Military History 2006-09

LETTERS

NOTHING (WRONG) UP HtS SLEEVE

In le.sponsc to J.H. Thompson's concern about the U.S. Navy's insignia and names tor the positions ("Letters," April 2006): Some rates have had the rating badges on the tight sleeve and some on the left since at least 1841. The reason varied, but in 1913 the "right ami rates" weit' the seamen rates. This was further refined in 1941 to specify the .seaman branch: boatswain's mate, tiinvt captain, signalman, gunners mate, fire controlman, quartermaster, mineman and totpedomans mate. All other rates wore the badge on the left ami. This was changed in 1949 to the current policy of all insignias being worn on the left arm. Therefore, pictures of boatswain's mates, .such as BM3 Thomas, taken during WWII show the insignia on the right ami. With regard to the remainder of Mr. Thompson's comments about the Navy's stixicture, he's mixing apples and oranges. In the Nav>' the rate refers to the pay grade, the rating refers to the occupalional specialty. In the example of BM3 Thomas, his rate is petty officer 3rd class; his rating is boatswain's mate. The use of "tank" for Navy enlisted personnel is in-

arm. In the old Navy that jimior BM rating was called coxswain, another job description from the sailing ship days. It was my own path to advancement when I was promoted i rom seaman 1 st class to coxswain on November 1.1941. In those days I never heard anyone talk about "grade." It was always refen ed to as one's "rate," as first, second or third class. EdRies San Diego, Calif. CORRECTIONS TO CORRECTIONS

William S. Storey's letter in the March 2006 issue was incon'ect in stating that the 3rd. 4th and 36th Infantn' divisions joined the Seventh Anny for the invasion of southern France. The units were the 3rd, 36th and 45th divisions. Also, the 442nd Regiment was not part of the 3i d Infanti^ Division—it was part of the 36th, from October 11 to November 9. 1944. David B. Leber was also in enx>r when he states that the 30th Infanti-y Regiment was in the 7th Division—it was a part ot the 3rd, when that division was part of the Seventh Army. Patrick D. Heagerty Manlius. N.Y.

COITOCt.

Lieutenant Michael A. Yates U.S. Navy (ret.) Mesa, Ariz. In rcgaid to J.H. Thompson's letter regarding rank and rate in the April 2006 issue, John Thomas' boatswain's mate 3id class rating badge is no! reversed. At the time, all membere of the seaman branch, or deck force, wore their rating badges on the right arm. They were the ratings associated with seamanship, gunner'y. navigation and signals, skills paramount in the sailing navy. Boatswain's mates were senior in precedence, followed [\v gunner's mates, quartermasters and signalmen. Turret captain was a senior gunnery rating, tisually for chief petty officei's. Toipedomen also had right ami i"jitings. All other lating badges, including those lor the engineer, artificer, aviation, etc., were worn on the left arm. The boatswain's mate 3rd class designation did not appear until war's end when all badges were shifted to the left

BOVINESINTHEBOCAGE

After reading your excellent overview of that nasty action in Normandy's hedgerow country in the April 2006 issue. I was reminded of something my tour guide told me of how the Allied forces had an assist in intelligence from an unexpected source. If you ever visit Normandy and stop at one of the hedgerow-enclosed fields, you will discover that the cows are both friendly and inquisitive, According to my source, the troops quickly learned to look at tlie cows. If they were grazing around the field or came to greet the troops, you could be pretty certain that there weren't any German emplacements in that particular bocage. But if the cows were clustered at a comer or were dead, that was a tipoff that the enemy was there. Steven Lopata Little Rock, Ark. FiRSTINST.LO?

My compliments to Daniel R. Champagne for his infoiTTtative and well-writ-

ten article on the hedgerow fighting in Nomiandy that appeared in the April 2006 issue. I am a bit disappointed, though, that Mr. Champagne did not include at least a mention of the contribution of the 115th Infantry Regiment in the account of the tinal capture of St. Lo. It was in lad the 1st Battalion of the 115th, along with Task Force C, consisting of the 29th Division's recon Iroops, tanks fixim the 747lh Tank Battalion and 12 M-lOs from the 821st Tank Destroyer Battalion, that captured St Lo, not the 116th Infanti> as implied in the ailicle. Having served with the Maryland Army National Guard in B Company, 1-115th, ibr almost six yeai-s beginning in 1985.1 am well aware of this battalion and regiment's fine history. In 1985 the 1-115th was considered one of the best combat units in the reserve component thanks to the able leadership of then-Lt, Col. (now Lt. Gen.) H. Steven Blum, who went on to command the 29th Infantry Division (Light) and is now the commanding general of the National Guard Bureau. Ron Griffin Osbkosh, Wis. ln regard to the feature "Battle of the Hedgerows" in the April 2006 issue, as a foiTner member of Company C, 134th Regiment, 35th Intantiy Division—albeit not at the time of the fight for St. Lo—I can tell you that the 134th Infantry was actually thefii^stunit to enter St. Lo. According to the I34th's regimental history. All Hell Con 'l Slop Us, its troops were instmcted to stop on the outskiits. but their advance took them into the city before they were finally halted and instRicted to fall back so that the 115th c(uild have the honor. After 1 joined the 134th on January 8,1945. the old-timers always claimed they were first into St. Lo. and the issue has been debated at postwar reunions ever since. James G. Graff Middlelown, 111. THE COST OF UBERATING ST. L 6

! Iwught your April 2006 edition and was gTatified to find mention of the 134th Regiment, 35tli Intantiy Division, the unit I served with trom Normandv until SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 9

LETTERS

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The Bloodiest Day Tfiis book offeri i striking visual accouni of the Battle of Ajitiecam where Clara Barton, lacer the founder of the American Red Crois. came Co the battlefield with a wheelbarrow full of cloth bandages to tend the wounded, whose in|uries had previousl;^ been wrapped with com husks.

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Available in bookstores everywhere

10 MnJTARy HISTORY SEPTEMBER 2006

Clenching my leeth, I drew out my bayo net and siit open his tunic. I reached into the end of World War II. 1 have always felt his inside pocket and withdrew his Solthat my illustrious regiment has been dalenbuch. Every German soldier canies sadly neglected. Numerous accounts his soldier's booklet, which lists his miliabout the Battle of St. Lo give credit only tan histoiy as well as his cuirent unit, to the 29th Division. This time you even and which he must present on payday. pnnaded a beautiful pninling of our boys I noticed about six more bodies lying fighting among the hedgerows. in the vicinity. 1 crawled to the next I was the intelligence specialist techni- coipse—one lying on its stomach, emitcal sergeant assigned by Supreme Hcad- ting a putrid stench of rotting flesh. I had quartei-s Allied Expeditionaiy Force to to turn the body over, and in so doing unthis unit, frequently serving as a POW in- covered a di"ied-up pool ol blood. It was terrogator. Your article reminded me ol a the only way I could reach the soldiers memorable incident during that time. lx)ok. I heard some distant shots. It was On about July 15. 1944, our regiment time to gel out of there. Keeping m\ was ordered to take the most difficult ob- helmet pointed towaid the enemy, 1 jective yet—the tall, forbidding Hill 122 crawled backward to the edge of the dominating the town of St. Lo. We first woods, where my buddies were waiting. had to capture (he hamlet of Emilie, The lieutenant colonel grinned when I which had to be taken in house-to-house showed him the enemy identification. fighting. We had to beat back 12 German "Sir," I announced, "you are facing the counterattacks between July 15 and 17, Panzer Lehr Grenadier Division. This is I came face to face with the hon-ors of one of the Nazis' elite divisions, comwar. I received a call at regimental head- manded by General Fritz Beycrlein, one quaiieT"s to come down to one of the bat- of Adolf Hitler's lavorile generals." talion command posts. As I approached We took Hill 122, the road into St. Lo the CP, I observed a tmck being loaded was open, but al what cost? Of the 1st with dead GIs. The coi-pses were being Battalion, one company was down to 40 tossed on top of each other until ihey men. The attack ended July 19. afler 11 were heaped higher than the cab of the days offiercefighting.The road into inwn truck. This was my first sight of dead was one long series of shell holes and bodies, and at age 20 little did 1 realize bomb craters, luil of watci". Our jeep that such hon'ors would soon be com- driver had lo zigzag around them, only to monplace and would continue for an- arrive in a town that was totally llattened, other nine months. In fact, I was in for a except for the church tower. There were sickening experience ihe very next hour. no civilians left, but it was thefii^stsizable The battalion commander asked if I toviTi that we had "liberated." was the guy froni intelligence who could Eugene Swartz identify Gemian units. Yes, I could. "OK," Knoxville, Tenn. he said, "I have a mission for you. We have a bunch of dead Krauts lying out TWO PAYNES there in no man's land. I want you to get The illustralion ofthe Battle of Agincourt out there and tell me what unit they're in the May 2006 "Personality" departfi'om." ment on P. 64 was credited lo Henn- A, Two GIs drove me to the edge of a Payne. It was in fact Harry Payne who wood, "You see this large open field and painted it as pail of his "Glorious Baltles" the woods al the other end?" one said. series published in 1915. "That's where the Jerries are. They probGan L. Slnuul ably can see us. It's your job to crawl into Springville, Iowa this field until you find the enemy bodies." Stmil letters to Mililai"y HistoiT Ediloi; I remembered my lessons from basic History Gnmp. 74} Miller Drive. SE. Suite 0-2, training: Lie very low, keep your helmet Leesburg, VA 20175, ore-mail to MilUaryfiislow and crawl forward by using your toiy(fi>theliistoty}U'l.coiu. Please include ynitr elbows, while bullets whiz over your name, address and daytime telephone nunilfer. head. Slowly I crawled toward the Letters may be edited. Military History welcomes German lines, thinking: "Have they seen editorial submissions but assumes no responsime yet? Am I going to be killed so soon— bility for the toss or damage oj unsolicited iiiatei a week after I've gotten into combat?" ml. Material tn be returned should be accivtjfxinied Suddenly 1 was staring into the contoiied by a selj-addressed, stamped nivehpe. ScndSASE face of a dead enemv soldier. Horrible! for our author's guidelines.

I N T R I G U E In 1864 Confederate agents tried to carry the Civil War north into the Great Lakes. By Chuck Lyons

oners held at the Johnsons Island prison camp in Lake Erie. The more than 2,000 fieed Confederates would then form an army to fight their way back south or support the Confederate-controlled Michigan as it sailed ihc lake, laying ruin to Sandusk>^, Cleveland, Detroit and Buffalo. The prison was on 15 acies at the southeast shore of Johnson's Island, in the harbor of Sandusky, Ohio. At its closest point the island was about one-half mile from the mainland and a mile from the city. The prison population varied One of those measures was a surrepti- over the sevei'al years of its existence, but tious scheme meant lo capitalize on per- averaged about 2,500 men. The vast maceived discontent with the war in the U.S. jority of those were officers, including a Noithwest—Ohio, Indiana and Illinois— number of generals. They were guarded with hopes it would lead to the North- between early 1862 and January 1864 by wests secession. Such an action, Confed- four companies of Ohio volunteers. By erate officials believed, might embarrass 1864, however, as rumors—and fears^ President Abraham Lincoln enough to grew that an attack on the prison would cause his defeat in the 1864 election, be launched from Canada, the gairison bringing in a new administration more grew to 2,200 men. amenable to Confederate demands. The plot began to unfold in late April Pan of thai plot, conceived by Confed- 1864 when President Jeffei"son Da\ is aperate agents in Canada, was a plan to pointed Clement Claibome Clay of Alaseize the Union's only warship on the bama iind Jacob Thompson of Mississippi lower Great Lakes, the 14-gun USS Michi- to operate as Confederate commissionei-s gan, and use it to free Confederate pris- in Canada. Thompson and Clay left the BY THE END OF 1863, the shadow of im-

minenl doom had lengthened across the South in the wake of Pyirhic Confederate victories at Chancellorsville and Chickaniauga, and defeats at Gettysburg, Vicksburg and Chattanooga. The Union controlled the Mississippi in the West, and Federal armies were poised to march ihroLigh Georgia. In the field and at home, soldiers and civilians alike were feeling the pinch of the Union blockade. Desperate times called for desperate measures.

Located three miles from Sandusky, Ohio, the POW camp on Johnson's Island became the target of a Confederate plot to free its captives and terrorize the Lake Erie region.

South in May, ran the Union blockade to Bennuda, antl then sailed lo Nova Scotia and eventually Moniical. One of Thompson's first acts was to appoint Captain Charles H. Cole, another operative, to develop plans to capture Michigan. Thai vessel, the oldest ironclad gunboal in the U.S. Navy, had been launched at Erie, Fa., in December 1843. Clay, a former U.S. representatiw, was also ordered to seek peace with the North through whatever means he could, and he did in fact meet with Lincoln aide John Hay at Niagara Falls in July. Those talks collapsed because the Confederacy would not entertain any proposal to rejoin the Union. It seems thai Thompson, who had sen'ed as secretary of the interior under President James Buchanan, was in charge of more heavy-handed lactics. Cole, a former member ot Nathan Bedford Forrest's cavalry, immediately traveled lo Sandusky, where he made the acquaintance of Michigan'.s Captain J.C. Carter, an old Naw man. After sizing up Caller, Cole reported to Thompson, "I do not think he can be bought." IN SANDUSKY Cole represented himself cither as the secretary of the Mount Hope Oil Co. ofHanisbui'g, Pa., or as a Philatk-ll^lila banker, and spenl freely to ingiatiale himself with officers of both the prison and oi'Micliiga}}. Meanwhile John Y. Beall, a Confederate naval officer assigned to work under Cole, had been dispatched aeross the Detixiii Ri\ er from Detroit to Windsor, Ontario, to collect men for the raid. That's when the plot began to unravel. An unidentilicd man informed Lt. Col. Bennett H. Hill, aeting assistant provost TnaT"shal at Detroit, that he had been approached to help commandeer Michigan and use it in an attack on Johnson's Island. The lake steamer Philo Parsons SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 13

INTRIGUE

and was himself taken prisoner. While Philo Parsons took on firewood. was to be seized during its normal lTm be- Island Queen, which ran between Santween Detroit and Sandusky, the infor- dusky and tbe Lake Erie islands, came in mant said, and used in ihe attack. He also to Middle Bass Island and was also said some of Michigan's enlisled men and seized. Its passengei^s, including 20 or so officei-s had been compromised by a man unanned Union soldiers on a boiiday, named Cole lo fuiiher the plot, which joined Philo Parsons' passengers. Once the refiieling was completed, all tbe male was scheduled for September 19. Hill's infonnant was later identified as passengers, including Captain Atwood, a Union operative who ran a hotel used were paroled to tbe island, which had no by many Confederate refugees in Wind- telegraph senice, tbe women were unsor. He was said to have overheard talk of conditionally released, and Philo Parsons (he plot there, possibly from Thompson depatted towing Island Queen. Atwood himself, who stayed in Windsor shortly took tbe ladies to his home and tried to make tbem as comfortable as possible. bclore the raid. Hill wired Captain Carter on Septem- Island Queen was scuttled in tbe lake, and ber 17, telling him what he had discov- Philo Parsons continued on to Sandusky ered and warning him that some of his and put to outside tbe barbor. crew had been "tampered viith." On the evening of the 18th, a man later identified THE CONFEDERATE RAIDERS now wail as Bennett G. Burley came aboard Philo ed for Coles signal to attack: a i"ocket fired Parsons, which was docked al Detroit, from Michigan's deck or from land. The and booked passage for himself and four captain bad planned to hold a lavish friends. The next morning the steamer dinner aboard Michigan that evening for departed with a nomial complement of his new friends, dmg their champagne lo crew and passengei"s, including Buiiey knock them out, and subsequently fire and his fnends. Al its lii'st scheduled stop, tbe all-important rocket, ln tbe meanMaiden, Ontario, another 20 oi" so men time, a group of pro-SoLilhcm Norihcmcame aboard canying with them a large ers, called Copperheads, were supposed trunk. Each ofthe men paid individually to arrive in Sandusky by train and seize and in rash for his passage; the newcom- tbe arsenal. At the same lime, a prison ei's seemed to pay no attention to Burley revolt instigated by Cole during bis \'isits and his g]X)up. Philo Parsons made its reg- to Johnson's Island was supposed to ular stops at North Bass and South Bass break out, enabling the prisoners to be islands and at Middle Bass Island, where freed witb the aid of tbe Copperbeads, the ships captain, Sylvester F. Atwood, SLippoiled by Michigan's guns. went ashore to spend the night with his Unknown to the Rebels aboard Philo family, something he did routinely. Parsons, tbe infomiant's leak in Detroit Philo Parsojis continued on to Kelley's had already derailed the elaborate plot. Island, and at about 4 p.m. a man ap- Cole had been arrested tbat afternoon at proached the acting captain, Mate D.C. his hotel, and the dinner never took place. Nichols. The man identified himself as a The Copperheads, whose nimibers and Confederate officer and said he had 30 oi^anization Tliompson had gi eatly overmen with him to seize control of the ship. estimated, never anived, and the prison Armed men, who had gotten weapons revolt never materialized. When it was from the trunk brought aboard at clear tbat the signal rocket would never Maiden, appeared throughout the sbip. go up, ihe Rebel crew tumed Philo ParThey herded male passengers and sons back toward Detroit. nonessential crewmembers into the bold A letter exists, signed by 16 members of and sent ladies into the cabin. tbe Confederate crew, addressed to Beall Captain Beall took over and piloted asking that the attack on Michigan be Philo Parsons toward Sandusky. At about abandoned because "the enemy is ali^ady 5 p.m. tbe steamer lay about eight miles apprised of our approach and is so weil off Cedar Point, and its Rebel crewmen prepared that we cannot by any possibilcould see Michigan, anchored near the ity make it a success." It is unclear, bowprison. At tbat point, however, Beall dis- ever, if the letter, written on tbe back of a covered tbat Philo Parsons was low on bill of lading, was wiitten wbile Philo Parfuel, and was forced to retum to Middle sons retumed to Sandusky fi-om its refuBass Island. Seeing his ship's unsched- eling stop, wbile the sbip waited for tbe uled reappearance. Captain Atwood ran planned signal, or later as a justification to the dock to see what was happening— for abandoning the raid. 14 MILITARY HISTORY SEPTEMBER 2006

At about 1 a.m. on September 20, tbe offieei-s marooned on Middle Bass Island again saw Philo Parsons as it passed In the moonligbt, and around 4 or 5 a.m. it docked at Sandwich, Ontario, where tbe crew plundered tbe sbip and attempted to sink it. Tbe gi'eat raid was over—and il had accomplished notbing. The Northwest stayed in the Union, tbe lake cities remained safe and in the fall Lincoln wt)n reelection. Even tbe two ships, Philo Par sons and Island Queen, retumed to senice after being repaired. THE MAN ASSIGNED to capture Michigan, Cole, was lioused at several Federal prisons, ending up at Fort Lafayette in New York City, where be was foLintI guilty of treason and was sentenced to be banged. He received amnesty, however, after be made a full confession of bis involvement witb the Johnsons Island plot. He was released in 1865. Beall did not fare so well. He was captured in December 1864 after allempting to derail a ti ain near Buflalo, N.Y. A military commission convicted him of being a spy and a guerrilla, in pail for seizing Philo Parso)is and Island Queen. He was hangctl

at Foil Columbus, on Governors Island In New York Hiirbor. on Febmaty 24, 186.S. Clay spent about a year in Canada before returning South in time for General Robert E. Lee's suirender and the end of the war. He retumed to bis law practice and died in Alabama in 1882. Thompson profited greatly from bis experience in Canada. As the war drew to a close, be withdrew all ibe remaining fimds in Confederate accounts iheie and Hed to France, where be is said to have lived lavisbiy. He died a rieb man in 1885. Michigan—later renamed Wolverine— continued to serve unmolested on the Great Lakes until it was decommissioned in 1912. Il then served for 11 more veal's, making iraining cniises tor tbe Penn.sylvania Naval Militia until a broken cylinder rod ended its service in 1923. All but tbe prow was sold for scrap in 1949. After tbe war Johnson's Island was more or less abandoned, ln 1889, however, a party of editors and public officials visited the island and, appalled at llie condition of tbe small cemetei"y there, held i\ public subscription for funds to erect gravestones to replace the ratting wooden markei"s tbat had originally been put up. Througb tbeir efforts, marble gravestones were erected over all 206 Confederate giaves. Today tbe Department of Veterans Affairs mountains tbe cemctei"v. MH

PERSONALITY Lakshmi Bai, the rani of Jhansi, was variously known as India's 'Jezebel' and its 'Joan of Arc' Bv Pamela D. Toler

Under Lord Dalhousie. the British govlatedly committed herself to the revolt ernment had adopted an aggressive known as the Indian Mutiny, Lakshmi policy of annexing IndJan states. Charges Baj, liic rani ol Jhansj, IULS been tlieonly of mismanagement often offered an leader to be described in positive teims excuse. Another justification, applied hy heradvei'saries. Tnie, some reviled her with increasing tVequency after 1848. was as a vjllainess. but othei"S admired her as the Doctrine of Uipse, The Bintish abeady a vvamoi" queen. Indian nationalists of exercised the right to recognize the sucthe ear'ly 20th centuiy were less divided cession in Indian states that were depenin venerating her as an early symbol of dent upon them. As a coiX)llaT>', DalhousJe lesislance to BntJsh nile. claimed tliat if the adoption of an heirto The iuturc rani was bom to a promi- the throne was not ratified by the govnent Brahmin family in Benares (now ernment, the state would pass hy "lapse" Varanisi) in noithem India on November lo the British. 19.1827. For-mally named Manikamika, In spite of the rani's ai^guments for the she was called "Manu" by her parents. legality of the adoption and EllJs' stateHer mother, BhagirathJ, died when she ments on her behalf. Dalhousie refused was 4. Under the care of her lather, Mo- to acknowledge Damodar Rao as Ganropanl Tambc, her education included gadhar Rao's heir. The new British suhorsemanship, fencing and shooting. In 1842 she became the second wife of Gansjadhar Rao NJwalkar, the childless raja of'Jhansi, a principality in Bundelkhand. Renamed Lakshmi Bai, the young rani bore one son in 1851. but he died four months later. In 1853. following a serious, illness, Gangadhar Rao adopted a distant cousin named Damodar Rao as his son— similarly. Gangadhar and the brothei who had preceded him on the thronL were adopted heJi^. The adoption papers ;uid a will naming the 5-year-old boy as Rao's heir and the rani as regent were presented to a Major Ellis, who was serving as an assistant political agent at IKansi on November 20, 1853. Gangadhar Rao died the following day. Ellis forwarded the inForTnation to his superior, Major John Malcolm. Ellis was sympathetic to the rani's claims, and even Malcolm, who did not .support her regency, described the young widow in a letter to Govemor-GeneraJ James Andrew BrounRamsay, 1st Maiquess of Dalhousie, as "a woman highly respected and esteemed, An 1890 Indian depiction of Lakshmi Bai, and I believe fully capable of doing jus- the rani of Jhansi, reflects her status as a tice to such a charge." national heroine. IN THE ALMOST 150 YEARS since she be-

perintendent, CaptaJn Alexander Skene, to{jk control of Jhansi under the Doetinne of Lapse without opposition. The rani was allowed to keep the town palace as a personal residence and received an annual pension of 5.000 nipees. from which she was expected to pay her husband's debts. Damodar Rao inherited the raja's pereonal estate, but neither his kingdom nor his title. On December 3, Lakshmi Bai submitted a letter contesting the Doctrine of Lapse with Ellis' approval, but Malcolm did not foi"\vard it. She submitted a second on FebmaiT 16, 1854. Aftcracoiv suitaiion wilh Brilish counsel John Lang, during whJch she declared "Mera Jhausi nahim dengee" ("I will not give up my Jhansi"), she submitted yet another pt-tjtion on April 22, and she continued to resubmit petitions until early 1856. All her appeals were rejected. Meanwhile, discontent had been building among the sepoys in the British East India Company's amiy. The General Ser\ices Enlistment Act of 1856 required all recniits to go ovei'seas if ordered, an act that would cause a Hindu to lose easte. Rumors spread that the cartridges for the newly issued Enfield rifles were greased with either cow or pig fat, regarded as abominations by lhe Hindu or Muslim sepoys who would tear them open with their teeth. Assurances that the cartridges were in fact greased with beeswax and vegetable oil were not as effective as rumors of a systematic British effort to undemiine the sepoys' faith and make it easier to convert them to Christianity. In MeeiTJt on May 9, 1857. 85 sepoys who refused to use the Enfield cartridges were tried and put in irons. The next day three regiments stomied the jail, killed the offiicei*s and their families and marched on Delhi, 50 miles away. Thousands of Indians outside the anny had grievances of tlioir own against SEPTEMBER2006 MIUTAKV HISTORy 17

PERSONALITY

escaped fi'om the fortress. Her father was less fortunate. He was captured and summarily hariged by the British, who sacked Biitish rule. Reforms against the practice Jhansi for the next three days. After riding of suttee and child marriage, peiTnitting some 93 miles in 24 houi^s, Lakshmi Bai widows to remany and allowing converts and her small retinue reached the fortress from Hinduism to inherit family property of Kalpi, where they joined three resiswere seen as attacks on Hindu religious tance leaders who had become infamous law. Land reform in Bengal had displaced in British eyes for the atrocity at Cawnmany landholders. Violence spread pore: Nana Sahib, Rao Sahib and Tatia through north and central India as leadTope. The rebel aiTny met the British at ers whose power had been threatened by Koonch on May 6 but was forced to rethe British took chai^ge and transfomied treat to Kalpi, where it was defealed the mutiny into organized resistance. again on May 22-23. On June 6, ti'oops al Jhansi mutinied, On May 30, the retreating rebels shot their commanding officers and ocreached Gwalior, which controlled both cupied the Stai' Fort, whei"e the garrison's the Gratid Tmnk Road and the telegraph treasuiy and magazine were stored. The lines between Agra and Bombay. Jayaji city's European populace took refuge in Rao Scindhia, the maharaja ol Gvvaliot; the fort under the direction of Captain who had remained loyal tt) the British, Skene. The fort was well designed to tried to stop the insurgents, but his troops withstand a siege: It included an internal went over to theii" side on June 1, forcing water supply, but food was limited, and Iiim to flee to Agra. about half of the 66 Europeans were women and children. On June 8, Skene On June 16, Rose's forces closed in on led the British out of the fort, but they In a subsequent letter the rani reported Gwalior. At the request of the other rebel were massacred. On June 12, the muti- there was anarchy and asked for ordei^ leadei"s, Lakshmi Bai led what remained neers left Jhansi for Delhi, from the British. Ei^kine fonvarded both of her Jhansi contingent out to stop them. Given Lakshmi Bais longstanding lettei-s to Calcutta with a note saying her On the second day of the fighting at grievances against the government, the account agreed with what he knew from Kotah-ki-Serai, the rani, dressed in male British were quick to blame the rising in other sources. He authorized the rani lo attire, was shot Irom her hoi^e and killed. Jhansi on her, but evidence of her in- manage the district until he could send Gwalior fell soon after, and organized i esistance collapsed. Rao Sahib and Talia volvement was thin. Skene's deputies and soldiers to restore order. Tope continued to lead gtienHlla attacks personal servants reported that when the against the British until they were capBritish asked the rani for assistance, she FACED WITH ATTACKS by both neigh refused to have anything to do with the boring principalities and a distant tuied and executed, Nana Sahib disap"British swine." A Eurasian clerk's wife claimant to the throne of Jhiuisi, Lakshmi peared and became a source of legend. who claimed to have escaped Irom the Bai recniited an army, strengthened the British ncwspapei's proclaitned Lakfort with her children reported that the city's defenses and foirned alliances with shmi Bai the "Jezebel of India," but Sir rani had promised the British sale con- the rebel rajas of Banpui' and Shargarh. Hugh Rose compai^d his fallen adversary duct. Her testimony has since been thor- Her new recruits included mutineei's to Joan of Arc. Reporting her death lo oughly debunked by S.N, Sen in his fi'om the Jhansi ganison. William Augustus, Duke of Cumbcriand, thoughtRil study titled 1857, but the idea The positive assessment of icKal British he said: "The Rani is remai'kable for her that she had betrayed the community in- officials was not enough to overcome the braveiy, cleverness, and pei^^veixince: her flamed British imaginations. British belief in Calcutta that Liikshnii Bai generosity to her subordinates was unLakshmi Bai hei-self sent an account of was responsible for the mutiny and the bounded. These qualities, cotnbincd with the massacre to Major Walter Erskinc, massacre, Hersubseqttent efforts to defend her rank, rendered her the most dangerthe commissioner at Sagar and Nar- Jhansi confirmed their beliefs. In January ous of all the rebel leadeT-s." In modern India, Lakshtni Bai is rebudda, on June 12: 1858, Maj, Gen. Sir Hugh Rose marched towanJ the city As late as Febniaiy the rani garded as a national heroine. Statties of The Govt. forces, stationed at Jhansie, thro' told her advisere that she would rettiiTi the her stand guard over Jhansi and Gwalior. their faithles.s, crue!t>; and violence, killed all district to the British when they anived. Herstoty has been told in ballads, novels, the European Civil and Militaiy officers, the On March 25, Rose laid siege to Jhansi. movies and the Indian equivalent ol Clasclerks and all their families and the Ranee not Threatened with execution ifcaptured by sics Illustruled comics. Prime Minister being able to assist them for want of Guns, the British, Lakshmi Bai resisted, In spite Indira Ghandi appeared as U\kslimi Bai and solders as she had only 100 or 50 people of a vigorous defense, by Mai ch 30, most in a political commercial in the 1980s. "Although she was a lady," Rose wrote, engaged in guarding her house she could of the rani's guns had heen disabled and render them no aid, which she very much re- the forts walls breached. On April 3, the "she was the bravest and best militaiT : k'is. That the>^ (he mutineers, afterwards be- British broke into the eiW, took the palace leader of the rebels. A man among the mutineers." His praise is echoed in the haved with much violence against hereelf and and stoiined the fort. her servants, and extorted a great deal of The night before the final assault, Lak- most popular of the folk songs about hen money from her..,.That her dependence was shmi Bai lashed her 10-year-old adopted "How well like a man fought the Ratii of entirely on the British authoi-ities who met son to her back and, with lour followers, Jhansi! How valiantly and well!" MH 18 MILITARY HISTORY SEPTEMBER Z0O6

with such a misfortune the Sepoys knowing her to be quite helpless sent me messages [,..]tothe effect that ifshe, at all hesitated to comply with their requests, they would blow up her palace with guns. Taking into consideration her position she was obliged to consent to all the requests made and put up with a great deal of annoyance, and had to pay large sums in propeiiy as w"ell as cash to save her life and honour. Knowing that no Biiiish officers had been spared in the whole District, she was, in consideration of the welfare and protection of the people, and the Dislrict, induced to addi'ess Perwannahs to all the Govt. subordinate Agency in the shape of Police, etc. to remain at their posts and perform their duties as usual, she is in continual dread of her life and that of the inhabitants. It was proper that the report of all this should have been made iinmediatcly, but the disaffected allowed her no opportunity for so doing. As they have this day proceeded towi\rds Delhi, she loses no time in writing.

LETTER FROM MILITARY HISTORY

Know Your Enemy Essential in war, an understanding of your opponent can also be a basis for peace.

W

hen warfare pretends to be rational, with a well-considered cause, goals and strategy, the intelligence required to pursue it usually includes knowledge of the enemy. The more one knows about him, the better one can counter his moves. History is littered with the detdtus of armies that went blindly into war and disasters under leaders who blithely ignored the need for such knowledge.

After the war is over, it is equally edifying to know more about the enemy one has just fought, from the opposing commander or army to the individual soldier This issue of Military History includes several examples, starting (chronologically) with thefinalconfrontations of longtime enemies Richard the Lionheart of England and Philip II Augustus of France, In World War I, newly unearthed information provides a glimpse across the trenches into the German side of the action that earned Corporal Alvin York the Medal of Honor—as well as immortality in his own lifetime (and perhaps a degree of embarrassment) in the film Sergeant York, as played by Gary Cooper During one of the conflicts that continued shortly after the "War to End All Wars," the Greek army ran into unexpected problems at Sakarya, unaware that the man who was galvanizing Turkish resistance, Mustafa Kemal Pasha, would soon be leading a revived Turkish nation into the 20th century as Kemal Ataturk, Finally, Kevin Patrick Muncer recounts his World War II experiences as an Avro Lancaster pilot in the Royal Air Force. Taken prisoner, he was surprised by the compassion he encountered among the civilians who probably saved his life. In that particular case, to know one's enemy included leaming that he was not as universally malevolent as one might have previously believed.

SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HISTORV 21

View From the Other S

22 MILITARY HISTORY SEPTEMBER 2006

German records reveal the view from the receiving end of Corporal Alvin C. York's torrent of bullets on October 8, 1918. BY DOUGLAS MASTRIANO

ctober 8, 1918, was a hard moming iov the 2nd Wiirttcmberg Laudwehr Division at Chatel Chehery, France. The Gei-man division's infanliT r-egiments, the 122nci, 120ih and !25th, were bareiv holding onto iheir piece of the Argonnc Forest against an attack by the U.S. Amiy's 82nd Division. Fortunately for ihe Gemians, the Argonne lavored the defense—^and the Ameiicans favored it further by attacking up a funnelshaped valley right into a deathtrap. In tho thick of the fight was LieutenanI Paul Jiligen Vollnier. Vollmer. or "Kuno," as his friends called him, was a higitly decorated oflicer who had it'cently assuniLxl command of the !20lh Wurttemberg Laudwehr Regiment's 1st Battalion, most of whose soldiei-s were from Ulm (in the semiautonomous German slate of Wiiii, where Vollmei- had been the assistant postmaster before the war. Vollmer was directing his triKjps against the Americans when his battalion adjutant. Lieutenant Karl Glass, approached. Vollmer hoped tlial this was not another repon that I he Anieiieans had penetrated the German lines. Sueh rumors had lx.'en common since October 2. when the M)-called Lost Battalion of the U.S. 77tH Infantry Division broke through a lew miles LEFT: A German infantryman wesl of his sector. stands watch as his trench Vollmer was relieved to comrades sleep. ABOVE: On hear that elements of October 8,1918, Alvin York thePnussian210thRepitted his own marksmanship seive Infanti-y Regiagainst German firepower. ment had just amved SEPTEMBER 2006 MIUTARV HISTORY 23

HiUWO Fleasant Vti

6TH MACHINE OVtt CO.

41H A\ACHINE eVS CO.

VOLIMTR'S 1STBN 4: ^tOTH RESERVE INF.REOT.

fk's s^ua f ^ p in ihe Getntan line, erm hyUS.ArtilUrv harraqc

tu ma. KohenhowiHitt

Aided by a timely barrage, 17 soldiers of the 328th Inibntry found a gap in the lines and captured 70 German reservists. At that point, however, machine-gunners on Humser Hill opened fire, killing or wounding all but eight of the Americans.

at his battalion command post 200 yards up the valley. The 210th was what Vollmer needed to push the Americans out of this portion of the Argonne. Vollmer told Glass to follow him to meet with the 2 lOth's commander, since they had only one hour" to be ready for the counterattack. Upon arriving at his headquarters, Vollmer was appalled to find that 70 soldiers of the 210th had laid down their arms and were eating breakfast. When he rebuffed them for their lack of preparedness, the weary' Prussians i"ep]ied, "We hiked all night, and first of all we need something to eat." Vollmer told Glass to go back to the hxmt and ordered the 210th to move quickly. He then wheeled around to rejoin his battalion. Suddenly, down the side of the far hill, a group of German soldiers came nmning to the command post yelling, "Die Amerikaner Konimen!" Then, off to the right, Vollmer saw a group of 210th soldiers drop their weapons and yell, "Kanierad," their hands high in the air. Bewildered, Vollmer drew his pistol and ordered them to pick up their weapons. Behind Vollmer came several Americans charging down the hill. Believing it was a large 24 MILITARY HISTORY SEPTEMBER 2006

American attack, the 210th surrendered. Before Vollmer realized what had happened, a large American with a red mustache, broad featui'es and a freckled face had captured him as well. That Yank, from the 82nd Division, was CorpoiTil Alvin C. York. Much has been written about York, but all the previous accounts have one .significant flaw: They do nol tell the German side ofthe stoiy In the couT"se ol recent ii:;search, hundreds of pages of archival information from across Geimany have come to light, uncovering the full stoiT ol what happened on October 8. October 7,1918—Initial German Defense The Gennan side of York's storv' began on October 7, as the 2nd Wuittemberg Laudwehr Division was preparing defensive positions along the eastern edge of the Ai"gonne. Vollmer's 1st Battalion, 120th Regiment, was the last of the division to pull back to the valley behind Chatel Chehery to serve as the reseive. This was welcome news for Vollmer's men, who had been in the thick of the fighting since the Americans launched their Meuse-Argonne

1 regard our situation as very dangerous, Lieutenant Karl Kubler said, Tor the Americans could easily pass through gaps in the sector of the 2nd Machine Gun Company and gain our rear/

A postmaster before Worid War I, Lieutenant Paul Jurgen Vollmer had participated in 10 campaigns over four years on the Western Front by the time of the American Argonne offensive.

Making optimum use of the hilly, wooded terrain with which they had become familiar, machine gun companies of the Gemian Fifth Army had exacted a heavy toll for every yard the Americans gained during the Argonne campaign.

offensive on September 26, but the 10-kiIometer move, harassed by American artillen; took most ofthe day before the ballalion finally anived near Chatel Chehery. While Vollmer's men were on the march, the U.S. 82nd Infantry Division mo\ed into Chalel Chehen' and prepared to atlack Castle Hill and a smaller position a kilometer to the north, designated Hill 180 by the Americans bill called Schom Aussichl ("Pleasant View") by ihe Germans, Both objectives were impt)r1ant, but Castle Hill, or Hill 223, as the Americans called it, v^'as vital. Whoever controlled it controlled access to that sector of the Argonne. Elements of the German I25th Wurttemberg Landwehr. the Guard Elizabeth Battalion and the 47th Machine Gun Company were given the mission of holding thai hill, under the overall command of Captain Heinrich Muller. On October 7, the 1st Battalion, 328th Infantrv Regiment of the 82nd Division attacked. Battalion Muller fought tenaciously but was pushed back to tbe western slope of Castle Hill. There, the Germans held on through the nighl al gi-eat loss and even attempted a counterattack. The 82nd Division also captured Hill 180, The near-complete losses of Castle Hill and Pleasant View put the Germans' grip on the Argonne at serious risk. General Max von Gallwitz, the German amiy group

commander in tbe region, monitored these developments wilh grave concern and directed the 45th Piiissian Reserve Division's 212th Reserve InfantiT Regiment to help tbe 125tb Landwehr to retake Pleasant View and the 2l0th Resewe InfantiT Regiment to assist tbe 120th Inudwehr in recaplunng Castle Hill. Those counterattacks would (x:cur at 1030 boui"s on October 8. Vollmer would lead the assault on Castle Hill. As llie 2nd Wuntember^ Division prepared its defenses on October 7, Vollmer's 4th Company commander, Lieutenant Fritz Endriss, identified gaps between his unit and the 2nd Machine Gun Company. One of Endriss' platoon leaders. Lieutenant Karl Ktibler, told Vollmer, "i regard our situation as ven' dangerous. For the Americans could easily pass through the gaps in the sector of the 2nd Machine Gun Company and gain our rear" Vollmer directed Kubler to establish liaison with the 2nd Machine Gim Company. Failing to do that, Kubler sent Vollmer a message, "I will, on my own responsibility, occupy Hill 2 wilh part of 4th Company." But Vollmei' replied, "You will hold the position to which you have been assigned." October 8—American Attack and German Counterattack Three significant threats faced Genei"al Georg von der MarSEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY rilSTORY 25

COVERSTORY

German prisoners cari^ a wounded comrade to an American aid station. In spite of the heavy casualties he inflicted, the devoutly religious York wanted to kill no more than he had to, intermittently ceasing fire to urge the Germans to surrender.

witz, the German Fifth Army commander, on October 8. First, there was the "Amenkaner nest" along the western edge of the Argonne Forest, where an isolated element of the 77th U.S. Infantrv' Division was proving to be more than the neighboring 76th German Reserve Division could handle. That saga began on October 2, when 590 American soldiere penetrated a mile into Gennan lines and settled down for live days in a 600-meter-long [xxrket. Despite several concerted German attacks, the Americans refused to surrender. Meanwhile the 77th Division launched attack after attack to relieve its Lost Battalion. Although unsuccessful thus far, these attacks were taking a heav\' toll on the 76th Resei-ve Division. Tf the 76th failed to eliminate the Lost Battalion, Mai-witzs flank would be exposed. A second problem was the advance of the U.S. 82nd and 28th divisions to secLire the eastern pait of the Argonne, which could sever Geiman lines of communication in the forest and protect the tlank of the main American attack in the Meuse River valley. The third trouble spot, and the most dangerous to the Gennan Fifth Ann\'. was the Meuse Valley, just east of the Argonne Forest. It was there that General John J. Pershing. commander of the American Expeditionary Force, sent the bulk of his First Army with the goal of ultimately cutting tbe main German supply aiteiy in Sedan, some 30 miles to the noilh. The 2nd Landwehr Division chronicled tbe German predicament in the region. Concerned about the situation, 26 MILrrARYHISTORV SEPTEMBER 2006

general headquarters committed elements of the 1 st Guard Infantn' Division, a portion ofthe 52nd Reserve Division. the 210th and 212th i-egiments of tbe 45th Rcseive Division and the Machine Gun Sbaipsbootei-s of Regiments 47 and 58 to tbefight.Headquailei-s i-eiwris stated: "We had to stop the enemy's main attack, which was now east of tbe Airc [in the Meuse River valley]. So our artillery around Hobenbomhohe was used to provide fires against bis flank." Meanwhile, German lookouts reported American soldiei's making their way toward Castle Hili. This was the 2nd Battalion, 328tb Infantrv' Regiment, 82nd DivisionYork's battalion—wbich would attack via Castle Hill in a nonhwesterK direction after a 10-minuteartilloiy ban-age. The battalion would advance one mile across a funnelshaped valley and seize a dual objective; tbe Decauville i-ail line and the Norlb-Soutb Road. These were the main Gemian supply lines into the Ai'gonne. The Americans bad no idea tbat tbe Gemians bad positioned more than 50 machine guns and dug in several bundred troops to kill anything thai dared move into that valley. Fog blanketed tbe Aire River valley below tbe Atgonnc early on October 8. Tilings started to look up lor Vollmer after the 7th Bavarian Sapper Company, under a Lieutenant Thoma, and a detachment of the 2I0th Pntssian Reser-ve Regiment reported for duty. He placed tho two units among the gaps on Hill 2 tbat Kilbler and Endiiss had previously complained about. It was 0610 boui-s.

'The Germans got us, and they got us right smart/ Alvin York wrote. 'They just stopped us dead in our tracks....Our boys went down like the long grass before the mowing machine at home.'

Suddenly, out of the early morning fog, the Germans hciird the upnuir of an enemy infantry- force attacking in llie valley, where ihe stillness was shatteix'd by the whine of rieocheting bullets. The Americans headed into the valley without a preparatoi^' ban-age because their supporting artilleiT unit had not received word lo fii'e. The alarm wa.s sounded across the 2nd L/iiichvehr Division, whose troops quickly manned their positions. The American advance was immediately contested by Battalion Miiller, which held on until it ran out of ammunition. After ihat, the Gei'mans retreated across the valley to the forward trenches of the 125th Regiment. With Battalion Miillcr out of the way, the Ameneans cleared Castle Hill and plunged into the valley. They were greeted with heav^y litle and machine gun lire Irctm huntlreds of German soldiei^s dug in on the thiee sunx)unding hills. Vollmer moved foiAvaixl with his battalion to bolster the 2nd Machine Gun and 7l h Bavanan companies, which bore the bmnt of the attack. Alter weeks of setbacks, it seemed thai at last the Germans would take hack the initiative in the Argonne. Akin York later described that cmcial engagement: S(> you see we wciv getting it from the frDnl and both Hanks. Well, llic first and second waves goi about hallway across ilie valley iind then were held up by machine gun fire from the three sides. It was awful. Our losses were very heavy. Tho advancement was stopped and we were ordered to dig in. I don't believe our whole battalion or even our whole division amid haw taken those machine giins by a straightfonvaixl attack. The Gennans got us, and they got us right smart. They just slopped us dead in our Iracks. Il was hilly country' with plenty of hiiish. and they had plenty of machine guns entrenched along I liose commanding ridges. And I'm telling you they were shootint: sli-aight. Our hoys just went down like the long grass befoi-e tile mowing machine at home. So our attack Just faded out. And 1 here we were, lying dowm. about halfway acix)ss, and no bannge, and ihose Gennan machine guns and big shells getting us haixl.

Among ihe Americans trapped in that Bght was Sergeant Hixny Parson, who ordered Acting Sergeant Bernard Early to lead a platoon of 17 men behind the Germans and lake out the machine guns. York was part of thai gi'oup. While the ihree American squads moved toward German-occupied Hill 2, a teirific eommotion shtKik the area as American aililleiy belatedly opened up in support of the besieged 328lh Infantiy The bairage inad\ei"Iently co\ered the movement of Eaily's men. who found a gap in the lines. They made iheir way through it and into the German rear area. Despite that, Vollmer felt

confident of victory. As the German 120th refiort stated: "Without any aililleiy preparation, the adversat>' launched a violent allack and theix' was heavy light ing....The enemy was repulsed almost eveiywhere. Isl BN absorbed the bnmt of the enemy attack without wavering, due to its good defcnsi\e position." It was at thai point in ihe iiglil ihal Vollmer, learning fiom Lieutenant Glass that the 210lh liad at last anived, returned to his command post to find the 210th eating breakfast. He was taken prisoner Ix'fore be liad a chance to lectify the situation. Glass, who returned lo Ihe liont lines moments before Vtillmei" departed, wenl baek to the command post to report ihat he had seen Anieiican troops moving (jn ihe hill above. Before he lealized it. Gla.ss too was York's prtsoner. E\ ei>lhing occun ed so suddenl\' ihat both Vollmer and the 210tli Regimental soldiers believed that this was a lar^e surprise attack by the Americans. As the 17 Americans busily gathci-ed their 70-plus prisonei-s, the 4lh and 6th companies of the 125lh Wiirltemberg Landwehr on Humser Hill saw what was happening below. They signaled to the captured Geimans to lie down and then opened Itre. The hail of bullets killed six and wounded three of their captor's. Seveml prisonei's weTvs also killed by the maehine-gunnei^s, which caused the surviving captured men to wave their hands wildly in the air and yell, "Don't shoot—there are Gennans here!" Lieulenanl Paul Adolph August Lipp, commandeioi the tilh Company, had his rnen aim more earefuUy. He brought up lillemen to join the machine-gunners in killing ihe Amerieans. Of the eight American sumvors, Coipoial York was the only noncommissioned oificer still standing. He worked liis way partly up the slope where the Gennan machinegunners were. For the gunnere to fire at York, they had to expose tbeir heads atxive their positions. Whenever York saw a German helmet, he (ited his .30-caliheT-1ille, hitting his target every time. Vollmer, the nearest to York, was appalled to see 25 of his comrades fall victim to the Tennessean's unening marksmanship. Al leasl thiec machine gun crews were killed in ihis manner, all while York, a devout Chilstian who did not want to kill any more than he had to, intermittently yelled at them to "Give up and come on down." Meanwhile Lieutenant Endriss, seeing that Vollmer was in trouble, led a valiant charge against Yotk. Yoik used a hunting skill he leanied when faced with a llock of turkeys. He knew that if the first soldier was sbot, those behind wottld take eover. Tt) prevent that, he fired his M1911 Colt .45-caliber semi-automatic pistol, targeting the men from tbe back to the fix)nt. The last Gennan be shot was EnSEPTEMBER2006 MILITARY HISTORY 27

Loath to surrender, Lieutenant Thoma told Lieutenant Paul Jurgen Vollmer, 1 will do so on your responsibility!' Vollmer replied that he would take all responsibility.

driss, who fell to the ground screaming in agony. York later wrote in bis diary that he had shot five German soldiers and an officer "like wild turkeys" with his pistol. Vollmer was not sure bow many Germans were killed in that assault, but knew it was a lot. Worse yet, bis wounded fiiend Endriss needed help. In the middle of the fight, Vollmer, who had lived in Chicago before the war, stood up, walked over to York and yelled above the din of battle, "English?" York replied, "No, not English." Vollmer then inquired, "What?" "American," York answeied. Vollmer exclaimed: "Good Lord! If you won't shoot any more I will make tbem give up." York told him to go ahead. Vollmer blew a whistle and yelled an order. Upon hearing Vollmer's order, Lipp told his men on tbe bill above to drop their weapons and make tbeir way down tbe bill to join tbe other prisonei"s. York directed Vollmer to line up the Gennans in a column and bave tbem cany out the six wounded Americans. He then placed the German officers at tbe head of tbe formation, witb Vollmer in the lead. York stood directly behind him. with the ,45-caliber Colt pointed at the Gennans hack. Vollmer suggested that York take the men down a gully in iront of Humser Hill to the left, which was still occupied by a lai-ge group of Gennan soldiers. Sensing a trap, York took tbem instead down the road that skirted Hill 2 and led back to Castle Hill and Chatel Cheber\\ Meanwhile, forward of York and the prisoners was Lieutenant Kubler and bis platoon. He told bis second in command, Wan^nt Officer Haegele, that "things just don't look right." Kubler ordei'ed his men to follow him to tbe battalion command post. As tbey approacbed, he was surrounded by several of York's men. Kubler and his platoon suiTendered. Vollmer told tbem to drop their weapons and equipment belts. Lieutenant Thoma, the 7th Bavarian commander, was not far off and beard Vollmer's order to Kubler to .surrender Tboma ordered bis men to follow bim with fixed bayonets and yelled to the 100-pliis Gennan prisoners, "Don't take off your belts!" Tboma's men took a position near the road for a fight. York shoved his pistol in Vollmer's back and demanded tbat he order Thoma to suirender. Volimer cried out, "You must smrender!" Tboma insisted that he would not. "It is useless," Vollmer said. "We are surrounded." Thoma then said, "I will do so on your responsibility!" Vollmer replied tbat he would take all responsibility. With that, Thoma and bis group, which included elements of tbe 2nd Macbine Gun Company, dropped their weapons and belts and joined the prisoners. 28 MILITARY HISTORY SEPTEMBER 2006

As tbe lai^e formation crossed the valley, York's battalion adjutant. Lieutenant Joseph A. Woods, saw tbe group of men and, believing tbat it was a Gemian counterattack, gathered as many soldiers as be could for a figbt. After a closer look, bowever, be realized that the Germans wenunarmed. York, at the head ol the formation, saluted and said, "Corporal York reports with prisoners, sir." "How many prisoner have you, Coi"p<;)ral?" "Honest Lieutenant," York replied, "I don't know." Woods, wbo must bave been stunned but kept bis composure, ordered, "Take them back to Chatel Chehery, and I will count tbem as they go by." His count: 132 Germans. German Line In the Argonne Shattered York's men frustrated the Geiman counterattack plan and bagged elements of tbe 120th Regiment, 210th Piiissian Reserve Regiment. 7th Bavarian Company, 2nd Machine Gun Company and 125th Landwehr. This clcaix:d the fitmt and enabled tbe Americans to press on up tbe valley to take tbeir objective, tbe Decauville rail line and tbe NorthSouth Road. The Gemian line was broken, and the 120th Landwehr would never recover from tlie day's losses. Its report stated: "Tbe flank of 6tb Company reported an enemy surprise attack. Next, the lemnant of 4tb Company and personnel from tbe 210th Regiment were caught by this surprise attack, where Lieutenant Endriss was killed. The company was shattered or was captured. Also Fii"st Lieutenant Vollmer ended up in the enemy's hands. Now tbe situation was worse." The planned German counterattack to take Castle and Pleasant View hills Iiad been preempted by York iind bis men. If the 82nd Infantry Division pressed tbe attack now, it could cause the collapse of German defenses in tbe Argonne and lead to the capture of thousands of tnx)ps, supplies and aitilleiy. But tbe American 328th infantiT had taken such a beating that it did not take advantage of tbis opportunity. Shortly after tbat tbe Gennans were ordered to witbdraw hom the Argonne. The 120th Wurttenberg Infantry's report noted: [We received] the depressing order at 1030 to withdraw. In good ordei"did we move. We did have some luck....There was no fiiv on the Noilh-South Road. But we did see tenible things on thf road. The results of the artillery; dead men, dead horses, destroyed vehicles blocking the way and destroyed trees were scallered to and fm. And what aboul the enemy? The North-Soiilh Road was closed by machine gun fire. This happened around ]200....It was amazing ihal the Americans did not press the attack. In the afternoon of 8 October, the headquaiiers of 3rd and

A truckload of wounded American soldiers looks on with satisfaction while a column of German prisoners files by. As York and his comrades escorted their captives to the rear, his battalion adjutant, Lieutenant Joseph A. Woods, counted 132.

"iih Army ordered a withdrawal iiom the Ai^gonne line.

On October 9, the final order was issued to withdraw inio the toi tified Hindenburg Line (or the linal defense belore the war ended. "It was now that General von der Manvitz, the leadei" of 5th Army, gave the last word," the 120lli's report stated. "We needed to occupy the secondary defensive p(jsitions luitherback, in the evening of 9/10 October, the regiment departed from the Argonne. The German soldiers gave so much after hard battles since 1914—moa' than 80,000 dead were lelt here. American arlillei-y biiefly hit the Humserberg line during ihe retreat and always there was the shrapnel. We were dead tired, too tired to contemplate, but able to hold onto hope." Postscript

Paul Vollmer served on the Western Front lor four yeare. He fought with the 125th and 120th Wurttemberg iMiuhvehr Infantry regiments in 10 campaigns and was awarded the lion Cross 2nd Class in 1914, the Knights CTOSS 2nd Class in 1915 and the Iron Cross 1st Class and the Queen Olga of Wiiiitembei^ Medal in 1918. Released in 1919, he moved to Stuttgart, where he again became a postmaster. In 1929 Vollmer was asked lo provide a statemenl alx)ul the events of October 8, 1918, to the German Archives in Potsdam, which he did not want to do. After several formal requests, he anived to answer questions.

He was visibly uneasy about submitting a fonnal rcpoit. Vollmer insisted that there was a large group of Amencans. not just York and his small squad. It must have seemed impossible that so few men could have captured so many highly trained Gemian soldiers. Alvin Cullum York was promoted to sergeant and t-eceived the Medal of Honor for his deeds of October 8. He was also awarded the Distinguished Sei^vice Cross, the French CroLx de Guetre and several other medals. After the war, he returned to his hometown of Pall Mall. Tenn., where the people of his state gave him a house and a fann. He man-ied his sweetheart, Gracie Williams, and they raised seven children—^five boys and two girls. The faith that brought him through the war stayed with him throughout his life. An October I918diai-yent!y just after the Ai^onne fight summarized his view of life;"! am a witness to Lhe fact thai God did help me out of that hard battle; for the bushes were shot up all around me and I never got a scratch." MH U.S. Amiy U. Col. Douglas Maslriano is an intelligence analyst, military tlieorist and historian wJio frequently visits the Argonne. For further reading, he recommends: The AilAmericans at War: The 82nd Division in the Great War. 1917-18, by James J. Cooke; Serjeant York: An American Hero, hy David D. Lee; and Sergeant York: His Own Life Story and War Diary, by Alvin York. SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HISTOKV 29

om in London and raised in Kent, Kevin Patrick Munccr wcis working as an analvticLiI chemist when World War II broke out on September 1. 1939. On September 11, he joined the Royal Air Force and served as an engine fitter before he got to train as a pilot. After some time as a Ilight instiuclor, Flying Olficer Munccr Hew bombing missions in Avro Lancastcrs with No. 166 Squadron, in which he became the human I'quivalcnt ot the pnivcrbial cat wilh nine lives. In an intei'vicw with English wnter John McAdams, he shared a stoiy of sur\ ival tempeivd with resilience and compassion. Military History: What was your first combat mission like? Muncer: I suppose my veiy first operational Ilighl was from KAr Brcighfon, Yorkshire, to Frankfiiil am Main, Germany, as second pilot in a Handley Page Halifax. Although I had already L-nnveiied to Lancasters, because they didn't cairy a second [lilot. we had to gain oui" operational expcnencc in Halifaxcs. MH: How did the Lancaslcrs compare with the Boeing B-17 I'King Fortresses that the U.S. Army Air Forces was operating >it thai time? Muncen When we met back at our base and ihe USAAF boys i.;unc lo visit us, the fii'st thing we did was to open our bomb bay to let them have a look inside. The Flying Fortress was designed in 1933, and its bomb hay was therefore comparatively small. The maximmn size bomb il could carr\' was a 500pounder, iisiiaily about six in total, but it was biistling with prok'ctivc guns. The Lancaster on the other hand could cany a 4,000-pound "Cookie" plus many incendiaries. Basically the IISAAF Mew daylight missions, and ihe RAF flew night missions, but alter D-Day out squadron stalled flying daylight missions, mainly in support of ground troops. We crossed over France into GctTTiany at 20,000 feet and were therefore relatively Siife Irom Ihik. Also the Uiftwaffe fighters were nowhere to be seen. The\' were vc\y short of petrol. MH: Were you happy with your fighter cover? Muncen Yes, we had Supermarine Spitfires and North Ameiitan P-51 Mustangs based in France, so we were very well protected. Those Mustangs of tlie USAAF could escort our bombers all the way to Berlin, but they only flew on daylight raids. MH: Were you involved in the bombing of Dresden in FebmaiT 1945? Muncer: Yes. I was on the night raid, and I had to go around

center with Gelman panzers coming hack over the biidges. In fact bombing it was a request from the Russians—ihey lold us German troops were retreating and assembling in Dresden. 1 must add that this saturation bombing policy was advocated by Sir Winston Cliuichill on the advice of his special scientific adviser, Frederick Lindemann. In 1942 King George VI elevated Lindemann to the peerage, and he became Lord Chei-weil. Although Sir Arthur "Bomber" Hairis, our boss, openly agived with this policy, he was merely following orders from above. MH: There has been much criticism both during and alter the war of Bomber Command and its "creep back" area bombing policy—sometimes as much as 10 miles short of the target. Would you like to comment on thai? Muncen This possibly did happen during the early stages of the war, when aircraft had a ver\' limited instniment panel and virtually no navigational aids. When I was operational in 194344, we had al! the latest navigational aids to assisi us, iike Gcc. Oboe and H2S, which made our navigation and target identification much more accurate. We also had de Havilland Mosquito bombers piloted by experienced people such as Group Captain Leonard Cheshiiv, dropping their coioi ed Hares as target mai kere on the designated target. When 1 was bombing, we would be told by the pathfinder Mustangs or Mosquitoes, who were al a lower altitude and naturally slightly ahead, to bomb, say, five seconds alter the particulai" coloi ed mat kei" flare. I flew lots of missions with Cheshire as a pathlindcr. As a ruse, the Gennans would light similar colored flares out in the countryside before the target to confuse us into releasing our bombload early and away from those strategic targets like munitions factories and marshalling yards. Also, I heard much lalerthal Bomber Command was aware of this ci'eep hack problem and seci'etly asked the pathfinder pilots to oveifly the target area and dtop their marker flares on the far side of the target to compensate. Al times it was all very confusing. MH: Just how accurate were your navigational aids? Muncen Gee was the first of the radio/navigational aids we used, and the receiver recorded the different frequencies hx)ni three transmitters about 100 miles apart, all based in England,

twice because the 4,000-pound bomb I was carrying got stuck in its rack. My Ilighl engineer had to go down a liltle trap door inlo the bomb bay, and when my bomb aimer said, "Pull," he pulled a small lever that physically released the bomb. My incendiaries had already gone, so when I got rid of the big one, we set coui-se for home. I still remember seeing the streets all patterned and burning furiously. They said Dresden was a supply depot lor the frontline troops and a communications

The beams had a range of about 400 miles and made it possible for us lo fix oiLr location to wilhin five miles, but ihis was easily jammed by ihe Germans. I remember in August 1942 about 150 heav>' bombei-s raided Osnabruck, and all their 150 Gees were tendered useless. The Gennans had rescued a Gee set from a crashed British lioml^er, and iheir boffins had worked out a simple counlenneasure. They called it "Heinrich," and they set up a large arc of jamming stations across occupied

Avro Lancasters of No. 57 Squadron, Royal Air Force Bomber Command, unload over a German industrial center, in a painting by Michael Turner.

SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 31

INTERVIEW Europe—one was positioned on top of the Eiffel Tower in Paris. they called their system Duppel, or radar chaff. Our boffins had to counter that with our own development, MH: When did you join your Lancaster unit? which they called Oboe—observer bombing over enemv—^using Muncer: I joined No. 166 Squadron in 1944. The squadron's two transmitters, one at Dover transmitting Morse code dots, motto was "Tenacity." which we called Cat. and the other at Cromer in Norfolk, trans- MH: Did you have a regular crew? mitting dashes, which we called Mouse. Where they intersected Muncer: My crew was ol mixed rank, and we were very closewas our target, and this enabled us to drop our bombs blind. If knit^rank didn't enter into that equation. We had a crew of I stayed on course, I received a continuous tone, but if I devi- seven; I was the pilot, my navigator was Gerry Gerrard and the ated off course toward Cat, I received dots, or toward Mouse I bomb aimer was Flight Sgt. James Patterson, a personal friend. received dashes. I could then Hy back to my mean course. When Flying Officer Ronald George Buckland was my wireless operI got close to our tai^et. Mouse would give me a definite warn- ator, Sergeant Vic Jones my flight engineer, Flying Officer John ing signal. The downside was that because the signed was on the Vincent Gardner was the rear gunner and Flight Sgt. William giound wave, the cuiTature of the earth restricted the range of C\Til Reynolds, Royal Canadian Air Foixe, was my mid-upper operation. Oboe was really a further development of the tun'el gunner Gennan Knickebeiri system, which they used to bomb our radai' MH: Did you consider your defenses adequate? and fighter stations during the Battle of Britain. Muncer: The Lancaster had three machine gun turrets, all ot MH: Did RAF Bomber Command develop any further naviga- which sported .303-caIiber machine guns. Vince Gardner; my tional aids? rear gunner, had a pair of the heavier .50-caliber Biownings. Muncen Yes, H2S was the first airborne radar where a navi- MH: What was the average age of your crew? gator could see an image of the ground Muncer: The average age must have been below. H2S was an abbreviation of its eai'ly 20s. I was 23 yeai^s old at the time of British code name "Home Sweet Home." my 23rd mission. Even though we were flying above or MH: When did you tly your last sortie? through 8/8 cloud, it meant we could still Muncen It was Friday, March 16. 1945— accurately bomb the target blind from Saint Patricks Day. I took off at 1715 houi-s 20,000 feet. H2S was initially issued to from RAF Kirminton, Lincolnshire, which pathfinder crews in Januaiy 1943 and had today is Humberside Airport. Hying my lots of teething pioblems, but giTidually oui' own Lancaster, M-Mike [Squadron Code bolfins sori;ed them out, and they came AS-M]. Our target was Niimbei-g, and we into our bombere in mid-1944. My navigawere not at all happy because it was heavtor. Flying Officer Geny Gen ard, could see ily defended with ack-ack and sun oimded all the Gennan cities displayed on his H2S by at least three known night fighter aircathode ray tube as bright silhouettes, and fields—one to the north and another two water such as lakes and rivers as much between Numberg and Munich. Our" misdarker patches. sion was to bomb the railway junction. The Americans were trying to cross the Rhine MH: What problems did the Gennan deRiver, the British Second Aimy was adfenses create? vancing toward Hamburg, and we were Muncer: The Geimans had their own supporting all the invading gi^ound forces. radai stations, which they positioned in a The Lancaster gained height very slowly gieat arc across occupied Europe that they with our big bombload and fuel tanks brim called the Kammhuber Line. They first defull. To arrive at 20,000 feet over the Rulir veloped their Himnielbetl radar giound staI had to reach at least 10.000 feet before I tions and progressed to their Wiirzburg Entering the Royal Air Force as an system with a maximum range of 50 miles, engine fitter at the start of Wbrid War II, crossed the Channel, which is why collisions occurred over assembly points and then to theii* famous Freya system with Kevin Patrick Muncer later trained to a range of 80 miles. They also developed be a pilot and served as a flight instruc- around the Norfolk and Suffolk coastal towns, especially in heavy cloud. radar-controlled searchlight batteries and tor before flying Lancasters with No. lai^e arcs of flak batteries. Their signals in- 166 Squadron-and surviving a succes- MH: How many "heavies" took pail in that mission? telligence units could detect when ou]" wire- sion of hair-raising ad^rentures. Muncer. On that night raid 350 took ofl, less operators switched on their 1155/56 and 36 didn't come back. We Hew southeast radio sets for testing. They then knew that a raid was imminent and from which bomber group, the types across Lincolnshire and Essex, crossing the Channel at Dover, of bombers being deployed and their maximum range. They where 1 positioned my Lancaster near the head of the main stream. It was a brilliant moonlit night, and as I crossed the could ihcn deduce possible targets and of course otir routes. Franco-German fiontier I had that uncomfortable feeling lhat MH: What did you use against that? there were German night fighters around. It was a sort of sixth Muncen Our boffins developed Window, a load of tinfoil strips sense that aircrews acquire with experience. Their fighters had that we dropped at specific intei'vals. This would reflect spurious electromagnetic impulses onto the German radar screens. obviously infiltrated our bomber stream, because ! saw three Window was a great advance in radar countermeasures, which, bombers in front of me shot out of the sky, burning fiercely as oddly enough, the GeiTnans also developed simultaneously— they fell to earth. I still remember following those three Lan32 MILHAKV HISTORV SEPTEMBER 20D6

ll i n our bomber stream and looking at their four brightly burning exhausts and thinking: "God, does my Lancaster, M-Mike, iook like that from behind? If so, then I'm a sitting duck!" We wL-re all vciy experienced, bul I still gave my crew a strict and limcly reminder to keep even greater \igilance. The Luftwaffe night fightere were twin-engine Junkers Ju-88Gs with a ceiling of 32.500 feet and a maximum speed of 310 mph. They would L'ntcr our bomber stream from behind and below, tndng to hide in our blind spot. They had three forward and upward-firing 20mm cannons and three 7.9mm machine guns in the nose, and they would position themselves so they could fire at the underside wing area between the two port or two starboard engines, where the fuel tanks were positioned. It was 2115 on a clear, cloudless night when we reached the target area, and I could clearly see the pathfinder flares, all different colors that we had to lecognize, burning brightly. The flak was heavy—an almost impenetrable wall of bursting anti-aireraft shells that 1 had to fly through with my bomb dooi~s open. Flying sueh a straight and level course gave searchlights and therefore ack-ack

cifully my parachute opened with a loud crack as my left flying boot fell off. I floated down to earth, losing consciousness. MH: What do you remember next? Muncer: 1 regained consciousness just as I crashed through Iree branches and hit the ground with a loud ihump. As pleased as I was to be alive on mother earth, I realized that I was not at all in good shape. Sitting at the base of a tree, I eventually found my whistle still attached to my bailie dress blouse and blew il as loud as I could. My whistle was an RAF issue Thunderer and contributed to saving my life, as no doubl it did for many other aircrews in similai' situations. My whistle for help was answered by a local German farmer and a French .soldier POW requisitioned to help on a fann. They could see immediately I was in serious trouble and gently earned me inside iheir faimhouse. The farmer's wife removed my bloodied battledress and examined the remains of my left arm. She immediately got some farmers bailing twine and wTapped it around my stump like a tourniquet to stem the flow of blood. That dear German lady whom we had just been bombing tmly saved my life. I vaguely

1 felt a thud as cannon shells severed my left arm and hlevv the cockpit roof canopy into a thousand pieces/ plenty of time to lock onto a bomber and set their fuzes for our correct altitude. I still had my incendiaries and my 4,000-pound Cookie, Riz.ed and primed in the bomb-bay rack just waiting for t he woixl. James Patterson was lining me up on the tai'get, giving ine the "Left, left...steady, steady...right, right." The bomb aimci' iilways repeated his direction request because of the noise and confusion over the target area. Just then a Ju-88 came in tiom below and on the port side, raking us with 20mm tracers that I remember coming up at me from the floor I felt a thud as cannon shells severed my left ann and blew the cockpit roof canopy into a thousand pieces. I instinctively rammed the conirol column forward and kicked the rudder bar, putting M-Mike into a screaming corkscrew dive to escape the Ju-88. The wind was cold and fierce, but I still noted that both starboard engines were sliot lo pieces and on fire. From a distance I heard Gardner, my rear gunner, calling out, "We re on fiie back here," and 1 hose were the last words I ever heard him speak. I know it was dark with bad visibility, but I can't understand how John failed io spot ihai Ju-88—that Luftwaffe pilot must have been a veiy experienced night fighter to get within range unobsened. I heaved back on the control column to recover from that dive ;ind heard a loud crack as all the control wires severed, relieving niL' of all control. Losing blood from my ann, 1 was drifting inandoutofconsciousness, but I still remember that our Lancaster, with its starboard inner engine dead and starboard outer slill turning, suddenly flicked over on its back. I was catapulted uiiiof the hole where' the canopy had been. I instinctively fumbled with my good right hand to pull ihe ripcoi d on my release straps, bul 1 didn't realize that my right thumb was broken. Eventually I got myfingei"sthrough ihe D-ring, pulled and mer-

One of the earliest Lincaster B Marit Is produced, R5689 "VN-N" served in No. 50 Squadron when photographed in 1940, but was finally wrinen off on September 19,1942, after crashing during its landing approach at Swindertiy airfield.

heard the fanner telephoning someone. MH: Who responded to that call? Muncen After the air raid was over and the all-clear sounded, I heard a car pull up outside, and a Luftwaffe officer with a medical orderly entered the farmhouse. The medic examined ihe stump of my left ami while the officer asked me some questions. I was so groggy that my answers musl have been incomprehensible. Like ail downed aircrew men, 1 only told him my number, rank and name, which was all we were required lo say under the temis of the Geneva Convention. They then look me to their hospital in nearby Briickburg. MH: Was this a civilian or militaiy hospital? Muncer. I believe it was a civilian hospital commandeered by the Gennan militai>', with around 600 beds, mostly orthopedic cases. I suppose 1 was really lucky coming down so close to a specialist hospital. Most of the patients were Gennan soldiers, injured on the Russian Front. I was really well looked after by the suigical team. As soon as I arrived, they tfxik me to the opSEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 33

INTERVIEW erating theater, stripped me dovm, dressed me in a hospital gown and gave me a general anesthetic. The surgeon then set about cleaning up what remained of my left ami, which again really saved mv life, because there was a gieat danger of gangrene setting in. They also put on a splint and bandaged my broken right thumb. I awoke around midday, and a doctor came, addressed me by my rank and name and started asking me questions about my squadron, aircraft type and details of my mission. He said, "You were bombing Nurnberg, weren't you?" and I replied, "If you know that, why are you asking me that question?" With that he turned on his heel and left me alone—that was the only inten^ogation I was subjected to. MH: So the Gennans looked after you in a veiy humane way? Mimcer: Inside the hospital, yes. One of the nui-sing nuns told me that the following day members of the local Volksslunn, armed with axes and hammers, tumed up at the hospital gates saying: "We undei-stand you have an English 'tenor flier' inside. We want him." The chief surgeon told them politely that they weren't going to get any one of his patients and to go away. That was another lucky escape. A senior surgeon told me they had found the bodies of RAF aircrew men in the area where I was found, and 1 was convinced 1 was the only sundvor of M-Mike. MH: Did you get to meet any of your fellow patients? Muncen It's very strange, really, For ihe first three weeks 1 had my own room, but when I could move around they transferred me to a general ward. I'd been in that ward for only a few days when the nursing nuns took me down the corridor to meet anotherflier.He turned out to be the Ju-88 pilot who had shot me down. Apparently he was spotted by one of our escorting Mosquitoes. He was all burned down one side. I really felt sony for him—and I'd lost my lefl aim. But we were both alive, which is a sort of blessing. I used to go down to the ward to see him, and we used to chat away—and when 1 was eventually liberated I gave him packs of American cigarettes as a farewell gilt. MH: How did the other patients feel about having the enemy in their midst?

A Lancaster moves into position on the flare path before taking off on a night bombing raid against German industrial targets in tiie Ruhr Valley. Muncer's last mission, on March 16,1945, was over NUrnberg, on a clear, cloudless, moonlit nighL

rubble, and the Americans had bulldozed the only road through. The other memory I have is of the advancing U,S. Anriy—not one soldier was on loot. They had all commandeered some form ot wheeled transport—abandoned German military vehicles, Mei-cedes Benz saloon cars, and we even passed a ftmeral hearse crammed full of live GIs. MH: What happened at Wurzburg airfield? Muncen The fu"st thing I remember was having a shower and change of undenvear—the fir-st in many, many weeks. This was lollowed by the kind ol waitime meal that only ihe Americans could provide. I was allowed to relax for a couple of days and debriefed by American intelligence officei^, then I was piled into a Douglas Dakota Mark III and llowii back to "Blighty." As soon as I landed at RAF Lynham in Wiltshire, I was taken to ihe Muncen I remember one incident. I was walking in the hos- American hospital down the road at Wroughton, just outside pital grounds when a squadron of B- 17s flew overhead at 20,000 Swindon. feet, heading for NiuTiberg. Visibility was so good I could see MH: What did you do with your newfound freedom? the sticks begin to fall. The nureing nuns fell on their knees and Muncen The first thing on my mind was to began to pray, and many of the German mititaiy patients began contact my wife. The problem was that 1 was to shout at me, as though it was my fault. The senior German confined to the hospital and denied access to doctor advised me to make myself scaree, which I did. The in- any means of oulside communication until cident was never mentioned again. ! had been debriefed. What made matlei-s MH: How much longer did you stay in that hospital? woi"se was ihat my mother-in-law lived in Muncer: After another couple of weeks, liberation amved in Swindon, just down the road—so close yet the shape of a German-speaking American doctor with a load so far! Luckily for me, one of the nurses lived of wounded German soldiers. This American caused quite a stir in Swindon, and she promised to drop her a because he wore a cowboy gun belt with a Colt .45, low slung note. Gwcn's mother was so overcome with in a holster, just like General George Patton. German medical personnel nevei' cairied arms. He was veiy surprised to see me in my cleaned and pressed RAF uniform as he checked the fn October 1945, Muncer got his wristwatch stump of my left arm. He explained he was really pushed for back from Leon Planade, a French POW time, but gave me some cigarettes and promised he would working on Hermann Wimmer's farm when report my presence. True to his word, two American officers he was shot down. After helping carry him to tumed up the following day in an armed jeep and took me off the farmhouse, Planade later found a severed to Ansbach. I was then ti^nsfened to a U.S. Aimy ambulance left arm nearby, with a wristwatch engraved with wounded American personnel and driven to Wurzhurg, "Pilot OfTicer K.P. Muncer" on the back. which had an aiifield of sorts. Wurzburg was like a ghost Planade assured Muncer tbat be gave his town—not a ci\ilian in sight. All ihe buildings were reduced to arm a good Christian burial. 3a MILlTAia' HISTORY SEPTEMBER 2QG6

In the morning he was confronted by two Germans wielding shotguns as he sat on a tree trunk in his underpants, quietly repairing a tear in his trousers.' t he gocxi news that she couldn't remember Gwen s telephone number. She went straight down to the local police station and explained ihe siltiation, and they took matters in hand—contaclcd Ihe RAF, gave them Gwen's present posting and got the message through. MH: Was that the end of your adventures? Muncer: No, not at all. Sometime later I received a letter, and i( said quite sinipl\, "Navigator lo Pilot—see you at 166 squadron reunion dinner RAF Kimiington, Saturday." lt was from Gerry Gerrard. He told me at the dinner thai when the first cannon shells hit our Lancaster, he clipped on his parachute. His navigator's table was just behind my pilot's seat, and when M-Mikc Hipped over onto its back, he fell out after me. He ianded in w(X)dland and spent the rest of the night wandering jiound in a daze. In the moming he was conlronted hy Iwo Gcmian pcnsionci"s wielding shotguns as he .sat on a fallen tree tiunk in liis underpants, quietly repairing a tear in his irousei's. As they walked back toward the police station, they passed the body of Vic Reynolds, wh(j was completely unmarked. MH: Did you leai'n of anvlhing further? Muncer: In OLtolier 1945,1 r-eceived a letler fr'om the Inlernai ional Red Citiss in Gene\'a, in which they said lhat they had been contacted by a Mon.'iienr Lc^on Planade. Leon had been a French POW working on a farm and had helped the Genrran fanner. Hermann Wimmcr, to cany me into his farmhouse at Winsor-, where I had been shot down. Leon went on to explain that he had Totind a left arm close by with a wristwatch sinipped around I he wr'isl, and he wished lor-etum ihe watch to me. He assured me lhat he gave my arm a good, reverent, Chiistian burial. There was no doubl that the watch was mine, because it was a "Scivices" watch given to me by my sister Doreen for Christmas in 1940. She had it engriived with my then rank and name. MH: On October I, 1945, you were also gazetted for the Distinguished Flying Cross. What did you do after the war? Muncer: I was r ecnrited into the RAF for hostilities only and aiumed to civilian life wilh ihe Pmdential Insur-ance Co., where 1 worked for a further 35 years. But in eaily 1947,1 received a letlei" in German (with translation into English) from HcnWimmer via the International Red Cross. He explained that he was suffer ing from severe arthrilis and could no longer work ihe fami alone. His eldest son was killed on ihe Russian Front; his second son, Hans was still a POW in Scotland and badly needed on the farm. T immediately wrote lo the Wai- Office, sending a copy ol his letler and explaining the full details and how Hennann Wimnierand his wife had saved my life. On June 20, 1947. I received the following letter^ from the International Red Cross in Oxford: "I have today heard trom the War Office that, ihanks to yotr. Hans Wimmer will be reluming to his home in Bavar-ia this July, I can imagine ihe joy of reunion in thai

Photographed in May 1945, Dresden reveals the effects of the day-and-night bombing h had suffered at the hands of American and British aircraft the previous Febmary. Muncer was among the Lancaster pilots who had participated in tlie devastating raids.

family. Heaven bless you. For some obsctire reason it will please me to associate you and your fiitirre with something of the sublimity of the Wingless Victoiy You wilh your lost ami but...not moaning....Forgive this intrusion, but my work brings me in contaci with so many broken and often embitleied lives, that the joys and evidence of appreciated sendees become heightened a thousandfold and to give expression to such, is just a little indulgence further. Youre sincerx'Iy, DoiTithy F. Fray." MH: That is a wonder fill ending to a remai'kablc story. Muncen Yes. I suppose it is really—bul that's not the end. In 1982—nearly 40 years latei—Gwen and I had a holiday in Germany, and decided to visit Winsor. We went to the local post office to make enquiries, and we found that ihe Wimmer- family still worked the lai-m. Neither Gwen nor-1 spoke Gemiun, and the old man couldn't speak English, but 1 got a pencil and papeiout of the car and drew a picture of a man hanging on a par^tichule out of a tree. The old man's eyes lit up in recognition. He introduced us to his family, incltiding his son, and took Gwen and me otitside lo show me the tree 1 had come down in, only 20 yards kom thefeiTnhouse.MH John McAdams is a former Royal Air Force signals officer and a Fellow ol ihe Royal Geographical Sociely. For further ivading, !ry: Battle Over the Reich, by Alfred Price: Bomber Command 19391945, hy Ian Carter: and Footprints on the Sand: RAF Bomber Command Prisoners-of-War in Germany, 1939-1945, by Oliver Chit ton-Brock. SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARV HISTORY 35

The LION ROARS in

FRANCE

King Philip ii Augustus of France (ieft) confronts King Riciiard i tiie Lionheart of Engiand at Gisors on September 2,1198. Before the battie, Ricbard apparentiy coined bis royai motto, "Dieu et mon Oroit" ("God and my Rigbt"), as a countersign and an affirmation that he owed no feaity to Pbiiip or anyone else but God.

36 MILITARY HISTORY SEPTEMBER 2006

Back from the Third Crusade and Austrian captivity, King Richard I of England spent the rest of his reign battling his longtime rival, King Philip II Augustus. BY SIMON REES •e have thought it proper to inform you of what happened to Richard, king of England, the enemy of our empire and disturber of your kingdom... he is now in our power. We know this news will bring you great happiness." With these words, addressed in a letter to Philip II Augustus, Capetian king of France, the riddle of Richard the Lionheart's where-

abouts had been resolved. Now, with the king of England locked in the Hnn grasp of Henry VI, the Holy Roman emperor, and the campaign season of 1193 approaching, Philip had a clear chance to regain his family's honor and begin the dcstiiictiun of its longtime nemesis, the Angevin empire.

Almost a year before, on December 27, Philip Augustus had anived in Paris a bitter man. He had recently returned from the Third Ciiisade, his health damaged and his pride badly mauled. Richard had outshone and outspent Philip at each step—at Messina in Sicily as the cru.sading forces waited for depaitui^e to the Holy Land, and then at the Siege of Acre. There was a raft of other arguments and bickeiing, both petty and major. But one insult had been greater than all the others combined—in late March 119!, while in Sicily. Richard had rejected his long-term betrothal to Philips sister Alice and announced his decision to marry Berengaria of Navane, Twisting the knife further. Richard claimed that Alice had been his father's mistress and had borne him an illegitimate son. To keep the crusade on the road and assure that he would not be held responsible for its failure, Philip had to swallow his pride and accept a 10,000-mark payoff. Pai1 of Alice's dovvTy was the NoiTnan borderlands ot the Vexin and the great fortress of Gisom. Philip agreed that this ten ilor\* was to remain in Richard's hands and that il would be handed (tn to his male descendants should he have any. Those vitally stiTitegic lands would revert to Philip's control if Richard died without a legitimate heir. If Philip died without an heir, the territory would be considered part of Normandy. For Philip it was the worst of humiliations. The English kings paid homage to the kings of France for their continental lands, and now Richard, the vassal, had freely slandered the Capetian name and had forced Philip to give up ten itoiy that by right should have returned to his control. The power of the French kings was seemingly at a low ebb, and it would take all Philips skill, intelligence and cunning to reverse his position. CROSSING n i E LINE In tackling Richard's power base, Philip was treading afineline. Richard was still on cmsade, and the rules were ver>' clear: A Cnisader's lands were protected by the church, and they could not be attacked while he was still away That, of coui"se, did not stop Philip fi*om making the necessary moves to retrieve Alice's dov^Tv- lands and more if possible. On JanuaiT 20, 1192, Philip met Richard's seneschal of Noimandy, William of FitzRalph, at a conference between Gisors and Trie. There, Philip produced fake documents SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HrSTORY 37

UON IN FRANCE

THE DEFENDERS SAID PHILIP COULD ENTER ROUEN that he claimed were drawn up with Richard in Messina, outlining the deal stmck in March 1191, Richard had supposedly agreed that Alice's dowiT lands in the Norman Vexin vvcrL' lo be handed over lo Philip. Suspecting it was a ruse, FitzRalph and the Norman barons rejected the French king's demands. In hindsight, Philip's effoits seem to be lhe spadework for building up a casus belli rather than a determined effort to start a drive into Angevin lands, which he was certainly not ready to do. Besides, he had bigger fish to hy. Many nobles who owed direct homage to Philip had died in the Holy Land, and many had left the French king teniton'—particularly Count Piiilip of Flandei-s, who had bequeathed the prosperous Artois region. If Philip were tofighla major war with the Angevin empire, he would need to secui'e those territories and their resources. During 1192 Philip wooed over the men who would form a bloc against Richards supporter's. Key figures among them were Count John, the Lionheart's brother. Count Ademar of Angouleme, Count Baldwin VTIT of Flanders and Count Raymond of Toulouse. Philip had also built up pressure on the local lords of the Vcxin, men who governed territories on ihc boundaries between the French and English kings' lands and who we? e obligated to both. But now, with Richard locked up—possibly indefinitely, as had happened to Robert of Normandy, brother of England's Henry I—many realized they would

soon have no choice but to turn to the French king. As hisloiian John Gillingham has noted, "If they did not leap on the bandwagon they were liable to be run down."

THE GREAT WAR BEGINS The year 1193 began with Count John arriving in Paris, where he paid homage for Richard s lands, including, it was said, for England. John then returned to England claiming that Richard was dead and that lhe crown should pass to him. That last point was easily dismissed, since Richards ministers and his mother, the indomitable Eleanor of Aquitaine, had already learned Richard was alive and in captivity by order of Heniy VI in Geimany. With Richard technically back ftom ciiisadc, Philip struck into the Vexin. The pattern that the war would lake was one of mercenary bodies and armies of varying size (none exceptionally large by modem standards) fighting sieges and al times skinnishcs. Al that time, battle was consideT-ed a risky business: Pillage, destmction and fast movement creating maximum disordei" through the enemy's lands was the prefeired means of waifaie. The Chanson des Uvrains vi\idly records how an army on the march conducted war at that time: "Out in front are the scouts and incendiaries... the incendiaries set the villages on fire and the foragers visit and sack them. The tcnificd inhabitants aix' either burned or led away with their hands tied to be held for ransom," Philip's fii"st target was the imposing castle of Gisors, described by some as the key lo the region, Gisons' castellan was Gilbert de Vascoeuil, who owned land in both the king Itmdon of England's and the king of France's territories. Rather than defend that mighty fortress, Gilbert meekly suirendered. English chronic!ei"s pointed to foul play, and lhe complete ease with which Philip won this strategically vital castle suggests that such may indeed have been the case. Moving on from Gisoi"s. Philip stormed into NoiTnandy. reaching as far as Dieppe. In payment for his tivacheiy, Mmttt rRFNi-H John was given Evreux, Philip's amiy, joined by a lai'ge conVEXIN ^ tingent of men led by Count Baldwin of Flanders, ihcn laid siege to the ducal capital of Normandy, Rouen. There, he was halted at lhe last moment by Ear! Robert of Leicester, who injected much-needed vigoi^ and organization into ihc city's defense. At one point Philip, believing success was within his grasp, offered the defendei^s a chance to surrender They replied that, on his own, the French king could AQUITAINE enter Rouen any time he liked. It was a none-too-subtic trap, of coui"se, and more likely a calculated insult. Enraged that he had been thwarted from taking the jewel of Normandy, Philip moved on to seek easier pickings. .Xrit At Mantes on July 9, Philip came to tenns with Richard's ministers—the French king could keep his gains and would be given some extra territories if he halted operations then The Vexin, strategically located between A[igevin-controlled Normandy and there. If Richard wanted those possessions back, he and Capetian France, was the territorial bone of contention in a rivalry would have to pay 20,000 marks and pay homage lo Pliilip, that predated both Richard's and Philip's coronations. Improbable as it was that Richaid would stoop that low, — - - - -

—-^"yj.-

38 MILITARV HISTORY SEPTEMBER 2006

\NY TIME HE LIKED. IT WAS A TRAP, OE COURSE. he could not respond in any way while he was still in captivity, where Philip and John, wanting time to consolidate iheirgains and to prepare forthe next campaign, prefen'ed hc remain. They tried desperately to biibe Henry VI with hefty promises of cash to detain Richard longer, or even hand hitn over to them. But while Heniy was no friend of Richard, the latter had impressed many al ihc German court wilh his eloquence and reputation. During his captivity Richatd had built strong relations with many lords, prtnces and i\iling clerg\-men in the Lower Rhineland, and ihis |x>werlul faction was a key influence on Henry's rejection of Philip and John's advances.

the counts of Angouleme and Perigueux, the viscount of Brosse and Geofirey de Rancon were all in open revolt against Richard's authority. A desperate Count John was also making promises to Philip for the latter's continuing support now that Richard was on the loose. The French king opened his 1194 campaign by besieging the stiong castle of VemeuH, The ganison had withstood a siege in 1193, and as a second besieging force approached, its confident defendei-s defianliy drew a rather unflattering caricature of Philip on the gates. By then, Philip was aware that Richard was preparing to return to France and that it was important he take Vcrneuil before the war proper began.

IHnJONUNCAGtD On February 4, 1194, Richard was released after Angevin wealth paid off the ransom demand, settled at 100,000 mai"ks, to be followed by another payment of 50,000 marks thai would secure the release of additional hostages. Richard was also forced to pay Heniy homage for England, although that embarrassing an"angement was downplayed in Angevin circles. Instead ol racing back lo his own lantls, Richard went to Cologne lo cement his German diplomatic ties—in the future they would become an important weight with which lo pressure Philip. By March 13, Richard was back in England, v\ hei"e hc swiftly reasserted his authonty over the kingtlom. Richard began a resale of English lands, titles and positions that had been put on the market before he went on ciiisade. He would need a large amount of disposable cash for the coming war with Philip, and he'd need it quickly. But Richard did not, as many historians have claimed, simply sell to the highest bidder. He was careful to grant the positions to taislcd and efficient men. The English king knew that stable finances and steady supplies are the ftiel of successful campaigning. Richard met William of Scotland on April 4, and the tw{j kings remained in each other's company until William went north on Apiil 22, Days before, on April 17. Richard was cixjwned for a second time, at Winchester, to underline his rightful position as monarch. By May 12, Richaid had set sail for Noimandy with a large fleet estimated at 300 ships. In the space of a few extraordinary months the Lionheart had retui-ned to his kingdom, stamped it again with his authority and organized an army to take with him to war against Philip. This would have been impossible to do if Kngland had been the impoverished and disordered kingdom that some historians have depicted.

Once Richard aiTi\'ed at Barflcur, hc was soon on the move toward Vemeuil. On the way, John anived and groveled for forgiveness. Richard, who viewed his brothei's treacherous efforts as contemptible, told him, "Don't be afraid, you are a child." To pixwe his worth, the 28-year-old John then went with men to Evreux, pretending still to sup-

/ERNFUIl. Philip had not been idle during RichaixI's return. He had consolidated the tcnitorics hc had taken, and now controlled much of MoiTnandy east of the Seine River. He was in striking distance of Rouen. In Tournine and Bcny, Philip's allies had made consideiiibic gains, and in Aquitaine

Released fn)m captivity by German Emperor Henry Vl-for a 100,000mark ransom-Richard lands at Sandwich on March 14,1194. After reasserting his authority in England, he prepared for war in France. SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARV HISTORY 39

UON IN FRANCE

CHATEAU GAILLARD WOULD BECOME THE BASE CA^ port Philip. Once inside, he had the French garrison rounded up and massacred. In the meantime, Richard's forces neared Vemeuil. Philip had struck camp, moving off toward Evreux, which he would retake and then sack. He had left the bulk of his forces to continue the siege, but without their king they made a general withdrawal the next day. On May 30, Richard entered the town unopposed. He was reportedly so grateful for the defenders' lack of resistance that he lined them up and kissed each one in thanks. (Historian Jim BradbuiT would later ponder whether "they appreciated their reward."} While Philip centered his enei"gies on the north without making much headway, Richai^ focused on the south, taking a series of fort! esses, including Loches in Touraine. Following those successes, he tumed his attention to restoring order to Aquitaine. By now, Philip was concerned enough lo gather and maixh his aimy south to relie\'e pressure on his allies there and to unstitch Richard's recent victories. By early July, Richard, aware that Philip's forces were nearing, confidently decided to commit his forces to a set-piece battle in the Vendome, across the road that Philip would have to travel on his wa\' into the Loire Valley. Philip sent Richard word that he would do battle, but in reality he had ordered a retreat hack the way his army had come. Richard pursued, and on JuK- 4 caught up Vkdth the French rear guard at Fr^teval. Philips army was put to flight after a sharp skirmish, and the French king only narrowly avoided capture. As it was, Philip's baggage train fell into Angevin hands. It contained the royal archives, including a list ol those willing to aid him againsl Richard within the Angevin camp. But although he was forced to leave Richard to his own devices in the south, Philip was far

sealed with Richard's niece's marrying Philip's son Louis, with the Vexin, the castellanies of Ivrv, Pacy and Vemon, and 20,000 marks as a dowry. That last point was put aside until more detailed talks could he arranged. Major conflict resumed in 1195, when Philip besieged Vaudreuil and then received a visit from Richard for fuither discussion. Etiquette at the time demanded that Philip halt the siege and deal with Richard, but the French king was keen to knock out Vaudreuil as a defensible position and urged his sappers lo continue undermining iis Initifications. It was therefore most emhaiTassing for Philip that one of the mighty walls collapsed prematurely while face-to-face negotiations were underway. Along with a good numher of oaths, Richard swore he would have his i^evenge and stomied off. Philip retired to attack noitheastem Normandy. That campaign culminated in a memorable raid on Dieppe, in which Philip's forces employed a substance like Greek fire to bum the English ships in the harbor Richard tried to attack the French rear guard, but this lime was driven off. Following his Normandy successes, Philip aimed his efforts southward in the Benyregion.Richard's top mercenary commander, Mercadiei; had captured Issoudun, and Philip wanted it back. The French king took the town and was besieging the castle Philip II, portrayed in stained when Richard and his vanguard stormed glass at the abbey church of through French lines and made theii' way in St-Denis, had seized control of to reinforce the ganison. Philip may have much Angevin territory in thought he now had Richard trapped, hul Richard's absence-sometimes the English king had given specific instjxicin collusion with the English tions before making his dating break-in lo king's brother, Count John. have his main foires close in and cut Philip's supply lines. The French king realized his predicament at the last moment and was from finished, forced to agree to terms for a new truce at the start of 1196.

UPS AND DOWNS Philip rushed back to Normandy and, in a reversal of his recent defeal, pounced on the forces of Count John and William d'Aubigny, Earl of Arundel, and seized their baggage train. Despite that last-minute success, the pace of campaigning at such a fast and furious rate was stretching Philip's resources to the extreme. The same could be said for Richard, who was now sending out peace feelers, a move that culminated in the temporary Truce of TiUieres. There was also the prospect of a more permanent peace, to be fiO MILITARY HISTORY SEPTEMBER 2006

SECOND PHASE The warfare in 1196 and 1197 was short and shaip, bul lower key. Atfii'slthings did nol seem to be going the Ljonheait's way. He had to attend to problems in Brittany, while at about that time his nephew and designated heir, Arthur of Brittany, was smuggled into Philip's hands. This was a major blow—should Richard fail to sire a son, the Angevin empire would now be inherited by John. Philip then won the Siege of Aumale, which Richard had tried unsuccessfully to relieve. Later, at the Siege of Gaillon,

FOR RICHARD'S CAMPAIGN TO RETAKE NORMANDY.

Chateau Gaillard, built by ffichard as a center of operations against Philip, still overiooks Les Andelys-sur-Seine. To the French king's boast that "if its walls were iron, yet I would take it," Richard retorted, "If these walls were butter, yet would i hold thenif'

Richard was wounded by a cmssbow boll, putting him out of action for more than a month. Richard did have some eliplomatic success in October 1196; he ended a 40-year war w'ah Toulouse by manying his sister Joan oft to Count Raymond or Toulouse. Richard was also building a majestic and powerful castle .11 Les Andelys-sui-Seine. Calling it Chateau Gaillard, Richard took two years and the then-immense sum of 11,500 pounds sterling lo erect the castle, but he was so happy with the results that he confidently declared he could defend il even if its walls were made of butter. Les Andelys was not, however, a defensive bastion but an offensive one. 11 would become the base camp for Richard's campaign to [ elakc the lands that he had lost in Normandy. Richard was keen to knock out one of Philip's key allies, [he count of Flanders, now Baldwin DC, and he managed this through a trade embargo. Flanders, one of Europe's workshops, had far too many mouths to feed for the amount of land available; it had always imported gi^ain from England to overcome the danger of starvation. The piincipal economy of the region, weaving, also relied heavily on English w(K)l. With English grain and wool slashed from the Flemish economy, Baldwin was under a great deal of pressure to

come over to the Angevin side. As well as a stick—the embargo—Richard also offered a carrot: the promise of full payment in an'ears of Baldwin's English pension and the gift of 5,000 marks. In 1197 the count of Flanders switched his allegiance to Richard. PHILIP OUTPLAYED Richard had a major success on an unexpected front in 1198 when the Holy Roman emperor, Henry VT, died, leaving a 3-year-old heir. In his place the Gemian elector's oi the empire settled on Otto of Brunswick—Richard's nephew. With the empire and the coalition of Rhineland supporters backing him, Richard was in a good position lo not only pressure Philip but also grab the pope's attention. In addition, Richard had obtained support from the counl of Boulogne and many other Norman lords who were again switching sides, hoping to back the likelie.st winner. Philip launched his campaign of 1198 with an extensive attack on the Vexin, reportedly sacking and burning 18 settlements. He was pushed back, however, and w ith Baldwin launching an attack into the Artois, Philip's attention was distracted fi^om lighting Richard. On September 27, Richard's forces struck into the Vexin, taking Courcelles-Chaussy and Boury before returning to SEPTEMBER2006 MILITARY HISTORY

UON IN FRANCE Dangu. Philip, back in ihc region, mistakenly believed that CoLircelles-Chaussy was still holding out and rode with 300 knights and sergeants to its relief. Mercadier and a local knight witnessed the French lea\'ing and repoited to Richard. Characteristically, the English king called for an immediate attack. Once again the French army was surprised and started to flee toward the nearest place of refuge—Cisors. Bunched together, the French knights and Philip attempted lo cross the Epte River on a bridge that promptly collapsed under their weight. AccoMinglo Anglo-Norman chronicici"S, the French king "drank of the liver" before l;)eing pulled out. Aboul 18 of his knights drowned, but the bulk of his men made it to Gisors, a position far too strong for Richard to consider stomiing or besieging with the forces at his disposal. Philip soon regrouped his aimy and raided Noimandy anew, again targeting E\Teu.\. Richard countered Philip's offensive with a counterattack in the Vexin, while Merradier led a raid on Abbeville. By the fall ol 1198, Richard had regained almost all that had been lost in 1193, and his power base and alliances seemed stronger than ever. To strive for a more permanent peace, Philip offered Richard the return of all the territories

he had taken except Gisoi>;, Richard refused to contemplate a .separate peace without Count Baldwin being included, so a truce was airanged and a date set for tuither' talks. END GAME In mid-January 1199, a Carlo Marochetti's statue boat approached the bank outside London's Palace of of the Seine River. Stand- Westminster captures the ing proudly on the deck legendary Richard-who in fact was Richai'd the Lionheaii. caFed little for England. while waiting on the riverbank was Philip. Two of Europes most powerful men spent their last meeting together shouting ternis to one another, and although they could nol conclude a peimanent tnice, they did agi ee to li.iither mediation. Those further discussions yielded a live-year halt in hostilities. With peace secured, Richai'd was able to refoeus his ef-

THE TWO KINGS SPENT THEIR LAST MEETING SHOUTIN

Dying of gangrene, Richard forgives Uie crossbowman wfio wounded him during the siege of Chalus, identified as PierTe Basile by Bernard of Itier. After Richard's death bis mercenary commander, Mercadier, bad tbe hapless Frencbman flayed to death. 42 MILITARV HISTORV SEPTEMBER 2006

bnnging inteiTial order lo the south of the Angevin empire. One pemianent ihorn in iiis side had been the counts of Angouleme and Limoges. It is pan of Richard's mythology that in March ! 199 he attacked Achurd, the lord of Chalus (vassal of the count of Limoges), because of hmied treasure. The accepted account says ihal Achaitl's men had discovered hidden loot. Roman perhaps, and had deliver^ed it to their master. Protocol diclated that Achard send some of the wealth to the count of Limoges as v^'ell as to Richard, his supreme overlord. Achard left Richard out of the cut. When Richai d found out (hal a vast hoard of wealth had heen discovered and he had heen deprived of his share, he launched an invasion. His death at Chalus—a small castle defended by no more than 40 men—was viewed by French chroniclers with glee. They saw the hum for treasure and his death as proof that God was displeased with his avarice and iust for power. Anglo-Nomian chroniclei-s iJso hiamed Richard's lust for gold. His death while huniing treasure was described as di\'inc justice. Bui ihecnix of their accounts was lhe mom! tlimension: Richard pardoned his killer and ihen asked lor torgiveness from God for his ovm sins. The Lionheart's be-

IJ TERMS TO EACH OTHER. havior just before death was underlined as the paradigm of Christian behavior and the action of a legendary Crusader king. Mercadier. his loyal mercenary, had no such chivalrous proclivities. After Richard died. Mercadier had lhe hapless cros.sbowman who had striack Richard flayed to dealh and the rest of Chalus' defendei's hanged. Fact has lx.'come inwocably mixed with fiction. Bernard of Itier. a monk in the Benedictine abbey of St. Martial in Limoges, i-ecorded that Richard's ohjective was to destroy I he count of Limoges' castles and towns, and did not menlion treasure. On March 26, Richard had gone oul viiiually unarmed to view the progress of the sappers' work. Vainous tiames of the defender who wounded the king have been uiven, but Bernard of Itier stated that PieiTe Basile, after pan-ying a number of besiegers' airows with a gigantic I lying pan, fired his cTOssbow at Richard. The English king was so impressed thai he applauded the man's courage liL'fore ducking—but he did so too late, and the crossbow bolt lodged between his neck and shoulder. Riding confidently back to his tent. Richard sought medical attention. A surgeon who tried to extricate the bolt botched the job and was described as a butcher hy the chronicler Roger of Howden. Gangrene set in, and Richard was much loo experienced a campaigner to believe he might recover. He may well have forgiven the man who shot him. hut hc certainly called for lhe Queen Mother, Eleanor, locome lo his bedside. On April 6, 1199, he died in theaiTns of his mother, who mourned him, saying, "I have lost the staff of my age, the Hghl of my eyes." Had Richatd the Lionheart lived, war with Philip would have probably lesumed sooner rather than later The Eng1 ish king would probably have worked his way like a steam-

After dying on April 6,1199, with his 77-yoar-nkl [nollicr, Eleanor of Aqiiitaine, beside him, Richard was buried next to his father, Henry II, at Fontevraud Abbey near Chinon-save for his bowels, buried at Chalus, and his heart, buried at Rouen.

roller onto Philip's lands and forced a settlement in his own favor. That, howevei; remains speculation. If anyone could turn the tide of war against Richard il was Philip, lhe man who had managed unlil 1198 to keep the war mainly inside lhe English king's territories. When Philip faced Richard's successor, the story was a different matter—King John was simply nol up to the job of defeating this wily and experienced campaigner. Indeed, John failed so abysmally (even discounting bad luck) that by the lime Philip died in 1223, the French king had achieved his longed-for goal: He had shattered the Angevin empire that Richard had fotight like a lion lo maintain. By outlasting the Lionheart. Philip II wenl down in French annals as Philip Augustus, while Richards hapless successor earned the sobriquet of John Lackland. MH Frequent Military History contributor Simon Rees writes from London. For fiuiher reading, /rvv Richard lhe Lionheart: The Mighty Crusader, /;v David Miller; and The Government of Philip Augustus: Foundation of French Royal Power in lhe Middle Ages, by John W. Baldwin. SEPTEIVI8ER 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 43

i

For wounds received...' The United States' oldest decoration has undergone several changes of purpose and criterion since its inception in 1782. BYFREDL BORCH

'ore than 1 million Pui-ple Hearts have been given out since 1932. when the decoration was revived by General Douglas MacAilhur as an award for combat wounds and meritorious service. But while the modern version of the Puiple Heart is less than 75 y a r s old. the honor was first created by General Washington in 1782, giving it the distinction ol being ihe United States' oldest military medal. The Puiple Heart is unique for several other reasons. When il was resuirected in 1932 as a medal for meritorious service, MacArthur and the U.S. Army never contemplated that it would be transfomied into an award that would go only to men and women who had been wounded or killed in action, as would be ihe case duiing World War \l and the Korean War. Unlike the criteria for other American medals, which have remained constant over time, those for awarding the Purple Heart have changed markedly in the past 73 years. WWII saw posthumous awards ol the Puiple Heart permitted for the firet time, while it ceased being awarded for meritorious sei^vice. The Navy also was given authority to award the Puiple Heart to sailors and Marines. In the 1960s, President John F. Kennedy altered the L-nleiia so that Americans wounded or killed while fighting in an undcclaivd war against a nontraditional enemy, as they were in Vietnam, could receive it. Similarly, in the 1980s President Ronald Reagan authorized it for U.S. military personnel killed ()r wounded on peacekeeping missions, or who became victims ()f international terrorist attacks. The most recent change came in 1997, when Congress enacted legislation prohibiting its award to civilians semng with the U.S. armed forces. On August 7, 1782, GenemI Washington decreed that "whenever any singularly meritorious action is perlormed, the author of it shall be permitted to

LEFT: The Rirple Heart as it looks today, bearing the relief of General George Washington, who first authorized it on August 7,1782. RIGHT: Called the Badge of Military Merit, the original Purple Heart was awarded to three enlisted veterans of the American Revolution.

wear...over his left breast...a heart in puiple cloth." Washington CEilled his new award the "'Badge of Militaiy Meril," and three were awarded to Continental Army noncommissioned officers in 1783. The first, Sergeant Daniel Bissell of the 2nd Connecticut Regiment, volunteered to "desert" the Continental Army in August 1781. He then traveled to New York City, where he enlisted in the British anny. Bissell, who was operating under Washington's pereonal direction, was to remain with the Britisli no longer than necessaiy to obtain all the infomiation he could on the strength of the enemy's forces, fortifications and plans. Just before he was to return to the American lines, however, Bissell became deathly ill wilh a fever and, while in a state of delirium, made some incriminating admissions. The British surgeon treating him guessed that he was a spy, but did not disclose his patients identity and reportedly later helped Bissell escape after his lengthy recovery. When he finally rejoined the Continental AiTny, a yeai' had passed. Bis.sen's mi.ssion, however, had been an unqualified success, and Washington awarded him the Badge of MilitaiT Merit on June 8, 1783, William Brown, a sergeant in the 5th Connecticut Regiment, earned his Puiple Heaii for gallantry in action at Yorktown, Va., on October 14, 1781. According to the citation for the award. Brown had been ordered to take a detachment of men and precede the main attack upon the British lines. He was to draw and sustain thefirstbiiint of the enemy'sfireand diive into their lines as far as possible without waiting for sappers to cul through the British barricades and obstructions. That would allow the Continental soldiers following Brov^'n and his men to attack a weakened enemy. Brown acted with "great bravery, propriety and deliberate firmness," and his Badge of Military Merit reflected his success under fire. Sergeant Elijah Churchill ofthe 2nd Continental Dragoons earned his Purple Heart for two raids inside British lines; both were planned and directed by Major Benjamin Tallmadge, the chief of Washington's intelligence service. In the first raid, Tallmadge learned lhat the British were storing several tons of hay in a building at Coram, on the north shore of Long Island. British soldiers NEW YORK SriTE OFFICE Of FMBK5 i HECREMION « HlSTOBrC P0ES6flU*TlQ«

SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 4S

PURPLE HEART

DOUGLAS MACARTHUI PURPLE HEART a 'symhc also iieiped with burning a British supply schooner anchored close to the shore and in the capture of 50 pris(jnei^. Churehill rejoined Tailmadge, with all his men, only one of whom was wounded. The second raid was earned out against Fort Slongo, on Long Island, in OclobcT-1781. Churchill and his men surprised the British, took 21 prisoners and seized a large quantity of clothes, tood, powder and ammunition. While historians surmise that there mas have been otticrs, Bissclis, Browns and Churchill's are the only coniiiTned awards ofthe Badges of Military Merit during the American Revolution.

Mark Breining displays the Purple Heart and Air Medal awarded to his uncle, Stephen Breining, killed when the transport plane on which he was a passenger crashed while making a forced landing in Greenland. For hundreds of thousands of Americans the Purple Heart is a priceless memento of a relative or loved one.

located at nearby Fort St. George were tasked with protecting the hay, which, given the imponance of animal transport in the militai^ of thai time, was extremely valuable. Tallmadge relayed this infonnation to Washington and proposed that the hay be destroyed and the foil protecting it attacked. Late in the afleiTioon of November 21,1780, Tallmadge and a deUichment ot 50 soldiers embarked in whaleboats at Fairfield, Conn., and headed across Long Island Sound toward Fort St. George, some 20 miles away. At about 3 a.m. on November 23, the troops arrived—unnoticed—within striking distance of the fort. In the subsequent operation, Churchill took 16 men and went ahead ofthe main body. He suiprised, took and destroyed Fort St. George, "acquitting himself with great gallantry, finnness and address." He Vin-rrARYHlSTOlO' SEPTEMBER 2006

fter the Revolution, the Badge of Military Merit was torgotten for more than 150 years. In the aftermath of World War I, however, the U.S. Army's leadei^ship recognized that it needed a new award to recognize meritorious semce. This was because it liad only three decorations; the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross and Distinguished Sen'ice Medal, the latU'i' awarded for service that was "exceptionally meritorious" and occun-ed in a position of "great responsibility." Many indi\ iduals \\ ho pei+ormed valuable services that tell shoit of the standards required for the Distinguished Service Medal could not be given the recognition they deceived. In theeai'ly 1930s, Douglas MacAjihui learned about Washington's Revolutionary War badge. Given his position as Army chief of staff, he was able to prod the War Department staff to prepare a study of the award.

By December 1931, the Army was ready to revive the Badge of Military Merit—the original name, whose i etention the staff study recommended—tor both wartime and peacetime meritorious service. The plan was for the new badge to be announced on FebiTiaiy 22, 1932, the bicentennial of Washington's birth. In December 1931, MacArthur made two important changes in the plan. He directed that the name of the new award be the Purple Heart ralher than the Badge of Militaiy Merit. Perhaps more important, he changed the definition of meritorioLis service to include combat wounds. That meant any soldier who had been wounded by the enemy had perfbnned the required meritorious sendee. As he explained in a letter wiitten some 10 yeare later, the new Purple Heart was unique in several ways:

thought the medal should ONLY GO TO THE LIVING. He felt that to make the •I death, with its corollary depressive influences/ would DEFEAT ITS PURPOSE. First, it is the oldest in American history, and antedates practically all the famous mililaiy medals of ihe world; second, it comes from ihe greaie.si of all Ameneans, George Washin}>toi}, and thereby carries with il .•iomelhiiig of the reverence which haloes his greai )mme; and third, it is the only decoration which is completely iih irinsic in that il does not depend upon approval or favor by anyone. It f-oes only to those who arc wounded in battle, and enemy action alone detenjiines its award. Il is a true badge oj courage and ei>ery breast that wears il can beat with pride.

O

n Febrviary 22, 1932, in General Orders No. 3, MacArthur announced that "the Puipic Heail, established by General Gt'(jrgt' Washington...is hereby levived oul of respect to his memoi>' and mililarv' achievements." While ihe order did not define the award cHtena, regulations published that same day spelled oul that it could be awarded to "any pei"son who, while serving in the Army.. .performed any singularly meritorious act of extraordinary fidelity or essential seivicc." riic following sentence, in parentheses, was added to the tielinition: "A wound, which necessitates treatment by a medical ollicer, and which is received in action with an enemy ot the Liniied Slates, or as a result of an act of such enemy, may.. .be constnied as resulting from a singularly meritorious act of essential seivice." Stalling in 1932, hundreds of soldiei^s began applying to the War Department for Purple Heatis. An applicant had to show that he had .served with iheAimyand had pei^onned some qualifying meritorious act, or been wounded in combat. The Anny inteipreted its regulations to mean that any individual who had been assigned to the American Expeditionary Forces during WWI was eligible for the Puiple Heaii, and as a result a small numliei" of Marines and sailoi^ received the new medal. General John J. Pershing, commander in chief of all U.S. l< ures in Europe, had also created and awarded a small number of "Meritorious Senice Citation Ceililicates" to several hundi ed .s(jldier-s fortheii seivice in Europe duiing World War I, and ihe Arm\ allowed those men to exchange the ceiiificate for the Piiiple Heart if they so desired. The overwhelming majority of medals, however, went to those who had been wounded. As iur proving ihal one had been wounded in combat and treatment by a medical officer had been necessary, the Army prefen ed to have proof via medical records, but was willing to ;iLcept substitutes like sworn affidavits where il was clear that ihe soldiei' had been shot, gassed, wounded by shrapnel orolhenvise injured in action. In 1932 alone some 25,000 Puiple I learts were awarded, and more than 60,000 had been issued bv 1938. In contrast to today, when Purple Hearts go to the next of kin of soldiei-s, sailor's, ainnen and Marines killed in action, the Puiple Heai1 in those days went only to troops who sumved iheir wounds. One ix'ason was that the Army was afraid that it would get loo many applications. Because evei> Puiple Henil then being issued was hand-engraved wiih the ixxipienl's name, ihat fear of a heavy workload makes some sense.

A battlefield wound did not always assure a soldier of a Purple Heart. Until 1932 it was a medal for meritorious service. Over the 73 years since then, the criteria have changed signincaiUly.

MacArthur explained in 1938, however, ihat the chief reason was that Washington had established ihe award to "animate and inspire the living," and the Army did not want "to commemorate the dead." In MacAithuis view, lo make ihe Puiple Heart a "symbol of death, with its corollaiy depressive iniluences, would be lo defeat ihe piimaiy puipose of its Ix'ing." Nol until 1942 would ihe Amiy change its regulations to permil the Puiple Heart to be awarded to those killed in action—and then it allowed posthumous awards only as far back as December 7, 1941. The War Department anticipated ihat niosl applicants (or the new medal would be veterans who had been injured in WWI. As the criteria did nol restrict its award lo any paiiicular contlict, however, men who had .seized in earlier conflicts also requested it. More than 10 went to Civil War veterans wounded between 1861 and 1865. A small number were also awarded lo soldiers who had been wounded in the Indian Wai's (1861 to 1898), Spanish-American War {1898), Philippine-American War (1899-1913), ihe Bo.xer Rebellion (1900), and the punitive expedition into Mexico (1916). SEPTEMBER 2D06 MILITARY HISTOKV

47

PURPLE HEART On April 28, 1942, ihe Army revei^sed its "no posthumous award" policy, in order to recognize the sacrifice of soldiers and aimien who had lost their lives in the opening days of hostilities with Gemiany and Japan, starting with those killed in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The posthumous award of the Purple Heart was now authorized "to members of the militaiy semce who are killed in action.. .or who die as a direct result of a wound received in action against an enemy of the United States, on or after December 7, 1941," with medals to be sent to the next of kin, After the United States fbiTnaUy entered WWII on December 8, 1941, Puiple Hearts were awarded to thousands of men who had been injured or killed in combat, while slightly more than 200 were given for mentonous action. But awarding Purple Hearts tor merit came to a halt with the creation of the Legion of Merit in 1942. The principal impetus was the need to have a decoration that could be bestowed upon high-ranking friendly foreign officers for services to the Allied cause. Consequently, the top three degi ees of the Legion of Merit wei e resented for foreign recipients. American officers of lower gi^de and enlisted men could also receive the Legion of Merit without degree as a general legionnaire. In September 1942, the War Department ruled that

To correct thai shortcoming. President Kennedy signed a new executive order on April 25, 1962, expressly providing that the Puiple Heart could be awarded to any member of the U.S. armed foires wounded or killed "in any action against an enemy of the United States." But the order also provided that the Puiple Heart could be awarded to any soldier, sailor, airman or Marine who was injured "as the result of an act of any hostile foreign force." Those words not oniy covered the ongoing hostilities in Vietnam but also—the drafters of this language must have thought—fighting under cii cumstances not yet foreseen. The drafters were connect to a gi'eat extent. The expansive language pennitted the Navy to award the Purple Heart to the 33 personnel killed and 170 wounded during the Israeli attack on the spy ship Lil> eny in June 1967, and the three Marine guaixls injured in the takeover of the U.S. embassy in Tehran, Iran, in Februaiy 1979. Likewise, the "hostile foreign foree" language meant the Army could award 112 Puiple Hearts to soldiers killed or wounded in Operation Urgent Fui-y, the U.S. invasion of Grenada in 1983. Nevertheless, the BEFORE WORLD WAR II, U.S. Navy officials term "any hostile foreign force" did not anticipate two new casucared little about THE PURPLE HEART. It alty categories that had emerged was an 'Army only' medal at the time. The by the 1980s: American sei-vice personnel wounded or killed gruesome Pacific theater changed all that. while seiving on ovei^seas peacekeeping missions—as occun'ed in Lebanon in 1982—and by intemationai terrorist attacks. the Puiple Heart should only be awarded to those wounded or killed in action. The chief impetus for making further changes to the award In December 1942, President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed an criteria came when the Army pointed to four ten orist incidents executive order that, for the lii^st time, gave the Department of the in which soldici^ had been killed oi' wounded, but lor which the Navy the authority to award the Puiple Heart to sailors and Purple Heart could not be awarded: the May 1972 bombing of Marines wounded or killed in action after December 7,1941. Prior V Coips Headquaitere in Frankfurt, Gemiany; a June 1979 asto Roosevelt's action, the Puiple Heart had been an "Aimy only" sassination attempt on the supreme allied commantier. Eurojx*; awai'd—and the Navy showed little official interest in obtaining the wounding of the commander in chief, Europe, in Septemits own authority to award the Purple Heart. As hostilities in the ber 1981; and the assassination ofthe U.S. assistant army atPacific grew, however, and Navy and Marine Corps personnel suf- tache to France in Januar\' 1982. fei^d ever greater losses, the Navy revereed couree. Roosevelt's With that as background. President Reagan's executive order executive order also meant that all personnel wei e on an equal of February 23, 1984, made periect sense. As a re.sult, any solfooting when it came to the Purple Heart, as the executive order dier, sailor, airman or Marine wounded or killed after March paralleled the Army's existing award criteria for the medal. 28, 1973, while on an overseas peacekeeping mission, or as a result of an intemationai terrorist attack, mayreceivethe Puiple 'ore than 500,000 Purple Hearts were awarded to Ameri- Heart. The effective date of March 29, 1973, was chosen as a cans during WWU. Under the same awaixl criteria, thou- starting point because it was the day after the cessation of hossands more were awarded during the Korean War from tilities invoKing American forees in Vietnam, Since then, Purple 1950 to 1953. By the 1960s, however, the natui e of war- Hearts have been awarded to Americans serving as peacekeep-fare—or at least American involvement in it—had ers in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia. Cambodia, Haiti, changed. In 1959 thefii'stAmericans aiiived as part of Military Kuwait, Lebanon, Sinai, Somalia and Westem Sahara. Assistance Advisory Group in Saigon, Republic of Vietnam. As The next of kin of Army Major Randall A. Carlson, for examthose soldiei-s l:)egan suffering casualties in the early 1960s, how- ple,receiveda reti'oactively awarded Puiple Heart after Carlson ever, the Army realized that the Purple Heart could not be was killed with three other United Nations Tiuce Supei"vision awarded to them because the existing award criteria required Organization membei-s when their jeep hit a land mine near that an "enemy" inflict the wounds or death—and the Viet Cong BeiRit, Lebanon, in September 1982. Navy Lieutenant Steven J. did not qualify. Corley also received a Purple Heart after being wounded when 48 MILITARY HISTORY SEPTEMBEP 2006

Three newly awarded Purple Hearts dangle from the pockets of soldiers during a recognition ceremony at Forward Operating Base Marez in Mosul, Iraq. The Purple Heart has remained a particularly respected American military award during the years spanning Worid War II and the Iraq war because it Is earned and does not require the approval of the brass.

Ins vehicle stiuck an antitank mine in the Angkor Thom district of Cambodia in September 1993. Army Specialist Martin J. Bcgo.sh was llic (irsl soldier to receive a Purple Heart while perlomiing peacekeeping duties in the Balkans, when the vehicle in which ho was riding stiiick a land mine and be was wounded. Terrori.st-1 elated Purple Hearts have been awarded to American militaiy pei^sonnel killed or wounded in Belgium, Egypt, El Salvador. France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Honduras, italy, Lebanon, Namibia, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Saudi ,'\fabia, Spain, Turkey and tbe United Kingdom. The Army, for example, awarded 53 Piuple Hemts (including one posthumous medal) lo soidiere injured in the tenorist bombing of the LaBelle disco in West Berlin, Gemiany, in April 1986. The Navy awarded a Puiple Heart to the next of kin of MasteiChief Sam Novello wben Tuikish leftists shot him at his home ill Istanbul in Apr il 1980. A posthitmous award also went to the lumily of Captain George Tsantes, assassinated in November 1983 while riding in a car in Athens, Greece. The most recent change to the Puiple Heart occurred in No\rmlx'r 1997, when Congirss restticted its award to militar\' personnel only. That congiessiona! action grew out of complaints by the Militar>' Order of the Puiple Heart that a military award

should not be given to civilians—^wbo until that time had been eligible to receive the Purple Heart if they had been "serving with" the U.S. anned forces. Probably no more than 100 civilians had received the Purple Heart between 1932 and 1997, witb the majority going to Americans wounded in international ter'rorist attacks on U,S. facilities in Saudi Arabia in 1995 and 1996. Other than the Medal of Honor, the Ptnple Heart is pi-obahly the most widely recognized Amer"ican military award, yet lew Americans realize bow far back it dates, or how many changes it has undergone. Those changes, however, bave not affected the decoration's prestige. Part of the Ptiiplc Heart's high status among recipients and other Americans certainly is due to the beauty ol the medals design. But it seems likely tbat the decoration also is cherished because, as MacArthur recognized, it is the only combat decoration who.se award does not depend upon approval or favor irom anyone. MH Fred L. Borch retired from the Anny afler 25 years aud works iu the federal court system. He is lhe author of Kimu^c\, Short and PeaiiWixrbov and several books ou tuilitaty decorations. For further reading, try The Puiple Heart; A Histon' of Ameiica's Oldest Militarv- Decoration, hv Borch and EC. Brown. SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARV HISTORY 49

A year after the Greeks came tantalizingly closed the complefe conquest of Anatolia, a detachment of Greek cavalry charges the resurgent Turkish army to cov^r the retreat of its own forces tqward th^port of Smyrna on September 16,1922. PV.T-MANM OHill

The Battle That Made

1 Ataturk

The Battle of the Sakarya iii 1921 represented Greece's last bid to defeat the Turkish Nationalist amiy. In-the end, it came down to a fight for one mountain. BY KENNETH CLINE

^, _

SAKARYA

I

n the spring of 1921, the Greek Army of Asia Minor found itself facing a new and troubling situation. Up to that point in their 22-month-long incureion into Turkish Anatolia, the Greek troops had mostly faced iiregular forces known as chettes. An assault on the key I'ailroad center of Eskisehir in Maich, however, had run into unexpectedly strong resistance fi om well-entrenched Turkish r egulare. Then, at the end of the month, Turkish troops led by Mustafa Ismet Pasha fought tliiee Greek divisions to a standstill and forced them back in a nine-day stiuggle known as the Second Battle of Inonu. British historian Arnold J. Toynbee, who accompanied tbe 7th Division on its retreat, later described the mood of disillusionment that settled in among the Greek troops: "The men were angiy—angry at spending so mucb blood and labor in vain, but even more humiliated at a defeat that broke a long record of victory of which they had been intensely proud." The reverse at Eskisehir shocked Greek militai>' and political leaders into a momentous escalation of a war that could be described, in some sense, as an epilogue to World War I. In the wake ofthe Ottoman empire's collapse, the Supreme Allied War Council had provided naval support for Greek forces as they landed unopposed at Adrianople (Edime), Bursa and Smyrna (Izmir) in tbe late spring of 1919. The Greeks then pressed inland to Usak, and by the summer of 1920 tbey had occupied all of Thrace. On August 10, Sultan Mehmed VI Vahdettin signed the Treaty of Sevres, redircing Turkey to a small Allied(x:cupied region in tbe middle of Anatolia. Although the sultan was prepared to accept the reduction of his once sprawling Ottoman empire to impotence, a movement of officers and statesmen was not. On April 23, 1920, these "Young Turks" elected a new parliament in Ankara and mobilized a new army, determined to resist tbe Greeks—^and tbe rest ofthe Allies if necessaiy Thus by April 1921, more than two years after the guns had fallen silent on the Western Eront, Greek soldiei^ found themselves bogged down in Asiatic Turkey figlitiiig a new army under

An English historian noted that Constantine was 'the first Christian king to set foot on Anatolian soil since the Crusades/ a new leader, Mustafa Kema! Pasha, and a new creed, Turkish nationalism. And the Turks were growing stronger all tbe time. Realizing they had to move decisively to bring tbe war to a close, Greek leaders began planning for what has come lo be known as the Battle of tbe Sakaiya, a two-month campaign tbat took their army to within 35 miles of Ankara, Strategically, tbe Greeks found their April line in the Anatolian plateau untenable. The Greek forces at Usak had a direct railroad connection back to the port of Smyrna, tbeir main base in Anatolia, but Greek forces at Bursa bad to r"ely on an indirect rail connection from Smyrna to Bandirma on the Sea of Marmara, and then bad r oads fr'om Bandirma to Bursa. The Turkish lorces dug in on the plateau, by contrast, enjoyed interior lines of communication based on the rail lines from Eskisehir to Ankara, and from Eskisehir to Konya via Kutahya and Afyon. The Greek gener-ais wonied that the Tur-kish army would be able to utilize tbose interior lines to strike their exposed salients at will. Capturing Eskisehir was the key to providing the Greeks with a defensible front in western Anatolia. To make sure tbis next offensive succeeded, tbe government of King Constantine called up about 50,000 more resei-vists, l-aising the Army of Asia Minor's strength to 200,000 men, twice tbat of a year before. Colonel Edward Spencer Hoare Naime, the British military attache in Athens, inspected the Gi'eek army in early June and later declar'ed it "the most formidable force the nation had ever pul into the Held. Its mor^ale was high. Judged by Balkan standards, its stafi was capable, its discipline and oi^anization good." Naime noted problems as well, however; political turmoil in some of the commands, poor aerial reconnaissance capabilities and not enough wireless sets to maintain communication between units. By far the biggest problem, officcr unrest, had to do with the great schism in Greek politics between Royalists and supporters of foiTner prime minister Eleutherios Venizelos.

U Greek artillerynien prepare to support an infantry assault during their advance into Anatolia in August 1921. In July the Greek forces had 410 fieldpieces at their disposal, compared with only 160 for the Turks. 52 MILITARY HISTOKV SEPTEMBER 2006

ntil the November 1920 elections, the Greek aimy had been dominated by proVenizelist ofliccrs. Tben the new Royalist gover-nment in Athens began I'einstating tifficers who hadretir^edwhen Constantine lost power" to Venizelos in 1917. Lieutenant General Anastasios Papoulas, the new commander in chief in Anatolia, had r-ecently been incarcer-ated in Crete. Some of those Royalists were able, but others proved poor substitutes for the experienced Venizelist commanders they replaced. The government probably made matters wor'se by keeping many of the Venizelist officers in the aimy, often in superfluous positions, which had the unfortunate

king bore the name of the last emperor i A Byzantium, last seen fighting on the walls of Constantinople on May 29, 1453, This king, however, was no wan'ior; hc left the plans to his general staff and their implementation to PapoLilas. The plans showed imagination and vei-ve. As in March, the Greek offensive would focus on Eskisehir, the key to the Anatolian railwiiy network. A southem wing based at Usak would attack Afyon, and a noiihern wing based at Bursa would approach Eskisehir. This time, however, the weight of the contentralion would be in the south, with particular focus on Kutahya, about midway between Afyon and Eskisehir. Once Kutahya and Atyon wei"e taken, the Greeks hoped to outflank Eskisehir from the south and cut the railway link lo Ankara, trapping the Turkish forces.

I

•n early July about 126,000 Greek troops were assembled in 11 divi.sions—seven in the south at Usak As the Greek amiy made a two-pronged advance on the Sakarya River and the and four at Bursa. Facing them along the strategically vital railroad town of Eskisehir, Mustafa Kemal Pasha was forced to front were 122.000 Turks in 18 divisions. withdraw his forces-a move that ended up producing a more compact defensive front The initial Greek moves were telegraphed in advance to deceive the Turks, On July effect of inflaming the seething rivalry between the two camps 8, two divisions of the Greek Northern Force, the 3rd and the 11th, madeadisplay of advancing on the fortified lines outside as they struggled to work together. On the other hand, the Greeks, with their access to Allied Eskisehir, while the 10th and 7th (operating as the III Coips) World War 1 suiplus equipment, enjoyed a considerable ma- moved suneptitiously on Kutahya by trails passing over and to icriel advantage. By July, for example, they had accumulated the west of Uludag, a mountain that dominates the Bursa more than 1,000 tiucks to haul supplies, while the Turks had region. hardly any motor transport. The Greeks also commanded a preThai same day the 9th Division ofthe Southern Force made ponderance of field guns (410 to 160), machine gims (4,000 to a noisy move north fixjm Usak in tour elongated columns head700) and aircraft (20 to four). ing for the center of the Turkish positions at Kutahya. The real The Turkish Nationalist army had to scrounge whatever Greek punch, however, had been secretly assembled at eqtiipment remained in the Ottoman ai-senals, supplemented Dumlupinar, about 30 miles up (he railway line in the direction of Afyon. On Jirly 10, four divisions by arms and ammunition that began to arrive of this force, comprising the I and II from the now Bolshevik government in Russia corps, moved north from Dumlupinar, (45,000 rifles, 300 machine guns, nearly 100 aiming for the Iefl flank of the Turkish pofield gims—many of the latter captured from sition at Kutahya, Meanwhile the reihe Japanese in Siberia), Kemal could also mainder of the Southem Force, the 12th count on his peasant infantry to fight doggedly, and 4th divisions, began advancing on particularly in defense. Turkish advances Af\()n. k'nded to be ill-cxxii-dinated and costly, however, reflecting an inexjTerienced officer corps. And The extreme r'ight wing of the Greek deseiiion rates were high—6,000 following the advance was the fii^st to encounter resisSecond Battle of Inonu, for example. The one tance on July 12, when the I2th Division Turkish advantage was in cavalry, which was to (commanded by Pnnce Andrew, the cause constant trouble in Greek rear areas once king's younger brothei) brushed aside a the campaign shifted to the vast open spaces of small Turkish force west of Afyon, and the plateau. then began moving north to Kutahya, east ofthe railway line. The 4th Division On June 11, Constantine embaHced for Smyrna entered Afyon and beat back a weak lo take nominal command ofthe army, "the first After relinquishing command of counterattack on July 15, thereby secui"Christian king to set fcxit on Anatolian soil since Turkish forces to Kemal (right], ing the Gt^eek right flank. the Crusades," as one English historian noted. Mustafa Ismet Pasha Cleft) served The previous day, the Greeks had come It was also symbolic for the Greeks that their ably as his lieutenant. SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARV HISTORy 53

SAKARYA up against the Turkish positions at Kutahya. The I and n corps launched their major assault on the enemy left on July 15, with the 5th Division d i ^ n g deep into the Turkish positions. A fierce Turkish counleratlack tho lollowing day inflicted 1,000 casualties on the 5th Division, but the Greeks held. That same day the m Coips coming down ft'om Bursa captured the positions on the Tiu'kish right Mank, Now threatened with encij'clcmcnt, the Turks at Kutahya retired that night toward Eskisehir, which the Greek 10th Division entered on July 17. Casualties on both sides amounted to about 3,000, although the Turks also sustained sonif heaw de.sertions during the retreat from Kutahya. The Ioss of Kutahya and Afyon came as a shock to the Turkish high command. Ismet (later president and prime minister of Turkey) had concentrated the bulk of his forces at Eskisehir because that had been the focus of the Greek offensive in March. A later investigation by the Grand National Assembly found that only five of the 18 Turkish divisions saw much fighting; the rest spent most of their time in pointless marches. Now Ismet's entire left flank liad been turned, and the Greek II Corps began marching on Seyitgazi, which threatened Eskisehir's rail link to Ankara. On the day Kutahya fell, Ismet i"eceived a telegram from Mustafa Kemal, who had been monitoring events from Ankara: "If it's no trouble, I propose to set out immediately to discuss the situation with you." He amved at the Eskisehir rail station at 5 a.m, the next day An officer present at the meeting said Kemai opened the discussion by asking, "Haven't we lost the battle?" When Ismet replied that it looked that way, Kemal suggested an immediate withdrawal to the Sakar\'a River west of Ankara, but Ismet proposed a counterattack first, a plan to which Kemal assented. He then returned to Ankam. The Greek III Corps entered Eskisehir on the night of July 19, to find the Turks had completed their evacuation earlier that evening. The next day the III Coips and its two divisions (the 7th and lOth) pushed on to the hills cast of Eskisehir, which they discovered were held by Turkish troops. An attack on those heights was scheduled for July 21, with the 9th Division assigned as a reserve. Meanwhile, the Greek 1 and IT corps were approaching from the south, the n Corps on the right wing near Seyitgazi and the I Corps crossing the Turkmen Dagi range in what was now the center of the Greek position.

Mustafa Kemal Pasha asked, 'Haven't we lost the battle?' Mustafa Ismet Pasha replied that it looked that way.

Ismet's own attack of July 21 focused on the Greek left and center, hoping to cut the Greek line of communications with both Burea and Kulahya. The Greeks were ready, however, and they checked the Turkish advance all along the line, following up with a counterattack that sent their opponents retiring in disorder. Watching from tlie top of a hill. Prince Andrew described long columns of retreating Turks "raising clouds of dust crossing the plain far to the east of Eskisehir." Once again the Turkish desertion rate was high, totaling about 31,000 when combined with the earlier battle at Kutahya. Altogether the Nationalist army had lost some 40,000 men in fhe two battles, compai-ed with about 8,000 Greeks (1.491 dead, 6,454 wounded and ! 10 missing). The remaining Ttirks retired in good order toward Ankara, where the government immediately made provisions to move the capital farther east to Kayseri il that became necessaty Offices and i"ecords were sent to Kayseri, in fact, but tbe Grand National Assembly i-emained in session in Ankara, where it voted on August 5 to appoint its president, Mustafa Kemal, as commander in chief for three months. Control of the anny helped strengthen Kemai's political position at a point when he was under criticism for abandoning his counliVs most fertile tetritorv- lo ihe Greeks. One ol Kemai'sfii^stacts as commander in chief was to proclaim to the nation that the enemy would be "throttled in the inner sanctuary of the fatherland." He followed that with draconian requisitions levied on a Turkish population thai had been more or less continuously at war since 1912 (the beginning of the Balkan Wai's), commandeering nearly hiUf the available supplies of cloth, leather, flour, soap and candles, along w ith onefifth of the horses, carts and carriages. Fresh le\'ies mobilized from the provinces soon restored the army's strength to about 90,000 men, who now faced about 100,000 Greeks in western Anatolia. The Greek high command had to decide whether to rest on its laurels or press on to Ankara. The victoi\ at Eskisehii" had improved the Greeks' strategic position, though it also saddled them with even longer and more \ailnerable supply lines back to Smyrna. Yet advancing on Ankai-a risked the aiTOv's de.struction in the open steppes of Anatolia. In late July King Constantine, Prime Minister Dimitrios Gounaris, General Papoulas and ot hei" ko\ political and military figures met in Kutahya to plot their next move. It is testimony to the strong differences of opinion among those men that the orders emerging on July 28 wei'e ambiguous and indecisive, as if ti'^'ing to placate all factions. On the one hand the army was instructed to advance to the Sakarva River and, if "it meets the enemy and defeals him," Mustafa Kemal reviews his troops as the Turks regroup to continue the fight On August 5,1921, the Grand National Assembly at Ankara voted to make its to continue on to Ankara. On the other hand, if the president, Kemal, commander in chief for three months. Turkish forces retreated across the Sakarya, the MTLUARY HISTORY SEPTEMBER 200fi

which flows into the Sakaiya al a righi angle h-om ihe easl, and then the Katrandji River, which connects with the Ilicaozu, also from the east. The Turkish line, tlien, resembled a right angle, with the light Hank along the Sakar^ya and the refused left flank along the Ilicaozu and Katrandji. Kcmal later' commented that tlie pressiiiv oi the Gi eek attack on these two sides eventually forced his own front line back to the hypotenuse, producing (for him) a more compact front. |he Greeks would experience the opposite effect. Sinee the Ilicaozu and Katrandji were much shallower than the Sakarya, they became the target of the advance. But that meant sending the Greek light wing on a wide swing away from Greek troops pause beside the body of a Turk killed during tbeir niarcb on the Sakarya. The its supply deix)ts through veiy diliieult two-pronged Greek advance forced Kernel to shorten his defensive line, concentrating his country, part of which included the forces on bis more vulnerable southern flank. hinge of the great Analollan Sail Desert. Greek soldiei-s weie instmctcd to "advance or halt according The Greek advance began on August 14 in ihree columns, to the circumstances at that time." If those circumstances each comprising three divisions. Already the logistical calculus proved unfavorable, the army was to retum to Eskisehir after was wot king against the Gtx'eks. Although they had commenced louring up about 60 miles of railroad track. the campaign in July with 11 divisions, two now had to be left "What a confusion of aims is here," marveled historian behind lo guard the suppl\ lines^—the 4lh Division near Afyon Michael Llewellyn Smith in his summing up ofthe situation. and ihe 11th Division east of Bui"sa. He went on toquer>; "Was the advance on Ankara to be the final In the north, ihe III Coips proceeded along ihe eoui'se of the kn(Kk-ou[ bhnv, or simply a punitive raid?" The answer appar- Poi-suk River and Eskisehir itiil line, \^'liich paralleled each other ently depended on whether the Nationalist army would allow for 75 miles until the Poi^suk joined with the Sakana 45 miles itseli to be destroyed in the open plain, as the Greeks hoped, or west of Ankara. This foree constituted the Greek left wing, (.Mitrtneh behind ihc Sakaiya. whose job was to cover Siirihisar {a key town on the road to Although Papoulas initially opposed the campaign, he Eskisehir) before later shifting two of its three di\isions south ultimately went along wilh advoeates such as Colonel S. to support the tight wing, which comprised the I and 11 coips. Prince Andrew, now commanding the II Cotps on the far Sariyannis, the army's deputy ehief of staff, General Xenophon Stratigos, deputy chief of the general staff, and Pr ime Minister right wing, had the hardest time of it, as his men had to march (iotinaris because of the potiiical cover afforded by the July 28 through part ol the Anatolian Sail Desert under a scorching nrdei-s. As Smith pointed out in his analysis, "Papoulas allowed summer stin. He described "a waterless desert countt>, where himself lo be persuaded into launching an attack in which he all the villages were seven or eight hours apart, and their inonly half believed, and whose object was imprecisely formu- habitants had not even enough to feed themselves." lated, in the conviction lhat if the amiy ran into difficulties it By August 23, after nine days of hard marching, the Greek could simply retire with no harm done." right wing wilh seven divisions (the I and 11 coips, and most of The distance to Ankara from Eskisehir is some 120 miles by the HI Corps) was in position south of the Ilieaozu. Only the 7th the most direct rail route. The sparsely populated landscape in Division of the ITT Coips remained in the bend of the Sakarya Ix'tween is dominated by mountains to the noiihand deseitlike facing the Turkish right flank. Papottlas' original plan was lo use landscape to the south. Since an advance north of the railroad lhat division to pin down the Turks on the Sakaiya line while line would be slowed down by the mountainous teirain, the his main force outflanked the Turkish left. But he was lelying GreeLs decided to mairh through the arid region to the south, on faulty intelligence that placed the bulk of the Nationalist which was flat enough to pennit the use of motor transport. Bul army farther noilh around the railroad depot at Polatli. In lael, 45 miles west of Ankara lies the Sakaiya River, behind whose Kemal had expected the main Greek effort to come from the sleep banks the Nationalist army, under Kemals pereonal di- south and had the bulk of his forces along the Ilicaozu. rection, was digging in. The battle tcwk place on the Haymana Plateau, a rolling plain The natural banner afforded by the Sakarya, however, ends some 3,000 feet above sea level that is dominated by several iibout 25 miles south of the rail line, where the liver veers off mountains {dag.-i), the most prominent being Mangal. Yildiz, to the west, From thai point south there is only open ground. Ardiz and Cal. The Greeks achieved an important success on So the Nationalists placed their left flank on the Ilicaozu Rivei; the first day when the T Corps captured Mangaf Dag south of

T!

SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 55

SAKARYA the Uicaozu against light opposition. A furious Kemal threatened his commanders with couii-martial if (hey failed to hold fast to their new positions behind the Uicaozu. Indeed, what had been a campaign of movement now devolved into a grinding slugfest, as the Turks fought back from every hill and ridgeline. Papoulas' plan of outflanking the Turkish left proved beyond the capabilities of Andrew's II Corgis, which got held up in a mountainotis area knowTi as the Kale Grotto. His strategy then shifted to an attack up the middle, led by the I and III coips. Andrew observed that the entire Greek advance soon became fragmented in the mountainous, broken ten^ain, with units often unable to support each other. He noted, "The battle had been transformed into local engagements, each corps fighting on its own account, and it often happened that one corps found itself involved in a fierce struggle while its neighbor was idle." In hindsight, Papoulas probably stripped too many troops from his left wing, which could have achieved more than it did. Since the Turks had likewise shifted so many men to the south, the Greek 7th Division managed to cross the Sakaiya with suiprising ea.se to press on the main Turkish supply depot at Polatli. The 7th eventuaDy retmited with the III Corps, which captured Yildiz Dag north of the Ilicaozu on August 30. The I Corps in the center captured Ardiz Dag on that same day and pressed on to Cal Dag, an alarming development for

'The more days with death and distress/ wrote Nikos Vasilikos, 'the faster our hopes evaporate for quick entry into Ankara.'

learned of it, "He fumed, swore, walked up and down, talked loudly.. .and toimented himself with indecision as to whcthei' he should order the i etreat or not." This is the "what if?" moment of the campaign. What if Kemal had lost heart, or if Papoulas had been able to throw a fresh division into the battle? Only 35 miles separated Cal Dag fi'om the outskirts of Ankara. But Papoulas cotild not exploit the victoi-y. The 10th Division tried to advance past Cai Dag, btit was pushed back on September 7. Heavy losses, lack of supplies and general exhaustion had all taken their toll on the Greeks while Turkish cavalrv' was wreaking havoc in their rear ai^'as, nearly capturing Papoulas himseli on August 26. Panteles Priniotakis, a lieutenant in the 3rd Division, recalled how food supplies started mnning low by mid-August because all the trucks were being used to transpoi't ammunition and wounded. His regiment, the 6th Infantiy was ordered to repair a half-ruined watermill to make flour out of whatever grain could be confiscated in the vicinity. "I will never Ibrget," Priniotakis wrote, "how the supply officer...found three sacks of cement, which he mistook for llour, and transported them to regimental headquarters, where his gaffe was discovered." "Hunger is constant," wnHe Nikos Vasilikos, an officer of the 7th Division on September 3. "My strength has been sapped by the day's heat, the nights unbearable cold, pitiless thirst, and annoying lice that gi'eedily suck the little bitxxl I have left... .The more the days go by with more death and distress, the quicker otn hopes evaporate for a quick entry into Ankara." Papoulas sought guidance from his government on whether to continue. An aborted attempt lo shorten the front by shifting the II Coips to the left Greek infantry assault a Turkish position. Stiffening resistance finally caused flank spread confusion in the Greek i^anks, where it a frustrated Lt. Gen. Anastasios Papoulas to abandon his offensive on was perceived as a withdrawal; Prince Andrew's poSeptember 11,1921 -forfeiting Greece's last chance to win the war. litical enemies later used this incident to blame him for the defeat. As the Greeks hesitated, the Turks counterattacked and recaptured Cal Dag on Septhe Turks. Cal Dag rose 1,000 feet from the plain and com- tember 8. They also began exerting pressure on the III Coips. manded the battlefield, but was hard to defend because of the which was protecting the thinly held Greek left flank. On Seplack ot covering vegetation (Cal means "bare, stony" in Turk- tember 9, the Greek general staff announced it had decided, loi ish.) On Augtist 26, Ismet actually proposed a retreat to a new the time being, "to suspend the effort of the Greek armies." That line, but Mustafa Fevzi, the chief of the general staff, decided to same day, Kemal confidently moved his headquarters from hold the Cal Dag position and brought in reinforcements fi"om Alagoz to Polatli, closer to the front, signaling his own growing the northern flank. Kemal continued to demand that every piece confidence. of ground be defended; he nonetheless ordered work to begin Papoulas finally threw in the towel on September 11, orderon a new defensive line on the outskirts of Ankara, whose citi- ing all three arniy corps back across the Sakarya. King Conzens cotild hear the distant artillery. stantine's official proclamation assured the aimy thai "the work The climax came on September 2. when the 2nd Division of you have done so far is sufficient for our purposes." But there the Greek I Corps took the eastern slope of Cal Dag; the 10th was no disguising the fact that Greece had just lost its best Division of the III Coips took the western side the next day. chance to win the war. Ismet later appraised Papoulas as a comTurkish journalist Halide Edip recalled that when Kemal petent commander but overly prone to discouragement when - / • - • •

56 MILITARV HISTORV SEPTEMBER 2006

A propaganda illustration shows Kemal leading the Turkish aniiy-aided by all four of its aircrafl-to victory in 1922. Commanding Ifie forces that stole the initiative from the Greeks at Sakarya strengthened Kenial's power, both political and military.

the strategic initiative, never to regain it. The slopes of Cal Dag turned out to be the high-water mark of their Anatolian adventure. Although the war was to continue lor another 12 months, he withdrawal could have been a disaster. Prince Andrew the Greek amiy would never mount another majoi- offensive. The Turkish Nationalists, however, were revitalized. In the aiwas hon ified to find retreating Greek troops tangled up with their iranspoil columns at the river crossings and termath ot the battie, Mustafa Kemal was able to declare a gensome units wandering about forlornly on the other side. If the eral mobilization, a step he had never fett politically strong Turks liad brought up machine guns to their side of the river, enough to take before. The Grand National Assembly also pr-ohe wiote, 'the destiiiction would have been utter and complete." moted him to mai^shal and gave him the honorai'y title ot ^azi, The only thing that saved the Greeks was the nearly equal ex- which signified a heroic Islamic wariioi. He would ullimately haustion on the Turkish side. By the time the Turkish pursuit use that militaiy and political capital to modernize his counliy lx'gan on September 13, there were no more Greeks east of the under the adopted sobriquet of Ataturk (father of the Turks). On the Greek side, Papoulas hung on as commander in chiet Sakai\a. flamed only by cavalry, the Anny of Asia Minor straggled back into its defensive line east of Eskisehir on the 22nd. until May 1922, when he lesigned and was replaced by General fn strictly militaiy tetiris, the Battle of the Sakai^ya eould be Geoj^ios Hatzianestis, on whose hapless head the deluge would described as a draw. By the standards of major European wai^s, fall. The deluge ended wfith the signing of the Treaty ol Lausanne ca.sualties were low and relatively equal: 3,700 dead and 18,000 on July 24, 1923, with Greece forced to accept the Marliza River wounded for the Turks, compared with 4,000 and 19,000 as the western boundary of a new Turkish Republic. MH Greeks, although the Greeks also left behind nearly 15,000 prisoners and deserters, compared with only 1,000 for the Turks. First-lime contributor l^nneth Cline writes from Atlanta, Ga. For The Greeks' retreat left them in a stronger strategic position, further reading, he recommends: Ionian Vision: Gaxxe in Asia since they still controlled the Eskisehir-Alyon rail line. Minor, 1919-1922, by Michael Llewellyn Sniilh; and Ataturk: The Yet like the Germans at Kursk in 1943, the Greeks had lost Biography of the Founder of Modem Turkey, by Andrew Mango. things didn't go as planned. "Papoulas avoided disaster," he said, adding, "But he never won a battle."

T

SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 57

REVIEWS Before Benedict Arnold the traitor, there was Benedict Arnold the patriot. Bv Steven Martinovich

Although the expedition was a specIraitor h\ Anieticaiis today, prior to Sep- tacular failure, Desjardin argues that it tember 1780 Benedict Arnold was justly showed the Amerieaas they could "oi"gahailed as an American hero. Two of the nize, endure and tight, even on the scale reasons ar-e explored in two recent books. of a coordinated land-and-sea campaign Arnold's first claim to fame is the sub- against enemy strongholds." The epilogue ject of Thomas Desjardin's Through a contains a compelling "What if?" exercise Howling Wilderness: Benedict Arnold's that is as interesting as Arnold's stoty. The March lo Quebec, 1775 (St. MaHin's Pi-ess,author posits lhat the failure lo take New York, 2006, $24,95). The plan was Quebec may have been a blessing in dissimple; While Brig. Gen. Richard Mont- guise. gomei>' attacked Montieal from the west, Whereas Desjardin focuses solely on Colonel Arnold was lo lake his force up the invasion of Quebec, James Nelson's ihrough Maine and attack Quebec City gripping Benedict Arnold's Navy: The irom the south. If the plan was success- Ragtag Fleet Thai Lost the Battle of Lake tul, Quebec would lea\e the British fold. Champlain but Won the A)neric(in RevoThe plan was simple, the execution far lution {International Marine/Ragged irom it. Arnold's men would have to Mountain Press, Camden, Maine, 2006, march through extraordinarily difficult $24.95) chronicles Arnold's career from tenain. Unaware that the march was ac- the capture of Fort Tieonderoga through tually twice as long as was shown on his the subsequenl naval battle on Lake maps, Arnold left Massachusetts with in- Champlain. At the stall ofthe rebellion, adequate supplies. Poor weather made Arnold was dispatched to grab control of navigating up the Kennebec River diffi- Fort Tieonderoga from the British and cult, and a third ol his force deserted with send its cannons to aid in the siege of Boston. While the mission was a sueeess, badly needed provisions. The expedition gradually became a Arnold was hamstrung by infighting and deatii marcii as Arnolci's soidiei^s ap- a lack of resoitrces. Arnold then hatched the plan to invade proaehed Quebec. There was no relief until they reached Quebec and received Quebec. While Desjardin argues that the invasion came within a hair of success, aid from the local population. After Arnold combined his battered Nelson believes that onee surprise was force with Montgomery's, the Americans lost, the weakened American force's prepared to attack Ouebee City. Although prospects disappeaied. Benedict Amold's Navy hits its stride imdennanned, the British held the upper hand thanks to their extensive prepara- when ATTiold, after recovering from the tions. The result was that Montgomeiy wounds he suffered at Quebec, retunis to was killed, Arnold wounded and much of Lake Champlain. He quickly realizes that the British will be sending men and ships the American force captured. down the lake in an effort to eut the colonies in half. He orders American To see these reviews and hundreds more forces to begin constnicting naval \ essels hy leading authorities, go to our new to halt the invasion. hook re\iew section at The odds, however, were heavily www.thchistorynet.com/reviews stacked against the Americans. The Thel-listoryNet.com British weren't short of trained sailoi^s to man the fleet ihev were assembling al the THOUGH JUSTIFIABLY CONSIDERED a

mM NeJiun ;> • niniliT both of h» pchud • — PATRICK O'BRIAN, lultiur of.4

BENEDICT ARNOLD'S r NAVY eet (hat Lost the Battle of l.ake Chninplain bul Won (he Amsriean RevoKilion

JAMES L. NELSON other end ofthe lake. The battle off Valeour Island on October ! 1, 1776, was piedictably a disaster for the Americans. Although Arnold had the advantage of picking the place to fight and the fleet fought ferociously, his ships were overmatched. The scene was set ior a massive invasion from the north. That invasion finally eame in 1777 under Lt. Gen. John Burgovne. Sweeping down Lake Champlain. Burgovne aimed his forces in a direct line Ior Albany. Qnce again, however, Arnold stepped into the breach to halt the danger to the colonies. On his own initiative at the Battle ol Saratoga, he rallied the faltering American lines. The battle ended with a large British army suirendering to the Americans for the iii^st time. While the Battle of Lake Champlain was a defeat for the Americans, Nelson points out thai by dekning the British advance, it gave the United States time In build a peiTiianent atmy. rather than relying on ad hoc militia units. Though the SEPTEMBER 20CI6 M I L I T A R Y H I S T O R Y 59

REVIEWS

to summarize the generals life and exploits in a manner that balances his perAmericans wotild continue to suffer set- sonal foibles against his genuine achievebacks in battle, an invasion from the ments—as well he should, given that this north Wcis now no longer a wony If the dichotomy is integral to the Patton Americans couldn't utilize Quebec in legend. Neither Axelrod nor series editor their fight, then neither could the British. General Wesley K. Clark cares to dwell on Both books chronicle Arnold's original legends, however, instead exploring the strong commitment to independence. actions and principles that made—and For yeai-s he suffered alongside his men, still make—^Patton relevant. displayed extraordinary personal courage The final chapter of Axelrod's biograand contributed greatly to the American phy focuses on all the techniques, lessons catise. That doesn't erase the stain of trea- and examples set by Patton that still son, but Desjaidin and Nelson prove that apply. For example, the author writes in a measure of respect is still due him. regard to his influence on tactics; "If all great generals project an effective comPatton: A Biography, by Alan Axelrod, mand presence, mo.st are also significant Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2006, strategists. This was not the case with George S, Patton, a fact his seniors rec$21.95. None too surprisingly, when Palgi"ave ognized." Patton, he points out, was usuMacmillan launched a "Great Generals ally content to play a subordinate role in Series" of short biographies, number one executing the strategy set by othei-s, proon its list of subjects was George S. vided he be given a free hand in doing so: Patton Jr., who in spite of the impolitic "He believed that brilliant strategy could acts and statements that denied him the never compensate for inadequate tacseniority he craved, still managed to tics.... Conversely, he sincerely believed become one of the most influential mili- that good tactics, skillfully and violently tary leaders in 20th-century American executed, could even compensate for liistoty. Alan Axelrod, who also authored poor strategy." Even so, Axelrod acthe book Patron on Leadership, manages knowledges the fact that while Patton's

emphasis on the importance of time in combat is more tactically important than ever in the high-tech 21 st century, the insurgency against American forces in Irati since 2003 reveals its strategic limiiutions: "Patton's tactics were developed on and for vast battlefield spaces occupied by large conventional armies. They nvv not eitective in asymmetrical warfare scenarios, in which time, which a determined insurgency can draw out almosi indefinitely, becomes for the much lai^ei invading force an enemy rather than an ally." whatever Patton's limitations—which are still a peipetual source of lively debate—General Dwight D. Eisenhower, most notably, recognized his capabilities and did his utmost to keep the controversial commander in a position to pla\' the instrumental role he took in the Alliod victoi-y in Europe in World War II. His concepts of training, combined aims tactics and leadership—still applicable In any anny—were aptly summed up by one of his lieutenants in the Third Army, John Ingles, who said that "we knew what General Patton expected us to do, and we be lieved that if we did it we would win." Jon Guttman

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REVIEWS Sniper on the Eastern Front: Tlte Memoirs ofSepp Atlerberget\ Kinghts Cross, by Albrecht Wacker, Pen and Sword Books, Bamsley, South Yorkshire, England, 2006, $34.95. The Easletn Ftont dining World War II was a great morass into which milhons of men, both Gennans and Russians, disappeared. Albrecht Wackers book Sniper on the Eastern From is the story of 19year-old Josef "Sepp" Allerbetger, a Wehmiachl machine-gunner lut'ned sniper who survived the German army's fighting retreat at the end of the war. Wacker's nairative. based upon Alletberger's war notebook and interviews with the man himself, is harrowing and intense. Not for the faint of heart, Allerberger's book is painful but in-esistible in the way its author has put his impressions lo paper. His vivid, disturbing descriptions of the misery and horror of the Eastern Front leave a lasting impression. Throughout the bfK)k, Wacket s waiting style, combined with Allerberger's experiences, keep the reader in suspense. Although many of his experiences and emotions can be attributed to countless soldiers in countless wars, Allerberger fought under the added stigma of the lone sniper, hitnted more so than othei's, condemned to a honific death if he were to be taken alive and his specialty discovered. For any student of military histoiy, Sniper on llie Easteni Front is a poweiful book, and quite simply a "must read." Nicholas E. Efstathiou

is considerable historical research behiitd these games. The characters all featua* authentic period uniforms and weapons, and in some cases the battlefields themselves have been taken straight irom pictures and tnaps of WWII battle sites. The historical context is both more ol> vious and cotnpelling in Brothers in Amjs: Earned in Blood. In this title the players character and squad mates are membci-s of the lOlst Airborne Division's 502nd Parachute lnfanli-y Regiment. The characters are fictional, but the events and battles they face are drawn from incidents found in the 502nd PIR's logs in U,S. Army archives. Earned in Blood has a sen.se of dt-ama, too, as the firefights are flashbacks that tell the stoi\ of a character being interviewed by real-life Army historian Colonel S,L.A. Mai-shall, Marshall's wiitings would later genet ate sotnc controversy, but the game's use of him as an interviewer in WWII is reasonable and a clever way to tell the story Earned m Blood is otheiAvise similar to its predecessor. Brothers in Anns: The Road to Hill 30. It does a respectable Job of illtisttaling fire and movement tactics at the squad level in the hedget^ows of France. Call of Duly 2 is likewise vei^ similar to Call of Duly, although its appt oach is different from that oi Brothers i}i Anns. Call

of Duty 2 presents myriad experiences ot WWIT. Each mission plays like the action sequence from a war tiiovie, filled with dramatic moments and spectacular sights. !n the British campaign, your alter' ego in the game fights gmeling battles in North Africa, while his Rtrssian counterpatt endures tough city fighting and infantry vs. tank encounters. The American missions include the U.S. Ar my Ranger Call of Duty 2 and Brothers in Arms: assault on Pointe du Hoc. Although the Earned in Blood trappings of the game are realistic, the Call of Duly 2 ($50, requires Microsoft play style is clearly geared to make the Windows 2000/XP, 1.4Ghz processor, player feel more heroic, and the empha256MB RAM, 8X CD drive, 4GB hard sis on teamwork is more superficial thnn drive space, 64MB 3D video card, Activi- substantial. It's probably a more cnjuysion. www.activision.com) and Brothers able experience for action fans than ill Ann.s: Earned iu Blood ($30, requires Eanu'd in Blood but isn't without historiMicrosoft Windows 2000/XP, IGhz cal value. A Call of Duly 2 Collectors Ediprocessor, 512MB RAM, 8X CD drive. tion DVD is available in some otrtlets for 3.5GB hiu d dtive space, 32MB 3D video the same price as the basic game and incard, Ubisoft, www.ubisoft.com) are the cludes the game and extra documenlaiies sequels to the debut entries in each of the and veteran interviews. respected World War II first-person Both titles are worthy advances for the shooter games. In what is considered the first-pereon shooter genre. Call of Duty 2 most visceral genre in entertainment soft- has a T rating for Teen (blood, mild lanware, these shootei^s let the player expe- guage and violence), and Eanied in Blood lience through the eyes and ears what is t ated M for MatuR* (blotKl and gorY, intheir alter ego in the game experiences. tense violence and strong language). To the software developers' credit, there Bernard Dy

P E R S P E C T I V E S Neville Chamberlain's appeasement policy as the cause of World War II is one of history's myths. By James Levy

AS ANY HISTORIAN KNOWS, ther e are

many dtibious assetiions in mainstream histor ical and foreign policy discourse. Few, however, are as dubious yet accepted as the conceit that appeasement caused or helped cause World War II. This moldy little chestnut has gone from an assettion to common wi.sdom to dogma with little challenge. It was one of those claims that evervbody across the political spccttTim could endorse. EmbatTassL-d by getting whipped by the Germans in 1940? Blame appeiiscment. Want to stand up to the "red menace" during the Cold War? Say that your enemies who seek peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union are pr'actitioners of the "failed policy of ap|>easement." Care to trash the inter-war British Conservative Party? Wheel out appeasement as exhibit "A." Center, right and left could all agree that appeasement had been a bad thing, although it was always somebody else's fault that it existed, and no coherent altctiiative was ever mentioned. Appeasement's popularity and rational aspects forgotten, the whole mess of the 1930s could be pinned on the winged collar of a dead man—Piime Minister Neville Chamberlain, who died in 1940— and safely anathematized. However, the contention that appeasetnent led to, or caused, Worid War II is built on military and moral sand. It is a pious fiction that dccsn't hold up under scmtiny. I he strategic case for appeasement was and is tock solid. World War I and the Great Depression had taken a drastic toll on British and French military strength. Their" finances were strained to the point where Britain was forced off the gold standard in 1931. Add to this the erosion of Btitain's Victorian industrial infrastiiictur-e, and the loss of revenue from shipping and insurance as world tr"ade tanked after 1929, and you've got a fair picture of the deep strategic weaknesses

with which British military and political leaders wiestled in the 1930s, American neutrality laws, which closed American capital markets to waning states, left the British certain that the next war would have to be financed wholly by the British taxpayer This was not the btoadest base on which to constnjct a global militate machine. After 1931 Britain enjoyed no mar-gin for eiror in the timing and pace of any future rearmament program. Its stored assets of gold and for eign cuirency could not be squandered, leaving nothing to support the state once war came. Watcould not be initiated as a choice or an indulgence^t had to be invoked only in a vital matter of national life or death. British strategy was hobbled by the need to counter thr-ee potential enemies— Germany, Italy and Japan—in three widely separated theaters of oper-ation; Western Eitrope and the Atlantic, the

Meditetranean and the Far East. Any one, or combination of the three, could strike in conjunction or in sequence. The British chiefs of staff were adatnant in insisting that they could never' light all three successfully at the same time. Therefore they wanted a robust rearTnament program and a serious effort to limit the ntimbcr of their potential enemies. By 1937, they had a r^annament prx>gram underway. In the meantime, the militai-y in Britain backed Chamlx'iiain and appeasement to the hill as the only sound approach to weathering the storm until British diplomacy could be backed by muscle. If war- came, the British expected to fight it on the seas and in the air They fervently wished that France would do most of the fighting (and by implication the dying) on land. This did not appeal much to the Fr-ench, who wanted a .strxmg continental commitment of British troops.

Retrospectively maligned for the Munich agreement, Neville Chamberlain Cleft) may have had little choice in at least postponing the threat Adolf Hitler posed in 1938. SEPTEMBER 2006 MIUTARV IHSTORY 65

AMERICAN H ISTORY

Magazine presents LINCOLN AND LEE AT ANTIETAM: Tlie Cost of Freedom Lincoln needs a victory in order to issue the KmiuicipLttion Proclamation and end s!avei7 in the South. But Rohert E. Lee has other plans—invade the North. When Lee's strateg)' falls into the hands of the Union Army, the result is the single bloodiest day in .\mericaii histoiy at the Battle of Antictaiii In Sharpsburg, Mar\'l;ind. Told hy Ronald F. Ma.\\veli. % minutes. DVD, Historical insight provided by: James M. McPherson, Princeton University; Pulitzer Prize winning author of Battle Cr\ of Treedoni and (Irossroads of Freedom: Antietam • Allen C. Guelzo. Gettysburg College. America's only repeat winner of the Lincoln Prize; .Nominated by President George W. Bush to the National Council ofthe Humanities • Dennis E. Frje, National Park Service (NPS) Historian at Harpers Ferry, autbor of Antietam Revealed and the associate producer of Gods and Generals • Patrick Faici, actor/performing historian portrays General Ambrose Hill at .Antietam • Paul V. Chiles, National Parks Service (NPS) Historian al Antietitm National Battlefield Park • Features Stiuiley Wernz, President of tbe Association of Lincoln Presenters, as Ahrabam Lincoln ;md Benjamin Black as Genenil Rohert \l IAX. 1TEM:CALD $ 2 4 . 9 5 FREE SHIPPING To order

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PERSPECTIVES but they had no choice. They needed Britain badly if they were to liave any hope against Germany in a replay of World War I. In any case, Allied strategy implicitly rested on a defensive stance on land while Britain instituted a naval blockade and strategic bombing to weaken Germany. The World War I formula would be repeated, but this time without the suicidal early offensives such as Loos and the Somme. The steady, patient mobilization of British and French imperial and financial strength would be used to exploit Gennan weaknesses in money and natural resources until Adolf Hitler's Germany, like the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II, collapsed from witliin. For France, the realit\' of Gcrnian numerical and industrial superiority would not go away. Because France was incapable of seeming either British or American gitarantees of support if attacked again by Getmany, the French logically opted for a defensive strateg>'. To protect the eastern frontier and free up troops for a likely Gennan tlinist through Belgium, France built the Maginot Line. Like Britain, France expected the next world war to be a multiyear slugging match, so doctrine and training were adjusted accordingly. Unlike in 1914-18, French generals decided to let the Geimans hammer their heads against strong Allied defenses. French armies would be wedded to the defensive, and would attack carefully and methodically only when great materiel advantage had been massed at a nan ow point of attack. There would be no more heroic bayonet charges like the ones that wrecked the French aimy in 1914-1917. Unfortunately for Britain and France, the logic of Allied strategy precluded any preemptive strikes against Geimany, even if the popular will existed for such an action, which it never did. At no time from 1936 to 1939 did Britain or France possess oflensive strike forces capable of dealing a decisive blow against Nazi Germany. The muscle simply was not there. Then too, the hon-or of 1914-18. with more than 700,000 British and 1.4 million French dead, made instigating a new war virtually impossible for the democracies. Nobody in his or her right mind wanted a repeat of World War I, and nobody could imagine that a hiiuve war would be in any way less bloody and destiaictive than the last one. The Allies expected that if war came (and they hoped it would not), Germany would start it,

and tbe Allies would have to plan some way of winning it. Both Britain ami France prepared for a long-war scenario that promised them the best chance of winning. Britain did this by privileging the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force (RAF). Those were its best tools and promised good results at a reduced cost in blood compared with raising a big arniy for a renewed slugging match on a levivified Westem Front, it also allowed Britain to retain the small, volunteei' professional army best suited to policing its empire. The result of those choices was a very small army widely dispei-sed. When Hitler moved into the Rhineland in 1936, the British amiy had on hand a field force in the United Kingdom of only two constituted infantry divisions. Even in 1936 Germany could handle such a force. France depended on a large conscript aiTny of shorl-temi citizen soldiei^s who were best suited to manning the defenses of the frontiei-s. If u-ar came, France intended to let the Germans charge heatllong into machine guns, artillery and the Maginot forts, preserving its strength and training troops for the final push against a weakened and exhausted Gennany The paper amiies the anti-appeasement advocates imagine "stopping" Hitler in 1936 or 1938 are fantasies, completely divorcetl from Allied military doctrine, planning and force stmcture, not to mention political reality and public mor'ale. They aw a historical constrxict intended to buttress a policy of aggressive, preemptive war that was not possible at that time.

MORAL CLAIMS against appeasement arc predicated on two claims—that appeasement led to war' by failing to stop Hitler, and that it somehow abetted the Holocaust. Let's look at each claim in tum. As we have seen, neither Britain nor France was materially or psychologically prepared to fight in 1936-38 because of the trauma of World War I, its economic lallout and the damage done by the Ga'ai Depression. Despite major efforts, neither power was ready in 1939, although tbey were closer and were finally sav\y about Ger'many's longer-ter'm intentions. The claim that Hitler could have been stopped rests on tbe sbaky foundation of believing that earlier r'eamiament would have deteired him, and that going to war in 1936 or 1938 would have been somehow more morally upright than waiting until 1939. Both points can be debated, especially the latter, which hinges on mor'al claims that are in the end subjective

and/oi- cultLirally determined. A Quaker, an Anglican and a Jew could have totally legitimate yet completely diiTen^nt stances on when or if war was justified. Nevertlicles.s, the moral case against appeasement is weak, hi the tii-st instance, there is no evidence that Hitler could have been detened from his coLii^se toward war no matter how much the Allies spent on reaiTiiament. By 1939 the British and French were together outbuilding the Germans in every weapons system (tanks, artillery, machine gims, warships, fighters) save bombers, yet Hitler kept pushing on lhe Danzig question. His selfaggrandizing foreign policy was at its heart in-ational, so it makes little sense to say that he could have heen dcteired if the British and French had thrown more money at the problem. That the Allies should have gone to war cailier flies in the face of all the evidence (if their i-eal-world strategy, doctrine and lorce structure. It ignores public opinion aiid the real human concern of Chamberlain that tlie next war would be a bloodbath (it turned out to be just that) and that the onus for starting such a terrible war should not rest on Britain but on the aggressors. Unleashing a war that would kill millions needed one big provocation. And the experience of 1939-40 indicates that an earlier iTish to war would not ha\e gone any better for the Allies, who were even less well prepared for it before then. Unless one feels that that the gesture of going to war was more important than the reality of beating Hitler, it doesn't make much sense to say that the Biitish and French should have tried to stop Hitler earlier than they did. Since nothing approaching the bloodletting of lhe Eiusalzgrtippcn or the death camps had yet emei"ged, no incident before the invasion of Poland morally compelled the Alhes to take action against Nazi Germany. THIS BRINGS US TO the issue of how. if at all appeasement abetted the Holocaust. It is a sticky one and must be carefully considered. As we look closer we will see that such claims rest on weak as.sumptions: that Chamberlain, Edouard Daladier and other Allied leaders knew the Nazi "Final Solution" was coming and still did nothing; that the Allies could haw beaten Hitler and nipped his genocidal ambitions in the bud. The first cbim is. frankly, a ridiculous slur against Chamberlain and fails logically because it leads histon backward and assumes a

prescience Chamberlain didn't have. Because the Holocaust happened doesn't mean that people living bcfoie it knew it would happen. We know it did happen, but to blame those who did not and couki Military & Civilian Decorations Atlantic & Medais not have predicted it is iiTational. Such Crossroads, Inc. Uniforms & Field Gear claims aix* always ex post facto assertions P.O.BoxiW-HH Documented Award Groups Tenafiy, NJ 07670 and never based on documents Irom the Military Badges & Insignia Phone: (201) 567-8717 Historical Documents time. They condemn a man for not knowFax:(201)567-6855 Reference Books ing about actions that would only maniE-mail: All major credit cards accepted sales@CollectRu5siacom fest themselves after his death. Worse, Large assortment S tiesl prices. they cloud an issue that should be crystal Satistaction Guaranteed'. Dealer inquiries welcome. clear: who was responsible for the HoloVisit us on ttie web caust. One thing is for sure: It wasn't Neville Chamberlain. I will go further. Those who associate All ofthe guts, glory, and valor, appeasement with the Holocaust must ...In miniatuni answer this question: Would the Jews of * Metal Toy Soldiers * Plastic Toy Soldiers Europe have been saler or in greater * 12"Action Figures danger if war had come earlier? The * Wargaming * M o d e l Kits answer is, they would have been safer * Paints & Supplies only if the British and the French could * Diorama & Scenic Materials have quickly and decisively beaten Nazi * Military Books Geimany. But they couldn't. In fact, it was & Publications under cover of war that the genocide took place, not before it. The vast majority of its victims lived in countries only accestmr Tel: 1-781-321-8855 sible to the Nazi killing machine through bv Soldier a Hobby Shop' E: mattft^hobbybun ker.com war and conquest. So marching off to WWW. hobby bunker.cotn war in 1938 would have done nothing to Hobby Bunker Inc 33 Exchange St Maiden, MA 02148 help avert the Holocaust. The Holocaust was caused by Nazi ideology, the German HistorL) Live state apparatus, early Gemian victories that exposed the victims to the machin- FVoduction of Napoleonic reproductions ery of mass murder, and widespread, active collaboration and collusion , .iewelru, Medals, throughout Europe, not by appeasement. V'id«xs. L:;ig!e6, Hags, Prints, The diplomatic dance that we now call appeasement failed, but it was a damned Nutcroclcers, Ospreu bcxiks sight bottei' than the alternatives available .See our w<.jrlc!wid\0 faces. World War Tl happened because orilrne o r send S^.OO Hitler was wedded to an in-ational coui"se of unlimited expansion. He imagined that somehow his relatively small and reDID YOU KNOW I.M.A. SUPPLIED THE source-poor nation could one day rule the EQUIPMENT USED IN "SAVING PRIVATE RYAN-?... world, or at least the Eurasian landmass. .,but that's just the beginning. • We have the worlds largest In that mad dream he could neither be selection of hard to find dissuaded by compromise nor deterred cottectibles at great prices! Mosi of our materials come by reamiament. As Marxist historian Eric dirtctly front Europe which is Hobshawm onee pointed out, the causes why so much ofthe merchandise we offer IS unavailable elsewhere. of World War I are complex; the cause oi • Visit our web iite to view our full World War 11 was Adolf Hitler. We do hisproduct selection, complete with color photos. Call or visit our web toi-y. Chamberlain and appeasement a I site to receive a copy of out print disservice when we tiy to apportion any catalog, FREE, featuring our unique cartoon itiusttations. part of the blame for World War Ii to WW w. I m a-u s a .com anyone but Hitler. Diplomacy doesn't 1000 VALLEY ROAD • GILLETTE, NJ 07933 cause wars—men who substitute vio908-903-1200 • FAX 908-903-0106 www.gerinanwor1dwars.com or wvrw.atlantacutlery.com lence for diplomacy do. MH

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WEAPONRY The phalanx dominated Greek warfare for three centuries, but fell before combined-arms forces, By Brian Todd Carey

SOMETIME IN THE MIDDLE OF the 7th

ceniun BC, a new style of warfar-e appeaitd in ancient Gr-eece, requiring a foot soldier to forsake acts of individual valor in favor of standing shoulder-to-shoulder with his eomr"adcs in a battle square. This square, called a phalanx, distinguished itself from other heavy infantry fotmations in the Near East in that it would evolve into a well-articulated tactieal system capable of decisive offensive tactieal mobility. How and when the change in emphasis from individtial to collective action on the Greek battlefield took place is still a matter of debate. During the Bronze Age and before the invention of the phalanx, Greek fighting had been dominated by aristocratic wairiors who reveled in individual duels with their adversaries, in a manner immotialized by Homer in Pie Iliad. Even as Homer was conceiving his epic, a shift in warfare was taking place. The revival of trade routes and the beginning of colonization in the 8th and 7th centuries BC led to economic prosperity in Greek mother-cities such as Corinth, Thebes and Athens. That piospedty allowed for the democratization of war. Iron had replaced bronze as the metal of choice for weapons, allowing an increasing number of faiTner-soldiers to equip themselves with helmets, armor, greaves and shields, and thus take their place in ihc battle line. The increasing number of armored hea\'y infantry was probably a major factor in the decline of individual warfare, and the Greek arl of war began to change to accommodate larger- number's of soldiers. How the ancient Greeks utilized those now developments in warfare is a subject of great interest and heated debate in militai"> history'. It is universally recognized that the new Greek tactical system 1 equired certain pr'econditions if battle was to take place. In mountainous

Greece, each of the opposing phalanxes sought level ground. Normally the defender enjoyed a significant advantage by secLiring a site on a slight slope so that the attacker would have to march and fight uphill. The uphill advantage, however, was often so gr eat that attackers usually declined to engage, avoiding the defenders' army and destroying their crops until

University of CaliforTiia at Santa has taken another look at the primary sourees and has come to a different conclusion. The new inteipretation describes phalanx battle as the collision of two battle squares in which, as the 4th-century BC Spar'tan soldier- and historian Xenophon described it, "crashing their shields together, they shoved, fought, slew

At Rataea in A79 BC, Persians fall back before an impenetrable phalanx ol shields and spears-a tactic their Greek enemies had perfected in the course of f igbting each other.

they were compelled to give up their advantageous position. To avoid such collateral damage to the civilian populace, adversaries fought by mutual consent on open level ground. Since the late !9th century AD, historians have debated how the Greek armies actually joined battle. The old school of thought advocated an orderly advance into battle in which front rank fought h"ont rank, with soldiers in the second rank waiting tofillthe places of the fallen or fatigued. But a new generation of classicists, led by Victor Davis Hanson of the

and died." The typical Greek phalanx foiTnation deployed in a closely packed rank and lile, usually but not always eight ranks deep. The or'ganization of the phalanx was based more on tiles than on ranks, with the hoplite belonging to his lile rather than his rank. The basic idea was to maintain a solid front after the opposing sides collided, to deny the enemy gaps to penetrate. The key to the Greek phalanx's success was in its innovative organization and technologies. The phalangeal SEPTEMBER 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 69

WEAPONRY

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consisted ot heavy iniatilnnien nt hoplites, so named because of the ingctiioLis shield orhoplou each earned itilo battle. The hoplon itself was a routid. convex shield nearly 3 feet in diameter and weighing more than 15 poutids. Thc essential dilfeience between ihe hoplon and the older shield was that the laltet could hang by its strap from time to litne, allowing a soldier to i^est his arm, and was used in combat by holding a grip behintl the central boss. The newer hoplon remained locked onto the forearm, with its weight boiTie by the left shotilder, tesulting in mote elfcctive and prolonged use. The disadvantage was that since thc hoplon was tiow gripped with the lell hand near its rim, half the shield piojected l
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The invenlion of a superior tactical system could not be monopolized lor long, however, as the phalanx quickly spread throtighout Greece. Thai ditlusion instigated an amis race among citystates, one that forced the evolution of the phalanx and In tum introduced phainngeal warfare as a cultural inslitution in Hellenic civilization. Because of tactical diOusion, heavy infantry all over Greece wore the same t>'pe of aiTnor and fought according to identical lactieal principles. Overall, greater battlefield articulation remained difficult for phalanxes lo achieve, especially since most hoplites were not professional soldiers but militia. Foi the most part,GT"eekmiIilia had l\iil-time occupations as farmers, ailisans and tradesmen. One city-state. Sparta, solved that problem by creating a professional anny, employing a wamor class that drilled for years, while other city-states experimented with the organization of the phalanx itself. When tactical experimentation did take plaee, it usually involved an inerease in the depth of the files of the phalanx rather than broadening the rank or frontage of the formation. Common belief held that by increasing the depth of the phalanx, gieater momentum could he gained in the initial collision, but the philosophy that more was better was not universally accepted. Xenopbon once asked, "When a phalanx is too deep foitbe men to reach tbe enemy with their weapons, what harm do you think they do to the enemy or good to their friends?" WITH THE WIDESPREAD adoption of identical tactical principles, a "cult of symmetry" arose in classical boplite battle. The idea of symmetry on the battlefield goes back to Bronze Age aristocratic warfare, but the ethos that eompelled Homers Achilles to battle nmno a niano with Hector outside the walls of TVoy was projected onto collective warfare in Greece between the 8th and 5th eentury BC. Phalanx-versus-phalanx combat beeame tbe prefen'ed mode of warfare in Greece to tbe e.xclusion of more efficient means of killing, inasmuch as light infantiy was not an acceptable battlefield tactical system for ihe Greeks. While archery was recognized in early Iron Age Near Eastern warfare as tbe great battlefield equalizer, allowing death Lo be dealt at a distance, it simply did not fit tbe confrontational image that was the essence of heroic warfare as defined by Homer. Consequently, archery was rele-

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gated to a subordinate status, usuall\ hunting. Classical Greek warfare tended to be very localized in its scope, with cit\'-.stal(.battling city-state lor tetiitorial gain. The relatively short distances hetween the vaiious Gieek city-stales, howevet", were still forgiving to the hoplite anny on the march. Greece's steep slopes, deep goi^es, dty washes and nairow passes dictated the use ol regular routes to move armies. That alone often compromised strategic surprise and reinforced the ritual character of phalangeal warfare at the same time. Furthermore, hoplite arms and armor were much too heavy to wear in the summer if crossing difficult teiTJun. Il meant that even for a shoit campaign against a neighboring city-state, the hoplite and his attendant had to transport several weeks' rations as well at ar ms anil aiTnor. If pack animals or ox-drawn carts were used, the size of the marching column grew exponentially, since at leasl some fodder for the pack or draft animals had to he canned as well. Greek victory' in the Persian wars in the first half of the 5th century BC contributed greatly to the perceived dominance of the heaw infantry phalanx. Although some Greeks realized that Persian enors had also contributed to their victory, the more common belief was that it represented the triumph of the spear over the bow and of heavy infantiyf over light. As the 5th century wore on, however, individual Greek city-states began to experiment with their- armies by adding light infanti^- to the tactical mix. During the Peloponnesian War, Athenian irse ol archers and javelin throwers against the Spartans at Spacteria in 425 BC improxed the Greek perception ol light infantry, bul it was only a slep toward a fully inlcgi^ted amiy. The Greek city-states never did adopt a complete combined-arms tactical system. That refusal cost them their- freedom when, in the middle of the 4th centuiy BC, King Philip 11 of Macedon marched south and defeated city-state after city-state with a balanced, combined-arms tactical system that added heavy cavalry^ lancers and hor-se archers to an improved phalanx protected by light infantry. With the invention ot the Macedonian combinedaims tactical system, Alexander the Great and his Greco-Macedonian army cari/ed an empire and ushered in the Hellenistic Age and a new era of warlare. MH

BEST

LITTLE

S T O R I E S

As one by one so many of the pieces fell into place, the mystery man's real identity seemed assured. By C. Brian Kelly

WHEN THEY BROUGHT HIM TO Wash-

ington, his speech and memory gone and his identity a mystery, the pieces of the puzzfe seemingly began to fall into place with the arrival of a wife whose soldierhusband was still missing. The Civil War was over.. .but not quite yet for the mystery man found in Tallahassee, Fla., by Union troops more than a year before his trip to a hospital for the insane in the nation's capital. Still, with the arrival of Elizabeth E. Hough ton from Ontario County, N.Y., there was hope that he could be identified as her missing husband, Thomas, last seen as his outfit. Company H, 140th New York Volunteer Infantry, was advancing on Frededcksburg, Va. Private Houghton, taken ill "on the march," referred to a hospital ambulance, according to the Union Army's acting adjutant general, Edward D. Townsend. "And he had not been heard of afterward," wrote Townsend in his postwar book Anecdotes ofthe Civil War in the United States. But now, with Elizabeth's arrival, so many pieces of the puzzle did fit. He looked a bit different, the missing soldier's wife admitted, but then she hadn't seen him in quite a while. And he probably had been through all kinds of ordeals as a prisoner so far down south. More positively, "The age and description of Houghton, as given by the muster rolls, corresponded with the appearance of the unknown man, and with Mrs. Houghton's account of her husband," Townsend wrote. Even more convincing were his moles and scars. Eor instance, the newspapers of the day had reported he had a mole on his back. Elizabeth pointed exactly where it should be. No, said a doctor attending the confused man, the mole was much higher up. Not so, the wife insisted. With the man's back uncovered, exam74 MILITARY HISTORY SEPTEMBER 2006

ination showed that she was right, the doctor was wrong. Then there were the telltale scars, such as those on his shin bone. Well, she explained, one time before her husband went off to war, he mounted a stool and reached for a saw on a beam above. The stool tipped over and the saw fell across his leg, with cuts resulting. "Thus those curious scars on the unknown man were satisfactorily accounted for," wrote Townsend. Well, she was asked, what about those small scars on his breast and back? One very hot day, she explained, her husband was washing sheep in a river while wearing a red flannel shirt. He came home with skin eruptions on his chest and back that required medical treatment and left scars. The surmise was that a toxic substance in the red dye might have caused his skin to break out. So much for those scars, but what about these, she was asked, on his arms? Those she had never seen before, she answered with apparent honesty. But they were recently incurred, the doctors acknowledged. She couldn't have seen them at all.

acknowledged her presence during visits, everything seemed to fit. All this was detennined in 1867, but Mrs. Houghton went back home without him, since he still wasn't mentally recovered. Then, in 1869, came a report that the patient had started speaking. "When asked his name this morning [a few days later], he distinctly replied that it is 'Thomas B. Houghton,'" reported Superintendent C.H. Nichols. Asked to name his wife, he couldn't, but he did say he was from New York. Case closed? The authorities in charge thought so, but they didn't count on the day somewhat later when someone addressed him by the Houghton name and, wrote Townsend, "he laughed and said that was not his name." Worse yet, he soon denied ever being a member of the 140th New York. Far from it! As he slowly recovered his memory, it turned out he had been an overseer supervising slaves on a Georgia plantation. He had gone to Florida on business "and had been drafted into a [Confederate] company of Florida conscripts...he lost his mind soon after, and did not remember anything." Further federal investigation convinced AND SO IT WENT. Everything added up. the authorities that was the real stoiy, and Like her husband, the mystery man had they sent him back home to pick up the blue eyes. Just like her husband, his toes pieces of his life. Townsend never did say were bent under—from habitually wear- what became of Thomas Houghton, if ing shoes that were too short. And his known, or his wife Elizabeth. Presumably hair looked the same under a microscope they—she alone, more likely—had pieces as a lock of her husband's hair, except for to pick up, too. a slight touch of added gray, which would Note: According to Brian A. Bennett, have been natural considering his long author of the criticaUy acclaimed histoiy absence. of the 140th New York (Sons of Old The mental patient found in Florida Monroe: A Regimental History of Patrick also had long, tapered thumbs, and when O'Rourke's 140th N.Y. Volunteer Infantry), sitting doing nothing he had a habit of the only clue to Private Houghton's fate twirling them—her missing husband all are conflicting official records listing him over again. as (1) the victim of a fatal illness in SepIn sum, even though he didn't—or tember 1862, and (2) as a deserter at Warcouldn't—speak a word and only barely renton, Va., two months later! MH