Osprey - Campaign - 061 - 1999 - Megiddo 1918 - The last great Cavalry Victory (2-p) OCR

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~reeti&sto'coolman & Iffriend!

CAMPAIGN SERIES

THE LAST GREAT CAVALRY VICTORY

SERIES EDITOR: LEE JOHNSON

THE LAST GREAT CAVALRY VICTORY

TEXT B Y

BRYAN PERRETT BATTLESCENE PLATES BY

ED DOVEY

Publisher's N o t e

CONTENTS

aesdsnmlivwrhfo a h l d y f h i . 1 , 1 1 . m " o n j u " D f , o ~ f i L 7 a ~ " ~ osprey pubr8,lonr

Artist's N o t e

ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

6

OPPOSING COMMANDERS 1 5 Th. All,..

0d.r

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.

Th. centre1 Powan

OPPOSING ARMIES 18

at ~ . t t ( e me ~ m n a ~~pnditionary n ~orse,8eptamb.r l s i a Ode, 01 Battle Wldmdm l r m y Omup, Wbambsr * S I B

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OPPOSING PLANS 30 Allanby% Plan

Sander.' Plrn .Ammunition Scale bIII& h I I septambar

Y

1 s ~~ l ~ t vanepon ed

THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO 37 Is Septambar. 1 0 8ept.mber. 22 Septembar. 21 8ept.mdCr

21 Septambr f

26 Saptmmbr

R O . ~10 ~amasrus.26 sememb~r- 1 o r t o b r on 10 s.pp

THE LEGACY OF MEGIDDO 84 THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY 87 CHRONOLOGY 90 WARGAMING MEGIDDO 92 FURTHER READING 95

ORIGINS OF THE CAMPAIGN

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suxrender d (enera1 Tutst~,hrud's fibice e( Kutdhmsra. TI;; bird alone a r l k v u l its ubjcrtiw, although cwrt hcrr. tbert xcru m<.mmu

: f : ~ ~ - ~ ~ M m the Taulur and Amanus mounrains, where mops and supplies had to detour by road. At Riyaq the line became narrowgauge, and the next stage of the journey could either be along a branch that crossed the mountains to Beirut, or down the main line to Damascus and then to Deraa. There it forked again, with one branch running to El A j a , near Beenheba, with connections to Haifa, Jdfa and Jerusalem, and the other - the famous Hejaz or Pilgrim railway - going straight down thmugh Arabia to Mcdina. The operation of the rail system was difficult at best, since the war denied Turkey much of her locomotive coal and wood could only be obtained by felling sparse local timber; ultimately the lrLawere farced

narrow-gauge singletrack system could not hope to Lee demands of a modern army in the field, and even wi

Nevertheless, at the beginning of commanders in souchern Palestine planne Canal, hoping to damage installations and blodtships. The troops detailed for the oper Corps, commanded by Djemal Bey, whose re led by Colonel Freiherr Krers von Kres~enstei

h e a y winter rains had filled the pools and cisterns along the way. Nevertheless, 3,000 water-carryingcamels were required to prevent thirrt becoming an acute problem. British had been enoectine the T u h h advance. and its Dmeress

slowly ro Beersheba, hating incurred EQme 2,000 se. British casualties ammmred to only 163,but no e itwas impossible m venture far into the Sinai red to caum trouble for the British in Egypt by secr. The Senussi lived mainly in fact that since the war between adbecome an Italian colony. they were engaged in a guerrilla war against the newcornen, Confining them to a narrow coastal strip. The Sultan now called for a jihad (hol) war) against all foreigners, including the Biitish. Ha>iingsupplied the Senusri with artillerv machine eunn. ammunition and advisers. the Sultan had

~ieu~enant-~eneral.Sir ~ o h MameU. n responsible for the security of Eglpt, had very few troops available, and this latest threat was contained only u"th diffrcul~.The arrival of reinforcements and m a p s back from Gallipoli tipped the scale, however, and after several hard-fought actions rhe Senussi were pushed back into Libya. Operations against the Senussi would condnue until February 1917. Duing these, the armoured cars of rhe L i g h t h o u r e d M o t o r Batteries (LAMBS)and open Fords of the Light Car Patrols proved to be the most effective weapons in the British amouq, since they were capable of independent action id the w t spaces of the ,vestem desert: If the Turkish attempt to create a mnning sore for the British in this areawas LO prove afailure, the rwerscwas true of British efforts to return the compliment in M i a . Here the Arab tnbei, led by Sherif Abdullah and his son,the Emir Feisal, brake out in full-scale rwolt against the

Tho buw n u ~ a l l i n gmrm or t b m n r r n a l ~ a i l at m EIUMN

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ChaYvel hm st.lrof the nt.d ~lvlslon. ms.r a t h . A ~ ~ t d . l l a n 1 C*'m.nd&

Ottoman Empire in June 1916, capturing Mecca and besieging the Turkish garrison a t Media.British military aid began to flow at once, accompanied 9 a team of advisers, of whom the best remembered was the then Captain T. E. Lawrence. Military common sense dictated that Medina w a s economically untenable, but as honour was involved, the Tbrb decided to hold the city. To do so required the movement of supplies and reinforcemenu along the Hejaz railway, and here they were at their most vulnerable. Lawence, who later gained i n stature and rank following the capture of the port of Aqaba in June 1917, saw the Turkish weakness and decided to exploit it. His policy was to allow the railway to function, but onlyjust. Hir raids suited the Arab temperament and kept thousands of Turkish troops uselessly pinned down in garrisons and blockhouses. Important di5,ersions as they were, neither the Senusri war nor the Arab revolt could resolve the transSinai stand-ff After Gallipoli the now considerable British military presence in Egypt was formed into an Egyptian Expeditionav Force under Lieutenant-general Sir Archibald Murray, who had recently held the post of Chief of rhe Impenal General Staff, Officially,British strategic policy was still defensive. Howeuer, stung by Kirchener's taunr - 'Are you defending the Canal or is it defending you? -Murray was forced to think along more aggressive lines. Having calculated that a renewed Turkish advance would enter Sinai through El Arish or El Kuseima, Murray decided to establish a 50-mile front b e m e n these two poinu. Yet even before this modest objective could be secured, much logistic groundwork had to be done; in this Murray was nothing if not thorough. Thousands of local labourers were engaged in constructing a standard-gauge railway from El Kanura on the canal. The railhead advanced across the Sinai at the ate of 50 miles per month, and in parallel a fresh-water pipeline was laid, complete with and hartcries of standpipes. Beyond the railhead an transport corps supplied the forward troops.

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whlch mas deployed along the Western Front The other, the Easterner. led bv Prune Mlntsrer Llovd Geome, belleyed that the

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ravalry cmcriug d,e upm k t 1 *auk The latter. cw~mandedbv rhe rheoMa,joqcucral I i m Chainel. ~ o o s i r r c d ~ t h c Younrrd . b ~ Divirion, the .\VEX \ i ~ w n s dQiw4cm. the IkriA Yeonvrnrp WM .mcm$ frotn fhe Awk h t Eosae, - E d and 4 wad

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General sir-~illiamRobertson, was not altogether convinced by the Easterners' argument but, partly because he urn opposed to a fresh offensive on the Western Front and partly because Murray seemed to be doing well, he approved a plan for a limited offensive which, it was hoped, would refulr in the capture of GaEa. Murray waited unril his railhead had caught up attackon 26 March 15717. However, defectiveseffwo being withdrawn from ~ i m lground at the very garrison commander was considering surren rrirh heavy casualries. Vn~riselyMurray's desp optimistic note, claiming that the operation 'j disaster to the enemy'.

1

~ l &i n t ip e~ ~n ~a tOesbk%e m n bh G c@ b e,W ~ O~innn1l o7nAfotti~s p i l md M ucieat. w g ao t e d wurinptheSPnd-,MWelrh)md54th(EpW*) div%ima, rei&rmivlth amsrlldektchnm~t oft@%.Dntkwnatqly,t&

anvawerrrqua~inpslley~ondtbsScc~~ttleof~ ilie~inaitcoIsive~,rithma~~~Bdtlh&tin~~hhi time the= muldbe no mnccalingfailute.Mumy, a capable md

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Mumy'r m a M , O a W Sir Edinund AUcab, rreceie ~ r n b ~ t h e ~ f r a n t a u d t h ~ M c n ~ . H L a r r n g nov?arnrlaeddthnt c o w ditDnmMoumed C o r n = Corps wj& hw iziilumy dAisions and XM Carp. with $ h e infamry In M h i%mW M&da armp 4@ Mpouril k h d a d in byh,.nnd Lloyd 'h told Atknby that he mtedJmidem ar a C

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Mma~aDBdCbthCA~mdANUCModDiririi(ms~ on 31 mdthc nsx~d%y XXI Caw' fdewttaclr, made whh the

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eaI(rrtslrlrdcfac~EbnanmPteclimdet5W~,~bmk dmqh the ddcnecs at CBna AUmb pmmptty &e&wcd hb U m r p d e d r u c c ~ a n d t h e T u t f s ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ p r c d M ~ n c t i c r m u H ~ o n 8 N w c m k r m d n E l ~ m L...g

The pire efr U 1 ~ n b y b I g I 7oftmm ~a 11%,md% but tho 'bh hed 1w W W lnco an$ their lnorrrk W- se~rouely

&iWuan E&mhup, a&mw ChieisTGmw ~ ~ r a ~ S B r f f w d t k r c o n ~ g F R q r m n i a w p w b c s t : M a * t u q i m h ~ O f w & k ~ *

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THE THIRD BATTLB OF QAZUBEERSHEBA

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THE ALLIES (Ienwel Blr edmynii XIImnku Hn~4-iOell ~ r n p r b Wnml r of W q ,Mlenby W iadmmwwled ~ & t w y . € M x i M6fCmEtnish E l t p c g i m I b t r e f ' v r 1m4 B uaa a p p M mihada ar h e nt11d Atmr m Ocraber lgld an4 M d tt competantly tEo; W e @ h ia 1VlX H m w r , he rharni amutwd estpathy with H w z d when M w &!Mar &:€cad k he he^ a@mnteda~easecdhim da & p m m b mchisf B & p cnJunt l#17 Knam ab ' ~ ~ B D Umfv ' l kwhewulgegfllis h a and panlphcwz h . r . w ~ w~ ~ brmff

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iufiral war to mBue GEQ &m h e cdmmnS of @to to a pwtisn

Hnrob~LDsert8~immwiketlrewa~ m ~ a e h W n e c a h i s e D w q ' h r d !&ra&&e&a, 91 bccdxr 1911, he d m m w d his ~ c W Deabilitv bp ddtinix &e

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BwafmrnmwNlrt $urn%,Wuld p W M 9 h a u d d 5 ~ aammkM;anayin p& tho .*fing ef I$L$ M he UDt been fdFaSQttl bend maaf &.hi.*@ saiu to Fmum @ w mer b n oaknahe-8 sn the.wesm Pmm.Once he 3ht$imthae hzd b%en b q h t . m*r cbdnOl wrildb ~ ~ ~ wq*bw e* ,an6 - wls . . &ie

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rne G.ENTRAL

POWERIT

aaart.1 Qtro l ! w n wen SCndierr (iBep?Pa#J caf m&:M&b LjDtM W% WIU~&W in Jug dl&,dm vW& he oclo@&& Wa.nah@ oft& W W*a Swrr, m ktw&lRsnt Ule , w;HenasonerjfthCm06tsewattl .. &immmkn iff

p p &T ~"me A W I ~ t r r $n ~qm18 u-, m ~ & d ~ % ~ c o r e r n Uw ~aa b&r p s ~ f rke h R k t b ~ at~unpptlpe, ~ 4 fn%..rtissthatan W&ne p i w d WWfutf1111dy &.due than ia tbc M k . %W e G o o ~ t p ~ e t &e

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l THE OPPOSING ARMIES

I

THE ALLIED ARMY

Western Front, by September the E m t i a n Expeditionary Force was imperial ie character and much ofitwas organisedon Indian army lines. Among some more inexperienced Indian unit? were the Guides and Frontier Force regimenti, regarded as an elite.

command had included a camel corps, but this had n o w been disbanded and ifs men returned to their parent units. . The Desert Mounted Corps consisted of the 4th and 5th Cavalry Di*ions, the Australian and New Zealand (ANZAC) Mounted Division, which was detached for the Megiddo operation, and the Aurualian Mounted D i ~ i o nBoth . cavalry divisions' order of bade followed that of the Indian army m d reflecfed the lessons learned during the Great Mutiny the previous centuv Each brigade contained one British regiment, with yeomanry wbrtituted for the usual regular units, and within the Indian regiments each sabre squadron was recruited from a different martial rhce. Most of the Indian troopers were acrurtamed to

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w a M of shell (Ib]

13-pdr. gun 18-pdr gun 60-pdr gun 4.5in. how'*sr 6in. howitzer 2.75in. mountain howitzer 3.7in. mountain howitzer

12 18 80 35 100 12 20

Range a yards) 5,900 7,000 10,300 7.000 10,DOC-11,600 5,800 5,800

The Palestine Brigade Royal .%irFwce operated under Menby's orders during the batrle and was equipped with Bristol fighters, SE5As. DHQs,some Nieuports and a single Handley Page bomber capable of carrying sixteen 112lb bombs. In terms of logistia, health and morale, Allenby's army was in excellent shape and was simply avniting the opportunity to finish the war Across the Jordan, and working in concert with Allenby, wan the Arab irregular army led by the Emir Feisal and Colonel T. E. Lawence. This had the support of a Brirish mechanised force which ineluded a LAMB,

ed witha 10-pdr mountain gun,and one Talbor mounting a m. a flight of airmaff: a company of the Egyptian Camel stic mops: and a small French detachment with two ur machine guns,commanded by Captain Pisani. lar arm1 commanded by Ja'far Pasha el AskerL ry brigade, a camel battalion, a bartalion of muled about eight guns. The irregular element of the , depending upon succesn or failure and how. clme tribe's home tenimry. All that can be said is that the

ThU. b ~ s I I ( ~ s l l ksowars e

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48th n n s ~ a ~ r own p n unsnr. phnognpksd at Nazareth, reflect the prots).lonSlllm of es~dlednpon tn. Nom w a n Flontlrr of ,"dl.. Th.1, 1.nr.s lark ~ n n o n b .nu melt hornas .I. h"". . D u t with w.hr b01.m and Lnp.baas. FunhCl p0IM al arm the .Dam bmdolb" m n d the hone.' n-k. an* t h. ,.lulled r ~ n o ~ ~ 10 k.epnur on. IIWM t&s

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s indicated earlier, the sire of the Turkish army group in Palestine uas largely governed by the number of troops that could be upported at the front. There had been no serious fighting in Palestine For severd months and it might have been expected that the army group's deficiencies would have been made good during this time. This was not the case, for two reanonr. First, Enver Pasha, the war minister, was allocating such resources ar existed ro the Caucasus Front. where Turkish troops had invaded the former Imperial Russian provinces with a view to securing the Baku oil fields far the Central Powers. Secondly, the Turkish war machine could not rope with che demands that were being made upon it, so everything, from uniforms and boots upwards, %an in short supply Mlderim, in fact, was nor an army group in the accepted renre since none of its composite armies was larger than a corps. It is true that the Ottoman Army as a n%*holehad benefited from the German iduence, but at the higher levels it remained a prey to indolent inrrigue. The very name Mldlderim, meaning 'lightning', was the subject of wry humour among attached German officers because of the leisurely manner in which affai~swere conducted. There was, roo,a serious cause of tension within the army Arab officersand soldiers were treated as second class and had in the past been unfairly blamed for reverser; having been given a bad name and ~ t little h to lose, Arab conscripts had begun deserting before they reached a battlefield. Lima" von Sanders' cavalry were too few in number to present a serious challenge to rheDesert Mounted Carps, but they could carry our reconnaissance and screening tasks efficiently and were ceriainly not lacking in spirir. The Anatolian element of the infan hardy, stoical peasant soldiers who had shown th courageous, tough, vindicdre fighters with a fondn However, as they had never been required to display

ORDER OF BATTLE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY' FORCE SEPTEMBER 1918 L

MERALna

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ESERT MOUNTED CORPS -ant-gsnMISrY

C1 Cnauua KCB KCMG

IRPS TROOPS

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k urn, &n$cm?n indcfd: ~lborh"err to La: dirrupvd. rim~~lrznrolnlv. ar Mgtn ih~eod@, the rcnllt could br liulr sllurt uf cawuopha.

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CORPS TROOPS *OY*.ED m"WOr~.1.r.",m"..m.m

55RO DIVISION MC W w w w d 8 8. Mo", 0s

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7 5 T H DIVISION

FRANCAIS DE PALESTINE ET SYRIE

m0 MslorameraiPC. Pslln. C B CMB IaIIDUWDE B r 8 g d i w g ~ w d HJ. Huddlsston.CMG. DSO. MC

(Under the omem d C 3 c X 54ul olvisloq C0mmsnd.r Colons P ds Rimam,08

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BqDER OF BATTLE DERlM ARMY GROUP SEPTEMBER 1918

I -I O U ~ E D ~ F L B -B

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Commmdarln Chid Ciemra Uman von Sanden C l e t o f S(s" MOB(.#K W m P e h l

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HAURAN DETACHMENT DIVISION

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MA'AN DETACHMENT

Vlll CORPS C o , o n ~ AF".d B a i

6OTH DIVISION OOC Mqowmeni J S M Shsr CB CMO DS0

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4 8 T H DIVISION COMPOSITE DIVISION

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CHAYTOR'S FORCE GOC MllorrjmersSnE W C ChaWmr KCMO CB ,w,tn ncsna ws,,u,ma"O N8u Z m M MounMDlwslonl

ROYAL AIR FORCE MIDDLE EAST OOC Msprgan-

W G H Wmond DSO

PALESTINE BRIOADE -

B r s d s r ~ m s n I AI

AUsTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION

STII ICOIHS IIMa lr sqn 1 1 19" j.2

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Notes an the above

Tstal Cavslry 11,000 lnlantw 56,000 Gun8 552

~ ~ ~ - m o u r nimmntw~eeimnt oa I n r * p . o d e n i l n ' ~ n 4B.NlllO"..l., OrdOd."

ea.1.1

SEVENTH ARMY

ASIA KORPS

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Colinll wn 09-n

ARMY TROOPS

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4BTH DIVISION

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OOC Gsnmrs, Muatapna nerd P r n

Ill CORPS a t o n e smst

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1ST DIVISION i i T H DIVISION

XXll CORPS

i S T H DIVISION i OTH DIVISION

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Teal Cavalry

XX CORPS Msiorgsneral* -us0 Pashe

2 4 T H DIVISION 2 6 T H DIVISION 6SRD DIVISION

7TH DlVlSlON 2OTH DIVISION

3,000

Infantry 32,000

mlooel Rdst Bai

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OPPOSING PLANS

ALLENBY'S PLAN

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k q o r kcwn tduennd AUenWs plmakgfor the Emk of M i d d o . Ex fiat war chat tleEfher the numbcr of the enemy'a gumr and machiMgvnspcr rmlc o f h n f i l m the width of hia .drc. nor the oventll depth d h b &knw tame elm ta sppm~kziqrhpt of tbe WBItEaFmnt andtJlb in iwlfenbnced the p'bility &aahiovins aciranb'raakthrougt,mannmnvspcmr.Thc~mnd~~muchof the enemy hinterland mlLVd &good c a * wunq m u k h the Deacn Mounad C m p c d d ha ured te hat W The third wpr the dirapsitiomafme?iak Cenersl vsn F ~ n b a p 0 , ~ d c rpcdmw, s' W in&%& to execute a VdmOtry shategic with7hw.l to the mom W y defurded watermmw of the Nnhr Wren*, whichrao through

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m I W t o m ~ ~ . S a n d e o . ~ , ~ p l e d u h e ~ ~ t h ~

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. . .thia ~ . had hS6-d toannsirm with the mull lhvr his riglltflank sdll zated an the %a i n s not capcdally fauaumble p i d o n , u w c rcn miles no* ofJatfp AUenbg's inteation ro d e w y Smdem' army srmp at a mk.An infaay breWtuugh on rhe cauM $ m ~ would r h cxpluilcd with B huge wheel w the right & the D e @ uMwnted brp, thus bneriag TurWah camrmmttat~enraa it carved % way to rhc Jordan valley. In 60ncezx of h ~ u n o u o d f o imou11&. r

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p&MvWBim# thI@tii&.l~ihW : s m a + n W d t i ~ . me tm%wmm@ w i t i ba&q wAl&mt*'a S * . M

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with,Frm Ule *cj *e mv,w Indian, 76% W I ~ & ~ ~ ; a l o v g a 1 . j u m 7 = s e a o r a f ~ c l a s s rQ ms&i&?&l &wePiti* fht balL af~&$?f'6 was uU~edtedm Par1 csFps, WW &e *rreniMI 6 @i@sdkqwwJ H.4. D $irnpS%~:B&W& the &@' W W W m . A l w &Lm$e w,W-pdhand lb&g2:W&;&~efiw oftfir%&i a&vfsW& FY& Bk%BS&m, phrs m WCHes,whb bwe*s &-?he neaBrtPrIBultte& Otifs wdd a puti~ tfita-rrb.phzcea&~boFn~nzaridihen~to~ swa f i s h on? .somp imwtrile .27in.$urn6 would m m p b a 8,wd ~.d. d %3-8 ~ w vf Im Pfwnfd be. deploXcd ~n .wmw& Wm

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% &~dhi&fx&&iU~ %I+ rhii&W a& aE8gr guns a& ,f&hm&e@ r2qpor-s fome &a four 60;pdr: @nh bur I&*, 2?&. r o e w som, fotn w* ?*.ws, twg %t9"d 1Ly"Un h-imd rbearek I*&. w g u ~ A R Z A CMaaxe& LWiw.

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m d ndlo newor*

ellmlnatad, this the m y meens

command of his army group. Then, tactically, it ~ ~ o u lby d , continuous strafmg of lirkish columns retreating from the front, break the enemy's will to continue the fight In the meantime, irs rask was w prevent Turkrrh and German airmen discovering the preparations for the forthcoming offensive by lieeping them out of Allied air space. In this it succeeded so well that only four enemy machineswere able to c r w the lines in the week before the offenskc began. Equally vial was Allenby's deception plan, which war convince Sanders that he intended attacking in the Jordan of on the coastal seccor Working in harsh, hot conditionr,, force played the major role in this, constructing dummy worn tents, dummy gun par& and battery positions built wheels, pipes and logs. and dummy hones made from 4 blankets and canvas, assembled into formal horse lines to the entire Desert Xounted Corps was present. The w accompanied by continuous bustle, muledram sledges nkb% dust cloudn, and the lighting of many campfires. Simultaneously Arab army intensified its efforts against the Hejaz railway, particul against the irnportantjuncdon at Deraa. At the other end of the l i e situation was reversed. Troops assembling for the anack moved by night into concealed bivouacs among the orange groves or into camps the size of which had been increased two months earlier They remained under cover during the houn of daylight and were permitted no fires ar any time - cooking was done with smokelens solidified alcohol. From the Turkish side af the liner, therefore, there was nothing w suggest that any abnormal aetidcy was &ng place. Secreq was of such imporwce that objectives were only given to brigade and regimental

$ANL?ERSSPLAN

0-

n 19 Sepxw&e.c lgld &udcrs %A

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THE BATTLE OF MEGIDDO

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~-twrdsnermrgb ~ b w i n m aM-W, : BUlfur'Bmihayrameanvnyq~. Hidand W~t_nm@=i%ll, bm the iEnpecus o f w emdd not be WW, On rwhtag +.be 'Mdah am,mnrnv smmthemd uader a pdl ofduet aml a&&, tha tbin MtW *im.wwmw &hew& plmlis, cm=u@tcdlrsnor e a t m-. k Ourry of g ~ n a d s aw p l W wund the -0 a& then -fkurentmHlfhrkebawef Mm,of*lwwntr*awers top-ed at confmed $ mo4a8fPam~w rutd W e w m mias mrmdvn. Wnd a&Uy ~ Y r d t ace& ~d bww%~slcW*mues tdolr U1) me ndpanse ra -re &@*&ant3and reaerm tin&of aenchmsL&ud&i~ B M q themwlws m apen toudhy 4th 4fBHe df u f i Turhb &giuvos s m d n g may ta thr no& and north-ar EvwpJmm tbmwsww fhaf the tsmw him had sha& meap's wi w t,ft On the 7rh [Kowtl IhyisiSak a9;watom, mm@buae m p h w e r ~q* of ljir cmplerr eaiollww, A &ma M ~ h~ekq ~ ~3r capnu& $ a d M t W. N& (Laor5I C?mpB,lj ButP Rhan d d t e %ud Brnj&i&and 5mr Wpndedmtn ih.latU~Imndthe-le8fhRi&toDgaOa~iraa~si*

thc trrw pan @ lf a& €a*eventual@ wpmanaarwaqz4 Msld hvhlawcltpled, wldlo.ralunaglari. ZPle Brd ~Lghor%.1,7th wmLtj%& eQWni*n BdWlep)an mmp q emt*9+d9iike~n qmmigdaarh$be* a pmWc€tVLI &d ahowlde th$ mp W u $ h vrh& the Dm* M o w f e d waS ~ . ~ m n * r r 1 ~ ~ a * Or M~M (rwM w JeOU) ~ - k e & J B M. S W 8 6ath IJMos, v+%h

behind BsSrrgh Itna msne@ to i d

ftrr

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n h to rapture Tul Karm ahdhand it milin body of 60th Divisidn anived, k t Shea had d telhing him to distpgard the m%nif he ran into ntratt instead on cutting the road aashmrds sed through 7th Divisionand by noan had town. Hereonesqmdrpn ofthe 15th Light afan enemy column retreating fram Irta moved off into the fwthiUs north end red tharge'b~a~quadronofthe Fmnch capture of an Austiiai b W 7 padtion Hading &cled Tul I(arm, thsdefences of rous rmtchine guna,'&slowderided to exera- his opmn and pursue the mnns offuglhves flmng along the road to Nablus These were nmulmnwusly bombed and mathme gunned fmm e h e a r r , e n m d mth dismounted fire fmm the hrllaides or Gdden do% in local c G e s Such w a the degree of panlc aftlfnlctmg the Turks h t overturned vehBlel blotkd the road at sereral namts and the* ulllin~lv "

.

\unicndtr~*lill I,!'&< tn\i$nbtn. . A l l t ~ g ~ f hI ~ ~r .hngdtlr P lc)ol\ IIII~L '2.(,110 ~.riwnvr.., 1.5 gtln. rnd A Ix:a lvd!d olrtrpp1lt.i. On*t:ncnn rc,lttmn did rntmrgu lo hrc;#k rreu ofvhr nnd r n d head north through Shuw,.r>Lr.hut

the French were sent m p u w t m d returned next m m ~ n wth g several hundred more prisoners At 17 00 the 6(lrh Dimulstan, hamng conducted a fighting advance af meen urd ahalfmles m twelve and a halfbourn, captured Tul K m , the garrrson of w h ~ h now , knovnng rtielf to he cnt off,had been furthu demonilrsed by air att& A furchar 500 Turks marched into captmry and ir doan more guns were taken Meanwlule, near the mast, the D m Mounted Cow was pounng through the gap that had been opened by XXI Corps' m f a n ~ yIn the lead were the 4th Cavalry D~wsronom thenght and 5th CamIy Divumn on ihc left Their commanders had spent tlie preplaus ntght i t the

hedqmmm of the inhnllgdkisbns that uerr m create thc g-ap lo that their could bcwr in motion ar th.a d @ s poniblemmenr The m m of rhe two dimms into rheir auembty area, o w e clearin& mute marking, vcnchnmping t h e mO r l h c R H A ~ e thcirpvtiarhcinirhl~mfhrdd~epco~~mplsn~n both. f o U d bv the hmdian Mounted Disiaion. had . d n movinn count,) ofthe plnin"obsh~G nta w*ingpx'c orrr h e good On the c w t inelf ruval gunfire snppon eaod the p ~ v d a MPpr. general .-drew's 5rh Cavalry W o n , d eLcwbm Uu m ' s rwinange nu nc%igihle; one -r of the G l o H- ~ prongr a p N r d ~o gum, an otliccr aad80 men, and M O & ~ captured 31 w o r n , fau~ c e r a e m l 1 0 men. 0 A torrent of hanu now -Inn nmtb ro ouickJv that du Turh m n if their c o m r n u n l hsd& ~ iorsn I& been wublc m rennThe w k d t h e 4th C m l q Dirision. with the I I rh LAMB and 1sILCP atcachcd, rm to wcum the Murmur Pass and cut rhcdhray near Afula A detachment wa, hen to be u n l m drr thc boidgn onr thc Jordan and Yumuk a t p r el bl+i *hilt me nuin bod, a h & on Beism lbe 5th Garln W o o , with i h h U U B lad 7th LCP aorrched waa to conthe no&to Ahu Shmhe, when itws ta m d a detlchment to %amnthknh the obierr af canmrirte &den' CHQ and s p m b ~ r sanden . himru, m i LX p r p h 'Od Jcnm and %irsn scmrding m cirrurmmoa'. The Ausrmlw IbimmtcdM o m . lmthe Wh Lipht Horse Brlgadc,was to foUw the 4th Crvally M n u corps msam and be pnpnrad 9,dctaeh a m e fmm El Lnijun to block the Damucusmed and railway atJcnin. The -whm enmrmtued. m d y fled a d c d at o m . rhbd~nrrirdapd&of&lmee.~chu~uNnhr ~ d i L i l 1 a ~ o l . ~ 0 0 ~ u r t r i dgruwoor m c o & u n b y ~ ~ ~ u n d m n 9d?tlwhmthe p n 8 and 50 m m wee cap& at a cat of m e Ylled rrl - d d On the other h b tbc mrp' horarr M

duld

to

INITIAL BREAKTHROUGH The Situation at

lz

midnisht

on ls-PO September 1918.

M n Sandam d i m 4 Major Frsy lnrpedor General of Pim-, b

occupythe rnoM ofthe Mvrmur Pals at El MU". 1)Mng ai his dismal the bssf ofthe 73th OeMf RBgirnenf at N m f h

A

hands-amtsld.ix sompanisP and 12 &in= gum.

~-~~

~

~~

wnn me ,tm i w s and ,st

LCP W a s l 8&Ym thS M Y s n U S Pass =nd rulway "esr~6,lk *"*?dian Mou"+edDivirim, lessthe 5th UsM H N e Bngads, war 10b11wrnsm cavav o i v i m as om^ raseand be prepered to *tach* m a d e han El La""" b bbskihe D a m ~ u mad r a m railway *dm!".

a"-.

me

. .

-

m a r the cos.1, the Mourned corps war ~ovnngtnmugnhs aspthat had been opened by U I C o p ' i n f m In Me lea0 were the 4m ca~slryn v i ~ o n on the nghtam 5th cavdri hvlvon on the l a. fdlowed by the Auauaiisn Mounted Oiv8sim.

Chawd

m very qu,*,y H m a M mae a man WI, but me olthe snack oovld not be nand. on w n g m e ~ u ~ i lines, sh n a

Bumn's intentry-.

mothend umer apsll of d w t and smoke. ms wm kit o f w j l ~ v a u r an breached With planb, caruwted imn or rtvtred uuldbags. EvaywMrsthare wwa signs mat the hammer How had s h s W hs snmy's rill l faht.

Taking advanbgeofmsDnoJ ofM s s nm t and flrrt igM, the infwVynxn olBfl8n'n YYI corps wmre si~enthllsmngwand mmingfomyd to ixwiouahlfapedM im*i at runt w l - m ,hair axs~olsduma. .t01:30, t k ~ n t i a hi r m m m e n t wddaohl munout. I, war the hesnest.irnwMed h n a h m of war and at np M h t ova 1,WO shslla w mirute w m aplmmng in me-a l l n s ~ ~ * m r can c h msws m a n m i w sky&.

suffered severely from the forced pace and a number, having foundered, had to be destroyed. During the evening a halt was made far watering and rest, since the commanders of borh cavalry divisions recognised that if the enemy was going to make a stand he would do so in the Samarian Hills, which separated rhem fram the Plain of Esdraelon. Movement would therefore continue overnight and the next few houn would be critical. Throughout 19 September Liman von Sanden was left groping in a fog of MW. All communication with H Q Eighth Army at Tul Karm had ceased at 07:00, but nvo houn later he received a message from Colonel von Oppen, routed through H Q Seventh Army, to the effect that the coastal sector had been pierced and that British cavalry was advancing northrards. Oppen, it seemed, uar constructing a defensive front between Nablus and Tul Karm, and Swenth Army, while apparently holdins. was oulline back to its second line.

transwon smsslw a

nde. .P.""I"l th. An'nWe"''"d p,.nn,ns was th. npld pa, l ~ s l ~ , , ~ in .t th. bn.nnmuan.

mkhg place on the ground. He believed, for example, that the Turkish

XXlI Golps was retiring before the Brilish advance when, of course, it had Nevertheless, by 12:30 he had made some allowance for trhat might happen and directed Major F q Inspector General ccupy the mouth of the Musmus Pass at El Lajjun, putting e bestofthe 13thDepot Regiment atNalarethand all the nwhom he could l q his hands a total of six companies guns.m y he specified the mouth rarher than rhe more summit of the pass remains a mystery

to &t

-

1 0 September I h e pattern of fighting during the second day of the battle saw XX and XXT Corps maintaining pressure on the Turkish Seventh and Eighth

armies, which continued to give ground, despite the stiff resistance offered by the German k i a Rorps. Djemd Pasha briefly refstablished his Eighth Army H Q at Masudiye Station, suiving vainly to impose some son of order on his fleeing mops. To the north, the Dcsen Mounted Corps wheeled nortbea~twardsacross the Turkish rear, TMth dramatic resultn.

.nd lndhn anlm.1 cm*-lnstheillrl8h tha r i m , a shsn clluo""d.d in ram., as,m,,,,,,op ~ ~ ~ . *moon n k 10 ~ b.r. IIWM N. atz.1~1

~

Majorgeneral Macandrew'r 5th Cavalry Division advanced on a one brigade frontage throughout the night, led by Brigadier-general P. J. V Kelly's 13th Cavally Brigade. Kelly's brigade crossed the Samarian Hills on mcks so rough thar in places the hones had to be led. AtJarak two squadrons of Hodson's Horse were detached to act as flank guard and at 02:15 a halt was called to allow the regiments to close up. Cronring the Plain of Esdmelon, the brigade began climbing che foothills mhardr Nazareth. Shortly after 0400 it entered the village of El Mujeidel, where a delay occurred while part of the 18th Lancers rounded up a number sleeping Turks who might otherwise have rent a warning to Nazareth. The s m e process was repeated at Yafa, a mile and a half short of the objective, and more lancers were detached to escort the prisoners. It was first light before the leading elemenw of the brigade reached a point south of the town, where asquadron of 18th Lancen was detached to cover the road from Afula This became engaged almost immediately with a convoy of lorries heading for the t o m , escorted by some 400 Turks, who surrendered after a brief fight. One of the lorries carried a chest containing £20,000 in gold coin and notes: anorher, carrying petrol, was guarded by a huge bear, which made a great nuisance of itself. Sanders, ir seems, war awakened by rhe shooting and, according m his housekeeper, made a haty prima-clad exit in his car, a matter on which he suhequently declined to comment. Kelly sent the remaining squadron of 18th Lancers to conrain a large Turkish barracks while, with the Gloucesters and the fa" remaining lancers, he attempted to isolate the town from the north. At 0425 the Gloucesters charged into the mwn, which now resembled a disturbed ant hill. Many Germans and Turks, unarmed and halfdazed with deep, surrendered at once, hut othen were for making a fight of it. The German GHQ clerks in particular displayed desperate courage and managed to bum most of their papers before they were all but ~ t annihilated. Resistance continued to stiffen as Liman, now fully dressed,

I

retuned to dtrect the 6 i:50 Kelly aent a me&&lf; Macandrew reqneshng &mce kom the 14th CaMry Brigade; haWhqf taken 1.200 Dnmnen. hLs handr w e e more than full. In due m m a replywas rekrved saying thar the homes were exhausted and htKdly bould withdraw m the &rechon of Afula Shortlg aRer 10:W the Gloucesters, -red by Hodson'$ Horse and the 18th Lancers, broke contact. In the u r m i a m e s , ca;udea had been nemWbb1ylight The Glouceters lost two !died, 11 wounded, six mwmg and 28 honeskiUed and Hodson's Horse nuo killed and nmc wounded: the llsth Laneen' losses are unknown. Desoite Ma-drew's comment r e d n e 14th B r h d e , the dread" south of ~ m r e t ah 2 ma*;m" for Afula 4hen;at 06:30. latter the Paona Horse came across mother convoy, consuhng of sven lomes filledanth Germans and Turks A runnmg fight ensued untll the convoy ran into the covering squadron of 18th Lancers. Brigadia.general G. V. Clarke, commanding 14th C a ~ l qBrigade, then ordered up his machine gun squadron and the enemy sumndered, haring fint set fix

first light and the

.-.-, &@

fits the 'pua

d d H. oce,

a m h..LUM".

7 . .

bccn&lsilcdm~tbcprr~\hpwarorderrdtowndthe 2nd Lane& r e i n Z o d m 1 no moured c a n of 11th LAMB and &uunal m m b e . guns- to the c m w o a d . rt Arm, lmtde the pas. mwcd & a t m:45.As b t h i a commanding and the o&r and snondipmmmand were ill, it- commanded by 3LLpx-old &pain D. S. Davison. Having captured 200 stra~lers,&o w m sent back under esmn, 2nd Lancers reached Am at about 23:m and took up position m n d the c-rmds.

I

Two hours earlier, Barrow had called in on Howard-Vyse and was asronished to learn that the latter had ordered his brigade to move at 2330 instead of 22:00 as specified in divisional orders. The reason given was thatwatering the honer was *ing longer than had been expected. Seriously alarmed, Bamw told Howard-V)3e to move at 23:00 whether or not watering had been completed, and, accompanied by Lieutenantcolonel W. J. Foster, his GSO1, Barrow drove on to convict Davison. He then sent the armoured cars rhrough the pass to verify that it was clear as far as Umm el Fahm, irs northern entrance, and when they confirmed this, he sent the 2nd Lancen through. Time passed without any sign of the rest of the b]iga.de and Barrow decided to retrace his steps. Eventually he learned to his horror that 10th Cavalry Brigade had missed the entrance to the pass- an easy thing to do, especially at night, for while the interior of the pars is narrow and tornous, the southem entrance ia a flat expanse 300 y r d s wide set between very low hills. The 10th Cavalry Brigade was now some miles beyond, with divisional headquarten and part of 11th Cavalry Brigade following.Afrer sending Colonel Foster to find the e m n t column, Bamw contacted Brigadiergenenil T. J. Wigan, commanding 12th Cavalty Brigade, at about 01:OO and told him to secure the pass, taking 2nd Lancers under command. Shortly afterwards, a staff officer from 10th Ca\alr/ Brigade anived to say that during its return journey the brigade had again missed the entrance to the and was off on another false uail. Bmow removed Howard-Vyse fmm h& command on the rpot, replacing him with Lieutenanriolonel W G. K Green ofJacob's Horse. Davisan'~command reached El Lajun (Megiddo) ar the northern end of the pass at about 03:OO m find about 100 Turks. their arms piled, sitting round afire, singing. They were the advance guard of Major Frey'r force, sent by Sanden to defend the pass, and were too surprised to offer any resistance. The leading elements of 12th Cavalry Brigade emerged from the pass at ahout 04:30and an hour later Wigan despatched 2nd Lancers, who had used the intern1 to water their hones and snatch breakfast, to capture Afula and cut the railwxy thethere.

.

~ m r e ' & t o w , d& the i f i c ~ and d ot down as it came in to land. A conMy ted to -pe dong the Bcisan mad but ~

During the d g the 4th Cavalry Division mnaentrated at AhJa At 18-4000 mrervmed itr advane d q fhe V a l e OfJepeeI to B&aq which was secured without d i f f d q by i8:M). Thw 150mm howieen mre captured amiswed hundred prisonw; hunmore m e in during th night Thedivision had covered 70 miles in 34 b u s , had mured an

with theJmdan. The 1% Imcw, r)le 18th Machine Gun the regiment set out

of20 miles, nachi

THE ESDAPEOFOENEWLI VON 3ANDERS FROM NAZAR

ol*rtm--am W.P..i.*tM.nM.

ma--

-w=-"toqhr4 Emden,but h. L"1I.d Wnd

..

machine m u ~ l e mthem v m no w ~ w r i t i o n .Bv the link of hurnLre supply durnp th; wwnrpmple mnged K, & rhcnnelra on th;: hmestom of fund, cloding and cquipmmr in a fmn? of loodrrl(. In the wrdt of tbr u 5 & histonan, the rr.oc n r m b l e d the lack of a twm dn- the T h q . k a m Wnr. The 9th -ht HOW had now come up, hut the AusInbnd wmc

I

, " Unmim hld dm Come 1r.r" ~ h pc i r t ~ Ilodgrun, ~~.. i t ,a b rrnlkd, had already drtarhcd 5lh tight t l w w W r d r ru nark *ith Shtitb 60th Oi\xron. Yo*. he had w hrcak up the '4th Ijghc 14ne Brigade

.I

Wn8.h owa. Th. 43th c.r.1~ B"d*''ttmpr'ocmp'un O.n.nl L1m.n von Sand." br -,,~A~s,~.s2-m.,,~~b

# r a f t c.wmr

rm& EIh ~ nth" n &m~&e~?p

Birgsdc & & & l r n a l ~ ~ . At I&+.%t h a a m I mnvut anair s%avxummma nparfm ihe &ct nwwk*fremJPmn, & h e n s m p w g e m a i i n g m e & rn m rh$ mWr & Ahda At 1620 Hqdgmus wde C h u d 4 9 dwnm,

$A L*

QrdEG%b wdSJi%tP 4r:f&*el Wth &3 h@i%mg"%, ke$ow regmsnt, %ht& m l d red)gm at El hjuh ~ ~ W&m i i with l l f f i LAMB,tlifaurrder carps cenaml,Tlrc k a Z q m$m@t& lot& aght nome:masi~ded w ~ & k c a l d n & A E % Maen, had cayered 11 m i m 70 mrdutas whm, at $ufr Adan, the mile n&rsst OfJemn, a bege k+ Of the *em): em 1,8$1 sttoag,

-

hd&gammxbarof b - w $ m t &m agroIp,&dgplQBpd ga if wrnw a&& intiarpyxzwkfrem &sawdl 5zd. LwmmtR W, K Dfq'$ w~tp imm&iy & ~ snotd d e enemy, taken mplwely by

mfpx'k, $umn&e&

&Cam.

I T a p CXeMdled a q* ti3 &* me JfirnbW&XWI, the q l i i & a d e farthe ~6~~1.&~a~*ii&Matln~hpaane%&rthan

i

~

hedfoumumtmd by the 3.W prLolrre t h q had tabu and vcre hard to r e a ~ eorder. ,asother Bullion wlKun W noeuM, rogethcr with 180 cases d Ckmm chaiipegne. During tbc *hr more d mme remating Turk, weary md dernodkd* convwgd on Jtnm. Mom gave up williody, and o r h a were bluEed lnm e m & , so Urat by daamwtlaan's ngimmm found thetwtlwguardiwnd fewer than %,OOO ptrswers. Urgestmesaagesto H d g s readed ~ ut fan onlcriq faMoud rnrrgimMa sf 4th Ljght Haat b a d e , wbirh had *amembled at El Ialtun. D ~ i r m a the POW-romnouad the mlumn was led bvbvtJm6whe M 1 retained their .- &infirreand ~ ~ . .nuanillauk ~ , w~ a c d w I & m s ! C * d s t l l displaying 4 genera?'# hpprwhed. Elmduring the day the Btitish infanuydiddona had bna. steteel net eser righter %and thcXlderinr Anny Group, q&dlyhI w e t , w h s e the Wrh, 7th and Snl d*uiorur rantinod i0 CXW incrromtrle @mawe a&&mia aumbling flank f2re inf8rmy'r pnn iu the batfLC3 m now all hwt over. XXCarbt had amlfib~ed1,502, ~~~~

~

..

I

~

..

1)nuing the A i n C k~, b t C I vnn Oppc~nreiwdwJm:$rurn Hu%r.xpha Krmd for thr Aia Kvrplto m r cherrurar ',I&? SRntlh Army. K m i l l I u d no atsln,tiw to urdrn dltrrt to i foonzlmn ot Kghth Ann,,, rlbc~rtltnt the ,bin b r y r x n mu.of Ole kulcr's f@ aulrlana. Opprn

we

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This w a a~ relatively quiet day, during which Nazareth was orcupied and ewIkw.de IWn in h.*hi a major part of the Seventh Arm): reveating along the Wadi Far'a, w a ~ ~ m u " m * . " * d dntmyed by the RAF. The long column was spotted at dawn and its head ~ ~ ~ ~ M ~ war attacked Amh bringing it to a standstill. The attacks continued Q,mrrl (IW all day, two aircraft appearing every three minutes to bomb and strafe, and an additional six every half.haur. For two miles the mad was choked with wrecked and abandoned vehidn and guns. At one point Ion). drivers had tried w batter their way thmugh, smashing into guns,carw and their reams until the accumulation of wreckre ~~m~ and dead animsls ........ brought the avalanche to a halt. At another, where the road ran along a ledge, guns and vehicles had k e n w e p t over the edge to a h into the stream below. Curioml~very Few of the enemy had been killed; most had succumbed to blind terror and fled in& the hills, from which they were winkled out in due CQune.It took several days to extract about 100guns from the wreckage, and in some places the tangleuas so bad that it could only be cleared by burning. Thin was the first occasion in histo? when a major formation was ~ ~annihilated l byy air power alone. The Asia Korps, together with elements of the Turkish 16th and 19th divisions. FMS now acting as Sanden' rearguard. During 21 September the remnants of the 702nd and 703rd battalions were amalgamated w form P single weak battalion consisting of one rifle company, one Varmuk r1v.n man, m mI W machine gun company and a trench-mortar detachment,.On learning Int.LtbylrnLu..n that the Wadi Far'a was blocked, Colonel von Oppen decided to uy for prmwa=9w the ford atJisr el Damiya. ~~~~~

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m u r 1 gave mc tasL of capturing Haifa to 5th Cavalry Division, adding the port of h, 12 miles to the north, to its list of objectives, and drtiled 4U1 Cavdry l)i\iion to clrw the j<,rdra>firrcb .\me wrs ukcu wmthc,ut undnre difficuln b\ the 19dt Cl\slt\ Hn~nrh.. b t ~ t 1lail.t. ihp ob~crtneuf l l r i ~ a d i r r ~ m t ~C r r l R Harht8td', l.olh Cavalry Brigade, proved m be a much tougher nut to crack. This was became irs garrison had not been directly affected by the general Turkish collapse and partly because the direct approach to the town lay along a narrow neck of land between Mount Camel Ridge to the south and the river Kishon (Nahr el Muqatta) to the north. Harbord w a ~ further handicapped by having had to detach the Hyderabad Iancers to escorr prisoners, leaving him with only the Jodhpore and Mysore Lancers, supported by B Battery HAC. The brigade's advance guard was engaged by machine guns firing from north of the river and the nonhern s l o ~ e of s Mount Carmel. and h) :rrtrllrry putloncd ,war a iclrx~onsrrtabl~rhmcr,~, ,he I(drn>rlheim. rt the vrqlern md c,f tltr ndgc Harhord rnonrntcd n ihrer-prong4 . ~ t w c l tlrnrd . ru go in at 14:OO. Oue y u d r o n c,f M)*on. Lmrr- k-.L)

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commanding the Jodhpore Lancers,and two others killed, 34 w a d e d , 64 horses killed and 83 hones wounded. Four days later the first supplier \$.ere landed at Haifa. Major-generalBarrow had deeiled the 11th Cam@ Brigade, under Brigadier-general Gregory, to dose the remaining Jordan fords. The brigade advanced down both banks of the river, meeting Mlying degrees of ~pporition.Some of the Turks,believing themselves to be %
T H E CAPTURE O F HAlFA

26 September

The Turkish Seventh and Eighth armies had now ceased to exist and all of Palerune west of the Jordan, swe for Samakh, was in British hands. Samakh kas the hinge of the holding line Sanders was struggling to Construct and he had reinforced the " e a n i ~ o nthere with Germiln machine gunners, ordering the commandanr. Captain vonKeyserling, to hold to the last man. The t o m was attacked before dawn by Brigadier-geneai W Grant's 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade (ALH),which the previous year had carried out an epic charge at Beersheba. On this occasion, however, G a n t S numbers were seriously depleted, since 4th W i was guarding ChauveYs headquarters and five m o p s of 12th ALH were escorting prisoners. Grant had been promised reinforctmenv- but a t h e r thanxxit for these to arrive and lose the benefit of darkness, he ordered 11th ALH m make a mounted atrack across open ground from the south-east, covered by machine gun fm.The 12th ALH he held in reserve. At 04:25 the light horse regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-colonel J. W. Panoni, charged wth d a w n swords in two lines ofhalf-squadrons, with about 200 yards beween lines. yellingroas to indicatetheir position to the supporting machine gunners. Men and horses began to go down to the enemy's return fire, but Ausualians broke through the eastern defences and. sheathing their swords. went inwith the rifle and bayoner. In the wards of the Official Histov: ' D a w came up on one of the hottest and most fiercely contested fights of the whole campaign as the m Australian squadrons assaulted the station buildings. The enemy lined a stout stone wall, fired automatir rifles from the windows, hurled bombs. Several parties and mndns in the sidines. established themselves in eneines " struggle raged a full hour, quarter betng neither asked nor glven. unul even man of the defenders had been k~lledor wounded In the nllage ~~~~~~~

-

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The R D L ~to O m m ~ s ~ 36 u l Sestember 1 October Anenby had her E%m@sNSa d Barut as hm neKt DQecUveS and p brmehr XXI C m s lrarL into thao~nufeme 7th Di,*".-- L-bvbu --I-*ha 8th k T D i v r & b n at Hafa, the k d D i m ~ mmoved up tbmughJctun andHwareth to %mkh and the%& D~ulstonbegan marchine mrth on the csasral secror WWin ihe Deaert Mounted Go@ the Austmhn Moltnted DMsrm and the 5th Gavaby D i ~ m o nwere tc -cen0ate at Tihellas and Nazareth re~pectivelyand then, with the Au&@atran Mounted Di+lm leading, were to ~ D S the B J~Tdana t J h BenutYukuh (theBndgE ufEbe Daughters a f j n d ) between Lakes Hulaand Tibcnag and ad%m through h e m a m l)amasew Theywee tQ h u e on the moml* of 28 September; tbe 4tb C a v e IXirzWn was to march on Deraa, cc-eperate wth the A4b army a t t a h g the rail*^ &en p r 0 d nonhwardalgng the Pdpm9'~oad,thmughRr,we to Damascus; illl were to march hght and k e o f f the c o u n ~ y as mch as possiilee

.~,",. -" ....

-

Very few options remained open to Liman von Sanden. He had reached Damascus during the evening of 23 Septemberand, recognising that rhe city w a s nor defensible, had finally resrtablirhed his GHQ at Ba'albP. He requested reinforcements from the commander of Second Anny bur the latter was only able to spare a few battalions. Sanders was relying heavilv on an ad hoc collenlon of troops, known as the Tiberias Group, to hold.the line of the Jordan benveen Lakes Hulr and Tiberias and to retire stubbornly and prevent the British curtingin on the line of Turkish retreat through Deraa to Damascus. In the longer term he decided to establish a new front covering the railwayjunction at Riyaq. On 27 September he ordered Colonel von Oppen and the remnanrs of the Aria b r p s to withdraw by train from Deraa. Nine houn had to be spent repaiting a 500-yard breach in the line, bur the train reached Damascus the next morning and went straight rhrough to Riyaq. There were also a number of changes in command. Mustapha &ma1 w a placed in command of the new front forming ar Riyaq; Djemal Kucuk, while retaining command of the Fourth h v , also took over rhe Tiberias Group and rherefore became responsible for the Turk' ' withdrawal rhrdugh Damascus; and Dje\ad P a h a lras sent back Constantinople, rogether with the staff of Eighth Army The Arab a m y was now in full cry and would play an important part in the coming operations, Its small regular element mainrained its diicipline, but the Turkish retreat provoked a general rising of the desert tribes, who were almosr beyond control. As the Turks withdrew along the tailmy, they killed, raped and pillaged their hap through one Arab village after another, sometimes commirting the mort bestial atrocities; at Tafas, not content with killing the women and children, they also indulged in mutilation. Naturally the Arabs wanted revenge, and whenever they overran a group of Turks, they indulged in an orgy of slaughter. In the midst of one of these scenes of carnage, Lawrence obser~~ed the conduct of the German 146th Regiment with a mixture of admiration and piv: 'They were 2,000 miles from home, without hope and without gurdes, in condirionr mad enough to break the strongest nerves. Yet their sections held rogether in firm rank, sheering through the wreck of Turk and Arab like armoured ships, high-faced and silent.

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is no When attacked. they halted, took position, flred to order T haste, no crying. no hesitation.' On the morning of 26 September the 4th C a ~ l r yDivixian, led b? 10th Cavalry Brigade, began its march on Deraa. Duting the afternoon the leading regiment, 2nd Lancen, now commanded by Major G. Gould, emerged from a defile to come under fire from two villages, El Bahira, on i s left, and Irbid, situated on a ridge ahead. The first ,$asquickly raken at a gallop, and Major Gould, wishing to secure water by nightfall, mounted a left flank attack on Irbid with three squadrons. This he did without proper reconnaissance and without waiting for the rest of the brigade to come up. A few men penetrated the village bur they rvere driven out; the attack foundered with the loss of 12 killed, 30 wounded and many more horses lost. This was the first real checkchauvel's corps had sustained since the offensive began, and it stemmed from understandable over-confidence. The Turks, in fact, belonged to the Fourth Army and were the flank guard put out by Djemal K u ~ u kwhile his troops passed through Deraa; not having been involved in the earlier disaster, their morale was unnhaken. During the night rhey withdrew leaving behind nine cons of barley and a small herd of cattle. Next morning the advance was continued. The Dorset Yeomanry now leading, came up with the Turks at the village of El Remte. When ' the leading m o p deployed for dismounted action, some 300 o^

SAMAKH P I Septelllber 1S1B

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enems aver-confidepr in their uun, rnqunW a naynreraWk'with the supptaffo!.umachEne guns,Thisgiwlved imo flightwhenthe restof the Dor8m.arriyed. OnP.qadron of the C e n M India IIom~jdinedin the prsuPt, which evewhelmed therest af rhe Turkish flank guard adit marehe% a w x d s Deraa, taking m a 1 hnndked more prisoners a a d bight m ~ h i b guns. e k a u s e the hopes w&e extremely titiredandbe%as uncertain who held Derza, BarMw halted?or che rest OF m e day a fkw miles f m the,-. Qn the morning of 28 September panols reported firm in the ation and it h e m e clear rhat rhp Arabs had taken Duaa the preYL3m~fternabn.Batmw rade in with 10th Gawky Brigade and wm met w i t h sighn '@$sdy *nil aughr that any man had yet wimemed'. Everywhew there were dead Tutks. but they w&e the fawnate ones; for the wounded lay scattered abwt: desp~iledand in agony, amit+ a litter d ~ d a g e ~half ., looted, half burnq of tom daeuments, and #mashed machine- A long ambnlance vain full of sick and wounded Tmks -6 dfaun u p in thertatian: the driver atid f i ~ e d a nwere still in their tabcab,still alive but moreny wounded. The An&m were gbing thra;ugh t h e train tedng off the dothing of The groaninb: ,and *&ken Twlis, rcg&ss o f e g wounds bmken limbs, and c&ng tkirvicthns' 'Ih~Arab0.w~~ pitched clff the ,wain, A i c h was planed under British p r d . The event Was norabte f w a meethg between Banawand,Lm+&ce, each &&am to& m l n s e n t dis like tD the bthec. Wlth the elieeptim of its I~ICorps, Djemsl &pi!& Fourth Aim? Had &$pod its exspe and for the next few days the 4th Cadr). Diilsion would co-opc"te with the A r a b d u i n g t h e pursuit to DamasuIs. The fate of ths T u k b h ll F D ~wa9 ~ sdecided rhat same day. An aitcraftiaformed C h q ~ c uthat it had b e m

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located at Zira and a message nar dropped to the enemy corps commander, Ali Bey Wakaby, demanding his surrender since all available wxmr sources were now in British hands, and threatening air attack if he did not ~ ~ m p lThe y . Turks agreed at once, but declined to lay down their anns until the arrival of a British force large enough 10 protect them from swarms of savage Arabs surrounding them. Brigadier-general Ryie's 2nd Light Horse Brigade was despatched to join the Turks. who were allowed to retain their weapons and actually outnumbered the Ausvalianr by eight ra one. The Arabs, who were not part of Feisal's m y , made several attacks during the night but the Turks beat them off, encouraged by Ausualian yells of 'Go on Jacko! Give it to the bastardsl' The next morning the New Zealand Mounted Riiles Brigade arrived to guard the sick and wounded until they could be moved by train while Ryie, having removed the title bolts of all save two Anatolian battalions, marched the remaining 4,000 prisoners into Amman. Chaytor's force had now completed in task. It had taken 10,322 prisoners, 57 guns, 11 locomotives, a large quantity of rolling stock and much else besides at a cosr of 27 killed, 105 wounded andseven miaring. Having spent so long in the hot, humid lower Jordan valley, the men were beginning to suffer from the cold nighs of the h b i m plateau. Outbreaks of disease, especially mdsria, began to ratage the force, and they were later withdrawn to Jerusalem and Bethlehem to recover. Meanwhile, the main thrust on Damascus had begun on the morning of 27 September The now complete Ausualian Mounted Dixision, in the lead, found the bridge at Jisr BenatYakub partially demolished and the far bank of the Jordan held in strength by an enemy force under the redoubtable Captain von Keyserling. Hard dismounted fighting followed, until the discovery of alternative fords enabled regiments to cwss the river overnight. By then the enemy had decamped in motor lonies. Filing up the Golan Heighfs, the Ausualianr reached Kuneitra at 15:OO on 28 September The town itself might be dirplaylng more white sheets than 'a Chinese laundry on %Monday',but as the area contained a large Circarsian population who were prc-Turkish and potentially hostile, Chaurel formed a composite brigade under Brigadier-general Grant to protect hislines of communication. This consisted of 11th and

DER*I\ST*TION 28 BEPT6MBER 1948

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I" tna ~ e r & h e , thmum wnlsh 1 1 1 .d . the w..NI.Pd ..llWry nd,Bl..nph I,". ,m D,mi.cu., the nmna* M m W1.h Fourah atmy w .. tr.pP.4 @nddm.tw.d blr.lement. 0 t h . I Y s l d l . n M O Y I I U I DIVIslon, firinstmm tn. hehht. .bow.

guns. Once again, most of the enemy escaped in lorries. As the day wore an the thump of guns ro the east indicated that Barrow's 4th Cavalry Division war pushing the Fourth Army's rearguard steadily hack on Damascus. Those mrks still opposing Hodgson's Ausvaliins were clearly unsettled and more dlling to surrender. At Kaukab, 11 miles short of Damascus, a large body of them, holding a song posirion, simply fled when Hodgson mounted a full divi~ional attack, a spectacle never likely to be seen again. Simultaneously, 5th Cavalry Division had come up on the right, inrercepung and capturing most of a 2,000suung column at Kiswe. Djemal b u k ' s fugitive Fourth hrmy w now streaming through Damascus in two directions - northwards alongrhe road ro Horns andwestw d s through the Barada Gorge touards Ripq and Beimt. At a b u t 1630 elements of the Australian Mounted Division, led by the French Wgiment Mixte and the 2nd New Zealand Machine Gun Squadron, reached the diffr on the southern edge of the lO&yard&de gorge and opened fire on the thousands of troops, nansport vehicles and railway mains below Two miles m the hzertthe 9th ALH also reached the edge of the gorge m d did IiieMise. The resulw are described in the Official History: 'The m t c h e d Turks, seein* that to eo forward meant comolete

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15th ALH, the Sherwood Rangers and the Hyderabad lancers, plus groups of men who were already dismounted or whose horses were shoxzng ogns of founderrng Durng the morntng of 29 September the m o u r e d cars of 11th LAMB came up unrh the Turk~shr e ~ g u a r dnear Sa'sa They ul(m deployed across the road on n m g ground covered wth boulders and therr left fla& was protected by a lava field contacning numerous wdc crevasses The Turks had p r e r e g s t m d orgets for then rnach~neguns, the fire of whtch remained eraemely accurate, even after dusk Brrgadler-general Wilson's 3rd lrghr Horse Bngade remaned stalled unnl mghtfall, when 9th and IOd? ALH began the slow process of ourflanlilng the poanon over dficult gomg By 02 00 the next day n bar

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ranks, attempted ressrance, but h a scuatlon was hopeless Some smggled through, othen turned back, while the AusValtans fired and fired ull the road uas litrered xzth the bodtes of men and animals and the wreckage of transport wagons Four hundred dead were later found on

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Damascus, but that night the city's milif;uy governor,Ali Riza Pasha el Rikabi, deserted and mde into the Lines of 4th CamlryDivision.AnArab,~ by birth, he had spent 40 years in the Turlrish army butwas m on@ too pleased to turn the mbles on his maJten, describing to Barrow the uicb he had wed to render the city indefensible. Early the nextmorning, on 1 October, the Ausvalians entered D a m u s . The leading Clement3 of the Arab m y arrived at

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th o m d more Twthew capton, 0f the endre I'ilderim Army Gmup, men had ewded Captore, hut of these only 4,000, eman 146th Rew e n t , were 5ghmg mops, the orgaflrsedCO1umn making i s m y up themad w Aoms; era alaa msed through ColoneI Oppen's outpost lme at &yag

On t o Aleppo Allenby's derision to mainuin the pursuit to the north war a bold one, given the inflexible rule that the power of an offensive decreases in proportion to the ground it hm covered. Casualties apart. many of the Desert Mounted Corps' hdrler had foundered and been desrroyed betause of the demands made upon them, and of those that remained the artiller) wan entitled to daim the fittest. Equally serious was an outbreak of malaria and influenza, coneacted from the Turks. During the worst week diseane pur over 3,000 men in hospital; four times as many deaths raulted frum these dineases as had been incurred during the baule itselk The burden of t h e pursuit fell on Macandrew's 5th Cavalry Didsion, which, though the healthiest in the COTS, had been reduced by sickness LO some 1.500 sabres. To balance the deficiennr Macandrew Was @\,en the Znd, 11th and 12th LAMBS and the lsq 2nd and 7th LCPs to act a a mechan~sedadvance y a r d An RAF squadron %as also placed at his disposal. There w s very little fighting. On 6 October Riyaq was taken without opposition and the next day amoured car patrols found that the enemy had also abandonedBeirur. XXI Corps' canlr) regiment and 7th Indian D i a i o n occupied the civ on 8 October and were ordered to push on to Tripoli, which they reached on 13 October, giving Allenby another supply pan. Meanwhile, Macandrew had reorganised his di\ision into nvo columns: Column A, consisting of the mechanised units and 15th Cadry Bligade, posrelsed the speed, punch and frcpowerrequired for deep peneoation: Column B, conraining the rest of the dMsion, would follow as quicWy as possible and go into action as andwhen needed. In this manner Hams was reached on 16 October and the advance continued down the valley of the Omnfes. Allenbv ordered Macandm to halt at Hama. but - - ~ ~On ~ 20 ~ October - relented when the Latter protested that 'there was no opposition worth thinking of at Aleppo' - an assenion confirmed by air reports that the enemy was leitmg the ckty tu large numben ~

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Wich an Arab force operating on its right, the advance guard continued northwards, and on 22 October it Foughr a running battle nirh a Turkish motor convoy protected by an irnprotised German armoured car. l h i r machine, heavier and slower than the Rullr-Royce cars, was also handicapped by having solid t)res and was ultimately abandoned by its crew The Turks were further hindered by nvo of their own aircraft which joined in the fray on the side of the Bririeh. Saragah was taken on 24 October, but the following day Macandrew, whose advance guard was now two days' march ahead of his main bad?, received a temporan, checkwhen Mustapha Kemal rejecred a summons ro surrender Aleppo. Kemal, however, war bluffing, for he ~vasalready preparing to withdraw in rhe face of Arab pressure from the east and north. On 26 October the armoured cam entered the cit): already in Arab hands. while 15th Cavallv Brieade eneared the Turkish reareuard

probably have led Turke) io seek terns, but the crushmg of her ally Bulgaria the preuous month at Vardar had added urgencr to the sxuauon and the Grand \ k e r had already. requested an armlstlce Thli . was granted on 31 October In the 38 days since the stan of the Bartle of Megiddo Allenby's troops had destroyed three Turkish armies, advanced 3j0 miles and captured 76,000 prisoners, 360 guns and 89 locomotives; no accurate figurer exist for the numbers of enemy killed and wounded. This victor), as complete as any in hlstoq had been achieved at the cast of only i 8 2 killed, 4,179 wounded and 382 missing.

THE ARAB RAIDS AGAINST THE RAILWAY AND THE MARCH OF THE 4TH CAVALRY DIVISION, 16-29 SEPTEMBER 1918 I

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TO ALEPPO, :TOBER 1918

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THE LEGACY OF MEGIDDO

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nitiallh the opening phases of rhe battle were known as the battles of Nablus and Sharon, but s its epicentre rested on El Lajjun (Meaddo), the scene of Pharaoh Thuunosis 111's great victory in 1469 BC, it was logical that Allenby's equally decisive victory should take the ancient battlefield's name. At Megiddo in 1918 all the elements of what became knom as the blitzkrieg technique were combined for the tint rime. They included an elaborate deception plan, a holding action by XX Corps, the generation of immense violence ar the chosen point of breakthrough, deep peneoation, the indirect approach to the objective, the infliction of strategic paralysis, and sustained air support at wery level. Equally m e Emir F*lul Ieaum thenflel imuortant was the facr that the critical ohase of the battle was foueht ar rllt I ~ L ~ J I L Y . . c,r c c ~ r p . Ir\eI Ihe ~ o n h ~ n eet ~ l l r c41~ ~I.c>L ~1.1111111~ n M " " n D ~ m ~ s o r s ~ ' D " o r ~ * n.nmg mth illanby. .on. ot I.roL ihc Turhl.h *?I1 to fighr dontld chr tirrt IIJ~I, i u ~dIt1.0ugI1 111~ nl,Omnau,.nc,nb.n.non r * T I . 3 " h l 'I,.., . , 2 d li 1, I . ,h, ,.On,o(tn "WY..N crcurnitances, battered by supenor arulleq, confronted by aggressive ollsga)

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he battletield of Megiddo lies in northern Ism1 and rhe liner of the subsequent pursuit passes through modern Lebanon and ordan into Syria. To follow events on the ground in chronological order therefore presenrj obvious difficulties to visitors wishing to leave Israeli territory, and in view of the unsettled stare of certain areas a welcome is not necessarily assured. Careful planning in conjunction with the relevant government authority is therefore swongly recommended. Much of the country is more densely populated than it was at the time of the battle. Agriculture, too, has been more intensively developed. There are fewer railway but many more good roads. I am indebted to Lieutenantiolonel David Eshel IDF (Rtd.) for the following description of rhe critical terrain at the time of writing. '.4lthough the main amaction of Tel Megiddo today is an impressive archaeological site, the top of the hill provider a superb obrenadon point, overlooking the scene of wents on 20 September 1918, when the Desert Mounted Corps, emerging from the Mumus Pass. now Wadi Emn, chased the Turks across the plain to the Jareel mlley

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the exit from the pass. From the high ground it is possible to look across theJezreel valley to Nazarerh, on the ridge to the north. This is the route 5th Cavalry Division took to reach Nazareth, in which the old building housing the Xlderim General Headquarters still exist. 'The modern visitor cannot expect to see many relics of the battle, although the topography is unchanged and little imagination is required to trace the course of evenu. 'However, twice in more recent times Megiddo became a battleground once again. During the 1948 war, unim from the newly created Golani Infantry Brigade capmred theTel from an Iraqi volunteer force under Fawzi el Kaukaji after a sharp battle, From the Lajun police fort near the junction, the Iraqis counter-attacked xzth the supporr of amoured cars. The Golani troops stood their ground and, crossing the open fields at night, blew breaches in the walk of the fort with demolition charges and, after furious dose-quarter fighting, captured ir. The fort is now a high-security prison. In the 1967 war theJunction also witnessed the beginning of the attack by Moshe Brill's 45th Mechanised Brigade against strong positions held by the Jordanian 25th Infantry Brigade on the hills overlooking Megiddo, from which the Jordanians were shelling the Ramat David Airbare in the Jezreel ralley with l55mm Long Tarns.'

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CHRONOLOGY

1914 19 October The Ottoman Empire declares war on the Allies.

1915 14January - 8 February Turkish dsault on the Suez Canal repulsed: Turks withdraw to Beersheba.

1916 lanuary -July The British, under General Sir Archibald Murray, advance slowly across the Sinai, methodically extending their logistic support facilities as they go; in the Western Desert the Turliish-backedSenussi invasion ofEgypt is checked: start of the Bririah-supportedArab revolt against the Turks in the Hejaz. I August Battle ofRomani. Turkish counter-artack on the British railhead in Sinai repulsed with heavy losses. Jeeember The Blitish reach El Ariah.

1917 M January Battle of Magruntein: Sinai cleared of last Turkish forces. !6 March First Battle of Gaza; British attack fails to capture the torw;

Turks establish Gara/Beenheba line. 17-19 April Second Battle of Gaza; further attempt to break the Gaza/Beersheba line fails; Murray replaced by General Sir Edmund Allenby. I1 October Third Battle of Gaza; Allenby tumr the Turkish flank at Beenheba and breaks through at Gala: Turks evacuate Gaza and withdraw. 3-14 November Battle ofJunction Station; further Turkish reverse, followed by fighting in the Judean hills. I December Wenby captures Jerusalem.

I918 anuary- September Arab rwolt in the Hejaz continues, pinning down Turkish mops: the demands of other theatres of war prwenr Menby from launching the decisive offensive until the aurumn. ! 6 3 1 March First raid against Amman. I0 April - S May Second raid against Amman. 9 September Battle of Megddo begtns; Turhsh XXII Corps destroyed, breakout of Desert Mounted Corps, capture of Tul Karm. qight 19/20 September Musmus Pass secured. I0 September El Laijun (Megiddo), Afula, Beisan andJenin taken; Neareth attacked.

iven that the fighting spread across many hundreds of square miles. it would be very difficult indeed to reproduce it in its entirev on the games mble. It would, of course, be possible to replay the entire battle at the strategic or operative levels using any of the hexagonal map methods in conjunction with unit symbols, but unless the facts of history are tampered d t h , the result is unlikely to be very different. A larger, well-managed army employing mobiliv ar the decisive weapon is unlikely to lose to a smaller, indifferently administered army with inferior mobiliv. At the tactical level, however, the resululr is not necessarily a foregone conclusion. At Nazareth, for example, the attacking commander uas oversautious, failed in his primary task because of it, and lost his job; at Irbid, the commanding off~cerconcerned was over-confident and was lucky nor only to escape with comparatively few casualties, but also to retain his command. hire were also a number of situations which, ~ ~ h i they l e might not have influenced rhe eventual outcome of the battle, could have presented the

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