude.

The

because of

rigors of the environment did

much toward denying them their objectives; the jungle, rain, dengue fever, malaria, unimanginably rugged terrain, and humid heat harassed

an additional enemy on their

them like

flanks.

Yet the common Japanese soldier, even a sick one, was a fierce enemy. Beginning with the early battles at the Ilu, Matanikau, and Tasimboko, it was clear to the Marines that the Japanese fighting man would neither accept nor give quarter. When a battle was not going well for him, he went too willingly to certain death.

Few prisoners were taken by either side;

in

combat, each accepted a fight to the finish. In many instances the Japanese, considering their situation, were foolhardy in not withdrawing to regroup

and

fight

another day.

By mid-September, following several difficult defense actions, the

1st

Marine Division had not received reinforcements or a resupply of ammunition. The battle of "Bloody Ridge" had proved to the skeptics that Guadalcanal could be held, and an effort to put in resupply and reinforcements was now viewed, from the rear, with a different attitude. It was clear that the

force of the 1st Marines, Reinforced, had to hold itself up by bootstraps before reinforcements and resupply would be risked

initial

its

—

is most difficult to recall and reswallow. the 7th Marines were landed, along with a supply of September On 18

thought that

rations and aviation gasoline. Admiral Turner,

who had been blockade-run-

ships in the early ning, was now darting into Lunga Point with supply which ruled the warships, morning; he departed by 1800 to avoid Japanese as well as waters of the Southern Solomons by night. Rations arrived, enough barbed wire to wire in the perimeter defense line.

Diary: Sept. 20,

There are alert to this at

Sunday

now. We have to be Jap snipers working us over off the edge of the times. There are two dead ones right

a lot of

all

109

field in

the trees.

They really smell. The artillery is still pounding away at

the Japs today, the remnants of the battle of the ridge,

Diary: Sept. 23,

We

got

I

suppose.

Wednesday

more planes

tively quiet for the past

in night before last. Things have been relafew days. The Japs are being bombed at their air

bases at Buka and Bougainville these days,

made another landing, and our them like a milk run.

I

hear. Several thousand Japs

planes have been bombing and strafing

made it possible for General Vandegrift to more complete defense in the perimeter and consider moving

Arrival of reinforcements

organize a

the west boundary to the Matanikau River and the eastern boundary to the

Tenaru. The southern boundary was more difficult to define;

was a sector formed through an almost impenetrable jungle, but a link was somehow devised. In his monograph The Guadalcanal Campaign, 1949, Major John L. Zimmerman, USMC, said of this sector: 'Time-distance factors were so distorted by the chaotic nature of the terrain that passing with any degree of confidence was out of the question for an attacking enemy force." Vandegrift' s situation was now further improved by the knowledge that the Army's 164th Infantry of the Americal Division in New Caledonia was scheduled to be committed to him in the near future. It

was

to the

west and northwest of the perimeter that enemy

strength was reforming; there was objective of the

little

'Tokyo Express" was

action to the east and south.

By

mount an

The

to reinforce the Japanese units in

that sector. Patrol action confirmed increasing intent to

it

enemy

strength, with an

offensive against the perimeter.

the end of September, replacements for Japanese losses at the

ridge and perimeter battles, plus

two

additional infantry regiments,

were

landed by the "Tokyo Express." Troop concentrations were well to the west, and so concealed by the jungle that an estimate of their strength and disposition

was impossible. Lack of intelligence gathering was costly in the

patrol actions to test the Japanese and determine their strength and disposition.

In the period

23-26 September,

the 1st Battalion 7th Marines ven-

tured to the west in a landing beyond the Matanikau River, toward Ko-

kumbona, coordinated with a sweep by the Raider Battalion to the east bank of the Matanikau. The two elements were to join in hope of establishing a reconnaissance base west of the perimeter. Both units met heavy resistance in unexpected force. With the 1st Battalion surrounded on a ridge and the Raiders meeting heavy resistance on the east bank of the Matanikau, they called for and received heavy close air support. The 1st Battalion received heavy casualties, but with the help of gunfire from the USS Ballard and close air support, they fought their way to the beach and were heroically evacuated in landing craft on the 27th. The Raider Battal-

110

Two

of the world's greatest aircraft mechanics, Charles N. Neblock

and Enoch

J.

Dahlman. Sep-

tember 1942.

withdrew to the perimeter. This was proof of the gathering strength of the Japanese west of the beachhead. Toward the end of September, opposing patrols clashed frequently along the east bank of the Matanikau. Japanese artillery pieces, 150mm, capable of reaching Henderson Field, were landed by the 'Tokyo Exion then

Ill

press."

The Marines were determined to keep the Japanese out of artillery

range of the

airfield.

Diary: Sept. 26, Friday

Our planes are bombing and strafing Japanese troops that are being landed west of the perimeter. B-17s are coming through and bombing farther north into Jap bases like Bougainville.

here tonight after a mission. visibility is terrible;

some

A

flight of

them landed

has been raining since about 1600 and

It

of the planes had a hard time getting

Loading bombs on our P-39/P-400s

is

quite a job.

We

in.

have no

equipment to hoist a bomb into place. The armament chief, Felix Gurbada, "Gunner," has it done by brute force. They roll a bomb onto two crowbars under the plane. Then everyone who can fit under the plane gets a hold on the bars and lifts it into place; someone in the cockpit trips the latch to hold it in place. One armament man, John Orlich, hurt his back so badly keeps on.

lifting

On one

that he

is

almost deformed with pain, but he just

occasion Orlich

latch; the latch didn't hold

The arming wire

was

and the

in

the cockpit working the

bomb

fell

bomb

under the plane on the

armed the rear fuse, which is a 45-second fuse. Kenneth Markel unscrewed the fuse with his hand and was able to throw it away before it exploded. The whole group loading the bomb would have been killed if he had not acted as he did. I was under the plane helping to load the bomb and saw what Markel did. He knew what to do; he was quick, and I appreciate it. ground.

pulled out and

The arrival of 4,262 fully equipped fresh troops of the 7th Marines on 18 September marked the point when Admiral Turner began to speed up his logistic support of Guadalcanal. The "Tokyo Express" and Japanese warships

in

general operated at will in the waters around Guadalcanal, yet

our resupply was steadily increasing with the daily arrival of ships off Lunga Point.

The

1800

to be out of range

ships would arrive, begin to unload about 0600, and depart at

warships arrived

off

when

the

'Tokyo Express" or other Japanese

the north coast to land troops and shell Henderson

Field.

Through all of this, the men on the airfield, sitting out the shell fire, were wondering, "Where in hell is our Navy? Why aren't they in here doing something to stop this?" The beefed-up logistic support began to show in every way and by the end of September, rations at Cactus began to improve. In air operations, additional aircraft eral

Roy

S. Geiger,

were making

it

possible for

Gen-

then commanding the Marine Air Wing, to assure

General Vandegrift of about 60 aircraft for daily operations by the "Cactus Air Force," the

Army

pseudonym given

air aircraft.

The

to this mixture of Marine, Navy, and

units then involved could usually promise in

mission rates to meet this requirement:

112

com-

Major John

L.

Smith,

USMC,

the legendary Marine Fighter Pilot and hero of Cactus

air action.

Sept.

1942 (USMC)

VMF-223 VMF-224 VF5 VMSB-232

(Lt. Col.

67th Sq., Army,

(John A.

(Major John L. Smith)

10 F4F

(Major Robert E. Galer)

15

(Lt.

Depending upon success

of

Cmdr. Leroy C. Simpler)

15

F4F F4F

Richard C. Mangrum) 12 SBD Thompson) 6 P-400*

ground crews patching up the worn-out, shot-up

P-400s.

In the early

morning of 14 September, Major Brannon and Lieuten-

ants Glasier and Childress had departed by C-47 to return to Tontouta,

New Caledonia.

In the late afternoon, Lieutenants J.T. Jarman,

R.M. Fer-

guson, E.H. Fernam, A.B. Farquharson, and D.C. Goerke arrived at Hen-

derson

field

aboard a C-47. This exchange

procedure for periodically relieving

pilots

initiated the 67th's

exchange

from combat duty.

The

nightly shelling continued and battle noises could be heard on all Marines made contact around the perimeter with the remnants of attempting to the Japanese attack force evidently in large numbers make their way to the west of the perimeter. John Thompson checked out sides as

—

—

the newly arrived pilots on the dive bombing and close support strafing

113

on numerous patrols and attacks on Japanese positions, landing boats, troops, supplies, and occupied villages. These close support raids were conducted in coordination with Marines, who reported that the attacks were very successful, especially in the destruction of supplies of food and ammunition. Scarcity of food was becoming a real problem for the tactics

Japanese troops.

On 16 September, tain,

Lieutenants B,W. Brown, D. Fincher, Z.D. Foun-

and R.B. Johnston returned to Tontouta. Lieutenants J. Sawyer, D.P.

Miller,

and

Morton arrived from

J.

Espiritu Santo in P-400s.

One P-400

had been lost at Santo in a landing accident; the pilot, Lieutenant Walsh was hospitalized. at

Another P-400, piloted by Lieutenant R.E. Kaiser, remained

Santo with engine trouble.

The new

arrivals

were immediately

initiated

the routine of close air support missions.

bombing and

They

by John Thompson into

all

got their

first licks in,

strafing Japanese front lines, destroying supplies, placing fire

in front of the

Marines, or shooting up landing boats.

An example

of a typical day following the battle of the ridge

was 19

September. Three P-400s attacked the village of Morovovo and vicinity on

Home plate for the 67th Squadron was the old Japanese hangar at the west end of Henderson Field. This tent, on the south side of the hangar, received much damage from shell fragments. The occupants, taking a break, are: front, Thomas Melton, Mike Zavoski; rear, unknown, R.L. Ferguson. September 1942.

114

the western end of Guadalcanal. A group of landing boats were attacked. Two were destroyed by bombs, two were exploded with tracer bullets, and the rest were put out of commission by heavy strafing. In addition, a building hit in a strafing attack near the village blew up in a tremendous

detonation

— obviously

a large

ammunition store

— that could be heard

back at the perimeter.

From a

on 22 September, Lieutenant E.H. Farnam did not return. Five P-400s along with some Marine dive bombers had bombed that area,* then the P-400s had strafed the area where many new huts had been constructed by the Japanese. When the flight joined up to return to the field, Farnam was missing. It was a day of bad weather, rain, and poor visibility that hindered an air search. similar mission to the Visale area,

Later, on 24 September, Lieutenant R. Waymouth of Navy Dive Bombing Squadron VS-3 reported seeing a P-400 down about 200 yards inland about five miles west of Kukum; it was believed to be Farnam's plane. Again, on 28 September, a more cheerful report was received; a Coast Watcher reported that Lieutenant Farnam was safe with him, but in poor health. Farnam returned to the base on 4 October, having been

missing for 12 days.

During the day on 22 September, General Millard F. Harmon Cactus.

visited

A jeep driver brought him down to the 67th's work area, where he

spoke for a few minutes with members of the ground crew.

It

was

a

The General was visibly moved by the spirit of the men and worried about their poor, ragged condition. He complimented them on the job they were doing. During the visit, one of the men surprisingly informal session.

said, "I'd

be happy to stay on here, General, but

my clothes are all wearing

out."

Close

air

support activity for the remainder of September was

in-

fluenced by the growing strength of the Japanese to the west and the

continuous landing of reinforcing troops by the "Tokyo Express." Their

growth in strength was fully realized when the action in the vicinity of the Matanikau by the 7th Marines and Raider Battalion met such overwhelming strength that the mission had to be withdrawn. During this episode, beginning 24 September, the 67th, along with Marine SBD dive bombers, gave significant support to the operation, its withdrawal, and its aftermath, proving that a Japanese force was assembling and preparing for a major counteroffensive.

During the period, Lieutenants Jarman and Sawyer led numerous flights, interdicting various parts of the area. On 27 September the sur-

rounded 1st Battalion of the 7th Marines, under heavy enemy fire, was fighting its way back to the beach west of Point Cruz, supported by gunfire from the USS Ballard. Lieutenants Miller, Goerke, Ferguson, Morton, and Farquharson made numerous strafing attacks in their P-400s in front of the landing area to help clear a path of retreat for the beleaguered

Marines. With the Marine SBDs, they covered the withdrawal to the beach, striking Japanese positions to ease the pressure on the evacuation.

115

Diary: Sept. 28, Sunday The Marines and Japs are engaged near Point Cruz, west of the Matanikau River. Our planes have been dive bombing and strafing in support. We had an air raid today; 18 Jap bombers came over and a lot of Zeros. Three

men were

killed

on the

field,

three in shock from

bomb

concussion, and about six wounded. Those air raids sure put terror in the soul.

Diary: Sept. 30,

Heavy

rain.

Wednesday

A B-17 came

in

with Admiral Nimitz and party.

Diary: Oct. 1, Thursday Admiral Nimitz left today. They took off in the afternoon. The B-17 couldn't get off in the morning because of the heavy mud on the runway. During his visit to Henderson Field, Adm. Nimitz awarded citations to Army, Navy, and Marine pilots. Major Smith, Major Galer, and Captain Carl of the Marine Squadrons received the Navy Cross. Eleven other pilots of the Army, Navy, and Marines received the Distinguished Flying Cross. The one Army pilot to receive it was our Lieutenant Jarman of the 67th. Some of the pilots already rotated, like Major Brannon and Captain Thompson, will probably receive citations at Tontouta. Missions to attack, bomb, and strafe the strengthening Japanese

Ground crew members of the 67th Fighter Squadron standing by a P-39/P-400 of the Cactus Flight. They are, from left to right: W.R. Williams, V.W. King, J.H. Miller, J.H. Hurford, F.J. O'Connell, D.V. Maupin,

116

F.

Gurbada, A.D. Fitzgerald, K. Markel. Sept. 1942.

forces west of the perimeter continued at a steady pace; ground crews

worked

a backbreaking schedule to keep the P-400s in commission for the

job.

The steady

traffic of

enemy destroyer

transports of the

"Tokyo Ex-

press" was frequently detected heading for Guadalcanal and attacked by

Cactus airplanes, but they continued to land troops and shell Henderson field under cover of darkness. The 11th Bombardment Group, under Colonel Laverne Saunders, out of Espiritu Santo, made valiant efforts to catch up with the "Express;" however, by the time his B-17s could fly to Guadalcanal, the "Express" would have dispersed and gone north, up patrolling

the

slot.

The Japanese Navy was still in control of the seas around the Southern Solomons.

117

V.

CHAPTER

Life

10

on the Target

Despite the temporary American successes of mid-September, there was indeed a Japanese grand strategy for recapturing Guadalcanal. Lieutenant

General Harukichi Hyakutake, his headquarters

still

Commander of the Japanese 17 Army, with had made in-depth plans for the task. The

at Rabaul,

elements of the Ichiki and Kawaguchi forces had merely been a part of the strength allocated to the mission and engaged too soon. Complacency and

poor planning had brought these two commanders to disaster at the

Ilu

and

Bloody Ridge. The buildup of Japanese strength continued uninhibited. Steady arrivals of the "Tokyo Express," west of the perimeter, were successfully landing troops and equipment on a nightly basis.

This increasing force,

now under

the local

command

of Lieutenant

General Masao Maruyama, reached a strength of over 20,000 by mid-Oc-

The

September clash with the Japanese along the Matanikau by the 7th Marines and the Raider Battalion had proved to General Vandegrift that the Japanese were there in force and growing rapidly in strength. As long as American air operations at Hendertober, and the process continued.

late

son Field continued, the Japanese could not safely bring large troop task forces in transports and cargo ships to Guadalcanal. Yet the

"Tokyo Ex-

press" delivered troops in relative safety and, over a period of time, built up a formidable force. Their only limitation, a very serious one,

was in trucks

and heavy equipment, for which large transport vessels were required.

To Field

118

the Japanese, under a rigid schedule, the recapture of Henderson was essential to the success of their offensive to eliminate the Ameri-

can beachhead. General Hyakutake had assembled the required force, lacking only some elements of the Japanese 38th Division, and they were enroute. His forces included an excellent selection of artillery and heavy weapons, but lacked large prime movers and other heavy equipment. In spite of this growing threat, Admiral Ghormley was continuing a plan to use badly needed troops and support resources to accomplish a

longstanding goal of occupying the island of Ndeni, in the Santa Cruz Islands, 335 miles east-southeast of Henderson Field, to deny it to the Japanese. Admiral Turner also favored the operation. General Vandegrift was openly against the diversion of such resources while Cactus-Ringbolt

(Guadalcanal and Tulagi) were in such a precarious plight. General Millard

Harmon, Army Commander of the South Pacific Area, regarded the affair as unsound and unnecessary. When Ghormley decided to go ahead with the Ndeni plan, General Harmon, in a letter to the Admiral F.

Ndeni

dated 6 October 1942, reviewed his reasons for scrapping the Ndeni operation as "not vital to the security of the South Pacific," the Japanese could not use

it,

and

it

was not needed by U.S. Forces

as a staging base.

Central to General Harmon's comments, he stated: "It conviction that the Jap

do so

will

in the

is

is

my

personal

capable of retaking Cactus-Ringbolt and that he

near future unless

it is

materially strengthened."

Ghormley held a conference with Admiral Turner and General Harmon on 6 October in which Harmon's views were discussed. After the meeting, Ghormley announced his intention to proceed with the Ndeni operation but agreed to Harmon's recommendation to send reinforcements to Cactus immediately. As a result, the 164th Infantry Regiment of the Americal Division, then in New Caledonia, was committed for duty at Guadalcanal.

Harmon was the most perceptive and commander on the Watchtower headquarters scene. He enjoyed

In these crucial days, General intelligent

excellent rapport with Admiral Ghormley, to whom he reported in the local

chain of

command, and had many

opportunities to present beneficial sug-

gestions and observations to the Admiral. General his

Army

Harmon

sent letters to

superiors in Washington on a regular basis, reporting progress

and conditions

in his

command. These

status reports

were frequently

General George C. Marshall,

mentioned to or seen by the Chief frequently conferred with Admiral Ernest J. King. King was well aware of opinion on both sides of the Ndeni question. In his wisdom, King replaced Ghormley as commander on 18 October sending Admiral William F. Halsey to the Pacific to review the situation by of Staff,

who

and to relieve Ghormley as overall commander of Operation Watchtower. After assuming command, Halsey directed that "the operation to occupy Ndeni be cancelled." Halsey had already adopted an approach that would provide vigorous reinforcement of ground and air forces on Guadalcanal

and beef up Naval and supply support to the operation.

It

was some time

before this vigorous policy was to actually strengthen the forces at Cactus,

but the news of

it

was heartening

to

all

of us.

119

1

Farquhar son Jarman Willi am s(Armorerj Sawyer,

Fitzgerald (Armorer F

j

e

1

st ad

Dewey Ferguson Campbe 1

J

10 11 !

2

13 14 15 16 17

Ramp Holmes B Morton J D. Goerke D. Canning L

.

.

.

Kerstetter Head t 1 er P. Miller

R. W.

M. D

.

The P-39/P-400 Hell's Bell and some of the pilots of the 347th Fighter Group, Cactus Flight. The plane is one of the original P-39/P-400 aircraft assigned to the 67th Fighter Squadron. November 1942. (Jarman)

120

General Vandegrift clung persistently to his goal of moving his perimeter boundary west, to the east bank of the Matanikau, and keeping the artillery out of range of the airfield. He believed he could accommove, while waiting for the promised reinforcement by the 164th Infantry, by placing diversionary pressure on the Japanese buildup west of

Japanese plish this

An operation to accomplish this plan was mounted during 7-9 October, using elements of the 5th, 2nd, and 7th Marines.

the Matanikau. the period

The

plan followed roughly that used in the late September affair along the Matanikau, from which the Marines had to be extricated under difficult circumstances. With main enemy forces well west of the Matanikau,

toward Kokumbona and Tassafaronga, considerably

To

more

this

new

operation went off with

success, heavily assisted by close air support.

the 67th Fighter Squadron and the Marine and

Navy air units on came a new phase of "Life on the Target." The climax of mid-September, when the Japanese attacks on Bloody Ridge and the perimeter were pushed back, was merely the preliminary bout. The Henderson

new

Field, there

threat by the Japanese buildup to the west and their support by

Japanese

"Tokyo Express" brought almost unbearable attack conditions for those stationed on the airfield. The air,

most crucial come.

naval surface forces, and the

battles for

The pressure

Henderson Field and the beachhead were yet

for the

67th to operate above

its

to

capacity as a Fighter

Squadron continued, with its associated shortages of planes and equipment relief of personnel from combat to rest at Tontouta. The 67th

and sporadic

was operating over

combat flight at At the home base in New Caledonia, the 67th busied itself with supplying pilots, ground crews, and parts for the fighter planes at Guadalcanal. It had the additional responsibility of maintaining a sort of rest camp for war-weary pilots and crewmen, a pursuit school for replacement pilots newly arrived from the a broad area of the theater, with

Guadalcanal and a fighter base at Tontouta,

United States, and an

The 67th had never

air

defense system for the island of

New Caledonia.

operated in an orthodox fashion, within the prescribed

operational duties of a fighter squadron, nor had

manned according

its

New Caledonia.

it

been equipped or

to the directed organizational tables for a fighter

squadron.

The 67th, weak from the frequent thinning of its organizational blood, was due for another complication. This was to expand fighter operations by new Fighter Group with headquarters at Tontouta, New Caledonia. On 3 October the new 347th Fighter Group was activated under the command of Major George McNeese, who had just arrived. To those watching this organizational drama unfold and who had come this far with the 67th, it seemed that Major Dale D. Brannon, with his vast on-the-scene experience, would have been the proper choice. It puzzles some members activating a

of the squadron to this day.

However, Brannon was assigned to command the new squadron, was to receive P-38 Lightning

started from scratch at Tontouta, which

121

Cheap

in the P-39/P-400s had to be set on frequency daily with a frequency meter. R.L. seen here performing this maintenance. 4 October 1 942.

radios

Ferguson

is

aircraft, after first starting

military service,

it

with P-39s. In the omnipotent wisdom of the

was probably the best

choice. Brannon's

tremendous

experience, insight, and personal integrity were again destined to produce it on a record 339th Fighter Squadron, the "Sun

a fine squadron, take the organization into combat, and start of outstanding performance as the

Setter Squadron."

122

The 347th Fighter Group had assigned to it four Fighter Squadrons, the 67th, the 68th (then stationed at Tonga), the 70th (then stationed at Fiji), and the new squadron, the 339th, made up of a cadre of about half the

move to Tontouta and rotate men to the fighter pool in the Army Cactus Flight.

veteran personnel of the 67th. All would soon

some

of their planes and

New airplanes and new pilots were arriving at Tontouta, New Caledonia. The planes were new P-39s, models D-l L, and K still P-39s, but better

—

,

than the clunkers previously assigned to operations at Cactus. As soon as the aircraft were assembled and tested, each was assigned to a pilot who finished his training in

it

and prepared to take

it

over the

now

well-estab-

lished route to Guadalcanal.

At Henderson

Field, the

67th had developed close

air

support bomb-

ing and strafing with the P-39/P-400 into a formidable frontline weapons

They continued

system.

business as usual, with the P-400s on close air

support and the P-39s flying a mixed bag of close

air

support and fighter

Navy and Marine dive bombers and torpedo bombers, or scrambling with the F4Fs in hope of making contact with the Japanese fighters and bombers. The developing situation of early October escort missions with the

only served to intensify the schedule of close air support missions covering

operations by the Marines in the vicinity of the Matanikau. Pressure from

the Japanese naval and air forces, bombing, strafing, and shelling the airfield,

effort.

grew in intensity;

flight

(a short distance to

maximum new fighter strip

operations were maintained at a

Rains kept the runway at Henderson Field and the

the east and south) saturated; takeoff and landing

were hazardous, with thick gumbo mud everywhere. On 1 October there seemed to be a break in the weather. Lieutenants Sawyer, Morton, Jarman, Farquharson, and Miller, carrying 100 pound bombs, hit Japanese occupied areas to the west of the perimeter, bombing conditions

and strafing any enemy object they could find.

A newly constructed building

by strafing gunfire; it was a store of volatile material. There was return gunfire; on returning to the field, Lieutenant Farquharson found his electrical system was partially out. He in

the vicinity of Visale was set on

was

fire

able to get the electrically operated landing gear

down by cranking it

As the flight came in to land, Farquharson, making a no-flap approach, decided to land as short as possible since without flaps it was a "hot" approach and he needed all the landing roll he could get. He touched down a few feet short of the steel matting; the muddy condition of the ground tore off the landing gear. The plane bellied in, a perfect wheels-off touchdown, skidding along the matting and turning as it skidded until the plane was facing the other direction as it came to a stop. Meanwhile, Farquharson cut the switches, into the

down

position, but could not get the flaps to operate.

kicked off the right door, stepped out onto the wing, and ran from the plane before it came to a full stop. Farquharson was uninjured, and the three planes

still

in

the landing pattern landed at the fighter

strip.

"Washing Machine Charlie" was again overhead, but gave the tired

men

in

That

little

night,

trouble to

the beachhead.

123

A

wrecked P-39/P-400 was set up at the shelter as a ground station. It was on the air combat. R.L. Ferguson (standing), E. Vaughn, W. H. Schneider R.W. Kerstetter (standing). October 1942.

radio stripped from a

used

regularly to listen in

(seated),

Each day the

Jagstaffel squeezed in as

New

many bombing and

strafing

from Tontouta. Everyone talked about the new P-39s being assembled back there and hoped that October's fighter activity for the 67th would improve when the new planes arrived. Japanese attacks on the field were heavy and persistent, but "Keep 'em flying" was the war cry; ground crews were continually workmissions as daylight would allow.

ing to the point of exhaustion to have as

primitive conditions would allow.

124

pilots arrived

many planes ready each day as the

The F4Fs continued fighters;

to score big against the Japanese bombers and everyone was conscious of the steady buildup of enemy forces to

the west. Daily, the patrolling

SBD

dive

bombers sighted Japanese

enroute to Guadalcanal to land troops and shell the

airfield.

ships

The SBDs and

TBF

torpedo bombers went out to attack them, sometimes knocking one or two. Still they came.

off

For the ground crews of the 67th living on the target, the work load and environment were wearing and the schedule left no time for real rest. Working on aircraft to keep them flying by daylight, and often volunteering

augment the Marines to man a forward listening post at night when a Japanese breakthrough became imminent, there were not enough of them for this kind of combat maintenance. Their tools were limited and there were few new spare parts. Parts taken from a wreck involved double retrieving the part from the wreck and then installing it on an work out-of-commision plane. The crews were skilled in the "boneyard" approach to spare parts supply; it had been their original method in the early days at Ton tout a, and here it was sometimes their only hope to get another to

—

airplane flying.

When

watching a taxiing

aircraft

on the move around the

bomb-cratered field, they knew when a wing or nose took a sudden dip that a main gear or a nose wheel had dropped into a aircraft

became the

first

bomb

crater.

One such

source of supply at Cactus,

The ugly Japanese hangar at the west end of the field continued to be a target for the Japanese and home plate for the 67th Fighter Squadron. Ugly but

practical, constructed of

heavy poles with

steel sheets laid over

October 1 942, while on a dive bombing and strafing sortie, ground fire knocked out the system of Lt. A.B. Farquharson's plane. Complications led to landing gear failure and he skidded in on a belly landing.

On

1

electrical

125

A member of the SeaBee Battalion at Henderson Field. Trucks were kept loaded with rode back and forth filling in bomb craters in the runway to keep Henderson Field

dirt

fill

in

September 1942.

the top as a roof,

it

was obviously

and assembled on the spot

—

prefabricated, transported to the island

a breezy, open-air structure built like a pole

barn on an American farm. Since arriving at Henderson Field with 14 P-400s, the 67th established

broad space

in front of

its

work and

flight line

in

August

area in the

the hangar. Marine air units occupied the other

three hangars, which after repeated damage by bombing, shelling, and fire, had to be torn down. Living on the target required many qualities, among them a sense of

humor. Most people

126

in

the unit were able to preserve theirs even under the

and they

operation.

most

stressful conditions. Sitting out the first

target

bombing

raid right

not what one expects; the reality of it is a surprise.

is

on the

Men sitting in a

shelter, sweating out the "whump, whump, whump" of bombs walking toward them, retained a sense of humor or they didn't last. They made such

remarks

as,

"Here comes death and destruction!" and "Do you think they

are trying to

kill

us?"

Beyond the work area, at the west end of the clearing, along the edge of the trees, was a latrine box, a two-holer. It had no class, but a great view. Early one morning during the first couple of weeks at Cactus, a mechanic wearing an Air Corps Technical Supply work hat was sitting on the latrine. The Japanese soldiers wore a cap with a baseball-type peak similar to the Tech Supply hat. Two young Marines were passing by and saw this fellow sitting

on the

latrine enjoying the view.

Never having seen

The Marines

this Jap.

a

Tech Supply hat before, they decided to capture him as they approached in deadly earnest.

yelled at

The mechanic jumped up and danced around, holding his pants at half mast, threw his cap on the ground, and issued some obscenities that were sure to convince the two Marines he was an American. The disturbance brought other members of the 67th, who helped convince them. The men's shoes and clothing were ragged from working in the that There were serious questions spoken aloud, such as: "Where in hell is our Navy? When are we going to see some real help? Why

stinking climate.

We need However, there were also the occasional humorous events. Kenneth Markel, an armament specialist, often acted like a comic American politician, using his best Senator Clagghorn voice. One of the other men would approach Markel as if to interview him and the doesn't our

Navy get

in

here and stop that shelling by the Japs?

supplies and reinforcements!"

conversation would begin, "Senator, do you have something to say about sending help to our men on Guadalcanal?" "Why, Suh, Ah say, you bet Ah have somethin' to say. There's nothin' too good for our men on Guadalcanal. So, that's what we shall send them, nothin'."

"But, Senator, don't you have something in mind to be done for our fighting

men on

Guadalcanal?"

the men on Guadalcanal." "Why, Suh, Ah say, f These events were resentful and ironic but humorous at the time and

would often go on for a

half

hour before Markel ran out of wisecracking

repartee.

The armament men worked under backbreaking rapid pace.

Everyone pitched

in

labor, at a steady

to help them. Short messages were often

scratched on the bombs with a piece of chalk as a humorous tension release. The messages were neat little one-liners: Now Hear This; If No Bang,

Twist Rear Fuse; Our Best to Tojo;

This'll Kill

You;

If

No Bang,

Wait, and

so forth.

Machine guns had

to be pulled out and cleaned.

When the guns began

127

P-39/P-400 number 1 2 got a flat tire while taxiing and became a victim of Japanese Zeros strafing the It was left in position as a decoy and often drew the fire of strafing Zeros. September 1 942.

airfield.

to

jam

at altitude,

Armament

Chief Felix "Gunner" Gurbada discovered

He stopped using oil. The guns were removed almost every day and every moving part was wiped clean. Condensation and dampness increased the number of cleanings per machine gun far beyond normal, further increasing the workload for the limited number of armament specialists, but the guns worked. It was necessary to set the cheap radios in the P-400s with a frequency meter every day to assure that the pilots could communicate during combat missions. As it was on many Pacific Islands, the rat population on Guadalcanal was high. Often during an air raid they could be seen scurrying to hide when the men rushed into a shelter. The rats were very bold, staying in the shelter with the occupants. On one occasion, when about five men were in a shelter, one of them noticed a rat hiding near a beam supporting the roof. that the

oil

got cold and hardened.

He pulled out his .45 and fired a shot at the rat. The sound inside the foxhole was deafening.

"Gimme

that

damn gun!"

"There's a rat

in

"There's always rats too.

said

one of the men as he grabbed

it

away.

here!" said the owner of the gun. in here!

Leave the

Put the damn gun away, now that we're

SOB alone; all

deaf. If

he's gotta' hide,

you ever

pull that

I'll make you a new holster for it!" Around the area near the hangar some odd-shaped barrels were found. They were about 2V2 feet high, with a little metal box cleverly inserted through the wood at the low end of the oval-shaped barrel. They

stunt again,

turned out to be Japanese

was

field

bathtubs and the metal box cut into the end

a charcoal stove for heating the water in the tub. These portable

bathtubs allowed the Japanese to bathe while the water was being heated,

128

enjoying the high temperature bath that was such a pleasure for them in their homeland. Since conditions made it impossible to put the tubs to test,

they were used as trashcans while the River

— when they could

men of the 67th bathed in the Lunga

find time.

Diary: Oct. 3, Saturday Another raid last night, but he didn't drop bombs on the field. I think Charlie is just trying to keep us awake. We had an air raid about 1300; the bombers turned back;

we could see them in and out of broken clouds was not good enough for a bomb run. We

in the overcast but visibility

were

on our resurrection radio but couldn't figure out the we heard over the radio that three Zeros were

listening

situation.

coming

in

Later today

from the north to strafe the

field.

We

looked and could see

them come in and turn up the field heading west, making a strafing run. They were not lined up with our position, so we stood there and watched them as they headed up the field to strafe the old burned-out decoys. silver planes with the red ball on the fuselage, strafing, What a sight flashing past our position. Ground fire from nearby .50-caliber machine guns got all of them. I saw two of them showing smoke and we could see the smoke from their crash just west of us. Lt. Miller and I and a couple of others went over to the crash site. A pilot or what was left of him could be seen among the burning wreckage all torn up and burned. I took

—

several pictures of the crash scene.

On 4 October, increasing enemy activity was evident as the Jagstaffel carried attacks into every area west of the perimeter.

landing craft,

new

They were

hitting

buildings that continually appeared near the villages,

ammunition stores, and Japanese personnel wherever they were detected. Lieutenant R.E. Kaiser finally arrived on 6 October from his stopover at Espiritu Santo with engine trouble. On that day Major Hubbard also arrived

crewmen aboard a C-47. By 7 October the Marine task force, which was to attempt to move the

with some additional ground

west boundary of the perimeter to the east bank of the Matanikau, began to take up positions along the approaches and the east bank of the river. Contact with the enemy on the coast road was light; the enemy withdrew Matanikau as the Marines approached, except for the west bank near the mouth of the river;

across the

mouth

about 150

who remained on

of the

these were surrounded while attempting to hold the position as their forward point on the east bank. The Raiders and the 5th Marines gained a

bridgehead on the west bank as part of the encirclement; fighting with the of pocketed Japanese continued until they were wiped out. Although torrential rain slowed the operation, the 7th Marines and

company

the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Marines forced a crossing up-river, deployed along the ridges with the river on their right, and attacked north toward the coast at the east base of Point Cruz. Fighting their way across rugged terrain and occasionally trapping large elements of Japanese infantry in ravines, they called for artillery and close air support strikes.

The

ravines

129

were bombed and

strafed on direction from the Marine ground troops as they continued to advance through these areas, discovering large numbers

The Marines were bombardment. Unfortunately, the objective of establishing a forward reconnissance base west of the perimeter had to be abandoned and the task group, after some mopping up operations, returned in a few days to the perimeter. Warning had been received from the Coast Watchers that a strong attack on the beachhead and perimeter was expected. Concentrations of ships at Rabaul indicated the attack would be well-supported, perhaps as an assault landing directly at the beachhead. A document captured during the Matanikau operation revealed the presence of Japanese troops to the east and west of the Matanikau River. Some of these had been the force just struck and annihilated by the Marines. The Japanese had been at the point of launching a similar offensive against the Marine lines. The objective of their offensive plan was to force the movement of a line east of the river to of Japanese killed

by close

air

support bombardment.

lavish in their praise of the support

bring the airfield under direct artillery

The

effort

was

to be the

initial

fire.

move

of a larger Japanese offensive to

retake the beachhead. During the operation, the entire area west of the perimeter, especially in the vicinity of action on the Matanikau, was cov-

ered by the 67th like a blanket. Patrolling P-400s spotted breakfast fires or other signs of

enemy presence and strafed the areas. Everything that hit. The effort gave maximum possible coverage on

looked suspicious was

the scene of the fighting and adjacent areas.

A detail note in the Squadron

one of the breakfast fire sightings, records: "Jarman saw a Jap crawling on his hands and knees dressed only in his underwear." Observation was really close, and an attack was placed on after-action report, referring to

anything that moved.

Diary: Oct. 7,

Bombing

Wednesday

raids

have been lighter

in

the past few days. B-17s are

working through here and giving them a taste

at their bases north of us.

Some men came in from Tontouta last night. Several of our men took the plane back, including Mike Zavoski. The Squadron has been supporting the formation of a new Fighter Group back at Tontouta. I guess I received a promotion while on vacation to this beautiful tropical island. I'll

hear the details about

it

later,

I

suppose.

No one wears rank here;

it

just helps the Jap snipers in their selection process.

On 8 October, 1 1 pilots in new P-39s arrived; eight of the pilots had been transferred from the 70th Fighter Squadron, now a part of the new 347th Fighter Group. It was planned that the new P-39s would work with the F4F fighters from the fighter strip, and the P-400s would work out of the main base in the close air support role. This proved impossible. The close air support role, with the heavy firepower and bombing capability, had become so important to General Vandegrift that the P-39s had to be

130

much of the time. They ended up doing everything: flying escort for SBD dive bombers, flying with the F4Fs in fighter actions, and in the close air support role of the Jagstaffel. They were not long in discovering that the new P-39s still would not quite reach the altitude diverted to this action

necessary to meet the Japanese bombers. This was no help morale of the 67th Fighter Squadron.

Diary: Oct. 8, Thursday Eleven new P-39s came better than what

we

at all to the

They are still P-39s but a lot They are really nice new them which is a help.

in last night.

started with, the P-400.

new type radio in There will not be much doing today; it's raining cats and dogs. This

planes.

They have

a

is loaded with Jap souvenirs, collected by the Marines on the front and traded for anything they need and can get. Money is no good here; you have to trade something of local value. If one is not out there to

place

lines

shoot the Jap at close range and take his property as souvenirs, then you pick them up by trade. I have no interest in their stuff. I hear that one way to get souvenirs is to see a friend off who is leaving for some reason, usually an injury. At that time among the lucky passengers there are always a few loaded down with souvenirs they have traded. At departure time, the pilot will usually say to these people, "I'm carrying a heavy

—

you or your damn souvenirs? I'm not taking man will just dump his stuff on the ground and get the plane, leaving it for anyone who wants it. Lt. Danny Miller jokes about it; he's not a collector either. He says

load, so

who

is

going

both." With that, the into

by many of the Japanese soldiers were inscribed with poems and good and friends when they left home for service in the war. October 1942.

Japanese

flags carried

wishes of

their family

131

he overheard a Jap prisoner being interrogated say, 'The Japanese fight for the Emperor and the Rising Sun. The Italians fight for Fascism and Mussolini. The Germans fight for Hitler and the Party. The British fight

King and Country, but the Americans fight for Souvenirs and the Hell could trade a commando knife that I have for enough stuff to equip a Jap squad. I'll just keep my knife. Typical of the problems of maximum effort operations in the rainy muddy environment were the days of 9- 12 October. On the morning of the 9th the Squadron was supporting ground operations near the Matanikau River. P-400s bombed and strafed the area around Kokumbona from for

Of

It." I

0545

On

to 0700.

this mission,

Lieutenants Sawyer, Holmes, Kerstetter,

Patterson, Morton, and Kaiser were scheduled for the

Sawyer broke saturated

off a

airfield.

flight.

Lieutenant

nosewheel when he taxied into a muddy hole on the

Lieutenant Holmes got two

flat tires

tenant Kaiser had a rough engine and could not get

off.

while taxiing. Lieu-

The others dropped

bombs and area-strafed in front of the Marines. The second close air support mission for the P-400s was

for three

planes scheduled for 0845. Major Hubbard and Lieutenants Kaiser and

Stern taxied out for takeoff. Lieutenant Kaiser's plane

built

up heavy

mud

under the wheels, dragging the plane to a stop; he shut down rather than put undue strain on the landing gear.

The others

got

strafed the frontline area, and returned to the field

—

off, still

bombed and muddy, but

improving under a hot sun at 0945. The aircraft were refueled and rearmed

and Lieutenants Sawyer, Kaiser, Miller, and Holmes flew another mission

bombs and strafing an area from the Matanikau to Kokumbona. The enemy could not be seen. The attacks were executed by

at 1100, dropping

signal panels set out

by the Marines

at the front

and by ground-to-air radio

direction.

The

flight

returned at 1200 with an

dispersed the aircraft on the

north without striking the

air raid alert flag flying

and

The attacking bomber force returned The P-400s were readied for another

field.

field.

Between 1410 and 1500 Major Hubbard and Lieutenants Canning and Ramp bombed and strafed west of Point Cruz. Marine ground troops continued to tell the P-400 pilots, again attacking an unseen enemy on the ground, of the tremendous effect these attacks were having on the opposmission.

ing Japanese forces.

The

There was a change of mission assignment for the P-39s on 9 October. mission, seven P-39s, took off from Henderson Field at 0545

—

first

Captains Mitchell and Sharpsteen and Lieutenants Farron, Purnell, Jacobson, Gillon, and Shaw.

The P-39s flew as escort fighters for nine SBDs led

by Lieutenant Commander John Eldridge of VS-71. The mission was to search for Japanese ships that had been attacked by SBDs the night before. Lieutenant Jacobson returned after 45 minutes with a faulty belly tank. The Japanese ships, five destroyers and a cruiser, were sighted 150 miles from Cactus in the

New Georgia channel. The cruiser was smoking

and the destroyers were screening as the SBDs began their attack, scoring

132

several hits on the ships.

and

The task group was attacked by Japanese aircraft,

which were intercepted by the P-39s. Captain Mitchell dived in on a Japanese floatplane from behind and above, hitting the aircraft with his 37mm cannon and blowing it to pieces. His guns five float biplanes

five Zeros,

jammed, causing him to miss several subsequent opportunities. He thought the guns jammed excessively because of their newness. Lieutenants

Shaw and

Gillon also had trouble with jammed guns. Captain Sharpsteen got a shot at a Japanese plane while passing in a dive. He pulled up and met another in a head-on attack. All his guns jammed. He

was

many times

two planes approached head-on. Flying glass him about the face and hands. Lieutenant Purnell stayed on the tail of one Japanese plane, firing his .50-caliber and 20mm guns until pieces were flying off the plane. It went hit

as the

from

a shot through the windshield cut

down

in a spin as Purnell's

guns jammed and he had to leave the fight. P-39 missions of eight planes were flown during the day in close air support of Marine ground troops. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Dinn, Purnell, Farron, Shaw, Dews, Jacobson, Gillon, Banfield, and Stern bombed and strafed the Morovovo district using demolition and incendiary bombs, followed up by strafing. The attacks were coordinated with Marine forward observers. Light antiaircraft fire was encountered, and all planes returned safely to Henderson Field.

Two

On

additional

11

October, the P-400s flew ground attack missions and the P-39s

scrambled with the F4Fs at "Tojo Time." Oxygen

failure

prevented the

P-39s from climbing above 19,000 feet. They could only observe the action. The new P-39s would not get to the required 27,000 feet even when the pilot had oxygen and could spend 30 to 45 minutes attempting to climb to that altitude. The enemy attack force was 16 Zeros followed by

two

flights of

18 and 16 two-engine bombers. The bombs were released field. Four Zeros and seven bombers were shot

before they reached the

down. One bomber, taking evasive action to get out of the fight, came down to a lower altitude and was shot down by Captain Sharpsteen; the others were all F4F kills. Lieutenant Howard Stern of the 67th failed to return

from the flight. Events leading up to the promised arrival of the 164th Infantry began with their embarkation at Noumea, New Caledonia, on 8 October. With the Naval task that covered the flanks of their convoy, Admiral Norman Scott began a mission to disrupt enemy supply and reinforcement efforts from the Northern Solomons and Rabaul.

San Francisco and Salt Lake with the destroyers BuBoise, and Helena City, and the light cruisers This was one of three McCalla. chanan, Duncan, Farenholt, Laffey, and U.S. task forces now in the lower Solomons. Another was a carrier group Scott's

was

a force of heavy cruisers

formed around the Hornet, in position west of Guadalcanal, and another formed around the battleship Washington. At 1345 on 11 October, Scott's force was cruising off Rennel Island when B-17s from Espiritu Santo and SBDs, searching from Guadalcanal,

133

reported

enemy naval forces on their way down the slot. At 1810 a second enemy 10 miles distant. Scott set course for a position off

report placed the

Cape Esperance, the western

tip of

Guadalcanal, setting his plans to inter-

cept about midnight.

By 2200 the two forces were converging on the Sealark Channel,

the

waters along the north coast of Guadalcanal. Scott's cruisers launched

from the Salt Lake City crashed

their floatplanes for local search; a plane

and burned

in

the water

some

distance from the ship.

The glare of the fire

was thought by the Japanese to be a signal fire from the shore; they answered with searchlights. Searchplanes spotted the Japanese and radar contact was made at about the same time at a distance of 18,000 yards. Moments later, Scott's force found themselves in a most advantageous position, crossing the "T" of an oncoming enemy line of battle. They opened fire at will as the guns of his force bore on the approaching enemy column. In the battle that followed, the destroyer Duncan was lost; there was light damage to the Farenholt and the Salt Lake City. For the Japanese the losses were severe; two cruisers were sunk and heavy damage was inflicted on another. Two others were sunk the next day by planes from Henderson Field, a mixed force of SBD, TBF, and P-39 aircraft. During the night battle, the men on Henderson Field could hear the noise of naval gunfire and see the rosy reflection of exploding shells and

burning ships on the horizon. This battle, which was fought

off

Cape

Esperance, not only failed to stop the "Tokyo Express," but had hardly any effect

on the regular nightly deliveries of Japanese troops and supplies to

Guadalcanal.

On 12 October

the P-400s of the 67th Fighter Squadron flew the

regular ground support attack missions, striking the growing enemy forces

west of the perimeter and strafed landing boats that had just appeared between Tassafaronga and Kokumbona. The P-39s flew cover for SBD dive

bombers and

TBF

torpedo bombers on several missions to attack

Japanese ships heading north

off

Cape Esperance from the

previous night. After several missions one ship was victim of a torpedo from a

effort flying

runway wet and muddy; hazardous.

dead

TBF. The other was sunk due

attacks by the mixed force of

Maximum

left

SBDs and

battle of the in

the water,

to repeated

P-39s.

and heavy rain

in early

October had made the

takeoff and landing conditions

were extremely

On 12 October the conditions were at their worst as the heavy

mission schedule of the day against the retreating Japanese ships took toll

on the wet runway. Lieutenant

of the day, crashed

on

Gillon, taking off

takeoff. His accident

accident involving Lieutenant V.L. Head.

on

was very

The

his

its

second mission

similar to a previous

plane, covered by a bath of

mud forced up through the matting, stalled as he attempted to pull it off the off the left side of the runway not far from the place where Lieutenant Heads's plane had come to a stop. The plane landed smoking and upside down. Lieutenant Gillon was immediately extracted from the wreckage by some nearby Marines and taken to the hospital. He

ground and tumbled

134

Taken minutes after the crash of a P-39/P-400 piloted by Lieutenant Gillon. On his second mission of the day on 1 2 October, mud on the Henderson Field runway splashed and covered the wings and the plane stalled and crashed similar to the accident of Lt. V.L. Head. Gillon was pulled from the wreckage by some nearby Marines. He was burned but recovered and returned to duty. r

was burned, but survived and was evacuated the next day. The Marines who pulled Gillon from the wreckage worked very fast and in danger of being consumed with Gillon if the smoking plane had exploded. It did not, and the fire was extinguished immediately after the rescue. Diary: Oct. 10, Saturday

Our planes are doing just and

this

fine.

They went

out yesterday morning

morning, escorting SBDs. They got a few Zeros.

We had an air

bombers turned back over Tulagi. I am installing new planes and I am not sure if we will get the equipment for

raid yesterday but the

IFF all

in

the

planes.

The new pilots

are good and fresh and anxious to get up there and one plane in the scrap this morning and they have just gone out again escorting dive bombers that are attacking Jap ships scrap.

We

lost

enroute here.

The wing insignia on our planes is a blue circle with a white star in it circle in the middle of the white star, but no more. Some time

and a red

ago the Marine pilots told us that anything with a red ball gets shot at; it even happened in one air engagement. Now the red circle is painted out and the star

is all

white.

135

CHAPTER

11

"Goodbye and Good Luck"

Following the successful operation by the Marines along the Matanikau,

7-9

enemy temporarily abandoned

October, the

territory along the

west bank.

his idea of holding the

All signs indicated that

center for offensive preparations to the area of

he had shifted his

Kokumbona and

further

west. During the battle off Cape Esperance on the night of 11 October,

Japanese reinforcements were successfully landed by ships of the "Tokyo

Express" near Tassafaronga while the battle was in progress. In addition to troops, the ships carried four artillery

150mm howitzers,

along with

some

lighter

and antiaircraft weapons.

The aftermath of the

battle brought the

heavy combat schedule of 12

October and the missions to sink the Japanese ships leaving the battle area. The Japanese losses in the battle of Cape Esperance had little effect on their plans;

the

'Tokyo Express" continued

to operate with

little

interference.

On 13 October

the mixed aircraft of General Geiger's Cactus Air

Force numbered 90 operational planes; SBDs, F4Fs, P-400s, P-39s, with occasionally a few TBFs. These were ready as a result of superhuman effort on the part of everyone involved.

Two months rations,

of continuous

and severe combat conditions, reduced

and no rest brought serious effects on health and moral by another

determined enemy, malaria. Of two

—

men

sick with malaria,

one might

become a patient and the other with perhaps a better physical condition, better morale, or a more tenacious attitude would remain on duty until

136

—

carried

away

delirious

from

its effects.

malaria cannot possibly perceive what

unconsciousness, or

its

A person who has not experienced it is

like to shiver into

debilitating effects. It

began to take

exhausted

its toll

on the

defenders of Guadalcanal.

The first reinforcements of Army troops, the 164th Infantry, arrived on 13 October aboard the McCawley and Zeilin. The ships were off Lunga Point at 0547 and immediately commenced unloading. The 164th Infantry, fully

equipped and supplied, 3200 tons of

The

area.

1st Raider Battalion

it, was put ashore in the landing was embarked for a well-earned rest and the

ships departed, clearing the Sealark Channel before nightfall, enroute to

New

Caledonia. Arrival of the 164th Infantry

made it

possible for General Vandegrift

to put in place his plan for strengthening the perimeter. This he did by

manning adjoining sectors in a complete perimeter defense that included the east bank of the Matanikau in the western boundary. Flight operations on 13 October began routinely in good flying weather. At 0530 Major Hubbard and Lieutenants Holmes, Patterson, and Sawyer, on dawn patrol, bombed and strafed landing boats and Japaneseoccupied villages. The early morning search missions by SBDs saw only two large oil slicks, floating gear, and life rafts south of Rendova, where attacks had been made the day before on Japanese ships. At "Tojo Time," 1130, 42 F4Fs, seven P-39s, and six P-400s scrambled. The Japanese attack force was a formation of 24 bombers escorted by 15 Zeros. The bombs did slight damage to the field, setting a small store of gasoline on fire. The P-400s climbed to 12,000 feet; the P-39s eventually got up to 27,000 where they again helplessly watched the neat formations all show above them. That P-39 Airacobra just would not get up there and no go. The F4Fs shot down a Zero. Lieutenant W.B. Freman, USMC, VMF-121, shot down a bomber; his own plane was so badly shot up that he went down in the water off the beach. He was later rescued uninjured. The planes were on the ground being refueled as the black flag went up again. Twelve F4Fs of VMF-121 had taken off on first warning; the others were caught on the ground in a refueling operation as the bombers hit the field, almost unopposed. There was some damage to aircraft on the ground and some casualties among the 164th Infantry, who were at the

—

height of disembarking the regiment at the unloading beach and arranging to deploy their units and equipment. Of the 15

bombers and 10 Zeros

the beachhead, one Zero was shot

came over to bomb USMC, VMF-121.

Foss,

that

down by Captain Joe

Antiaircraft guns put up heavy fire during the raid

and accounted for one bomber.

150mm guns that the Japanese At first the shells were airfield. the on fire to began had brought ashore field and the runway. the of end west short, but soon they were hitting the Their fire was at irregular intervals and was thought to be one gun or heavy For the

mortar.

The

special treat of the day, the

irritating schedule,

averaging about three to four rounds per

hour, caused nerve-shattering anticipation; the gun

was nicknamed

"Pistol

137

crewmen readied the old P-400s for a mission to seek out and silence "Pistol Pete" before he could damage the runway. The mission was suddenly called off because aviation gas was running short. There was still plenty of Japanese gas left, but it was good only in motor vehicles. The 100-octane aviation gas was very low and there was Pete." Pilots and

concern because resupply appeared to be impossible at the time. the SeaBee Battalion kept trucks loaded with steel matting.

They raced back and

fill

dirt

Men

of

and precut pieces of

forth after a hit by "Pistol Pete"

repairing the runway, just barely keeping the field in operation.

For "Pistol Pete," firing from positions near Kokumbona, the airfield seemed to be at extreme range. He was easily reaching Kukum Beach, making it untenable, and doing some real damage to the extreme west end of the runway, but was most effective as a source of harassment. Later, Marine artillery, poorly equipped for counter battery detection, moved to counter "Pistol Pete" without success. Later attempts to dive

bomb

the

gun were no better because the exact location of the gun was unknown. In fact, "Pistol Pete," thought at the time to be one gun, was in reality several guns, dispersed and firing at irregular intervals. At about 2300 on 13 October a Japanese naval task force moved unopposed into the Sealark Channel. It included two battleships (Haruna and Kongo), eight cruisers, and eight destroyers. A scout floatplane was launched from a cruiser and proceeded to a position just west of the Henderson Field runway. The night was pitch black and the aircraft, thought to be just another "Washing Machine Charlie," could be heard as it approached just west of the field. The pilot cut his engine in a deafening silence, gliding toward the airfield. Suddenly a bright red flare blossomed and descended slowly over the west end of the runway, followed by a green flare over the east end. The night visitor then put full power to his engine, swung around, and crossed the center of the runway, marking it with a white flare as he headed west at full power, hastening away from the vicinity of the field.

In a

moment the first salvo of naval shelling exploded with devastating

ferocity and overhead the scoutplane could again be heard spotting fire for

the bombardment. their foxholes and

The ground shook with every salvo as men waited in bomb shelters. Large fragments of exploding shells

could be heard whirring or screaming as they flew and struck objects on the field,

around the hangar, or cut branches

The observation

off trees at

the edge of the

field.

plane was guiding the pattern shelling and dropping occa-

sional flares as a guide to shift fire.

For hours the shells raked the area, salvo after salvo,

shifting

now and

then to pattern-shell the entire beachhead area and every corner of the airfield.

tion

Star shells

dumps were

lit

up the night sky

burning; airplanes

noonday. Gasoline and ammuniwere wrecked and burned; men

like

cringed in their shelters, both cursing and praying, as helplessly they

absorbed the punishment.

138

On through the night and into the early morning

hours the shelling continued at a high pitch of sustained the big

thought to be 16-inch

stuff,

stop coming

fire.

in;

Only once did

for a short while

gun tubes. Then the big stuff roared accompanying the smaller shells which had not ceased at all.

the Japanese again,

Navy cooled

shells,

its

big

in

Once, a star shell burst directly over a bomb shelter. It seemed to light up even the inside of the shelter as members of the 67th looked out on the devastation. They knew the Japanese would now adjust fire on the location of the star shell and the next salvo would be close and "beat hell out of us."

The next salvos were indeed close and killed five Marine dive bomber pilots in a nearby bomb shelter. The dead were Major G.A. Bell, Captain E.F. Miller, Captain R.A. Abbott,

2nd Lieutenant H.F. Chaney Jr., and Lieuten-

VMSB-141. With them were Navy Lieutenant W.P. Kephart, of VS-7 1 and four enlisted crewmen of MAG-23, all wiped out by ant Haley,

of

all

,

There was nothing to do but sit in the and flashes of the bombardment. Many a stalwart soul in the shelters joked and carried on a continuous comic banter a direct salvo of high-explosive shells.

shelter and

watch the

flares

to help ease the pressure of the situation; others at times turned into

gibbering idiots.

The

At 0400 the

noise and concussion were shocking.

shelling stopped,

and the warships headed north out of

the Sealark Channel. Then, after a hardly noticeable interval of quiet, three

Japanese bombers crossed the field to lay a stick of bombs right through the work and hangar areas at the southwest end of the runway. They were followed by three more, selecting another section of the

three more, continuing the ritual until just before

first light

field,

and then

on the morning

The bombardment had covered the arrival of the "Tokyo a night's work of landing troops and equipment near

of 14 October.

Express"

in

Tassafaronga.

The foxholes.

quiet of first light brought everyone out of their shelters and

The damage they surveyed was

were large jagged

shell

ground; these could have cut a limb

bombardment, one

a disheartening sight.

There

shells lying about

on the

fragments from 14-inch

shell

off a tree

fragment ricocheted

off

or a man. During the

the hangar, flew into a

blow on the leg, and fell to the muddy his hand on the hot fragment as he burning dark, the floor. He reached in picked it up, fumbled it from hand to hand, wrapping it in his shirt. Today the fragment, molded in plastic, is a paperweight on the desk of a Maryland shelter, struck an occupant a sharp

businessman.

The

effects of the shelling left the

men badly shaken.

All

had acoustic

trauma, making it necessary to speak loudly to each other for days because of the ringing in their ears. Mostly they were tired and hungry. There was no chow because the cooks were also in the foxholes all night and some of the kitchens were torn up by shell fragments. Tents and personal belongings were torn to shreds; the airfield was burned to a shambles.

General Geiger 's Cactus Air Force had been dealt a nearly fatal blow,

and the defenses of Henderson Field were almost shattered. Fifty-seven

139

aircraft

had

hit

had been destroyed or damaged and, here and there where shells the runway, holes were decorated around the edges by jagged

pieces of steel matting bent straight up fronrthe explosions.

Without sleep or breakfast the crews threw themselves into the job of

damaged

repairing the

beginning with those damaged least, in

aircraft,

order to increase operational numbers as soon as possible for what was to

To search out the "Tokyo Express," four SBDs The TBFs were damaged beyond repair. The 67th had been

be another brutal day.

were

readied.

fortunate, for miraculously, parked amid

all

of the flying shell fragments,

damage and the P-400s escaped clean. Many of the F4Fs were damaged; repair work on them proceeded at a feverish pace, with admirable cooperation between the Marine and 67th only two P-39s sustained minor

ground crews.

By "Tojo Time," between aircraft

the

F4Fs and the

planes of the 67th, 24

scrambled at 1145 to meet 25 enemy bombers in time,

Bomb damage

the runway,

to the airfield

was

light;

in

two

flights of

16

and no contact was made.

and nine, but they did not reach altitude

now

repaired by the

SeaBees, was not damaged.

morning patrol had discovered new gun positions, both antiaircraft and field artillery, on the beach west of the perimeter. The P-400s had gone out to look for "Pistol Pete;" the gun had already started

The

early

day of lobbing in occasional shells. They also searched for other targets, Major Hubbard and Lieutenants Sawyer, Dewey, and Morton bombed and strafed landing boats and Japanese troops along the beach, setting fire to gasoline and destroyed supplies. The search for "that damn gun" was its

without success.

The mission was repeated by Lieutenants Dewey, Kaiser,

Kerstetter, Goerke, and Holmes.

During the day on 13 October, Colonel Saunders' B-17s returned to Henderson Field after bombing over Buka and Tonolei. In the night of shelling, two of the B-17s were so damaged that they were abandoned. In the midst of the early morning devastation and confusion, Saunders led out five of the six remaining B-17s. The bomber crews had loaded up to "get the hell out of Cactus" and back to Espiritu Santo. With 2000 feet of usable runway, the bombers took off several of them on three engines in about 1800 feet of runway, drawing 70 inches of manifold pressure. They

—

—

cleared the

field

without "blowing a jug" (cylinder).

In the afternoon, a remaining B-17, patched

up enough to fly, left Cactus on three engines; there were two B-17s too damaged to make it. Later, when the Japanese offensive seemed close to retaking Henderson Field, a message was received from General Harmon's headquarters directing the removal of the Norden bombsights from the two derelict B-17s. Several of us inspected the planes, removed the bombsights, detonated the

IFF (an electronic box

for identifying friendly aircraft), and

removed other

electronic items for destruction to prevent capture by the Japanese, should

they succeed

in

retaking the

airfield.

In the afternoon of 14 October the air raid alert

140

was

raised. Fifteen

Japanese bombers and 10 Zeros were intercepted over the airfield. Nine bombers and three Zeros were shot down. The attack on the bombers during their bomb run may have prevented damage to the airfield. It is

more

bombers were aiming for the unloading area of the beach and the 164th Infantry. During the shelling the night before, the 164th Infantry, newly arrived and under fire for the first time, was hit hard, likely the

moving ashore. The bombing raid placed a few bombs among the men who were just about ready to move out of that area lacking time to dig in after

to take up their assigned positions to hold a lengthy stretch of the perimeter defenses.

As the day wore on, everyone was punchy from lack of sleep; they managed to get a little cold chow from the field kitchens and continued to fly and work on aircraft. They were concerned about aircraft repair, food, in that order. The known presence of Japanese reinforcements and rest

—

(indicated by the previous night's shelling) and that a major offensive to

retake the beachhead could soon begin seemed to be of secondary concern.

Missions were continually flown to strike the Japanese troops and supplies, and to search for "Pistol Pete." The planes took off at random whenever the pilots could get to their planes. Often, as a shell from "that damn gun" hit, a pilot crouched in a foxhole with parachute buckled on would run to his plane, start the engine, taxi out, and take off, hoping to get off before the next round hit the field. When there was no source of loud

noise nearby, the muzzle blast of the Japanese howitzer could be heard on

the field as

it

fired.

With the high trajectory of the howitzer shell, the sound

on the night of 13 Caught on the ground at Henderson Field during the heavy Japanese shelling that they could no October 1 942, several B-1 7s of the 1 1 th Bombardment Group were so damaged this plane sent shell of wing the under bursting shell A depart with the others for Espiritu Santo. and covered the airplane fragments through the fuselage and left wing. The explosion tore off a flap with clods of earth.

141

Bomb delivery to the 67th's flight line. This bomb handling equipment was finally landed at the end of October 1942.

would reach the

field a

few seconds before the

projectile, allowing a pilot

running for his plane to flop on his face before the shell for his plane

hit,

then again run

and be off on the search. Since "Pistol Pete" was really several

well-concealed guns, such attempts were a waste of gasoline and were

abandoned, awaiting more gas and better information on the location of "Pistol Pete."

The continuous bombing, shelling, and attention from "Pistol Pete" were preventing aircraft from using the Henderson Field runway. The order was given to move temporarily to the fighter strip (now capable of supporting fighter operations) until the gun could be annihilated. Henderson Field was declared out of operation; aircraft repair, of necessity, continued at the regular location at the west end of the field. SeaBees continued to repair the runway and by superhuman effort stayed up with "Pistol Pete's" damage.

The "Tokyo Express" was again enroute to Guadalcanal, moving both warships and transports to reinforce the Japanese troops massing for the

coming 1600.

offensive.

A

They were spotted by SBDs 180 miles from Cactus at low on aviation gas was readied. The 67th

strike force critically

P-400s with gas, ammunition, and 100-pound bombs; the P-39s carried 300-pound bombs. Captain Sharpsteen and Lieutenants Farron, Dinn, Sawyer, Miller, and Haedtler joined four SBDs to strike the Japanese warships and transports. loaded

its

The enemy

force

was found east

of Santa Isabel Island. All aircraft

dived in to bomb and strafe through heavy antiaircraft fire.

A hit was scored

on a transport by 2nd Lieutenant J.M. Waterman, USMC, VMSB-141, in an SBD. The other planes scored near misses on the other ships, which broke formation in violent evasive action.

Someone remembered the gas

142

in

the wing tanks of the B-17s. This

was drained; there was enough for another mission against the oncoming enemy task force. At 1715 Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Shaw and and Lieutenants Sawyer, Miller, Holmes, Barr, and P-400s, each carrying 500-pound bombs, joined SBDs and Haedtler F4Fs for another strike at the task force, which had now reached the

Farron

in P-39s, in

southeastern

tip of

Santa Isabel Island. Lieutenant Sawyer returned with

plane trouble shortly after takeoff. Lieutenant Haedtler had electrical trouble,

made an

made one

early pass on a transport, and returned to the

runway, hit a stack of which killed a Marine

The other

steel matting off

airfield attendant;

planes attacked with

near misses were seen. the

field individually

strip

He

field.

on the Henderson Field the right edge and tore off a wing,

of those poorly lighted night landings

as

Haedtler came out uninjured.

bombs and

strafed the ships. Several

Due to the shortage of fuel, each plane returned to its ammunition ran out. They landed at the fighter

because Haedtler's accident was not yet cleared from the edge of the

main runway. Lieutenant Barr of the 67th was bombing pass and was thought to have been hit by not return to the

last to

make

his dive

antiaircraft fire.

He did

field.

Diary: Oct. 14, Wednesday We had two heavy air raids yesterday and

five last night after the

Jap Navy shelled the field. They shelled us just about all night long again; real heavy shells. Also the Jap artillery fired on us many times during the

evening and again this morning. That gun ("Pistol Pete")

is

close

enough to us to be able to reach our end of the field with its shells. We don't know what to expect and when to expect it. 1730 hrs.: We were bombed twice today and shelled at times by that Jap artillery gun. Sometimes it sounds like an 80mm mortar. If it's quiet,

we can hear it fire and then in a short time the shell hits right in our

They are putting maximum effort into bombing raids and they are Our planes are bombing and strafing a Jap invasion task force bad. very area.

that

is still

150 miles out and heading

on gas for the airplanes; the

bomb

the Jap ships.

around

in

We

last of

it

for Guadalcanal.

We are very low

may be in the planes that are out to

are scrounging a few extra barrels

left

laying

the bush and the palm groves.

bombing mission against the enemy task force, nearly all aviation gas was used and enemy pressure was increasing on land, sea, and in the air. Earlier in the day, as preparations for the strike at the Japanese ships got underway, a Marine Colonel came down With the completion

of the dive

from the Pagoda to the 67th Fighter Squadron position at the hangar. His words were reminiscent of past situations in the Philippines, still fresh in everyone's minds: "We don't know whether we'll be able to hold the field or not. There's a Jap task force of destroyers, cruisers, and troop transports heading our way. We have enough gas for one other mission against

them. Load your planes with bombs and go out with the dive bombers and

143

them. After the gas

hit

is

gone, we'll have to

Then your officers and men outfit. Goodbye and good luck." over.

will attach

let

the ground troops take

themselves to some infantry

Certain in the knowledge there would be another night of shelling, serious thoughts and preparations

were formulated by groups around the

beachhead; everyone kept his personal arms and belongings close at hand. "Pistol Pete" closed the final hours of daylight with flurries of shots at the airfield.

The word was

around the

airfield for

out to search the palm groves and

drums

of gasoline dispersed earlier,

were brought ashore after the wreck in the boneyard.

By nightfall the off

landing,

six transports of the

wooded areas when supplies

and to drain the tanks

in

every

'Tokyo Express" were standing

Tassafaronga, discharging fresh troops and supplies while their escort

war ships prepared to shell the beachhead. At 0150, 15 October, "Washing Machine Charlie" glided in over the airfield, dropped flares, and set the stage for another night of heavy shelling. It commenced immediately, a demonstration of fireworks exactly

like

the night before, lasting only until

0220.

American torpedo boats, newly arrived at Tulagi, had made their way through the darkness of the Sealark Channel as the Japanese cruisers Chokai and Kinugasa and other craft were identifying themselves to the torpedo boats by flashing their signature toward the beachhead. As the torpedo boats moved in for attack runs, their wake was sighted by lookouts on the Japanese ships, which began evasive action immediately. The torpedo attacks interrupted the shelling, and, due to the audacity of the attacking torpedo boats (Motor Torpedo Squadron 3), firing at the beachhead did not commence again that night. Gasoline found around the area amounted to the equivalent of 400 drums, enough to keep those aircraft in commission flying for two days. Word was received that additional gas was on the way. By mid-morning it began to arrive, ferried in by C-47s of the Marine Air Transport Squadron and the Army 13th Troop Carrier Squadron, each carrying 12 drums of aviation gasoline.

If

they had been jumped by a Japanese plane approaching

Guadalcanal, one tracer bullet or piece of hot shell fragment would have

blown the plane to bits. One by one the planes touched down on the Henderson Field runway, braked to a stop, the drums were rolled onto the ground, and the pilots turned and took off before shell fragments could stop them. For a week the C-47s supplied Henderson Field with aviation gasoline.

The morning search mission

at

0640 reported

additional Japanese

ships enroute to Guadalcanal. Yesterday's warships and six transports

were

still

off

the beach unloading troops and supplies. Four single plane

were made on the transports between Kokumbona, Doma Reef, and Tassafaronga before 0700. One was flown by Lieutenant D. Miller in a P-400. Throughout the day the transports and warships were hit by P-39s, attacks

P-400s, SBDs, B-17s, and by a

144

PBY that made a torpedo attack. Fire from

antiaircraft guns, just put ashore by the Japanese, was heavy and Japanese Zero fighters were flying cover over the landing operation. At 0900 Captains Mitchell and Sharpsteen, in P-39s carrying 500-

pound bombs, attacked the transports. Captain Sharpsteen got a probable hit on a transport and shot down a Zero flying over the landing operation. P-400s flown by Lieutenants Sawyer, Campbell, Dewey, and Holmes also attacked with 100-pound bombs. Sawyer made a hit on a transport. Holmes dropped his bomb on a transport, starting a fire which later was put out. At 1225, Captain Sharpsteen and Lieutenants Purnell, Jacobson, Dinn, and Farron in P-39s and Lieutenants Sawyer, Kerstetter, Kaiser, and Dews in P-400s repeated the attack. Lieutenant Dinn got a direct hit with a 500-pound bomb on one of the transports, which caught fire and

who rendezvoused with the formation about 10 minutes after the attack, did not make it back to the field. The "Tojo Time" raid, which occurred while the flight was out, was finally sank.

Lieutenant Farron,

not intercepted by the F4Fs. There were 24 bombers and an unknown number of Zeros. The antiaircraft guns put up heavy fire and downed one of the bombers. Strafing attacks and bombing near misses were credited to

Captains Mitchell and Sharpsteen and Lieutenants Campbell, Shaw, Haedtler, Holmes, Dinn, Sawyer, Dewey, Purnell, Kerstetter, and Miller.

This day's work by the 67th did not appear

The combined

in

ports inflicted continuous and heavy damage.

where one was In spite of

all

Navy press

releases.

operation by the "Cactus Air Force" over the trans-

while burning; a third was sunk. sea,

the

hit

Two

of the ships

beached

The three remaining transports put out to

and set on

fire

by a B- 17 attack near Savo

Island.

the air attacks, the Japanese transports succeeded

in

4500 troops ashore with most of their equipment. Much of ammunition were destroyed by dive bombing and strafing attacks on the beach. The Japanese landing was successful. It was now clear that the Japanese offensive beginning to unfold was to be putting about

their equipment, gasoline, and

carried out by a formidable force.

The punishment taken by the Japanese landing force during the day repaid at midnight. The eight-inch guns of the Japanese cruisers Maya and Miyako and their accompanying destroyers battered Henderson Field for over an hour. The light of the burning transports off Tassafaronga was

fully

could be seen in the night sky along with the flashes of naval guns shelling Henderson Field. The attack was long and fierce, but less so than "that

long night" of 13 October, ever to be

Men were was depressing.

canal. light

killed,

remembered by veterans

planes wrecked, and the sight of the

of Guadal-

airfield at first

Department of Navy was telling the Ameriof what was going on. The news media were sniffing

In Washington, D.C., the

can people very

little

out a story and doing their best to report

newspapers. Opening that Guadalcanal

it

in radio

broadcasts and in

were ominous in their doubt Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox could

lines of radio newscasts

was still holding.

say only: "Our boys on Guadalcanal

will

do their best."

145

The American people began to believe that another experience The men on Guadalcanal recognized

Corregidor was approaching. situation for

what

The defenders

it

was

—

like

the

a grave military situation against terrible odds.

of Guadalcanal held

on to their personal firearms and pre-

pared for a period of conflict even worse than they had already experienced.

146

CHAPTER

12

"Are You Still There, Cactus?"

To bring additional forces to bear, the Navy was scraping the barrel. On

15

October, the aircraft carrier Enterprise, the battleship South Dakota, and nine destroyers were ordered from Pearl Harbor into the South Pacific.

Bomber

operations out of Espiritu Santo were augmented and operated

against Rabaul and Japanese air bases in the northern Solomons. Increased

search and patrol activities were ordered.

More

assistance for besieged

Guadalcanal would require a decision at the highest national

level,

where

preoccupation with Europe and North Africa was clouding the issue and British insistence

on

all-out U.S.

support for Europe was denying us that

assistance.

On the morning of 16

October, Henderson Field was a bustling com-

munity: aircraft repairs, runway repairs,

movement

of

newly found gaso-

drums, arrival of C-47s from Espiritu Santo loaded with drums of gasoline, bombs being loaded under the bellies of P-39s, P-400s, and line

SBDs

— and everyone

in his turn

scrounging something to eat

in

the

makeshift kitchens as "Pistol Pete" lobbed in his occasional greeting.

The Japanese

transports beached or sunk off Tassafaronga were

smoking hulks as the morning attack missions began. The task now was to bomb and strafe the Japanese troops and their supplies concentrated on the beaches, in coconut groves, and in the nearby jungle growth. Their supplies were stacked in supply and ammunition dumps along the boundaries of the

beach assembly areas until they could be moved inland to a more protected area. Missions were flown, like "milk runs," throughout the day from

147

Kokumbona to Tassafaronga, attacking the landing areas. The routine was to dive in, drop a bomb, come back and strafe the troops, attempting to destroy as much of their equipment, supplies v and ammunition as possible. There were Zeros around during the first morning flights, but they were not a significant deterrent to the ground attack sorties. The seaplane tender McFarland stood off Lunga Point during the day unloading aviation gasoline into gas barges, a welcome drink for the thirsty Cactus Air Force. At about 1730 Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Bauer of VMF-212, finally released for operations at Henderson Field, led his 19 F4Fs to Cactus from Espiritu Santo. For too long Admiral Ghormley had insisted they be held back to guard the New Hebrides. While the F4Fs were making their approach to the field, the McFarland was attacked by Japanese Aichi type 99 dive bombers, damaging the ship and setting fire to a gas barge. Before landing, Bauer became aware of the situation and chased a flight of eight Japanese

dive bombers, shot

down four of them, and returned

to the field to land. Lieutenant Colonel Bauer, the great aerial

aviator

who

programs

in

helped the 67th Fighter Squadron start the early days at Tontouta, was

now

its

gunnery

gunnery training

landing at Cactus with

four Japanese planes scored to his credit before landing and reporting in to

General Geiger,

Commander

of the

Marine Air Wing and the Cactus Air

Force.

Diary: Oct. 16, Friday I guess the Jap task force was able to land much of its strength, in spite of the damage our planes have been inflicting on them by burning and sinking their transports. They got plenty of troops and equipment ashore and some antiaircraft guns. They are just a

little

to the

west of us,

and when our planes dive in to bomb and strafe them we can see the black puffs of antiaircraft fire bursting over the Jap positions.

We

have been shelled for the past three nights. They are

really

maximum effort to retake Guadalcanal. The shelling was terrifying; it seemed like they were using 16-inch guns. There were many casualties as a result of all this enemy action. The 164th Infantry, which making

a

just arrived

here from

New Caledonia, was not

settled in yet and got a

bad taste of it as a welcome. Our planes bombed the transports as they came in to unload, but the Japs were able to beach some of the transports and boats and got most of their force unloaded even though they were taking a lot of punishment along the beaches.

on the task force,

in its

I

hear that

in all that action

approach, during their landing and during their

departure, they lost six ships.

The bombing raids are bad and frequent. The Jap buildup is deploying somewhere to the west of the perimeter and it looks like it will be real

rough here for a while. Occasionally on a night watch, Sidney

Hudson and Thomas Melton, made contact

operating the ground station for the 67th's Cactus station,

with the 67tlrs radio station Jig Ground, at Tontouta,

148

New

Caledonia.

They would tune a receiver to the frequency of the Jig Ground station and call. News of the heavy shelling and the hard-pressed plight of their Henderson Field was a matter of grave concern to the rest of the outfit at Tontouta. At regular intervals they would try very hard to get a return call from their men at Cactus. During a shelling, the radio operator would dive into a nearby bomb shelter; when the worst was over he would come out and guard the Henderson Field operational channel. On one occasion during a heavy night shelling, Thomas Melton got back into his chair and listened on the Jig Ground frequency. He heard the worried voice of Master Sergeant Joe Melton (no relation to Thomas Melton),

await a unit at

calling

"Cactus, Cactus, Cactus, are you

still

there,

Cactus? Over."

Thomas Melton caught the call, switched over, and after a brief reply to let them know that Cactus was still holding on, signed off and guarded the regular Cactus operational frequency.

The Japanese position on 16 October was one of supreme confidence. General Hyakutake was assured by his senior commander on the scene, Lieutenant General Maso Maruyama, that plans were in place for a threepronged, coordinated attack on the boundaries of the American beachhead.

A tentative date of

18 October was set for the attack. Maruyama, leading airfield, would move with a force of about

the force that would capture the

nine infantry battalions to a line of departure southeast of the

airfield;

Major General Kawaguchi, of Bloody Ridge fame, would command the right (Vandegrift's east boundary); and Major General Yumio Nasu would command the left (Vandegrift's west boundary). Major General Tadashi Sumiyoshi was to cover the rear, bringing his attack against the Matanikau line.

Sumiyoshi commanded

including the infamous

tank company. This was attacks by forces

the perimeter.

A

all

of the artillery of the Japanese 17th

Army

150mm howitzers, five battalions of infantry, and a all

to be accomplished concurrently in coordinated

now located in the vicinity of Kokumbona,

to the west of

code word, "Banzai," was to signal the jumpoff for the

attacking elements. Detailed instructions were issued for accepting the

surrender of General A.A. Vandegrift. For some time, Maruyama's engineers had been preparing trails from the west to a point southeast of the airfield, in the cover of the jungle, over

which his force could move to the

line of departure.

The

activity of the

engineering parties went undetected by Marine patrols or aircraft observation; however, frequent observation of the unsuspecting airfield was

made by Japanese officers from the ridges to the

south. In a

most remark-

able display of confidence, complacency, and arrogance, the jungle terrain

over which they had to maneuver a large force and heavy equipment was not previously reconnoitered; not enough time was allowed in the plan for preparation of

moved

trails. It

was only with extreme

difficulty that forces

were

into place. Everything had to be brought forward by manpower,

with infantry soldiers often carrying two artillery shells in addition to their pack. The effort continued, in an attempt to adhere to the schedule. The landing of the large force of Japanese had alerted the Marines to

149

expect an attack, but disposition of the Japanese forces and the place of their attack

were unknown. Vandegrift was

able to deploy his forces to

protect the entire perimeter with emphasis in strength on the west, place his artillery to bring fire in front of

advantage of defending inner

lines.

any sector, and generally exploit

The Japanese moved over

his

the chosen

routes more slowly than they had expected, often abandoning artillery and heavy weapons along the trail to maintain their schedule. In the face of this difficulty, Maruyama postponed the assault until the 22nd, and, ultimately, to 24 October. Their entire preparation and approach to the assault was marked by cocky arrogance and failure to understand and appreciate their enemy and the environment. their inflexible

A

chain reaction of circumstances adversely affected

maneuvers; steady rain made

trails

almost impassable and

saturated communications equipment. Here the inflexibility of a totalitarian society,

where innovation and replanning were necessary, emasculated

their plans,

which called for coordinated attacks, but resulted

in

maximum

which were launched separately and lacked the punch of their

efforts

abandoned weapons for supporting fire. These separately executed attacks gave General Vandegrift flexibility in the use of his forces and the attacks, although very close to achieving the goal, were separately squashed. In the great difficulty of airfield,

moving

Maruyama had postponed

his forces into position south of the

the jump-off date several times.

munications were poor and probably contributed to the failure

On 23

Com-

in timing.

October, having failed to receive the change in plans, Sumiyoshi's

Number 22, a workhorse P-39/P-400 Airacobra, stands ready for another Jagstaffel sortie. October 1942.

150

which had been regularly firing on Henderson Field and the fire a heavy concentration of artillery on the Matanikau line. When the firing ceased, a column of Japanese tanks came out of the jungle and crossed the sandbar at the mouth of the river in an assault on the Marine lines. Just west of the river, Japanese infantry were ready to follow artillery,

perimeter, began to

the tanks and gain a position on the east shore. Artillery of the 11th Marines immediately placed fire between the river and Point Cruz, blanketing the Japanese infantry waiting to

The

move up behind

the tanks.

effects of the artillery barrage

on the Japanese infantry was devastating. Marine antitank guns wrecked the tanks. Four separate assaults by the tanks and Japanese infantry were attempted against the

Marine

line.

Each time the Marine

lines held, inflicting

heavy losses on the

attacking Japanese.

After regrouping during the night, the Japanese again attacked the

Matanikau

line at

dawn on 24 October. Close

air

support missions were

flown throughout the day as numerous additional Japanese attacks were

beaten back; heavy rain grounded the aircraft for most of the afternoon. The Japanese thrust across the Matanikau failed. Air operations leading up to the battle had not detected the presence of Japanese engineers preparing jungle trails for the

movement

of their

Marine patrols had not extended to the depth the trails were being prepared, and the greatest threat was considered to be along the Matanikau. Dive-bombing and strafing of assembling forces to the west continued, with Japanese Zeros overhead at frequent intervals. Attempts were being made to find and destroy "Pistol Pete." A strange report was received during the day on 16 October that a German ME 109 fighter was strafing Marine positions. Flight operations up to 22 October were steady "milk forces.

runs," bombing and strafing Japanese ships, landing boats, troops, sup-

and antiaircraft positions near Kokumbona. On these missions the from the Matanikau to Cape Esperance and along the Matanikau and area Lunga was covered in search of Japanese movements, which were indeed active but concealed by the jungle and continued unobserved. The P-400s were literally falling apart. Guns often would not fireplies,

engines, flaps, electrical systems, and propellers failed frequently. The P-400s were in no condition to go on long overwater missions, but out they

went with the SBDs and P-39s

to

bomb and

strafe Japanese ships, trans-

went with complete disregard for the condition of the planes and out of respect for the superhuman effort of the crewmen who kept them in commission to fly. Japanese antiaircraft gun ports, or personnel barges.

The

pilots

were thick near Kokumbona and were frequently attacked during the sorties. On 21 October, Lieutenant Haedtler put two of them out of commission with bombs; another was wiped out by Lieutenant Dewey. The 67th's hangar, the last to remain standing, was knocked out and positions

Captain Mitchell ordered everyone moved to the fighter strip except for some mechanical work that was to be completed before several of the planes could be moved. The most pleasant collapsed from Japanese artillery

fire.

151

occurrence of 21 October was the return of Lieutenant Barr, shot down a

week before in an attack on a Japanese troop transport. He was returned from the Russell Islands in a Higgins boat and was in good health except for a wrenched knee and lower back. Barr was evacuated on a C-47 the next day without his personal belongings, which had all been stolen from his storage place in the palm grove by Marines, so accustomed to looting the Japs that anything they came across was fair game. "Pistol Pete" continued to get an inordinate amount of attention; daily the P-39s and F4Fs met the "Tojo Time" raid; the F4Fs continued to rack up a good score against the Japanese Zeros and bombers. On 23 October the regular attack missions continued until about 0800, when word was received that the expected Japanese offensive along the Matanikau had started; it was considered to be the main threat to the perimeter. The attack began with heavy concentrations of Japanese artillery fire placed on the Marine lines in preparation for the assault. Along with this, the heavy return fire from Marine artillery created fierce battle sounds, making it clear to those on the airfield that a major engagement was in progress. These sounds could be heard on the airfield throughout the night. As Marine antitank guns gutted and burned Japanese tanks attempting to cross the sandbar at the mouth of the river, the glow of fires could be seen to the west during the intervals when heavy rain let up. The artillery exchange continued and the 1 1th Marines placed their fire just west of the sandbar at the mouth of the river, inflicting heavy casualties on the Japanese infantry massed for an attack across the sandbar. The Marines called for close air support; at first light on the morning of 24 October the P-39s, P-400s, and SBDs began a day of bombing and strafing Japanese troops in front of the Marines on the Matanikau and on targets further west. At 0645 Lieutenants Haedtler and Holmes put 100pound bombs into the Japanese troop concentrations and strafed until their ammunition was expended. The Marines had ground panels laid out but code cards had not been provided for the early flight. However, there was no problem identifying and attacking the enemy. The entire day was spent in similar attacks on the Matanikau break. The heavy schedule of sorties again brought the supply of aviation gas to a dangerously low point. The Marine artillery had fired so many rounds that a resupply of ammunition was needed. The gasoline and ammunition urgently called for soon began to arrive in the heroic C-47 transport aircraft. It was a day of heavy clouds and frequent rain showers in the southern Solomons, and 'Tojo Time" did not materialize for Henderson Field. Everything was swimming in flash floods and mud. The expected shelling for that night did not occur.

General Sumiyoshi's attack on the Matanikau, delivered before Mar-

uyama was in position to the south of the perimeter, was a costly deviation from plan for the Japanese. The failure of the attack freed up Marine forces, moved from the perimeter south of the airfield as reinforcements on the

152

Matanikau, to be returned to strengthen the southern line when they were needed.

On

the day following the failure of Sumiyoshi's attack, the perimeter was relatively quiet. Japanese artillery continued to fire throughout the day, killing or

wounding about 30 Marines;

pressure on the entire Marine its

it

was

successful in holding

The 67th Fighter Squadron continued heavy "milk run" schedule to bomb and strafe the Matanikau, Kokumline.

bona, Cape Esperance areas, as well as general patrols searching the

perimeter. Air operations were curtailed at about 1630

when heavy rain began again. During the early afternoon, men of the 7th Marines, holding the far left-forward position of the Matanikau line, spotted a column of Japanese infantry moving eastward along a Mount Austen trail. The sighting of this column, which later proved to be a force under Japanese Colonel Oka, caused a reassessment that the Japanese could be present in force at any point along the perimeter from the mouth of the Matanikau to a point along the Lunga southeast of the

airfield.

A late afternoon patrol reported seeing

a Japanese officer studying Bloody Ridge through field glasses and

smoke

rising

from "many

rice fires" south of the

Lunga and the

saw

ridge.

Vandegrift was thus alerted to the possible need to reinforce the 7th

Marines and the 164th Infantry, holding the line southeast of the airfield. Maruyama's forces had finally moved into position; their heaviest weapons were now machine guns, for they had abandoned their artillery pieces along the treacherous line of march, a route that the general had

himself

named the Maruyama Road

before experiencing

its

treachery. In

the early evening of the 24th they were deploying for attack, heavy rain

adding to their problems.

morning on the 25th the attack began. The predawn strikes on the line south of Henderson Field were vigorous and suicidal, executed with skill and bravery in their utmost determination to breach and gain a hold on the airfield. The lines of the 7th Marines and the In the early hours of the

164th Infantry were penetrated in several places, with the Japanese absorbing ghastly losses under heavy rifle, mortar, and artillery fire. The groups of penetrating Japanese, accepting their fate

in

the true tradition of

Samurai, were surrounded and annihilated.

Marines laid heavy concentrations of artillery fire in front of the perimeter defenses through the night, taking a heavy toll on the

The

1 1th

Japanese infantry; each wave of the attack resulted in fierce hand-to-hand combat. By 0700 on 25 October the lines of the 164th Infantry and the Marines had held fast, and Maruyama withdrew to regroup his force and repeat the attack.

The heavy

rains had flash-flooded

Henderson Field and the

fighter

strip; Marines and men of the 67th were searching about for infiltrating Japanese, fearing they might get on the field to destroy parked aircraft.

Japanese

artillery shelled the area all day;

Japanese

air activity

was so

153

day became known to veterans of Guadalcanal as "Dugout The Sunday." Japanese bombed and strafed in numerous attacks during plentiful that the

the day.

At 0800,

five

Zeros were seen circling over the

field.

The Japanese

begun with heavy shelling on the night of 13 October planned, by now, to have the airfield in Japanese control; their aircraft were awaiting a signal to land. These were joined by others, and by a two-engined German Heinkel bomber which had markings that looked like III-K. It crossed the airfield at about 10,000 feet, from east to west, circling to look everything over. By 0900 the mud that held the planes on the ground had baked enough in the hot sun for the pilots to try a takeoff. Eight F4Fs slithered off, climbing to meet the Zeros. Later, five more Zeros appeared, and four more F4Fs were able to get off. The two-engine Heinkel bomber came back across the field from east to west, flying at about 1000 feet to get a closer look at the airfield that was supposed to be in Japanese hands. It got a good look at about 0945, when heavy fire from .50-caliber antiaircraft machine guns hit the plane. It started smoking and crashed in a flaming explosion between Henderson Field and the Matanikau. All Zeros that appeared overhead were shot down by F4Fs. During the day, Japanese dive bombers struck a row of parked airplanes on Henderson field, destroying many of them. However, this row of aircraft was made up of hulks from the boneyard, dragged into line to draw Japanese fire away from other aircraft dispersed and hidden in the edge of the trees around the fighter strip. By evening, 22 Japanese aircraft were shot down. Of these, 17 were Zeros. Captain Joe Foss accounted for four of offensive schedule which had

them, repeating his score of the previous day.

From mid-morning on, the planes of the 67th were joined with SBDs bomb Japanese warships in the vicinity. An early SBD patrol had

to dive

reported a Japanese task force of one heavy cruiser, three light carriers,

and two destroyers, 105 miles from Cactus, a report that was confirmed by Coast Watchers. At 1300 this force was attacked by five SBDs led by Lieutenant direct hit

Commander John

on a

Eldridge,

cruiser, stopping

were scored by the

it

dead

Jr.,

of VS-71. Eldridge

in the water; several

made

a

near-misses

flight.

In a follow-up attack by P-39s, Lieutenants Dinn, Purnell, and Jacob-

500-pound bombs, attacked at 1400, scoring two near-misses on a cruiser. At 1500 a third attack by SBDs, P-39s, and F4Fs hit the task force. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Purnell, Dinn, and Jacobson dropped 500-pound bombs. Lieutenant Jacobson made a direct hit on a cruiser, inflicting fatal damage; it was the Japanese cruiser Yura, later sent to the bottom by her escort. The other bombs were damaging near-misses. As the flight returned, the ships were heading north with two cruisers trailing heavy oil slicks, and six B-17s were on the scene for an attack; they son, with

did

no additional damage to the

force.

The mission

of the Japanese task

force had been to land troops at Koli, east of the perimeter. Its

154

commander

Kenneth Markel, armament specialist, makes a fast reload of the machine guns on a P-39 of the 67th Fighter Squadron. October 1942.

had received incorrect information that the airfield had been neutralized or captured, and the vicious dive bombing attacks were totally unexpected.

Throughout the day submarine nel.

of attacks

Amberjack was

on the Japanese task forces, the U.S. way into the Sealark Chan-

slowly making her

Exercising caution and taking an occasional look at the surface action,

the crew of the

A mberjack could feel the throb of bombs in the water as she

made her way into the harbor at Tulagi carrying precious cargo. Her spare tanks carried thousands of gallons of aviation gasoline; she carried a supply

100-pound bombs, and torpedoes for the PT boat squadron at Tulagi. For the 67th Fighter Squadron she carried 15 aircraft mechanics and armorers from New Caledonia to augment and replace personnel in the

of

tired squadron.

In the heavy attacks of Dugout Sunday, the forces on the perimeter, both U.S. and Japanese, were regrouping and preparing for the next assault. After sundown, flashes of lights could be seen in the hills south of the

heavy Japanese activity. Maruyama's forces were reorganized and making ready for a maximum effort to break through the perimeter defenses and capture the airfield. After dark the assault began. Maruyama threw wave after wave of airfield, signaling

screaming infantry, shouting "Banzai," in direct frontal attack against the perimeter line held by the 164th Infantry and the 5th and 7th Marines. The Japanese pressed their attack through a hail of rifle, artillery, and heavy-

155

weapons

fire.

They took heavy casualties; their fighting was every bit as They made repeated charges, at times stand-

fierce as the previous night.

ing in the U.S. lines in close individual combat, only to be repulsed or annihilated. In the early morning they withdrew from this macabre scene of no-quarter battle, gathering the remnants of their force as they faded into the jungle.

During the night an additional attack was thrown the Colonel

Oka force

that had

been seen on a

trail

at the

crossing

perimeter by

Mount Austen

the day before. At one point this force broke through the lines of the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Marines, only to be thrown back by a counterattack.

Except for infiltrating groups of Japanese infantry that actually got as far as the airfield, Colonel Oka's force probably drove their attack closest to the objective before being squashed.

On 26 at

October, the 67th flew numerous missions

major battle points south and west of the

airfield.

in close air

support

Bombing and

strafing

by ground control, they attacked Japanese concentrations the line south of the antiaircraft

guns

at

airfield.

the bush at

were flown against the

Additional attacks

Kokumbona

in

beach, where three guns were knocked

out.

The same effort was repeated on 27 October. On 28 October, Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Dinn and Jacobson, carrying 100-pound bombs,

accompanied SBDs to Rekata Bay on Santa Isabel Island. Five Japanese floatplanes on the beach were strafed and destroyed. The bombing and strafing attacks

on the Japanese seaplane base also destroyed gasoline and

ammunition supplies, which were left burning as the flight departed. The attack encountered heavy antiaircraft fire. Lieutenant Dinn's plane was hit, smoking heavily as he bailed out. Pilots of VMF 212 saw his parachute

open and go down

in

the trees on the south coast of Santa Isabel. Later in

the day, Captain Mitchell and Lieutenant Jacobson strafed Rekata Bay and

looked for Lieutenant Dinn; they encountered heavy antiaircraft

both planes received

hits.

They destroyed

a floatplane and

saw

fire,

and

six others

destroyed by the previous attack. Daily attacks

were made on

frontline positions through

with good results reported by Marine and

Army

troops.

The

31 October, attacks con-

tinued to destroy landing boats, ammunition, and antiaircraft guns near

Kokumbona.

The

unsuccessful attacks of 25 and 26 October brought an end to the

Japanese October offensive on Guadalcanal. that their losses

were 3,568

officers

A

detailed survey reported

and men. The shelling of Henderson

Field on "that long night" of 13 October, which their schedule for capturing the beachhead,

marked the opening

of

had been very successful and at

one point had actually closed down Henderson Field operations. Had the bombardments and ground offensive been well -coordinated, the outcome might have been

different. In reality, their efforts

rately and failed miserably

poorly formulated plan.

156

when measured

were delivered sepa-

against their over-detailed and

At his headquarters at Rabaul, Lieutenant General Harukichi Hyakutake monitored operations with confidence as the Japanese ground attack continued on 25 and 26 October. An erroneous message that Henderson Field

was in Japanese hands had been received and conditions

at the

scene

by headquarters nor correction from the field. The large Japanese force to clinch the fight, destroy the American forces retreating from Guadalcanal, and occupy the island, started down the Slot did not allow verification

to claim their prize.

Admiral Halsey scraped together every vessel he could claim

in the

meet this threat. The Enterprise, still recovering from previous wounds, and the new South Dakota were rushed from Pearl Harbor. With the carrier Hornet, these made up the main ships of a task force with which Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid was approaching the Santa Cruz Islands on 26 October, ready to intercept the south-bound Pacific for the task force to

enemy force. The Japanese

fleet

was sighted by

Espiritu Santo. This formidable

a

PBY and B-17s patrolling out

of

enemy force included four aircraft carriers,

four battleships, nine heavy cruisers, and two light cruisers, along with auxiliary ships

and three cargo transports.

In the battle of the Santa Cruz Islands that followed, the Americans

20 planes to the enemy and 54 from other causes. The carrier Hornet and destroyer Porter were sunk. The Enterprise, and South Dakota, the lost

cruiser

San Juan, and the destroyer Smith were damaged. Two Japanese and a battleship were damaged; none were sunk. The

aircraft carriers

lost at least 100 planes, a severe blow to their dwindling complement of experienced pilots. The damage was not, however, responsible for the withdrawal of the Japanese fleet. They had learned that the American

Japanese

troops could

still

still

held their beachhead at Guadalcanal and that Henderson Field

strike with aircraft.

The

forces within the beachhead at Cactus

had saved themselves.

157

*

CHAPTER

13

Block Their

Sunday Punch

At the end of October, the situation in the Pacific depended upon the outcome of the Guadalcanal Campaign. To the surprise of many in Washington,

General

Guadalcanal shall's

Vandegrift

— with

and

his

team

still

held

possession

of

shamefully limited national support. General Mar-

orders had been to keep the emphasis on Europe and North Africa.

Admiral King kept right on insisting that more emphasis be placed on winning a decisive victory

in

the southern Solomons. General Millard F.

Harmon kept up continuous pressure in his regular reports to Washington, calling for the strengthening of Guadalcanal to secure

it

as a base for future

In his study of the situation, President Roosevelt

became convinced

rollback of the Japanese in the Pacific.

that the possession of Guadalcanal had

nese planners

in

Roosevelt

it

a prerequisite of the Japa-

continuing their war in the Pacific.

test of Japanese military

To

become

It

was now becoming

a

performance before the Emperor and the world.

became an

equally important and prestigious base to be

held and used as a stepping stone to exploit the victory.

Roosevelt settled the continuing squabble among the 'Top Brass" regarding support for the Pacific. that every possible

On 24

October, the President ordered

weapon and appropriate support be sent to the Pacific if commitments must be reduced else-

and that Guadalcanal be held, even

where. Marshall and King began immediately to plan for augmentation of the area with troops, planes, and ships, expecting this support to be in use

before the end of November.

158

The aggressive Admiral Halsey put pressure

on to make it happen as soon as possible. General Douglas MacArthur ultimately agreed that the 25th Division in Hawaii and additional fighter planes that were due to arrive in his area could be diverted to the South Pacific.

The heavy

combat damage, bombing and shelling wear and tear continually reduced the airpower available at Henderson Field. In addition, the defenders were still plagued with a constant shortage of fuel. The October Japanese offensive came close to destroying Henderson Field and the "Cactus Air Force." As the month drew to a close, there were only 29 aircraft on the "in commission" list. This situation was greatly improved by mid-November. The 347th Fighter Group, which was activated in October, along with the 339th Fighter Squadron, had absorbed the 70th and 68th as well as the flying schedule,

losses, plus just plain

67th Fighter Squadrons. Pilots of the 70th squadron had been added to the

Cactus Flight as early as 8 October, when eight of them arrived in a flight of 11 new P-39s. Four pilots of the 68th arrived on 7 November as their squadron moved from Tonga to

New

Caledonia.

The

operation of the

Cactus Flight continued to be reported, in daily action reports, under the 67th Fighter Squadron until 2 December, when the daily action report

159

heading changed to read "347th Fighter Group." Elements of

squadrons

all

active

group were actually rotating and operating

in the Cactus mid-November. (Many writers of today like to refer to these Army Fighter Squadrons of late 1942 as part of the 13th Fighter Command, which they were at a later time. However, it was not until January 1943 that 13 Fighter Command came into existence.) Early in November, during a time of critical personnel needs within the beachhead, Admiral Turner pursued another of his headstrong pet

in the

Flight as early as

projects, the building of an additional airfield near Aola Bay.

He diverted The force

forces newly assigned to Guadalcanal to cover his operation.

included the 147th Infantry, 1st Battalion, two companies of the 2nd

Marine Raider Battalion, a detachment of the 5th Defense Battalion, BatK of the 246th Field Artillery, and 500 Naval construction troops. Taking troops and construction capability critically needed within the perimeter, he wasted a month in a place totally unsuited for an airfield. This fact had been previously determined by Vandegrift's engineers, who had chosen a site at Koli Point where, in fact, an airfield was later built. The job was abandoned after a costly waste of effort. It would have been better if Turner had stuck with Naval operations, a job at which he was at least tery

tolerable.

The net result of the event was that Vandegrift could have better

utilized the units to

strengthen his perimeter defenses

and to improve Henderson

Ships were beginning to arrive

and supplies

off

Lunga

in

the beachhead

Field.

more frequently with reinforcements

Point. Additional infantry, artillery, and support

units of the Americal Division continued to arrive, along with similar units of the

Marine Corps.

With the failure of their attack of 23 - 24 October, the Japanese began preparing for another offensive against the American beachhead. General Hyakutake decided to send a Japanese Division under command of Lieutenant General Tadayoshi Sano and

heavy equipment to Guadalcanal in troop transports rather than by 'Tokyo Express." At Rabaul, a new Japanese 8th Area Army was created. Hyakutake, now under this command, could, as commander of the 17th Army, concentrate his effort on the recapture of Guadalcanal from a command post near Kokumbona. With a its

separate army he was organizationally free of problems elsewhere in the

Area Army.

To

accomplish this next offensive, four Japanese naval task forces

were organized. Two bombardment forces would neutralize Henderson Field by naval shelling. Another would transport a Japanese division and its heavy equipment to Guadalcanal, and a fourth would provide general support. The Japanese had been very successful thus far in the use of their aircraft carriers, but did not commit them to support these task forces. This was a surprising element in their plan, even though they were in a position to provide air cover from cruiser-launched aircraft and land-based aircraft.

Japanese forces on Guadalcanal, after being defeated

160

i

in their

mid-Oc-

tober attacks on the perimeter, began to reassemble west of the perimeter A smaller number attempted to assemble east of the

near Kokumbona. perimeter

in

the vicinity of Koli. Vandegrift was determined to strike while

they were off-balance, attempting to recover and regroup. cross the Matanikau again, to take the

He planned to Kokumbona area, about 8000 yards

He

then planned to push on 26,000 yards farther west to Poha River. Moving the line west to this point would artillery out of range of the Lunga area airfields.

farther west.

establish a line at the

keep enemy

Infantry forces

were prepared

to

move

eral places, using foot bridges prefabricated

neers. At

first light

on

1

November,

across the Matanikau in sev-

and put

artillery of the

in place

by the engi-

11th Marines and the

3rd Defense Battalion, assisted by cruisers offshore, shelled the area at the base of and west of Point Cruz. Close air support attacks by P-39s and

SBDs from Henderson

Field delivered attacks against opposing Japanese

19 B- 17s from Espiritu Santo bombed Kokumbona. When the bombardment fire was lifted, the 5th Marines moved across the Matanikau at a point just south of the coast road. Another force, under artillery positions;

Colonel William J. Whaling,

USMC, crossed up-river covering the left flank

west along the grassy knolls and ravines. The Marines gained 1000 yards the

day.

first

day.

A vehicular bridge was constructed across the river the next

As the move proceeded, additional units of the 5th Marines and 164th were moved forward. The 5th Marines successfully eliminated a

Infantry

pocket of Japanese resistance at the base of Point Cruz, capturing their artillery

and heavy weapons. In

this action,

350 Japanese were

killed in

action involving several bayonet assaults by the 5th Marines.

an

The 5th

Marines and the Whaling Group were then relieved and returned to the perimeter.

The following morning, 3 November, the 1st Battalion 164th Infantry and the 3rd Battalion 2nd Marines continued the advance, and by the end of the day were 2000 yards beyond Point Cruz, with 4000 yards to go to Kokumbona; close supporting P-39s bombed and strafed in front of them as they advanced. The advance was halted at this point on orders from General Vandegrift's Headquarters.

Enemy troops had been landed east of the

perimeter. Until this threat could be evaluated and eliminated, no further

movement west would be attempted. At

this time, the

2nd Battalion

of the 7th

Marines was

in position at

the Matapona River east of Koli Point, in front of a Japanese landing force of battalion size. The force had landed at Tetere, a little east of the

Matapona. This Japanese landing force had been ordered by General Hyakutake to join with the remnants that had retreated east after the October and to attempt to build a landing strip. For several days around the first part of November, the daily log of the 67th Fighter Squadron opened with the words, "No bombing, no shelling, no relief." Typical, then, of a mission day was 1 November. The 67th, along with the SBDs, flew close air support attacks missions in front of the push by ground forces across the Matanikau. A mission was flown at 0615 by battle

161

Lieutenants Jacobson, Shaw, Haedtler, and Holmes.

They

strafed areas

near Point Cruz. After the B-17s bombed Kokumbona, they thoroughly strafed the

Kokumbona

area. Lieutenant Jacobson broke

away

early be-

cause of propeller trouble on his beat-up airplane and Lieutenant returned because of high

oil

Dewey

temperature.

The second

mission, flown by Lieutenants Kerstetter and Patterson, gun positions west of Kokumbona. Lieutenant Kerstetter reported getting an excellent view of two new gun positions. The third mission, flown by Captain Mitchell and Lieutenant Jacobson, bombed and hit artillery

strafed in the

mission,

still

Kokumbona

in

area; their

bombs

failed to explode.

The

fourth

support of the ground advance to the west, was flown by

Lieutenants Holmes, Patterson, Dewey, and Haedtler, strafing the ground action.

in front of

The Marine and Army troops were meeting stiff resist-

ance but making good progress, indicating by signal panels on the ground the location of the front lines where they wanted bombing and strafing

support to be placed. Lieutenant Haedtler broke away early with jammed

guns and Patterson with propeller trouble. Lieutenants Kerstetter and Patterson, on the fifth mission, bombed and strafed Japanese movements

on the road between Point Cruz and Kokumbona. On the sixth mission of the day, Lieutenants Shaw and Purnell bombed and strafed the Kokumbona area and started four or five fires, several of which exploded like ammunition stores. in

The missions encountered varying amounts of antiaircraft fire

and around Kokumbona. Day-long schedules of close

air

support continued as on

1

November;

they attacked bivouac areas, camouflaged artillery guns, antiaircraft positions,

enemy

vehicles and personnel on-the-move, ammunition stores,

landing boats and supply dumps.

Numerous unseen targets (identified only

by direction from signal panels set out by infantry troops on the front lines) were hit in front of the ground troops. Airplanes and people were wearing out.

On 3 November the close air

support sorties began to include missions to the east as well, because of the

Japanese landing at Koli Point near the village of Tetere.

A

force of 15

SBDs, four P-39s, one TBF, and four F4Fs strafed and bombed the area of the enemy force. They dropped 20 500-pound bombs, 76 100-pound bombs, and one 325-pound depth charge in the attack area while receiving heavy return small arms and antiaircraft fire. Members of the 67th on the flight were Captain Mitchell, Lieutenants Jacobson, Purnell, Shaw, Dews, in P-39s and Lieutenants Dewey and Patterson in P-400s. During the Koli operation these missions were continued whenever called for. The American forces of the 7th Marines and 164th Infantry attempted to surround the Japanese. Support missions were stopped for a time because of poor communications; the dense jungle

made it impossible

where the changing front line was, and some American casualties had been sustained from strafing American planes. By 10 November, 450 Japanese had been killed; the rest escaped the trap through a gap in the line between two battalions of the 164th Infantry. Less than half

to determine

162

the Japanese in the Koli pocket survived the trek through the jungle to assemble with their forces near Kokumbona. During this heavy schedule of activity, a local ship known as "Horton's

Lunga Point on 4 November carrying five pilots. had been picked up by friendly natives and Coast Watchers. One of the survivors was Lieutenant Wally Dinn, seen parachuting from his smoking P-39 about a week before, in good health and ready for action. After parachuting from his plane, Lieutenant Dinn had been found by four friendly natives. One of them, having had some mission Schooner" arrived

at

These men, missing

in action,

school education, spoke English.

They took Dinn

in their

the long relay trip to bring him back to Guadalcanal.

boat and started

One

stop was on a

small island where, according to the English-speaking native, a Japanese pilot

pilot

was hiding. With the help of the natives, Dinn captured the Japanese and took him along. At one of their stops a couple of days later, the Jap

capsized the boat in shallow water and escaped.

He was captured the next

morning. The prisoner was placed on a diet of one banana a day and a sugar cane; he was closely guarded for the remainder of the Guadalcanal, Dinn turned him over as a prisoner of war.

little

trip.

At

Then Lieutenant

Dinn immediately joined the heavy schedule of close air support missions. With the close of the Koli operation it was possible to renew the offensive to the west toward Kokumbona. By 1 1 November the line was pushed beyond the position they had gained on 4 November. Their efforts were supported by naval gunfire from offshore and close air support sorties. On that day the advance was again canceled by General Vandegrift, after receiving word that the Japanese were preparing a large force of warships and transports to attack Guadalcanal. With insufficient forces the advance was abandoned; the troops were withdrawn to the perimeter to

meet the

threat.

An early November accounting of the heavily used aircraft shows the struggling

"Cactus Air Force"

still

waiting for reinforcements. In com-

mission were:

12 out of

39 22

P-400 P-39

2 out of

4

5 out of

5

TBF

1

out of

2

F4F-7

lout

F4F-4

36 out

SBD

of

of

1

On 7 November, some relief (10 pilots in new P-39s) arrived for the 67th. Among the group were two pilots of the 67th on their second tour at 68th squadron. Captain Mitchell and most of to his remaining pilots were scheduled for rest at Tontouta and assignment P-38 Lockheed the into the new 339th Fighter Squadron to transition

Cactus and

five pilots of the

Lightnings, newly arrived at Tontouta.

The heavy schedule continued. Each mission made successful attacks 163

on enemy troops, ammunition dumps, ment. "Pistol Pete" was receiving a

pound the

airfield at will. Artillery

arrived in the perimeter and

artillery guns,

and ground equip-

lot of -attention;

he could no longer

with counter battery capability had

was having some success

in locating

the guns

of "Pistol Pete."

In the afternoon,

SBD

patrol planes observed a Japanese force of 11

warships northeast of Santa Isabel Island heading for Guadalcanal.

A com-

The flight was made up of seven SBDs carrying 1000-pound bombs, three TBFs carrying torpedoes, and eight P-39s led by Captain Mitchell and including three of the pilots who had just arrived. Each P-39 carried a 500-pound bomb. The escort for this flight was 22 F4F Wildcats. The 67th pilots were performing a dual role; they were to dive bomb the warships and climb back up to join the F4Fs flying fighter cover. The P-39s were last to depart on the flight and would bined strike force was assembled to attack.

overtake the others enroute.

As Mitchell's flight was catching up with the formations, they encoun-

The P-39s

tered four float Zeros and a large lumbering float biplane. jettisoned their bombs, attacked and shot

down

all

five of the

Japanese

aircraft.

Meanwhile, the composite force was having some success. The TBFs put two torpedoes into a cruiser and another into a destroyer.

succeeded

in putting a

1000-pound bomb on a

The SBDs

cruiser. In the air battle, the

enemy lost 15 aircraft over the battle area. The Marines lost four F4Fs. One Wildcat, Lieutenant D. Doyl, USMC, went down in a violent spin with wing missing and crashed into the sea; another, Lieutenant J.B. Maas, landed on the water, out of gas, to be picked up later by a PT boat. Captain Joe Foss and Lieutenant O.M. Bate, USMC, went down near Malaita. Foss was later found and returned to Henderson Field. Mitchell's flight included J.T. Jarman and R.M. Ferguson, who had just arrived for a second tour, plus W. Dinn, W. Shaw, F. Purnell, J. Jacobson, and J. Geyer. The five Japanese planes shot down by the Army pilots were credited to Mitchell, Shaw, Dinn, Purnell, and Ferguson. For the next few days Captain Mitchell and a few of the pilots to be relieved stayed around to start the newly arrived pilots off right. Secondtimers like Jim Jarman and Robert M. Ferguson needed no indoctrination; they just dropped back into the routine. An established routine was just what it was for the next few days. Captain Mitchell and Lieutenants Williams, McLanahan, Jarman, Inciardi, Kellum, Ferguson, Shambrook, Bauer, Hull, Ryan, Patterson, Waldmire, Novak, and Norris divided up the close support missions. They continually bombed and strafed the area west a

USMC,

of Tassafaronga.

On

11

November they

strafed landing boats in

Tassafaronga and supported Marine occasional

bombing and

artillery firing

Doma Cove

and near

on Kokumbona with

strafing runs. Lieutenants Clark and

McLanahan The

spotted a Zero in the area; they pursued him, getting in a few shots.

plane looked like a Zero with a long canopy to accommodate a rear-seat

164

observer.

McLanahan got

in a long burst,

shooting him down. The plane, and went straight into the sea, bursting parts and flames across the waters of the channel. The warning of an approaching Japanese invasion task force diverted the squadron to other

smoking and

in flames, did a half-roll

business.

Coast Watchers had been reporting unusually heavy Japanese activity the Shortlands Harbor and other assembly areas. Sixty-one ships were observed assembling there. By 11 November it was clear from the mix of in

ships that a powerful task force to take Guadalcanal had ation.

commenced operThey had started an effort to put the reinforced 38th Division under

Lieutenant General Tadayoshi Sano and heavy equipment ashore at Guawas estimated that if they achieved complete success, 30,000

dalcanal. It

additional troops

would be facing the Americans

the Guadalcanal

in

beachhead. Air reconnaissance, by B-17s, of the harbors between Buin and Rabaul

developed the content of the force.

On 12 November

it

was reported

to

contain two aircraft carriers, four battleships, five heavy cruisers, and 30

was a large number of cargo ships for a total 60 vessels. As the Japanese task force moved out to assemble, they withheld the aircraft carriers, not committing them to the immediate destroyers. In addition, there of over

support of the task force.

For the pending operation, the U.S. had two naval task forces available: a carrier task force under Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, and Admiral Richard Kelly Turner's force, responsible for reinforcement and defense of Guadalcanal. Unless these limited forces could stop the Japanese at sea, the

U.S.

Navy

could be driven out of the Solomons, where

them two battleships, two cruisers, and eight destroyers

difficult for

prise,

it

to operate. Admiral Kinkaid's task force

was already

— the Enter-

— was

to support

Admiral Turner. Turner's force consisted of three groups: three transports, one cruiser, and four destroyers under Admiral Norman Scott, carrying Marines, ammunition, and supplies from Espiritu Santo to Guadalcanal; Admiral Daniel Callaghan, with the second group of 10 destroyers

and

five cruisers

directly

operated out of Espiritu Santo to cover the third group

commanded by Turner with

four transports carrying the 182nd

Infantry to Guadalcanal. Turner departed Noumea on 8

November and was

joined by Scott and Callaghan. successfully reinforce Guadalcanal, troops and supplies had to be landed off Lunga Point and the ships safely withdrawn before the Japanese task force descended upon the Sealark Channel. Time was severely limited,

To

requiring the landing schedule to go off like clockwork. Fortunately, Allied Japanese intelligence had provided Turner an excellent assessment of the Japanese the that learned he situation and invasion schedule; it was here

been committed to the task force. The predicted enemy timetable indicated land-based bombing of Henderson Field, beginon the ning with a maximum effort 10 November, naval bombardment November, on 12 Field Henderson on night of 11 November, air attacks carriers had, as yet, not

165

and naval bombardment and landing of Japanese troops that night. The landing force was to be completely ashore during the early morning hours of Friday, 13

November.

off Lunga Point at 0530 on 11 November; the transports Zeilin, Libra, and Betelgeuse began unloading. At 0930 the ships were attacked by 10 Aichi-99 dive bombers escorted by 12

Admiral Scott's group arrived

F4Fs were lost fighting saved. They accounted for at least only damage was to the Zeilin.

two of the pilots were four Zeros and one dive bomber. The

Zeros. Six

off this attack;

At 1127 a high-altitude bombing raid by two-engine Japanese bombers struck the area. They inflicted no damage, but interrupted the unloading because the ships had to get under way for their

The 67th gasping,

own protection.

P-39s reached 26,000 feet and, with engines well below the bombers. Two of the 17 F4Fs attacking

pilots in eight

were

still

down six of the enemy bombers. At 1800, the transports, almost completely unloaded, departed east for the night. The damage to the Zeilin proved more serious than had been the bombers were lost while shooting

initially

assessed; she departed for Espiritu Santo with a destroyer escort.

Admiral Turner's other ships, protected by Admiral Callaghan' group, joined before midnight. Scott's warships joined Callaghan's and Callaghan

cruised the Sealark channel during the night without incident.

At 0530 on 12 November all transports were again unloading off Lunga Point under cover of the warships. The 67th was on its usual daily close air support bombing and strafing missions. At 0740, Lieutenants Hansen and Kellum dropped 100-pound bombs, attacking and strafing aiong the Tambelego River. In a low strafing run, Hansen's wing caught a treetop and the airplane cartwheeled across a clearing to crash in a flaming explosion.

At 1340 an

air raid

warning was raised for "Tojo Time." The transway for their protection and formed

ports stopped unloading and got under into an antiaircraft formation.

Foss and

his

F4Fs, a welcome

close support routine for

A

flight of eight

P-39s scrambled with Joe

combat opportunity and a break from the the 67th they were pleased with any opportuair

—

gunnery as a change. The flight climbed up, taking their assigned positions around the area to intercept the bombers. At 1405, 25 Japanese torpedo bombers came in low over the Sealark nity for fighter

Channel to attack the transports. While cruising around up high, looking for Zeros, the P-39s heard by radio that there

with a Zero escort on the ships

toward the torpedo bombers,

still

F4Fs were already on the scene. of the

P-39s fogged with mist

off

in

Lunga

was

a raid

Point.

by torpedo bombers

The P-39s

dived

down

descending for their torpedo attacks;

In the dive from altitude, the cool canopies

the descent into the hot, humid air below.

The sudden condition so blinded one of the pilots, Lieutenant Frank Clark, that he dove into the sea.

on the scene, the torpedo bombers were taken by surprise. The strength of the opposition caused many of them to drop

As the P-39s roared

166

in

their torpedoes too high, causing

The

them

to tumble into the water and sink.

San Francisco, Admiral Callaghan's flagship, and the desBuchanan were damaged. None of the transports were hit; their

cruiser

troyer

only loss was two hours of unloading time.

Navy flak and fighters from Henderson Field accounted for 24 torpedo bombers out of 25 and for five Zeros out of eight. The 67th did not make an outstanding showing in air victories; Lieutenant McLanahan shot down a bomber and Lieutenant Ryan shot down a Zero. Their big contribution to the scrap was their diving entry on the scene in time to chase five Zeros off the tails of the F4Fs; the F4Fs simply twisted around and polished them off.

When the pilots of the Army flight landed, Captain Joe Foss and his Marine were waiting

at the

runway

meet the

There was a

lot of

handshaking and back-slapping as they praised and thanked the P-39

pilots

pilots

to

for their timely intrusion into the air battle.

flight.

"You

fellows can play ball on

our team any day," said Foss. Earlier in the day, patrol planes reported a Japanese task force, in-

two battleships, moving south in the Slot, a threat to the U.S. transports off Lunga Point. Farther north, another sighting reported a cluding

convoy of transports carrying the Japanese landing

force.

With Turner's

transports almost completely unloaded by 1815, they prepared to with-

A total of 6000 men had been put ashore, including 3358 men of the 182nd Infantry and 245th field Artillery. Callaghan's and Scott's warships escorted the convoy east to Indispensable Strait, then reversed course to protect Guadalcanal and meet the oncoming Japanese warships. Activities of the Army Cactus Flight, still referred to as the 67th Fighter Squadron, were now beginning to take on a distinct 347th Fighter Group mix. At 0700 on 12 November, a flight of eight P-38 Lightnings of the 339th Fighter Squadron departed Tontouta, New Caledonia, for Hendraw.

derson Field, Guadalcanal. After a stop at Espiritu Santo, the flight arrived by 1530 at Cactus. The flight was led by Major Dale D. Brannon, now

commander of the 339th; he was the old 67th Fighter Squadron hand who, back

in

August, had led the

Squadron from

flight of five

P-400s of the 67th Fighter Four of his flight had been

New Caledonia to Guadalcanal.

members of his pioneer hop to Cactus with the P-400s. Their B-17 escort, carrying ground personnel for the P-38s, turned back because of a radio Cactuses under attack. The P-38s were received with wild

report that

new twin-engine fighters taxied into the flight line area; everyone turned out to help service the new fighters. From here on, all squadrons of the 347th Fighter Group were mixed in the Army Cactus Flight operations, flying both types with little squadron excitement as the

For some time the daily combat logs continued to be headed 'The 67th Fighter Squadron." Brannon, in command of the 339th, had turned over command of the 67th to John A. Thompson, now a Major, who had followed him to Henderson Field by just a few days, in August, with the second flight of P-400s. Brannon had been assigned to command the 339th when it was formed from a cadre of 67th squadron veterans. When he identity.

167

P-38 Lightnings for the 339th Fighter Squadron, 347th Fighter Group, are transported from the docks through Noumea, New Caledonia, enroute to Tontouta Air Base. In the background is a famous landmark and watering hole of the South Pacific, the Grand Hotel DuPacifique. October 1942. (USAF)

received the P-38s, he transitioned his P-39 pilots to the

brought their

Commander

first flight

in

to

Henderson

Field;

new

he was the

planes and

first

Squadron

the Pacific to bring the P-38 into combat.

Air strength at Henderson Field was further strengthened on 11 and

12 November by the arrival of new SBDs, TBFs, and F4Fs for the expected Japanese offensive.

in

preparation

Nine B-26 Marauders and four more

New Caledonia on 14 November to augment the "Cactus Air Force." Fireworks on the horizon were witnessed by the defenders of Henderson Field during the night of 12-13 November. The Japanese task force, sighted earlier in the day far up the Slot, comprised the battleships P-38s were alerted and departed

Hiei and Kirishima, one

light cruiser,

and 15 destroyers. The force had

orders to enter the Sea Lark Channel and carry out the invasion plan

—

neutralize

Henderson

first

Field, Guadalcanal,

phase of their

by naval bom-

bardment. Once accomplished, the Japanese troop transports could approach Guadalcanal

in safety.

This superior task force was met Admirals Callaghan and Scott were the battle

168

in a night battle in

which both

Both sides suffered heavy losses; was more costly to the Japanese. The defenders of Henderson killed.

On specially constructed trailers, these P-38 Lightnings pass through Noumea, New Caledonia, enroute to the 339th Fighter Squadron at Tontouta Air Base. October 1942. (USAF) Field,

watching the glow of battle and burning ships on the horizon, were

spared the brutal period of naval shelling that had been

Dawn

of Friday,

in store for

13 November, found the morning search

them.

flight look-

ing over the waters of the battle area. Surviving vessels and local boats

were looking for survivors. The Japanese battleship Hiei was sighted smoking and badly damaged eight miles northwest of Savo Island, proceeding at 5 knots with a cruiser and two destroyers protecting her. The Hiei had been hit 85 times during the night battle and became the principal

liiiB Fueling a B-17 at

Henderson

Field.

November 1942.

169

An F4F Wildcat arrives back at Henderson

Field after a morning be Captain Joe Foss, USMC. Late November, 1942. (USMC)

The pilot is believed to

fighter sortie.

target for attack during the day. Admiral Kinkaid's task force

was now

south of Guadalcanal, and, because of the still-damaged elevator on Enterprise,

some

of her planes

were sent

to

Henderson Field

after the first air

attack on the Hiei.

Throughout the day, continuous attacks were made on the disabled Japanese battleship, with the 67th flying

and

flying

cover for other attacking

aging near-misses on the Japanese escort attack on the battleship

SBDs

torpedo.

67th

was by four TBFs, making one

with 1000-pound bombs,

in a dual role

dropping bombs The P-39s scored some damdestroyers. The first successful

in its duel role of

aircraft.

TBFs

direct hit with a

with torpedoes, and the

continued until bad weather and darkness stopped the

attacks.

The Hiei was dead later scuttled

the Hiei

in

the water and red from internal

by her crew. There

was towed

is

fires;

she was

a popular story, never confirmed, that

into position to take part in the shelling of

Henderson

Field that night. Nevertheless, she had taken 11 torpedoes and four 1000-

pound bomb

hits during the day's operation against her.

Continuing with their schedule for neutralizing Henderson Field, a night force, regrouped and augmented, shelled the airfield for at least 80

minutes, pounding Henderson and the fighter strips until interrupted by

PT

boats from Tulagi. Shells of

all

destroyers, and a battleship (which

sizes

poured

may have been

in

from the

cruisers,

the Hiei or the Kiri-

shima or both). Foxholes and shelters were torn open, trees were split and were torn to shreds, and fragments ripped through planes standing in the 67th work area and flight line, which seemed to take the

felled, tents

brunt of the shelling.

was killed; only four ground crew members were Of the airplanes in commission at the close of operations the day before, morning found only one undamaged. It was that old P-400 that led a charmed life, The Resurrection, rewarded for the love and care lavished Miraculously, no one

injured.

upon

it

by the ground crews, the "Society for the Preservation of the

Resurrection." Of the other aircraft, some were total losses; others, with

minor damage, were restored to

170

flying condition.

Three were soon opera-

tional

were

by cannibalizing those more seriously damaged. None of the P-38s but one SBD and 15 F4Fs were slightly damaged by flying shell

hit,

fragments; two

F4Fs were burned

up.

Disregarding the indecisiveness of the night battle and the threat of Henderson Field, which they must have known had not been neutralized as

they planned, the Japanese transports, which were holding back up in the Slot, set course for Guadalcanal. Patrolling SBDs and B-17s continued to report the position of the task force.

P-38s came

from

in

New

The

nine B-26s and four additional

Caledonia late in the day.

The Japanese invasion task group was made up of 12 transports and 12 escorting destroyers, the largest force of its kind to be employed by the Solomons. At 0800 on 14 November, patrol planes were in contact with this enemy group 150 miles from Guadalcanal. Without air-

Japanese

in the

craft carriers in support, the convoy's air cover

was provided only by

land-based aircraft, which probably arrived in relays over the convoy, and

perhaps some cruiser-launched floatplanes.

morning hours of 14 November, Cactus aircraft were being refueled and rearmed. Bombs and gas drums were rolled through the mud, making ready for a heavy attack schedule. Both the Japanese convoy of troop transports and their warships, proceeding north to regroup after their night battle, were under surveillance by patrol planes from HenderIn the early

son Field, the carrier Enterprise, and Espiritu Santo. The warships, as they regrouped and reorganized, as well as the convoy of transports, were attacked by

many

aircraft could

flights

from Henderson

Field.

As

rapidly as the attack

be refueled and rearmed, they went out again to attack,

concentrating on the troop transports, which were not yet rejoined by the

regrouping Japanese warships.

The F4Fs and P-39s flew escort and high cover above the holocaust, making occasional contact with Zero fighters in the attack area. TBFs put three torpedoes into a light cruiser;

SBDs made direct hits on another light

cruiser with 1000-pound bombs. Five attacks

transports with devastating results.

The

were made on the troop

transports were

jammed

full

of

Japanese infantrymen. They were helpless; the slaughter was awesome. The attacks continued until nightfall against the convoy of transports protected only by destroyers, which were also being badly mauled. At dusk, five of the transports had been sunk; three were burning and dead in the

The four that remained were still heading for Guadalcanal; two of them were slightly damaged. During the day over the attack area there had

water.

been a few periods of air combat with Zeros. Six Zeros were shot down, six SBDs were lost, and two F4Fs failed to return, one of them piloted by the great Marine gunnery aviator and friend of the 67th, Lieutenant Colonel Harold W. Bauer, "Injun Joe." A special search failed to locate any of the missing

pilots.

The Japanese task force engaged by Admiral Callaghan on the night of 12-13 November was now regrouped and returned to the scene to protect the remaining transports enroute to Guadalcanal and to meet whatever U.S. Navy ships were left to attack them. The task force now consisted of

171

the battleship Kirishima, two heavy cruisers, and nine destroyers.

To

meet them, Admiral Halsey detached the battleships Washington and South Dakota and four destroyers from Admiral Kinkaid, under Admiral Willis A. Lee, Jr. At midnight on the morning of 15 November, near Savo Island, Lee made radar contact and commenced firing. The long-range battleship duel lasted until 0142. Flashes of the heavy exchange could be seen on the night horizon from Henderson Field; the airfield received some shelling before the naval battle heated up. The Japanese retired northward, again having failed to bombard and neutralize Henderson Field. The battleship Kirishima was knocked out and scuttled by her crew; one Japanese destroyer was sunk. Three American destroyers were sunk; the South Dakota and the other destroyer were damaged.

On dawn flight

the morning of 15 November, the earliest possible takeoff for

patrol

was scheduled.

In the pitch darkness Jim

— R.M. Ferguson, M. Ryan, and W, Norris —

Jarman readied for the patrol.

his

The

planes were dispersed on the field at the new fighter strip, Fighter II, which was now capable of some operation. As they checked their planes in the dark, Ferguson discovered someone had removed his parachute; he decided to go without

They

it.

started up and followed Jarman, taxiing in the darkness using

wing lights to see each other; they proceeded toward the end of the runway. As they taxied, Jarman noticed occasional flashes in the dark, like a photo flash. When he reached the end of the runway and looked back, he realized they were under direct fire from a Japanese artillery gun. The Jap observer had seen the running lights of the planes making their way along the field and, using them as a reference, opened fire. The shells were tracking along behind Ferguson as he taxied; the Japs were taking pot shots at the first fighter planes to actually

Jarman,

in takeoff position,

cover as he gave

Jarman saw,

in

it

use Fighter

ordered the

II.

flight to

shut

down and

take

the gun for takeoff. Shortly after takeoff and climbout

the predawn darkness, the shadow and running lights of a

He approached

to look over the visitor and received a burst machine gun fire over his canopy as a warning not to come closer. He backed away and to the side; in a moment he was able to make out the

large aircraft. of

markings of a

New Zealand Lockheed Hudson bomber, just coming in from

somewhere and awaiting

daylight to land.

Jarman then proceeded northwest toward Savo Island, with the first light of early morning outlining the surf along the shoreline around Point Cruz under his left wing, looking for remnants of the naval battle of the night before. What he saw as he looked off to the west toward Kokumbona and Tassafaronga was four large transports just offshore. They were the Japanese transports that survived the attacks of the day before and had indeed reached Guadalcanal.

He crossed over the transports at about 1200 feet and in the morning dusk was not able to identify them as friend or foe. In a high-speed descending turn, he lined up to cross over the transports at about 500 feet; they 172

opened fire with everything. One of the ships got up speed and, as Jarman watched, the big ship ran aground on the beach, pushing its bow well into the step-to of the shore. It was still half an hour before sunup. He landed back at Henderson Field, giving radio reports of his find as he returned. He picked up the rest of his again to get

first

flight,

Ferguson, Ryan, and Norris, and got

off

cut at the targets.

As they passed Point Cruz they could see the transports in the process of beaching; the second and third had already beached, and the fourth

was making its run in. They dived immediately to attack the transports. Ferguson and Ryan made perfect passes; each got a direct hit on a transport. Norris got a near miss and Jarman's result of the explosion.

causing

fire

The

bomb fell short or was a dud; he saw no

by Ferguson and Ryan were already and destruction as they left the scene to reload. Both later hits

received the Distinguished Flying Cross for the attack.

They returned to Henderson Field and rearmed without refueling. They shared the credit on another transport, hitting the one that had beached last because it had not yet been able to start unloading. From then on, traffic over the four transports was heavy. SBDs and P-39s continued to bomb them and the P-39s strafed the unloading operation against heavy return fire. Even the B-26s made an attack on the transports before departing for Espiritu Santo. At 0900 the 67th attacked the only transport not yet burning. Lieutenants Williams, Geyer, Kellum, Conrad, McLanahan, Novak, and Waldmire hit the transports and surrounding area with

500-pound bombs. At 1045 Lieutenants Jarman, Patterson, Ryan, and Inciardi dive bombed and strafed Kokumbona, dropping 500-pound bombs on the fourth transport, with one direct hit. All four transports were raging infernos. Because attack traffic was heavy over the transports and beaches, Jarman led his flight out over the channel to look for remnants of the sea battle. They found the bow of a destroyer, the USS Walke, sunk in the battle the night before. The sea around it was covered with heavy black oil slick and numerous items of flotsam and jetsam. Crowded on and around the bow protruding from the waters of the Sealark Channel were many oil-covered survivors. Jarman radioed Henderson Field for a query on friendly or enemy status on the survivors. The reply was that there were no reported American losses in that vicinity: the flight was free to attack. As the flight swung away to establish a strafing run, another hurried call from Henderson Operations was received, directing them to hold fire. In a few minutes they came back with information that there had been American losses in the area and not to attack. Off the beach at

Kokumbona, Jarman had seen the destroyer Meade

shelling the area of the burning transports.

Meade and approached

The flight returned to the down across her bow in a

in a friendly fashion, flew

low, wing-rocking pass, strung out in the direction of the survivors of the sunken destroyer, about 12 miles away. The Meade continued to shell the

beach.

A second try was made and got the same reaction. Jarman then told

the flight to hold back in case the

commander of the Meade misunderstood 173

low pass across the bow, firing all guns. When he felt sure Meade knew it was the same flight overhead, he dropped down and crossed the bow in the direction of the survivors on the floating bow section. The Meade took the hint and got underway toward the bow of the his next action, a

the

Walke, with the planes flying back and forth along the path to be followed. At the scene, the Meade put out boats and rescued 264 survivors, bringing the event to a much better conclusion than might have been.* "So you can imagine that we were greatly relieved to know that we had not attacked these friendly survivors and that the rescue had worked out. Because at the time everyone was trying to outdo everyone else at being atrocious and it would have been terrible to have attacked. There were a lot of people saved and I am as thankful as they are," recalls Jarman. With the transports blazing, the planes turned their attention to the troops and supplies on the beach near Kokumbona, to bomb and strafe what the Japanese had brought ashore, knocking out gun positions, strafing, and setting fires along their supply storage area. They received heavy return fire from small arms and antiaircraft guns. One blaze of enemy stores was a

thousand yards long. All day, during takeoffs

and landings, the planes were harassed by

One pilot started his engine and looked out to his crew chief "thumbs up" signal. The crew chief was running away from the plane to jump into a foxhole. The pilot taxied out for takeoff and felt his plane shake with concussion as one of "Pistol Pete's" shells exploded where his "Pistol Pete."

for a

plane had just been.

He

debris blowing away.

A

looked around to see a shell hole with dust and

second

shell hit

behind him as he took

off.

by Lieutenants McLanahan and Geyer went out after "Pistol Pete." They had a location report on a gun, marked by a Immediately a

flight

smoke bomb from an SBD. They strafed the area around the gun and McLanahan's 500-pound bomb landed about five feet from the gun position. Both planes strafed again; Geyer caused an ammunition explosion. During the day several attacks were made by SBDs and TBFs on the transports, 95 miles out from Guadalcanal, which had been left burning and dead in the water the day before. These attacks left one with uncontrollable fires, one sunk, and one sinking. A fighter scramble at 1530 shot down six out of eight Zeros and the 12 Aichi 99 dive bombers they were escorting. Two P-38s were sent south to cover the departing battleships South Dakota and Washington. After encountering a severe weather front, they returned to Cactus.

The powerful Japanese

Many were

task force succeeded in landing about

4000

many were rescued by Japanese ships. Of their supplies brought ashore, much was destroyed by constant air attacks. The destruction of their convoy brought their plans for the November troops.

lost at sea;

counteroffensive to an abrupt end. Their naval losses were heavy along

with the costly loss of the transport convoy

The 174

— 77,609 shipping

264 survivors were from the Walke and the Preston. Both were sunk

tons.

that night.

CHAPTER

A Switch

The crushing

14

to the Offensive

of the Japanese

November

counteroffensive marked their

major effort to recapture the American beachhead on Guadalcanal, although this was not apparent to its defenders until much later. The last

"Tokyo Express" continued its operations, landing and resupplying troops on the western third of the island. The November action was the turning point and was indeed their last strong attempt to regain position. The landing of the 182nd Infantry during the early stages of the Japanese

November

effort

was the last movement of troops to Guadalcanal in the American troops could be landed regularly with good

face of enemy forces.

surface security, although Japanese air attacks continued to be heavy.

By mid-November the strength of aviation units at Cactus began to The second fighter strip, just a little north and west of Henderson Field, Fighter II, was completed by the end of November. The fighter increase.

aircraft

operated from there, on higher and dryer ground. B-17s were

using Henderson Field regularly, although aviation gas was

still

in

short

supply and they could not be based there for some time, awaiting the

development of larger fuel storage facilities. Additional air reinforcements continued to arrive through the end of November. On 16 November, eight P-39s arrived at Cactus from New Caledonia, led by Major John A. Thompson, commander of the 67th Fighter Squadron. Of these, seven of the pilots had seen Cactus before. They had been among the first pilots to arrive in August with the P-400s. Now they were back for a second tour. The Marine pilots they had lived and fought

175

with on their

USA;

first

tour at Henderson Field were

fresh squadrons had been

now back in

the good old

sent out to relieve them.

On their previous tour, John Thompson had landed after a tough fight with Zeros with 15 bullet holes in his plane and one in his shoulder. Lieutenant Head had cracked up taking off on a muddy runway and had been burned. Lieutenant Childress had bailed out of his shot-up plane over the jungle and walked in. Two of them had been blown out of a bomb shelter by a 1000-pound bomb that hit just five feet from the shelter and buried them in dirt and debris. Another had been shipped out exhausted from the living conditions and rigorous combat schedule. The combat tour schedule

was

rotating

all

pilots available.

too rapidly among the limited number of Army Air Corps When they were relieved for a rest at Tontouta, there was

no place to go for real relaxation or vacation. Very few ever got to Australia or New Zealand, to the beaches and cities for real rest and relaxation. Their arrival at Cactus placed the number of aircraft in commission immediate duty at 25 F4Fs, 25 SBDs, 2 P-400s, 8 TBFs, and a total of 36 other Army planes on fighter duty P-38s and P-39s.

for

—

Air operations were divided into fighter and attack missions. Aircraft

and

pilots assigned to fighter missions

scrambled with the F4Fs on

air raid

warnings. Those on attack status kept up the tradition of the Jagstaffel,

bombing and strafing in front of the advancing infantry and attacking ground targets needing special attention. It was an admitted fact in discussions by the U.S. Marines (and later with Japanese officers interviewed after the war) that their

bombing and

along the frontlines accounted for

strafing missions in close air support

more Japanese

casualties than infantry

engagements.

The P-39s on fighter status often flew long escort missions covering SBDs. P-38s flew the long escort missions in support of the B-17s. On 18 November, nine P-38s escorted 10 B- 17s to Tonalei Harbor at the southern tip of Bougainville. The flight was led by Major Dale D. Brannon, Commander of the 339th Fighter Squadron, with Captain Sharpsteen and Lieutenants Fincher, Goerke, Farquharson, Miller, Canning, Brzuska, and

Reagh. The

flight

was attacked

in

the target area by float biplanes and

land-based and float Zero fighters.

maneuvering with great difficulty against the Japanese fighters, Lieutenant Reagh, who had flown up with the supercharger on his right engine inoperative, made one pass at a float biplane, hit it in the cockpit, and saw it spin in as he hastened out of the area because of the poor performance of his right engine. Major Brannon shot a float biplane down in flames and got another probable. Captain Sharpsteen got one probable float Zero. Lieutenant Brzuska was hit by 20mm shells, which knocked out his right engine. Lieutenant Farquharson was hit eight times, six of approximately .50-caliber in the tail, one 20mm through the flap, and another In the air combat,

20mm exploded in his wing, leaving a large hole. All aircraft returned safely to

Henderson

An

176

Field.

additional mission the next day, led

by Captain Sharpsteen, also

Lightning of the 339th Fighter Squadron departs Tontouta Air Base, New Caledonia for Guadalcanal. The number 1 10 is often associated with Captain Tom Lamphier, a fighter Ace of the 339th Fighter Squadron. Here Lamphier is departing in No. 110 on a flight to Cactus. December 1942.

A P-38

encountered enemy fighters over the target. Lieutenant Fincher shot down two Zeros and Lieutenant Obermiller got one.

These early missions resulted not an escort fighter. in fact,

at

it

all. It

It

depressing lesson. it

The P-38 was

could not maneuver with a Zero;

had two big right and left gyros that did not want the plane to turn

could not turn like a fighter aircraft; the only reason for the degree

of success aviators.

it

By

did enjoy

was

that

it

was flown by some

of the world's best

taking advantage of the built-in strength and advantage that

the P-38 did have, they masked

combat

in a

had blind spots,

its

shortcomings by perfecting their unique

tactics.

Recognizing the fact that there was no combat maneuver that could be performed better than a Japanese fighter in a one-on-one combat, flights

were flown

in

mutually protective and cooperative formations. Flights of

were spread out in echelon to the right or left, leaving a maneuvering space of several aircraft lengths to protect each other. Mission formations were made up of as many flights of four as the mission called for. Each flight leader might have a wingman or element leader on his left, with the other two in echelon to the right, consisting of an element leader and a wingman to his right in the "tail-end Charlie" position. 'Tailend Charlie" was usually a fighter pilot of considerable combat experience.

four P-38s

were spread out with the planned interval between aircraft for mutual protection. Four flights made up an ideal size formation of 16 All

Adhering to flight discipline, they avoided being unnecessarily sucked into individual combat and engaged the enemy fighters on their own terms. If it was a fighter sortie, even when the aircraft for escort or a fighter sortie.

177

was engaged by the enemy and the formation eventually broke up, every effort was made to keep the breakdown to no less than elements of two leader and wingman. Even this was not possible at times. If it was a bomber escort, they held protective formation over the bombers and fired only on enemy fighters entering the formation to pick off entire formation

—

the plane ahead.

When engaged, they could escape from a Japanese fighter

with their advantage of climb or could dive and lose him. They could then turn back into the fight at better advantage to their

own

aircraft's fire-

power and speed, against the Japanese fighter, which normally favored individual combat over disciplined formations. Major Brannon turned over command of the 339th Squadron's P-38s to Captain John W. Mitchell, an old Cactus hand and an outstanding commander, and transferred to Headquarters of the 347th Fighter Group at Tontouta, New Caledonia, on 25 November. Shortly after arriving at the Group Headquarters, Brannon attended a meeting at Headquarters USAFISPA in Noumea. General H.H. (Hap) Arnold was visiting and receiving on various aspects of the war. Brannon had the opportunity to tell General Arnold just how poorly the P-39/P-400 aircraft had performed as a fighter aircraft at Cactus, and of the protective tactics necessary for success with the P-38 against the superior Japanese fighters. Brannon, as always, laid it right on the line. The unvarnished truth was a surprise to Arnold, who did not believe that the Zero could operate effectively at altitudes well above 20,000 feet. Impressed as Arnold was with the sleek, streamlined beauty of the P-39 Airacobra and the P-38 Lightning, he couldn't believe what Brannon was briefings

telling him.

The

November Kokumbona and

naval victory and defeat of the Japanese

allowed General Vandegrift's offensive toward

River to resume.

It

was determined by

offensive

the Poha

infantry patrols and aerial recon-

naissance that the Japanese were not occupying the west bank of the

A drive to the west across the Matanikau was planned for 18 November. General Hyakutake, with about 25,000 troops remaining, was also planning an offensive. His plan was to advance east from Kokumbona Matanikau.

and take the high ground to the east of the river for artillery positions, a line of departure for an assault

on the Lunga

airfields,

Austen, which overlooked Henderson Field and

all

and to occupy Mount of the contested area.

On 18 November, the 182nd Infantry, covered by the 8th Marines, began the move across the Matanikau. They were followed by other units on the 19th, and the force advanced toward Point Cruz where at noon they were dug

along a frontline with

in

its

right anchored

on the east base of

enemy resistance. Numerous close air these made it possible for the Americans

Point Cruz and were meeting heavy

support missions were called to hold

some

of the

Efforts to

in;

ground they had gained.

move

farther west

were

stalled

by heavy Japanese

ance, artillery fire at their front, and Japanese troops

178

still

resist-

holding the mass

With the help of air attack missions by the 67th and SBDs, Point Cruz was reduced; the American line did not move forward, however! of Point Cruz.

until the

164th Infantry passed through. In

ravines one at a time, their advance

Japanese

fire;

bitter fighting to take hills

was soon

and

halted again by heavy

the Japanese were dug in in shallow pits on the side of the

ravines with cover above and in foxholes.

The engagement was

a stale-

mate; further advance could not be made without undue losses. The force was ordered to dig in on the Point Cruz line, which ran south through a number of American-held hills and ravines. Interdiction of the

Japanese held positions by air attack and artillery continued. As the Americans held this line, there had been but one advantage gained: The planned Japanese offensive to cross the Matanikau had been upstaged, and the Americans held a perimeter position west of the Matanikau.

The Americans and the Japanese faced each other on high ground with ravines between them. Each had the other covered by tight interlocking Although the Americans called in a devastating schedule of air on the Japanese positions, as well as artillery, a stalemate on this

fields of fire.

strikes

line existed until

the beginning of the January offensive by the total Ameriwhich was by then part of the new XIV Corps. From the jump-off across the Matanikau on the 18th until well into December, the Army Cactus Flight continued a grueling schedule of close

cal Division,

air

support and search-and-destroy flights, attacking any target designated

or spotted in the Japanese area.

On many

missions, pilots got fleeting

glances at Japanese troops on a road, on a ridge, or at the edge of a ravine.

They attacked in front of the Point Cruz line on ground direction by radio or ground signal panels, rarely seeing the enemy they were attacking. On 21 November, Lieutenants Patterson and Tullis, in P-39s, observed approximately 12 river.

They were

enemy

troops at a beach road crossing a small

either eating or washing clothes; they had large camou-

and straw mats spread on the river bank. They made no move they were sure they were observed. The area was strafed and a

flage nets until

100-pound bomb was dropped;

it

was

a dud.

The

flight

was

typical of the

detailed attention given to everything on these search-and-destroy flights of the Jagstaffel

On 23 November,

Lieutenant McLanahan bombed and strafed about

Kokumbona. This must have been difficult for McLanahan as he thought of the large number of cattle back on his home ranch. Every truck, cart, or column of troops was strafed when found. For weeks the Jagstaffel kept up its daily pounding of the Japanese troops and supplies. They worked coordinated attacks with the infantry efforts to move the line farther west. They dropped demolition, fragmentation, and incendiary bombs, as well as depth charges— which made a 60 head

of cattle near

great grass cutter and concussion bomb. a

"Rube Goldberg,"

a belly-tank

with an incendiary to set

it off; it

They even dropped a device called

with a mixture of gasoline and oil a great fire when placed in the right

filled

made

179

area.* This neat arrangement turned out to be a napalm

bomb later in the

war.

The term "search-and-destroy," so frequently used in the Vietnam was coined at Cactusby the Jagstaffel. It was probably coined

operations,

by Lieutenant Danforth P. Miller

in a

diet of close air support operations:

bored statement about the steady

"Ho hum, ho hum, search and destroy,

search and destroy."

Although close air support bombing and strafing attacks accounted for

most enemy

battle casualties, there

was

any other combat

of this or

little

contribution by the 67th Fighter Squadron and other operations by the

347th's Cactus Flight mentioned in Navy communiques, an omission that

made no mention of the Marine and Navy F6Fs at Leyte in December of 1944. The P-38s and P-39s on fighter duty waited for a scramble and flew patrols. One 67th pilot described the patrol duties as "three disagreeable patrol assignments. On the dawn patrol you rise in the middle of the night, cold and damp from the humidity of the tropical night, take off while it's still too dark to see the end of the runway, and ride around for two hours, boring holes in the air, without breakfast. The cigarette that keeps you company expands the void in your fuzzy, empty stomach. "For the noon patrol you hop on the wing, now heated to 130 degrees in the hot sun, climb into a cockpit that is like an oven, sweat in your already stinking flying togs and helmet, and taxi out onto the hot runway, dripping with sweat, with a rag stuffed into the heater duct that never stops putting out hot air. The glare of the sun, sea, and even the green island stings your eyes until your head aches, and when you land there is some second chow so irritated General Douglas MacArthur that he

left for

you,

"On

if

you're lucky.

the dusk patrol you

fly

around for two hours

in the dark,

hoping

who have knocked off for the day will save you some of whatever it is they are having. When you land, if the field is dusty, the lights seem to make a false runway about 20 feet high in the dust above the touchdown that those

point."

The Japanese seemed to be building strength west of Point Cruz line and the entire area west to Cape Esperance, the west end of the island. The area was under continuous close surveillance and attack.

continued to go out, striking from

with empty guns and

bomb

Kokumbona

The

Jagstaffel

to the Cape, and returning

racks.

Thursday, 26 November, brought a change

in food;

it

was Thanksgiv-

The 67th had been switched from one unit to another for messing. The chow with the 164th Infantry was good perhaps because it was ing Day.

—

upon the leaves

The

arrival of the

much

164th that supplies improved and the starvation

to be desired, but Thanksgiving

incendiary

bomb was

Day was

different.

General

invented and tested by Lieutenant Jim McLanahan. At

first he worked. What he did to the vegetation along the enemy side of the Matanikau River was dramatic. In fact, it had not grown back by March of 1981, when the area was visited by members of the 347th Fighter Group Alumni

received a

lot of

razzing from the other pilots, but

it

Association.

180 i

Harmon and Admiral Halsey pulled together to get a real Thanksgiving dinner to the men on Guadalcanal; it was good in every mess. The Japanese shelling of Henderson Field was becoming infrequent because the 'Tokyo Express" was busy trying to deliver supplies and replacements and watching for the U.S. Navy. Even "Washing Machine Charlie" and "Pistol Pete"

were

erratic in their performance. Thanksgiving

Day was

a relatively

comfortable day.

To further the spirit of celebration, air attack was carried far afield enemy territory. The target was the Japanese seaplane base at Rekata Bay at the north end of Santa Isabel. The mission marked a new change in into

attitude.

and

this

Japanese plans were severely upset by the mid-November defeat mission was a switch to the offensive.

At Rekata Bay there was a large and thriving base with several thousand Japanese troops, a seaplane base, gasoline and ammunition dumps, and seaplane support facilities. The target on Santa Isabel was 165

A strike force of nine SBDs, each carrying a 1000-pound bomb and two 100-pound bombs, was escorted by 15 P-39s of the Army Cactus Flight, each carrying a 100-pound bomb. miles from Henderson Field.

The slower SBDs took off in the late afternoon;

Lieutenants McLana-

han, Williams, Bauer, Patton, Norris, Waldmire, Tullis, Ryan, Brewster,

and some other newly arrived

pilots took off at 1735 and would overtake rendezvous time near the east coast of Santa Isabel. They planned a dusk attack on the Japanese base. Rendezvous was on time; the

the

SBDs

at

SBDs proceeded across the island to Rekata Bay,

with the P-39s speeding

back and forth above their path for protection against

float Zeros.

There

was no opposition.

A crimson setting sun was touching the ocean horizon in the west; its red rays across the waters of the Pacific and the scattered clouds called to

mind that the Japanese "Rising Sun" might soon be setting in the southern Solomons. Below, the first haze of dusk was settling around the Japanese base as the dive bombers screamed down in their almost-vertical dives, releasing their loads into the base and seaplane facility in the now shadowy harbor. It was light enough for the aircraft above to see that there were no seaplanes or flying boats on the water. Resupply of the base by flying boat almost assured the presence of some aircraft on the water at the time of the

There were none, but the base caught hell. After the dive bombers finished their passes, the P-39s started dive bombing runs into the darkening Japanese base below. It was a fireworks attack.

all guns firing in the dive; the tracer bullets glowed candles as they penetrated the palm grove covering the base. bombing, strafing, and red tracers penetrating the base would give the

demonstration, with like

The

Roman

Japanese occupants a frightening experience. Tracers from their 20mm antiaircraft and small machine guns sent up an equally beautiful tracer

stream of return diving pilots.

past the diving aircraft, a threatening sight to the were released low over the base; the P-39s zigged and

fire

Bombs

rations of captured Japanese rice twice a day

were

finally

augmented.

It is

sufficient to observe that messing with strange units as a tenant often

181

zagged away across the palm trees to evade the heavy antiaircraft fire. The P-39s then strafed the base, climbed out, and rejoined in a protective formation above the SBDs, escorting them put of the danger area. Then, with minimum fuel remaining, they picked up regular cruising speed and

headed for Cactus. When they had climbed out after the bombing and strafing Bay, the P-39s took up position

whatever plane had arrived newly-arrived

pilot,

in

at

Rekata

the escort formation on the wing of

ahead of them.

happened that a Lieutenant Bauer, had climbed out first and followed in position

It

the SBDs; the others as they arrived in the escort formation took up position

on him. As they

the radio,

left

the

'yardbird' in this lead plane." It

airplanes

SBDs to head for home, Bauer called over

"How about taking over the lead, one of you, somebody, there's a managed

was a night ride home to Cactus, but all 15

to find the island and the field, to land safely in the

darkness of the dusty fighter

strip.

The mission was a turnaround event in now on the offensive.

both action and attitude. Cactus was

The Japanese had

not given up their plans to heavily reinforce and

supply their remaining troops on Guadalcanal. Patrol and intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese

were gathering a strong force

"Tokyo Express," preparing another attempt

of the

to put substantial supply

support ashore at Guadalcanal along the western third of the island.

An

American force of five cruisers and six destroyers under Rear Admiral C.H. Wright was assigned to counter this Japanese attempt. The U.S. Navy task force departed Espiritu Santo at 2300 on 29 November and arrived in the Cactus-Ringbolt area the next evening. The "Tokyo Express," eight enemy destroyers under Admiral Raizo Tanaka, was entering the area at about the same time.

The weather was bad, and air search and night illumination was denied made radar contact, his radar being a distinct advantage over the enemy. While Tanaka was floating supplies ashore in both Admirals. Wright's force

connected chains of sealed casks, he was under radar observation by Wright.

Wright held in

off taking

such battle conditions.

any action for a quarter of an hour, an eternity

He went to the attack with much of his advantage

of surprise frittered away.

maneuvered

brilliantly

The

Japanese, although taken by surprise,

with precise and deadly effect, abandoning their

flotation supply chains off Tassafaronga.

The

results

were serious

for the

Americans. Despite having achieved surprise at close range, they suc-

ceeded

in sinking

heavily damaged.

only one

The

notwithstanding, this

enemy

destroyer. Four American ships

were

lessons of previous naval battles off Guadalcanal

final

naval engagement, close to Guadalcanal,

was

botched.

Almost immediately the Japanese began to form another naval force of the

"Tokyo Express"

to help the troops of the Japanese 17th

holding the northwest sector of Guadalcanal. force

was observed

Guadalcanal.

182

The

in

On

the afternoon proceeding

force comprised six destroyers,

Army

still

3 December this task

down two

the Slot toward

light cruisers,

and

two heavy cruisers, deployed in columns for antiaircraft defense. This threat was met with land-based airpower from Henderson Field. Based on the reported position and speed of the enemy attack force, it would not cruise into striking range until darkness was approaching and had the added protection of poor weather conditions. Planning an attack with a flying distance of 180 miles, a force of eight SBD dive bombers, seven TBF torpedo bombers, four F4Fs, and six P-39s was alerted for the mission.

At 1730 the attack force took off in cloudy, misty weather and visibilabout one mile. For well over an hour this task force of assorted "Cactus Air Force" planes flew westward in search of the enemy task

ity of

They reached

force.

the limit of their radius of action with

spare for fruitless search.

little fuel

to

When they were all but past the turn-back time,

they spotted white streaks below —the wake of the Japanese ships. The weather was murky and misty and the haze below the clouds carried the gray nothingness to the surface of the ocean with no horizon. The white streaks marking the wake of the Japanese ships actually improved their visual reference to the ocean's surface.

The tor^

attack began. Torpedo bombers descended to take positions for

runs; dive

*

bombers screamed down

nese ships broke formation

in

to drop their loads.

The Japa-

high-speed evasive action, churning up a

wake which made visual reference to the ocean surface more elusive. The P-39s followed the dive bombers, immediately climbing back after their bombs were dropped to join the F4Fs in fighter cover. Antiaircraft fire over the ships was heavy. Flashes of larger and whiter

better but the targets

exploding bombs, torpedoes, and antiaircraft could be plainly observed

below

in the

The

gathering gloom of the evening dusk.

was diverted to attacking floatplanes, which had been launched by the cruisers. The F4Fs turned to meet the attack. The P-39s, now at 8,000 feet and climbing, could not maneuver with the float biplanes. They climbed to 11,000 feet, turned, and made a diving attack. The float biplanes, which were relatively slow, were extremely maneuverable and turned to meet the P-39s head on, firing light caliber machine guns and attempting to crash head-on with their attackers. attention of the fighters

When passing,

the biplanes would pull up into a vertical climb, giving their

rear gunners an excellent "going-away" shot at the P-39s.

The P-39 would

and renew the diving attack. The execute guns of the P-39 jammed with exasperating regularity, and often a pilot maneuvered into a perfect position for a sure shot, only to press a dead a steep chandelle to gain altitude

for four of the attacking planes and two credited with two. Lieutenants Founwas Glazier Lieutenant probables.

trigger.

tain

The P-39s accounted

and Childress had one each, confirmed. The four F4F pilots shot down

three each.

Below, Japanese ships were burning. The strike had put two 1000pound bombs on separate ships; there were several 100-pound hits, two torpedo hits, and two probable torpedo hits. Two of the warships were in flames and stood dead in the water; others were still in evasive maneuver-

183

The Japanese task force was repulsed by land-based aircraft from Henderson Field, and the field was spared ; another shelling. It was dark as the planes began their long night flight back to Hendering.

son Field. The exhilaration of battle faded into exhausted anxiety over the flight and critically low fuel. The drizzling rain made the long over-

return

water return

flight a black and lonely experience. Finding the island with instruments hardly adequate for daylight operation, and in these condi-

tions,

was

a task that justified their concern.

With their best cruise control settings, they proceeded cautiously toward Henderson Field, ever mindful of the mountainous islands of the Slot which could be in their path if they strayed off course. There was continuous radio chatter by the 67th pilots as they tried to gather a return formation.

They

called their course, altitude,

and a guess

at their position

to each other, switched on their running lights or landing lights, but in the

darkness, spread out as they were after the combat engagement, their

attempts to assemble a formation were to no

avail.

They proceeded appre-

hensively, thinking about the rock-filled clouds, of running out of gas, and of bailing out

over the ocean or an equally unfriendly and unmarked jungle.

Later, there

were

frantic radio calls to

Field to turn on the lights.

Cactus control

at

Henderson

The beams of the powerful searchlights, capable

of poking a shaft of light for miles into the night sky, pointed their powerful

beams, a

north of west, into the drizzling blackness.

little

Still

the calls

came: "Cactus, turn on the searchlights." Over the dark ocean a scattered attack flight was hunting for that piece of mountain-covered land called Guadalcanal.

One by one Field,

67th

the returning planes began to

come

in across

Henderson out.

One

in the

dark

dropped their gear, and landed while the fumes of fuel held

pilot, his

windshield covered with

oil,

became disoriented

He gave it make it around again

descent and found himself at stalling speed over the palm trees. the gun, fortunately having enough fuel remaining to

Another almost missed the runway because of the billowing clouds of dirt, debris, and mist blown up by the propwash of the preceding plane. The ground crew fired a red flare; he, too, made a successful to land safely.

go-around.

With lots of prayer and flier's luck, all of the 67th's planes made it back Henderson Field. Others were not so fortunate. Although the searchlights stayed on for hours, one dive bomber and one F4F were lost and the great Marine Aviator, Major Joe Sailer of VMSB-132, failed to return. The pilots of the 67th welcomed these opportunities for air combat despite the fact that the P-39 was an absolute dog as a fighter plane. At a later time, many of them had the chance to fly the Bell P-63 King Cobra, a to

redesigned Airacobra (P-39) with a laminar-flow

airfoil

supercharged engine. "While the P-63 was never tested the get-up-and-go

we needed.

If it

had been

have had more aces than any other had the targets

184

we

and a powerful

in

combat,

at Guadalcanal, the

outfit in the

had," Jim Jarman explained.

it

had

67th would

war, because no one ever

CHAPTER

15

Guadalcanal Secured

December 1942 brought

Early

weary

the long-promised relief of the combat-

Marine Division. This commitment had been preceded by assurances that additional forces would be landed to take the place of the units being relieved and to build up sufficient strength to resume the offensive. Additional units were committed and the 25th Division, commanded by Major General J. Lawton Collins, was alerted to move out of Hawaii. Major General Alexander M. Patch, commanding the Americal Division, was 1st

Harmon to direct the tactical operations at GuadalHe assumed command from General Vandegrift on 9 December. The

selected by General canal.

Marine Division Reinforced received a citation, in the name of the President, by Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox. The citation was presented to each individual member of the initial Cactus operation at a later 1st

date.

At that time Guadalcanal was declared secured. Although the remaining Japanese were still to be defeated and cleared from the island, the daily threat of a large Japanese invasion force attempting to retake Guadalcanal

had passed. Offensive pressure on the enemy

still

on Guadalcanal was

continued with increasing vigor.

On

5 December,

advised they would

quarters at

all

Army

become

New Caledonia.

Air Force units in the South Pacific were

part of the

This

new 13th

Air Force with Head-

new Air Force was officially activated on

13 January 1943, commanded by General Nathan B. Twining. Colonel

Dean

C. Strother

was assigned

as

commander

of the 13th Fighter

Com-

185

mand. At Guadalcanal, Army Air Corps units continued under control of the Marine Air Wing now commanded by General Louis E. Woods, USMC, who had taken over from his boss, General Geiger, in early November. Woods

was relieved from his long stay at Guadalcanal in late December by General

USMC. In February, all air units at Guadalcanal became a Command Solomons (COMAIRSOLS) under Rear Admiral

Francis Mulcahy, part of Air

Charles P. Mason.

General Patch remained responsible to Admiral Halsey for completion

Turner was out of this picture, but remained responsible for naval defense of Guadalcanal and the transport of of operations at Guadalcanal. Admiral

It was still a Navy show! The growing troop strength through December placed such a burden

troops and supplies.

on Americal Division Headquarters (which was duties of a Corps Headquarters) that

The Corps

Patch, 2 January 1943.

virtually

performing the

XIV Corps was formed under General

included the 2nd Marine Division and

other Marine Corps ground forces, the 25th Division, and the Americal Division,

now commanded by General Edmund

B. Sebree. In January,

troop strength at Guadalcanal reached the desired level to resume the offensive as a

full

XIV Corps

operation.

During December, the Cactus Flight established by the 67th Fighter Squadron began reporting daily operations as a detachment of the "347th Fighter Group, Cactus Flight," and continued to include pilots from

Squadrons

in the

Army

Group. Other

Air units on Henderson Field

all

in-

cluded a detachment of the 44th Fighter Squadron flying P-40s, which arrived at Cactus on

20 January; the 70th Medium Bombardment Squadsome B-17s of the 11th and 19th Bom-

ron, with B-26s; and, frequently,

bardment Groups, stopping at Guadalcanal during their far-reaching operations. In addition, a few P-40s were added to the 347th's Cactus Flight for middle-air cover. The growth in air strength could already be seen by the end of November, when the in-commission list for the day of 27 November showed 116 aircraft, with perhaps 20 percent more out for repair or other reasons.

As the month

of

December opened, there was

tropical rain. It flooded the strip.

Conditions were severe and personal belongings, arms,

and parachutes were

in

clinched the decision to

move

planes out of Fighter field

a period of continuous

Army Cactus Flight from its camp at the fighter

— with

its

I

flight gear,

danger of permanent damage. This torrent all

to the

Army and Marine fighter pilots and their new fighter strip, Fighter II. The new

higher ground, excellent campsite, and a runway of crushed

and rolled coral covered with steel matting

— was

a real

improvement. The

was abandoned. Henderson Field was receiving a major facelift: new runway surface and matting and taxiways to better support B-17s for their strikes further north in the Solomons. Enemy air raids continued, but Henderson Field was well defended by antiaircraft whenever the bombers were able to get by the fighters. "Washing Machine Charlie" continued his occasional night original fighter strip

186

bomb now and then. The routine of close air support and search-and-destroy flights continued for the P-39s and the remaining P-400s. interruptions, tossing out a

On 4 December,

Lieutenants McLanahan and Tullis discovered what looked like strings of gasoline drums tied together floating just offshore between Tassafaronga and Kokumbona. Fifteen new landing barges were discovered near Tassafaronga by Captain Williams. All of this was the

remains of the supply attempt by the 'Tokyo Express" interrupted by Admiral Wright. The chains of sealed drums, containing supplies for the Japanese troops, had not been recovered by the addressee. All were bombed, strafed, and destroyed by the P-39s shuttling between the airfield

and the various target areas to the west. The next day, Japanese dugouts in front of the troops along the Point Cruz line

were bombed and strafed; much activity behind enemy lines was observed and thoroughly strafed. On 6 December, Lieutenants McLanahan, Brewster, Patterson, and Kellum flew P-39s to Munda Point, New Georgia Island. There they made low-altitude reconnaissance to check out reports that a Japanese airfield

was being built. They found the airfield in its early stages of construction two fighter strips with Japanese workers using trucks, rollers, and hand carts, working on the runways. The area was strafed, setting fire to the equipment and disrupting the construction. "The field was cleverly camouflaged by palm trees propped up on the runway. The field could not be seen on an aerial photo," reported McLanahan. Although the field was subjected

—

to frequent attack, Japanese planes operated from

it

as early as 9 De-

cember. The base was placed under regular attack, day and night, by B-17s

and the Cactus

aircraft.

Attacks on other islands as well as Guadalcanal continued

in this

manner throughout December. As part of these missions, flights of P-39s were sent on a series of daily searches of Santa Isabel and New Georgia islands. The flights were beautiful sightseeing tours; however, the planes were sitting ducks for any flight of Zeros that might happen along as they sped over the coastal areas of these pilots

islands. Stiff

necks resulted from the

keeping their heads "on a swivel" to watch the sky for an enemy They flew low along the coastal

surprise and to examine the search areas.

new

areas looking for

signs of landing boats, Japanese observation posts,

warships put in to resupply or land troops, campsites, or any signs of new

Japanese

activity.

There was

also a sickening gratuitous duty to perform.

planes on the Santa Isabel search were to

went

to

fly

The two

over Rekata Bay; the two that

New Georgia were to fly over Munda. When the Japanese antiair-

opened fire on them, they were to judge whether the flak barrage was heavy or light. This judgment became a report from which all theater intelligence officers could draw red arrows on craft protecting these strongholds

Munda and mark "A/A Light" or "A/A sitting duck mission to the unnecessary Heavy." This side trip seemed an pilots risking their necks for a flak demonstration. their

maps

pointing to Rekata and

187

The P-39s concentrated on staffel

the traditional mission style of the Jag-

and escorted dive bombers. The P-38s flew a heavy December

schedule escorting B-17s striking the Central Solomons.

Two missions in

example of the tactical advantage gained by approaching the

particular give

On 10 December, escorting a B-17 on Tonolei Harbor at Bougainville, the Zero interceptors did not have the altitude advantage not because the bombing mission was being flown at high altitude, but because the Zeros were not up in time. The target at high altitude in a P-38 escort.

strike

—

P-38s caught the Zeros on their way up and met them with a descending advantage.

They met some head-on

and heavy firepower, All

five

Zeros

fell

as they climbed; with this advantage

burning into the sea and one probable.

P-38s returned from the mission, although one made the return trip on

one engine.

A

December was an

mission on 20

identical strike.

However, the

Zeros were waiting at high altitude for the arrival of the P-38s. In the aerial combat, two Zeros were flamed and three probable.

No P-38s were

because of their disciplined, mutually protective combat

tactics,

lost

but sev-

were pretty well shot up and got home only because the P-38 was a it home from a long pull on one engine. The mission emphasized the disadvantage of conducting bombing raids at low altitude below 20,000 feet rather than at altitudes that were optimum for the operation of both the bombers and the P-38 fighters. It was a useless sacrifice of tactical advantage, but the bombers preferred eral

rugged two-engine fighter that could make

—

—

the lower altitudes because of an imagined advantage in occasionally

it

was necessary due

On 24 December

to

bomb

accuracy;

weather conditions.

— Christmas Eve — the Japanese

airfield at

Munda

was attacked by nine SBD dive bombers, escorted by nine bomb-carrying P-39s and four F4Fs. It was an early morning strike, hitting Munda Point base just before daylight. Twenty-four Zeros were caught on the ground as they taxied out for takeoff. All the Zeros were destroyed on the ground or in

the air shortly after takeoff. In the last

December ground

situation, the

Americans faced a Japa-

nese force of 25,000. The Japanese had not received any major resupply or reinforcement since some fragmentary resources reached shore when the Japanese task force was destroyed on 15 November. How much resupply was being accomplished by night visits of the "Tokyo Express" and landing boats shuttling

down from other

islands

was not known. They were

thought to be a formidable force. They were,

in reality, a starving, malaria-

weakened army, cut off from their supporting forces and incapable of an effective offensive move. The Japanese were prepared, however, to give up no ground except at great cost to the Americans. Their sick and wounded manned forward machine gun positions, holding and defending their ground in the strictest devotion of Bushido.

To dislodge the Japanese from their hardened individual pockets along their prepared

network

Mount Austen,

the

188

full

of defenses,

which stretched from Point Cruz to XIV Corps was committed.

force of General Patch's

i

The Japanese

fortress of

Mount Austen stood

Corps offensive across the

on the

island.

hill

in the

way

of a full-scale

masses and ravines to eliminate the enemy

Mount Austen, the southern anchor of the Japanese line, was

a labyrinth of pockets,

hills,

peaks, caves, and ravines that concealed great

numbers of wary defenders in every possible niche like a veritable prairie dog town. This stronghold was a constant threat to Henderson Field. The airfield actually could be watched by the Japanese, who reported to their bases in the northern Solomons when missions departed to attack them much the same as the Coast Watchers passed warning to Guadalcanal of approaching Japanese bombers or surface forces. Japanese patrols from Mount Austen worked south to cover the entire western third of the island and posed a constant threat to the

airfield.

On 12 December, a raiding party of Japanese infiltrated the lines and made their way onto the airfield at Fighter II, where they destroyed a P-39 and set fire to a gas truck. The roaring fire resulted in complete destruction, creating a diversion that

allowed the patrol to escape. American

met heavy fire; the forces Mount Austen, did not at first expose

patrols probing at points along the Japanese line

on the southern end, concealed

in

themselves.

On 17 December, preparatory maneuvers to occupy Mount Austen started. The action supported plans for the general offensive by the total XIV Corps, scheduled for 10 January, with the planned drive anchored on the north coast. The offensive would move west in a line until all enemy were

resistance was overcome. With the preliminary effort to occupy Mount Austen and establish a southern anchor for the American line, it was discovered that this fortress was more heavily defended than had been

suspected. Bitter fighting and heavy casualties slowed the operation.

As soon

as the assault on

Mount Austen achieved some

definition,

close air support missions switched from their general roving nature to

focus on the specific

enemy strongpoints in front of the advancing infantry

bombing and

heavy schedule of "milk run" sorties. The infantry units, supported by artillery and close air support, stormed the Japanese positions at great cost in dead, wounded, and morale. assault,

strafing in a

The maneuver

to occupy Mount Austen, thought at first to be virfound an unexpected bristling fortress. This effort, which began on 17 December, did not find Mount Austen successfully in American hands until 15 January; mopping up to secure its many parts took tually unoccupied,

was a period during which combat infantry soldiers and superhuman efforts from themselves and their men in acts of heroism that will live as long as the Guadalcanal Campaign is remembered. They were supported every inch of the way by a heavy until

22 January.

It

officers extracted

schedule of close air support missions by the P-39s of the 347th Fighter Group, Cactus Flight. During missions into the ravines around Mount Austen and the hill strongholds to the north and west, such as "Galloping

Horse

Hill"

and "The Gifu," the P-39s, carrying 500-pound bombs,

hit

189

specific

enemy

strongpoints and returned to drop below the level of con-

cealing treetops to thoroughly strafe these positions.

From Christmas

to

22 January, veteran pilots of the 67th were reBy 29 January they were rotating back into

lieved for rest and relaxation.

the Cactus Flight; operations continued with 67th, 68th, 70th, and 339th Squadrons. air

support work and missions to escort

all

squadrons represented

The P-39s continued

—

their close

SBD dive bombers or B-17s. The

P-38s flew long escort missions covering the B-17s

in their attacks

on

where they encountered continuous heavy fighter resistance. The P-38s were shooting down Zeros and were pretty well shot up themselves in the process. Diving from higher altitudes gave the opening advantage to enemy fighters. Aside from its shortcomings as a fighter, the P-38 was not used at the higher altitudes, where it could perform to best advantage. The mutually protective fighter tactics of the 339th Squadron made up for the disadvantage to some extent. The Squadron, with its Bougainville,

P-38s, had destroyed 21 Japanese planes with seven probable, at a loss of its own pilots, during December. Many of the veteran pilots of the 339th got off for the famous Christmas leave along with the 67th and were back at Cactus by the end of January. The P-40s, added to the 347th's Cactus Flight, were doing their part in middle air protection of B-17s. On 18 January a flight of P-40s flown by pilots of the 68th Squadron escorted B-17s to the Shortlands area. They were sighted early by two casual enemy planes; one was towing a target in gunnery practice. Soon there was an air battle, with the P-40s holding their positions for close protection of the B-17s and to augment the forward firepower of the bombers. During the confusion of the Japanese fighter attacks, Captain Stanley A. Palmer was accidentally fired on by a B-17 gunner. His plane was forced down; he bailed out, landing in the water within sight of the enemy base. A lifer aft and canteen of water were dropped to him, everyone hoping for a later rescue. Twenty-four hours later a Navy PBY, with a covering escort of P-38s and P-40s, landed on the water under the nose of the enemy to pick up Palmer. During the rescue, a P-40 flown by Lieutenant Lynch had engine failure and he ditched in the ocean. Both pilots were rescued by the PBY and were taken to Cactus. Captain Palmer suffered from exposure; Lieutenant Lynch struck his eye on the gunsight when his P-40 nosed over as he went into the water. After ground fighting had reduced Mount Austen and with the southern flank secure, the western line, running south from Point Cruz, was moved gradually forward aided continually by air support strikes and artillery. Progress against pockets of heavy enemy resistance was slow. The rock-solid line defense by the Japanese was changing to heavy resistance by

three of

defiant pockets.

On

the afternoon of 23 January, elements of the 27th Infantry, 25th

Kokumbona, encircled by the 182nd and 147th Infantry, which had advanced on the right along the coast road. With Kokumbona captured, the push was continued westward toward the Poha River as the Division, entered

190

Japanese withdrew to the west. The American effort was to move rapidly west and around to the south to encircle the Japanese forces.

By

early February, with confusingly heavy operation by the 'Tokyo it was suddenly realized that the Japanese were evacuating their

Express,"

veterans of Guadalcanal.

On 9 February the Army moved into Tenaro and

organized resistance by the Japanese was at an end. Only scattered stragglers remained on the island.

On

the night of 22 January, General Hyakutake, having received

instructions to concentrate on the evacuation of as

many of the remaining troops as possible, began to withdraw the remnants of his army toward Cape Esperance. Beginning 1 February, nightly evacuations were carried out. In the rainy darkness, the

Japanese destroyers of the 'Tokyo Express" removed the tired and emaciated veterans of the 17th Army. With the evacuation on the night of 8 February, the deed was done. The American envelopment had moved too slowly, and the Navy was confused. About 13,000 Japanese troops had been brilliantly evacuated. Hundreds of sick,

wounded, and starving Japanese soldiers, still resisting, were killed or swept up by U.S. infantrymen. Throughout the steady diet of patrols, dive bombing, strafing, and escort cover for strike forces, an interesting and humorous practice devel-

oped among the

pilots of the

Cactus Flight.

A description of it was contrib-

uted to the 67th Fighter Squadron Unit History.

It is

quoted here

in

memory of its contributor, Lieutenant Barclay Dillon, Jr.: "One of the boys found, among the torn and thumb-smeared books and magazines labeled 'Reading Material,' a paperbacked edition of The Best Of Damon Runyon. Soon

all

and sundry began to notice the strange

behavior of this party every time he takes a gander into this book, as he lolls in his

sack and laughs out loud, although nobody

in

the tent makes any

funny remarks to him. Pretty soon they investigate and

find this

book very

fact, they become so enthusiastic over these characters of named Runyon that they find themselves talking like these

funny indeed. In this scribe

tough customers, saying what they have to say

in this historic

present

many days pass they carry this business to they become known to all, not by their names on their

tense, or Runyonese. Before

such an extent that

Handaxe Jack, Harry Dave the Dude, and their tent

birth certificates, but as Spanish John, Little Isadore,

the Horse, Big Nig, Guinea Mike, and

becomes Good Time Charly's. "Then one day it comes to pass that these guys are out flying around looking for some characters they would like very much to cool off, when all of a sudden the radios emit some words as follows: "'Harry the Horse to Big Nig. Harry the Horse to Big Nig. Several jokers at 3 o'clock.'

'"Big Nig to Harry the Horse. Roger Dodger. Let us push the stick

down and take

a look-see.'

happens that these particular jokers are legitimate and friendly, and it does not do to cool them off, and they pass on and look for other meat. "It so

191

However, they return to the

field

and

find several radio

guys from control

much perturbed and confused no end, and waiting to goes on. They see no percentage in such talk. But

waiting for them, very

know what

the hell

Spanish John and his friends see a very high percentage

in

it,

especially for

one reason. If the guys in control cannot understand the talk, then neither can the Japs, who, as everyone knows, are very good at savvying our lingo.

So they decide that they are keeping it up. (By this time these characters, all they've been through, are becoming very tough and are taking

with

nothing

off

nobody.)

"On another day, February

1st to be exact, four of them are providing low cover for the dive bombers as they attack the Tokyo Express' coming

down the Slot, when suddenly they're set upon by no fewer than 20 Zeros. The following conversation takes place: "'Little Isadore to Spanish John. Little Isadore to Spanish John. Some jokers are shooting at me.'

'"Spanish John to Little Isadore, sure enough, better

we

should be

shooting at them.' '"Little Isadore to Spanish John. Better hurry, like

my crate already looks

Swiss cheese.'

'"Roger Dodger. Stand clear while "This results

in

I

pass amongst these characters.'

Spanish John shooting

others. Little Isadore's plane

he counts 30 bullet holes

is

down one and dispersing the when he gets home

indeed breezy because

in it."

(Spanish John was Captain Jerome Sawyer. Little Isadore was Lieu-

tenant Nilo F. Inciardi.)

On four separate days at the beginning of February, the P-39s of the Cactus Flight escorted Navy and Marine SBD dive bombers and TBF torpedo bombers up the Slot to attack strong groups of Japanese warships of the "Tokyo Express." These convoys of Japanese destroyers were obviously coming to Guadalcanal to shell Henderson Field and to land Japanese troops and supplies in the rain and darkness of the north coast. The convoys originated from Short lands Harbor, near the tip of Bougainville Island, during the day and were routinely reported by the Coast Watchers as they got underway. There were as many as 20 ships, including light cruisers; they traveled in perfect formation for antiaircraft defense. They proceeded down the Slot with a cover of 20 to 30 Zeros flying cover over them. Nightfall would be near before they would be in range of aircraft from Henderson Field. On each day that they were reported, the weather was poor with heavy clouds, mist, and low visibility. When the strike force reached them, always about dusk, the ships of the "Express" would maneuver in violent evasive action during the attack, then rejoin formation to proceed to Guadalcanal, leaving behind any casualties crippled by the dive bombing attack. When these convoys reached the dark and rainy northwest coast of the island, they loaded troops for evacuation and were out of range by daylight. The fighters flew cover for strikes against these ships of the "Ex-

192

press" on 30 January and

1, 2, and 4 February, convinced they were "Express" on the usual mission of resupply and reinforcement of the Japanese forces on Guadalcanal.

striking an

The

ruse that screened the Japanese evacuation plan began the later

December. The Japanese had moved a large number of troops and the 4th Air Army to Rabaul; an airstrip was under construction at Munda point on New Georgia Island, all of which presaged another attempt to retake Guadalcanal. With the heavy loss of ships and aircraft, the Japanese were unable to mount another offensive. The observation of their preparations may have been the feint they needed to use the "Tokyo Express" to evacuate rather than resupply and land troops. In retrospect, it is interestpart of

Navy in the Action Report of the dated 17 April 1943: "Until almost the last

ing to note the aura of surprise to the U.S.

Commander-in-Chief,

Pacific,

moment, it appeared that the Japanese were attempting a major reinforcement effort. Only skill in keeping their plans disguised and bold celerity in carrying them out enabled the Japanese to withdraw the remnants of the Guadalcanal Garrison. Not until after all organized forces had been evacuated on 8 February did we realize the purpose of their air and naval dispositions; otherwise with the strong forces available to us ashore

Guadalcanal and our powerful fleet in the South

Pacific,

on

we might have

converted the withdrawal into a disastrous rout."

To the Japanese, Guadalcanal was now a threatening Allied base, one was capable of being built to strength to become an invasion base to menace their position in the central and northern Solomons. They inthat

creased their air attacks on Guadalcanal to prevent the Allied buildup,

throwing in aircraft as

if

there were no end to their supply. They increased

the night raids over Henderson Field, causing irritation and loss of sleep for the "Cactus Air Force."

On 27

January a report was received that 30 Zeros escorting 10

twin-engine Mitsubishi bombers were heading toward Guadalcanal. fighter force

was scrambled

A

to intercept. Captain John Mitchell with six

P-38s climbed to 30,000 feet to meet the attack. Twelve F4Fs were also scrambled. They were followed by 10 P-40s of the 44th Squadron. Enroute to Guadalcanal the bombers descended to the surface to come in under the radar screen and were not intercepted. Captain Mitchell's

flight

sighted

the Zeros about 10,000 feet below him. In their usual manner, the Japanese was trailing along, doing loops, rolls, and lazy eights to slow their

escort

pace over the bombers. The Japanese escorts,

in general,

chose this sort of

cavorting along in aerobatics, rather than a disciplined form of escort formation.

the Zeros in a diving attack. He met the first Zero coming in on him with all guns firing; Mitchell turned into him. the Zero with a short burst into the cockpit and midsection, flaming Mitchell led his formation

down on

The Zero spun out and crashed. The P-40s, still climbing, were hit hard in a diving attack and, joined by broad area the P-38s and F4Fs, they engaged in a running dogfight over a

193

of the north coast and the Sealark Channel, often to within inches of the

water

— a poor position

caught

in that position

for

maneuvering the P-38. One P-38

with a fuel tank that would not drop

As he

pilot

off,

was

further

away from the water, he was who was nearby, pulled in behind the Zero and with one short burst flamed him into the water. Mitchell became the first ace of the 339th Squadron; this was his limiting his maneuverability.

caught

in the fire of a

pulled up,

Zero and went

in.

Captain Mitchell,

sixth victory.

The P-40s of the 44th Squadron, caught in their climb, had to dive away to shake off the Zeros. Two of them were shot down; a third was badly shot up. Lieutenant Robert Westbrook, in a P-40, found himself in trouble in a fight

with a Zero.

He broke away in a high-speed dive, crossed the field, flight of three Zeros. He turned

and came up on the other side looking at a

one and, with a long burst, shot him down in flames. (Lieutenant Westbrook was soon to become one of the top scoring aces in the Pacific; in 1944 he led the "Game Cock" 67th Fighter Squadron.) The P-40s accounted for four of the Zeros that day; one Zero each for Lieutenants Tarbet, Westbrook, Wheaden, and Captain Taylor. The net result was nine Zeros shot down and a loss of two P-40s and two P-38s, Captain Shaw and Lieutenant McDaniel of the 339th Squadron. The insufferable irritation of the night bombing by the Japanese caused numerous attempts to make a night intercept and "flame the bastard." On the night of 29 January the men on the ground at Guadalcanal watched eagerly to see if Captain Mitchell, in a P-38, would be able to into

locate the intruder. Mitchell, slowly cruising around in the dark, located the

bomber just as he dropped his load. He gradually moved up behind the tail of fire, and squirted everything at him until the bomber burst into flames and fell like a torch into Iron Bottom Bay. There were wild cheers of satisfaction from the men looking on from the the twin-engine bomber, opened

ground.

With the end of organized resistance on Guadalcanal, the island was hustled into an offensive posture in every respect. Units of the 347th Fighter Group now aimed at cleaning up the remaining pockets of Japanese on the island and carrying the war north would ultimately end the war.

194

in a roll-up of Japanese

bases that

CHAPTER

16

The Wild Blue Yonder War, like most things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by perseverance, by time, and by practice.

Alexander Hamilton

The

Federalist

Many battles have changed the course of war, even the nature of war as an instrument of national policy. Yet there are few such violent conflicts of

which man can be proud. With Thermopylae, Agincourt, and Muese-Argonne, Guadalcanal ranks with the great battles of history, fought against great odds.

It

stands

among these that have changed the course of history

like the Spartans, the Americans at Guadaloutnumbered and with shamefully inadequate support by their unprepared nation, were determined to hold their ground at all cost. Guadalcanal and Thermopylae stir the same emotions and pride in all who hold liberty and democracy sacred.

and the nature of conflict. For,

canal, brutally

In the laudation recorded in Herodotus, and in the to the Spartans at

Thermopylae,

lies

hymn of Simonides

a kindred insight to the meaning of

Guadalcanal:

Four thousand men Peloponnesus brought Who 'gainst three hundred myriads nobly fought.

Of those

at

famed Thermopylae who

lie

Glorious the fortune, bright the destiny.

Their tomb an alter

A fond

is;

remembrance

their noble

name

of ancestral fame.

Their death, a song of triumph; neither rust Nor time that turns all mortal things to dust, Shall

dim the splendor

Where Greece

of that holy shrine,

forever sees her native virtues shine.

195

As

a nation,

we do

not yet comprehend the meaning of the epoch

devotion to duty that was Guadalcanal, nor to

its

veterans and dead. Only

the Japanese sincerely maintain a shrine" and conserve battle sites on Guadalcanal to honor the memory of those who fell in that great battle.

How can we

possibly do less?

This crusade succeeded against an enemy accustomed to victory. The Americans, poorly prepared, threw themselves into the battle ready for

any

The condition is almost amusing in the Americans hate war. They eschew the thoughts of prepar-

sacrifice to hold their gain.

realization that

edness and duty to serve

in favor of

the

more peace-loving viewpoint. As a

consequence, their readiness for conflict has a record of inadequacy. But

when this giant,

feigning

unselfish and relentless.

drowsy indifference, is provoked, the response is The good sense to recognize the warning signs

and to seek peace through strength

we

pray

shall

be ours

in

the future.

The significance of Guadalcanal is that the campaign began in a nick of many were the creation of our own nation. The Japanese, to whom defeat was all but unknown, consistently underestimating their enemy and their environment, were defeated and time against great odds, of which

war to the chastened 67th Fighter Squadron and the 347th Fighter

the Americans gained a base from which to carry the

Japanese.

The men

of the

Group gave full measure of their effort,

blood, and their youth and are justly

proud of their contribution. In matters of

command,

tactics,

and organization for naval combat,

in

the near waters off Guadalcanal, the performance of American admirals in

these early engagements can be described out-admiraled by the Japanese,

who

in a

word: inept. They were

did not have the benefit of advanced

radar and often lacked the advantage of surprise, an anomalous fact that

was fortunately not true

of the U.S.

Navy performance elsewhere.

In the

execution of the entire Guadalcanal operation, both sides were guilty of

many mistakes. Success in the overall ground, sea, and air operation can be made more mistakes than the

attributed to the fact that the Japanese

Americans. Essentially, the victory was achieved through the tenacity of

who made their temporary home in the beachhead and on Henderson Field. As 1943 began, there was still much to be done to remove all Japanese presence from the island. The war was now an offensive one and being carried with growing strength to the Japanese bases in the middle and the Americans

northern Solomons. The Japanese, with their seemingly endless supply of aircraft,

put up strong resistance as the Americans were striving to build

air superiority in

the area.

347th Fighter Group was on Fighter status, forsaking the old duties of the JagstaffeL The P-39s and P-40s flew long patrols searching enemy territory and flew escort for B-26s or B- 17s which were daily bombing the Japanese, striving to keep their airfield at Munda in operation. The 44th Fighter Squadron had arrived on 20 January, flying their share of the mixed bag of fighter operations. The pressure on the Japanese in the All of the

196

Men examine a wrecked P-38 of the 339th Fighter Squadron that crash-landed on Vella Lavella, Solomon Islands, on 7 October 1 943. A 20mm shell burst in the left engine, making it impossible for the pilot, Lt. D.W. Livesey, of El Cajon California, to lower his landing gear. (USAF)

northern Solomons gained strength; the P-38s flew escort for strikes at

Munda on New Georgia. The P-38s of the 339th "Sun Setter" Squadron had a steady diet of bomber escort or photo reconnaissance. Holding their disciplined formaBuin and Shortlands at Bougainville, and

tions to protect the

streaked

in

bombers, they were

at a disadvantage as

Zeros

and out, taking pot shots. Their teamwork brought them

through with few losses and their tactics were rewarded with an occasional victory

when

a

Zero ventured

in for a

pass at one of the P-38s, only to be

flamed by the next covering P-38 behind

in

the escort formation.

On just

such a mission on 2 February, Captain Mitchell, leading a four-P-38 escort sticking to their business of protecting the bombers, bagged three Zeros

without loss to themselves. Captain Mitchell got one, Lieutenant Holmes another, and Lieutenant Jim Shubin shot

down his first Zero,

the beginning

of an illustrious record.

February, four P-38s, Lieutenants Morton, Cramer, Rist, and Lockridge flying, escorted B-24 Liberators to bomb installations on Bougainville. The regular intercept action by Zeros was repeated. Lieutenant

On 13

Lockridge accounted for one; Lieutenant Robert P. Rist was shot down down another Zero. The mission was repeated to the Short-

after shooting

lands area the next day, 14 February.

197

St. Valentine's

day was a bad day for the 339th. The mission included

10 P-38s escorting nine B-24 Liberators (actually PB4Y models) and 12 Marine F4U Corsair fighters. The P-38s stayed in close to cover the bombers in their usual protective formation. Thirty Japanese Zeros took off from Bougainville's Kahili Field and were in the target area. They began their attack on the P-38 escort formation. The P-38s held position, occasionally feinting a turn into an attacking Zero in an effort to cause him to break off, but resumed position immediately in the escort. A violent air battle with the intercepting Zeros took its toll on the defensive P-38 formation. Captain Griffith shot down one and another probable. Lieutenant J.A. Geyer flamed two and another probable; Lieutenant F.S. Brown got one probable. The 339th lost three pilots, Lieutenants Mulvey, White, and Finkenstein. Mulvey was later recovered. Two Zeros were flamed by the F4Us, who lost two of their own. The mission was termed "a costly but successful lesson." In

February the

Allies

moved into the Russell Islands, a small group of

islands northwest of Guadalcanal, the Japanese having evacuated the lands. P-39s, P-40s,

is-

and P-38s patrolled the Russells to cover construction

were able to spare an attack effort from Munda, which was under constant attack by Cactus

of an airfield, in case the Japanese their protection of

Under this protection the were completed in March. aircraft.

airfield

and

installations at the Russells

On 5 March, four P-39s of the 67th Squadron were patrolling over the The flight was routine and two new arrivals were sent along to

Russells.

become familiar with the area. During the flight, they heard Control at Henderson Field scrambling the fighters. A large enemy formation was heading for Henderson Field. The flight continued its routine patrol of the Russells. As the enemy formation approached Guadalcanal, it was seen on the radar to break into several smaller groups and turned back toward the

Navy TBF Avenger torpedo Bombers are parked 1943. (USAF)

198

at

a newly constructed

air strip

on

New Caledonia,

Russells, apparently to attack the

new American

warning was heard by the patrolling P-39

flight

installations there.

on the

radio:

The

"Recon

to

Clean Slate, bogies approaching you."

By that

time, the attack

was

on. Fifteen Japanese dive

bombers were

making runs on the new Army facilities; 25 Zeros were overhead to cover them. The four P-39 pilots were very concerned; they were outnumbered and the enemy was between them and home. Smoke from the bombs was rising in several places

bombers.

when the P-39s started their dive to attack the dive

Two of the Japanese planes passed under the P-39s as they came

bombing passes. The P-39 formation turned in its dive and down both planes. Two more dive bombers completed their dive, scooting away across the water. The P-39s dropped in behind them and sent them flaming into the sea. The four P-39s, attacking 15 dive bombers, off their dive

shot

had already flamed four before attracting the attention of the 25 Zeros overhead, who were entertaining themselves with their aerobatic cavorting.

The smoke from

the dive bombers hitting the water attracted their

attention and the sky around the Airacobras

was suddenly filled with angry

Zeros.

The Zeros made passes at fast

the P-39s but the

first of

them came

in too

and overshot the mark; they then began to undershoot in their attacks.

The P-39 flight leader chased off after a crippled dive bomber. The second element leader and his wingman kept running across the Russells base with Zeros on their tails. They flew right into dive bombers that were coming off a dive

bombing run with Zeros

still

chasing them. With the Zeros firing on

the P-39s, they in turn were attacking the dive bombers; two

more were

flamed into the water.

The two new men,

their first

day on the

job, out to get familiar

the area, thought this was really something for a routine to the wings of their element leaders and fired

flight.

when they did.

with

They stuck They flew a

beautiful tight formation; they couldn't afford to separate because they didn't

know which direction was home. As the two dive bombers went into

the water in flaming crashes, the Zeros went racing past the two P-39s,

overshooting their attack.

The P-39s broke

off in

the other direction,

losing them.

was four enemy planes and two down in the presence of a total of 40 Japanese planes. The patrol returned home without a bullet hole. In April, enemy air effort continued to build. Daily the large formations of dive bombers escorted by Zeros proceeded down from Bougain-

The

day's bag for the routine patrol

probable, shot

ville.

for

With ample warning, the fighters from Henderson Field were ready off in waves, they engaged the approaching enemy over

them. Taking

much of his incoming flight path. On one such day, 1 April, in a lengthy air battle, 20 Japanese fighters were shot down with a loss of six of the Cactus airplanes. Again on 7 April, the Japanese delivered attacks with a large force of dive bombers and fighters;

over 150 enemy aircraft took part. The 347th Fighter Group's

199

A

view of Tontouta

Air

Base,

New

Caiedonia. 7 October 1943. (USAF)

P-38s, P-39s, and P-40s, along with the F4Fs,

moved against the attacking

Japanese formations. Captain Lamphier and Lieutenants Barber, McLanahan, and Moore, in P-38s, dived on the disciplined tactics

enemy from

above. Holding their

and protecting one another, they shot down seven out of

a flight of 11 Japanese planes. Captain Lamphier got three; Lieutenant

Barber shot down two, and Lieutenants Moore and McLanahan each accounted for one. In that long day, with opposing forces meeting

in

waves,

12 Japanese dive bombers and 27 Zeros were shot down by the fighters

from Henderson

Field.

On 9 April, the 67th Squadron was alerted to move its entire organizapresaged a series of island-hopping moves by units of the 347th Fighter Group as the roll-up of the Japanese began. A mission by the 339th Fighter Squadron on 18 April 1943 was one of the most remarkable of World War II. It was preceded by a period of Allied intelligence-gathering in which several intelligence windfalls came to the advantage of the Allies. U.S. Intelligence had at its disposal the Japanese codes, which American Navy cryptanalysts had broken. This invaluable tion, a notice that

tool allowed intelligence officers to follow the activities of the Japanese,

identifying their intentions with

A

amazing

celerity.

study of messages concerning the movements of Admiral Yama-

moto, chief of Japanese Naval Forces, had taught them that the Admiral

was a man of precise schedules and timing in his every action. Early in April a series of messages concerning an inspection tour by Yamamoto were under study by intelligence personnel. It was determined that the inspection tour ville.

would bring the Admiral to Buin,

From

at the

followed by the Japanese inspection team

determined that Yamamoto would arrive April. Secretary of the

200

southern end of Bougain-

this intelligence analysis, a schedule that

in

would be precisely

was worked out and it was the Buin area at 0935 on 18

Navy Frank Knox directed that a mission be planned

to intercept and shoot

down

the plane carrying Admiral Yamamoto's

in-

spection party

The only aircraft capable of a mission of this type from a land base was W. Mitchell, Commander of the 339th Fighter Squad-

the P-38. Major John

was assigned to plan and lead the mission. Mitchell, an outstanding fighter commander, deserves the credit for planning and carrying out a ron,

flawless mission. details

down

He planned a

16-plane sortie, working out the timing and

to the takeoff times of aircraft and possible replacement of

ground aborts. The 16 P-38s began their takeoffs planes

was

led

by Captain

at

0725. The attack section of four

Tom Lamphier, who was then still a member of

Rex Barber, Jim McLanahan, and Joe Moore. McLanahan's plane blew a tire and he was out of it. Jim was an excellent pilot and an aggressive fighter, and this disappointment was a bitter one for him. He just shut down his engines and cussed the tire problem. (Jim still cusses that blown tire. If it had just happened a little later, with flying speed, he could have got off and gone on the mission. Even in an October 1980 discussion, during a 347th Fighter Group reunion, McLanahan still showed his disappointment. "I could have worried about the 70th Squadron, with Lieutenants

landing with a

flat tire

when

I

returned.")

Major John W. Mitchell being decorated by Brig. Gen. Dean C. Strother. The outstanding success of the mission to Bougainville on 18 April 1943 was based on impeccable planning by Major Mitchell, then commanding the 339th Fighter Squadron. It was during this mission that the Japanese aircraft carrying Admiral Yamamoto was shot down in flames. (USAF)

201

Lieutenant

Moore developed engine

trouble just after takeoff and

returned. Having planned for possible aborts, Lieutenant Besby Holmes and Raymond Hine were ready. They took off and joined Lamphier, restoring the attack section to four aircraft. Major John W. Mitchell with Julius

Jacobson and Lieutenants Douglas Canning, Del ton Goerke, Gordon Whittaker,

Roger Ames, Lawrence Gnaebner, Everett Anglin, William Smith,

Albert Long, Eldon Stratton, and Major Louis Kittel provided escort and

cover for the attack section.

410 miles to Bougainville at 30 feet above The flight was approaching the south coast at the designated time, 0935. As the flight approached the coast, the enemy formation was sighted at about three miles, heading down the coast toward Kahili Field. There were two twin-engine bombers at 4500 feet with an Mitchell took his flight the

the water to avoid detection.

escort of three Zeros covering each at about

The P-38 formation was

still

1500

feet above them.

undetected. Mitchell, according to plan,

climbed his cover section rapidly to 15,000 feet and there leveled provide cover for the attack. to attack

was almost

off to

The temptation for pilots in Mitchell's section

uncontrollable; yet a disciplined protective cover

was

maintained without deviation.

The fierce air combat that now took place has been the subject numerous controversial analyses. Evaluation of intelligence debriefings hot pursuit combat which often takes place in a matter of seconds

of of is

vague and incomplete. The events of the seconds that followed seem to have ticked difficult,

away

and

historical accounts in unit histories are often

as told here.

Captain Lamphier led the attack section in a climb to the level of the

bombers as they dropped their belly tanks for combat. Lamphier and Barber, his wing man, were within a mile of the bombers before being observed. Lieutenant Holmes had difficulty dropping a tank. Hine stayed with him until it dropped off. The bombers nosed over and started descending in evasive action.

intercept the P-38s.

The Zeros dropped their belly The diving Zeros intervened

tanks and dived to in

Lamphier' s and

Barber's attack on the bombers. Lamphier turned into them,

fired,

and

flamed one as they passed. This diversion brought Lamphier to 6000 feet. Lieutenant Barber continued his run on one of the bombers

in a

high-speed pass; he overshot his target. Under attack by a Zero, he pulled his plane sharply around,

the fuselage, and saw the

made another attack on the bomber, firing into section come off in parts. The bomber turned

tail

on its back and plummeted to the ground as he passed. Lamphier, having been delayed by the intrusion of the Zeros, dived into the fray, and with a

bomber that was fleeing the scene along the side in a A wing tore off in an outbreak of fire and the bomber crashed in

deflection shot raked a

long burst. flames.

With their scene at this

202

belly tank

problem solved, Holmes and Hine arrived on the

moment and attacked the Zeros that were after Lamphier and

Thomas

G. Lamphier Jr. was leader of the attack section on the 18 April 1943 mission to Lamphier was officially credited with destroying the Japanese aircraft carrying Admiral Yamamoto. (USAF)

Captain

Bougainville.

Barber.

much

A

racing dogfight

was engaged

in

by

all

for several minutes, with

shooting and unconfirmed results.

While making his way out of the attack area, which had extended over the Kahili and Shortlands regions of Bougainville, Lieutenant Holmes,

203

low over the water, spotted a bomber near Moila Point. He dived in on the bomber, followed by Lieutenant Hine. Holmes fired a burst that started the left engine smoking and Hine followed with another firing pass. flying

tail of the bomber and put a long bomber crash-landed on the water. With the bombers destroyed they broke off to head home; Zeros were everywhere. In the dogfights that followed, Holmes and Barber each shot down a Zero. Lieutenant Hine's left engine began to smoke and he was last

Lieutenant Barber then dived in on the

burst into the fuselage, and the flaming

seen losing altitude south of Shortlands, having shot down a Zero before receiving the hit in his

made an emergency

left

engine. Lieutenant

Holmes ran low on

fuel

and

landing at the Russells air strip. Lieutenant Barber's

coolant system took several hits, which slowed his otherwise safe return.

Lieutenants Barber and Holmes were added to the

list

of aces that day.

On the mission, the 339th was credited with three bombers and three Yamamoto's bomber was the mission was made possible first by a

Zeros, with the loss of Lieutenant Hine; Admiral

one of the three. The success of

fortuitous intelligence situation and then by

its perfect planning and execuby the Commander of the 339th Fighter Squadron, Major John W. Mitchell. Each of his pilots was so well briefed that he knew exactly how each pilot on the mission was to perform. The timing was exact and

tion

Admiral Yamamoto made a precisely planned rendezvous with his destiny.*

The Japanese continued to send heavy air attacks to Guadalcanal and new airstrips at the Russells, fully realizing that the American attempt roll up the islands to Bougainville and Rabaul was a certainty. The U.S.

the to

heavy bombers kept up the pressure on Bougainville and the other Japanese bases to the north; the 347th Fighter Group covered the bombers in their attacks.

Guadalcanal received constant attention from the Japanese as the

need for intelligence secrecy concerning the Yamamoto mission had passed, the identified Lt. Col. Thomas G. Lamphier, Jr., as the man who had shot down the plane carrying Admiral Yamamoto. That combat involving Tom Lamphier and Rex Barber still remains controversial and at that time it was not possible to know which of the Betty bombers shot down had been carrying Admiral Yamamoto. Military security suppressed any open discussion, and it was not known until after the war that there were survivors in the Betty that had crashed on the water. The Admiral was definitely in the one that crashed in flames in the jungle. John W. Mitchell, commander of the mission, gives equal credit. Various visitors to the crash site on Bougainville have came out with "corroborating evidence" for one side or the other based on disposition of wreckage and angle and location of bullet holes in the airframe. Both men have described their experiences on the flight many times, including attack profiles, altitudes, attitudes, and firing angles. At the Admiral Nimitz Museum, Fredericksburg, Texas there is a videotape made to cover the history of the mission. Part of this is an interview conducted in Japan with the last surviving Zero pilot in Admiral Yamamoto's escort flight. His description of the attack and destruction of the Admiral's Betty aircraft tracks closely to Rex Barber's descriptions and lends credence to his claim. The brilliant planning and execution of the mission by its commander, John W. Mitchell, has never received the deserved recognition for his outstanding leadership and airmanship on that day. There is much support for his position that dual credit for the kill should be given to Tom Lamphier and Rex Barber. The bottom line here is that this mission was a total success and John W. Mitchell is the real hero. * After the

War Department

204

Looking East toward

Munda Airdrome on New Georgia Island in the Solomons Group,

1

943. (USAF)

all their troubles. Their strikes were met by Cactus which continued to take heavy tolls on them. The Japanese appeared willing to make sacrifices from their seemingly endless supply of

marshalling base for

fighters,

aircraft,

June.

accepting such losses as 16 aircraft on 13 May, 7 June, and 23

On 16 June, the Japanese sent more than 100 planes down the Slot in

a series of flights. Sixty-six Japanese planes

were shot down with the loss of

Continuous upgrading made a major Allied Air Base out of Tontouta. Here steel matting is stacked for work on runways, 1944. (USAF)

205

Cleaning guns and performing maintenance on a P-39 at an airfield on Bougainville Island are crew members of the 68th Fighter Squadron. They are, left to right, Sgt. Adolph Tavani, Sgt. Mendus R. Western, S/Sgt. Guba, Pfc. Misha Mazur, Sgt. Joe Raburn, and Sgt. Armond Davis. 5 March 1944.

(USAF)

Cactus aircraft. On that day, Lieutenant Murray Shubin of the 339th Squadron accounted for five of them. Some damage was inflicted by the bombers, but the air victory soundly defeated their maximum effort. These six

fierce efforts

by the enemy were

buildup and the

moves

that

P-39s needing repair are parked (USAF)

Air Base, 1944.

206

typical of their resistance to the Allied

were sure

in

front of

to

come.

hanger #1 at 1 3th

Air

Depot on

New Caledonia, Tontouta

Lt. Colonel Robert Westbrook, of Hollywood California, leading ace of the 13th Fighter Command, shot down his 1 7th Japanese plane on 30 September 1 944 over enemy-held Kendari Field in the southern Celebes. Flying a P-38 Lightning, Col. Westbrook led seven fighters of the "Game Cock"

Squadron on a long

1

500-mile

bomber escort

On 30 June

mission. (USAF)

1943, Rendova Island was invaded by the

cover was so effective that

it

The

air

accounted for 20 to 30 enemy planes on each

of the several days of the operation.

crossed and landed on

Allies.

Using Rendova as a base, troops

New Georgia in July to begin their drive to capture

the Japanese airfields at Munda. Within a

month the Americans were using

207

The 67th

Fighter Squadron's

Philippine Islands.

"Game Cock"

insignia

on a tree outside

their

camp

at Palawan,

9 October 1945. (USAF)

Munda strip as an emergency field while it was being put in condition more extensive use. The 67th Squadron, the "Game Cock," had now arrived at Gerney Field, Milne Bay, New Guinea, on 17 June, preparatory to a July move to the

for

Woodlark

208

Island,

which

lies

between the southern

tip of

New

Guinea and

An F-4 Phantom of the 68th Tactical

Fighter

Squadron

at

Moody Air Force Base,

This aircraft took part in the recent Operation Proud Phantom Tactical Fighter Wing exercise. (USAF)

Bougainville.

There were plenty

in flights

Valdosta, Georgia.

to Cairo-West, Egypt, a 347th

of attack sorties and scrambles there for

much air action, although Captain Joe Berkow did shoot down a two-engine enemy reconnaissance bomber on 24 August. By October, all of the 347th Fighter Group was operating out of Munda or the 67th but not

Guadalcanal, supporting the invasion of Bougainville in November.

The

story of the

"Game Cock"

through the end of the war.

It

takes the 67th Fighter Squadron

played a significant role in the

life

of the

347th Fighter Group and the detailed exploits of the 347th Fighter Group in its move through the Pacific, which deserves a more complete treatment in a

separate book.

Beginning with the Guadalcanal invasion

An F-15 Eagle of the 67th Kadena Okinawa. (USAF)

Tactical Fighter Squadron, the

in

August of 1942, the 67th

"Game Cock," now on

fighter duty at

209

Fighter Squadron (and later, the 347th Fighter Group) went on to become

Command. They island : hopped through the South and joined with the 5th Fighter Command, advancing up through the Southwest Pacific, at the Philippines. From there they were to begin

part of the 13th Fighter Pacific

—

Ryukus to the home islands of Japan a plan became unnecessary when the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan hastened the end of the war and saved hundreds of thousands of lives that their approach through the

that

would have been sacrificed in an invasion of the home Islands of Japan. The 67th Fighter Squadron remained overseas after the end of World War II, receiving occasional changes in aircraft and personnel. The Squadron took part in the Korean War, where many of its former pilots, veterans of Guadalcanal, returned to combat. The "Game Cock" played its part in the Vietnam War as well; and, later, was stationed at various bases in the Pacific and the Far East. Today the "Game Cock" carries on, with the F-15 Eagles of the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron at Kadena Air Base,

Okinawa.

The other Squadrons of the old 347th Fighter Group, the 68th, 70th, Moody Air Force Base, Valdosta, Georgia, in the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing. The 347th, reactivated at Moody AFB in 1976, is the consistent winner of awards and and 339th Tactical Fighter Squadrons, are stationed at

honors, including the coveted Air Force Outstanding Unit Award. Flying their F-4

Phantoms in readiness for global operations, they deploy on short Most recently, the

notice to any part of the world, assisted by air refueling.

68th and 70th Squadrons moved their

aircraft in flights to Cairo- West,

Egypt, where they operated for 90 days

Proud Phantom. The spirit of the "Game Cock" Squadron and

210

in

in

lives

desert maneuvers, Operation

on

in

the 67th Tactical Fighter

the 347th Tactical Fighter Wing.

APPENDIX

Letters of Gen.

A

Harmon

Below are some appropriate letters of General Millard F. Harmon, Commanding General, United States Army Forces in the South Pacific Area;(USAFISPA). Letter to General George C. Marshall, 11 August, 1942; expresses

1.

doubt that Guadalcanal can be held by the Navy operation

in

progress

unless reinforcing efforts are immediately forthcoming.

2.

Letter to General H.H. Arnold, 18 August, 1942; discusses

Army com-

mitments to support Cactus. 3.

Letter to General H.H. Arnold, 28 September, 1942; provides an

tial

ini-

summary of action by the P-39/P-400s of the 67th Fighter Squadron at

Cactus.

4.

Letter to Admiral Ghormley, 6 October, 1942; outlines to Ghormley

areas of caution and disagreement on the pending operation to occupy the Island of Ndeni.

211

5.

Letter to General H.H. Arnold, 20 October, 1942; a general report on

activities of personal

importance, includes word on the replacement of

Admiral Ghormley as Commander of Operation Watchtower, by Admiral Chester Nimitz.

Major General Millard F. ("Miff") Harmon, U.S. Army Air Force, deserves substantial credit for the successful conquest of the Solomon Islands.

A polished

gentleman, an aggressive commander and a genius at

planning and organization, he was a suave and competent diplomat

who

tiptoed through the thorny morass of organization set up by the Navy. His

guidance was sought, respected, and followed by his Navy superiors.

Harmon was one of the most competent and least apprecommanders of the Pacific War. Little has been presented in histori-

Millard F. ciated

cal writing of this quiet genius, probably

The

due to

his early

and untimely

which he was making a noncombat flight was depresumed lost on 26 February, 1945, somewhere in the Pacific Ocean Area. It is sad indeed that he did not live on to serve his country as Commanding General Army Air Force, or as Chief Of Staff death.

aircraft in

clared missing and

United States Air Force.

212

EXTRACT SECRET HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA Noumea,

New

Caledonia

11 August 1942

General George C. Marshall Chief of Staff

United States

Army

Washington, D.C.

Dear General Marshall: 10.

Our estimate

of Jap forces in the Bismark-Solomon area

is

as

follows:

2 Divisions and about 5,000 miscellaneous

40 Bombers 50 Fighters 45 Miscellaneous

aircraft

10 Cruisers

20 Destroyers AP, AK etc, capable of transporting one Above does not take into account losses suffered Rapid reenforcement of

air

division. in

recent action.

and surface craft from Truk area must

be considered. 13.

The

thing that impresses

me more

connection with the Solomon action

is

that

than anything else

we

in

are not prepared to

"follow up." At great effort, with a strong array of Naval force and with

Army Bombardment

support,

we succeeded

in

occupying Cactus -

Ringbolt with a Marine Division (Reinforced). Certain losses were all forces participating. We have seized a strategic position from which future operations against the Bismarks can be strongly supported. Can the Marines hold it? There is considerable room for doubt. Certainly they will receive every possible support from forces

suffered by

213

available.

The Japanese

force that can be quickly brought to bear

theoretically sufficient to retake Cactus-Ringbolt before

it

is

can be

consolidated and reenforced by aircraft, antiaircraft, and additional

That they

troops.

will

make

the attempt

I

have no doubt for the

concentration of forces in the Rabaul-Solomon area

The

resourcefulness and determination of our

own

is

rapid and heavy.

forces will

I

trust

foil

this attempt.

A

capable construction unit with the landing forces to improve

airdromes, provide dispersion and camouflage; proper logistic provisions for fuel,

bombs

etc and the availability of three squadrons of P-38 type

Fighters to protect our

own Bombers and

critical installations

would

almost assure retention of what has been gained.

Navy can get airdrome construction personnel and fuel, bombs and ammunition and the Marine Fighter and Scout Bomber Squadrons into Cactus we can augment with the P-400 and then be all set to operate our medium and heavy bombers from Cactus initially, at least as an advanced airdrome. Under these conditions I believe the position can be held. It is the procedure I propose to recommend to Admiral Ghormley. If

the

equipment, forward echelons of ground crews,

,

,

M.F. HARMON Major General, U.S.A.

214

HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA Noumea,

New

Caledonia

18 August 1942 Lieut. Gen.

H.H. Arnold

Commanding General

Army

Air Forces

Washington, D.C.

Dear General Arnold:

Am operating with temporary headquarters here in Noumea. me

With

are Twining, Breene, Jamison, Glasgow, Adj. Gen. Sherman G-2,

Wilson, Anti-aircraft, Evans

Ground G-3, Beadle, Engr., Ankenbrandt,

Barnes, Ord. Colonels Everest and Strother

I

sent along with Admiral

(Comairsopac) on his flag-ship up to Buttons to serve for

on

his staff as

Bomber and Fighter

that capacity. Lt. Col. Saunders is

also at Buttons.

McCain

him —

Officer,

and as

my

McCain

this operation

representatives in

commanding the 11th Group and he consults them all and they have been

is

freely

this he told me himself. I am sure also that they have helped him a lot and that they have contributed materially to the proper employment of our Bomber forces. Saunders has done a splendid

invaluable to

I am sure before this goes much further he will be in order for an appropriate decoration. All of his crews and personnel have done equally well in their own niche. Operating out of narrow dusty fields,

job and

eating

when they

could,

working and sleeping

airplanes; often without cots or tents.

in

Through

and around their

it all

cheerful and doing

They are a bit of alright. Was up at Buttons a few days ago and they were just unloading their dunnage off the ship and were getting their camp set up and were all O.K. by the following three

mens work

each.

evening. Boats can't keep up with this kind of a war, unless the needs

215

are forseen and then only in certain circumstances. That

one reason are going to U.K. but what a godsend just a few would be out here. Could "for example, with two of them send the ground crews for the P-400s into Cactus without the risk of having them sunk on the way up by plane or torpedo, and a

we need

C-47s. Yes

know they

I

is

all

thousand other jobs.

On

returning from Buttons on this past trip

gave Purple Hearts to two

officers

I

stopped at Roses and

and one Sergeant wounded over

—

combat with Zero yet they got the Zero. Had the band and three companies of my old 24th Infantry to do the honors. After it was over I gave the dark boys a talk in regard to their responsibilities as Cactus

in

front line representatives of the military efforts of the Colored People

Hope

of America.

it

did

some good but am not

blinded with optimism.

Strother went out on a reconnaissance mission with the Bombers

one day. The B-17 he was

was

in

lost in foul

weather and they

finally

landed in the water off the coast of Buttons. All reached ashore eventually and

were brought

in,

but Strother had a bad cut on one leg

bay (you see what the Navy has done to me) for a while. As usual the B-17 broke just aft of the radio compartment and and

be

will

in the sick

sank quickly, but not before they got a

raft out.

you McCain is conducting operations from his ship at Buttons. I have Everest and Strother with him and Saunders is on shore close by. So I keep in touch through them and have been up twice myself. McCain is very reasonable, accepts advice and suggestions and is properly concerned as to the welfare of the operating personnel. Nevertheless it is a bit more difficult for the Group Commander than it would be if he were directly under familiar experienced Air Force control. However everyone concerned is doing his utmost for efficient, harmonious operation and the situation at Buttons with Marines, Army and Navy working together with but one purpose in mind is a most

As

I

told

encouraging thing to see.

Here Twining and I are in daily contact with Ghormley. He never comes ashore but we go out and board him practically every day, frequently have lunch, and go over the whole works.

and complete information. plans, thoughts

I

could not ask for a

more

and confidences than he accords.

I

He

only wish

I

smart enough to be more sure of the soundness of the advice

when he

asks for

me

gives

full

free access to his

were I

give him

it.

With the help of

my

staff;

through a personal knowledge of the

Roses and Buttons; by frequent contact with Ghormley and McCain as well as our Air Force Commanders I am situation in Fantan, Poppy,

in every possible way to keep the machine oiled so as to smooth functioning. Adequacy of supplies, proper command

endeavoring assist in its

functioning, operational procedure, communications and individual

demand attention. Airdrome construction and special emphasis on dispersion and camouflage are a daily concern. Mine is a rather

fitness

216

peculiar status, particularly during this period prior to assuming responsibility for supply

and administration, but

I

am

confident that

we

have been of assistance. Am having prepared a very brief estimate of the situation which I hope to be able to mail to General Marshall within the next few days. It will

not be a polished document, but

resume

of the situation as

should be done about

Right

—

now we

it

are

full

out to get

.

Hope we

do hope

it

will

serve to present a

what

I

believe

it.

into Cactus Early operation of

Cactus.

I

exists in this area, and

some Fighters

B-17

will, of

— and then Bombers

course, be by staging at

get out P-400s through without any losses. Every

care will be exercised and they have the range. With the Bombers able to top off at Cactus

we

can give Kieta and Buka a good plastering.

I

we must take emergency measures to help out the Marines and secure that Cactus base for

hate to deplete Poppy of Fighters but

Bomber

offensive operations.

Kind regards to

all.

M.F. HARMON Major General, U.S.A. Note:

Code Name Poppy

New

Buttons

Espiritu Santos,

Roses Fantan

Efate,

Location Caledonia

New

New

Hebrides

Hebrides

Fiji

217

HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA Noumea, New Caledonia 28 September 1942

MEMORANDUM: TO: Lieutenant General Arnold. 1.

The

following

is

a

summary

of our fighter operations at Cactus

The dates and in some cases

during the period, August 22nd to September 15th 1942.

given for different actions are estimates of the pilots are not exact.

The account

of these operations

is

based on the

consolidated reports of pilots engaged. 14 P-400s, 17 Officers, 30 enlisted

men

of the

67th Fighter Squadron completed their move to

Cactus on August 22nd 1942. The

flight of P-400s from Poppy to Roses to Button to Cactus was accomplished without incident, with navigational escort being furnished by B-17 airplanes. 2.

Air Action

The

:

when two P-400s attacked and P-400s attacked an enemy four engine flying boat and made a total of six passes upon it. The enemy airplane was left smoking and losing altitude when the P-400s were compelled to return to base due to fuel shortage. Seven P-400s were attacked at 14,000 feet by 15 Zeros. Our fighters accounted for three sure and three probable Zeros. Two P~400s were lost, both pilots parachuted to safety, while three other P-400s were damaged by enemy fire. A flight of four P-400s were attacked by six or seven Zeros at an altitude of 100 feet near Tulagi. No enemy airplanes were shot down but two P-400s with pilots are missing. In air action the P-400s were first air

action

was

destroyed a Zero fighter.

218

initiated

Two

unable to reach 23,000 feet where the Japanese bombardment habitually operate.

Support of Marines at Tasimboko

3.

The Marine

:

Tasimboko was supported by P-400s low altitude missions. on Four bombing and strafing missions were flown one day by flights of three P-400s. Our airplanes inflicted severe personnel casualties and damaged a considerable store of supplies. The Marines were loud in their praise of this supporting action and stated that the mission could not have been successfully completed without the landing action at

fighter support.

Santa Isabel Island

3.

:

On

about September 8th Japanese landing barges were discovered near Santa Isabel Island. A total of 27 boats were seen, some of which

were beached and others being off shore. Two dive bombing and strafing missions of four P-400s each were completed against this objective. At least 20 landing boats with their supplies were destroyed and the others damaged and an estimated 300 Japanese killed. Three landing boats, closely spaced and full of personnel and supplies, were attacked by Captain T.J.J. Christian. A direct hit was scored on the center boat by a 500 pound bomb and the two adjacent boats with their cargos were destroyed. Each boat was estimated to be carrying 75 Japanese.

Cape Esperance

4.

:

Japanese landing boats were discovered at Cape Esperance, when supplies and barges

were seen on the beach. P-400s attacked

this

position for three days, using a flight of four airplanes. Approximately

20 barges and a considerable store of supplies and an unknown number of personnel were destroyed. 5. Tenaru River The Marines were stopped in the action at Tenaru River on September 14th by a Japanese strong point. They asked our fighters to clean out the strong point as they were unable to reach it by ground action. Captain J.F. Thompson with two other P-400s attacked the Japanese position, which was in a valley, and necessitated our forces threading their way up and down the valley in bombing and strafing :

attacks.

The Marines completed

action had killed at least

due to our 6.

their mission

300 Japs and

and reported that our

that the success of the action

air

was

fighters.

Almost

daily

Japanese positions

bombing and

in

strafing action has

been taken against

the Jungle, however, results are

estimate because of the thick vegetation. In

all

difficult to

of these actions the

Marines have been most grateful and complimentary to our P-400 action. In a statement at Cactus General Geiger stated that without ,

exception the P-400 was the best attack type ship at the that

field.

Further,

Major Brannon and Captain Thompson were excellent and able

219

squadron commanders, that

performed 8.

in

all

pilots

an outstanding manner.

engaged

in

these actions

*

A recapitulation of these operations

indicate that our

P-400s

destroyed over 40 landing barges, large quantities of stores, supplies,

and ammunition and

killed

over 600 Japanese,

in addition to

the 4 Zeros

certain and the 3 Zeros probable.

M.F. HARMON Major General, U.S.A.

220

HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA (Forward Echelon)

Noumea,

New

Caledonia

6 October 1942

SUBJECT: Occupation TO: Comsopac 1.

From

of Ndini

a military viewpoint the occupation of Ndini at this time

under the existing strategic situation has not appealed to

measure best I

utilizing the capabilities of

me

as a

our forces.

have not previously more completely expressed subject. While fully prepared to support to the utmost

regret that

myself on this

I

final decision it does not appear that it is even now too late to review the plan, as action for its accomplishment has but just been initiated.

your

Attention

is

therefore invited to the following considerations:

understood that the primary reasons for the occupation

a. It is

of Ndini are: (1) To provide a base for airplane operation for: Antisubmarine patrol; extension of patrols to the North and Northeast and protection of east flank of Line of Communication to the Solomons. (2) (3)

To deny it to the enemy. To afford an intermediate

Cactus for staging short range

Reference in

a. (1)

field

between Button and

aircraft.

These are

all

admittedly important reasons

favor of this line of action but cannot afford our forces any benefit or

influence

the

enemy

final analysis

action for at least

two and probably three months.

they are not individually or cumulatively

vital to

In

the

success of main offensive operation or accomplishment of primary mission of maintaining security of South Pacific bases and lines of

communication.

221

Reference

develop Ndini or occupy intensive

not probable that the

a. (2) It is it

we

long as

in force as

enemy

will

are able to conduct

bomber operations from Buttons. Reference

practically

all

aircraft

b. (1)

While desirable

a. (3)

can make the

The occupation

this is not a necessity as

Button-Cactus direct.

flight

of Ndini at this time represents a

diversion from the main effort and dispersion of force.

The

situation in

Cactus-Ringbolt cannot be regarded as anything but "continuingly critical." Infiltration

enemy

continues and recent additions probably give the

Pack or other employed could a serious danger. With or without augmentation by

a force ashore in the neighborhood of 3,500.

mobile artillery

develop into

the hands of this force

in

infiltration, this force

victory

if

skillfully

if

could well tip the scales in favor of an

enemy

used against our Southern and Western front

skillfully

in

conjunction with a determined night attack from the seaward

approaches. There

is

no effective defense against

his support of

such an

attack by fire from warships. If

we do

not succeed in holding Cactus-Ringbolt our effort in

the Santa Cruz will be a total waste

The

— and

loss.

The Solomons has

to be

would be a four way victory for the Jap provide a vanguard for his strong Bismarck position, deny us a jumping off place against that position, give him a jumping off place against the New Hebrides, effectively cover his our main

effort.

—

operations against It is

my

loss of Cactus-Ringbolt

New

Guinea.

personal conviction that the Jap

Cactus-Ringbolt and that he materially strengthened.

I

will

do so

in

is

capable of retaking

the near future unless

it is

further believe that appropriate increase in

strength of garrison, rapid improvement of conditions for air operation

and increased surface action,

if

accomplished

operation so costly that he will not attempt (2)

The airdrome

in time, will

make

the

it.

(including both fields) cannot be considered

suitable for continuous operation.

The

the character of the surface on which

durability of the mat, considering it is

laid,

for continuous operation

heavy ships is open to doubt. The mat is not completed on the runway, and there are no taxiways or standings. With any considerable of

degree of cease.

rain, air operations

The Jap has

under present conditions

will practically

not shown himself unskillful at forecasting

meteorological conditions nor slow in taking advantage of them. (3) There may be some plan behind his recent method of Fighter-Bomber approach. Is there perhaps the idea that on the right

day, at the appropriate time, after having exhausted our Fighters and

apparently withdrawn his Bombers, he heavily? Dispersion at Cactus

there

is

relatively none.

to operate

them

in

We

is

will

do not have

two echelons

sufficient Fighters or facilities

of sufficient strength.

well executed, would be a stunning blow.

222

return with them and strike

poor. Of concealment and protection

Such an attack,

(4)

The

to permit the

runway and adequate facilities B-17 squadron would go far

availability of a suitable

full

effective operation of

toward the security of our position by extending the range of daylight reconnaissance and by providing a ready striking force to be used against appropriate objectives as far northwest as Buka. 2. It is

recommended

that any reconsideration of plans take

cognisance of the following proposed lines of action:

The abandonment

a.

of the Ndini operation until such time as a

condition of reasonable stability and security

is

achieved

in

the Southern

Solomons.

The immediate reinforcement of Cactus by not less than the Combat Team. The intensification, as means and conditions permit, of naval

b.

equivalent of one Infantry Regimental c.

surface action in South Solomon waters.

The prompt

d.

dispatch to Cactus of

all

the airdrome

construction personnel, equipment and construction supplies that can be

employed and used, with the initial mission of: (1) Completing one all-weather runway with taxiways and

effectively

dispersed standings. (2)

Completing a second all-weather runway with taxiways

and dispersed standings. (3)

Improvement

and protection of

Material augmentation of fuel supply to a

e.

250,000

of fueling system, dispersal, camouflage

aircraft.

minimum

level of

gallons.

Conduct of intensive

f.

air

operations from Cactus against

Bui-Tonolei-Faisi and Buka. g. air,

Continuation of intensive short range

air

operations against

land and sea objectives. h.

Occupation of

tactical localities in the

New

Georgia group by

infiltration.

3.

Appreciating that

may have I

I

have not exhausted

important considerations

in

this subject

and that you

mind that are not covered

herein,

nevertheless feel obligated to present these views to you.

M.H.

HARMON

Major General, U.S.A.

Commanding

223

HEADQUARTERS USAFISPA

MFH/DY/kl 1

APO

502, San Francisco, 20 October 1942

Lt.

Calif

Gen. H.H. Arnold,

Commanding General, Army

Air Forces

Munitions Bldg.

Washington, D.C.

Dear General Arnold:

Your letter of September 15 concerning information desired of combat participation, individual combats and experiences together with pictures is being given my personal attention. We will do our best to comply, but it is difficult due to operating conditions and distances. Anything I send in officially for publication, pictures and all, has to go through Cincpac. I note Eddie Rickenbacker and Hans Adamson are coming out this way soon. I will try to collect as much data and pictures in the meantime as possible and, while routing officially through Cincpac, will give them all I can personally to bring back for "y° ur information." Inclosed

is

recommending

a note to Saunders who, incidentally,

I

am

D.S.M. Will also award him a D.F.C. for specific air missions, but also feel he well merits a D.S.M. for the fine job of leadership he has done under extremely difficult conditions. Have finally for a

prevailed upon him to take a short rest in

leave in a few days. off for

five

We

of Cactus

who

Willis

Zealand, and he will

got three of his combat crews, nine

Aukland today and

days interval.

New

will follow

The same

men

each,

with others on a schedule of about

also for the tired

P-400 and P-39 boys out

surely have done a bang up job.

Hale

is

here for a day or two and

we have worked

out a

pretty good understanding of our mutual problems. Things are definitely

224

looking up in regard to the attainment of the ground and air (including ground echelons) forces I visualize as necessary for this area.

Cactus remains a most disturbing question.

It is right where it has our surface forces can stop the Jap freedom of action, particularly at night, and if we get the landing field operating

been from the beginning. for

B-17

ferried

— with enough

bombs

in

by

air

If

fuel

on the beach and bombs

— we can

yesterday

Halsey relieved Ghormley today. Perhaps there in

method or

the bush

— we

will

be a difference

There are some I hope for the best.

intensity of surface force action.

from Pearl.

additional surface forces enroute All

in

pull the fat out of the fire.

our P-39s are set up.

We

lost

about seven as a result of one

Most of the P-38s are set up and we have six good pilots with about 100 hours each and about ten real good P-39 pilots all of whom have had two engine time, under training. Should have a good tight little P-38 flight soon, but I am not going to unleash them night shelling at Cactus

until

Strother and

Cactus

from

is

.

McNeese

OK, some

fuel

say they are "ready to go," and the

shell fire.

Don't think there goes

I

will

ever spend

my Rainbow

back there than

I

and

it

field at

ashore and a reasonable expectation of security

fishing.

much time

in

New

Zealand

— and

Halsey seems no more inclined to move

appears that

we may be moving more and more

up here. Will keep the purely administrative part back there under Lincoln with enough to carry out our contacts with the New Zealand Army and Air Force. For the time being Breene as

of our headquarters

Commanding General Service Command will have to be there but move him up here later on. We have about 250 four second fuses on hand but no change to try them out. Art Goebel

I

I

may

as yet

brought up from Aukland and took him to Button with

us a few days ago with the idea of sending him back up as Base Commanding Officer of Saunders Bomber Field. Unfortunately he

is

having a lot of trouble with his ears. We have our best medics working on him, and we have some good ones, but I am worried about him. If they can't correct the trouble we will just have to send him back to a dry climate. if it is

Wanted you

to

know about

necessary to return him you

With kind regards from

this, as I

will

know

of your interest and

understand the reason.

all,

M.F. HARMON Major General, U.S. Army, Commanding.

225

APPENDIX

B

Citations

1.

Letter of commendation, 18 September, 1942, from Major Dale D.

Brannon,

Commander

of the 67th's

Cactus

Flight, to the

Commander,

67th Fighter Squadron. The letter commends the 30 enlisted ground crew

members assigned in the first contingent of the squadron sent to Guadalcanal. As a result of this letter, each of these men was decorated with the Legion of Merit, by order of General Harmon, May, 1943, Headquarters USAFISPA. 2.

in

General Order #123, 24

Americal Division General Order, authorizing the Presidential Distin-

guished Unit Citation to

all

of the initial

members of the Cactus contingent

of the 67th Fighter Squadron.

3. Letter from the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, 17 November, 1942, a commendation by Admiral William F. Halsey to all participants on the November 1942 action at Guadalcanal and surrounding area.

4.

A letter of commendation from General A.A. Vandegrift, Commander of

the 1st Marine Division, to

aviation units at Guadalcanal, dated

23

5. A commendation by Brig. General L.E. Woods, Commander of the Marine Air Wing, to all air units on Guadalcanal.

1st

all

November, 1942.

226

6. Citation

by the Secretary of the Navy, Frank Knox, dated 4 February,

1943, to the 1st Marine Division Reinforced, authorizes that the citation

be issued to each individual who served in the initial invasion and Guadalcanal was secured and the 1st Marine Division was relieved.

until

227

SIXTY-SEVENTH FIGHTER SQUADRON 18 September 1942.

SUBJECT: Commendation. Commanding Officer, 67th Fighter Squadron. TO :

1. For an extremely hazardous mission, flight operations at Henderson Field, Guadalcanal, Solomon Islands, the following men the 67th Fighter Squadron were selected.

Tech

Sgt.

"

"

Stf.

" " "

Enoch

Dalhman

J.

Charles N. Neblock

James M. Crawford Floyd D. Cunningham " Edwin M. Czerniakowski " Felix Gurbada

Sgt.

"

"

"

"

"

Thomas W. Hurford Verne W.King

"

"

Francis

Sgt.

" "

J.

O'Connell

Kermit Carnes Robert L. Ferguson

"

JohnOhrlich Arnold H. Phillips

"

Franklin A. Ryder

"

William H. Schneider

"

Duane

"

Hugh

"

William R. Williams

E.

F.

Shumway

Slimmer

Cpl Sidney G. Hudson "

Harvey J. Lein

"

Jack H.Miller

"

Kenneth Markel DaleV. Maupin " Thomas 0. Melton "

6557048 6828715 6914288 6912728 6913315 6803475-RAR 6765109 17016117 6667896 35129349 20123249 35167031 12022235 16014023 6998385 18017856 18000754 17027535 7002119 36216711 35040022 18029384 17027324 14029208

228 i

of

Pfc William E. Flynn

11011642 17027532 17021079 14077692 20846565 16014052

Jr.

Vernard H. Trebon Fred L. Williams Pvt Archie A. Fitzgerald ff

Tony

ft

Michael Zavoskey

F.

Lopez

2. These men were transported by Navy Sea Vessel, through dangerous waters, to their destination. From the moment of debarkation

on August 23, until the undersigned was relieved of command on September 14, the services of these men were outstanding.

Through

bombing raids, sniper fire, cruiser and submarine men worked unhesitatingly in order that the airplanes would be mechanically fit as humanly possible, that they would 3.

daily

shelling at night, these

be gassed, armed, loaded with bombs,

all

set to go, in order that

all

missions could be successfully accomplished.

4.

Under conditions

of barely

enough

food, very

little

sleep,

burned, bombed, or damaged equipment, lack of equipment, these

worked up to and beyond the yet worked on and on. 5. In

limit of

the midst of death and destruction, tropic heat, hunger, and

physical weariness, these

men gave

cannot describe or appreciate. not the normal once but

6.

men

normal physical endurance, and

The

a devotion to duty that words

They were

called to give

and they gave,

five-fold.

side that has

men

like

these just cannot loose.

DALE

D.

BRANNON,

Major, Air Corps, Flight

Commander.

1st Ind.

HQ. 67th Fighter Squadron, AAF, Americal

Division,

September 19,

1942.

TO:

Commanding 1.

Officer,

The Commanding

AAF, Americal

Division.

Officer of the 67th Fighter

Squadron

is

extremely proud to pass on this information concerning the loyalty and fine spirit

with which these

men

accomplished their mission.

THOMAS H. HUBBARD, Major, Air Corps,

Commander.

229

HEADQUARTERS AMERICAL DIVISION AP0 716 31 December 1943.

GENERAL ORDERS

)

NUMBER

)

67

Awards

By

of the Presidential Unit Citation

direction of the President, and authority contained in paragraph

5, Letter,

War Department, The

(29 Jul 43), subject:

Eligibility of

Adjutant General's Office,

Army Personnel

Unit Citation and ribbon bar with star, dated 5

Endorsement, Headquarters USAFISPA, the following-named officers and enlisted

APO men

200.6

November 1943, and 502,

AG

dated 10 December 1943, the Presidential Unit Citation

who served

AG

to the Presidential 1st

200.6 (7)1, is awarded to

of the Americal Division

combat with the First Marine Division, Reinforced, on Guadalcanal at any time during the period 7 August 1942 to 9 December 1942: in actual

(Sent to each individual with

name

entered here)

By command

of

Major General

HODGE:

CM. McQUARRIE Colonel, General Staff Corps

Chief of Staff

OFFICIAL: W.H.

BIGGERSTAFF

Lieutenant Colonel, Adjutant General's Department Adjutant General

230

KV10/A3-2(6)/her (C-132)

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, FLEET MARINE FORCE, c/o POSTMASTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA. November

17, 1942.

WING MEMORANDUM) :

NUMBER 1.

The

Southern

Commendation.

2C-1942) following radio message received from the

Pacific, is

quoted for the information of

all

Commander,

aircraft units

attached to this base:

17

NOVEMBER

1942

TO THE SUPERB OFFICERS AND MEN ON LAND — ON SEA— IN THE AIR— AND UNDER THE SEA WHO HAVE PERFORMED SUCH MAGNIFICENT FEATS FOR OUR COUNTRY IN THE PAST FEW DAYS X YOU HAVE WRITTEN YOUR NAMES IN GOLDEN LETTERS ON THE PAGES OF HISTORY AND WON THE

UNDYING GRATITUDE OF YOUR COUNTRYMEN X MY — NO HONOR FOR

PRIDE IN YOU IS BEYOND EXPRESSION YOU COULD BE TOO GREAT X

MAGNIFICENTLY DONE X GOD BLESS EACH AND EVERY ONE OF YOU X TO THE GLORIOUS DEAD — HAIL HEROES— REST WITH GOD X SIGNED HALSEY

BY COMMAND OF BRIGADIER GENERAL WOODS: OFFICIAL:

M. SANPAS Major,

USMC,

W-2 231

1990-5-30 Headquarters, First Marine Division

066/216

Fleet Marine Force,

C/O Postmaster, San

Francisco, Calif.

November

DIVISION CIRCULAR) :

NUMBER 1.

.

.

—

Commendation

23, 1942

of certain Aviation Units

30a-42)

The Commanding General

takes pride and pleasure in

transmitting herewith the following

commendatory dispatch from the

Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet:

"CONVEY MY PERSONAL CONGRATULATIONS TO EACH 01 THE WILDCAT AND AIRCOBRA PILOTS WHO TOOK PART IN THE ATTACK ON ENEMY AIRCRAFT ON 12 NOVEMBER DURING WHICH 16 TORPEDO BOMBERS AND 5 ZEROS WERE SHOT DOWN WHILE ATTEMPTING TO ATTACK FRIENDLY SHIPPING OFF GUADALCANAL" 2. It is

the pilots

directed that a copy of this Circular be delivered to each of

who took

part in the above-mentioned action.

s/

A.A. Vandegrift

A. A.

Distribution: All units.

VANDEGRIFT

HEADQUARTERS SECTION FIRST MARINE AIR WING, CACTUS To

all

Cactus based First Marine Aircraft Wing units and other

attached units (VT-8, VB-10, VF-10, 67th Pursuit Squadron, 39th Pursuit Squadron, and 339th Pursuit Squadron) at Guadalcanal:

On November German

11th, the anniversary of our final defeat of the

forces, the Japanese

struck in an

all

Navy,

Army and

their air forces,

out attempt to retake this island. So intent and

determined was the enemy to accomplish this objective that it gathered together over a period of weeks an armada of not less than two airplane carriers, two battleships, three heavy cruisers, six light cruisers,

twenty destroyers, and

transports, capable of carrying supplies;

and

this

at least twelve large

more than 30,000 troops and

their

armada was reinforced by numerous land-based

aircraft.

After five days of furious fighting off this

we

have, almost unaided, beaten

formidable force by our airpower, and in so doing, have

destroyed sixty-five

enemy

airplanes, a battleship, twelve

numbers of troops and quantities have heavily damaged four enemy cruisers. transports, large

of supplies, and,

This feat of arms was accomplished by the combined Marine, Navy and Army pilots and their ground crews, who had already

performed on

enemy

planes,

this island

heavy

weeks

of ardous

combat duty. Neither

anti-aircraft fire, miserable flying conditions,

no intense fatigue halted our pilots from pushing home attack after attack until even a powerful and persistent enemy was forced to

233

give way.

The

planes with which these tremendous tasks have

been carried out were kept in operation only by the unremitting persistence, ingenuity and courage of our ground crews, who worked day and night, under bombing and shell fire, to keep our planes flying.

Every man has

in

in

the First Marine Air Wing, and

these past five days lived up

traditions of our flying force;

its

attached units,

to, in fact exalted,

the finest

and has thereby insured us the

possession of this island, and the

final

defeat of the enemy.

/s/

L.E.

Woods

/t/

L.E.

WOODS,

Brigadier General,

Commanding

234

USMC,

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Washington 4 February 1943 (Sent to each individual, with

name

entered here) Cited in the

THE

Name

of

The President of the United States FIRST MARINE DIVISION, REINFORCED Under Command

of

Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, U.S.M.C.

CITATION: "The

and enlisted

officers

men

of the First

Marine Division,

Reinforced, on August 7 to 9, 1942, demonstrated outstanding gallantry

and determination against a

number

in successfully

executing forced landing assaults

of strongly defended Japanese positions

on Tulagi,

Gavutu, Tanambogo, Florida and Guadalcanal, British Solomon Islands, completely routing

base and Pacific

airfield

Ocean.

all

the

enemy forces and seizing a most valuable enemy zone of operations in the South

within the

From

the above period until 9 December, 1942, this

Reinforced Division not only held their important strategic positions despite determined and repeated Japanese naval, air and land attacks,

but by a series of offensive operations against strong enemy resistance drove the Japanese from the proximity of the airfield and inflicted great losses on them by land and air attacks. The courage and determination displayed in these operations

were

of an inspiring order."

/s/

Frank Knox

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY

235

APPENDIX

C

Intelligence Reports

A selection of Intelligence Reports relating to air actions in which the Army Cactus Flight took 1.

part.

An interview, dated 16 October,

Fighter Squadron, concerning

2. Intelligence

1942, with Captain Mitchell of the 67th

air action

on 9 October, 1942.

report on a P-38 mission by the 339th Fighter Squadron

over Tonolei, Bougainville, led by Major Dale D. Brannon on 18 November, 1942.

3.

An interview dated 6 March, 1943, with Captain Jerome R. Sawyer, and

his flight,

236

concerning

air action

over the Russell Islands, near Guadalcanal.

United States Pacific Fleet

AIRCRAFT SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE A8 071

Serial

CONFIDENTIAL To:

Commander Aircraft, South Pacific Force Commander South Pacific Force

Subject:

Naval Air Combat Intelligence.

From:

EXTRACT (C)

Memorandum

of interview

by Lieut. Gail Burck, Naval Air Combat

Intelligence with Captain Mitchell and other pilots of 67th Pursuit

Squadron

in

regard to combat with

enemy

(9 Oct 42)

planes.

C.McK. LYNCH,

By Copy

Jr.

Direction

to:

BuAer. CinCPac.

ComAirPac.

1.

Date: 9 October 1942 Time: 0655 Love Place: Lat. 08°oo S., Long. 158°E.

2.

Weather: Clear at altitude of contact

3.

Unit Reporting: Lieut. Gail Mitchell,

4.

AAF, and

five five

J.

— 6/10 clouds 1200

ft.

Burck interview with Captain

other pilots of 67th Pursuit Squadron.

Nature of Operation: Protection for SBDs in attack on surface vessels.

237

5.

Forces engaged

P-39D-2s with

7.

8.

20mm

P-39Ks with 37mm cannon, 4 cannon) Enemy: 5 serial 33 float biplanes

bomber 95) and 2

(recon.

6.

— Own: 6 P-39s

(2

floatplane zeros.

— Own: Generally from above — See Paragraph #16 Type Enemy Tactics — Remarkable maneuvering — see #16 Brief Description Action: Capt. Mitchell P-39s — Types

of Attack

of

of

led flight of six

approached target area at 12,000'. Spotted Jap planes below and peeled off for individual dogfights, choosing opponet at randum. #16 9.

—

Weapons Employed Own: .50-cal and cannon) Enemy: 7.7 machine gun.

10. Evasive Action

11.

Employed: See

20mm

cannon (or

37mm

PP #16

Ammunition Expended: Comparatively small amount, because

of

many jams. 12. Results

—

certain: 1 serial

33 destroyed and probably 2

additional

serial 33's.

13.

Damage

to

own

aircraft:

4 planes

— none. Shaw — 2 7.7 — many 7.7 Lt.

prop and cowling. Capt Sharpsteen wings,

tail

—

pilot

wounded

in face

hits in

hits in cockpit,

by glass splintered from cockpit

window. 16.

Remarks: Capt. Mitchell dove on Jap biplane from behind and 3000 on 3rd shot with 37mm cannon hit biplane just under rear gun position, which blew it to pieces. His cannon then jammed, as did .50-cal., so missed several subsequent set-ups. Feels that all jams

feet above Jap twisted and turned, but Mitchell followed in and

due to newness of guns and that would otherwise have destroyed all in speed and climb, the P-35s wonderfully maneuverable. The latter were dark colored

Jap planes, since P-39s had decided advantage

2-place single float biplanes, with top speed of 170 mph.

Capt. Sharpsteen dived past a biplane from 5000' above and

behind but probably missed with .50-cal

full

deflection shot.

head on attack —

—

Came back

all his up met another biplane in he was hit many times by Jap who came straight in so close Sharpsteen

had to dodge

— he

Lieut. Purnell

guns jammed, and

left fight.

dove from 500' above and behind S-53 which turned

sharply but could not dodge

— Purnell followed shooting

.50-cal as

20mm cannon was jammed — saw pieces fly off Jap plane — down in spin. Lieut.

238

Shaw

— Made head on attack on biplane

at

8000' coming so

close together that

Shaw had

to

dodge

off,

Jap never wavered. Shaw's

plane hit in prop by 7.7 machine gun bullets. .50-cal

and

20mm

him again as he Lt.

Farron

guns; Jap

fell in spin.

Shaw

hit

Jap both with

Lieut. Farron 2000'

below

hit

saw him continue fall into clouds. His only burst was into Shaw's cripple. All his guns

fell

past and

— — Made 3 head on passes, one on Float Zero and 2

then jammed and he

left fight.

Lieut. Gillon

(one each) on 2 biplanes. Undership target every time. Guns jammed on

3rd pass so

left fight.

He

feels

he should have

hit all

3 planes except for

poor gunnery.

The P-39s proved faster in every way then Jap biplanes, the latter can out manouver them. The Jap biplanes were 2-place jobs, top speed 170 mph with 2 or more guns, probably all 7.7 machine guns, all in nose, none in wings.

The Jap

aviators

were expert, getting every inch

out of their inferior planes, and twisting to give hardest possible shots, or else carrying an attack clean home.

239

347th

FIGHTER DETACHMENT CACTUS December

SUBJECT: Report on P-38 Escort Mission

20,

to Bougainville (on 18

1942

No-

vember, 1942)

TO: G-2, USAFISPA, POPPY At 1400, nine P-38s took off to escort Harbor on the southern tip of Bougainville.

B-17s to Tonolei were Major Dale D. Brannon, Capt. Wm. C. Sharpsteen, 1st Lts. D.N. Fincher, D.C. Goerke, A.B. Farquarson, D.P. Miller, D.G. Canning, E.E. Brzuska, and 2nd Lt. G.L. Reagh. Soon after takeoff Lt. Miller returned due to five

Pilots

engine trouble.

The P-38s flight circled

flew in formation at

16000

feet over the B-17s.

out over the Coral Sea area in order to

over the target area on the

home

were

was cloudy and

unlimited, however,

Upon reaching

it

stretch.

Enroute

make one ceiling

The

pass

and

visibility

rainy over the target area.

the target our air task force was jumped by at least

some float Zeros, the majority of the planes being float biplanes, the same as previously encountered in this area. The enemy planes made for our fighters and did not seem to attempt to work on our bombers which immediately left thirty planes, a

few land-based square wing

tip

Zeros,

the area without dropping their bombs. However, three phosphorous

bombs were seen

to explode near our

bombers evidently dropped from

planes above. In the ensuing struggle, Lt.

Reagh who had flown up with

supercharger on his right engine out made one pass at a

made in.

Lt.

made

240

a hit in top of the

Reagh came on

enemy

in to

cockpit, and thinks he

float biplane,

saw the plane

Cactus Major Brannon, leading the

a pass at a float biplane and

.

saw

it

go down

in flames, also

spin

flight,

another probable

float biplane. Lt.

Fincher shot a

float biplane

flames. Capt. Sharpsteen got one probable float biplane.

observed. Lt. Brzuska was hit by a coolant system in his

Farquarson was

left

down

No AA

fire

in

was

20MM shell which knocked out the

engine which rendered

hit eight times, six in

the

tail

it

useless. Lt.

of approximately .50-

through his flap, and one 20MM which wing leaving a large hole. However, all P-38s came away safely leaving the final score two enemy fighters shot down (confirmed), and three probable. Our P-38s picked up the B-17s near Lambeti, New Georgia, area and saw the B-17s unload their bombs on the fighter strip there. All P-38s landed safely at Cactus The conclusions drawn are the same as submitted in all previous the P-38 is not an escort fighter the plane is too reports unmanouverable and blind. The P-38 has not yet been sent out at its proper altitude, and the B-17s are always at a poor altitude for the P-38. If our pilots had some P-40s or P-51s, they could have had a field caliber size,

exploded

one

20MM.

in his right

.

—

day over Tonoli and given the Japs a real shellacing.

GEORGE W. PHILLIPS Captain Air Corps Actg. Gp. G-2

241

347TH FIGHTER GROUP

ADVANCED ECHELON APO 709

—

Interception. SUBJECT: Combat Report TO: Commanding General, USAFISPA.

1.

— March 1943. 1230, land 1450. Place — Area Russell Northwest Date

6,

Time— Take

off

Islands

to Eastern end of

New

Georgia.

—

2.

Weather

3.

Combat Forces

Visibility

and

ceiling unlimited.

— Own: Four P-39Ks. Enemy: 12 Dive Bombers

(Vals),

25 Fighters

(ZEKES).

— Patrol over Russell two Vals — Four Vals — Bombing Russells with undetermined

4.

Operation

5.

Enemy

6.

Our

7.

Information data:

Islands.

losses

losses

(sure),

of

(Probable).

results.

Japanese forces had completed their evacuation of the Russell

on February 7th, and our reconnaissance of the islands began shortly afterward. A dawn-to-dusk patrol to cover our landing operations was begun on February 21st. Islands

242

8.

Geographical data: Russell Islands (Pavavu and Banika) are about 100 square miles in size, and are approximately 30 miles W-NW of Henderson Field. Buraku Island is in the same direction and about 80 miles from Henderson. Getukai Island is the nearest of the New Georgia group, and about 115 miles from Henderson.

9.

Fighter Pilots Involved: Capt.

JEROME

1st Lt

R.

ARNOLD

SAWYER

M.

1st Lt WALLACE D. MCCLENDON Jr.

PATTERSON

1st Lt

ISSAAC

L.

LALLONDE Capt Sawyer was the flight leader with McClendon his wing man. Lt Patterson led the second element with Lallonde on his wing. 10.

Combat Account: Lt Patterson's report (paraphrased): "Capt Sawyer was leading us in our regular Russells patrol at about 9,000 feet. 'Recon'

Sawyer and told him that enemy aircraft and apparently headed for Guadalcanal or Tulagi and to remain on station. I looked in that direction

(fighter director) called

was

in the vicinity

(Florida Islands),

and saw a

flight of

close formation.

enemy

flight

attacking an

about 30 planes at about 12,000

From

this I conclude that this

feet, all in

was the

one

entire

(excepting five Zeros who,

I

SBD

my former experience,

on anti-sub

patrol). In

understand, were the

Zeros usually were considerably above the TBs making lazy

maneuvers, lazy eights, etc.; this time they flew straight away, with no scissoring whatsoever, and right on top of the bombers.

"We

until Recon advised us that the enemy up over the Russells. Capt Sawyer was unaware of all this as his receiver was out, and his first sight of the bombers was when the enemy was heading Northwest towards home. "The first element of bombers, the fixed landing gear type, had outrun their protection and were going hell-bent about 200 feet over the water. Sawyer, at a wing dip, led us into a left echelon, and we swooped down and made a standard gunnery run (high side pass) on them. All four of us hit the first, which went away smoking and burning. Sawyer hit the second, McClendon and I set it afire, and Lallonde got what was left. It exploded on contact with the water. As we completed this, four more bombers in groups of two, came our way, and our same tight, concentrated offensive was repeated. Sawyer's element took the first group, and mine the

was

maintained patrol

splitting

must have killed the pilot, for the plane plummeted right into the water, no smoke, no fire. "Then came the Zeros: About fifteen of them dove down into my element. They were a little late though, because we had second.

I

hit

one and

it

243

already contacted six bombers and there were

more

to come.

We

turned right into and under them, and Ihey overshot us considerably and never came in closer than 700 - 800 yards. It was a funny situation.

We were proceeding from the sea,

East toward the

bombers passing us and going the other way. So, while diving under the Zeros, we were able to fire into the passing bombers, and set one of them smoking. I didn't see him go down. "The Zeros didn't pursue us, the bombers had all left, so we Russells with Zeros after us and

cruised around for several minutes looking for Capt. Sawyer.

During

this

time

I

saw four planes

in

that the Bogies had left the area and

And

the water.

we were

I

advised Recon

ordered to pancake.

that's that!"

Capt Sawyer's report (paraphrased): "Patterson has covered it up to the 'Zero point.' I didn't see their fighters at all. After we had accounted for the first two bombers, each element, mine and Patterson's, contacted another pair.

and he went down.

We

I

hit

one

in the right

started then to chase his partner,

wing-root

who was

smoking. What evasive maneuvers he took!

He went around Baruka

Island three times with us right after him.

called Patterson to

around and meet him on the other contact.

I

assume he was

I

side, but could not

also quite

busy

at the time.

go

make The VB was

barely 50 feet off the water constantly changing direction by decisive turns. (He could turn inside a P-39).

and hedgehopped the

reefs.

He ducked

into coves

We had killed his rear-gunner,

but

we

ran out of ammunition and had to abandon the chase at Gatukai Island.

bombers could do well to use that pilot's evasive tactics. He was damned good he kept as low possible over the water, thus preventing us from making any "I believe that

all

dive

—

as

he constantly made sharp turns, and always had his gunner in a good shooting position. It was fortunate for us that this tail gunner had been killed early in the chase. "After abandoning the chase, I went back to the Russells, and inasmuch as we were receiving some AA fire from our own ground positions there, I thought it might be a good idea to get back home. "I can't complete this though without giving unstinted praise to our two wing men, Lts Lellande and McClendon. This was their first combat hour, and their combat flying was excellent. They followed every rule of air discipline and followed their element altitude passes; tail

leaders at

11.

all

times.

They deserve

all

the credit in the world,"

Comment:

From an interview with Fighter Director representative and from diagnosis of their plot sheet, the following was learned: (Data is in relation to Henderson Field.)

244

a.

Contact at 1323; course 295 degrees; distance 80 mi; 5 or

more

aircraft.

b.

Contact at 1333; course 285 degrees; distance 70 mi; 10

c.

Contact at 1344; course 270 degrees; distance 40

d.

A

or

more

aircraft.

series of small plots, indicating that the

up into groups and were

at

low

mi;.

enemy had

split

altitudes.

The last large plot was at 140 degrees when the bogies were home on a course of 300 degrees. Conclusion: the flight

heading

approached the Russells from the Northeast, went South to Southwest of the Russells, then went East to a position Southeast of the Russells,

from which point they swept

into the attack.

12. Conclusions:

Credit must be given to Capt Sawyer for one sure and one probable to Lt Patterson one sure and one probable; and tolhe ;

whole

flight

— two

sure; In view of the circumstances,

absolutely perfect interception.

power accounted

The whole

flight's

it

was an

concentrated

fire

two bombers. Even when the elements separated, the teamwork within the elements left nothing for the first

to be desired.

Postscript:

This report would not show the true picture if it did not include an item of honest-to-goodness

human interest. The P-39 pilots, during their stay at

Guadalcanal, had "nicknamed" each other, using the names of personali-

from the writings of Damon Runyan: "Big Nig," "Harry the Horse," "Guinea Mike," "Handaxe John," "Dancing Dan," "Sorrowful," etc. These names were always used in their ordinary conversation. Hence, when Capt Sawyer, in the episode around Buraku Is, called Lt ties

Patterson, he actually said

this:

"Spanish John to Little Isadore. Have

chased this character around the island to get this joker in

until

I

am tired.

It

would be greatly

you went around the other side of the island the middle." Which would have been very confusing to

appreciated by Spanish John

if

the enemy, no doubt.

American spirit which, evidenced sense of humor, does not allow itself to be smothered even when it is

It

in its

seems

enveloped

in

to be characteristic of the

such 'Delicate' circumstances as herein described. /s/ Lt. (jg)

Air

Joseph E. McGuigan,

Combat

USNN,

Intelligence.

245

APPENDIX

Pilots of the

Cactus

D

Army

Flight

of pilots in the Army Cactus Flight are listed in the order in which they first appear in the daily action report, during early operations at

The names Henderson

TJJ.

Field, Guadalcanal,

Christian

Sawyer

J.R.

D.D. Brannon

D.P. Miller

B.E. Davis

J.K.

W.H.B. Erwin E.E. Brzuska D.H. Fincher

JJ. Walsh

R.E. Chilson

G.G.

Dewey

Thompson V.L. Head

B.F.

Holmes

L.H.

Ramp

P.M. Childress

K.S. Fjelstad

B.H. Dillon

D.S. Canning

R.B. Johnston

R.W. Kerstetter A.M. Patterson M.C. Haedtler T.H. Hubbard

J.A.

Z.D. Fountain

L.M. Glazier B.W. Brown A.H. Dutton

Jarman R.M. Ferguson

246

through December 1942.

Morton

R.E. Kaiser J.R.

Campbell

J.W. Mitchell

Jacobson

J.T.

J.

E.H. Farnam

W.C. Sharpsteen W.L. Dinn

A.B. Farquharson

F.V. Purnell

D.C. Goerke

E.L.

Dews

O.G. Gillon TT T f»i H.L. Stern

F. Clark

K. Banneld

E. Conrad

L.K. Barron

P.M. Hansen T T TTT TTT H.W. Waldmeyer E. Novak

V. Harter

1

E.E. Barr J.N.

Geyer

R.C. Williams J.D. VT

T~>

McLanahan T

J*

•

N.F. Inciardi E.L. Norris t7 TTT

TT

11

<

Boots B.B. Toland Baker S.A. Palmer 1~» T"»

TVI

K.W. Kellum R.D. Shambrook R. Bauer TTT T> TT 11 W.T. Hull M.E. Ryan 11 TTT R.W. Tulhs C. Brewster

Hancock R.D, Kennedy

W.W. Patton

J.E. Obermiller

•

F.F. Ploetz

R. Hilken

G.A. Heckert T>

TT*

R. Hine

L.G. Huff T*

P.

TT

1

247

Index 11th

Bombardment Group,

45-49,

60, 69, 95, 117, 141

11th Marines, 76, 152, 153, 161 5th Battalion of, 101 5th Air Force Group, South Pacific,

30 5th Defense 5th Fighter

Battalion,

1st Battalion,

48

58th Pursuit Group, 5, Division,

7, 9,

59,

Group,

Marine Division, Reinforced, 2, 47, 49, 81, 185 1st Parachute Battalion, 49 1st Raider Battalion, 49, 87, 95, 100-106, 110, 115-118, 129, 137 44th Fighter Squadron, 186, 194, 196 46th Field Artillery, 160 1st

164th Infantry, 46, 110, 121, 137, 153-155, 161-162, 179-180 Infantry, 167,

exchange procedure for, 113 Game Cock insignia for, 66, 208 Jagstaffel nickname for, 84

movement of, 175 photo of, 39 67th Pursuit Squadron, 2-24 offensive

MAG-23, 46

9th Station Hospital,

70th Medium Bombardment Squadron, 186 65th Material Squadron, 15 65th Pursuit Squadron, 20 67th Fighter Squadron (May 15,

bomb

10

46-54,

65-67, 71, 84, 108-109 1st Marine Division Air

190

Noumea,

N.C.,

33 2nd Marine Raider Battalion, 160 2nd Marines, 121, 129

248

Battalion of, 156

1942), 24-210 delivery to, 142

5th Marines, Reinforced, 49

182nd

161-162

2nd

159

160

Command, 210

Combat Team Two, 49

Marine

49

70th Fighter Squadron, 123, 130,

5th Marines, 104, 105, 121, 129, 155, 161

1st

1st Battalion of, 48,

3rd Battalion of, 129, 161 7th Marines, 112-121, 129, 153-155,

renaming

of,

24

67th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 209 68th Fighter Squadron, 123, 159, 163, 206

68th Pursuit Squadron, 8 68th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 209 69th Pursuit Squadron, 5, 10, 49 3rd Marine Defense Battalion, 48, 49, 161 13th Air Depot Group, New Caledonia, 35,

206

13th Fighter

207, 210

Command,

160, 185,

38th Division, 165 339th Fighter Squadron, 122-123, 159, 163-169, 176-178, 190-206 347th Fighter Group, 120-123, 130, 159-168, 178-180, 186, 190, 196-201, 210 347th Tactical Fighter Wing, 209 25th Division, 159, 185 25th Japanese Air Flotilla, 69 27th Infantry, 190 26th Yankee Division, 12 23rd Marine Air Group, after-action report on, 106

245th Field

Artillery,

167

A USMC, 139

Abbot, Capt. R.A. Aichi dive

bombers "VAL," 53

Air

Base Expansion Program, 10

Air

Command, COMAIRSOLS, 186

Air

Corps Technical Supply, 127 210

Air Force, 13th, 160, 185, 207,

Wing, 1 st Marine, 46, 61,71, 93, 139 Akagi(Japanese aircraft carrier), 44

Air

Aleutian Islands, 43 Amberjack (submarine), 155

Americal Division, 12, 46, 48, 110, 186 American Expeditionary Force (World War I), 7 American Volunteer Group (China), 8, 16 Amerine, Lt. R.R. USMC, 90 Ames, Lt. Roger, 202 Anglin,

Lt.

202

Everett,

ANZAC, 14 Aola Bay, 160 Argentina, 12 Army 13th Troop Carrier Squadron, 144 Army Air Corps, 5 Arnold, Gen. H.H. (Hap), 5, 56, 178, 211-218, 224 Astoria (cruiser), 54

Athena,

HMS

Balboa,

20

44

67-69, 76, 130, 154, 165, 189,

192

"Banzai," 149 Lt. Rex, 200-204 Barr, Lt. Edger E., 143, 152 Bate, Lt. O.M., 164 Baton Rouge Air Base, 10 Bauer, Maj. Harold W., 37, 148, 171 Bauer, Lt. Robert, 164, 181, 182 Beach Red, 51, 53, 62, 63 Beachey, Sgt. Paul, 8 Bell, Maj. G.A. USMC, 139 Berger, Sgt. Willard, 8 Betelgeuse (transport), 166

Barber,

BF109 German

fighter, 151

biplanes, 7

4 Bloody Ridge, 56-57, 100-109, 118, 121, 149, 153 hand-to-hand combat on, 101 Boise (cruiser), 133 Bombardment Group, 11th, 45-49, blitzkrieg,

60, 69, 95, 117, 141

Bora Bora, 13 Borneo, 42 Bougainville, 51, 67, 76, 81, 110-112, 176, 188, 192, 197-206 Boulouparis, New Caledonia, 32 Bourake, New Caledonia, 32 Brannon, Maj. Dale D., 8, 14-27, 32-40, 59-62, 71-72,78,84-89, 94-97, 113-116, 121, 167, 176-

178 Brannon's Bomb Crater, 94, 96 Brett, Gen. George H., 9, 15, 20 Brewster, Lt. Gordon, 181 British Solomon Islands Defense Force, 67 Brooklyn Army Terminal, 11 Brown, Lt. Bryan, 33, 104, 114 Brown, Lt. F.S., 198 Bruce, Capt. James, 16, 28 Brzuska, Lt. Edmund E., 39, 61, 84,

Buchanan

(destroyer), 133,

167

Buka, 49, 51, 54, 67, 110, 140 Burroughs (transport), 78-80

C C-47transport,61,71, 113, 144, 147 Cactus Air Force, 58, 112,1 36-1 39, 145-148, 159, 163

Cactus

B

Flight, 120,

pilots of, 4, 30,

46-51,

60-62, 73, 93-95, 102,112-117, 130, 140-141, 154, 165, 169,

186 B-24 Liberator, 198

13

Buin, 165, 197, 200

American reinforcement of, 13 armed forces of (ANZAC), 14 Japanese advance on, 2 Japanese threat to, 41 Australian Coast Watchers, 45,

B-17 Flying Fortress,

Panama Canal Zone,

Ballard (destroyer), 110, 115 Banfield, Lt. Kenneth C, 133

94, 176

(transport), 18,

Australia, 13, 42,

B-26, 48, 186

123

246-247

Cactus, Operation, 2, 40, 46, 54-62, 72-79, 115, 119, 211 August 1942, 73 Japanese sniping attacks on, 109 September 1942, 83

249

Cactus-Ringbolt, Operation, 213, 222 Caldwell, Lt. T.F., 95, 101

Calhoun

(destroyer),

Callaghan, R.

Camp

Adm.

119,

79

Daniel, 165-171

Darley, Australia, 13, 14, 15

Campbell, Lt. James R., 120, 145 Canal Zone, 12, 13 Canberra (cruiser), 54 Canning, Lt. Douglas S., 120, 132, 176, 202

Cape Esperance,

51, 95, 134-136,

151-153, 180, 191, 219 Carl, Capt. Marion, 71,

116

Dillon, Lt. Barclay, Jr., 74-79, 191

Dinn, Lt. Wallace S., 133, 142-145, 154-156, 163-164 Dive Bomber Squadron VMSB 232, 48, 61, 75

Doma

Cove, 144, 164 Jimmy, 3 Doyle, Lt. D., 164 Drum, Gen. Hugh, 4 Dugout Sunday, 154, 155 Doolittle,

Dumbea, New Caledonia, 33-36 Duncan (destroyer), 133, 134 Dust-Bowl

Field, 33, 35,

Dutton,

Albert H, 33, 74, 78-80

Lt.

36

Celebes, 42

Chaney, Chicago

Lt.

H.F., Jr.,

(cruiser),

E

139

54

Childress, Lt. Peter H., 31, 74-79, 84-87, 94-96, 113, 176, 183 Chilson,

Robert

Lt.

E., 10, 39, 60, 63,

75-79

China Detail, 16 Chitose (seaplane Choiseul, 51 Chokai

100-105 carrier),

70

144

(cruiser),

Christian, Capt.

Thomas

28, 40, 59-60, 78-85,

J., Jr. 16,

94

Cicero Kid, 36

Efate Island, 37, 49, 59-62 Eichenburger, Ensign C. E., 98 Eldridge, Lt. Cmdr. John, Jr., 132,

154 Ellice Islands,

Clagett, Brig. Gen., 9

,

W.H. Bruce,

Erwin,

COMSOPAC,

F4F Grumman

221

43 Coral Sea, 42, 44 Corkey, 36 Corregidor, 15, 146 Corsairs (F-4U), 198 Cramer, Lt., 197 Cristobal, Panama Canal Zone, 13 Islands,

53

Enterprise (carrier), 48, 51 70-72, 147, 157, 165, 170-171

Lt. Frank, 164, 166 Clemens, Capt. Martin, 67 Clinton, Ontario, 9 Collins, Maj. Gen. J. Lawton, 185 Collins, Sgt. Ward, 8 COMAIRSOLS, 186 Combat Group A, 49 Combat Team Two, 5th Marines, 49

Clark,

Cook

43

Elliot (transport),

226-235

citations,

Eager Eagle, 36 Eaker, Lt. Gen. Ira C, 3 East China Sea, 42 Edson's Ridge, 100 Edson, Lt. Col. Merritt, 87, 95,

Lt.

F F-15 Eagle, 209 F-4 Phantom, 209 Wildcat, 37, 48-49, 61, 71-79, 84-86, 93, 98, 123,

136-140, 154, 164, 166, 170

F4U

Corsairs, 198

Fantan, 217 Farenholt (destroyer), 133, 134

Farnam,

Lt.

Ellery

H.,

Cristobal (transport), 12

Curtiss (seaplane tender), 49

Farrant,

Dauntless (SBD), 48-49, 61, 72-79, 84-85, 95-98, 101, 115 Davis,

Lt.

B.E., 61, 80, 84, 88, 95,

104-106 Davis, Sgt.

Defense

Battalion, 3rd Marine, 48,

49, 161

Edna and Harry A., 14 Dewey, Lt. George B., 20, 120, 140, Deller,

145, 151, 162

Dews,

250

Lt.

Edwin L, 133, 145

Richard., 11

Lt.,

Ferguson,

fighter

Lt.

commands,

U.S.

Army

Air

Corps. 5th,

Armond, 206

Lt.

115 B., 113, 115,

132, 133, 142-145 Robert M., 39, 96, 103, 113-115, 120-124, 164, 172 Fernam, E.H., 113

Farron,

Dahlman, S/Sgt. Enoch, 8

94

114-117, 129-133, 140, 147-148, 157-166, 171, 173, 182

Farquharson, Lt. Albert 120-125, 176

D

61, 75,

Espiritu Santo, 49, 58-61, 69-74,

210

13th, 160, 185, 207,

210

fighter group, 347th, 120-123, 130,

159-168, 178-180, 186, 190, 196-201, 210 Fighter Group Headquarters, New Caledonia, 35 Fighter-1 runway, 95

1

1

squadrons VF-5, 95, 113 VMF-121, 137 VMF-212, 148, 156 VMF-223, 74, 93, 102, 113 VMF-224, 85, 86, 90, 93, 102, 113 Fiji Islands, 43-49, 54

fighter

Fincher, Lt. Deltis, 29, 39, 59-61, 71-78, 84-89, 96, 114, 176-177

Finkenstein, Lt., 198 First Pursuit Group, 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 Fitzgerald, A.A., 116, 120

120 Fletcher, Adm. Frank

Felix

"Gunner,"

Haedtler, Lt. Martin C, 10, 142-145, 151, 152, 162

39,

Hale, Willis, 224

Haley,

Lt.

USMC, 139

Halmahera Island, 42 Halsey, Adm. William

F.,

55, 56,

119, 157, 158, 172, 181, 186

Fjelstad, F.S.,

46-54, 69,

J.,

Gurbada, S/Sgt. 112, 116, 128

71

Hansen, Lt. Donald, 166 Harmon, Maj. Gen. Millard F., 48-55, 115-119,140,158,181,185, 212 letters of, 21

Florida Island, 49, 51 Flying Fortress, 4

Haruna, 138 Hawaiian Islands, 43 Hawk, 7 Head, Lt. Vernon L, 74, 84-89, 94, 134, 176

Flying Pole, 36 Flying Tigers, 8, 16 (transport), 60-62

Fomalhaut

New

Fort Dix,

Foss,

Jersey,

1

Joseph,

Capt.

Heatter, Gabriel, 101

137,

154,

164-167 Fountain, Lt. Zed D., 74, 78, 84, 86, 92-95, 114, 183 Foye, Major Robert, 8, 11, 22-24 France, Nazi invasion of, 4

Freeman,

W.B. USMC, 137

Lt.

189

Hill,

7, 20, 36,

66

Island, 49, 51

Gavutu

Geyer,

Field, Lt.

New

Guinea, 208

James A.,

164, 173, 174,

198

Henderson

53-58, 119, 148, 211, 212

42

Gillon, Lt. O.G.,

132-135

Glazier, Lt. Linwood, 26, 74, 85, 88,

94, 96, 113, 183

1942, 141 radar installation on, 76 strafing attack on, 77 Henderson, Maj. Lofton, 56 Hiryu (carrier), 44

Holmes,

Lt.

Goerke,

Delton

Lt.

C,

Lt.

Besby, 132, 137-145,

152, 162, 202-204 Hornet (carrier), 133, 157

Horton's Schooner, 163 Howecraft, Boatswain's Mate 1st Cl.,61

Hubbard, Capt. Thomas, 129, 132, 137, 140 Hudson, Cpl. Sidney, 148 Hull, Lt. William T. 164 Hunter Liggett

(transport),

16,

28,

53

Hurford, J.H., 116

Lawrence, 202

Gnaebner,

120

Field, 46, 56-83, 95-98,

109-112, 123

Ghormley, Vice Adm. Robert, 46-48, Gifu, The, 189 Gilbert Islands,

133

Hiei (battleship), 168-170

Geiger, Gen. Roy S., 106, 112, 136-139, 148, 186 George, Lt. Col. Harold L., 5

Gerney

(cruiser),

Hell's Bells, 36, 103,

September 1942 air raid on, 85 armaments on, 65 Japanese shelling of 13 October

116

Game Cock insignia,5,

Helena

1

Galer, Maj. Robert E., 85, 95, 113,

Galloping Horse

Heine, Lt. Raymond, 202, 204 Heinkel bomber, 154

113, 115, 120,

Hyakutake, Lt. Gen. Harukichi, 118-119,149,157,160,178,191

140, 176

Grand Hotel Du Grassy

Pacifique, 168 I

Knoll, 45, 51

East Asia Co-Prosperity

Greater Sphere, 84

Gregory (transport), 85 Griffith, Capt. W., 198 Guadalcanal, 44-71

beachhead invasion

map Guba,

of,

of,

of,

55,

2

68

S.Sgt.,

206

57

Ichiki, Col.

Kiyono, 58, 61, 69, 71,

118 140

IFF,

River, 84, 109, 118 incendiary bombs, 179 llu

Inciardi, Lt. Nilo F., 10, 39, 164,

173

infantry divisions,

67, 1st Marine, 2, 46-54, 59, 65, 71, 81, 84, 108-109, 185

251

,

Americal (Army), 12, 46, 48, 110,

Kinkaid, R.

Adm. Thomas,

Kinugasa, 144

25th (Army), 159, 185 1st (Marines), 2, 46-54, 59, 65, 67,

Kirishima, 168, 170, 172 Kittel, Maj. Louis, 202

71, 81, 84, 108-109, 185 2nd (Marines), 48, 49, 121, 129,

Kokumbona,

infantry regiments

160, 161 5th (Marines), 48, 49, 104, 105, 121, 129, 155, 161

7th (Marines), 112-121, 129, 153-155, 161-162 11th (Marines), 76, 101, 152, 153, 161 27th (Army), 190 164th (Army), 46, 110, 121, 137, 153- 155, 161, 162, 179-180

J Lt.

Julius, 132-133, 145,

154- 156, 162-164, 202 176, 179, 188 Japan, 42 Japan Sea, 42 Japanese 17th Army, 44, 118, 149,

191

Japanese 38th Division, 119 Japanese 8th Area Army, 160 Japanese Combined Fleet, 44 Japanese flag, 131 Japanese Naval Task Force, 67 Jarman, Lt. James T., 10, 14-20, 33-40, 108, 113-123, 159, 164, 172-173, 184

Lawrence

Kuter, Maj.

S.,

5

L

Lamphier, Capt. 177, 200-204

Adm.

Thomas

Willis A., Jr.,

G., Jr.,

172

Levers Pass, 86 Lexington (carrier), 44 Leyte, 180 Liberators (B-24/PBY-4), 198 Libra (transport), 166 Lightning aircraft (P-38), 9, 121

Lindberg, Charles A., 3 Lindley, Sgt. John, 61 Little Burma Road, 21 Little (transport),

85

Livesey, Lt. D. W., 197 Lockridge, Lt. 197

Long Island Long,

Lunga Lunga

86 148

Ground radio station, John Erickson (transport), Jig

Richard

154-163 Kongo, 138 Koro Island, 49 Koumac Island, 28 Kukum, 115, 138

Lt.

(carrier),

61

202

Albert,

Luftwaffe, 4

Jarvis (destroyer), 53 Jefferies, Lt. Robert, Jr.,

Lt.

187-190 Koli Point, 51,

Lee, R.

Jagstaffel, 84, 93, 124, 129, 131,

Johnston,

110, 121, 134-138, 144, 149-164, 172-174, 178-180,

L'il

Bottom Bay, 51, 79

Jacobson,

Knox, Frank, 145, 185, 200

Joe, 36 Lafayette Escadrille, 7 Laffey (destroyer), 133

intelligence reports, 236-245 Iron

157, 165,

170, 172

186

12,

18

B., 25, 78, 84,

88, 95, 114

Plain, 2, 44, 45,

63

Point, 51, 56, 58, 71, 109,

112, 137, 148, 153, 160-167, 178

Lunga Luzon

Straits,

Lynch,

Lt. J.,

99 42 190

River, 98,

K Kadena Air Base, Okinawa, 210 Kaga (carrier), 44 Kahili Field, 198,

Kaiser,

Lt.

202

R.E., 114, 129, 132, 140,

145 Kavieng, 49 Kawaguchi, Gen. Kiyotake, 100-105, 118, 149

Keim, Capt. Glen, 15 Kellum, Lt., 164, 166, 173 Kelly Field, Texas, 3, 10 Kerstetter, R.W., 120, 124, 132, 140,

145, 162

King Cobra, 184 King, Adm. Ernest 158 King, V.W., 116

J.,

45, 46, 119,

M Maas,

164 MacArthur, Gen. Douglas 44, 51, 55, 159, 180 MacKinac (tender), 49 Malaita, 49, 51 67 Lt. J.B.,

A., 15, 22,

,

Mangrum,

Lt.

Col. Richard

C,

61,

73, 75, 113 Marine Air Group

23 (MAG-23), 93, 139 Marine Air Group 25 (MAG-25), 61 71

Marine Air Squadrons, 48 Marine Air Transport Squadron, 144 Marine Air Wing, 112, 148 Marine Fighter Squadron VMF 212, 37, 49

252 i

1

,

Marine Fighter Squadron,

VMF 223,

80

48, 61,

119, 158, 211, 213

Gen. Masao, 118,

Lt.

149-155

Maruyama Road, 153

Matanikau River, 110, 116 River, 161

Maupin, D.V., 116 Maya (cruiser), 145 Mazur, Pfc. Misha, 206 McAndrew, 12 McCain, R. Adm. John S., 48, 55-58 McCalla (destroyer), 133 McCawley (carrier), 54, 137 McDaniel, Lt., 194 McFarland (seaplane tender), 148 McKeon (destroyer), 60 Lt.

N

James, 164, 167,

173-174, 179-181, 187, 200-201 McNeese, Maj. George, 121

Meade

(destroyer), 173, 174 Melbourne, Australia, 20 Melton, M/Sgt. Joseph, 149 Melton, Cpl. Thomas, 114, 148 Michaud, Sgt. Joseph, 8, 19 Mickey Mouse radios, 36 Midway, 44 Military Air Service, 2, 3 milk runs, 147-153, 189 Miller, Capt. E.F., 139

DP., 114, 115, 120, 123, 132, 142-145, 176, 180 Miracle Works, 22, 24, 28 Mitchell, Gen. William, 3, 4 Mitchell, Maj. John W., 132, 133, 143, 145, 151, 156, 162-164,

1 1

Nehoui, New Caledonia, 35 Nelson, S/Sgt. Arthur, 8

Nepoui River, 29, 30

New New

149-154, 161, 178-179

McLanahan,

Britian Island, 44,

75, 110, 133, 137 Japanese attack on, 19

New Georgia

Island, 49-51

Guinea, 42, 44, 49 Hebrides, 37, 42, 44, 49, 54, 59, 60, 148 New Zealand, 46, 51

Japanese Nimitz,

threat to, 41

Adm. Chester,

Norris, Lt. W.P., 164, 172, 181

Noumea,

18-28, 33, 46, 48, 54-60, 133, 165, 178 Novak, Lt. Emile, 164, 173

Noyes, R. Adm. Leigh, 48

O O'Connell,

Air Force Base, 209, 210 Moore, Lt. Joseph, 200-202 Morovovo, 114, 133

Morton, Lt. James K., 114-115, 120-123, 132, 140, 197

Mount Austen,

116

F.J.,

Obermiller, Lt. James, 177 Oka, Col. Akinosuka, 153, 156 Orlich, Sgt. John, 65,

112

Oscar (Japanese submarine), 82

P P-35, 10 P-36, 10 P-38 Lightning, 121, 163-169, 177,

197 P-39/400 Airacobra,

3,

144

45, 51, 53, 153, 156,

188, 189, 190 Mugford (destroyer), 53 Mulcahy, Gen. Francis, 186 Mulvey, Lt., 198 Munda Airdrome, 205

6

22

122 6 Number 22, 150 oxygen failure in, 133 problems with, 26 Russian use of, 6 P-40 Warhawk, 5, 9 P-43, 9, 10, 37 P-63 King Cobra, 184 P6-E Hawk, 7 Pacific Ocean, 42

French use

Moody

Motor Torpedo Squadron

44-48, 116,

212

faulty radios

145

67, 76,

New New

(C, D, F, K),

Moila Point, 204

,

132, 187, 193, 197, 205

British configuration of,

193-197, 201, 204 Mitsubishi bomber, 159 (cruiser),

45

Caledonia, 14, 18-49, 59-63,

Miller, Lt.

Miyako

197

Nasu, Maj. Gen. Yumio, 149 National Defense Act of 1920, 3 Navy Dive Bombing Squadron VS-3, 115 Ndeni, 49, 119, 211, 221 Neblock, S/Sgt. Charles N., 8, 18, 22, 24, 87,

Mason, Cecil J. (RAAF), 53 Mason, R. Adm. Charles P., 186 Matanikau, 109-123, 129-137,

Matapona

Point, 187, 188, 193,

198

Marine Observation Squadron 251 49 Markel, Kenneth, 102, 112, 116 Marshall Islands, 42 Marshall, Gen. George C, 45, 55,

Maruyama,

Munda

in,

of,

Japanese advance

in,

2

Pair-of-Dice Field, 36 Palawan, Philippine Islands,

208

253

The

Palmer, Capt. Stanley A., 190 Canal, 12, 13

Resurrection,

Parachute Battalion, 100

Ringbolt, Operation, 2, 119

Panama

Paradise, 33 Patch, Gen.

Rist, Lt.

Alexander

M.,

(P-400), 27, 36,

170

46,

185-188 Patsy Field, 29-36 Patsy Flight, 65 Patterson, Lt. Arnold M., 132, 137, 162, 164, 173, 179 Boats, 49, 144,

PBY Catalina Flying 190

Robert

P.,

"Rube Goldberg," 180 Rupertus, Brig. Gen. William H., 49 Russell Islands, 51, 152, 198, 199, 204 Ryan,

Pearl Harbor, 2, 5, 9, 10, 28, 41 Philippine Islands, 16, 42

Japanese attack on, 28

197

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 4, 41, 158 Roses, Operation, 217 Royal New Zealand Air Force, 49

Lt. Martin 172-173, 181

Ryujo

(carrier),

Ryuku

Islands,

E.,

164,

167,

70 210

Philippines Group, 33, 34, 42

G.W., 11, Phoenix Islands, 43 Phillips, Lt.

14,

S

19 Sailer, Maj.

Lake City

Pistol Pete, 138-147, 151-152, 164,

Salt

174, 181 Plaines des Gaiacs, 28, 29, 34, 61

Samo New Caledonia,

Poha

River, 161, 178, 190 Point Cruz, 115-116, 129-132, 161,

172-173, 178-180, 187, 190 Point Lunga, 151

Poland, Nazi invasion

of,

Pond, 2nd Lt. Kenneth Poppy, Operation, 217

4

A., 71

Japanese attack on, 13 Port Moresby, New Guinea, 44, 49 Porter (destroyer), 157 Preston, 174 Port Darwin,

Price, Lt. Albert, 11, 14, 19

prisoners of war, Japanese atrocities against, 69 Proud Phantom, Operation, 209, 210 PT Boats, 155, 170 Purnell, Lt. Fred, 132, 133, 145, 154,

Q

R-4D transport RAAF, 15

aircraft,

61

Rabaul, 44-49, 54, 69, 81 1 18, 133, 147, 157, 160, 165, 204 ,

Raburn, Sgt. Joseph, 206 radar, 9 RAF, 9 Raiders, 87-89, 95, 100-118, 129, 137, 160 Ralph Talbot (destroyer), 54

Ramopo

(tanker),

13

Lt. Leland, 108, 120, 132 Reagh, Lt., 176 Rekata Bay, 81, 156, 181, 182, 187 Rendova Island, 137, 207 Rennel Island, 51, 133

254

134

43

Samoa, 44 San Cristobel, 51 San Francisco (cruiser), San Juan (cruiser), 157

133, 167

Sano, Lt. Gen. Tadayoshi, 160 Santa Cruz Islands, 45, 119, 157 Santa Elena (cruiser), 12 Santa Isabel, 51, 67, 81-85, 143, 156, 164, 181, 187, 219 Santa Rosa (cruiser), 12 Saratoga (carrier), 48, 51, 95 Saunders, Col. Laverne, 117, 140 Savo Island, 54, 85, 145, 169, 172 Sawyer, Lt. Jerome, 114-115, 120, 123, 132, 137, 140-145 SBD Dauntless dive bomber, 48, 49, 61, 72-79, 84, 85, 95-101, 115,

125, 131-142, 151, 154 Schneider, Sgt. William, 90, 124 Scott,

Adm. Norman,

133,

134,

D-14, SBD Dauntless, 49 VS-7, 132, 139, 154

54

(cruiser),

R

Ramp,

(cruiser), 133,

Islands,

165-168 scout bombing squadrons

164

Quincy

Joseph, 184

VMSB-132, 184 VMSB-141, 139, 142 VMSB-232, 73, 113 SeaBees, 126, 142 Sealark Channel, 44, 51, 62, 78, 134-139, 144,155,165-168,173,

194 search-and-destroy missions, 180 Sebree, Gen. Edmund B., 186 Selfridge Field, Michigan, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11

Shambrook,

Lt.

Russell, 164

Sharpsteen, Capt. Wm, 132, 133, 142, 145, 176 Shaw, Lt. W.S., 132-133, 143, 145, 162, 164, 194 Sherman, Adj. Gen., 215

Shoe-Box

Field, 31, 32,

35

Shoho

14, 23, 25, 33-40, 60, 74-79,

44

(carrier),

Shortlands, 51, 54, 165, 190, 192,

Shubin, Shubin,

Lt.

Simpler,

Lt.

Slot,

Lt.

James, 197 Murray, 206 Cmdr. Leroy C, 95,

The, 51 -53,

1

57,

1

67,

1

71

1 1

,

13

84,

192 Smith, Lt. William, 202 Smith, Maj. John L, 76, 79, 61

Smith (destroyer), 157 Soehner, Lt. Bernard P. (MD),

Solomon

,

1

13

1 1

,

23

Islands, 44-51, 109, 133,

113-114, 121-124, 130, 148, 163,168-169, 176-178, 200-206

Truman Committee, 6 Truman, Harry

6

S.,

Tulagi, 2, 44, 47-54, 78-80, 95, 119,

in, 80 64 Solomon Sea, 44 Soryu (carrier), 44 South China Sea, 42 South Dakota (battleship), 147, 157, 172, 174 South Pacific Ocean Japanese advances in, 19, 41 table of distances for, 43 Southern Belle, 36 Spaatz, Gen. Carl, 3

of,

58, 80-87, 109-121, 134-144, 160, 175, 182, 187-192 Tonga Islands, 43, 123, 159 Tonolei Harbor, 140, 176, 188 Tontouta, 18-37, 48, 59-60, 94,

Truk, 81

147 earthquakes

map

84-87, 92-95,104-108,113-116, 167, 175 Tokyo Express,

197, 204

52,

aircraft, 7 spare parts, boneyard approach 125 Sterling, Col. John, 9 Stern, Lt. Howard, 132-133

144, 155, 170 R.W., 179, 181, 187 Turner, R. Adm. Richard K., 48, 54,

Tullis, Lt.

109-112, 119, 160-166, 186 Twining, Gen. Nathan B., 185, 215

U Army Air Corps, 6, 9 U S Army Forces in the South Pa-

U.S.

cific

Area (USAFISPA), 48-50 178, 211

USAFISPA,

Union Group, 43

Spad

Stratton, Lt. Eldon, 202 Strother, Brig. Gen. Dean

201 Sumiyoshi, 149-153

Sun

Maj.

C,

to,

185,

Gen Tadashi,

Setter Squadron, 122, 197

T Tail-end Charlie, 177

Taivu Point, 87

Tambelego River, 166 Tanaka, Adm. Raizo, 182 Lt. D., 194 Tasimboko, 80-100, 109, 219 Task Force No. 6814, 12 Task Force Poppy, 14 Tasman Sea, 13 Tassafaronga, 121, 134, 136, 144, 147, 164, 182, 187 Tavani, Sgt. Adolph, 206 Taylor, Capt., 194 TBF Avenger torpedo bombers, 1 25,

Tarbet,

134-140, 198 Tenaro, 191

Tenaru

River, 110,

219

Tetere, 162 Thio, 31

Thomas

11, A. Barry (transport),

12,18 Thompson,

Lt.

John

A., 8, 10, 11,

V Vandegrift, Maj. Gen. Alexander A., 46-55, 67, 83, 92, 100-112,

118-185

Vaughn,

124

E.,

Vella Lavella, 51, 81, 197 VF5 Squadron, 95, 113

59

Vila Field, Efate,

Vincennes

(cruiser),

54

Visale, 86, 115, 123

VMF 121, 137 VMF 212, 148, 156 VMF 223, 74, 93, 102, 113 VMF 224, 85, 86, 90, 93, 102, VMSB 132, 184 VMSB 141, 139, 142 VMSB 232, 73, 113 Sir

Vouza, Sgt. Maj.

113

Jacob, 67-69

VS-7, 132, 139, 154

W Waldmire,

Lt.

Henry W., 164, 173,

181 Walker,

Walke Walsh,

5 Lt. Col. Kenneth N., (destroyer), 173, 174 Lt. J.J.,

114

Warhawk, 5 Washing Machine

Charlie, 109, 123,

138, 181, 186

Washington 174

Wasp

(battleship), 133, 172,

(carrier), 48, 51

Watchtower, Operation, 55, 119, 212

2,

45, 46,

255

World War

Waterman, Lt. J.M., 142 Waymouth, Lt. R., 115 Wehrmacht, 4

Wright, R.

Wythes,

New Zealand, 46 Westbrook, Lt. Robert, 194, 207 Western, Sgt. Mendus R., 206 Whaling Group, 161 Whaling, Col. William J., 161 Wheaden, Lt., 194 Whistling Britches, 36 White, Lt., 198 Whittaker, Lt. Gordon, 202 Williams, F.L., 120 Williams, Lt. W.R., 116, 164, 173, 181, 187

I,

7

Adm.

Lt.

C.H., 182 Keith W., 74-79

Wellington,

Woodlark Island, 208 Woods, Brig. Gen. Louis

256

Y Yamamoto, 200, 204 Yellow Sea, 42 YP-38 Lightning, 9 Yura (cruiser), 154

Z Zavoski, Mike, 86, 114, 130 Zeilin, 137, 166 Zero (Zekes) fighters, 61 76, 78, 84, ,

98, 154 E.,

186

Zimmerman,

Maj.

i

John

L.,

110

Edited by Steven Mesner

Guadalcanal— The Island

of Fire:

Reflections of the 347th Fighter Group Robert Lawrence Ferguson

A first-hand account of the Battle of Guadalcanal

from a member of the famed "Game Cock" Squadron.

August 7, 1987 marked the 45th anniversary of one of the hardest fought battles in history— the six-month campaign for control of the Solomon Island of Guadalcanal. This gripping on-thescene report captures not only the almost constant action, but the impossible conditions under which the beleaguered Americans withstood a larger and better equipped Japanese army. This book is different from others covering the Guadalcanal campaign because it was written by a man who himself was among the first combat troops to arrive. You'll see the original maps and never before published combat pictures and relive those events sometimes humorous, sometimes ironic but always strikingly heroic. More than just a true story of action and suspense, this book honors the men of the 67th Fighter Squadron, "The Game Cock," and the other squadrons that became the 347th Fighter Group. In August of 1942, despite months of shelling, bombing, and sniper attacks, the Americans dug in just outside the airfield perimeter and repulsed repeated Japanese counter attacks. Not until January, 1943 was Guadalcanal at last declared "secure" by the American commander, The Guadalcanal campaihn> provides us with a unique view of those desperate months. Ferguson presents not only an accurate historical account of the early 'disastrous events but a criTTSal analysis of the origins, errors and/ccbnsequences for a nation unprepared for waging a war in the\ Pacific. A true story of the bold ef(FOr,t§ of ordinary men, this boo|
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