Osprey, Men-at-Arms #174 The Korean War 1950-53 (1986) 93Ed OCR 8.12

MILITARY

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

THE KOREAN WAR

1950-53

174

EDITOR, MARTIN WINDROW

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MILITARY

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

THE KOREAN WAR

1950-53 Text by NIGEL THOMAS and PETER ABBOTT Colour plates by MIKE CHAPPELL

174

First published in Great Britain in 1986 by Osprey, an imprint of Reed Consumer Boob UmHed

Michelin House, 81 Fulham Road London SW3 6RB and Auddand, Melbourne, Sinppore and Toronto 01986 Reed International Boob Umltcd Reprinted 1986, 1987, 1969, 1991, 1992. 1993 .\11 rights re5(:r....ed. Apan from any fair dealing for tht purpost of private study, research, criticism or rC"'iew, as permitted undC'r thC' Copyrign t Doigns and Patents Act, 1988, no part oftnu publication may be rtproduced, stored in a retrie\'al system, or transmitted in any form or by any mt:ans, e1C'Ctronic, electrical, cnC'mical, mC'Chanical, oplical, photocopying, recording or OInel'\\ i.se, \\ ithout the prior ptrmission of the copyright 0\\ nC'T. Enquirirs should be addressed to the Publishers.

Brituh L1.bru'Y Colologu/1Ig

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PubllCatJon Doto

Nigel Thomas and Abbott, Peter The Korean War 1950-53. (~ilen.at·arms series; 1]4 I. Korean War, 1950 1953 I. Title II. Thomas, Nigel. 19.fi- Ill. Series

951.9'O.P

05918

Filrnsct in Great Britain Printed through Bookbuildcrs Ltd, Hong Kong

Acknowledgements A work such as this would not have been possible without the generous hdp of others. Special thanks are due to Mikt Cox, Shelby Stanton, Y. C. ChOC' Korean \'etC'rans' Association, LC'e Russell, and Col. Arnall OLl, ReI. . WC' would also like to thank LLCoI. Ret. L. Turcoll Royal 22~ Regt. " Ted Zuber, W. A. B. Douglass Canadian Defense HQI. John Scurr, P. J. Bume\'S {Au...tralan War ,\kmorial . Shaun Bland. Lt.CoI. H. L. Zwitzer Royal ;'\etherlands Army, Pitm: C. T. \'trheye,J. Ludrikscn R.No.A.F. , Capt. Togas Hellenic ;\'a\)' ,Col. M. S.Okcay Turkish Army J, Offict of Military History US:\IC,J. Anker Xidsen Royal Danish Embassy and Capt. H. Stradiot Belgian Na\·YJ.

The Korean flir 1950 -53 i\lacArthur to command UN forces \\ hich would be sent to sa\"e South Korea. The Soviet Union, which had been boycotting UN meetings, missed the chance to veto the decision. The Korean peninsula, 450 miles long and a,·craging 160 miles \\idc, is about the size ofCrcat ~Ieanwhile, the :"orth Koreans advanced relentBritain or Southern California. Some 3,000 small lessly southwards; a mob of refugees and disorienislands ring the coast; and the Yalu and Tumen tated RJJK troops ned before them, choking roads Ri\ers separate it from the People's Republic of already turned into quagmires by the monsoon. On China and the Soviet Union. The countryside is '27 June the ilwaders took Seoul; on 5 July they moslly forest, and the Tacbaek moulllain range .. mm
Tlte COIII:ie oftlte IMr

3

brushed aside a token rorce or us troops at Osan; and 011 20 July they crushed a more determim·d stand at Taejon. US reinrorcements were now pouring in and, with ROK troops, they established a 200-mile derensive line in south-castern Korea, around the port or Pusan. The BatLie or the Pusan Perimeter began on I August as US rorccs (now designated the 8th Army) and ROK troops defended an area 80 miles long by 50 miles wide. The North Koreans mistakenly deployed their rorccs along the entire perimeter instead or concentrating them ror a definitive breakthrough. Although they did make some advances, they were always repulsed. On 28 August British troops-the first orman) UI\' contingents arri,-ed in the perimeler; North Korean pressure eased as UN aircrart bombed theirsupply-lines, and local peasants \\ithhcld rood. By 14 Seplember the U~ had won the baHle, and the initiati"e now lay with the 8th Arm). On 15 September 1950 a US amphibious rorce from Japan Slormed ashore on the west coast at Inchon, and II days later recaptured SeouJ against heavy North Korean resistance. ~(eanwhile, on 16 September, US/ROK troops burst out orthe Pusan Peri meier in scveral directions; a mobile force stormed north·\\cstwards and linked up with S rorccs at Seoul on the 26th, Ihereby Irapping considerable numbers orenemy troops in the South. By go September organised North Korean resistance in South Korea was practically over. Now the UN, artcr initial hesitation, mandated MacArthur to invade North Korea. UN troops advanced in the wcst, capturing the North Korean A lypic:ally idealised painl;ng showing K;n. II-Sung surrounded by admiring KI'A lroop'"

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capital of P'yongyang on 19 October, while ROK forces pressed rorward in the cast, actually reaching Ihe Chinese border on 26 OCIOber. JUSI as North Korea, her territory now reduced 10 frontier encla\es in the north-west and north-easl, seemed doomed, Chinese forces intervened on 14 October; they coullIer-attacked sirongly in the north-west, forcing the 1'01 advance 10 a standstill as Ihe cruel North Korean winter began to break. On 24 November ~lacArlhur launched the finaJ offensive against North Korea; but the very next day his central rrOllt collapsed, as massive Chinese forces broke through and advanced southwards. Now N rorces began a fighting retreat through blizzards and across rrozcn rivers out or North Korea; and it was not until mid-December that they were able to organise a derensive linc roughly on the 38th Parallel, where they braced themselves for the expected offensive by Chincse and new North Korean divisions. Meanwhile, UN troops marooned in north-eastern Nonh Korea executed a classic fighting retreat to the coast at Hungnam, whence the US Navy evacuated them to South Korea. The end or 1950 saw the conclusion of this first phase or the war: mobile warrare characterised by spectacular offensivcs alternating with apparcntly hopeless retreats. Chincse involvement meant that outright victory was now unattainable ror either side, but the prospect or defeat was also unthinkable. As the vaslmanpower orChina confronted the almosl unlimitt-d firepower of the United Nat..ions, the conflict degeneraled into a static warorattrition centred on the 38th Parallel.

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At dawn on New Year"s Day 1951 the CommunisLS attacked all along the frollt, forcing L:;\I troops back. $coul was abandoned once more; but on IsJanuary the [ront stabilised, in appalling snowstorms, 40 miles 50mh of the capital. On 25 January UN forces began a cautious advance; repelled a Chinese cOUllIeT-attack on II February; and pushed fon\'ard rclcmlessly U1l1il '21 April, as exhausted Communist units retreated before lhem. S), laiC February the thaw had transformed the countryside into a sea of mud, but on 15 ~Iarch $coul was retaken once .again, and the border into

Xorth Korea was crossed. Then, on

I I

April,

President Truman abruptly dismissed Cen. r..lacArthur over 'political differences' and appoinl{'d Gen. Ridg"way as UN/ROK Commander. On 22 April 1951 the Communists began their 'First Spring Offensive', breaching UN lines in the central sector, and forcing a retreat to a new line north of Seoul. By 30 April the attack was spent, and the Ui\' edged forward before taking the full force of tile 'Second Spring oncnsivc' on 16 May, which again ruptured the central sector, but which was contained after a limited retreat in the east. Now the UN advanced, determined on a strategy to carry the battle into North Korca, but not to attempt another full-scale invasion. By loj une they had established a line 20 miles above the 38th Parallel, astride the crucial enemy supply and communications centre calk'd the 'Iron Triangle'. On 23 june Jacob ~Ialik, the Soviet Deputy Foreign ~tinister, proposed a ceascfire; and on 10 july talks opened at Kacsong, in 'No ~fan's Land' just north of Seoul. In amjcipation of an imminent

agreement, fighting was restrictcd to patl'Oliing and local skirmishes; but when talks broke down at the end of August the UN recommenced the offensive, making valuable gains before discussions resumed on 25 October at Panmunjom, ncar Kaesong. In :\'ovcmber 1951 the war re.ached its third and final phasc-stalcmate. While talks continued the UN ceased activc opcrations and maintained a static defence linc with minimum casualties, while continuing air attacks on enemy communications and naval bombar
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Finally, on 27 July [953, the long-awaited Armistice wassigncd at Panmunjom, and the threcyear-old Korean \Var was ovcr. The Armistice len the Western dcmocracies with a scnse of anticlimax. North and South Korea were utlcrly dcvastatcd, totally dependent on the USSR or the United States for economic sun..ivaL Casualties had been unexpectedly high: 8-1-,000 UNjROK, 140,000 Chinese and NOflh Koreans, and two million civilians, all dead. And yel the war had brought real achie\-ements and changes. The People's Republic of China took its placc as a world power. China and Ihe Olhcr Communist states were exposed as aggrcssive, ruthless, formidable, bUI nOl im-inciblc, opponents, brttding in Ihe Wesl a sense of insecurily that led 10 a strenglhening of the NATO alliance,' and a reliance on Ihe deterrent effect of nuclear \\eapons \\ hich man) beLie\-e to be eXCCSSI\'e, . South Korean independence had been succcssfully defended; but this achievemelll, and the heroism and sacrifice oflhe UN ROK forces, now seem to pale before the shining triumphs of the Second World War and the stark tragedy of Vietnam. This continuing sense of anticlimax is prcscn'cd today at Pamnunjom where, 22 years afler the Armistice, the opposing sidl'S still argue about the agenda of the future Peace Confcrence.

LL~ N.... II (<
JIm A-un' was established on 8 February 194-8 from fanner guerrilla units and the Korean VolulltCf:r Corps Korean Communists in Ihe Chinese People's Liberation Army. By December 19-1-8 Soviel Iroops had officially left, but 'ad\;scrs' remained; \\hile Ihe ;"Iaoist guerrilla model was rejected in fa\'our of Soviel mililary organisation, sub\'crsion and border raids cominued against South Korea. In June 19So the 223,oBo-strong KPA was .L \ KOt"erI organised into ten In(;1I1tr)' Di\isions, each wilh three thre~>battalion regiments, an al'tillcry regiOne of the guerrilla leaders opposing the [931 ment (three [2-gun battalions), a self-propelled gun Japanese invasion of China was the young Korean battalion ([ 2 5U-76s) and services, totalling 12,092 Communist Kim II-Sung (formerly Kim Sung men. Some 102,000 served in olher units. The K PA Chu), who in 1930 had formed the Korean People's order of battle wa~: Revolutionary Army in China. On 25 April 1932 1st Div. (HQ Sinmak) .. 20, 22, 24 Inr.ReglS. this combined with other nationalist groups in the (one regt. cx-PLA) Anti~apanesc Guerrilla Amy operating on the 2nd Di\'. (HQ Wonsan) ... 4, 6, t7 Inr.Regts. Manchuria-Korea border. Captured in '9-1-0, Kim 3rd Guards Div. (HQ Wonsan) ... 7,8,9 Inr.Regts. escaped to the Soviet Union in [9.' [, returning in 4th Div. (HQChangnyoll ... S' [6, t8Inr.Regts. 19-1-5 as a Soviet AmlY 11ajor to the Soviet Zone of (one regt. ex-PLA Korea (already under local nationalist control,. By Sth Di\'. 1-IQi'\amhllng) ... [0, [', Illnf.Regts. February 19-1-6 Kim and his tso,ooo-strong ex-PLA ,6-1-th Oi\. People's ~lilitia had taken po\ver; and in Septem- 6th Oiv. HQSariwon ... 13, 1.1, 15 Inr.Regts. ber 19,18 he became President of the new cx-PLA l66th Di\". Democratic People's Republic of Korea. 7th Di\'. HQHaeju ... 1,2,3Inr.RcgIS. ex-PLA. The KI'.-\ Korean Peoplc's Army Cho-~iJn In139. 110. 1.11. IS6Di\".

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loth Div. (I-IQ Unsanni) ... 25, 27, 29 Inf.Regts. (formed March 1950) [3th Div. (HQChonju) ... 19,2[,23 Inf.Regts. (formed J lllle [950) 15th Div. (I-IQ Yongdaeri) ... 45,48, 50 Inf.Regts. (formed March 1950) 105lh Armd.Bde. .. 1°7, log, 203 Regts. 206 ~1('ch.Jllr. each with 40 T-34/85 tanks) Other units were the 122 mm Artillery Reg!. 1,300 men; Ami-Aircraft Artiller) Regts. 1,200; 603rd i\lotorcycle Reconnaissance Regt. 13,500 ; the Engineer Brigade (2,500 ,; Signal Regt. 1,000; 1st and 2nd ~tilitary Academies 4.000; Guerrilla and Commando Forces (2,500 ; Internal Security 34,000 ; and other forces '5,700. There was also a Navy (13,700), Air Force (2,000: and i\larines 9,000 . The ~Iillistry of the Interior controlled the 19,ooo-strong Border Constabulary (80 A" Doe) with five brigades (1-3, 5,7) each with six to seven battalions, formed from Koreans originally living in the Soviet Union. The KPA commander was Gen. Choi Yung Kun under the Supreme Commander, Ficld Marshal Kim II-Sung. KPA generals were battlc-hardened China veterans, skilled in Soviet-style mobile warfare, leading weB-armed, disciplined and motivated troops who were initially more than a match for the lightly-armed South Koreans. For the invasion, scven combat-ready divisions were grouped into a ;Front' equh'alent to a Western AnnYI under Gen. Kim Chaek, controllingtwo'Annies' ArmyCorp": IstAnny Ist,3rd, .. th, 6th Divs., 105th Annd.Bdt". , and 2nd Arm) ,md, jth, 7th Divs.. 1st Army swiftl) o\crran the

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exposed Ongjin Peninsula and sent 3rd and 4th Divs. and 105th Bde. to occupy Seoul; whilc 'md Army advanced in the cast, rcinforced by 886th Commando and 549th Marine units, and 766th Commando unit landed on the coast behind ROK lines. After the fall of Seoul the formations werc re-organi.·.ed. 3rd and 4th Div<;. r-aeh received Ihe honour-title 'Scoul Division', and 105th Brigadc became the JO;th 'Seoul' Armoured Division, adding the 308th SPG Bn. to its strength. On 2Jul~ 7th Oiv. was redesignated 12th 'Antung' Div.; 7th &rdCT Bele. was cxpanded to become the new 7th Div.; 8th Div. was activated; 9th Di\. Ist-jrd &rdcT Regts. was raised from 3rd &rder Bele., and I mh, 13th and I ;th Divs. were mobilised. When the seemingly irresistible KPA was finally stopped on the Pusan Perimeter, time began to work against the North Koreans; their overstretched supply-lines were vulnerable, and thcir besl units werc commincd on the Perimeter, leaving their homeland dangerously exposed. The I st Army in lhc west (2 4,th, 6th, 7lh, 9th, loth, 10;lh Divs.) and 2nd Army in the north (1st, ;th, 8th, t2th, 13th, 15lh Divs.) battered the UN lines, but by midSeptember their oflcnsive had run Olll of steam. The 9th Div. rushed rrom Pusan tojoin the 18th Div. and 549th ~tarines in opposing the Inchon landing; but Seoul soon fcll, cutting ofl'supplies to the south. The 1st Army was smashed b) US Di\os. advancing westwards, while 2nd Army managed to retreat northwards berore coUapsing. Some units continued toopcrate as guerrillas in nonhern South Korea; and 30,000 demoralised stragglers fled into North Korea with US/ROK forces in hot pursuit. A

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Weary ROK IrOOp_Ole VUren>e )"OUlh Dr ...Iwer ill lefl «"Ire--n>aki.o~their

.....)' i,uo British liDo afler the Cttin~ bra
tempo•.uy dcfcnsivc linc \\'as establishcd to cover P'yongyang with scven divisions including some newly designated formations (9th, 14th, 17th, 18th, 31st, 3~.md, 4~md and one other), while three (1st, 249th, and one othcr) fought in the easl; but on 19 October the capital fell, and Kim II-Sung fled to Sinuiju on the Yalu. The KI)A had lost 335,000 men, and thc survivors were sheltering on the Chinese bordcr. Now the Chinese PLA intervcned to save North Korea. A Combined Headquarters was established at Mukden, Manchuria, with Kim II-Sung as nominal Commander-in-Chief but with the Chinese holding the real power. The KPA was re-organised with amazing speed, and by early December there were foul' armies: in the west [st Army (105th Annd., [7th, 47th Divs.) and 5th Army (3rd, 4th 7th, 9th 42nd); and in thc east 2nd Army (2nd, 6th, loth, 31st Divs.) and 3rd Army (8th, 18th). Appearances were deceptive, however, for 1st Army, with only 19,800 men, was equivalent to a division. As the rebuilt KPA pushed southwards with the Chinese, 20,000 fonner 2nd

8

Army Iroops operated behind UN lines, disrupting the UN retreat. By the end of 1950 all North Korea had returned 10 Communist control. In the 1951 New Year offensivc 1st Army 8th, 17th i\lcd., 47th Divs. and 51h Anny 6th,7th, 13th, 32nd, 43rd) helped relake Seoul; but the main effort was in Ihe cast, opposing less formidable ROK forces. 3rd Army (1st, 3rd, 5th Divs.) stayed in reserve, bUI2nd Army (2nd, 31'd, 91h, loth, 27th, 31st) and [2th Oiv. broke through, infiltrating guerrillas behind UN tines. loth Div. penetrated deep into South Korea, and in ~'Iarch, under constalll attack by US Marines, staged an epic fighting retreat back to K I)A lincs. In the face of the UN counter·atlack, however, lSI Army abandoned Seoul, and the othcr armies also suf1cred heavily. In the two 195\ Spring Oflcnsives 1st Army advanced with the Chinese in the west, but the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Armies made little progress against ROK fore(.'S. In May 6th Army and 7th Army were hastily organised to defend P'yongyang and WOllsan rt'Spcctively; but the expected UN offensive ncvcr materialised, and in July LLGen. Nam II, the K PA Commander and a former Soviet citizen, opened Armistice talks. Stalemate set in, and Seolll now seemed permanently unattainable; SO 1st Army 8[h, 9th,

47th Divs.) transferred in December 1951 to join 2nd Army (2nd, 13th, 27th) and 3rd Army (1St, 15th, 45th) in the east. ~leanwhile 4th Army (4th, 5th, I05th Armd. Di\"s., 26th Bde. ,5th Army (6th, 12th, 32nd), 6th Arm) (gth, 17th ~lech., 18th, 23rd and 7th Army (3rd, 24th, 37th, 46th Divs., 6:3rd Bde. remained in reserve ochind the line. The KPA was short of manpower, and war-weary; but it continued to patrol, mount local probing attacks, and infiltrate guerrillas. The Jul} 1953 Order of Battle was: HI Army:

8th Oiv 47th Div 21/d .4'"9': '2nd Div 13th Di\". 27th Di\". 24th Bde.

81, 8'1, 83 lnf.Regts. 113, 1'13, 1'24 Inf.Regts. 4, 6, 17 Inf.Regts. 19, '21, '23, Inf.Rcgts. 17'2, 173. '74 Inf.Regts.

Jrd Army:

1St Di\' '1, 3, q_,lnf.Regls. 15th Oi\ 45, 48, 50 lnf.Regts. 37th Oi\' 70, 71. 76 Inf.Regts. 15th Oi\" ag, go, gl Inf.Regts. 41h A 171!J': 1th Di\.. . .'). 18,29 Inf.Regts. 5thOiv 10, II, 1'2lnf.Regts. '25. '27, 33 Inf.Regts. loth Oiv 5th Army: 6th Div I, 13, 15 Inf.Regts. 12th Div 30, 31, 3'2 Inf.Regts. 46th Oiv 158, 159, 160 Inf.Regts. 20th, '22ml nnd 25th Bdes. 7th tinny: 7,8,9 Inf.Rcgts. 3rd Div 7th Div 51, 53, 54 Inf.Rcgts. 9th Div 85, 86, 87 Inf.Regts. Also 17th Div. (8, '28 and an unidentified Inf.Regt.), 21st, 23rd, 26th Bdes., 16th AA Di\'. (19, 'la, '23, 33, 34, 36, 37 AA Regts.), four AA regts. (21, 24, 3'2, 38), sevcn tanks regIS. (, 04, 105, 106, 107, 109,206 and '208), twO artillery rt.-glS. ('29,3°) and 18 and 21 mortar regimellts. The North Korean soldier in captivity showed the same tenacity as in the field. ~lost I)o\\'s, morc than 100,000, wcre held at Koje-do (Koje Island) ncar Pusan, and in June t952 they staged riots which were eventuall} suppressed only by the intervention of US infantry and paratroops.

lnfaatry or Lh., R,OK 9tb Divi,,;o... w.,ll ~uipped by Ihe USA (m....tty witb M~J fat;pK, in lhill .,.,..,), assembl., fo..... a'l'Pult in '953- The imp..."·.,....,lIt in appeanonlLt "me.. '930 i" noticeable. (US Army)

Activit} at the Cront, howe\cr, remained low-key, although KPA uniLS did support the June 1953 offensive by making marginal gains against ROK forces before the July Armistice. With Ihe Armistice, Kim II-Sung's dreams of a united Communist Korea evaporated. North Korea was in ruins, its southern border areas shrunk, one million civilians dead, and the mighty KPA cripplcd by the loss of520,000 men. But Kim has survived to this day. His army is now the fifth largest in the world an impossible burden for such a relalively small country, comprising 520,000 soldiers, 25,000 sailors, 23,000 marines, 3'1,600 airmen, 40,000 Border Constabulary and almost three million Workers' Militia. These aggressive troops still line the southern border, raid South Korean onshore islands, infiltrate guerrillas, drive labyrinthine tunnels under the Armistice Line, and assauJr UN officials al Panlllunjom.

SOl/til/(oref{ During the Japanese occupation Korean nationalism was brutally suppressed, and Koreans were conscripted into IhcJaptmcse forces. Politicans such as Dr Syngman Rhec opera led governmcnts-inexile in Nalionalist China and the United States, and returned to South Korea aner 8 September '945, when US troops accepted the Japanese 9

~ riecy or (ati«,,~ c10lhiaA (d'. PI.IU 8 aad C) "'"-" be ... ade _I c..hi. II"-P pholo of Col. Waller B. Ric.... rd_... 00 of Camp' OA Ko~Do, posiall ...otJ> ROK .ffi.,....... They are(l"rc to ny.1) two lie.olenaDl-c:olo...,I.., a colo..",l, • Ij.,..IUlaAI..,o1.Olei ..........jor. Note ROK collar .-.......If; ;"~;pia; aDd (I"rl &ad ~tre) Uktyl.. II~ ·cornt..1 Inder' loops ...-0.... 08 c.M

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shoulder stnps by Ihe ball.lioa con1mand"r .ad r~~la1 comrnand..r. Col. Richard_o wean the inilipia of 1m; previous posliOljf-the 'lad Divis; '. <1<>
surrender and established a temporal) military govcmfficnt. The Korean Conslabulary was form· ed from ex-Jap.'\ncse Army \'("lcrans, and on 15 Janual) 1946 the first battalion-size rcgimelll was ready. On '5 August 1948 Rhee became prcsidcllI

of an independcnt Republic of Korea and .he 15,ooo-strong Constabulary became the ROK Army Tar-Han ,\/m·(;uk luA-J.-un). In J\layljune 1948 the six Constabulary Brigades (1St 3rd and 5th-7th: after 19.,8 the locally unlucky number '4' was ayoid<.·d b) the South, but not the North Koreans) became di\'isions, and the 8th and Capital Security Command wen: added. By '949 the army had expanded to 60,000 men, by dint of massive United Stales aid, and was kept busy preventing North Korean border raids and internal subversion. In June 1950 lhe 98,ooo-slrong ROK Army under ~'Iaj. Cen. Chae Pyongdok had seven weak infantry divisions and the Capital Security Command (after 5 July the 'Capitol Didsion'l. Each division should ha\'(' had three three-battalion regimellts each of :1,938 men ,; a ballalion comprised a heavy weapons com pan) \\ ith one mortar and two heavy machine gun platoons and three riRe companies, each rifle company haying three rifle platoons and a \\eapons platoon with a

mortar and a lighl machine gun squad. In reality, most divisions had only two two-battalion regiments. There should have been divisional services, an anli-tank company and an artillery battalion (15 x 105 mm light howitzers in three batteries); but there were only lhree artillery ballalions in the entire ann) supporting the 7th and 8th Diys. and the Clite 17th Independent Regiment. The Capital Security Command was a p.."1rade unit, with the rusmountl-d Ca\alr) Reg!. acting as Honour Cuard, but in wartime it performed well. There were no tanks, hea\y mortars, mines, medium artille!) or rC'Coilless rifles; little ammunition; and onl) :17 ~18 armoured cars in the 1st Cayal!) Regiment. Only 1St, 6th, 7th and Capitol Diy'S. were at full strength 10,948 men, and they. together \\'ith the 8th Di\. \\ere the best units. There was also the elite ~Iarine Corps K~IC, founded in April 1949, comprisin~ the 1St Rt.'gt. 1St 3rd Bns. and the- independent 5th Bn., modelled on the CS ~larine Corps. The ROK Coastguard and Air Force were insignificant; but the National Police pro\-ided Internal &curity Battalions to fight guerrillas. ROK soldiers were tough and courageous, and \\ ere often likened (0 the Curkhas; but they were inexperienced, and the senior officers were too young and rarely qualified to command above battalion le\'('1. ROK troops fought tenaciously against the initial North Korean invasion, but were no match ror superior weapons, and were soon in full retreat. The 17th Reg!., isolated on lhe Ongjin Peninsula, was evacualed by sea, abandoning its precious supporting artillery. The lSI, 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 7th and Capitol Divs. withdrew south arter the fall of Seoul, and thl' 61h and 8th retreated in the cast. Some 44,000 ml'n, almost haIr the army, were trapped north of the Han River when its bridges were prematurely demolished, and their units disintegrated. On 14July, in desperation President Rhee placed all ROK troops (now under LI.Cen. Chung "Kwon under the American Cen. Walker. After an unsuccessful stand at Taejon with the US 24th Di\'. the shattered remnants or the ROK Army reached the northern Pusan Perimeter. There, on 'l4Juiy, tilt" 2nd, 5th and 7th Divs. were disbanded; 8th and Capitol formed I Corps; 1st and 6th, II Corps; and 3m guarded Army Headquarters. 1'11(_"i(' fi\"(' rc-maining divisions dun~ desperately

the northern pnimcwr throughout August 1950. I Corps was under ill\cnse pressure along the coast, and had to withdra\\, c\'aeuating the marooned 3rd Di\'. by sea; but the line held. In the west, II Corps fought alongside the US 1st Cav.Div. (0 hold Taegu insomeofthc worst fighting of the war. r..lcanwhik, 7th Oi\. was reacti\ated, and ROK conscripts were temporarily illlegrated into United States and Briti,h units as auxiliariN. The four K~IC battalions fought at Inchon and Seoul, and earned a fearsome reputation as _treetfightc...... I Corp' Vel and Capitol Oi\"s., K~IAG spt'd frum l'U',lll up the east coast; II Corps 6th, 7th, 8th pushed through the central mountains; and 1St Di\.joined liS I Corps al Seoul. By 10 October I Corps had rcached \\"onsan m mulL for Hllll~nam. III Corps formed 8 October remained in South Korea on securil) duties with Illh Division also formed in October and 51h Division. In Ihat S<"lme month the 1st Anti-Guerrilla Group ISI-3rd,5th 71h 8ns. was fonm."'d. On 19 Oclober lSI Oi\. look P\ongyang, and joined II Corps further north. On 2,~ O<:tobcr 7th Regt. 6th Oi\. rcached thc Yalu Ri\'er; but the next day this di\'ision was smashed by an ovcn\'helming Chinese attack, and only the arri\al of 71h Di\. prevented the total collapse of II Corps and stabilised the line. By 24 November Capitol Di\". had reached Chongjin, 60 miles from the Soviet border; bllt on the next day the Chinese, taking advantage of the low firepower of ROK divisions and the primiti\'e fear the Chinesc inspired among Koreans, aHacked II Corps again. The corps cracked, nccl."SSitating a general 8th Army retreat to the 38th ParalleL ~leanwhile the exposed Capitol and 3rd Oivs. fell back to Songjin and Hungnam respectively, and were evacuated to South Korea. By mid-December 1950 1st Oiv, (US I Corps) was manning the line in Ihe wCSt; in the celllre, III Corps (2nd Div. rerormed 7th November, 5th and II th Oivs.); then the weakened I I Corps (6th, 7th, 81h Oivs.); and on the coasl I Corps (gth Oiv., formed 25 October; 3rd, Capilol Oivs.). When the 1951 i\'ew Ycar offcmi\"c struck. 6th Oiv. was promptly attached to US IX Corps, and II Corps ....as disbanded. On 2 January 2nd, 5th and 81h Oivs. joined US X Corps, \\ hich took over most of Ihe vulnerable central sector from III Corps now with 71h and Illh Din. '.In the U:\' retreat 2nd and to

Tho: co......and",r of lh", US '151 ~hri ..", 01';"';0.., Maj.Gea. Oti....r P. Smilh (I",rr, ill lh", Mari...,.' "'......e:t.,..;stie HBT ... tilili~ and camo.. ftaslNI h",lm," co.... r), lalb 10 US X Co..,.,. commander Maj.Gen. Ed ..... rd M. Almo..d (ri&hl, i.. M4:) fatip", ~ P .... u.~· phlNI al S-.. I m s,.,pt",mber '9,;0, Sonilh ...ould ...ithi.. I mo.. thli be I.,.dm& Ih", famo..,. GlIlhli.5 rd....,.t of his d"·isio.. from CIoGSi.. R.,..,n·o;r. Ju,.l ..osibl", al far rilllhl is llit Marin", Air WinS commandu M.j.c..... Fi",1d f1arris, ...hose Corsair S
9th Oivs. \'irtuall) dislilllegratcd, and Communist troops poured through gaps in ROK lines. In the January vi':" CQulller·o(fensive III Corps had difficult) keeping up; and, on II Februar} north of Hocngsan, the 3rd (with 1St Ki\IC Regt. attached, 5th and 8th Divs. look Ihe brUni ofa heavy Chinese attack, which destroyed the 8th Div. (it later reformed). However, by mid·April [951 I and III Corps were saldy in position on 'Line Utah' just inside North Korea. In Ihe 195[ First Spring Offensive the ChinL'Sc concentrated their attack on the [st and 6th Oivs. in the west, and both formations fell back; but a determined stand by 5th KMC Btl. on the Kimpo Peninsula prevented an attack on Seoul. Gen. Van Fleet moved 2nd Di\. to join the 6th in US IX Corps, leaving US X Corps with 5th and 71h Oivs. In the Second Spring Offensive these last IWO divisions and III Corps all collapsed, and even I Corps retreated; but by 20 ~lay the line had stabilised. Now II I Corps was disbanded, leaving only I Corps (3rd, I I th, Capilol Di\"s, in the line, I Corps subsequently attacked, together with 5th, 7th. 8th and 9th Din.. no\\ all in US X Corps.

"

Oespitecatastl'Ophicsctbacks the ROK Army, 1I0W under Maj.Ccn. Vi Chongchan, still fielded ten divisions; and in August 1951 357,430 South Koreans, the largest UNC contingent, were under arms. The ROK Army took advantage ofthe stalemate period to build up its forces. Four 155 mm and six 105 mm Artillery Battalions, authorised in September 1951, ensured that by mid·1952 ROK divisions at last had their own organic artillery. There were also ten Field Artillery Croups (I st -3rd, 5th-I Ith " each with two 105 mm battalions; and II IndqX"ndc-llt Field Artillf'n Bn". 88th---qVd. ',-,III ,,,,111 (hilt-I Illllh lllllmlni ,-;!.:h, J .Illk Compallic..~ 51:.1 5jrd, 55th 59th; Ij Security Bns. Ist-3rd, 5th 13th, 15th on anti-guerrilla duties; fi\e Securit), Guard Bns. (3Ist---33rd, 35th, 36th guarding PoW camps; and Korean Senrice Corps Regts. each with four battalions on labouring duties with UN units. On I ~lay 1952 the order of batLie at the front was: US I Corps 1st Div./; S IX Corps (2nd, 9th; a re-formed II Corps 3rd, 6th, Capitoll; US X Corps 7th, 8th and I Corps :5th, 11th," The revitalised army, now under LLCen. Paik Sun Vup, performed very effectively in the 1952 'Outpost' battles, and could now be trusted with three-quarters of the line. ~Ior(' units were raised: 12th and 15th Oivs., 53rd and 55th 59th Independent Regts. (November 1952); 20th and 21St Divs. (February 1953); 22nd and 25th Oivs. (April (953); and 26th and 27th Oivs. Uune 1953). In the Chinese attacks of June 1953 II Corps fell back but held, although 5th Oiv. had to be rescued. Nevertheless, 14 ROK divisions faced the final

assault in July: 1st Oiv. (US I Corps); 2nd, 9th, Capitol (US IX Corps); 3rd, 5th, 6th, 8th, 11th (II Corps); 7th, 12th, 20th (US X Corps); 15th and 21st (l Corps). The concentrated pressure all II Corps smashed lhe redoubtable C,1.pitol Oiv., and the Corps fell back; but subsc
..... T~ 'O~". '''••'0' D'.'O'OM . _ '010

UI/iter/Strltes ojAlIlerim •

Aner 1945 the United States decided to rely on the United States Air Force to deter any future aggressor with its nuclear capability. There thus seemed to be no necessity for a large standing anny, and the bulk of the US Army was hastily demobilised. By mid-1950 it had shrunk to 591,487 men, seven per cent of its peak wartime strength, with what some ha\'ejudged to be a disastrous effect

on unit efficiency and morale. There were only ten combat divisions 1St, 2nd, 3rd, 71h, 24th and 25th Infantry, 1St Cavalry (Dismoullled), 2nd Armoured, t Ith and 8~:2Ild Aid>orne-pius lhe 1St and 2nd US :-'larinc Corps Di\'isions l . Occupation duty in Germany andJapan proved the biggest drain on resources, and only onc division, the 1St Infantry in Gennany, was mailllained al full strength. In South Korea, 100, Uniled Stales airpower was the main defence againsl polenlial North Korean aggression, and anel" June 19+91he only US forces \\l're the 500-S1ron~ Korean ~Iilitary Advisory Group K~IAG training the fledgling ROK Ann)'. ~Ieanwhilc, the Uniled Slates Go\'ernment ignored mmours of an imminent North Korean invasion wilh a complacency lhat ultimately proved disastrous. At anyone lime scven nitcd Slales di\'isionsInfantry, Ca\'alry and ~larine Corps-served in Korea, aU in the infantry role. This commitment, while moclest by World War II standards. was a major burden on the diminished US Ann)'. Each division contained lhree infantry regiments each \....ith three battalions; and an artillery regimelll with three 105 mm ballalions and one heavy 155 mm battalion, each with threc batteries. The strength oftlte US artillery was 10 prove decisive., There were also a combat engineer battalion, reconnaissance troops, and services; and later a tank, a tank-dcstroyer and an anti-aircraft battalion were added. Apart from the three rifle battalions (each wilh one heavy weapons and three rifle companies) a US infantry rcgimcnt also fielded a tank company with 22 tanks. A rifle company comprised one weapons and three rifle platoons; a rifle platoon, onc wcapons squad and three rifle squads, each with nine men. All divisions (except lhe ~'!arines) wcre 30 pcr cent under strength. All regiments (except the :'-Iegl"O 24th Infantry) had only IWO battalions: artillery battalions had only two batteries, and most infantry battalions were a rifle company shon, ahhough from August 1950 all regiments in Korea received a third batlalion. f\lany tanks were obsoiescelll, or too light 10 meet the 1'-34/85 on equaltcrms. Ncvertheless, these divisions did boast '''oraD accounl ofl~ LS'IC" rondllion al lhl> tim....... Elit" 2. TJ" l ',. II.",,,, COl'" ""1" '96.

Pusa.a,January '951: .h~ US Army''' S .... Sisnab 8 .. Perl"OD.D~l Section, in a l"Old.i~r'. Iypical ~ ... pshot. ne HIlI...nlal rar I~n ...-0.... on hi.. 118T r"IiS"" Ihe D~W chen"o.. lI officially introdu~ t.h~ roUowinS mo..d.; Ihe 'Ria""ure 'combal cheVl'OOUi' are ...·om by Ihe yo , Hrs...... t i.. th~ pile winter Ctlp, ..iShl ce..lre. (Sh.dby S lo.j

an awesome firepo\\er, especiall) in artillery, which outcJa.ssed comparable enem) units l , For special missions a regiment could lx.'Come a 'rt>gimcmal combat team equivalent 10 a British 'brigade group' by attaching a divisional 105 mm artillery banalion, a signals detachment, and engineel" and medical companies. At least 12 infantry regiments (7th, 151h, 19th, 21st, 23rd, 24th, 31st, 32nd, 34th, 35th, 65th, I 60th) operated at some time as RCrs, as well as the independent 5th and 29th, and the famous 187th Airborne (detached from 11th Airborne Division). Other elite units were the 1St 5th and 8th Ranger Infantry Companies (Airborne), each with five officers and 1°7 men, including the all-black 2nd Co., in Korea from October 1950 to A ugllst 195 I ; and the mixcd American-British-Korean 'United Nations Partisan Infalllry Korea' (UNPI K). These units all operated clandestinely behind cnemy lines and on the offshore islands. The scattered KMAG advisers retrealed helplessly with the ROK divisions before the North Korean advance, an advance which immediale USAF air strikes were unable to hall. United States Army intervention was nC1:essary, and four of Ihe five divisions of Lt.Gen. Wahon H. Walker's 8th Army (7th, 24th, 251h Infantry, lSI Cavalryl.lhen

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Fia.. study ofaUS Arnt)' rifl .. Mtuad I...d .. r io aulum.n '950' Cpl. Carroll Va,;l of the 35lh RCT, band 0" Ih.. 35th l..fJOalry from "'5th Di i",;o... No uail or ... nlo in..-i5R'" are WOnt io th.. fi..ld. II.. CII.rri... Ihe ~h rifle, a"d a triple-poclo'" 5r......d .. pou"h (I..tt) aad fi",1 aid pou"h are alla"hKl to hi. rift.. belt.

Tb....at ... ba"doli are Iypkal ..nou5h--bul ODe U",,",,,I'" thai the 5re....de ther preCllrioUJily alla"hKl hy ..lippiD5 Ih"ir "'pooall iolo p""ku", "'ere th.. phOIOS... ph...... id....... io oombal th..y ...ould be ... lh..r more ",""urely atta"hed to Ih.. "'"Iwpm.... I. (US Arnt)' vUr. Shelby Sla,lIon)

on occupation duty injapun, were put on alerl. On I july 1950 'Task Force Smilh' two rifle companies from 21st Inr.Regt. (24th Div. reinforced by 105 mm howitzel', monar, bazooka and recoilless rifle teams raced to the front, and managed to delay the enemy advance on Osan before retreating to meet the rest of the division. The 24th made a heroic stand at Taejon, but abandoned Ihe town on 20 july, having lost their commander, ~laj.Gen. Dean. They had bought time for the safe arrival of the 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Di\·s., and the 29th RCT from Okinawa. On 13 july Gen. Walker established 'EUSAK' Eighth United States Army in Korea wilhin the Pusan perimeter, \\ here he also commanded five ROK divisions. All forces in Korea came under Gen. ~lacArthur, since 7 july the Supreme Commander of United ~ations Command Ui'\C B) the end of july the perimeter line had stabilised along the Naktong Ri\'er, to be defended at all COSts. In August reinforcements arrived in the fonn of di"'isional tank battalions, the 5th Ref from Hawaii, the 2nd Inf.Di\'. and tSt Provisional ,\Iarine Bde. built around 5th t\larine Regt., from the USA, and the 27th British Brigade. South Korean conscripts, designated 'Katusas' Koreans auached to the US Armyl, were integrated into the US Anny and unofficially into USt\IC units, with 100 per company, a total of between 1,000 and 3,000 per division. Wearing US unifonns (but rarely attaining NCO rank) these enthusiastic, fearless, but virtually untrained Koreans provided a vital stopgap in manpower. Walker's nine divisions and two brigades were insufficient for a continuous defensive line; but he deployed them so skilfully in anlicipation of enemy attacks that he was able to win the fierce six-week 'Perimeter Ballles', and by mid-September he was ready lO counter-attack. On 15 September, United Stales X Corps (activated in Japan on 26 August) stormed ashore at Inchon with 1st Marine Div. (the expanded Provisional Bde.), 71h Inf.Div. (including ROK I 7lh Reg!. and 8,000 Katusas), 5th R r and, later, 187 ARCT. On 28 Scptember Seoul was recaptured after fiercc fighting. l\leanwhile, on 16 September, EUSAK forces broke out of the Pusan perimelcr. ROK forces thrust northwards, US IX Corps {activated on 23 September with 2nd and 25th Divs. attacked wcsl\\ards, and US I Corps I.

(activated 13 September wilh 1st Cav., 24th Inf. and lSI ROK Di\"s. and 271h Bde.) pushed northwcstwards, linking up with X Corps on 26 September. On I October Walker began the advance into North Korea. I Corps later joined by IX Corps attacked along the wCSt coast, taking P'yongyan~on the Igth, while the ROKs advanced in the east, joined by X Corps no\\ with 3rd Inf.Div. from the l:SA , which landed at Wonsan on 26 October. Ilow(,\,(,I", this triumphant progress ground to a halt in 1'\"ovember with the intervention of the Chinese. The furthest U:\' penetration north\\ards was by the 1 7th Re~t., \\ hich reached the Chinese- :\onh Korean border at I-Iycsanjin. On 24 .i\o\-cmocr ~lacArthur ordered the final push to the Yalu Riwr fromier; but aftcr 24 hours' steady ad\'ance a powerful Chinese counter-atlack ruptured the line in the central 'iCctOr, forcing I and IX Corps to retreat south\\ards to avoid encirclement. B) '5 December they and thr('(' ROK Corps, no\\ out of reach of the Chinese advance, had established a defensive line on the 38th Parallcl. ~Ieanwhile, on 27 :\'ovember, X Corps, marooned in north-eastern Korea. be~an an epic fightin~ retreat to Hlllll1;nam. I

~nob
II,,,,

'5

where 193 UN ships, under a massive air umbrella, successfully cvacuated them. By Christmas Day 105,000 troops had embarked for Pusan in the biggest sea evacuation in American history. Then, on 23 Dccember, Gen. \Valkcr was killed in a traffic accident, to be replaced as EUSAK Commanderon Ihe 261h b) LeGen. ~Iatthe\\ B. Ridgwa). Ridgway had 365,000 troops from west to cast, US I Corps (25th, 3rd Inf., lSI ROK Divs.; IX Corps (lSI Cav., 1St ~Iarine, 24th Inf., 61h ROK Divs.)j three RQK Corps; and X Corps (2nd, 7th Inf., 2nd, 5th, 8th ROK) in reserve. The Chincsc New Year offensive brought X Corps illlo the central sector, and forced I and IX Corps to abandon Seoul 011 4January 1951. However, by 15 January the offensi\'e had run out of steam, and on the 25th EUSAK, now just south of Osan, counterattacked strongly northwards against detcrmined Chinese opposition. ~Ieanwhile the 1St ~Iarine Di\. fought the North Korean loth Div., cut offdeep in South Korea, before joining the IX Corps advance in February. On 14 ~Iarch I Corps recaptured Seoul, and by mid-April Ridgway's forces had reached 'Linc Utah', just inside North Korea. On I I April. after a dramatic disagreement over the issue of widening the scope of operations against China, Presidcnt Truman replaced thc legendary Gen. ~lacArthur with Gen. Ridgway, \\ho in turn passed EUSAK command to LeGen. James Van Fleet. In the First Spring Offensive I and IX Corps dcfending the approaches to Seoul were attacked, but held firm. By 29 April the offensive was spent, and Van Fleet pushed forward gingerly with annourcd patrols. Order of battle was now 1 Corps 1St Cav., 3rd and 25th Inf.Divs.), IX Corps (7th and 24th Inf.. 2nd and 6th ROK Divs., 187th ARCT" and X Corps 1St ~Iarine, 2nd Inf., 5th and 7th ROK Divs.). The Second Spring Offensive on 16 ~Iaysmashed ROK divisions in X Corps, but other units plugged Ihe gap as the Corps fell back, and attacks on I and I X Corps were similarl) contained. Now Van Fleet counter-attacked strongly; and on 21 ~Iay advanced against light resistance to 'Line Wyoming' back in l':orth Korea, which he fortified with trenches, wire, mincs and artillery. The truce talks reduced activilY to local level, bUI X Corps foughl successfully 10 improve its position. ~I('"anwhile. on 6 April the 65th {Puerto

,6

Col .'rederid. B. Ale.....der, co of the 2'lit Infantry, 'lot Oiv;"ion, earty '953. Note combat boots filled w;lh "l';ippe, and regimenlal cre.n worn un 'combat leader'.' gr.. "houJder strap loop, .bo,·e Lhe divisional shoulder sl~ ..."ig...... (US Anny)

Rico) I nf.Regt. replaced the 30th in 3rd Div.; an on I August the day Van Fleet was promoted fu general the 14th Inf. joined 25th Div., rcplacin the black 24th Regt., which was disbanded. Now stalemate set in, as Ridg'o\lay ordeTO ECSAK to StOP ad\ancing but actively to defend il forward positions in North Korea. In Deccmbe '951 the 1st Cav.Div. was replaced in I Corps lr 45th Oklahoma Div., one offour i\'ational Guan divisions called into Federal service in August 195
ually inlO Ibe '1!"Oil Triang'le', inflicting huge casualties. By January 1953 \' ,HI Fleet had 768,000 troops disposed (from wesl to cast) in I Corps (2nd, jlh, lalcr 25th, Inf.; 1St ~Iarine; 1St, 2nd, 15th ROK Divs.); IX Corps 3rd Inf.; 91h ROK, ROK CapitoL; ROK II Corps; X Corps :40th, 45th Inf.; jth 12th, 20th ROJ\. ; and ROK I Corps. On II February 1953 Van Fleet retired after nearly two years as EUSAK Commander, and was replaced by Lt.Cen. from 23Junc, Cen. ~Ia.xwell D. Taylor. In )'Iarch and ~ lay I Corps "ithstood hea vy enem) anaeks, and were reinforced in June b} 187th .\R r and 34th ReT (21th Di,. from Japan. On 10 June a powerful Chill~'SC offensivc a~a.inst ROJ\. II Corps forced thc neighbouring X Corps back three miles. Then, on 13July, IX Corps contained with difficulty the lasl major Chinese penetration before the Armistice of 27 July. The United States emerged from the Korean War as undeniably the principal Western power in succession to Creat BI"itain and France, accepting world-wide obligations, especially in the containment of Communi~m. The 1945 concept of tolal war, \\ aged b) aircraft carr} ing atomic weapons, gaw way to the concept oflimitl'd war, requiring a standing army which must nevcr again decline to the dangerousl} low !cHis of the late 19-1os. Taclically, lhe infantr) reasserted its traditional position as the key arm, which it had apparently lost Field Marshal Lord Aluander of Tunis, Ihe Brilish Ocfenc:e Minister, inspe<:l.li an Honor Guard from th.. US 3m Infantry Division wearing HBT ratiguell much d,r.".sed up for the occasion wilh Ih .. di,,;sion'~ blue and whil" insignia, matching ScarvCll, polished and badMe<1 h ..lmetlin"n, and other typical pa....... d .. f..aturell. (In'perial War Mus.... m)

10 armour. The importance of artillery firepower was re-emphasiscd; Ranger and Airborne units had heen so successful that their Iraining methods were extended to all infalllry ofTictrs; and the grow th of Army (csptcially helicopter) aviation presaged the birth of Ihe 'ai,'mobile' concept. The United Slatt'S di,isional order of bailie ill Korea was: 2nd Inf.Div.... 9th, 23rd, 38lh Inf.Regts.; 12th·, 15th, 37th, 38th Arty.Bns.; 72nd Tk.Bn.; 2nd Eng.Bn.; 82nd AA Bn. 3rd Inf.Di\ .... 7th, 15th. 30th replaced b) 65th Puerto Rico, Inf.Regts.; 9th., loth, 39th, 58th Arty.Bns.; 64th Tk.Bn.; loth Eng.Bn.; 3rd AA Bn. 7th Inf.Di\. ... 17th. 31St, 32nd Inf.Regts.; 31St., 4-8th, 49th, 57th Arty.Bns.; nrd Tk.Bn.; 13th Eng.Bn.; 15th AA Bn. 24th Inf.Di\ .... 19th, 21St, 34th Inf.Regts.; 11th·, 13th, 52nd, 63rd Art} .8I1s.; 70th Tk.Bn.; 3rd Eng.Bn.; '.!6th AA Bn. 25th Inf.Div.... 2lth replaced by 14lh ,27th, 35th Inf.Regts.; 8th, 64th, Ggth, goth· Arty.Bns.; 89th Tk.Bn.; 65th Eng.Bn.; 21S1 AA Bn. 'loth Inf.Div.. . 160th, :l'13rcl, 224th Inf.Regts.; I 43rd, 625th, gBoth, gBlst· Arty.8ns.; 140th Tk.Bn.; 578th Eng.Bn.; 140th AA Bn. 451h Inf.Di\. .. 179th, lSoth, 279th Inf.Rcgts.; 158th, l60th, I7ISt, 189th· Arty.Hns.; 245th Tk.8n.; 120th Eng.Bn.; 145th AA Bn. 1St Cav.Div.... 5th, 7th, 8th Cav.Rcgts.; 61St, 77th 82nd·, 99th, Arty.Bns.; 6th Tk.Bn.; 8th Eng.Bn.; 29th AA Bn. 1st Mar.Div.... 1St, 5th, 7th Mar.Regts.; 1St, 2nd, 3rd, 4th Hns.; Illh Any.Regt.; 1St Tk.Bn.j 1st Eng.Bn.; 1St Amph.Bn. (*dcnoles 155 mm artillery battalion)

Briti.1!1 COIIIIIIOllfe'eflltil After 1945 the British Army began 10 demobilisc; but Ihe British government recognised the nccessit} ofa credible peacetime army, and so conscription (in 1948 renamed 'National Service' was retained for men aged 18~o. Britain had traditional Imperial commitments to which wcrc 110W added ncw inl(Omalional obligations occupation forces

Bugl.,.Major Martin, Our....... Lighl l.nIanlry, '"",rm. up' hi,. bUlll",n (or a fanfare. They wear Ibe rel!imenlaJ ClIp badge 0" Lbe m ......;.hl biOI'" Ixrel ..-Meh W1l,. (and rema;n,.) the seneral ;uue (or British IroGJK, LbouSh "OW repbeed'" tbe LI by dark S...,.,.... The 6eld jaekec aocl lrousen are Ih", I)'pe bier d~""led M:;8 combat dress; "ole COmmo....-.,.ILb 0; ... ;0" iih.ield and ~ ...ental tiLle on rillh1 tihould",r5. The bUill.,. major'. rour chevronli are "-0"' On Ih., upper, ",her Ih.... the lo..-",r .. I"""'-e as ...... r ..guladon. (Th.. UShl Inranlry)

in Germany and Japan, and NATO requirements for troops to defend Western Europe. Similarl), in Canada, Australia and :\ew Zealand membership of W<:stem military alliances was accepted as essential to the security of national independence. The North Korean invasion, so soon after the Communist victory in China, was seen as a funher step towards Communist world domination. 1m· media tel) 17 ships and 7,000 men of the Royal. Royal Australian and Royal Ne\\ Zealand Na\;cs \\ere sent to Korea. They \\ere followed on 29June by 77 (Fighter) Sqn. RAAF, flying l\lustangs, and subsequently by 30 (Transport) Unit RAAF, 426 (Transport) Sqn. ReAF, and, in November, the ~Iustangs of 2 Sqn. SAAF, the ·Fly·ing Cheetahs'. In August 27th InfalHry Brigade, the United Kingdom Strategic Rescr"Ye then station('(\ with 40th Div. in I-long Kong, was earmarked for Korea. A British or Commonweallh illfantry brigade (equivalent to a US regiment consistcd of headquaners, ser"Yices, and three riAe battalions each 909 men strong. A rifle banalion had an HQ company with signals and administration plat· oons); a support company (mortar, machine gun, anti-tank and assault pioneer platoons); and four

riAe compan.ies IA-D each with three rifle pia tOOl 1st 9th within the company. A platoon had thrl rifle se<:tions, each with a cO'lx>ral and eight mel In peacetime most battalions had only thrcc rif companies, and so for Korea a fourth was raise from neighbouring battalions. During this peri(J there \\ as a high incidence of'cross posting' to brin units up to strength for tours in K.orea. The trOOI \\cre a mixture of long-scr.itt reg-ulars, wanill" reservists recallcd to the colours, and TUition: service conscripts. Some of the latter were given tb option of volunteering, but this was not general. On 28 August 1950 27th Bele. rcallya 'brigad group', as it operated wilh organic supportin arms disembarked at Pusan with ani) t\\ battalions IS1 Argyll and Sutherland Highlandel and 1st i\liddlcsex Regt. and immediately mar ned the western perimeter, supported by twO U artillcr)- batleri('S and some US tanks. On I September Lhey broke out, and ad\anecd north westwards with US 24th Di\.. meeting fierce enem opposition against \\hich i\laj. ~luirofLh('f\rg)'1I earned a poslhumous Victoria Cross). On October the brigade was rcnamed 27th Com monwcalth Jnf.lkle., being brought IIp to strengtl by the arrival of 3rd Bn., Royal Australian Regt., . formidable all.regular unit. During the rapi, advance up the west coast the Australians killed 27' North Koreans in a bayonet charge north c P'yongyang. On 30 October the brigade hat reached Chongju, 40 miles from the i\lanehurial border, when the Chinese inter.'ention forced : withdrawal to Sinanju; hcre the brigade beat orL detem1ined Chinese anad:. i\leam\hilc, the 250 strong 41st (Independent) Commando, Roya Marines, formed in Japan in September 1950 fa Korean service, mounted two raids against the cas coast in carly October, and in November joined U~ 1st :\Ianne Di\. X Corps isolated in ~E Korea Following the Chinese attack of l5 !\'O\embe 27th Bele., now in US IX Corps reserve, Sllpportec: the general retreat south, meeting the British 29tl Indepcndcnt Ikigadc Group, which had disem barked at Pusan on 3 November and was no\. advancing north. On 14 December 27th Bele., no\. on the 38th Parallel defence line, \\'asjoined by Got! Parachute, Indian Field Ambulance, India·sonl) but distinguished contribution to the war-effort The 29th Brigade---which as well as three infantl"}

battalions ficldt'd tank I, artil1cl") and engineer unilS had bet'n fighting North Korean guerrillas l1earScoul before moving up to P'yongyang, only to retreat again to the 38th Parallel in mid-December. Commando performed a .\Ieanwhile, 4t magnificent fighting withdrawal wilil US 1St .\Iarine Di\. from the Chasin Reservoir to lIi'l11~nam for e\'acuation to South Korea. In December 1950 all ground, sea and air forc<.."S became the British Commonwealth Forces in Korea BCFK, I-IQ Japan, under LI.Gen. Sir Horace Robertson. the first of tlm.'e Australians to hold thc command. The 27th Bde, US J X Corps retrcatcd in good order before the 1951 Xe\\ Year offensi\e; 29th Bde. US I Corps, covering Seoul, fought fiercel} al Chungghung Dong, and crossed the Han Rher after suffering heavy casualties. By mid-Januar) the twO brigades were entrenched well south of Seoul. Then the slo\\ UX winter counteroffensive northwards began. 27th Brigade at last received its own organic artillery battalion 16th Ficld Reg.. , Royal New Zealand Artillery; and on 18 Fcbruary 2nd 8n., Princess I'atrida's Canadjan Light Infantry became its fourth infantry battalion. By 19 April both bl'igades had halted \\ell north of Seoul, 29th Bde. on thc Imjin Rivcr. The First Spring Offensi\C struck 29th Bde. with massi\'e force and they fell back. leaving 1St Gloucester'S cut off on Point 235 ('Gloucester Hill' to conduct a heroic last stand whieh bought time for Olher units, and ultimately blunted the offensive, After two and a half days JUSt 39 Gloucesters reached UN lines; Lt.CoI. Carne, the battalion commander, and Ll. Curtis were both awarded the Vicloria Cross. The battle of the lmjin River was the Commonwealth's finest hour in Korea. 27th Bde. fought its way southwards, and on 26 April '951 became 28th Commonwealth lkIe. (the only brigade to be 'relieved'), In carly May, 25th Canadian In(;llltry Brigadc Group arrived with three infantry battalions (including 2nd prCLl, transferred from 28th Bde.), an artillery regiment, a fidd ambulance (both battalion equivalents), and lank and engineer scluadrons, In the ~lay UN counter-offensive 25th Bde, (US I Corps, 28th and 29th Bdes. (US IX Corps) all advanced to a ncw 'ror ckt.a.ilnl. acrountl 01 Brit;.h tank (J1X'1"ation~ ~ Yanll:uan:b .n, rill e.",.. . . .,. . . . 1U1I1,. and 17. t . . ., -.J tA A-.,.. 1\"..,..

T",'o Brit;sh _Idi"... or 110" DLI poK wiu. • 'Ka.uom' befor" loinl oul on palrol, '952 SJ- Th"y wear ClIp con.rorl"..-kni, ClIps, rolled rrom.. lube or wool; US M'9S' (t"rt) and M'9';2 'flak j.ck"t.'1 ... d carry SI6O' and l",nad0':5. (Th" Li&ht lnfamry)

defensive line inside North Korea. There, on 28Jul} 195', the 1St Commonwealth Di\"i~ion was formed from the existing Ihree infantry brigades, a tank regiment and scluadron, three artillery regiments and t\\O batteries, an engineer regiment and two squadrons, and three field ambulances. The division defended Seoul under US I Corps: and in October advanced northwards in Opera lion 'Commando', during which 1St KOSB (28th BcIe.) suflcred heavily in Chinese counter-attacks. It was during this battle that Pte, Slx'akman \\on his \C, The stalemate period allowed the division's British, Canadian, Australian, l"ew Zealand and Indian units to reach a level of efficient cooperation, spiced with friendly rivalry, \\hich still stands as a model for multi-national military formations. The intens(' winter cold of 1951---2 brought welfare problems not encountered since the Crimean \\'ar, but military activit} was restricted to patrols and raids. In late .\Ia} 1952 twO companies sen-cd on Kojc-do Po\\' Camp as prison guards. )"leal1\\ hile -11 Celo. R~J, after coastal

'9

raiding throughout 1951, lcrt Korea, and was disbanded at Plymollth in February 1952. Static wadi:ll"C continucd throughout the winter of 1952 3, but improved Chinese defensive fire made local raiding increasingly unattractive. The fiunt was quie!. ahhou~h in late October divisional artillery did suppOrt the neighbouring 1st US ~larine Div. when they came under attack. 1,000 RQK conscripts were integrated. as 'Katcoms' 'Koreans Attached Commonwealth Division', with two Katcoms JX'r infantry section. They wore the relevant unil uniform; could be promoted to NCO rank; and were liked. and respected. During November 1952 1St Black Watch repelled a detennined Chinese attack againsl Ihe hill known as 'The Hook'. The division Spclll IWO months in rcscrve from Februal) 1953; and in late ~Iay the lSI Duke of Wellinglon's Reg!., supported by artillery and Ihe Cclllurions of lSI RTR, again defended A Sconu.b _Idi"r ...,rvin! ... Kona bei"1I611ee1 ....iLho ....." ReO"d t}']M: or .......er ...-arfan dOlhias in..eeI ill nlipo."''' to Lhoe ....rr....in.-l.. orBriti h troops d ..riroll,h" appalliDlIl)' "Old ...u.'er of.gso. {Imp"rial War M ......... m)

The Hook in the last sizeable Commonwealt although infantry an engagement of the wa artillery did help the US Marines in the la: desperate fighting before the Annistice. Commonwealth losses, at 1,263 dead of whor 686 were British, were considered moderate; an the di"ision slayed in South Korea until 1956. whe it was replaced b) a 2,000·strong Colllingen which was steadily reduced over the years whic followed. The unique experimelll of the mulu national division, although successful, is unlikel ever to be repeated in Ihe entirely different strategi conditions n hich now r.'lce the separale nations ( the Old CommOl1neahh. The order of battle of Commonwealth grom). forces excluding 41 Cdo. Royal ~Iarincs follon below. Diagonal strokes represent successive de ployments: e.g. the inilial infant!) units of29th &Ie were lSI Bn., Royal Northumberland FusiJiers; H 811., The Clouceslershire Reg!.; and 1St Bn., ROY
lSI ~Iiddx./lst KSLI/1S1 DLl/ist Warwicks lSI Argylis/ISI KOSB/1S1 R. Fusiliers/lst Essex 3rd R. Australians/tSt R. AustralianS/2nd R Australians 2nd PPCLI 16th Fd.Reg!. RNZA 60th I ndian (Para) Fd.Amb.

29lh British II/jalltry Brigade Grou/) lSI Nonhumbcrlands/lst Lciccsters/lst Blad Watch/1st R. Scots 1st Cloucesters/lst Welch/1st Ok of Wellington's 1St Ulsters/1st Norfolks/lst Liverpool 'C' Sqn. 7th Royal Tank Regt. 8th Irish Hussars/5th Inniskillings/ls1 RTR/5l1 RTR 45th/14th/20th Fd.Reg!. RA 170lh/1201h Lt. Banery RA (~lortars)/61S1 Lt Reg!. RA I I th/42nd Ll. AA Bn. RA 551h & 12211d Fd.SqnRE, 6.4Ih Fd.Pk.Sqn.RE 28th Fd.Eng.Rcg!.RE 26th Fd.Amb. 20

2jlh Canadian b!frwlry Brigade Group 'lndflst/3rd R. Canadians 'lnd/lSt/3rd R.'22< Regt. ~wdjlst/3rd PPCLI 'C'(B'I'A' Sqn. Lord Strathcona's Horse 2nd 1st R.Can. Horse Arty.jBlst Fd.Regt. RCA 23rd Fd.Sqn. RCEj281h Fd.Eng.Regt. RE 571h Indep.Fd.Sqn. RCE 25th '37Ih/38Ih Can. Fd.Amb. 25lh Can.Fd. Dressing Slat. lSI Comm. Oiv. Sigs. Regt. 1903rd Indep.AOP Flight

Ot/lfr LIllitffl.\OtiOIl.i COlltillgflltS Three days arter the i'l\orth Korean lI1\'aslon the Uniled Nations called on all member states to help Soulh Korea. Ten countries, besides the Commonwealth, sent armed units, and four scnt medical teams. The soldiers, all volunteers, were idealists, adventurers, or regulars hoping for accelerated promotion Ihrough rt.'CclH combat experience. In all cases (exccpt Ihe Philippines) special units were raised and they, or their personnel, werc regularly rotaled. First came Ihe Philippines. The army, reorganised in early 1950 inlO tell US·style 'baualion combat leams' to fight the Huk Communisls, selll the experienced 10lh BeT p,'lotorised) and a .\ledium Tank Company. With 1,367 men in three rine com panics, light tank and reconnaissance Ucep) companies, ;I self,pl'OpcJled artillery ballery and supponing services, the unit could operate independently. Troops wore uniforms identical to the US Army \\,itb the Philippine cap badge, and US rank insignia including pre· I 948 chevrons. They disembarked al Ilusan on 20 September 1950; and operated with US 25th Oiv. 011 anti·guerrilla dutjes theil' speciality. From January 1951 the unilserved with US 3rd Oiv., and in April its tanks lried unsuccessfully 10 relieve lhe Cloucesters at the Imjin River. The 20lh BCT look over in September 1951, scrying from April 1952 with US 45th Oiv.; in June 1952 il was rclie\'ed by 19th BeT 'Blood-

An MP o( tbe c.nadian Pron'~1 Corps., 2Sth Bde., '51 Cornrnon,,·e:l.hb Divi.ion. Nnle "I.... ~·e ill i&.... "'0'" on Iwo bra.. _rd.... 011 hili le(1 arm Ibe divi.ional.i~0" hi.. ri~hl tbf, rM 'Ca.aad.' .hi,"-Id wilh. &old_)","-Uow n':l.pl,"-Ir.U:l.nd "Tr.ltb, bolh und,"-r r'"-!irne..I.llides. (P.. b(jc Ard.;'-es Ca_da)

hounds' ; in April 1953 by 14th HCT 'Awngers' , and finally, in April 1954, by 2nd BCT. After World Wal' I I Turkey was driven by fear of its Soviel neighbour into the Weslern camp. Although at peace since 1923, Turkish troops were generally considered lhe bcsi of the smaller UN cOlllingents; Ihey fought well, especially in dose combat; werc steadfast in defence, and resolute as Po\'Vs; and were well led. 'rhe lSI Turkish Brigade-with 241S1 Inf.Regl. (three battalions), an artillery battalion, signals platoon, and engineer, transport, medical and ordnance companies disembarked at Pusan 5,455 Slrong, on 18 20 October '950, and advanced with 25th US Div. into North Korea. They met the Chinese inter\'ention head on, fighting desperately bUI being beaten back at Sinnimini with hea\') losses. They fought doggedly near Osan in February 1951, and on 15 !\ lay foiled anotherdircci Chinese assault. On I Septcmber 1951 2nd Bele. took o\er; on 30July 1952, 3rd Bdc.; and on 4 September 1953. 4th Bde.; which left Korca in :-'1;1\ I<)'ll.

"

A c:oopcain o( (he french &,ui/liJI, rk COf'H ..·..... rin~ Ih" black M",I and bad~" ilI.."lraIM ;n Plale F'_ole 111""&" "')'"I"u, in M",I. fr"nch and A."'''rican df!COrlll.;On,. ar" worn 00 US (ati~u".. itldud;n~ Ihe ballaHoo'. la")"Ard (or (our 1'011""1;"" c;tat;on.. in Ih" .:010.. ..-,...110... "",,51...1 whh !r""n--o( Ih" MUuilk MiJilu;r~ r;bbo... Thr"" !old ban pinn"'" 10 Lbe mesc indicale his rank. {E.C.I>. Arn,ie.j

Thailand sent til{' 'Royal Thai Forces in Korea' air and naval forces and the 2 [st Inr.R<,·gt., formed 22 September 1950 with HQand 1st Bn. only. It reached Korea on 22 October, and advanced with the US 187th ARCT 10 P'yongyang. In January [95[ the unit retreated wilh the British 29th Bde. under Chinese pressure; and, with tst US Cav.Div., fought guerrillas and faced the Spring Oflensives. In December [951 they patrolled \\ith US 9th Inr. (';md Div.), fighting gallantly at Pork Chop I-lill. The regiment returned home on 31 i\larch '955, leaving a company·sized contingl'nt which remained until 1972, by which time 19.000 Thais had scn'ed tours in Korea; wartime service cost them 125 dead. The 21st Regt. is now Hi\1 Quccn Sirikit's Guard (Jnit. In spitc of the heav} burden of her war in Indochina France sent thc (J:\' French Forces 22

under LI.Cen. (temporary LLC01!) i\londar l commanding an IIQ and the French Battaliol (Bataillon Fran~ais), with I-IQcompany (indudin: an elite assault pioneer platoon), support compan' and three rifle companies (1St -3rd), each with on support and three rifle platoons. They discmbarkec at Pusan on 29 November '950, and joined the 23n Ref 2nd US Division. The battalion disLin guished itself in a ba)'onet charge at Wonju on II Januaf) '951, and in an epic defence ofChip'yong ni village from 13 to 17 February, which turned th Chinese offensi\e. At Putchaetul '7 :\la)" th pioneers fought to the death. Heartbreak Ridge wa captured in October '951, and Arro\\ Head Hi! held in October 1952, but again at the cost of th pionccrs. On 22 October 1953 the French set sail fo the Indochina \\'ar, le3\ing 261 dead in Korea. Netherlands nasal forces reached Korea inJul 1950: but the Dutch Army, seriously depleted afte their recent war in Indoncsia, could offer onl) al understrcngth infantry battalion from the recentl formed Regiment \'an HeulSZ. The 636-stron; unit with headquarters, HQ company, on support and twO riflc companies and some nurse:!: all under i\lajor den Ouden reached Pusan on 2 NO\ember 1950, andjoincd US 38th Inf. US 2111 Oi\'. in a particularly successful partnership. On I February 195' the headquarters and HQCo. weI' o\'errun by Chinese disguised as ROK troops, ani den Ouden was killed. In 1\lay a third rifl company arri\ed, and in April to July 1952 i helped quell the l)oW revolt on Kojc-do. 11 September 1954 the battalion left Korea, havin; lost [20 dead. Exbausted after a long civil war Greec. nevertheless SCIll a reinforced bat talion formed fron volunteers from the Creek Army's 1St, 8tb and 9tl Divs.; tbere was also the 13th Transport Flight 0 the RHAF, which helped evacuate US X Corp from J-!ungnam. The 8'~9-Strong battalion, witl headquarters, J-1Q company, and three rifll companies each with one i\IG mortar and three rifll platoons, reached I)usan on 9 December 1950, all( joined US 7th Ca\'.Regt. (US 1St Cav.Div.). On 2~ January 1951 the battalion captured Hill 4°2, all(

lie'"

'Thr World \hr It tk XW"r(,J I.I,C"I, \IJli;rill' \·rr...,rr~. ",110 k< Ihr h..-rill;n I..rll;lon\ I J' D.. ml-8rili;adr al 'aruk and in loul .\[rin Liid- mall\ ot Dr G.ulk·, ,mall b.md "I ,..oK"'" Imm Ihr I......... olcxiJ( hr k"pl h~. ",ut;m... P"'"",I..",m .... 1{. Gr". L..d ..n, .

on 5 October occupied Hill 313 ('Scotch Hill'), losing 28 dead. InJanuary 1952 they patrolled with 15th InC (US srd Div.); and in May they helped guard Koje-do camp. Finally, in June 1953, they held 'Harry Hill' against determined Chinese asa.ults. On IsJanual"y 195+ the arrival or 1,66] rcinrorcelllcnts enabled expansion to the twobattalion Hellenic Regiment. By the end or 1955 almost all had lert Korea, having lost 182 dead. OnSIJanuary 19511heBeigiuDl Luxemburg contribution the 1St Iklgian Bn. Bataillon Beige arriwd at Pusan, comprising a headquarters, HQ company, and hea,') \\cajxms company all mixed Walloon I;lemish ; A and B rifle

Four S! Canadian Light lnf.. nuy p""., .,h.,.,rl"ully Wilh C"n.n\"ni~1 I' ......,aganda plal:ards. All w.,ar Ih., Canadian >lumn..,.._w.,ighl li.,ld .,al"'; Ih., Iwo fo~g..ound '·.,I.,.... n>l oolh di>!I,lay Canadi.. n pa....chUl., wingO!; th., oorpu....J (Jefl f..onl) hall ch.,VTon" Ii,.,n.,illo:d in minialUr., besid., his cap badlll'" imilaling US pra.,lic.,; Ih., man at ri,;ht rear h Canadian.iu,uo:d US-mad., ...li,·., brown SW.,al.,r.1lt., COq>o I'" bllttiedr.,llll blou"., i.. Hrilish 1946 iuu." wo...., with winl.,r ov"rlrOus.,r~ th., n".n al riJlhl front ",.,ar" Canadian bauledru.... and US combat boo'li. Iii" .303 U'" Enfic:ld was Ih., s ....nd.. rd rifl", ,hroulhou, Commonwealth conting",nu. (Public Archi,·.,,, Canad..

Companies (Walloon, and C Co. lFlemish. The Luxemburg DClachment or 48 men ronned the 1St Pill. or A Co., and wore lhe Grand-Ducal monogram on Ihe collar palches or Iheir Belgian unifonns. The battalion rOllghl magnificelllly at the Imjin Ri,-er, supporting British 29th Bde.: it was

'3

relievcd on 21 Augusl by the 2nd Bn., whieh was Padilla, followed on 15 June '951 by the 1St Ihen assigncd to US 71h InCRegL (3rd Oiv.). In Colombia Bn. (Bata1l6n Colombia), the only Lalin OClObcr Ihis unil defended a forward posit.ion at American ground unit ever to fight in Asia, Haktang-ni for Ihree days against a heavy Chinese Colombians were fint,,1 five dollars for not shaving attack. from 26 t1.larch '952 to 20January '953 Ihe daily or writing home weekly, and a nine-picce 2nd Luxemburg Ptn. ser\ed with the battaJion. In Latin band accompanied them; but this was ne April 1953 the unit fought on· Chinese attacks 'operetta army', for they earned a fightin@ at Chatkol. In June 1955 the last Belgians lefl reputation surpassed only by the Turks. The 1,060Korea, having lost 1°3 dead including two strong reinforced batlalionjoined US 241h Oi\'. and Luxemburgers,. first saw combat on 7 August, later mounting an Emperor Ilaile Selassie, eager to involve epic defence of K umsong from 13 10 23 October. In Ethiopia in the internationalised conflict, sent the carly 1952 the) transferred 10 the US 31st Inf. uS 1St Kagne\\ "Conquerors' Bn., formed in August 7th Oi,', ; and fought on ·Old Baldy' before bein~ 1950 with three riAe companies lSi, 2nd and 4th relieved b) Ihe 2nd Bn. on 4July. After the fighl fOi Cos. drawn from his elite Imperial Guard. They "T-Bone Hill' in late '952the3rd Bn. took over, alS( arrived at I'usan on 7 ~Iay 1951, and joined US fighting at "Old Baldy' before rcliefb) 4th Bn. on 2: 32nd InCRcgl. 7th Oi\. on 'Line Kansas'. from June 1953. By the time this battalion left Korea ir 16 to 22 September they were engaged in furious OClober 195-1, 131 Colombians had died in action The first foreign medicalleam to arri,·c in Korea hand-to-hand fighting al Sam-Hyon. On 29 i\larch 1952 2nd Kagne" Bn. tooko,·er, 10 be relieved in its "as from lhe Swedish Red Cross, operating a field tum on 16 April 1953 by 3rd Kagnew Bn., which hospilal at I'usan from '23 September 1950 until Ie drove off al b,ayonet-point a Chinese attack at April 1957. On 7 ~Iarch 1951 the Danish Red Tokan-ni on 20 ~Iay. This unit was fighting at Pork Cross ship ]ul/ondia anchored in Pusan harbour. Chop Hill al the time of the Armislice. The last and operatt-d there and at Inehon wilh 100 medical Ethiopian soldier left Korea on 3 January 1965. personnel ulllil ,6 August '957. From ~Iay '951 In 1950 Colotnbia sent the frigate A/miranl~ until '954 the Norwegian Red Cross 'after I ~o"cmber 1951, Ihe Norwegian Army' operated M~n oftb.. 3m Turkish Bd....rrh in th .. Panbudon8 l'O!<'tor 10 ta .... o"~r from th .. 37th US Marin in May '953' By lhi" dal~ 'Normash', a ~Iobile Army Surgical Hospital th .. Tur.... wu.. ~nlirdy clothed and equipped wilh US il~rn5., '~Iash'), the 106 personnel wearing at first includ;n~ th.. US Arrny'. nylon .Iuminium 'Armor, V"SI, M,~·. (US Army couru,.y Simon Dunstan) NOI"\\egian and latcr US Army uniforms. Finall)

North Korean KPA: I: Sergeant. lummer field dres.. 1950 2: PJi .... te, winter field dreu, 1950 3: Colonel• .ervice d,,", 1952

--

-

2

r •

r, 3

/

A

Republic otKo",a: I: Mllior, toervlce dreu, 1960 2: Ueutenant. neld d.rft.. 1900 3: Trained Private, wmlfor field dreu, 1900

•

I

•

I

B

l

United State. Anny: I: Mlljor, IlW11mer'khaltU',1950

2: Private, 111mmer rield d~ 1960 3: Corporal, Iwnmer field t1reu, 1952

c

I: US Anny 5"t.. field d 2: US Millin.., winter field d

1951 1953

S: U.Col., Coiombianeontingent.l963

\

r

c.

3

~-""'-

o

--

I: Cpl., 3rd Bn., Royal A...,lrallllD Regt., 1960 2: Pte., 1111 Bn., The Glooeelllerllhlre Regl. (lJK~ 1001 3: Sgt., Royal22 e Regiment (Canada), 1901

E

I, Lt., Bn. de Coree (France), 1961 2, Kpl.l
F

1: M-.lor, 1Urki.h Ude., 1950 2: U., 1.1 Kagnew 8n. (Ethiopia), I~I 3: UCpl., 2bt Inl Regl. (Thailand), 1901

•

G

Chinese People'. Ube...lloD Anny: I: Infantrym winter field drellS, 1950 2: Infanlrym ummerfielddreu, 1961 3: Officer• .ervice dre$.. 1962

3

H

from t6Novembcr '95' until2January t955, the Italian Red Cross built and ran a hospital at Yongdungpo.

People:l Repllb/ir of Olillfl in 1950 the Chinese People's Liberation Army Clrung-Kuo 1m-Min Chi~h-fong Chiin herearter PLA ,comprising Ihe Army, Navy, Air Force and \Iilitia or the year-old People's Republic, was commanded by Ihe ~tinister or Derence, Chu-Teh, Anny commander since June 1930. There were between twO and three million troops in rour Field Armies numbered 1st 4th and GHQ units sometimes called ,jth Ficld Army: and one (0 two million in the second-line Garrison Armies. A Ficld AmlY 130,000---160,000 strong, equivalent 10 a \\eak CS or British 'army' contained about three ISI--'23rd. A Group Army Group Armies 30,000-80,000 strong, equivalent to a Western 'corps' usually contained twO 10 six Armies 1st-about 77thl. The Army (21,000--30,000 strong, or hair again the size or a US or British Division) was the princip..'ll selr·sufficienl tactical formation. Each comprised three, sometimes rour, Divisions (numbered 1st about 230th); artillery, special duty, Iraining and lorry transport regiments; and engineer, reconnaissance, communications and anti-aircrart battalions. A division 7,000--10,000 SO'ong, equivalent to a US 'light division') had three infantry rcgimellls (1St-about 70mh), an anillery rcgimetll, and engineer, Iranspon, medical and signals companies. A regimen! (in theory 3,242 men, but usually understrenglh) had three inran!ry battalions (each with three three-platoon companies), an anillery battery, and guard, monar, transport, signals, medical and stretcher companies. There were also some artillery divisions (with artillery and rocketprojector regimen!s), and Inner r..longolian mounled cavalry divisions, but apparently no armoured di\'isions al this time, although the PLA did operate some ex-Nationalist tanks. Army organisation was slrictly triangular, and all regiments were allocated 10 divisions in numerical sequence, as werc divisions to armies. Although 3,000 recently arrin.-d So\-ie{ military

Lt.CoL M. P. A, de.. Oude.., the finn CO orthe Net.herlaad~8n., deco.... tes or hi" eornmaad will> the US Broazo: Star. Not" th., Ukt)'I., «r"",. 'eomb,lt I.,ad.,r' loop" WOnt 0 .. hi" ..houlder strap"- 0.... Oud"" was killed ia • .,lio.. 0 ....... Huafl:_"« 0 .. OIl f"bno.ary '95" (M.il.Hist.Sec., Royal Dutdo Army)

ID""

advisers were training the PLA in modern mechanised \\arfare, it was still at this stage a mass inramry rorce unsurpassed in its expericnce or guerrilla warfare. Thc Army was multi-racial, with a cadre of dedicated Communists controlling exnationalist deserters and Po\Vs, and troops from the compromised Chinese, i\lanchukuo and Mongol collaborationist armies. To prevent elitism 'positional titles' (or 'appoimments') were substituted for the usual military ranks (sec table). Equipment was poor, and logistical serviccs rudimentary, but tbe calibre of the ordinary soldier made the PLA a rormidable fighling machine, The North Korean invasion of the South had come as a surprise to Peking, but the Chinese were unwilling to see the dcstruction or a fellow Communist slatC when the tide orwar began to turn against it. By 140Ctobcr '950 the first regular PLA. troops--designaled 'Chinese People's Volunteers', to disguise official Chinese emry into the war, and commanded by 'General' I>'cng Teh-huai-had crossed the Yalu River secretly into North Korea. By early No\"embcr these comprised 200,0Cl0 men in the 13th Group Army ~38th, 39th, 40th Armies ; 42nd, 50th and 66th Armies; 8th Artillery and 1st 33

and 2nd ~totoriscd Artillery Divisions; a cavalf} regiment, and the 42nd ~ lotor Transport Regi. ment. They promptly smashed ROK forces at tne Chasin Reservoir, but 38th and 40th Armies sustained heavy losses at Ch'ongch'on against CS IX Corps before attacking the weaker ROK II Corps. On 27 i':o\'ember 9th Group Army 20th. 26th, 27th Armies) was so badly mauled in itl. unsuccessful attempt to prevelll US X Corps' fighting relreal to H(mgnam that it was withdrawn to :\Iandwna for re-organisation. :\Ieanwhile the main Chinese force (38Ih, 39th, 40th, 42nd, 50th. 66th Armies chased the remaining US ROK forces Out of North Korea, pausing in December al the 38th Parallel. Then, on I January 1951, thC)' surged southwards, and occupied Seoul befon halting for resupply. The crude logistical 'tair Wal; Bely...... and G"",k lroo~ an.cl"ed 10 US 3rd I.'.ntry Dh. '95'. with Gl. ,,·earin. Ih., divi.io..•• ...si,.... on thrio hetmet.. The ha"e . . . .tional fta. in"'pi. 0 .. tllei. hel.nets; the beret...·... ria. Bel.i.aalil .n: e
Gt_'"

Appointments in the Chinese PLA Titft Yen-chan-chun Ssu·ling-yuan Ping-t'uan Ssu-ling yuan Chlin Ssu-ling-yuall Shih Ssu-ling-yiian Shih Fu Ssu-ling-yiian

Littraf Transla/ion Field Army Commanding Officer Group Army Commanding Officer Army Commanding Officer Divisional Commanding Officer Deputy Divisional Commanding Officer

British Equil'Q(tn/ General Lieut. General Major General Brigadier Brigadier

T'uan-chang Fu T'uan-chang Ying-chang Lien-chang Fu Lien-chang P'ai-chang

Regimental Commander Deputy Regimental Commander Batlalion Commander Company Commander Deputy Company Commander Platoon Commander

Colonel Lieu!. Colonel Major Captain Lieutenant 2nd Lieutenant

Fu P'ai-chang Pan-chang Fu Pan-chang Chan-shih

Deputy Platoon Commander Section Commander Deputy Section Commander Fighter

Sergeant Corporal Lance-Corporal Private

On 16 September 1955 (with effect 1January 1956) this system was replaced by Soviel-Slyle ranks. Under the Cultural Revolution il was reinslated, with the addition of'Chieh-fang Chun Tsung-ssuling' Commander-in-Chiefoflhe PLA equivalent to Field t\larshal. On I August 1983 a relurn to So\"iet-slyle ranks was announced. 34

quite unable to supply cven the modcst 40 tons of supplies needed by a Chinesc division (a US Divis.ion needed Goo!) nftcrso rapid an advance. On II February 40th, 66th and KPA 5th Armies pressed on towllrds \Vonju, lIsing massed 'human w3\'e' tactics for the first time; but these caused appalling casualties in the face of the deadly UN fireJXlwcr, and the Chinese wCI'e forced to retreat back over the 38th Parallel, having lost Seoul. Now scvcn more annics 12th, 15th, 47th. ooth, 63rd, 64-th, 65th arrived for the First Spring Offensive, which was to be the PLA's greatest if ultimately unsuccessful effort of the war. In the ....est, the 3rd and 19th Croup Armies would take Seoul; the 13th and reconstituted 19th Croup Amlies would attack in the central sector, backed up by independent Armies and e\'en some ~Iongolian cavalry a total of30divisions (25°,000 men with about 40 divisions in reserye. The offensive began on 22 April, but had already been halted by the 30th, with 70,000 casualties, Seoul snU out of reach, and the advance in the central sector blunted after 40 miles by the stand of 29th British Bde. at the Imjin. On 17 i\ lay pressure s\\;tched to the cast in the Second Spring Offcnsivc, with 21 Chinese divisions and two North Korean armies, led by 3rd and 9th Croup Armics; but after four days and 90,000 casualties the advance petered out. The Chinese wcre shattered, and realised that e\'en their virtually unlimited human resources could not overcome the murderous UN firepower. They retreated as the UN coulllcr·attacked, to a secure line just inside North Korea, saved from humilial· ing defeat by UN reluctance to invade North Korea again, and by the hope ofan armistice as peace talks opened. The November 1951 stalemate found the Chinese troops manning static fortifications against an enemy who no longer feared them as invincible, but who did 110t wish to waSte lives by attacking. Now the Chinese constructed a 14-mile-deep system of lrenches, earthworks, deep tunnels and underground bases as sheltcr against artillery barrages, air strikes, and c\'cn nuclear attack. L:sing their unrivalled skills in concealment and camouRage, they moved only under coyer of darkness, and attacked in battalion or company strength, suppOrted by increa.sccl artillery, mortars and tanks. The Chinese now manned exclusively

Or E. Saad.aa, «lmm"nd
the western and central sectors, facing UN/ROK forces, leaving the relatively peaceful castern sector to their \\eaker North Korean allies. Their probing attacks, usually against vulnerable ROK units, were localised but still vicious; inJanuary 1952 they lost 4,000 men in a single frenzied battle. In May 1952 lhey escalated attacks against 1st ROK Div., backed by artillery and mortar barrage, but werc once again unsuccessful. InJ uly 1952 the CPV, now with 14 armies (12th, 15th, 20th, 26lh, 27th, 38th, 39th, 40th, 4'2nd, 47th, 60th, 63rd--65th), began the 'Outpost Baltles', but were usually repulsed, often with significant losses. In October they launched a major attack against US IX Corps, but lost 2,000 men from 38th Army in IWO days. Activity declined over the winter months, and more armies arrived as reinforcements (16th, 24th, 54th, 67th and 68th I. Now there were se\'cn Chinese and two North Korean armies in the line, 270,000 men, and II armies with a further 531,000 in reserve. In ~larch 1953 the Chinese attacked hard in the west towards Seoul; and in mid-June a major assault in the central sector 35

26th Arm) 76, 77, 78, 88 Din. from 9th Anny; 3rd Fd. Army 27th Army (79, 80, 81, go Divs.) Arm); 3rd Fd. Army 38th Army· 112, 113, 1'4 Divs. from 13th G Army; .ph Fd. Army 391h Army· (115, 116, 117 Divs.) from 13th Ct Army: 4th Fd. Arm)' 40th Ann)'· 118, 119, 120 Divs. from 13th G, Army; 41h Fd. Arm) 41st Army (121,122,123 Divs.) 42nd Army (124, 12':;, 126 Divs. from 14th Gr. Ann)"; 41h Fd. Ann) 46th Army· 133, 136, 137, Di\"s. from 131h Gr. Chiaese Iroop" crolli doe v...... River ia OctobftI "tick ~re...de. hated Americans. The order of battle of the CP\' ,\as as follo'\s ·indicates formations prC'SC1lI in July 1953; u i means unidentified.: 1St Army· 1,2,7 Di,'s. from 13lh Gr. Arm); 2nd Fd. Army 12th Ann)· (3-1 [later 31],35,36 Divs. from 3rd Gr. Army; 2nd Fd. Arm) 15lh Army· (29,44,45 Divs.) from 3rd Cr. Army; .mel Fd. Army 16th Arnl)· 46,47.48 [lat('LI_6, 47, u i, 32] Divs. from 9th Gr. Anny 20th Army (58, 59, 60, 89 Divs.) from 9th Gr. Arm); 3rd Fd. Army 23rd Army· 67. Gg, 73 Di,·s. from 9th Gr. Arm) 24th Army· 7°,72,77 [later 74 J Divs. from 9th Gr. Army

671h Army'" ( '99, 200, 20' Divs.) from 20th GeArmy 68th Army'" (202, 2°3, 2°4 Oivs.) from 201h Cr. Army 70th Army (208, 209, 2tO Divs.) Also present inJuly 1953: four motorised artillery divs., lSI '25,26,27 Regts." 2nd '28,29,30 Regts.), 7th II, 20, 21 Rcgts.1, 8th 31, 44, 45, 47, 4,8 Rcgts. '; 21S1 Rocket Launcher Oi\'. (201,202,2°3 Regts.,; six allli·lank regts. 401 +06; fi\"C' horsedrawn artillery regts. g, 10,4-°,41, U i; fouT AA regts. 1,2.3,9' and four tank regIS. 1,6 and two

"' .

Ti,e Plotes A: SOTtll I(ouon KPA AI: &rg~ant, summtr fi~ld dms, 1950

The Russian·stylc shirt blouse was often worn inside the trousers, \\ ith the collar unfastened and the opening filled by a separate triangular "gas flap" of blue cloth. A simplified \"Cfsion introduced later in the war had plain cuffs, and only one flapless pocket on the left breast. The baggy trousers were fastened with tapes al the ankle and worn with rubber-soled camas ankle Ix>ots. The original olive khaki shade faded rapidl) to a light yellowish hue. The delachable shouldel' boards were made of a superior malerial which retained its dark olive green colour better and contrasted markedly with the resl of the uniform: some, at Icast, could be reversed to act as red or green full dress insignia. The uniform had reinforcing patches on the clbows, trouscr scat and knees, and fn.:quelltJy single or double rows ofhoriZOlltal 'zigzag' stilching around the cap and across the shoulders, chest and upper sleeves, which were used to hold leaf camouflage. The SovicHtylc steel helmet had the national badge painted on the front, but seems to have been little worn in the field. Tank crews appear to han' worn Russian-slyle one-piece overalls in black or khaki, wilh high Ix>ots and padded canvas helmets. Az: Pril.'ot~, u';nJtr drtss, 1950 This quilted cotton uniform \\as padded with

Japan"'''e ",mploy"," of t.he US Army mod",1 t.h", Chin~ P_pl""" Volu.al"""r,,' "01100 "ummer "ombal uniforn..-d: Plat., II. n., fabri., tub<: "Iunp; "round the body ill for"'rryinp; rations; the mised luther and fabric pou.,h rip; ill tbat also shown in the posed phOlo on .... P;e Jo (US Army via Lo:o: Run.,U)

cotton wool or kapok. The style followed that of the summer uniform, except that the shirl/blouse had a low slanding collar. The field cap, which was made from the same material, had larger side naps which could be fastened under thc chin but wcrc otherwise lied over the crown. The uniform was worn with padded mittens which had separate thumbs and trigger fingers, and rubber-soled ankle Ix>oIS Wilh quilted cotlon tops. Some officers wore high boots of white fclt which had a Strip of dark leather all the way up the front. There was also a double-breasted parka wilh slanting side pockets; and officers had conventional double-breasted greatcoats with SO\'icHtyle collar tabs. Later the blouse was replaced by a five-button double-breasted jacket similar 10 that of the Chinese PLA; some, indeed, may have been of Chinese origin, for the i'orth

37

Korean supply position must have been sevcrely affected by the UN's '950 advance. Equipment resembled the Soviet World War I I pattern, with leather waist belts and ammunition pouches, and a plain canvas rucksack and haversack. The arma4 melll was identical to the current Soviet issue, and consisted ofSKS carbines or PPSh.p S~IGs. .43: Colontl, un';u drm, '952 This smart, Russian-style uniform seems 10 dale from 1948 al least. The lunic was very similar 10 the 1943 Soviet J,:iUtl excepl in having pointed cu(fs. The piping was red for the Army and green for the Border Conslabulary. The tunic was aJmOSI always worn with Russian-style breeches and high black boots, though long trousers seem to have been authorised for undress. The North Koreans appear to ha\'c follo\\ed the Soviet practice whereb) both wore dark blue for parade and walking-oUl dress and khaki for field scr\·ice. Generals had broad double arm-of4scr\'ice colour stripes, and other >,(Jltrll I·Q.U'

,f ••1I1

officers narrow plJ)lng. All ranks wore the diSlinctive North Korean cap, but only officers had the piping around lhe crown and the two diagonal Hnes on either side or the badge. The badge itself clearly rencctcd Soviet innuence, as did the shoulder boards. The officers' field uniform \\as simjlar except that it was made of callan drill and lacked the piping. There was also a while summt'f tunic in lhe S<'l.me sl)'le, which was worn wilh the peaked cap and blue or khaki lrousers. The dress tunic was worn without a belt, lhe field version with a 'Sam Browne' with a plain rrame buckle. B: Army of 1M Rtpubli( oj Koua BI: Major, Jariu drw. 1950 The Rcpublic of Korea's Army was organised under American auspices, and received surplus CS arms, equipment and uniforms rrom 1947 onwards. ROK officers wore lhe S Army's olive drab tunic and trousers; its slimmer service dress orlight khaki shirl and trousers: or. as in this case, the bauledrcss-

"SIC" t:

"_Ho

(I) Cy ~~d.f ~ohJ. (iI) field marli....J-Kim U-SUDS only. (]) O'.SII, deputy field marshal-nonk aol h",ld 101 lhi. dal"'. (4l Stuw-itvw, li"'ul",nant,"&",n",ral. /10'8, Ihe fou~lar raM of T~, !",neral, i. aol ..howa hu",. ($) C""'¥i-j'Il, ..erseanC. (.8) 11.._, corporal. ('9) S",,/:-
9,. ,

•

~I. I~I Clan F .... nk R. Oakello LI.CoI. t'-rand. o..i~her and LL Roe 8)'onll lieun ~uP"'rv;..i.n1l repatriation or CommuniSI PoW. al Panmunjom i .. Au«"sl '9~hu. Ihe .upe.rvi&or'. arm b .....sard•. NOle minor differences in the ratipe pallenu, (Sft comme.. t.ri.... to Plates C, 0); .ad method. or ....eariag rank and brancb in.ig-aia, USA ...d ROK. (US Army via Lee Rusliell)

style 'Eisenhower jacket' which had become the standard US temperate climate sen'ice dress gannelH during the immediate post-\\ ar pcrioo. US officers could combine it with light-colourcd slacks on the snme basis as the pre-war 'pinks and greens', and this officer has ob\;ously followed their example. A closed-collar version, worn with olive drab trousers and peaked cap, was authorised for enlisted men. The cap bndge fentured the trnditional )'flf/g and yin symbol. While generals wore US-style stars, field and company grade officers wore their devices moullled on gilt backing bars in a fashion reminiscent of World War II Japanese practice, and the service dress tunic sometimes bore Japanese-style cuff braiding. USstyle arm-of-scrvice devices existed by the end of the war, and were supposed to be worn on the left hand side ofthe shirt collar after the US fashion, but fe\\ photographs actuall) show them in use. These branch devices were only worn by officers. 82: Li(IJttnant,fi~ld dr~ss. 1950 The North Korean invasion disrupted the ROK Anny's suppl) system, and in the period before US

material started to nood in, South Korean soldiers presented a very motley appearance. OldJapanese Arisaka rines and even some steel helmets were brought out ofstol"e, and many troops hnd to make do with camas 'tennis shoes' instead of combat boots. The sUI-plus US Army material supplied \\ as not necessarily of the mOSt up-to-date pattern. This officer, for instance, wears the lJS ~141 field jacket, which had long been superseded in the US Army by the much improved ~143 combat clothing. With it, he wears US-style olive drab \\oollen trousers, combat boots, and the peaked field cap of the summer fatigue uniform. l\lany ROK soldiers seem to have been issued with US Army greatcoats at the beginning of winter 1950--51, evcn though these wen: really obsolete as a field garment. By mid'95', however, the South Koreans had been fully equipped with US-pattern field clothing. US innuencc extended to the development ofa systcm of divisional patches, which were often paimcd on the helmet sides, and to parade embellishmcllls such as chromed helmet liners, decorative cravats, and \\ hile ladder-lacing in the combat boots. 83: Prit'Qt~, train~d, wintn fi~ld dms, 1!J50 Ahhough the South Koreans wore what were esscntiall) US uniforms, there \\ere certain differences. The US 1\(-12 HBT summer fatiguo sometimes had the same 'zigzag' stitching across the upper part of the blouse as appeared on North Korean uniforms and which were apparently designed to hold foliage camounage. This NCO is wearing an indigenous winter outfit made of the same quilted COllon material as the North Korean and Chinese moods (which seems sometimes to have led to cases of mistaken identity, with ROK stragglers being takcn for Communists by their UN allies); it diOcred in that the material was olive green in colour, generally with a criss-cross quilting pattern, and in having two large breast pockets like the 1\142 1-1 BT fatiguejacket. It was often worn with a US-pattern pile cap instead of the steel helmet. Like the belt, web pouches and combat boots, this was or the standard US World War II pattern. Rank chevrons wcre supposed to be \\orn on the upper arms, but this seems to haH been rare on the fidd clothing; they more commonl) appeared on the helmet front, sometimes with miniature versions on the lcft hand breast packel flap. 39

c: Uniltd Slatts Amry Ct: iHajor, Slimmer khakis, '950 The term 'khaki' can cause confusion because Americans usc it to mean a lighl tan, whereas to the British and others il means a darker shade more akin 10 the American olive drab. During Ihe '9305 the practice of wearing khaki shirts and privately purchased trouscrs devcloped; and these became issue garments for enlisted men in 1938-40, along wilh Ihe 'ovcrseas cap', until thell not authorised for wear in the United Stales. This practical and comfortable hOH\calhcr uniform was also widely &OK AJt..\lY

worn by officers; it continued 10 be Ihe main summer service dress after 1945. and was worn in rear areas, such asJapan, throughout the Korean \Var. Officers and wa...·ant officers were also authorised to purchase a khaki tunic as an optional item for wear on more formal occasions. The style was similar to that of the oli\ e drab tunic, except that the lower pockct flaps "cre poilHCd, and it lacked a cloth bell. Arter World War II some officers began to wear a khaki version of Ihe 'Ike jacket' instead of the tunic, though this garment seems to have been less common than its oli\'e drab Li I I. ('9) So-wi, MCO..d li"'.. I"' _ " for'"'!!oins:, sih-.... ba on s:old..l'lO) r;;~_ s.~ rno.. t om.,.,r, RrJ I. m.jor. {21I/.ft~ Soul:f RrJ...... I. (2:1) lJ.tii"
'N>IG~lA:

(I) Infanlry. (:I) Anill",ry. (3) MNi~l. (.Il Anno.........11 th", f0rt50u.5> llold. Is) Eapel'.....-ih-u. llold "I.r. (6) Cap bads:~ bl.... U .. I .... widl ih·..r IH't:llll, sold _ ..... Ih. (1) I Co~1r. biOI" and whil"'. (I) Capilol Dhio;i0--Vft'D shi",1d, ..-hil'" rim, y",lIow lill"'r'. h..-d.. (9) '''I Divisio..-dark bI..", rim.., )..,lIow o;hOeld, red .. um"'nol. {.o)]reI Divi"io--.brk biOI'" and _hil"'. (I I) C~+UW, li"""enanl..."'....raL (12) $o.jIuw, m.jo.........enJ. (I]) CIw.-jQ",. bripdi",..-_U th", (0rt50u.5> .it"",r. ('4) T_)~. colonel (15) C ...."OI'o;ibly f..1l dr...... ('7) T-.tri. capt.;... (.I) CIf,,"K"""i,

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equivalent. Insignia were the S<'l.mc on all unifonns: here, Quartermaster Corps, Japan Logistical Command.

US troop>< advance 0 .. T ae~ dun"s che o(fe...i,·e followUo.S Lhe Ihe hn."'" of Lhe KPA'_ 10SLh Annd..Bde.-1he.... i. IIOlhinll 10 d.inlnll"w5h Ihi. 5Cene from ma"1 lake.. i .. Ihe latter .1_11" ofibe Pacific W... all1lin"1 Japan. lncloOIl landlnS_ in a ..lu... 11 '!tYJ; aparl fro hel ...et CO)ve..-..d che 'brewed' T..,.. lis I

C2: SoJditr, summtr jitJd drm, 1950 Among the most important of the US Army's greenish grey. These garmenlS became the basis for innovations during Wodd War II was the use of the Army's post-war summer combat dress, and fatigue clothing as hot-weather combat dress. The wcrc widely worn in Korea by the US Army, ROK first fatigues used in this way wcre the 1\'141 HBT and other UN troops. (Herring Bone Twill) work suits, which could be recognised by their hip-length jackets and shirt- C3: Corporal, summ,rjitld drtss, '952 type cuffs. These were occasionally to be seen in During the second year of the war the M42 H BT Korea; but werc largely supcrseded by the two- fatigues began to be replaced by a newer pattern. piece M42 fatigues, which differed in having a These appear to have been designed in 1947 but not longer coat with tab closures at the cuffs, a gas flap manufactured lIntil the early 1 95°S. The coat across the neck opening (almost always removcd in resembled that of the M42 set and had the same gas practice), and unusually large 'bellows' pockets on flap (again, almost invariably removed), bUI the the chest and high on the hips of the trousers. With cuffs were plain, and the pocketS were of the normal these fatigucs went a peaked field cap, whose short patch type with squared-on' naps and 'docked' visor was lengthcned after 1945. The H BT material bottoms. The trousers had normal side and back was tough and hardwearing, but it was also heavy pockets, and the buttons were of plain plastic and slow to dry when weI. It prcsenu.:d a faintly instead of being the earlier' '3 star' black metal 'striped' appearance, though this was only visible pallern. The first batches of these new fatigues were dose up. The original colour was a dark green made of the old H BT cloth, but later oncs were of Army Shade 7 "hich quickly faded to a pale dark olive green OG 107 cotton t\\;11. Like all

4'

side 'cargo' pockets prcviously used only by paratroops, and lhe shin and sweater were dark green. The praelice of adding a rigid liner to the MSI field cap produced the fashionable, kepi-like '\\Talker' or 'Ridgway' cap typical of the laler 19505 and '60s, This NCO wears the 1948-patlern miniature chcvrons, JUSt visible on the right.


Korcan War fatigues, thcy wcrc baggy and shapeless. Those worn in thc field seldom bore formation patches or c\cn rank chevrons, though smartened-up versions worn with decorative neckerchiefs, highly polished or chromed helmel Iinerx and while ladder-laced combat boots began [0 appear behind the lines. Like man) line NCOs, lhis corporal has relained the older World War I I-style chevrons inSlead of the unpopular 19{8-pattern minialures blue on gold for combatant arms, gold on blue for services which were discontinued early III 19S1.

D1: Strgeant, US An"'y,jield dms, I95J The US Army relained its successful ~143 field uniform after World War I I. Thc matcrial was windproof CottOIl sateen in a dislinclly greenish shade of olivc drab. In summcr thcjackel could bc worn over the I-IBT fatigues. III wintcr the jacket and trousers wcre worn ovcr a woollcn shirt, sweatel' and 'lincr' (a woollen cardigan-style garment) in a browner shadc of olivc drab. The .M43 peaked field cap had car flaps, but the pile cap more commonly accompanied this uniform during the Korean winter, Thc World War II 'doublebuckle' combal boots were progressively replaced by plain lacc-uponcs, all in rliSSCllcather. This M43 uniform cquipped the majority of US troops in Korea, as well as the re-equipped ROK troops and many of the UN contingents. However, it began to give way loan improved version known as thc ~151. The jacket differed onl) in having snap pocket elosurcs instead ofbUtlons; hut the trousers had the

D2: US Marine, win/tr dms, 1953 The US ~Iarincs wore their own HBT ;utilities', peaked field cap and eamounaged helmel cover, and retained thc carl) World War I I-pallern ankle boots and canvas leggings, which led the North Koreans 10 nickname them 'ycllowlegs'. Their winter uniforms approximated more lO the Arm) pattern, howe\'er, and included ~143 jackets, trousers and pile caps, together with \\'orld \\'ar II parkas, and lhe unsatisfactol') canvas and rubber 'shocpaks', The ~151 winter outfit was issued 10 both arms, although nOt ul1lil relatively late in the war. It was based on lhe same 'layering' principle as the ~143, The field jacket and lrousers wcrc worn over frieze liners, \\'hich wcrc white and dark green respectively: a green nannel shirt; and a loose-fitting while undershirt and drawers, For really cold wealher a parka and ovenrouscrs could be added, The parka resembled the World War I I pattern exeepl that it lackt.-'d a belt, had only lhe slanting upper pockets, and was oli\'e green instead of the earlier lighl Ian. The boots were ofdouble-thickness rubber with a layer offcit between: perspiration was prevenlcd from evaporating, but the insulation supposedly kept it from freezing. There werc leather gloves with woollen inserts, or ArClic miucns which had pile backs for rubbing frostbitten noses and faces. D3: Tmiente Coronel, Colombian contingenl, 1953 This is a good example of lhe 'smartened-up' fatigues worn by most senior officers during t..hc Korean War. Non-Commonwealth UN contingents normally worc standard US field clothing with the addition of their own national and rank insignia (this did not appl) to the Filipino troops, who were slill using US-style rank insignia at this period), usually Wilh the palch of the US Division 10 which they were attached on their left shoulders. This lieulenant-coloncl wears the M47-panern fatigue blouse with ~142-pattern trousers, a mixture

of styles which was cllIircly charactcrislic of the period. For somc reason hc has the Colombian national badge under thc titlc '0.11.0\1111;\' in gold on red in place ofa divisional patch. The same badge has been sewn to his neckerchief (a post-war US Army fashion) whose light blue could stand both for the United Nations or infalllry in the US service. Colombian company officers wore one to three gilt stars, and field officers similar stars with a gill bar: since the fatigue jackets lacked shoulder straps this officer has presumably pinned his insignia two stars divided b) a bar to the collar in the US fashion, adding the com entional crossed rifles of his ann-of-service device on the left. EI: Australia: Corporal, 3'd Bn., Ro)"al Australian Rrgimrnl, 1950 The Australian contingent was initiall)' equipped with the familiar loosely fitling tunic, trousers and 'Digger' hat worn in two world wars, and a summer unifonn ofkhaki drill shirt and trousers. Black boots had replaced brown in 1948. The canvas gaiters resembled the American pattern but were fastened with straps, while other web equipment followed British models. \\'hite-on-red 'Ro\"'. \lSlkAlIA.' R£GI.\u:......-r' shoulder titles replaced the discontinued battalion patches, but the RAR's regimental badge did nOt supplant the \,'ell-known 'Rising Sun' until 1954. The Australians were the first Commonwcalth troops to receive US winter clothing. This included pile caps, on \vhich they werc ordered to wcar 'Rising Sun' colla I' badges. [n practice, many retained their distinctive wide-brimmed headgear-as one said, 'They can take away my strides, but not my hat.' Steel helmets wcre conspicuous by their absence. Subscquclllly, British-pattern proofed combat dress and steel helmets and US flakjadets were adopted for field wear. The ol"iginal service dress uniform was replaced by 194,8·pauern Australian battledress, which differed lillie from tbe British model cxcept that the lapels werc rather wider. The distinctiyc hat and gaiters were retained, and 2nd RAR initiated the Australian practice of blackening the laller in '952.

Pfe. na KI w. JacklIOn of Co.L, 5th RCT, weariaS the earty 'Vest, A o~ M-'95" ia Iat., September '952. By thill da'" the USA y had reclti ... nllIOme2O,ooo ""'ampln ofehill USMCprocured n-t; d.e fiMle .hipmene of the Army'll own·A.......or, V.,.c, M-'9~' did aO'arri,·., uotil th"t December. Early rrponll indicated that th., us., of body armour rnluenl the cas_hie" hy aboue:JO per ee.>I. For rull d.,tails """ MAA '57, F"'1i Jlldns. (US Army COUM.,.,.y Simon Ounlllull.)

green bush shins, trousers and floppy bush hats. At the onset of winter they donncd standard khaki serge battledress and cap comforters, later 'acquiring' US M43 combat clothing. Meanwhile, supplit."S of British World War I I-pattern cold weather clothing were rushed out. This included string vests, long underwear, ribbed sweaters, oiled socks, felt· lined boots, visored field GlpS with neck and car flaps, gloves, gaullllets and lhe '942 windproof outer suit consisting of a hoodcd smock and oveflrouscrs in a green, brown and khaki 'brushed' camouflage pattern. For the second winter they wcre issued with a newl) de<;igned field uniform of greenish grey gaberdine, consisting of combat jackct, trousers, peaked field cap, inner and outer u: Guat Britain: Pril.'Ot~, 1st Bn., Th~ Glouustnshire parkas and rubbeNolcd boots. The cap (dubbed R~gimml, 1951 'Hat, Horrible' was not a success, but the jacket The Brilish arrived ,\earing 195o--pattern jungle and trousers went on to become the :\158 combat

Ii

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/::-~"' STtADY_DN

I'tlILLlffiNts

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CIwf tk """,;/lotl (Major) Barthelemy, adjut••' or the Frnocll battalio... newly ..... rd~ the US lAJI:,oa or Meril. Like .........y ~·~ ..ratUI orFree Fn:..cb ........ic:e ...ilh the 8riti~h, he ...,.ai.,. th", Bnush rilll'"·ha.ad beret 'pull'. He wn." Antericaa o;hirt ...... lrou~ • French ,,..' brown lfllilou MIt, cloth Fn:.m ",h We.. SII'1IP .......kina, aad. muntin: oCF.. _cb, US and ROK d~ tio..,. and ituoipia. Note tbe IU.TIOl'oli m.U5 lri"Olo.... shidd t..d8"' ....0 .... 0.. the collar. (E. C. P. Ann~l

dress. This private wears the Gloucestcrs' famous 'back badge' on his bush hat. The ribbed sweater was often worn as an ouler garmelll, with the regimental title, divisional patch and rank chevrons on a drab brassard, and officers' pips sewn 10 the shoulders (and note this unit's US Citation dasp). The 1944 pattern ~Ik. 4 SICel helmet became mandatory as enemy artillery strength increased, and US-supplied body armour made its appearance.

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IDo"ln.O SATIO!'o"S L'lSlGlo"I,A.: (I) ~15ia.. B..... (~) British 10th Di...- i..itially ""0.... (3) British ~h Bel". (4) I.t British Commo""",""lth

by 2".10 Bel". Dhuion. (5) 25th CaDadia.n Bele. (') Colombia.. B (7) Ethiopia.. K.a5_· B..... (.) F~..ch Bn.-o..rfl. c,) C...".k B (.o)Lwt"mburs; Pt....pocl<"t patch. (I t) N"'th_taDds 8 ... (t2) .otlt Philipp...,.. BCT. (':51 Thai c:ont.iaA,","t. (I+) Turkish Bel".

overtrousers, together with a distinctively Canadian peak(.'d field cap, which was manufactured in both wool and cotton. The earlier Brit.ish ~Ik. 3 steel hdmet was superseded by Ihe later :"lk. 4, with some US i\ll helmets appearing towards the end. The Canadians wore their red brigade patch on bolh slccves until they became part of the Commonwcalth Division, after which they wore the lauer's light blue shield on their left sleeve or brassard and their own patch on the right. Each regiment and corps had itS own distinctively £3: Catlllda: Sergeont, Ro)'ol 22' Regimel/t, '95' embroidered shoulder title. Rank insignia followed In 1950 thc Canadian Army WOI·C its own version of the standard British pattern at this period. battlcdress, differing sliglllly from the British and made of a beuer-quality, rather greener material. FI: FrollCt: Lieutenant, 1951 tl.losl units wore khaki berets, but the paratroop~ The Bataillon de Corce was raised in September Irained 1st Ballalions had maroon, and the 1950 from volunteers of all branches of the French armoured squadrons black. Summer wear consisted army-Metropolitan, Colonial and Foreign of a khaki flannel shirt or olive grccn bush jacket Legion-and was commanded by Lt.CoI. Olivier together with plain olive green ·bush pants'. Le M ire, a former paratroop officer of the I "RCP. Equipment followed the British pattern cxcept that The mixed nature of the unit prompted him to the web anklets wcre replaced by short puttccs. organise the companies 011 ·tribal' lines: 1St Co. was Injt.iaJly, the Canadians receivcd US ~143jackets, largely composed ofColonials, 2nd of'i\letros', and overtrousers and S combat boots. Subsequently 3rd of paratroopers from all three C<'1tegorics. The ttlC) introduced their own olive green nylon parka problem of distinctive headgear and insignia was in fact a hooded ~143·style field jackel and soh-cd by issuing the black beret of the para44

commando Batail10n de Choc. The usc of enamelled beret and lapel (as opposed to pocketfob) unit badges was a break with French tradition; the latter consisted of a tricolour shield with the inscription ",\TIO'S l'lU,'. The beret badge--illustrated e1scwhere in detail was usually, though not invariably, worn 011 the right; some berets also had two very prominent brass vemilation eyelets on the right side. Ranks were indicated on shoulder ~trap slides or chest tabs in the usual French manner. On arrival in Korea the troops received US arms, rquipment, combat clothing and steel helmets. The lJS 2nd Division's 'Indian Head' patch was worn; bm the) retained their French berets, and the lapel dC\;ce occasionally appeared on fatigue dress collars. Ex-paras of the 3rd and HQ companies sometimes pinned their wings, or the French para beret badge, to the front flap of their pile caps; and some old North Africa hands sported the characteristic 'clinch' or desert scarf. Some paras kept their camouflaged smocks, often ofex-British stock, of the t9.12 windproof,,·inter suit, which was very popular for its lightness among French paras in Indochina at this period, and was nicknamed 'sausage skin'. The same smock was also issued to Commonwealth troops in Korea. After returning to Indochina in October 1953, the unit formed the cadre for the two-battalion Regiment de Coree. (In June-July 1954 this was virtuall) wiped out in the Central Highlands of Vietnam, around An Khe and Plciku, while serving with the r.... mous Groupe ~Iobile 100.) F2.' Nttlrerftmds: Korporaal l ' J.-tasSt, '95' The volunteers were isslled with the Dutch army's British-style battledt>css. Most wore standard khaki berets, but ex-paratroopers, M arincs and cavalrymen retained their red, blue or black Olles, bearing the brass badge of Regimelll Van Heutsz (an eightpoint star on a stylised 'w'), worn in tbe Dutch fashion on a distinctive ribbon backing, in this case black with orange edges. In Korea the volunteers received US fatigues for field wear and 'I ke' jackets and trousers for walking out; but the beret was commonly worn in preference to US headgear such as peaked fatigue caps or pile hats. The nalional patch was worn on the right shoulder, with a miniature enamelled '·ersion on the left collar point;

Mr F. J. K Net.h.,rl....h a comm.ndu, Ann,)

bu"'l. Slate Sec::~l.f")' ror Dd....u, ,-is;I'' till.. Ko...... Au!" 1 1953; al l..rl, Lbe balULliOD COI. C. K.ooul"l. (MiUlj"I.SK., Ro),.] Dutch

the US 2nd 1nfantr) Di,'ision's large 'I ndian Head' patch was worn on the left shoulder, with a similar miniature on the right collar point; and the uS 38th Infantry Regiment's enamelled badge was worn on the left breast (occasionally on the beret or fatigue cap, too). These devices fn.·(lll(,ntly appeared on the fatigue dress, either separately or in combination. Officers wore their own Dutch stars and bars ofrank on collar or shoulder strap loops, but NCOs adopted US rank chevrons. Since this NCO's rank had no US equivalent, the Dutch improvised by cutting the upper chevron off the US sergeant's IIlSlgma.

F3: Belgium: CapilaiTlt, 1.950 The volunteers initially received standard Belgian battlcdress, which resembled the British model except that it was greener and had longer collar points. They nlso received British Denison Smocks (some officers wore these privately bought versions similar in style but with a more distinct, 'wavy edged' camouflage pattern). Web equipment and boots followed the Briti~h pattern. They adopted a distinctive brown berct; and a gilt badge incorporating the Belgian lion on a shield with a helmet above, b... cked by the \\'alloon battlcaxe and Flemish 'glMotTloag' or ball-and-chain mace, the whole over a scroll lettered '8H..(;[l'I'. The coUar 45

patches were brown edged with yellow. Normal Belgian rank insignia were worn; when in s.hirLSlee\e order officers wore miniature versions of the collar patch on the s.traps._ In Korea the Belgians \'>ere issued with US steel helmets, \\ inter clothing such as ~143jackets, parkas and pile caps, and US fatigues. for usc as summer fidd dress_ However, they continued to wear their distincti\e berets and camouflage jackets, IOgether with 'British' items such as knitted "cap comforters' and oli\e khaki shim with pleated breast pockets. The national shield patch was worn on the lert shoulder, that of the US 3rd Infalllry Di\-ision on the right, with gold-on-brown "8£1..GIUI' shoulder titles above, C/: T/lrkry: A!ajor, 1950

The Turks arrived in Korea wearing lheir l'eccllIly adopled battlcdrcss uniforms wilh US-pattern field caps made Oflhl" same maH.·rial. Bl'iti~h ~Ik. 2 steel helmets, leather waist belLS and Cerman-pauern ammunition pouches. i\'CO:. and men wore no insignia other than a rough disc in arm-of-scr.ice colour green for infant..)', blue for artillery on the side cap, but officers had collar patche:> in the same colours, Stan- wore red . There was ani) time to issue them with L:S weapons and some US :\11943 combat dothing before they werc thrown into action in i\o\ember 19:;0, and most were still wearing their battledress, leather equipment and heavy double-breasted greatcoat.:> \\ hen tile) first met the enemy. Subsequent I) their field clothing, steel helmets and combat equipment became entirely US in style, but they retaill('d their own insignia l . The brigade device (a r('d spearhead decorated with white stars, worn on the right side of the helmet), and the national badge (the white star and crescent on a red circle worn at the lap of the right sleeve) seem to have been introduced during 1951. Cenerals wore their gilt-and-red rank de\-iccs on both shoulder Straps and helmet fronts, and had gorget patcht.'S on their field uniforms as well. G2: Ethiopia: tiro/man/. 1951 The Ethiopians am\-ed wearing 1946-panern British battledress \,-ith CS-st~1c camas gaiter-..; Imperial Guard collar badges; and pith helmets, on the right side of which was a rl"Ctangular patch bearing a green, )ellow and red cockade. The) "ere I~Pt;otrCI.

\1\\ Ij;fitltJiIlh

soon issued with US field uniforms, wearing the L'S 7th Divi~ion 's 'diabolo' patch on their left shouldel'i; a cur.'ed "1.1I110l'1\' shoulder title in rcd on buff edged with red, yellow and green on the right; and. for parade purposes, a large version of the cockade on the right ~ide ohhe (;S steel helmet. Towards the end ohhe period a rather ornate patch bearing the Lion of Judah \\ as introducccl: this was worn beneath the "HIIlOl'!.\' sleeve tide, and on the lefi side of the steel helmet with the US 7th Division's insignia on thc right. The Guard badge continued to be worn on the collar. The Ethiopians retained their own British-style rank insignia. L'suall) officers wore their gilt Imperial crowns or sixpointed stars on buff-colourcd shoulder loops., but appear 10 have pinned them to the right hand collars of the strapless US summer fatigues, with the Guard badge on the lefl_ NCOs wore Bl'ilish·style chevrons; WOs, wreathed lions or crowns in brass. G3: Thailand: Lallu-CorjJQral" /95/

This NCO is wearing a 'variant' version of the US ~142 HBT fatigues with single pleated breast and hip pockets. These fatigues were made in relatively small numbers, and worn interchangeably \\ ith the normal type in both the US and allied armies_ His helmet soon superseded by the US model looks \'Cry much likc the French "Adrian' pattern, which the Thais had certainly worn up to and during World War II, but it is possible that it was in fact an earl) Jap..1llcsc model. It bore a national roundei crest which also formed the basis of the cap badge. Junior NCOs' rank chevrons follow(:'<1 the British system, but were embroidered in yellow or gold on a dark blue-grecn backing, with the roundel surmounted by a pagoda-like Thai crown above, and worn on the left sletve only. Senior NCOs wore a gilt bar below one to three upward-poillling chevrons on their shoulder straps; compallY officers, one to three gold stars; field officers the same, but with the upper star surmounted by a Thai CTOwn. Gilt arm-of-scr.-ice devices were worn on the right collar, with the unit indicated b) combinations of Thai lettering and ordinal')' numerals on the left. The infantry device was crossed rines with a fourcartridge clip superimposed_ I-I: ChintJt Ptople"s Liberatio" Arm)' HI: Solditr, winter drtn, 1950

The PLA's quilted cotton \\ inter uniform was both light and warm, though the material" as difficult to dry when it became wet. The summer uniform \\as nornlally worn underneath for additional insulation. Officers seem sometimes to have worn a single-breasted vcrsion. The colour was generally an olive khaki, with a white lining which could be reversed to act as snow camouflage. The cap was made from thc same matcrial and faced with fur or pilc; it had ear flaps which tied under the chin with tapes. Padded mittens with separatc trigger fingcrs werc supposed to form part of this uniform, but many soldiers had either lost or never been issued with these, and tucked their bands inside their sleeves instead. The wintcr boots were made of stout, fur-Iint.-d leather and worn with felt leggings, though many troops seem to have continued to wear the canvas summer shoes. This style of uniform, with its external quilting, \\ as replaced from 1952 onwards by onc which had the padding onlhc inside and looked likc a bulkier version of the summer uniform. Equipmcnt was usually restricted to a waist belt with two or three stick grenades and twO COtton bandoliers, one containing ammunition, the othcr rice.

LI.Cot. Vi"......, CO ofth" ktlliaa 8a. f"bnoary '95' f"bnoary '933 (aad in .# kill.... ArtnNl FarcIES CommandlErh m""U 110" commaadlalllleaeral orthe US 15th lar...lry Division, lhe 'Thu....erbird,·. (kill.... N..no....1 Der.,..« MiD.ilitry)

volunt~rs carried old Chinese or Japanese bolt action rifles or, like this 'tommy gunner', captured US weapons of World War 11 vimage.

1/3: Officu, st!n·ju duss, '952 The Chinese I>cople's Liberation Army prided itself on its egalitarianism, and officers and men were all supposed to wcar the same simple and austerc H2: &ldiu, summt!r drtSs, 1951 uniform. In practice differences of style, cut and Thc I>LA's 'official' summer uniform from about material continued to exisl. In particular, the officers' tunics commonly had four instead of two 19'~9 to '952 seems to have been a Russian-stylc blouse with a turn-down collar, three-button chest pockets, and \\ere made of wool or evcn silk opening, breast pockets and shirt-type cuns, \,..orn matcrial as opposed to the men's cotton. The colour with long trousers and a peaked cap. However, this continued to vary, but tcnded towards the harsh, only appears to have bttn issued to selected units; yellowish ·Ycnan green' deri,"ed from the d)cs and the summcr U1tifonn worn in Korea did not available in the PLA's homc province. In the early differ very much from that worn by the Chincsc days the Chint"se Communists had worn cloth rcd Nationalists, except that the older field cap had star cap badges: after their victory in the civil war developed into the shapeless 'Mao cap', and puttees they adopted an enamelled vcrsion with gold secm to have become obsolete. The footwear edging, bearing the Chinese characters for '8_[' consisted of canvas shoes with rope or rubber soles. commemorating the PLA·s date of formation in Although there were no official rank insignia, the cel1lre. This does not seem to have been worn in ·leaders' sometimes wore red or red-and-blue Korea, presumably in order to support the fiction armbands, and some were reported to have had red that the Chinese were \olumcers rather than a piping diagonally across their cuffs and on their national force. The absence of rank insignia was collars, tunic frollts and trouser scams. After '952 acceptable in a guerrilla force, but re-equipment these uniforms wcre superseded by a plain single· with Soviet material led to a steady increase in the breasted tunic, trousers and ~Iao cap in 'Ycnan professionalism of the officer corps; in '955 new gr~n·. The PLA had inherited large stocks of Soviet·style uniforms and insignia were introduced, Japancsc steel helmets, but few if an) seem to have onl) to be abolished again during ~Iao's ·Cultural been issued in Korea. ~Iost of the original Chincsc Re\'olution' ten years later.

47

Farbtareln

Notes sur les planches en couleur

",fOr",.
; YIlt' '""""'" ';mplifitt .,,"" un< poche .... 1. p""n....lda manch.tuft un fut pi... ,;mi. Ill"""""poiJ roug. a"lOUr da rpaukl1t:1 indiq"aitnl l'a.mtt-- '" !'"_poil vnl, 1.0. poliott do fronl>
""rod"".

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B. Lts .. niforrncI ROK prnq .... idtntiq_ aWl do: farm«: do Elfl........ U
,tn,

pon "nt, a,,,,, Ics «>UI..rft CD ~ d ~. Ul CDC<" . . . . - . . - ... ;tI, pono' rhi,n Us i......... tooro"ntl ' ~ caMl poe_ do< JIOI'n... pu<_. C. Coon tIt do< "'~ d·~I~. tIn.'n>iono tau ablt dai. do< ... ~ ~. tin pan I a q "" poe"'" n Ia bit..- 'Ik' "'" pj!ft\u ROK n l:'\ 1 , _ \1'9:" a'",' tin poc r..-, a'''''tIn~... do< pllddfl"'dod.caIl"....... c . - . D21 d pa.-bd .. ..,-kdott Ln U..., .......'ft'ftI, cu.-rdtt do< ... Q'. D] 0.. ,............ COf'\'ff ~ rtnd pi dcpnlt:l P.'":' tin .....,n ..., u~ etDml pot1= pal .... nom "ngm.. O'\l·. .....'CDI a\'t-'£ r d·q>auln,., .... b d1.-... am
lOOf1l~fl

de vade

.......... <'\;uot'n'I""''''''''' ,,,,,, ..'

.,..,~,

E. Ln ..... ni>nto pot1um. lruuakmtnl cia , .,""I""'nnrn' lIOf>ak<. ... ill m;u,..,... pi", lIlnl cia ,"" d· _ des ,~n dot comba, bntMmoq ........ tIn 'fbk ,fttI' arntno:aina~tlC(lftp1 .... ,anl. Larnifl<: l0~ oitaienl ~n,,,,,,,,,,,,,," & La trou"", bn,""""l aiml a'.., .....

do< J"+ ,,,rt<' pa-airn, a la .~,... pour ptTmia ""
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carao:loklauq ... d.. con

FI L., balallJon 1"'1("-1' ,..,.,,... It- lit.....' ,,,,,r.~, .... ,.... ~".,. dc ~ d· .. ru'. f"m,;".. a'.... un ..niron... qui t,aJl I",,'opaklllt'" .mrnUln. Q Iq u,.. - t , . U1I"" bn,,,,,,,"lUO ... du ('.....,,,,,,,,,,.,.Icm.:ll ",~nn" ..... ai.nl I....IM pa' .~h3(.ilJo" P...._Ra... 0.-.. in.. ~ .. d~ I. ~flto '<11"".'" d·i"l .. ntfn." d. I. l< a"...no"". ~'ale", a .."'Ii F] L" bI-,... h'ml o',a" I"'"'''' a ..... 'NII'ti,,,,·, '/)~",_ _ t·~, <'q .. ipe"",nl h,;' ..,,,,'],,..,

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G, IIlI"a~m~"', I... ,......< p,-,rt"f'" "" ",el."K" he";'''l!~''' de "l'l.,. de len ...,. cl d'o'q,",,,,n ",, bri'""n~l'_ lImo',ira"...., all,,,,",,,h; ph.. la,d, da,.. n'.~ d·a""'.:lI ",eriui", lUI"'" de la 7' d"........, arni1'in."I<:. G3 L' ..... "na",~ ,h.lla"d.,,, d .. ca"l .... r"''''ia" Atlrian f.., pot1
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