Military History 2010-09

Letters Remembering 'the Old Man's LCI' MILITARY HISTORY

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saw his ship in an episode of Victory at Sea. After he passed away, I found a 16-^page letter he had written during the war, the kind you ask your buddies to send home if you don't make it. With that letter in hand, I showed up at the 2001 LCI reunion in Reno, looking for information. Two LCI sailors in wheelchairs took me under their wings, taught me ahout LCIs and pointed me in the right direction. With their help, and others', I was ahle to put together a report for my brother's seven grown children (five of whom are teachers.)

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In 2002 we visited LCl1091. Captain Ralph probahly thought I was a Coast Guard inspector; I was in every compartment, nook and cranny on that ship. I felt very near to my hrother, as though we were touring the ship together. A wonderful experience. The LCI National Association has scheduled its 2010 reunion in Cincinnati August 25-29. It will likely he one of our few remaining opportunities to talk with our World War II LCI sailors; time is rap-

MILITARY HISTORY

Ralph Davis of LCI(L)-}091 called tTie the other night lo alert me to "The Last LCI" [by Henry Allen] in the July 2010 Military History. Great article! I really enjoyed it. Fantastic layout. Allen's father would be very proud of him. When he wrote about the visit he and his son made to 1091,1 was with him every step of the way. ln 2002, during our California LCI reunion in Eureka, I had my first opportunity to go aboard an LCI. My older brother served aboard LCl(G)-347 in the Pacific Campaign. He, too, spoke very httle of his wartime experience, with one exception—when he idly thinning their ranks. At each reunion, I am reminded of the remarks of General Douglas MacArthur during his last t r i p to the Philippines: "For I must admit, with a sense of sadness, that the deepening shadows of lile cast doubt upon my ability to pledge again, 'I shall return.'" Joe Flynn Calijoniia Director U5S LCI National Associalion www.ussici.com EL CAJON, CALIFORNIA

Thanks for including the terrific essay "The Last LCI" (by Henry Allen, July) in your latest issue. It brought hack memories. My father, Howard Broadbent, was a young ensign on USS Lycoming, APA155, and helmed an LCVP to the heaeh at Okinawa. However, I'm puzzled: Why no picture of LCI-1091 as she currently rests at the Eureka, Ore-, museum?

As for my Dad's ship, Lycoming spent decades at anchor at the James River "Dead Fleet" anchorage in Virginia before being cut up for scrap. Like Allen, I too had no idea my father's ship had heen so close to me until I was able to track it down via the Internet. But by then, my father had passed away, and the ship was gone for good. jack Broadbent GRASONVtLLE, TEXAS

MiG Be Not Nimble I read with interest the article on the Egypt-Israel War of Attrition ["Suez Smashup," by David T. Zabecki, July!. This conflict was the first 1 can recall watching on the evening news with my parents. One comment on the reference on P. 48 to the MiG-21 as the "nimble and proven" primary Egyptian Air Force fighter: The MiG-21—designed as a high-

speed, short-range interceptor to interdict U.S. strategic bombers during any U.S.-Soviet war —was proven but was certainly not nimble. A business colleague purchased a surplus Polish MiG-21 and flew it out of Ellington field in Houston back in the early 1990s and often commented on how poorly it maneuvered. He said he could be traveling south over Houston at speed, begin a turn and not complete it till he was over the Gulf of Mexico. He did love that Mach 2 experience, however. Clayton Buck KATV, TEXAS

Vimy Ridge Hallowed Ground ["Vimy Ridge, France," by David T. Zabecki, July] states that four Victoria Crosses were won posthumously at Vimy Ridge. In fact, only two awards, to Private William Milne and Lance Sgt. Ellis Sifton, were posthumous. Private John Pattison survived this battle only to be killed during the Batlle of Lens on June 3, 1917, and Captain Thain MacDowell died of natural causes on March 27, 1960. [It was a] good article nonetheless. John Davidson OTTAWA, ONTARIO

Pueblo Secrets I've been interested in your article and letters on the Pueblo capture by

North Korea, since I was involved in the followup. 1 was assigned to ihe U.S. Air Force 67th Reconnaissance Technical Squadron at Yokota Air Base, Japan, when thai occurred. We were the ones who processed and exploited aerial film from the three CIA-flown A-12 {Black Shield) missions iliat almost completely covered North Korea. It was on that film Pueblo was located and a North Korean military buildup documented. We also produced thousands of target materials for two

Pueblo's capture had been decided by a eouple of MiG17s that a pair of our fighters on strip alert could have eaten for lunch. Nor was there any mention of the Carter Administration looking the other way when North Korea sailed Pueblo from the east coast port of Wonsan to Pyongyang on the west coast, going around the southern tip of Korea.

carriers and the USAF "Combat Fox" buildup in South Korea, in case retaliatory action was required. Nothing was mentioned as to why the USAF didn't intervene. At the time. Fifth Air Force intel people told us the Navy hadn't alerted the Air Force about a requirement for defense of a ship. so our fighter-bombers on deployment in South Korea were configured lor their SIOP missions (mountings for nukes). By the lime USAF fighters were rearmed lor airto-air, it was too late—the ship had been herded into territorial waters.

Roy M. Stanley U Cokmt'l U.S. AirFone (Reí.) FREDERICKSBURG, V A .

Correction The article "One Way to Hell," by Stephan WUhinson, in the July issue reads in part, "in De-

cember 1944, early in the Battle of the Bulge, the Wehrmacht captured the sunounded 82nd Airboi-ne Division's entire medical staff and .supplies. " The surrounded division at Bastogne was Brig. Gen. Anííionv McAulifjes famed Wist Airborne. AU we can say is, "NUTS! " We regret the error. Send letters to Editor, Military History Weider History Group 19300 Promenade Dr. Leesburg, VA 20176 or via e-mail to mllitaryhistory@ weiderhistorygroup.com Please include name, address and telephone number.

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News

By Brendan Manley

DISPATCHES Memorial Honors Bay of Pigs Pilots This spring the Cuban Pilots Association | vvv\'\v.fupal!brc .org] dedicated a memorial at south Florida's KendallTamiami Executive Airport

to ihc 16 aviaioc^ w m- HR-II

Stephen Ambrose based his biography of Ike on hours of interviews—but just how many hours?

Eisenhower Library Official Casts Doubt on Ambrose Biography of Ike

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An official at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library [www.eisenhower .archives.gov] in Abilene, Kan., is questioning the integrity of Stephen Ambroses The Supreme Commander (1970), the esteemed historian's two-volume biography of the five-star general and 34th U.S. president. Timothy Rives, deputy director of the library, points to papers in the library archives suggesting Ambrose may have only spent two to three hours interviewing Eisenhower for the book, despite the late author's claims to have spent hundreds of hours with him on the project. Critics in tum

suggest that Ambrose, known for such popular military histories as Band oJBrothers and

D-Day, may have fabricated sizable sections of the work. Rives stumbled upon discrepancies while preparing a retrospective on the historians works. The first clue was a letter from Ambrose, then working as associate editor of the Elsenhower papers, requesting an interview for the planned biography— contradicting Ambroses insistence that Eisenhower had initiated contact. Rives also cites at least seven interviews in Supreme Commander's foot-

notes that could not have occurred due to scheduling con-

flicts. Ambrose worked on the biography from 1964 until Eisenhowers death in 1969 and repeatedly claimed to have spent two days per week speaking with the president at his Gettysburg, Pa., office. Ambrose's work has fallen under scrutiny before. Shortly before his death in October 2002, he was accused of plagiarizing portions of his World War II history The Wild Blue (he had footnoted the passages but not enclosed them in quotations). The latest revelation will likely cast doubt on other Ambrose works, as more than half of his 30-plus published titles deal with Eisenhower-related subjects.

There is properly no history, only biography' —Ralph Waldo Emerson

MILITARY HISTORY

during the failed April 1961 Bay of Pigs Invasion of Cuba. The memorial, atop brickwork resembling the Cuban flag, incorporates a period Douglas B-26B Invader like those used in the invasion. An obelisk hears the name of the dead—10 Cuhan pilots, four CIA volunteer pilots and two technicians from the 2506 Assault Brigade Liberation Air Force.

Missing Waterloo Souvenir Returned A stolen quaieh (drinking bowl) carved from wood taken from the Waterloo battlefield has been returned lo Sir Walter Scott's AhboisFord House Iwwwscousahhois ford.CO uk] in Melrose, Scot-

land. Stolen in UÍ94, ihe silver-gilt howl turned up in France this spring- Novelist Scott had the quaieh made In 1824 using wood from an elm hcneath which the Duke of Wellington had directed his troops to victory over Napoleon nine years earlier.

The World at War Reissued in Hi-Def Anyone over age 40 recalls the brilliant World War II television documeniar)' The World at War, which premiered in 1P73 with narra-

tion by Sir t-aurence Olivier and a haunting score. This fail FreemantleMedia ¡www . I remain li'incdia com) will reissue the 26-pan:, 36-hour series on 11 DVDs or nine Blu-ray discs, with a digilally restored 16:9 picture, subiides and a behind-thescenes featurette.

Aussie Team Maps Undersea Gallipoli Australian archaeologists are mapping the underwater terrain off Turkey's Galtipoli peninsula in the first large-scale survey of its kind. The team will also search for such military relics as sunken boats, discarded ordnance and ruined

jetties. The l915-I6Gallipoli Campaign cost nearly a half million combined casualties lor all participants and was the first major test for the nascent Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC), which alone sustained more than 35,000 casualties.

Exhibit, Documentary Reveal 'Ghost Army' A new documentary and University of Michigan exhibit [www.lib.uinich.edu/gallcry /events/ghosi-armyl detail the World War II exploits of llie covert U.S. 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, aka ''The Ghost Army," which carried out 20 elaborate battlefield deceptions over five major European campaigns. Filmmaker Rick Beyer interviewed 21 surviving members of the unit, after decades of silence and, until recently.

Pentagon denial of the unit's very existence. The unit recruited some 1,100 actors, photographers, press agents, painters, makeup artists and sound technicians to con- § vince the Nazis of I an Allied presence i where none really ° existed. Tactics in- | eluded the use of inflatable tanks, artillery and planes to fool enetny recon; amps to project the prerecorded rumble of armor; and actors to spread disinformation.

'God is not averse to deceit in a holy cause'

—Aeschylus

Sailors Retrace Bligh's Post-Mutiny Voyage Four men are attempting to re-create Royal Navy Captain William Blighs 6,700-mile voyage from Tonga to Timor—on a 25-foot open-decked boat 1 www.bouiiiyboat.coni | with minimal supplies and no modern navigational aids. In April 1789, mutineers aboard HMS Bounty set Bligh and 18 crewmen adrift in the South Pacific. The men spent the next 47 days at sea, catcbing fish and drinking rainwater to survive the ordeal. The modern-day "drifters"—Australians Don Mclnlyre and David Br^ce, Hong Kong businessman David Wilkinson and 18-year-oId British student Chris Wilde—have adhered closely to Bligh's provisions, carrying hard tack, salt pork, six bottles of wine and a two-week supply of water. Talisker Bounty Boat set off in late April and was due to arrive in Timor by late June.

WAR RECORD A formidable navy has time and again offered a crucial edge, often deciding the outcome of broad campaigns and, in some cases, entire wars. The dog days of August and September have frequently set the stage for victory—and defeat—at sea. • Aug. 1.1798: Napoléon Bonaparte's campaign in Egypt (see R 40) falls apart when British Rear Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson decimates the French fleet at Aboukir Bay. Nelson's victory gives Britain control of the Mediterranean and makes him a national hero. • Aug. 24-25,1942: American and Japanese carriers square off in the two-day Battle of the Eastern Solomons, during the Guadalcanal Campaign. Both sides retreat after taking heavy damage, but tbe resulting delay of Japanese reinforcements greatly assists U.S. land forces. • Sept. 5.1914: The German V-2¡ torpedoes ifMS Pathfinder, touching off its magazine and sinking the cruiser in minutes, with tbe loss of more than 250 men. The attack by Lieutenant Otto Hersing is the first combat victory for the nn)dem submarine (see P 26). • Sept. 10,1S13: Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry leads nine American ships to glor)' over British Commander Robert Barclay's six at the Battle of Lake Erie (see P 36). The win ensures American control of the lake for the duration of the war.

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Falkland Islands Demining Underway

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Among the items up for auction are Boer War dispatches Churchill wrote for London papers.

Unprecedented Churchill Auction Offers Rare Window into PM's Life

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Publishing magnate Steve Porbes collection ol Winston Churchill memorabilia will go on the Christie's auction block [www.christies coml in a series of three unprecedented offerings in London and New York tbis year and next and is expected to fetch up to $2 million. Tbe trove—wbicb includes letters, pbotos. appointment books and even an unsmoked cigar—offers an intimate look at tbe statesman's life, from bis days as a young soldier in tbe Boer War to bis pivotal tenure as World War II Britisb prime minister. Notable items include Cburcbill's wartime appointment diary (September 1939 to June 1945}, wbicb provides details of meetings witb Stalin and Roosevelt, his regular Tuesday visits witb tbe king, and sucb leisure activities as tbeater outings and soccer matcbes at Wembley Stadium. Other memorabilia trace Churcbills younger days, including a letter written after the 1898 Battle of Omdur-

man in the Sudan, wbicb provides a riveting aecount of tbe English army's last cavalry cbarge, Cburcbill describing the enemy as 'at tbe very least 40,000 men—five miles long with great bumps and .squares at intervals." After running the gauntlet unscathed, be later wrote, "It was, I suppose, the most dangerous two minutes I sbould live to see." In 1899 tbe Boers captured Churchill in tbe Transvaal and imprisoned bim in Pretoria. He eseaped by scaling a latrine wall, sneaking througb tbe prisons outer gaiden, tben strolling down tbe street and jumping on a moving train. Up for auction is a telegram sent by Boer police after tbe jailbreak, witb a less-tbanflattering description of the future PM: "Englishman, 25 years old, about 5 foot 8 inches tall, medium build, walks with a slight stoop. Pale features. Reddisb-brown hair, almost invisible small rnoustacbe. Speaks througb his nose and cannot pronounce tbe letter S,"

'An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile—hoping it will eat him last' —Winston OmrcWiX

MILITARY HISTORY

Demining teams arc working to remove some of ihc 20,000 landmines believed buried on ihc Falkland Islands-—most of which remain armed and potentially

lethal nearly 30 years after the close of hostiliiics there between Britain antl Argeniina. The Argentine navy kepi dctailctl records of its mineiiclds, which have greatly aided removal efforts, but randomly dispersed British cluster munitions pose a far challenge lo ihc cJc teams. The painstaking work is expected to continue for several years.

'Triple Nickle'Para Jumpers Honored Tlic Pentagon paid tribuif this spring to the 555th Parachute Infantry Banalion, aka "The Triple Nickles" |www,tripleni(jkle,coin|, which in 1944 became the U.S, Army's first all-hlack paratrooper unil. Integration concerns kept the Triple Nickles from aciion in Europe; instead, the paratroopcTs were secretly tic ployed stateside to thwari Japanese attacks oi the North Amen can mainland via incendiary balloon,s, which sparked lon'--i fires throughout the Pa cific Northwest- The Triple Nickles logged more than 1,200 smoke-Jumping missions by war's end.

News Million-Dollar Fix for Frontier Fort The Oklahoma Historical Society Iwww.okhisiory.orgI has raised $1 million in state and federal funds to

R-no\'iitc Fon Gibson Historic Site. Buili in 1824 and used by federal forces through the Civil War, Gibson was the westernmost bastiun in the ehain of forts protecting ihe 19th century American frontier. The project will restore the WPA-era re-created stockade and buildings, clear existing walkways, address drainage issues and add new interpretive centers, trails and a visitor center.

Johns Hopkins University Iwww.hopkinsmedicine.orgl inTectious disease specialist Dr. Paul Auwaerter believes Latin American revolutionär)' Simón ßoIiVar died o I chronic arsenic poisoning and not tuberculosis, as previously assumed. Bolivar—vfho in the early 19th century led a half dozen nations to independence from Spain—died in Santa Marta, Colombia, on Dec. 17. 1830, at age 47. Auwaerter presented his findings this spring at the aimual Historical Clinicopathological Conference [www.medicalalumnl.org/CPC] in Baltimore, Md. He based his diagnosis on a study of Bolivars deathbed symptoms, which included severe weight loss, fatigue, coughing, loss of consciousness and nagging headaches. But Auwaerter believes BohVar's poisoning was likely accidental, the arsenic either ingested in contaminated drinking water or administered by doctors as a medical remedy.

AP Corrects Caption on 'Bataan' Photo

1 am not, nor do I care to be, a Napoléon' —Simón Bolívar

The Associated í're^is ¡wu"w .ap.orgi has corrected the caption on an archived photo long thought to depicl [he infamous April

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Doc Says Bolivar May Have Been Poisoned

1942 Bauuii De.uh Vhnrh in the Philippines. The photo shows .soldiers carrying dead comrades in makeshift pole-and-blanket litters. Acting on a tip from a Balaan survivor, archivists reviewed the records and found that the pholo actually shows a POW burial detail at Camp O'Donnell in the weeks following the march.

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MILITARY HISTORY

Recovery Team Claims to Find Flynn Remains Searchers In Cambodia may have found the retnaitis of American combat photographer Sean Flynn—son of Hollywood swashbuckler Errol Flynn —who vanished in April 1970 while covering that conIlict. Communist Kilmer Rouge guerrilias reportedly captured and later killed Flynn, 28, and fellow photojournalist Dana Stone, 32.

Following a paper trail and local tips, David MacMillan and Keith Rotheram recovered teeth and bones last March in the Catnbodian countryside. The U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh has sent the remains to I the Hawaii-based

I Joint POW/MIA „" Accounting Com5 mand's Central Identification Laboratory Ivywwjpac.pacom.mill for forensie identificatioti.

VOICES OF WAR Shifting sands olT Cape CIKI, Mass., have exposed the timbers of IIMS Somerscl. the British warship Paul Revere narrowly avoided as he rowed across ihe Charles River for his ride to Lexington in April 1775. Other war machines have recently restirfaced: •

Maid of Hartech: In

2007 a rare Lockheed P-38 Lighting fighter rose from the sands of a Welsh heaeh, where ii had cra'ihcd during a training llight in 1942. Conservation efforts are underway Ihttpy/tigharoi^I. • HMSfVffice: Last March Ukrainian archaeologists located the Crimean Warera steamer HMS Prince, which sank off Balaclava in November 18'54 iltiring a winter slorm. The ship had just landed British troops for the Siege of Sevastopol. • RAF Avro Lancaster This spring a Gemían archaeology student with a metal detector found the wreckage of a British Avro Lancaster bomher in the woods near Brandau. The bomber crashed while on a mission to Frankfurt in November 1943. • Scotphn: L^st fall researchers on Maryland's Fatuxent River rediscovered Scorpion, flagship of Commodore Joshua Barney's Chesapeake Flotilla during the War of 1812. Experts hope to raise the scuttled ship.

Interview Evan Thomas: War Lovers and American Power

seen the dead stacked up at Antietam." And he had seen it. Sometimes policymakers who have actually experienced war are more reluctant lo get into war than the ones who have not.

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Was the U.S. ready for war? No. We had a very small standing army of about 25,000 that had been fighting Indians but was unready for an amphibious expedition. The bureaucracy was a mess, and the Army couldn't provide proper supplies. The meat was rancid; soldiers were given hot winter uniforms; there weren't enough quality rifles. There was chaos in Tampa, the port of embarkation. Roosevelt essentially had to steal a ship from New York units, to make sure he got his Rough Riders to Cuba.

ow wars get started is a major theme in Evan Thomas' newest history. The War Lovers traces the intertwined lives and actions of three major figures {war lovers ail) at the turn of the 20th century—Theodore Roosevelt, Henty Cabot Lodge and WiUiam Randolph Hearst—as America lurched into the seriocomic Spanish-American War in 1898. Thomas, editor at large at Newsweek and author oja biography of John Paul Jones and Sea of Thunder, a history ojjour naval commanders and the 1944 Batik' of Leyte Gulj, has concentrated on the character and ambitions of three powerful men who saw war as Amenca's golden road to world power.

engagement against Britain. He wasn't being hyperbolic; he was serious. It is a theme he repeatedly returned to in his correspondence. He said in 1895 or so that he wanted to have a great buccaneering expedition, to get Canada away from England or Cuba away from Spain. Would you consider Roosevelt and the others imperialists? Yes, although they disliked the word and didn't want to colonize other peoples. They were sensitive to self-determination and democracy. Lodge talked about what he called the "large policy" He'd been reading Captain Alfred Mahan and was convinced the United States should rival Great Britain as a great sea power and that we needed to build a great navy. He was already envisioning coaling stations in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Hawaii and Guam and a canal through the isthmus, to launch us as a great global sea power.

i We needed a war to regenerate ourselves, and Roosevelt didn't particularly care which warf

How did America get whipped into such a pro-war frenzy? The Cubans were being oppressed by Spain, and we wanted to rescue them. Bui there were deeper forces at work. The most interesting one to me was the idea held in some of the upper classes that America was somehow soft—"overcivilized," as Theodore Rooseveh put it. We needed a war to regenerate ourselves, and Roosevelt didn't particularly care which war. o QC LLJ

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Did he talk about looking for a war? He wrote about it. As early as 1886, he was thinking about raising a bunch of cowboys to fight the Mexicans after a minor border provocation. Then he wrote about hoping for a naval

MILITARY HISTORY

How could so many American leaders be "war lovers" just a half-century after the Civil War? One person did worry about that: President William McKinley. He had been at Antietam as a major. He was the dove here. Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt was constantly bugging McKinley to go to war against Spain, 10 liberate Cuba. McKinley resisted, saying to Roosevelt, "1 have

Was America behind the war eíTort? There was no shortage of volunteers. The propaganda was effective. The Army grew from 25,000 to 125.000 men almost overnight. It was a very patriotic period in American history. One of the war aims was to bring the countr)' together, and it succeeded. When the Rough Riders took a train from Texas to Florida, American flags were being waved in Dixie. That hadn't happened since belore the Civil War. Were Hearst and other journalists responsible for driving the nation into the war? Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer helped invent the mass media scandal sheet— large circulations, sensationalist yellow journalism, feeding the masses conspiracy theories and sex and violence. Everybody was reading Hearst and Pulitzer; they had a disproportionate influence. Journalistic standards were not too great, at least in Hearsi publications. Hearst never shied away from having his reporters make up whal they didn't know.

As chaotic as the American adventure in Cuba was, the Spanish didn't fare much better, did they? The only thing holding the Spanish together was pride. They wanted to die. When they sailed out for their last nava! battle, they put on their dress uniforms, all flags flying, tnen lined up on deck and lining the yardarms. It was a suicide mission. The American sailors couldn't believe it. It was like the SpanLsh were on parade. And they were on parade, a parade of death, because they were all sunk.

It was probably a miracle he was not killed. Was the Spanish-American War good for Roosevelt, politically? There was an immediate reward. Although there is no evidence Roosevelt thought there would be a political benefit for him personally, it certainly

What about the Philippines? The Philippines were an afterthought. Roosevelt sent Commodore [George] Dewey and his fleet to fight the Spanish fleet in Manila Harbor. Having defeated the Spanish, all of a sudden we were occupying the Philippines. The problem was, instead of welcoming us as liberators, the Filipinos regarded us as occupiers and revolted, launching a war that lasted four years and cost 4,000 American lives. Roosevelt comes across abloodthirsty. Was he? Evan Thomas' The War Lovers examines how human His letters are bloody-minded, foibles shape the conduct of both politics and conflict. but I think Roosevelt was tryoccurred to his friend Henry Cabot ing to show that he was an unsentiLodge. He wrote to Roosevelt, who mental realist. 1 don't think he meant was still on top of San Juan Hill, to to, but he comes across as being a say that people were already talkUttle ghoulish. But, clearly, he loved ing about Roosevelt running for govbattle. As he ran down Kettle Hill, ernor of New York. Within a week leading his men up to San Juan ridge, after returning in August 1898, he he shouted, "Holy Godfrey, what fun!" met with the leader of New York's 1 don't think there are too many combat Republican Party. commanders who would be shouting that as they charged. But Roosevelt's men loved him. They did not think How did the war affect the reputations of American military leaders? he was nutty, they thought he was Dewey was a great national hero. Leonbrave. He led from the front, literally

ard Wood did well and went on to become the military governor of Cuba. But the Army commander, IMaj. Gen. William] Shafter, who had done well in the Civil War, had become a pathetic figure. He was so fat he had to be carried around on a board. Did racism play a role in this conflict? Yes. The Army had many Southern officers, and Reconstruction was still a fresh memory. One of the crises came when the American Expeditionary Force arrived in Cuba, and the Cuban rebels were half black. What's more, they had black officers, which was anathema to many soldiers. The American soldiers thought the Cuban rebels were poor fighters because they didn't believe in frontal assaults. They were guerrillas; they didn't want to go racing up the hill. And part of the reason there were so many American blacks in the U.S. force, mostly "Buffalo Soldiers," is because Army commanders believed blacks were somehow immune from tropical disease, which, of course, is not true. Did the war shape later Cuban history? When the Americans excluded the Cuban rebels from the surrender ceremony, it was a great blow to Cuban pride, and they never forgot. When Fidel Castro came out of the hills in 1959, he was quick to remind the people that the Americans had denied the Cubans their dignity. So it's a fresh wound. Even though we liberated Cuba, they don't quite remember it that way They remember us as intervening and then placing onerous conditions on their new government and exploiting them economically. There are still billboards on the road from Santiago to Daiquiri, where the Americans landed, quoting the Cuban military commander Calixto García about Cuban dignity and how the Americans had robbed them of that dignity. | ^

what we Learned... from the Mayaguez Incident By William H. McMichaci

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.S. military prestige was at an ebb in 1975. Its war in Vietnam had ended in defeat, and the Khmer Rouge had taken Phnom Penh and extended Cambodia's territorial waiers lo 90 miles from shore. On May 12, Washington learned Khmer Rouge gunhoals had seized the U.S.-registered container ship Mayaguez. A reconnaissance plane soon located Mayaguez near Koh Tang, an island some 40 miles off the Cambodian coast. President Gerald Ford declared the seizure an act of piracy and resolved to recover the ship and crew. Even as the United Slates demanded the crew's immediate release, U.S. fighters sank several Cambodian gunboats involved in the Mayaguvz seizure. Ford approved a Marine assault at dawn on May 15. The Marines pulled 1,000 men from Okinawa and 100 from the Philippines for the operation. The objectives were to take both Mayaguez and Koh Tang. The Navy rushed the

carrier Coral Sea, destroyer escort HaroldE. Hoh and guided-missiledestroyer Heniy B. Wilson to the area, hul decided not to "soften" Koh Tang with a preinvasion bombardmeni since the civilian mariners were thought to be ashore. Only 235 Marines were tapped for ihe initial assault, as early estimates suggested die island held no more than 20 Cambodian irregulars. On May 12, Defense Intelligence Agency analysts concluded the enemy actually comprised 150 to 200 heavily armed Khmer Rouge fighters, but that information wasn't relayed to the Marines. Eleven helicopters were allocated for the assault; three to transport a 60-man boarding team to Holt, while the other eight would carry the 175-man assault team to Koh Tang. On May 15, as the assault team approached Koh Tang, heavy fire downed or disabled five of the eight helicopters, each with about 25 Marines aboard. Ninety minutes later. Holt came alongside Mayaguez with the boarding team,

Put aboard Mayaguez from Holt, gas mask-wearing Marines head for the container ship's upper decks. They met no opposition but also didn't find the ship's crewmen.

which found the ship empty Al about the same time, Washington heard the Khmer Rouge intended lo release Maya^ez, but since there was no mention of the crew, the fighting continued. About 65 hours after the initial seizure, Wilson picked up Mavüguí'::'s crew from a fishing boat the Cambodians had set adrift. When Ford heard that, just past midnight, he suspended all offensive operations. But a Matine extraction team was already en route. The crews of four Air Force helicoptei-s braved heavy fire to lift the assault team to Coral Sea. The operation left 18 U.S, military personnel dead and 50 wounded (with another 23 aimien dead in a related helicopter crash in Thailand). Shamefully, three Marines were left behind, all presumed captured and executed. For Ford, the mission was a public success. For the military, it was both a triumph and a sad denouement lo Vietnam,

Lessons: • Communicate—up and down the chain. Local U.S. commanders had better communications with Washington than with forces on Koh Tang. • Consider the options, including diplomacy A cordon around Koh Tang might have forced the Cambodians' hand or allowed a more effective assault. • Early recon counts. Too much time passed before Thailand-based search aircraft located Mayaguez• Bad intel kills people. Assault planners believed the risks were acceptable only because they relied on inaccurate enemy strength estimates. • It can always get worse. The U.S. delayed warning other merchant ships, even though Cambodia was seizing vessels in its extended territorial waters. • Soften the landing. The Navy didn't bomhard the island because it thought the crew was ashore—more had intel. • Do the deadly math. The rescue team recovered all 40 Mayaguez crewmen— but at a eost of 44 lives, (Jfi)

Down with His Submarine By Chuck Lyons

Captain John Cromwell U.S. Navy Medal of Honor Caroline Islands Nov. 19.1943 n November 1943, U.S. Navy Captain John Philip Cromwell fought a deadly game with the Japanese and lost. But with his noble sacrifice, he became the highest-ranking submariner awarded the Medal of Honor in World War II. Cromwell willingly died to keep a secret. Bom Sept. U, 1901, in Illinois, Cromwell graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1924. He served on the battleship USS Maryland and on several submarines, becatiie engineer officer for the Pacific Fleet submarine force and. by the start of World War II, was on I he staff of Commander, Submarines Pacific, In 1942 and 1943, he commanded Submarine Divisions 203, 44, and 43. By the middle of 1943, the tide had turned in the Pacific, and the Nav>' had solved many of the tactical and torpedo problems that had plagued it earlier in

the war. Na\'y ships were moving west across the Pacific, sinking Japanese vessels as they went. Much of their success was based on the breaking of Japan's JN-25 code. Intercepts had already contributed to the U.S. victories at Midway and the Coral Sea in 1942 and were now pinpointing convoys in the Pacific. Such intercepts and the very fact cryptographers had broken JN-25 were highly classified. Cromwell was among the few high-ranking oRiccrs aware of the secret. In fall 1943, following the Solomons campaign, the United States prepared to invade the Gilbert Islands (Operation Galvanic), The Navy .sent a dozen stibmarines to patrol off the major enemy bases at Truk and Kwajalein, west and north of the Gilherts. Among the boats

dropped a pattern of depth charges tliat, unknown to the crew, damaged the submarines depth gauge, Sculpm went deep and laid low for several hours. Around noon Connaway attempted to take the sub to periscope depth for another attack on the convoy. But Scuipms broken depth gauge stuck at 125 feet, confusing the diving officer and causing the boat to broach in view of Yamuffitno. Sculpin again dove, and the Japanese destroyer dropped more depth charges, damagingSÎKI/ÎIIÎ'; hull. Connaway concluded Scuipins only hope was to surface and fight it out. With the sub's decks awash, its crew manned the guns. But Yamagumo's opening salvo killed Sculpin's entire bridge watch team, including Connaway. The ship's senior surviving officer, a reserve lieutenant, ordered the boat scuttled and the crew to abandon ship. Given his personal knowledge of JN-25 intercepts and Operation Galvanic, Cromwell realized if he was in-

I

Commissioned in 1939, USS 5cu/p/rr was on its nintli war patrol wlien it encotjnterecl Yamagumo.

stationed around Truk was USS Sculpin, under Lt. Cmdr. Fred Connaway. Cromwell was aboard to take cotnmand of a wolf pack if conditions warranted. Sculpin arrived on station November 16, made radar contact with a Japanese convoy on the night of the 18th and prepared to attack at dawn. On the sub's final approach, however, an enemy sailor spotted its periscope, and Connaway was obliged to take Sculpm deep and allow the convoy to pass overhead. Sculpin then surfaced behind the convoy lo attempt an attack from the rear. But the trailing destroyer Yamagttmo forced Sculpm to dive, Yamagimw

terrogated by the Japanese, he tnight compromise those secrets under the influence of drugs or torture. Instead, be rode Scuipin on its fimU plunge to the bottom, taking those secrets with him. The Japanese pulled 41 Sculpin crewmen from the sea. Many later died when another U.S. sub sank tbe Japanese transport on which they were being held. Due in part to Cromwell's courageous act, U.S. forces captured the Gilberts in late November, and the JN-25 intercepts remained secret througb war's end. hi 1954 the Navy honored the Sculpin hero, naming a Dea ley-class destroyer escort USS Cromwi'K. (ffil

Hand Tool Roman Pontoon Bridge Like a road over troubled waters

By Jon Guttman ' illustration by Gregory Proch

Workers lashed together beams to construct a roadbed atop tbe covered deck, tben nailed wooden planks to the frameworks to form tbe roadway.

Legions transported pontoons and lumber on wbeeled carts. Wooden decking improved buoyancy and provided support for the roadbed.

As illustrated on Trajan's Column, below and at far left, Roman engineers had tbe boats anchored at regular intervals and secured with cables.

R

ecorded uses of pontoon bridges date to ancient China and Persia, the latter most famously with Xerxes' great twin spans over the Hellespont in 480 BC. It was probably the Roman army, however, that made the readily assetnbled pontoon bridge a regular part of its doctrine. In his Epitoma Rei Militam, 4lh century' AD Romati writer Flavius Vegetius Renatus wrote: liul ihc mosl commodious invention is that of the small boats hoUowed out ojone piece of timber and very light both by their make and the quality of the wood. The army al-

ways has a number 0/ these boats upon carriages, together with a sufficient quality ojplanks and iron nails. Thus with the help oj cables to kish the boats together, a bndge is instantly constructed, which/or ihe time iuts the solidity oja bñdge of stone.

To quickly bridge a water obstacle, a legions engineers would release the pontoons downstream stern first, initially controlling them with an oared boat and then dropping a stone-filled wicker basket from each pontoon to anchor it from the bow. With the pontoons in place, at about 15-foot intervals, soldiers

lashed together beams and cross planks to span the gaps and extended gangways from the end boats to either bank. During the decisive Battle of the Medway in 43 , Legion II "Augusta," led by Titus Flavitts Vespasianus (the future Emperor Vespasian), deployed a pontoon bridge upriver from the opposing British tribes, thus establishing a bridgehead frotn which to flank and rout the Britons. Trajan's Column (see P 62) includes a relief carving of a pontoon bridge used to span the Danube during that Roman emperor's 2nd century Dacian campaigns. ^

Power Tool

By Jon Guarnan ' Illustration by Gregory Proch

Carronade This short-range smasher cleared the decks

A carronade weighed less than a cannon of equivalent bore size, took up less space and required fewer hands. Its range, however, was half to one-third that of a standard cannon.

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Aft sight ^ ^ 1

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The carronade saw widespread use during the American Revolution. John Montague, 4th Earl of Sandwich, adopted the gun for use on the forecastles and quarterdecks of Royal Navy warships. France was unable to produce an equivalent weapon for 20 years, but the ..,.y 7i':-- ib-^ . ^ - j United States made widespread use of carronades.

A V Horizontal, rotation axis \ A carronade was typically mounted on two-platform fitted with an elevation screw, slid along grooves on block beneath the barrel clamped to two shoes. The front; wheels or rollers at the back enabled gunners

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roadsides at sea were bloody affairs in the Age of Sail, and in the mid-18th century the Royal Navy introduced a gun that made shortrange duels even more hazardous. Designed to infliet casualties by shattering wooden superstructures into lethal splinlers, this relatively lightweight, lowvelocity killer was called the carronade. British sailors appreciatively dubbed it "The Smasher." Designed in the 1750s by Lt. Gen. Roben Melville, with help from Carrón (Seotland) ironworks manager Charles Gascoigne, the carronade was forged in

carriages—an upper platform, the lower platform. A wooden lower platform pivoted at the to move or swivel the weapon.

6-, 12-, 18-, 24-, 34-, 42- and even 68pound sizes. Its chamber was one caliber smaller than its bore, making for more efficient use of gunpowder at the expense of velocity. But that reduced muzzle velocity boosted the splintering effect of round shot. Mounted on the forecastles and quarterdecks of British men-of-war, the upper decks of gunboats and on ships' boais, the carronade shredded everything in its path. HMS Victory proved the short-range lethality of the carronade at Trafalgar on Oct. 21, 1805, when Admiral Lord Horatio Nelson's flagship fired two carron-

ades filled with round shot and musket halls through Bucentaure^s stern, sweeping its gun deck and killing scores of French sailors. A few Royal Navy warships, including the 56-gun HMS Glatton and 48-gun HMS Rainbow, experimented with allcarronade armament, bui they could only be effective by closing the range through a gauntlet of enemy cannon fire. And when mounted between decks, the short-barreled carronade posed a fire risk to the gun ports. I..ong-range guns and rifled barrels led navies to phase out the carronade in the 1850s. ffil

hull Down by the stern after being torpedoed by UB-32 on March 31, Í9l74he British bospital ship Gloucester Castle was tater salvaged and returned io service. By war's end in 1918, Germany's U-boat fleet had sunk about 11 million gross tons of Allied shipping.

PRIOR TO WORLD WAR I, KRUPP'S SHIPYARD IN KIEL, GERMANY, TURNED A MARITIME NOVELTY INTO A DEADLY NAVAL WEAPON BY STEPHAN WILKINSON

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; World War 1 saw the first widespread use of four game-changing weapons: aircraft, tanks, machine guns and submarines. Of the four, subs were hy far the most advanced system for their time and were remarkably similar to the boats with which the United States and Germany, particularly, entered the next world war. Had early 1940s airplanes been as similar to their 1918 counterparts, American pilots would have gone to Guadalcanal with fabric-covered open-cockpit biplanes rather than F4F Wildcats. Like airplanes and moon rockets, submarines had been imagined, pos-

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MILITARY HISTORY

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U-boats prepare to cast off from their tender in Kiel harbor. While the German submarine fleet proved highly effective against Allied shipping, the victories came at a high cost. Of the 370-plus boats in service between 1914 and 1918, about half were lost in action.

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tulated and fictionalized for centuries by inventors, dreamers and spacey writers, though rarely did anyone build an acmal sub. The few that did make it into the water were basically boats that sank (occasionally to resurface) and then stumbled about blindly at minor depths. In 1897 Irish-American John Philip Holland—on his sixth try at building a submersible boat—took sub technology in a new direction. He launched in New York a cigar-shaped, 75-ton craft

MILITARY HISTORY

with a gasoline engine that ran both ihe boat and a generator on the surface and an electric motor that propelled the vessel while submerged, powered by batteries the engine had charged. The vessel was also fitted with diving planes, like an airjilanes elevators, allowing it to dive and surface just as a fish would. At the time, Hollands main competitor, American naval architect Simon Lake, insisted subs should sink and then bob back to the surface in a level attitude, which never caught on.

been developed and iried by someone, somewhere, somclime. Electric molors for underwater propulsion; storage batteries and engine-driven generators to charge them; double hulls in which a pressure vessel was enclosed by a light, external streamlining shape; ballast tanks; dive planes; pneumatically expelled torpedoes—none was a secret. Yet the Germans got it right from the start. f7-7, commissioned in 1906, was a lully functional, no-excuses submarine. It was not a visionary leap by the German Imperial Nav)', the KaiserBy the time Germany's Krupp GerlichcMarini; but the amalgamation of a maniawerft shipyard laid ihe keel of Forelle^ the first true imlerseeboot ("un- half-century of innovation, the fortunate application of advanced German dersea boat"), or U-boat, in 1903, all the inlertial-cornbustion technology and basic features of what would become the use of the Krupp shipyard in Kiel, ihe classic World War 1 submarine had

power plant provided excellent fuel efficiency and, therefore, greater range and eliminated the considerable danger (and sickening odor) of volatile gasolitie fumes in an enclosed space shared with electric motors and batteries, Tbe twinscrew V-l was powered on tbe surface by two 200-hp Körting kerosene engines and while submerged by two battery-powered 100-hp electric motors. Like nearly all submarines that would follow it, U-l was double-hulled. The strong inner bull held pressure when the vessel submerged, while the thin outer hull beld fuel and ballast tanks—the latter of wbicb were flooded to submerge tbe boat and blown empty to surface—and provided a hydrodyiiamic sbape for efficiency An ancillar)' advantage was tbat engineers were able to place all of the structure needed to strengthen tbe inner pressure bull on the outside of tbe vessel rather than consume interior space, Tbe outer bull also shielded tbe pressure hull from at least some depthcharge damage. A disadvantage, however, was that semiexternal fuel tanks often sprang leaks during depth-charge attacks, creating slicks that could hetray a sub's position. U-l bad a single bow torpedo tube which had been husily building suband carried three rounds—one "up tbe marines for the Russians. Ironically, the spout," or in the tube, and two reloads, Germans based U-l on an earlier design Tbe torpedo was, of course, the develby French maritime engineer Maxime optnent that made U-boats so effective. Laubeuf. Krupp later funded and built Essentially miniature, unmanned subtbe experimental Forelle for the Immarines, torpedoes are such fearsotne perial Russian Navy and sold three weapons because they're large enougb follow-on Laubeuf-type subs to Russia. Finally, in 1904 the Kaiserliche Marine, to encapsulate an enormous amount of explosive energy yet compact enough which bad been buying srnall foreign to be carried by a relatively small and subs of limited utility, ordered U-}. simple vehicle able to attack from well The internal-combustion technology within the range of even tbe largest destined to be Germany's major contrinaval rille. bution to subtnarine deveiopment— The sub had a crew of 22 and could and which set the precedent for subdive to a deptb of almost 100 feet. mersibles until the advent of nuclear Maximum surface speed was just sbort power plants in 1954—was tbe diesel of 11 knots, with a surfaced range of engine. A major improvement over 1,500 nautical miles at 10 knots. Tbe gasoline engines of the era, the diesel

boat's submerged speed was said to be 8,7 knots, witb a range of 50 nautical miles at 5 knots. And U-l looked like a proper U-boat: Its small, streamlined conning tower sported a classic periscope, and an aggressive "beak" on the barrel-like hull cowled the torpedo tube's muzzle. Nor did it hurt that Germany's superior optics ensured the nations subs were fitted witb the best periscopes the world would see for many decades. Despite such innovations, U-l never went to war. Submarine technology moved rapidly enough in the early 1900s tbat the pioneering vessel was

As an officer looks on, a sailor in a U-boat engine room responds to a command from the bridge over the engine order telegraph. The submarine used diesel engines when running on the surface-which was most of the time -but relied on electric motors underwater. obsolete by 1914 and was used solely for training. Rather tban being the prototype of a class of identical boats, U-l was the first of a rapidly improving series of submersibles soon equipped witb proper diesel engines. One of U-Fs direct descendants, U-9, sank three British cruisers in less than an hour in September 1914 and in a couple of weeks killed more Britisb sailors than Lord Nelson lost in all his battles.

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n an era wben nuclear subs dive as soon as tbey clear tbeir bomeport breakwater and don't resurface for months, it's sometimes forgotten that

frotn World War I until the 1950s, underwater warships were not precisely submarines but submersibles— surface boats that dived briefly now and then but spent 99 percent of their titne at the surface. Until 1944 and the first operational use of the snorkel—an intake/ exhaust tube that extended to the surface and allowed diesel propulsion and battery-charging while underwater—U-boats submerged only to attack or hide, and then not very deep. So surface speed and seakeeping were a U-boat's assets. After all, tnany of the vessels had to sail vast distances just to reach their patrol areas—not something you'd want to do at 5 knots. A World War I U-boat was basically a torpedo boat hull witb a conning tower instead of a superstructure, atop and around the pressure vessel suspetided below it. The Germans learned that if you did build a streamlined cigar with underwater speed in mind, your crew would be beat into insensibility on the surface by fierce pitching

and rolling. U-boats' large conning towers bristled with railings, ladders, jackstaffs and coamings. And their big deck guns, typically 86mm to 105intTi, had high-drag teak decks and rigging for ease of surface operation. Battery power ditln't last long running underwater, so U-boat captains had to calculate when and where to dive and best intersect their tai^el within torpedo range. That's why the simple tactic of zigzagging—frequent, irregular course alterations—was so effective for sutface ships: A single zig or zag could nullify a U-boat commander's careful calculations. When your top speed underwater is 5 or 6 knots, there's no way to chase or maneuver to develop a new firing solution and sink a 10-knot freighter. tnuch less a warship doing 20. Thus, U-boats did their most fearsome work on the surface. Hollywood once had us believe a U-boat's deck guns were for fending off furious destroyer attacks after a crippled sub was forced to surface, but the truth is that

powerful deck ordnance was a far more effective and less expensive way to dispose of merchant ships, which were the World War I U-boats primary tat;get. No sub commander would waste a torpedo—of which he had only a limited nutnber—on a trudgitig collier or rusty banana boat. One of the most remarkable World War 1 U-boats was DcuLschhnil named rather than U-numbered, initially, because it was an unarmed commercial vessel, crewed by tbe Norddeutscher Lloyd steamship line. It was the world's first submarine freighter, an enormous, beamy, 1,875-ton (submerged) miniZeppelin. In 1916 Deulschiand wr^úa two trips to the United States, first to Baltimore and then to New London, Conn., carrying hard-lo-get chemicals and aniline dyes to the States and returning to Gennany with a variety of strategic war materiel, mainly nickel, tin and rubber. DcuiscNnnd-was a blockade-runner. It cruised on the surface at 16 knots for

German ü-23-Class Submarine In 1917 tbe Illustrated London News provided readers this cutaway schematic of one of the Kaiserliche Marine's early Krupp-built U-boats. Overall length: 212 feet Total displacement: 971 tons Normal crew: 5 officers, 30 men Maximum range: 8,790 miles Maximum depth: 164 feet

TORVEDO ROOÏVI TRIMMING l A N K OKEOF TUBES

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most of the trip but submerged to pass unnoticed beneath the British-enforced North Atlantic blockade, which was otherwise quite successful at starving Germany of food and supplies. It also eluded a Royal Navy cordon off the U.S. East Coast. After Deutschlands second cargo voyage, Germany converted the sub into L/-255, sending it and six sister boats to war as longrange merchant raiders armed with particularly large-caliber deck guns. Lf-i55wasn't the only U-boat to call at an American port. U-53 popped into Newport, R.I., in fall 1916. For a few hours on October 7, its captain, Hans Rose, paid visits to U.S. naval officers and entertained visitors aboard U-53. Early the next morning. Rose sailed Í7-53 just out the harbor and quickly sank five AUied ships—three British, one Norwegian and one Dutch. All were in international waters, albeil within sight of the lightship Nantucket. A special class of U-boats—UCs— were built as coastal minelayers, per-

Earlier U-boat types incorporated deck guns that stowed below deck level, top, when not in use. The crew raised the weapon into firing position, above, to engage surface targets.

haps better termed minepoppers, since they popped the mines into place while submerged rather than laying them from the surface. While effective (Uboat mines sank nearly 3 million tons of shipping), they were deathtraps for their crews: Most were lost either to premature detonation of their own mines or from hitting other German mines in the fields they were servicing. World War I U-boats were state of the art in every way but one: Naval experts who assessed the Kaiserliche Marines surrendered boats found that comfort, space and accommodations—"habitability," they called it—were better on U.S. Navy subs of the era. But the fact remains, those comfy American boats sank not a single merchant ship during World War I. U-boats, on the other hand, sank 5,708 ships totaling about 11 million tons—roughly a quarter of all ihc worlds merchant shipping at the time (admittedly at a cost to the U-boat (leet of nearly half the 370-plus subs Germany built during World War 1). U-35

alone accounted for 224 ships totaling more than 500,000 tons—most sunk by its deck gun. It averaged nmc kills per patrol, making V-35 the highestscoring submarine of e/i/jer world war.

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be source of the Kaiserliche Marines spectacular submarine successes was Germany's unilateral decision early in 1915 to wage unrestricted submarine warfare. Until that time, various conventions and accepted principles of maritime combat ruled thai a warship could only attack a noncombatant ship once the warship commander had irrefutably determined the merchant was carrying supplies to an enemy, and furthermore, that the commander must make provisions for the safety of its civilian crew. In fact, naval experts widely assumed

MILITARY HISTORY

Sailors shove a torpedo into their U-boat's loading hatch, above. Their vessel already doomed by just such a weapon, British sailors, top, scramble to abandon ship following a 1917 U-boat attack. Between 1914 and 1918 German subs sank 5,708 Allied ships totaling about U million tons.

SUBMARINE TIMELINE

early on that submarines would never he effective weapons against shipping, as they lacked ihe room to carry either prize crews (to sail a sei2ed ship to a friendly port) or prisoners (if they sank one). Bui Britain was starving Germany with its surface blockade, and the Kaiserliche Mciritic felt it had no recourse other ihan lo relum the favor— not by blockade, since Germany's surface navy wasn't powerful enough ¡o do that, but by sinking ihe ships supplying Britain with food and war materiel. As the U-boats couldn't risk surfacing while carrying out the niceties of classic navy-versus-merchant confrontations—particularly since the iniroduction of heavily armed Royal Navy Q-shlps, which masqueraded as tramps and trawlers specifically to lure

enemy subs to the surface—Germany simply warned the world it would sink any ship (innocent, neutral or combatant) that entered a war zone. The British were shocked. "Blockade and death by slow starvation are hallowed by use and wont," one British naval commander oddly rationalized. "Speedy death by drowning is not." The British despised submarines, one admiral famously calling them "underhand, unfair and damned unEnglish." Said another Royal Navy admiral in 1914, "No country in this world would ever use such a vicious and petty form of warfare!" Given a little more time, Germany's U-boat plague conceivably could have forced the British lo negotiate a peace. Instead, it helped force the United States into the conflict, sealing the Second Reich's doom. A popular misconception is that iJ-20^May 7,1915,sinking of the British liner RMS Lusitania with nearly 1,200 civilian casualties, including more than 120 Americans, was the major reason President Woodrow Wilson sent the American Expeditionary Force to Europe. But what actually pushed Wilson over the edge was the infamous January 1917 "Zimmennan Telegram," intercepted and decoded by the British and gleefully shared with Washington. German Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman had cabled his ambassador in Mexico City, alerting him thai the unrestricted U-boai campaign was about to escalate, that it would subdue the British within six months as long as America stayed neutral, and that if America were to respond, the ambassador should seek an alliance: Mexico was to attack the United States, thus distracting il from the European war, and in return Germany would help Mexico reclaim Arizona, New Mexico and Texas. Zimmerman's grasp of foreign relations apparently extended no farther than his bedside nightstand. As military historian Thomas Parrish writes in his exeellent book The Submarine, Zimmerman didn't seem to understand that "reintegrating Texas into Mexico would be as impossible as restoring the virginity of the Kaiserin."

• 1776 (September?) Patriot inventor David Bushnell's Turtle becomes the first sub used (unsuccessfully) to attack an enemy vessel in wartime. • 1800 Robert Fulton launches Nautilus, the first "plunging" sub, with diving planes to control the angle of dive and a sail for surface propulsion. • 1855 Wilhelm Bauer builds Seeteufel {Sea DevH). a 52-foot-long, treadmill-powered sub that is huge for its time. • 1863 The Confederacy introduces the David class of semisubmersibles. • 1864 (February 17) CSS H.L Hunley sinks a blockading Union sloop of war off Charleston, the first time a submersible sinks an enemy warship, • 1866 Englishman Robert Whitehead develops the self-powered torpedo. • 1878 John Philip Holland builds his first submarine. Holland I. • 1894 Simon Lake launches his first submarine, Argonaut Junior. • 1897 Lake launches Argonaut, a wheeled salvage subwithanairlock• 1897 Holland launches his first truly successful sub. Holland Vl. which the U,S. Navy commissions in 1900. • 1900 Frenchman Maxime Laubeuf launches Narval, the first double-hulled sub. • 1904 Laubeuf launches Aigrette, the first dieselpowered sub, • 1906 Germany launches U-l. the first truly modern military submarine. • 1914 (September 5) U-21 sinks the British cruiser Pathfinder, the first sinking of a warship by a submarine-fired torpedo, • 1914 (September 22) US sinks three large British cruisers within an hour, killing nearly 1,500 sailors. • 1914 (October 18) U-l? torpedoes a British freighter, the first sinking of a merchant ship by a submarine, which in both world wars becomes the craft'strue raison d'être. • 1915 Germany announces unrestricted submarine warfare: on May 7 U-20 sinks the British passenger liner Lusitania. killing nearly 1.200 civilians, including more than 120 Americans, • 1917 Britain's adoption of the convoy system for merchant ships stems nearly three years of unchecked losses to German U-boats, • 1928 The U.S, Navy uses U-135 as a prototype for the class of subs with which it would enter World War II, • 1939 USS Squalus sinks off Portsmouth. N.H,. but divers are able to rescue 33 members of the 59man crew from a depth of 243 feet through use of the Momsen rescue chamber. • 1940 The United States begins building the 73 Gafo-ciass submarines that formed the core of the Navy's World War II sub fleet; the famed "fleet boats" are all named after fish, • 1944 Although they didn't invent the concept, the Germans put the snorkel into operational use. allowing subs to recharge their batteries while submerged. • 1954 The U.S. Navy launches Nautilus, the world's first operational nuclear-powered submarine, • 1960 The Navy launches USS George Washington. the world's first ballistic-missile sub. • 1961 The U.S. Navy launches Threst^er. its first deep-diving attack submarine. Thresher sinks with all hands off Cape Cod, Mass., in 1963, • 1984 Tom Clancy's novel The Hunt for Red October and its 1990 film adaptation wildly popularize the role of the submarine in the Cold War,

what finally beat the U-boats was the reinvention of the convoy system, whose history stretched back to tbe Spanish treasure fleets. At first glance, it migbt seem convoys would be selfdefeatitig. After all, why collect all of a U-boat's targets in one convenient flotilla? The truth is tbat spotting one 30-ship convoy in tbe immensity of the Atlantic was vastly more difficult than finding any one of 30 separate vessels scattered between North America and the British Isles. Convoys also presented a U-boat witb target overload. A commander could get off only so many torpedo sbols before tbe convoy was out of range or, more likely, its escorts put an end to further attacks. Convoy losses accounted for no more tban 1 percent of all convoyed vessels, against 10 percent losses for ships sailing solo. Germany had lost the gamble it could starve England into submission before the Yanks arrived.

liminal War Wartime propaganda, unlike the steel and cordite tangibles of combat, targeted a viewer's emotions, to cut deep and elicit an emotional response. The words and images might mock or demonize one's opponent or stir up tearyeyed patriotism. The advent of modern submarine warfare in 1914 provided propaganda artists on both sides of the war fresh material with which to vilify the enemy, boost enlistment numbers and sell war bonds, fflt

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n 1919 postwar America began to crank out its first serious submersibles—the S-class, or S-boats, the first U.S. subs designed by tbe Navy ratber tban civilian inventors and contractors, Tbe S-boats weren't much good at first, but things began to look up when the Navy acquired several U-boats to reverse-engineer. Said tbe chief of tbe Navy's Bureau of Engineering in 1927, "We find in general tbat departures from German practice lof U-boat constructionl get us into trouble, and that trouble can generally be cured by strict adherence to German practice," In 1928, when the Navy began building its next sub class, it used as its prototype U-135., a boat already a decade old. The United States entered World War II with the resultant Galoclass "fleet boats." Imagine tbe U.S. Air Force capturing a 1939 Messerschmitt Bf 109 and in 1949 using it as the prototype of its next-generation fighter. That's bow advanced the Gennans were in the undersea world. (^ For furlhcr reading, Stqjhan WUkinson recommends: The Submarine: A History, by Thomas Parrish, and U-boats of the Kaiser's Navy, hy Gordon Williamson.

MILITARY HISTORY

A German poster trumpets, "U-Boats, Out!"

what finally beat the U-boats was the reinvention of the convoy system, whose history stretched back to tbe Spanish treasure fleets. At first glance, it migbt seem convoys would be selfdefeatitig. After all, why collect all of a U-boat's targets in one convenient flotilla? The truth is tbat spotting one 30-ship convoy in tbe immensity of the Atlantic was vastly more difficult than finding any one of 30 separate vessels scattered between North America and the British Isles. Convoys also presented a U-boat witb target overload. A commander could get off only so many torpedo sbols before tbe convoy was out of range or, more likely, its escorts put an end to further attacks. Convoy losses accounted for no more tban 1 percent of all convoyed vessels, against 10 percent losses for ships sailing solo. Germany had lost the gamble it could starve England into submission before the Yanks arrived.

liminal War Wartime propaganda, unlike the steel and cordite tangibles of combat, targeted a viewer's emotions, to cut deep and elicit an emotional response. The words and images might mock or demonize one's opponent or stir up tearyeyed patriotism. The advent of modern submarine warfare in 1914 provided propaganda artists on both sides of the war fresh material with which to vilify the enemy, boost enlistment numbers and sell war bonds, fflt

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n 1919 postwar America began to crank out its first serious submersibles—the S-class, or S-boats, the first U.S. subs designed by tbe Navy ratber tban civilian inventors and contractors, Tbe S-boats weren't much good at first, but things began to look up when the Navy acquired several U-boats to reverse-engineer. Said tbe chief of tbe Navy's Bureau of Engineering in 1927, "We find in general tbat departures from German practice lof U-boat constructionl get us into trouble, and that trouble can generally be cured by strict adherence to German practice," In 1928, when the Navy began building its next sub class, it used as its prototype U-135., a boat already a decade old. The United States entered World War II with the resultant Galoclass "fleet boats." Imagine tbe U.S. Air Force capturing a 1939 Messerschmitt Bf 109 and in 1949 using it as the prototype of its next-generation fighter. That's bow advanced the Gennans were in the undersea world. (^ For furlhcr reading, Stqjhan WUkinson recommends: The Submarine: A History, by Thomas Parrish, and U-boats of the Kaiser's Navy, hy Gordon Williamson.

MILITARY HISTORY

A German poster trumpets, "U-Boats, Out!"

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fis )icbl ^tc britl)d)rn 3dtben men Unb Irijiltcri jr^I nctttnil. Norvegen

A chameleon with British muttonchops "changes colors" before a U-boat. Britain's merchant ensign (lower right) resembled neutral Norway's ensign (lower left).

Cartoonist Thomas Theodor Heine was already a gifted satirist when Germany unleashed his wit against the Allies. Above, Woodrow Wilson dreams of netting "harmless" U-boats.

MILITARY HISTORY

The May 7,1915, U-boat torpedoing of the liner RMS Lusitania provided fodder for Allied propaganda. Here a German sailor ruthlessly finishes off a female survivor.

The German U-boat fleet, personified as a diver (note the helmet spike), drowns the Union Jack-draped John Bull (Great Britain). The text reads, "Down with him!"

ILITARY HISTORY

, and /fis U-BOATS

Victory Depends on Which fails first, food or frightfulness

U.S. Food Administration posters advocated wartime food conservation. Here an overtly sinister kaiser oversees a U-boat strike on a merchant ship.

NAPOLEON BONAPARTE HAD GRAND AMBITIONS WHEN HE LANDED I. EGYPT IN 1798. A BRITISH FLOTILLA AND THE DESERT COUNTRY ITSELF WOULD THWART HIS DREAMS OF EMPIRE BY ANTHONY BRANDT I

njune 9,1798, the people of the oft-invaded Mediterranean island of Malta foun themselves yet again under threat. A French fleet had appeared offshore, and il titular commander. Napoléon Bonaparte, was demanding the right to enter th •) island's harbors to resupply his ships. It quickly became apparent the general demand was a ruse de guerre, for when the Maltese balked at allowing so man foreign warships entry at the same time. Napoléon sent his troops ashore in a preplannei invasion of the strategically important island. The French troops faced little opposition. The island had long been under the dominioi of a military religious order known as the Knights of St. John, but their power had declina and, lacking the support of the Maltese people, the knights were unable to mount a seriou defense. Their leader. Grand Master Ferdinand von Hompesch, quickly capitulated, am Napoléon won himself an easy victory But the French commander had bigger victories in mind, and Malta was only a stepping stone en route to the land he already considered his next conquest. Unfortunately for Napoléoi and those he led, that land—Egypt—would prove more trial than triumph.Napoléons inteti was to colonize Egypt, thereby increasing French influence in the region and restricting Britisl access to India. He always claimed to be lucky, and his luck held during those initial move! across the Mediterranean. In addition to his easy conquest of Malta, ,i Napoléon kept one step ahead of a pursuing 14-ship Royal Navy Though Napoleon's I

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A i - i r i T - x T i

squadron under Rear Admiral Sir Horatio Nelson. The British admiral had come close, though. On the dark, foggy night ofJune 22-23 Nelson unwittingly passed wathin a few miles of the outer edge of Napoléons huge and vulnerable flotilla of 300 ships, almost all ' , , ^ , , ., , ., , . transports. Nelson raced east, beat Napoléon to Alexandria and, not finding him there, left the area on June 29 to search near Cyprus. The

ILITARY HISTORY

troops were ill-prepared

^^^ {^^ harsh conditions they encountered in > Egypt, their combat fpmence and superior tactics enabled them to dominate the bold but poorly led Mamelukes. •

last British ship slipped over the horizon just hours before the French frigate Lajunon, sent ahead to pick up the French consul in Alexandria for an assessment of the situation in Fgypt, sailed into the harbor. Napoleon's planned conquest did not begin well In calm weather his fleet might simply have sailed into Alexandras harbor to offload the 30,000-man army and its supplies. Unfortunately for the French, on July 1 a gale was blowing. The harbor was poorly charted, its entrance known to be tricky and difficult. Napoleon had no choice but to put men and materiel ashore on a windy beach eight mites west of Alexandria, then march them overland to launch his assault. The landings began at noon, but it wasn't until 8 that evening that any appreciable number of Napoleon's wretched, waterlogged troops reached land. The rough seas drowned at least 19 men, and when the remainder finally got ashore, they had no horses, artillery, food or water. At dawn on July 2, already worn out, they began the march to Alexandria. Nomadic Bedouin tribesmen had filled in most of the wells along the route, the cisterns were empty, and the heat of the midsummer sun was hke nothing any of the French soldiers had ever experienced. The ever-present Bedouin seized the inevitable stragglers—exhausted soldiers, a few wives and camp followers, some French merchants who planned to open businesses in Cairo—but returned them a few days later. Fascinated by the creamy white skins of the men, the tribesmen had raped them. The women they had only beaten. Defending Alexandria were just 500 Fgyptian garrison troops, and despite his soldiers' condition. Napoleon took the city in a matter of hours. Though it had been Fgypt's capital in ancient times—the city from which Cleopatra ruled, famous for its lighthouse and its library—by 1798 the port city was a miserable ghost of itself, its wonders long since vanished and most of its 6,000 people dirt

MILITARY HISTORY

poor. Indeed, Alexandria's defenders had scant ammunition and could do httle more than throw stones at the French invaders. The rest of Egypt was nearly as defenseless. Ottoman control of Egypt was only nominal, and for all intents, the country had been ruled since about 1200 by the Mamelukes (Arabic for "owned"), a self-perpetuating class of warriors comprising ex-slaves, mostly from the Caucasus Mountains in southern Russia. Mameluke agents made regular trips into the Caucasus to buy 8- to 10-year-old boys from their parents. The Mamelukes trained

áThe French wanted Egypt as a colony, as the gate to the land route to India and the Far East and as the site for a canal to the Red Sea V the boys as warriors, then freed them when they reached fighting age, whereupon they received two servants and a command. Only a boy so trained could achieve Mameluke nobility; descent had nothing to do with it. Indeed, the children of Mameluke warriors were looked down upon as not having achieved their standing in the proper way, through training. Mameluke wives correspondingly avoided having children in hopes of keeping their looks and thereby their husbands, who were as likely to prefer sex with concubines, or Mameluke boys, as with their wives. A different Mameluke chieftain, or bey, ruled each of Fgypt's 24 provinces. The beys fielded mounted Mameluke units and, in the absence of outside enemies, fought regular battles among themselves for power and land. Fighting in concert to defend

their nation was a concept unknown to them.

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apoleon went to Fgypt with a complicated agenda. The French were actually allied with the Ottoman Empire, and lor a while Napoleon and the five-man directory that ruled France tried to maintain the ridiculous fiction that the invasion of Egypt was meant to strengthen Ottoman control and prevent Britain from seizing Fgypt for itself. The latter point was not farfetched; the Ottomans were widely believed to be on the verge of collapse, and the British, Russians and Hapsburgs were all ready to pounce on the remains. The French wanted Egypt as a colony, as the gate to the land route to India and the Far Fast and as the site for a canal connecting the Mediterranean to the Red Sea across the Fgyptian isthtnus. King Louis XIV had proposed just such a canal to the Ottomans a century before, at a time when the French were building their own Canal du Midi in southern France. Napoléon also dreamed of using Egypt as a base from which to drive the British from south Asia and end their empire. He saw himself leading his army across Arabia to the Indian Ocean and from there across Persia to the Indus. Nothing if not ambitious, he aspired to a greatness comparable to that of Alexander the Great. All ihai stood in his way were some 12,000 Mamelukes, tierce warriors but hardly a match for Napoleon's 30,000 seasoned French troops. The Mamelukes weren't the only obstacle, however. The French also had to contend with the desert, the incredible heat, the flies, the scarcity of water, the hostility of Egyptians forced to suffer infidels in a sacred landscape and, last and worst, diseases such as the plague. In truth, the French had come to Fgypt knowing little about il and wholly unprepared for the challenges it presented. Napoléon, trying to keep his destination a secret until the last minute, had not even issued canteens to his men, much less water

to fill them. The troops were wearing wool uniforms in July. Napoleon was about to encounter not the Egypt of classical antiquity, the great civilization described by Herodotus, the Egypt of Alexander the Great and Julius Caesar, but the real Egypt of the 18th century, a cauldron of heat and sand. And he encountered it almost immediately.

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apoleon wanted to reach Cairo as soon as possible, before the Nile flooded and inundated the very land he had to cross. To get to Cairo, he had to get lo the Nile, and the mouth of the river lay 40 miles east of Alexandria, at Rosetta, and that was not the most direct route. The latter led across ihe desert to Damanhur, and then to the Nile at El Rahmaniya. Erom Alexandria he senl four divisions on this route and one to Rosetta. The first French units left Alexandria on July 3. They lacked sufficient

Napoléon and his staff crossed the desert on horses and camels purchased from local tribes. The Bedouin then turned on the French, harassing them all the way from Alexandria to Cairo.

horses; some cavalrymen had to walk, and one division even had to leave its artillery behind. Napoléon sought to obtain horses and camels from local Bedouin leaders, but the sheiks in Cairo convinced the tribesmen to switch sides, and they harassed the French along the entire route of march. The khamsin, the desiccating wind that blows up the dust of the Libyan Desert into great choking, blinding clouds, had begun. The French troops had only dr)' biscuits to eat, and who can eat hardtack without water to soften It? Thirst quickly became the deadliest enemy A few cistems, half full, could not possibly satisfy the thirst of thousands of men on a hellish march. "It

was a pity to see men stretched on their bellies around that fetid hole, dying of tbirsl, panting and unable to satisfy their craving," wrote one officer. Before the march was over, hundreds had died, some by their own hand. Meanwhile, word got around that Murad Bey, with his army of Mamelukes, was on the march to meet them. "It would be difficult," wrote J. Christopher Herold in his superb history of the expedition, Bonaparte in Egypt, "to give an idea of the disgust, the discontent, the melancholy, the despair of that army during its first weeks in Fgypt." At the Nile there was water at last, and fields of watermelons, and the French filled their bellies with both. A few miles south of El Rahmaniya, ai the village of Shubra Khit, they met Murad Bey on July 13. The chieftain had perhaps 4,000 men on horseback, 10,000 peasants armed only with clubs and a small flotilla of gunboats.

BONAPARTE IN EGYPT, 1798-1801 apoléon's campaign in Egypt—intended to protect France^s economic interests in the eastern Mediterranean while hampering tritain's access to India—suffered from poor planning ] and a succession of military and political missteps. While the experienced, well-disciplined French army enjoyed considerable tactical success, the British Royal Navy's 1798 victory at Aboukir Bay stranded ^. Napoleon's legions in Egypt. Lacking adequate logistical support from Paris and confronting an intensely hostile climate, the French launched an attack into Syria meant to blunt a developing Ottoman offensive. Defeated at Acre, Napoléon retreated to Egypt. The French ultimately surrendered in 1801.

EGYPTIAN MAMELUKES Former slaves who rose to power in Egypi, the Matnelukes were superb horsemen but no match for modern artillery or firearms. Their courage so impressed Napoléon, however, that he later incorporated Mameluke units into his European formations.

BATTLE AT SHUBRA KHIT

In many ways a preview of the later Battle of the Pyramids, the fight at Shubra Khit pitted Napoleon's artillery-reinforced infantry squares against the mounted Mamelukes for the first time. Unable to penetrate the French squares and decimated by artillery, the Mamelukes withdrew.

SHUBRA KHIT EL RAHMANIYA

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One division sent via Rosetta, arrives July 8

Battle of ttie Nile August 1-3

Batile with Murad Bey and Mamelukes July 13

Ju/y S - 1 0 o OA^MANHUR

Four Wvisions sent via Damanhur

Troops depart Alexandria Julys O ALEXANDRIA

DISTANCES: Cairo: 112 mJles/180 km Maps by Steve Walkowiak

iNapoleon's landing location Juiy 1.1798

SOLDIERS AND GOOD SCIENTISTS Though Napoleon's intentions in Egypt were decidedly militaristic, he also had the foresight to take along savants—scientists, engineers, mathematicians, architects, archaeologists and artists—to discover, document and collect the remains of ancient Egyptian civilization.

OTTOMANS AND EUROPEANS

Though the European powers widely believed the 500-year-old Ottoman Empire to be in decline, at the time Napoléon invaded Egypt, the Ottomans still held sway over vast areas of North Africa, the Middle East and southeastern Europe. Indeed, the size of his empire made it difficult for Sultan Selim Ml (r. 1789-1807) to effectively repel European encroachments. Napoleon's humiliating defeat in Egypt sparked a significant —if short-lived—revival of Constantinople's influence. Acre JaHn

^ile River O CAIRO

Nile River Delta

BABA Battle of the Pyramids July 21

Pyramids

jNjjIe River (Rosetta distributary)

NAPOLÉON AND THE BIRTH OF EGYPTOLOGY

The savants documented sites ranging from Giza to the ruins of ancient Thebes and the temples of Karnak. Upon returning to France in 1801, they published Description de l'Egypte, a lavishly illustrated 24'Volume compilation of their findings. Despite its prohibitive sale price, this founding document of Egyptology proved popular and was at least partiy responsible for the "Egyptomania" that swept Europe in the eariy 19th century.

THE ROSETTA STONE

At the port of Rosetta, the savants found a 1.700-pound slab of granite bearing an inscription in Greek, demotic (the common language of Egypt at the time the stone was carved) and hieroglyphics. When deciphered, the stone unlocked the cultural traditions of ancient Egypt.

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The Mamelukes rode to war on the finest Arabian horses and wearing much of their wealth—richly colored silk vests and robes, jewelry, and coins wrapped in their turbans. Each warrior carried a carbine, two or three pistols, javelins and a scimitar or two. They were generally big men, chosen for their size as boys, and they were expert horsemen who could decapitate an enemy with one swing of the scimitar. But for all their brilliant array, for all their skill, the Mamelukes never had a chance. The French troops might have been miserable, but they were experienced and highly disciplined fighters. They had defeated armies all over Europe, and to them all the Mamelukes' weapons and colorful silks were nothing more than booty. Each French division formed into a deadly fighting square, each side six men deep, with artillery pieces at the corners. The mounted Mamelukes pranced around the squares, looking for a way in. After an hour of probing.

MILITARY HISTORY

Fought August 1-3,1798. the Battle of the Nile (commemorated on the medal at upper left) was a decisive British naval victory that stranded Napoleon's army in Egypt and left the Royal Navy dominant in the region.

they charged, only to be met by a hailstorm of grapeshot and small-arms fire. For another hour they probed the French squares, to no effect. Meanwhile, on the river the French engaged the Greek-manned Mameluke gunboats, until a lucky shot blew up the Mameluke flagship, prompting the other vessels' hasty withdrawal. Finally, shattered against the French squares, ihe entire Mameluke army fled.

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n July 21, the French and the Mamelukes met again, in unbearable heat at a place called Embaba, within sight of the pyramids and the Cairo skyline. This time the French faced more Mameluke infantry, including tough Albanian soldiers known as Janissaries, and a larger horde of largely ineffective Bedouins

and peasants, but about the same number of Mameluke horsemen. Despite a grueling march south, the five French divisions quickly and efficiently formed squares, now 10 men deep and again nearly impregnable. When the Mameluke horsemen closed within yards of the squares, the French opened a withering fire. Dead horses and dead men piled up as the horsemen repeatedly charged. The Janissaries retreated to a walled compound in Embaba, which the French stormed and, having taken it, killed all the defenders. Other Mamelukes, trying to escape, drowned in the Nile. Two hours after it began, the Battle of the Pyramids was over. Murad Bey retreated to Cairo and then look his family and what remained of his army to the Sinai Peninsula. Most of Cairos citizens also abandoned the city, piling whatever they could on carts and heading south up the Nile—to be robbed by Bedouin, whose only interest in any warfare was booty. But it was the French who were gathering the bulk of the goods. One French officer

who had killed a Mameluke horseman found more than 500 gold pieces sewn into the dead inans skullcap. The French dragged the Nile for corpses to rob; they were insatiable, indefatigable. At nightfall on July 22, two French infantry companies and five officers marched into Cairo. The city was a maze of tiny streets, mud hovels and great sparkling palaces, but of its 300,000 people there was virtually no sign. The French troops found the streets deserted, and all they could hear was the wailing of women from behind shuttered doors and windows. It didn t maitcr. Fgypt was conquered. Napoleon—who with his staff had taken up residence in Murad Bey's riverfront palace—could not savor his triumph, however. He'd discovered that his wife, his beloved Josephine, was in Paris with a lover.

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n August 1, a week after the French occupied Cairo, Horatio Nelson and his flotilla appeared off Alexandria. He found Vice Admiral François-Paul Brucys d Aigalliers' French fleet anchored in a line parallel to the beach along a stretch of shallow Aboukir Bay, just northeast of the city. The French line of battle was formidable—500 guns faced out to sea, and Brueys believed his warships had anchored far enough inshore to prevent the British from getting inside their line and firing on them from the lee, or land, side. Brueys had 13 ships of the line and four frigates, but what he did not have were experienced crews—half his men were under 18, and most had never seen combat. When the battle began, a quarter of the French crews were ashore, digging wells or on other errands. Nelson attacked with veteran British seamen manning his guns, and he came at full speed with all sails flying. U must have been a magnificent sight. It was certainly deadly. And daring. The Fnglish did not know the configuration of the sea bottom between the French line and the beach and simply sailed over ihe shoals. Inshore, a French frigate fired on the lead Fnglish ships and was im-

mediately sunk. The FngUsh vessels, operating in two divisions, engaged the French line from both sides. As the French had not expected to use their landward batteries, they were unprepared and had a great deal of difficulty bringing the guns into play The ships at the rear of the French line were not in the action at all, as the wind was against them, They could only sit and watch. What they saw as night wore on and the fighting conlinucd was the loss of the French fleet. A British cannonball mangled the already wounded Brueys' left leg, taking the French com-

i A British cannonball took the French commander's iife two hours before fire ravaged his 118-gun fiagship, setting off her powder magazine V mander's life some two hours before fire ravaged his 118-gun flagship, L'Oriente, setting off her powder magazine in a massive explosion. By the time the battle ended the following morning, nine French ships had surrendered, three lay in tatters and one was at the bottom of the bay. What remained of Brueys' fleet—two ships of the line and a pair of frigates— cut their cables and escaped into the open Mediterranean.

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he French fleet's loss at the Battle of the Nile left Napoleon and his army stranded in Egypt. The Fnglish would patrol the coastline from then on; for the next three years they intercepted most French official communications. English newspapers even published letters from French soldiers to friends and family back home, in mockery Napoléon had

Egypt, but it was equally true that Egypt had him. In the end. Napoléon himself spent a little over a year in Fgypt, slipping out of the country and back to France after an abortive attempt to march his army north into the Levant in the spring of 1799. That campaign carne to grief at Acre, in Palestine, when he failed to take a crusader-era fort that ringed the city. He further damaged his reputation when he ordered the massacre of more than 2,000 Turkish prisoners at Jaffa—men one of his field commanders had promised amnesty Then, on ihe French retreat lo Egypt, Napoléon arranged for his doctors to poison those of his own iroops afflicted with the plague and delaying the French withdrawal. Barring certain archcologicai discoveries, the Egyptian campaign ended in failure for the French. The native parliament Napoléon established disintegrated. Occupation troops suppressed two separate rebellions in Cairo, with much bloodshed. French soldiers walked alone through the city's streets at iheir peril. In the countryside they faced even more danger. Messengers sent to distant outposts often vanished. Napoléon nominally ruled the country while there, hut he never pacified it. Barely half of the 40,000 French soldiers and sailors Napoléon took to Fgypt made it home again. Of those repatriated, some 3,000 were invalids. By the lime they got back to France, Napoléon was first consul and would shortly become emperor. But Egypt remained under Ottoman control; the Ottomans refused to collapse as expected; the English consolidated their hold on India and expanded their empire; and Napoléon had achieved none of his lofty goals. U had been demonstrated, finally, that he was not invincible. Egypt had beaten General Bonaparte, decisively. (^ For further reading, Anthony Brandt recommends: Bonaparte in Egypt, hy J. Christopher Herald, and Mirage: Napo-

léons Scientists and the Unveiling of Egypt. i^V N'"fl Bw'ieigfi.

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ver large areas of the country," wrote Britwestern lowlands, while the colonial government. ish journalist Malcolm Muggeridge in dominated hy ethnic Malays, had far less success in the London Daily Telegraph, 'law and gaining the cooperation of its Chinese population. order have, to all intents and purposes, In response to the outhreak of armed violence, broken down. Cotntnunications, esthe colonial administration increased ihc size of pecially by rail, are continuously interrupted; road the police force from 9,000 to 50,000 in just six travel is hazardous, and often requires an armored months. Although administrators found enough vehicle and an armed escort lo he tolerably safe." men to put in uniform, they did not pay sufficient Such was the state of affairs in the British colony attention to quality control, training and superof Malaya in February 1952, vision, with the result thai on the eve of Gerald Tetnpler's police leaders were woefully arrival as British high commisdeficient in experience, comsioner to take charge of what petence and integrity. One secould fairly be called a "quagnior British officer explained, mire." The country was then in "Inexperienced people often the throes of a widespread and think that you have hut to orgadestructive insurgency. nize a force or service on paper, equip it with suitable weapons Yel within months of Tcmand fill the establishtncnt with pler's assumption of cotnmand, men." lt was "a hopeless attithe British had broken ihe intude," he concluded, because "it surgents' momentutn, and hy is men that count, not bodies." the end of his 28 months in The Malayan civil adminiscommand, they had sent the intration, staffed at the critical sitrgents irrevocably on a downdistrict level hy British civil serward slope. That reversal of forvants, also suffered from severe tune is well known, but the leadership deficits. The British reasons behind it remain hotly government did not sctid disdisputed. Those reasons are of trict administrators with suffiinterest not only as crucial deTO WIN A BRUTAL cient experience or language tails of the historical record, BUSH WAR IN MALAYA, skills, and some of those it did hut also as guideposts for the send were actually opposed to GENERAL SIR GERALD future. The lessons of what was Britain's Malaya policy. The called the Malayan Etnergency TEMPLER WENT BACK head of the administration. are among the tnost frequently High Commissioner Sir Henry TO THE BASICS cited historical precedents for Gurney, spent most of his time subsequent Atnerican and Britin his office on adtninistraBYMARKMOYAR ish counterinsurgency doctrine tive tasks and rarely visited and operations. the districts in the countryside to see how his subThe Malayan Emergency hegan in May 1948 ordinates were performing. when the nation's communist party, frustrated in its efforts 10 win political power hy legal means, began With the police and civil authorities unahle to attacking government officials and assassinating contain the spreading insurgency, 4,000 British plantation managers. Headquartered in the colony's army regulars entered the fray Their intervention dense jungles, the comtnunists marshaled thouwas crucial when, in late 1948, insurgent forces sands of veteran soldiers, nearly all of them ethnic attempted to take over Malayan towns in emulaChinese, who had fought the Japanese in World tion of the Chinese communists' recent convenWar U. Cotnmunist cadres recruited extensively tional attacks on China's towns and cities. British among the ethnic Chinese squatters in Malaya's hattalions thwarted such initiatives in Malaya

MILITARY HISTORY

;

•%•''

Itially bufit around police lerations (background) Malaya's counterinsurgency effort became effective with British Prime Minister Winston Cburcbill's January 1952 appointment of Lt Gen. Sir Gerald Templer asJvfb commissioner.

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and forced the insurgents to revert to guerrilla tactics. The British infantry regulars were able to push the guerrillas back into the jungle but lacked intelligence on the whereabouts of the enemy and seldom caught any of them.

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n 1950, buoyed by the final defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists in China, the Malayan guerrillas intensified their offensive operations. They concentrated attacks on the dispersed Malayan police forces, killing some 100 policemen per month. As the situation deteriorated, London sent U. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs in April 1950 lo take charge of the security forces. A distinguished veteran of World War 11 Asian jungle warfare, he quickly developed a new strategy that became known as the Briggs Plan. Central to his strategy was the relocation of the ethnic Chinese population into concentrated settlements that would be easier to defend against guerrilla intrusion. The plan also called for recruitment of the ethnic Chinese into local inilitias, known collectively as tbe Home Guard, and for the strengthening of the civil administration and the Special Branch, the police force's intelligence arm. The implementation of the Briggs Plan fell well short of expectations. Army and police commanders failed to adhere to some of Briggs' guidelines. With ongoing leadership problems, tbe police remained ineffective at collecting information and withstanding insurgent attacks. The Home Guard was generally inept and, in some cases, disloyal. Indeed, many Home Guard units performed so poorly that the government refused to issue Lhem weapons. General Sir John Harding Commander in chief of Britain's Far East Land Forces from 1948 to 1951, he oversaw initial counterinsurgency* efforts. He also prompied reactivalion of World War Il-cra Special Air Service commando units for use in Malava,

MILITARY HISTORY

During the fall of 1951, the British in Malaya suffered several sharp blows that would, in time, prove fortuitous: On October 6, Gumey was motoring from Kuala Lumpur to the resort at Fraser's Hill when armed insurgents ambushed his convoy, killing him. The next month.

cessful World War II generals, Churchill inter\ iewed Maj. Gen. Sir Gerald Templer for the job of cominander in Malaya. Churchill quickly concluded that Templer deserved his stellar reputation and injanuary 1952 offered bim the position of British high commissioner in Malaya. Churchill promised whatever support Templer deemed necessary, including top-noich perMALAY sonnel. Templer accepted tbe asPENINSULA signment with [be remark tbat having "ibe men to do the job" was "of primary importance."

A land of rugged mountains, thick jungles and swampy coastal plains, the Malay Peninsula presented Commonwealth military forces with daunting tactical and logistical challenges. Briggs was evacuated from Malaya v>áth a tropical illness, and be died shortly afterward. The insurgents intensified tbeir attacks to capitalize on the chaotic situation, and the countednsurgency drifted. On the other side of the world, meanwhile, British parliamentary elections returned Winston Churchill to power just after Gumey's assassination. Following recommendations from Field Marshal Sir William Slim, Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery and other suc-

5ir Henry Gurney A career Colonial Service officer who had earlier served in Africa, ihe Caribbean and Palestine, Gurney became British high commisioner of Malaya in 1948. He was killed in an insurgent ambush on Oct. 6, 1951.

Templer had dropped oui of school as a teenager to fight in World War I. Although he performed poorly at Sandhurst, tbe army retained him due to its dire need for infantry officers. Templer arrived in France in October 1917 but saw little action thanks to a series of misbaps and coincidences that spared him from harm. In March 1918, for example, Templer was hospitalized with diphtheria just before bis 800-man battalion plunged into the First Bal lie of tbe Somme and suffered 763 casualties. Templer spent much of ihe interwar period in the Middle East, gaining significant experience in battling guerrillas while serving in Palestine. During World War II, he became tbe British armys youngest corps commander but tben relinquished that position in order lo command tbe British 47tb Infantry Division in the Italian campaign. Tbc 47th played a critical role in preventing tbe Wehrmacht from ovemmning tbe Anzio beacbbead in February 1944. Wben the war ended, tbe British put Templer in charge of tbeir sector of occupied Germany, and he set about the task with cliaracterisdc vigor. Most famously, he fired the mayor of Cologne—future

U. Gen. Sir Harold Briggs As director of operalions in Malaya, the U.S.-born \cieran of British army sLTvicc in holh world wars based his counicrin.surf>ency plan on tactics ihai had worked in earlier guerrilla conflicts, such as ihe Second Boer War.

West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer—for inactivity

A

ccording to one popular interpretation of tbe Malayan Emergency, Templer reversed the wars momentum by introducing a new counterinsurgency strategy and disseminating new tactics through a doctrinal manual that later influenced U.S. Army and Marine Corps warfighting doctrine. But in actuality, Templer did not make major changes in strategy or tactics, relying instead on the strategy of the Briggs Plan. The doctrinal manual Templer first published in 1Q52—The Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya—merely codified Winston Churchill Returned lo power as prime minister in Britains l'-)51 general election. t hurehill soughi a more L-lieciive counierinsurgency iti Malaya. His seleelion of General Templer as high commissioner was vital to Brilains military success.

Outraged by the insurgents' brutality, many Malays supported the campaign to eradicate them. Here, antícommunist demonstrators parade in support of Templer's policies.

tactics that had been in use for years. Derived from Britain's conflicts in colonial South Africa (especially the Second Boer War), Burma, Palestine and the initiai experiences in Malaya, those tactics had been disseminated in the first years of the Malayan counterinsurgency through a series of pamphlets and in school instruction (in 1948 the British established a jungle warfare school in Malaya, with instruction based largely on lessons learned in the World War II Burma campaign against the Japanese). Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Wells Appoinled ehief of Australias General Staff in Decemher 1954, Wells presided over the deployment to Malaya of his nation's soldiers and air foree in support of Britain's ongoing cotmterinsurgency.

Templet's stunning success resulted, instead, from superior implementation of existing strategy and tactics. The key to improving implementation in Malaya, as in nearly all counterinsurgencies, was bettering the quahty of field commanders. Theorists have characterized counterinsurgency as either "population-centric" warfare, in which the loyalty of the population is the deciding factor, or as "enemy-centric" warfare, in which the destruction of the enemy is paratnount. But Templer's example suggests counterinsurgency is best viewed as "leader-centric" warfare, since obtaining the support of the population, defeating the enemy's armed forces and nearly everything Chin Peng A lifelong communist parly organizer who was itceoraied hy Britain for iiis World War M serviec againsl the Japanese, Chin led Malaya's insurgency. Counterinsurgency troops ultimately foreed his withdrawal into Thailand.

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else in counterinsurgency hinges on the talents and effectiveness of leaders. Accordingly, Templer began by replacing weak senior leaders. Among those to fall under his ax was his top subordinate, Malayan Federation Chief Secretary Sir Vincent del Tufo, whom the British secretary of state for colonies labeled a man with "no power of command" who ''gives out no inspiration" and "is, of course, quite useless as chief secretary" Taking advantage of Churchill's offer of top-quality leaders, Templer reached across the British Empire for the best senior executives; he picked as his intelligence operations chief Alec Peterson, a grammar school headmaster from Shropshire who had distinguished himself in World War II as the head of black propaganda operations in Malaya. Templer's next step was to fix leadership problems at the middle and lower levels. Like most senior leaders who have excelled at counterinsurgency, Templer delegated broad operational authority to local commanders. Rather than insisting those commanders ad-

to

ILITARY HISTORY

PolJce officers, above, search the bodies of Insurgents killed in fighting with government forces. Commandos of Britain's Special Air Service, right, prepare to move into the jungle after being flown In by helicopter, another successful tactical innovation. here to doctrine, he let them decide which counterinsurgency methods and principles were applicable in their areas, knowing that problems and solutions varied widely across the country. At the same time, Templer was so concerned about micromanagement by officials servingbetween himself and local commanders that he gave his phone number to lower-level commanders and told them to report any efforts by others to interfere in their work. With command thoroughly decentralized, success depended upon the quality of those local leaders. Templer addressed local leadership on both the civil and military sides, for Churchill had given him the combined civil and military authority that had previously been divided between Gurney and

Briggs. Unlike Gurney, Templer left most administrative matters to two of his deputies and spent far more lime in the field visiting police posts, infantry battalion commands, district government headquarters and villages across ihe country. Arriving with little advance warning, he would spend hours talking with subordinates and the population. Templer was thus able to assess local commanders personally He also sent four of his stalf ofRcers to tour the country and conduct similar assessments. Through his formidable powers of intuition, Templer quickly identified weak leaders and relieved them withoul hesitation. He was somewhat more delicate in firing civil servants, as the Malayan civil service was unaccustomed to close scrutiny or relief for poor performance. Initially Templer fired only the two most egregious examples of poor leadership in the civil service— one whom he called "an awfully nice fellow but quite gaga," the other whom he characterized as "absolutely burnt out and useless, though a nice chap."

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In finding replacements for those he sacked, Templer demonstrated exceptional perseverance and ingenuity. London did not act on his pleas for more Chinese-speaking ci\il ser\'ants, so Templer engaged an energetic former missionary to locate Chinese-speaking missionaries and convince them to work in Malaya. He also chose the most promising two dozen Malayan cadets and sent them to Sandhurst for training. Templer enlarged the Special Branch of the police and stocked it with firstrate officers recruited from throughout the empire, emphasizing the quahties of initiative and creativity. As a result, intelligence collection on the insui^ents surged. But recognizing the Hmited depth of the police officer pool and the futility of fielding forces without adequate leadership, Templer cut the other police elements from 71,000 to 54,000. Although Templer sought to recruit more ethnic Chinese into the Home Guard, he filled most of the leadership slots with British and Australian officers, due to the past incompetence and

MILITARY HISTORY

Young police recruits learn the basics of rifle marksmansbip. Templer reduced the size of tbe initially ineffective police forces, trading numbers for improved morale and capability. disloyalty of many Chinese officers. In Septemher 1952, Templer notified London, "The Home Guard is not progressing as fast as I would wish or had hoped. This is almost entirely due to the lack of expatriate officers (ahout which I sent you an urgent telegram)., ,We will never gel any sense into the thing until we get the British and Australian officers for whom we have been striving so long." Once British and Australian officers began arriving. Home Guard performance improved substantially, and in the following year, the Home Guard assumed all security responsibilities in 150 of the 500 principal relocation sites.

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ver and above his administrative skills and remarkable energy, Templer proved a charismatic and inspirational leader. He often delivered effective motivational

speeches, energizing counterinsurgents of ail nationalities and occupations. Templers vigorous spirit rubbed off on subordinate commanders, and they in turn energized the soldiers, policemen and civil servants operating in the countryside. After hearing Templer speak, tme British official remarked, "The impact was electrifying. Templer combined high-powered vitality and a slightly Machiavellian expression with ruthless determination and an infectious sense of humor," Templer endeared bimself to those under his command by paying personal attention to them and soliciting their opinions. A young British officer described him as "dynamic, enthusiastic, energetic and, for someone in my position, a hero, who was always open to ideas from junior officers like myself." On his frequent visits to villages, Templer talked with ordinär)' citizens in shops and alleys and spoke to the assembled population about the tasks ahead. These appearances usually had a galvanizing effect on the people, although there was the occasional mis-

step: At one village where the guerrillas had recently conducted an effective ambush, Templer told a gathering of villagers, "You're a buncb of bastards!" which the interpreter translated as, "His excellency informs you that he knows that none of your mothers and fathers were married when you were born." Templer continued, "You may be bastards, but you'll find out tbat I can be a bigger one." The interpreter conveyed this statement lo tbe befuddled villagers as, "His excellency does admit, however, tbat his father was also not married to his mother." Templer also made a point of visiting Malaya's vital rubber plantations and tin mines, wbere much of the ethnic Chinese population lived and worked. He pushed mine and plantation managers to provide good working conditions and wages to defuse worker discontent, while exhorting laborers to reject communist calls for strikes. One plantation owner commented after hearing Templer, "Here was a man al least who knew what be wanted to do and bow to do it." Templer also look his message into ibe capital city of Kuala Lumpur, which was physically and psychologically removed from thefightingin the countryside. The city's residents, particularly the Europeans, seemed unconcerned about the insurgency and were keeping ibemselves busy with business and pleasure. Upbraiding tbe capitals bigb society at the Rotary Club in April 1952, Templer exclaimed, "You see today bow tbe communists work....Tbey seldom go to tbe races. They seldom go to dinner parties or cocktail parties. And they don't play golf!" A few weeks later, be reminded the chamber of commerce ibat tbe Europeans Ln Malaya bad an obligation to participate in tbe community and spend time in volunteer activities; he published a list of organizations ihat needed volunteers, and as a result of his exhortations, large numbers of Europeans did volunteer their time.

The one audience with which Templer did not regularly triumph was the media. Although he did nol impose censorship, be berated local newspaper editors for printing items be considered detrimental to tbe cause. In response, journalists, including some who had initially praised him, wrote more negative stories on the war and bis performance.

When traveling through Malaya's restive and often dangerous rural areas. Templer and his wife, Lady Edith, employed an armored car. With improved intelligence and increased security in populous areas, the government was able to obtain more and better information, wbich tbe upgraded security forces used to capture thousands of insurgents. Intelligence was not plentiful enough, however, to eliminate the need for offensive patrolling in the jungle; in 1954 the average soldier was still spending 1,000 hours on patrol before encountering tbe enemy. Tbe effectiveness of jungle patrolling, therefore, usually came down to the tactical proficiency and perseverance of small-unii leaders—a point succinctly stated in Templer's operations manual: "The success or failure of tbese operations therefore depends on the standard of junior leaders....The type of junior leader required is a mentally tough, sell-reliant hunter, determined to close with and kill the CT [communist terrorists!."

The presence of capable security forces in tbe villages made it barder for the insurgents to recruit, gather intelligence and collect food. The police and civil servants also devised innovative methods for limiting the insurgents' access to food, which was especially important, as guerrillas in tbe jungle relied on food from the villages. For example, the counterinsurgents organized the cooking of rice al central kitchens and banned the sale of uncooked rice, ensuring that rice would spoil before it could be transported deep -^^ into tbe jungle. As anoth• ^ cr means of compelling prompt consuinpiion, they required village shops to puncture cans of food at the time of purchase. The impacts of all these steps? When tbe communist party leaders ordered I tbe Malayan guerrillas to ^ intensify offensive operaI tions in late 1952 to counteract Templer's gains, ibe guerrillas could not comply because of dwindling troop numbers and food supplies. The insurgency's woes multiplied in 1953 and 1954. Whereas insurgent strikes had averaged more than 500 per month wben Templer arrived, they sank below 100 before he departed in tbe middle of 1954. Insurgent casualties exceeded insurgent recruits in 1952 for thefirsttime, and at Templer's exit the insurgents had lost more than half ibeir lotal strength. Some lighting did streich into the posi-Templer years, but by then the insurgents were essentially beaten and would never again pose a serious threat to Malaya's government. The colony achieved its independence in 1957. As happens from time to time in ibe bistory of counterinsurgency, ibe installation of one effective leader bad turned a quagmire into a patb to victor)'. Il is a lesson worth remembering. <^ For further reading, Math Mayar recom-

mends: Suppressing Insurgency, by John Coates, and Hearts and Minds in Guerrilla Warfare, by Richard Slubbs.

WITH A GREEN SQUADRON HEWN FROM THE FORESTED SHORES OF LAKE ERIE, OLIVER HAZARD PERRY CHALLENGED THE MIGHT OFTHE ROYAL NAVY

FRONTIER BYERICNIDEROST

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he lookout aboard the brig USS Lawrence peered into the distance, looking for signs of the enemy in the pale light of dawn. He was stationed at the masthead, and from his high perch could see the great blue expanse of Lake Erie stretching east to the horizon. It was the morning of Sept. 10, 1813, and Lawrence was the flagship of a nine-vessel U.S. Navy squadron anchored at Put-in-Bay, Ohio. The Americans had been playing a deadly game of bide and seek with their British enemy, and most were eager for action. But where was the Royal Navy squadron? The lookout thought he saw a shape in the distance. "Sail, ho!" he cried. "Where away?" asked ihe officer of the deck. "Off Rattlesnake Island!" came the swift reply. Before the officer could ask for details, the lookout again shouted, "Sail, ho! Sail, ho! Six sail in sight, sir!" There was no doubt—it was the British squadron commanded by Captain Robert Heriot Barclay, a veteran of Trafalgar.

MILITARY HISTORY

The American ships were an impressive sight as they emerged north past Rattlesnake Island and moved into Lake Erie waters, now gilded by a rising sun. The tiny flotilla—led by Master Commandant Oliver Hazard Perry, already a seasoned mariner at 28— would that day celebrate one of tbe few clear-cut American triumphs of the War of 1812. But while the U.S. Navy's victory in what came to be known as the Battle of Lake Erie resulted from Perry's leadership and his sailors' skills, it would not have been possible without the efforts of men more accustomed lo working with broadaxes and mallets than muskets and cannon. The real miracle of the American victory on that remote body of water was that just months earlier the ships of Perry's flotilla had been nothing more than standing trees. The U.S. fleet had literally been fashioned directly from the forest. The United States went to war with Britain in 1812 for several reasons, among them London's increasingly restrictive trade policies and its support

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A somewhat romanticized 1911 painting depicts Oliver Hazard Perrytransferring his flag from the badly damaged Lawrence to Niagara at the height of the Battle of Lake Erie.

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of Indian attacks on American settlers on the nation's Western frontiers. But it was Britain's disregard for U.S. sovereignty at sea that most aroused American indignation and patriotic fury. Engaged in a titanic struggle with Napoleon Bonaparte's France and in need of both ships and sailors, London had begun seizing U.S. vessels and "impressing"—involuntarily drafting—American seamen into Royal Navy service. While American President James Madison and his cabinet sought to resist vi'hat they saw as gross British arrogance, they also saw the conflict as an opportunity British Canada seemed vulnerable, a rich prize ripe for the plucking. Once war was declared, it seemed only a matter of time before Canada—or at least a major portion of it—would be in American hands. But U.S. invasion attempts proved embarrassing fiascos. There was too much reliance on ill-disciplined militia, and too many of the officers were old, having learned their trade in the Revolution. Others were simply incompetent. Perhaps the bitterest blow came on Aug. 16,1812, when a befuddled Brig. Gen. WiUiam Hull surrendered Detroit to an inferior force of Redcoats and Indians under Maj. Gen. Sir Isaac Brock. The tables were now turned. Upper Canada (modern-day Ontario) was safe from American invasion, and Detroit could serve as a base of operations against American forts and supply depots. Even more important, the British gained control of Lake Erie. With the Great Lakes region still mostly viildemess, and the few roads primitive, ships were the most efficient mode of travel. Thus the country that controlled shipping on the lakes controlled the entire area. British naval forces on Lake Erie were modest, initially comprising just four vessels— one of which, the U.S. brig Adams, had been captured in Detroit. But in September 1812 the Americans had

MILITARY HISTORY

not one serviceable ship on the lake. Something had to be done, quickly

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oon after the fall of Detroit, one of the captured Americans slipped away from British custody and ultimately made his way to Washington. The man was Daniel Dobbins, a merchant captain with years of experience on Lake Erie, and during a cabinet meeting, he gave President Madison a full account of the situation in the Great Lakes. He strongly advo-

Surrounded by forest with ready access to Lake Erie, the remote settlement of Presque Isle was an ideal place to huild the small and nimble warships of Perry's American fleet. cated the creation of a U.S. naval force on the lakes. Madison realized the urgency of the situation and agreed that American warships must be constructed on Lake Erie. Maj. Gen. William Henry Harrison, governor of Indiana Territory and commander of the Army of the Northwest, was ready to move against the resurgent British enemy. American control of Lake Erie was a key ingredient in Harrison's plan to retake Detroit and push on into Upper Canada. Once the president agreed to the shipbuilding plan, Dobbins met with Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton to work out the details. Hamilton accepted Dobbins' arguments that Presque Isle (modern-day Erie, Pa.) was the best place to build ships on the lake and ordered the captain to proceed there and immediately begin construction of four gunboats. Dobbins

was allocated a budget "not exceeding $2,000" and appointed a sailing master in the U.S. Navy. Presque Isle was a recent settlement, a cluster of some 50 houses and log cabins hacked from the wilderness. Dobbins nevertheless believed the little island of rough civilization on the edge of a seemingly endless forest was the right place to establish a shipyard, for in addition to an ample supply of timber, it had both a sawmill and a blacksmith's shop. More important was its strategic setting. The Presque Isle peninsula juts out from shore, flanking an 8-square-niile bay perfect for sheltering a fleet and offering the only good natural harbor on 241-miIe-long Lake Erie. Blocking the bay entrance was a sandbar, stretching about a mile from the tip of the peninsula to the lakeshore. A 9-foot-deep channel snaked though this bar, and only a skilled pilot could navigate its tortuous curves. Effectively barred from entering, the British warships could not interrupt the building project. Work on the Lake Erie fleet began in late September 1812. Tradition holds that Dobbins himself felled the first tree, a sturdy black oak. He hired local loggers, and the forests soon rang with the sounds of blades hiting deep into tree trunks. Skilled carpenters came from such far-flung places as New York, Philadelphia and Newport, R.I.. calling for long and arduous treks though the wilderness. The men hired in Pennsylvania, for example, took five weeks to cover the 400 miles between the Quaker City and Presque Isle—a journey made worse by an incompetent guide. Estimates vary, but at the height of the shipbuilding effort some 300 workers labored in the two yards at Presque Isle —one at the mouth of Cascade Creek and the other at Lees Run. Two 110foot, 493-ton brigs were built at the former, where the water was deeper, while workers at the latter constructed smaller vessels. Another shipyard—on

AMERICAN SQUADRON Lawrence 20 guns 493 tons 136 crew

Ariel 3 guns 112 tons 36 crew

Caledonia 3 guns 180 tons 53 crew

Niagara 20 guns 493 tons 155 crew

Somers

Chippeway 2 guns 70 tons 27 crew

Little Belt

2 guns 94 tons 30 crew

Trippe lgun 50 tons 35 crew

Tigress lgun 96 tons 27 crew

Scorpion 2 guns 86 tons 35 crew

Porcupine 3 guns 83 tons 25 crew

BRITISH SQUADRON Detroit 19 guns 490 tons 160 crew

Queen Charlotte 17 guns 400 tons 135 crew

Lady Prévost 13 guns 230 tons 91 crew

Hunter 10 guns 180 tons 49 crew

2 guns 60 tons 40 crew

PERRY'S CODE OF SIGNALS One gun: Underway to get

White at the main: Tack

Green at the fore: Form the order of sailing ahead

White at the main peak: Follow the motions of flagship

Green at the main: Form the order of sailing abreast

Ensign at the main gaff: Engage the enemy

Green at the main peak: Form the order of battle on the starboard tack

White at the main, with stop in the middle: Chase

Green in the fore rigging: Form tfie order of battle on the larboard tack

Ensign in the fore rigging: Repair on board flagships, all commanders

Green in the main rigging: Close more the present order

Green and white at the main gaff: Come within hail

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Scajaquada Creek at Black Rock, some 93 miles northeast of Presque Isle on tbe Niagara River—was less useful, as it lay well within range of Britisb guns just across the river at Fort Niagara. Wooden ship construction was not a casual undertaking, and care had to be taken in choosing trees from among Presque Isle's abundant oak and ash. Shipwrights were particularly interested in finding curved or gtiarled trees, whose bent timber was ideal for sucb important curved structural pieces as catheads (the shafts from which anchors were suspended) and knees (used to support deck beams). Horse or ox teams dragged the cut timber to the constmction sites. An oak that had been standing in tbe forest in the mortiing might be part of a sbip's bull by afternoon, but therein lay a problem: Tbe sbipwrigbts bad no time to properly dry. or "season," the timber, so the sbips were made lai^ely of green wood. And the need to produce vessels quickly in a remote area caused other problems as well: Treenails—wooden pegs—initially substituted for bardto-obtain iron spikes and nails. And seams along the sbips' bull planking bad to be caulked in lead, for want of proper oakum. Dobbins hired master shipwright Ebenezer Crosby of New York to supervise tbe laying-down process. Crosby was replaced in February 1813 by Noab Brown, another experienced New York shipwright, who designed the two brigs as well as tbe smaller sloop and gunboats. Wbile they were at it. Brown and his crew of carpenters built more iban a dozen fleet boats and all tbe gun carriages, plus all the buildings for tbe two sbipyards, including a blockhouse, kitchen, mess building, barracks, a guardhouse and an office. Theirs was a busy winter. Witb the construction effort in expert hands, Dobbins could turn bis attention to other issues—such as labor problems. Men worked from

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MILITARY HISTORY

dawn to dusk, but tbat was normal for the period. Wages were high. The trouble started wben Perry arranged for some 1,500 Pennsylvania militiamen to protect Presque Isle and its sbipyards. Called by one disgusted officer "as great a set of ragamuffins as ever a dog barked at," the troops were a mixed blessing at best. Worse, tbe sudden influx of additional consumers caused prices to skyrocket, making Presque Isle a miniature boomtown. Tbough wild game was fairly plentiful, the overcrowding meant scarce rations, and shipwright Brown recalled tbat his men "raised" (struck) and "declared they would work no longer if they could not have better fare." Brown

Though Noah Brown left no plans for the brigs Lawrence and Niagara, the 1913 raising of the latter enabled historian Howard I. Chapelle to create the drawings needed to build a replica.

wisely made no attempt to force them back to work. He instead let them forage for themselves, and wben tbey came back empty-banded, tbey understood he was doing his best for tbem and went back to work. Yet tbe biggest problem for the sbipbuilding effort was simply Presque Isle's remote location. Roads to and from tbe settlement were little more tban rutted dirt tracks tbough dense woodland. In wet weatber tbe roads turned into bogs, and tbe Conestoga wagons used for overland transpon— swaybacked giants pulled by six borses and capable of carrying two tons of cargo—often sank to tbeir axles in the ooze. Freight cbarges were correspondingly bigh, even if delivery times were slow. Flour was $100 per barrel, and it could cost $1,000 to transport a cannon from Albany to Lake Erie.

Hard work and resourceful improvisation allowed tbe sbipwrigbts to make steady progress despite the many challenges. Wben Perry arrived in late Marcb to take command of the growing fleet, he pinned his hopes on Pittsburgh as a major source of tbe supplies needed to complete tbe ships. A bustling town of 6,000, Pittsburgh boasted foundries, rope walks, metal sbops and forges that collectively could produce most everything needed. One hundred thirty miles of the usual nightmarish wilderness track separated Pittsburgb and Presque Isle, but Perry knew of an alternate route. Shallow-draft keelboats could carry materials from Pittsburgb up tbe Allegheny River to French Creek, then up the French to Waterford. It was 14 miles from tbere to Erie via a new graveled toll road that was corduroyed—surfaced with half logs— where it crossed swampy areas. With Perry's plan in place, work proceeded rapidly through the spring—until an outbreak brougbt construction to a bait. A "lake fever"—possibly typhoid—killed one worker and made many others sick. Perry himself became feverisb for a time. The enforced boiling of drinking water finally eased the problem, and tbe furious work pace resumed. Byjuly 1813 the American lake flotilla was nearly complete. At Presque Isle lay tbe two 20-gun brigs, Lawrence and Niagara; ibe tbree-gun schooners Aiiel and Porcupine; and the two-gun scbooner Scorpion. Soon joining tbem were five more ships—the captured British three-gun brig Caledonia; tbe two-gun schooner Somers; tbe singlegun schooners Ohio and Tigress; and tbe single-gun sloop Tiippe. These ships had slipped through a British blockade at Black Rock to join tlie force at Presque Isle. Perry's decision to send Dobbins on Ohio for food and additional munitions reduced bis fleet to nine vessels. Perry may bave been ready for battle, but Barclay's Britisb squadron ar-

rived on July 20 and blockaded Presque Isle. Bad weather and short supplies forced them to withdraw on July 29. With ihc British gone. Perry hastened [o get his flotilla over the sandbar, which had protected the vessels during construction but would now only hinder their departure. To ease the ships over the sandbar, the Americans used ballast-filled "camels"—specially designed barges that closely hugged a vessel's hull. As men removed the ballast, both camels and vessel rose. In this manner, even the heavy flagship Lawrence cleared the bar. His fleet free. Perry went looking for a fight.

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he long months of hard work in the wilderness came to a head on Sept. 10, 1813, when Perry and his flotilla finally met the enemy in battle near the American base at Put-in-Bay. The British fleet comprised six vessels—the 19-gun brig Dfí?-í»íí, Barclay's flagship; ihe 17-gun ship-rigged sloop Queen Charlotte; the 13-gun schooner Lady Prévost; the 10gun brig Hunier; the two-gun schooner Chippeway; and the two-gun sloop Li«le Belt. Barclay's ships bad superiority in long guns, traditional ordnance that could hurl a cannonball about a mile. By contrast, most of the American guns were shorter-range but more destructive carronades. At first the British had the weather gauge—the wind at their hacks and in their favor—forcing Perry to tack slowly to gain headway. At midmorning the wind turned in Perry's favor but remained light, so moving into range oí the enemy was difficult, and his smaller vessels—the schooners and sloop—tagged behind. But Barclay had his own troubles. His supplies were low, and a shortage of skilled seamen meant he'd had to fill out his depleted ranks with poorly trained British soldiers and Canadian militiamen. The baille opened just before noon when Delroit fired a 24-pounder at extreme range. The shot fell short, but a second round holed Lawrence's hull. The resulting shower of wooden splinters shredded a nearby sailor, his body falling to the sand-strewn deck. He

was the first American casualty, hut he would soon have company With Lawrence still out of firing range, Perry signaled Scorpion and Ariel to open fire, and the smaller vessels did their best. Bui Vervy was puzzled to see Master Commandant Jesse Elliott's Nici^ara lagging behind. Elliot was certainly no coward, but his actions suggested an unwillingness to engage the enemy As the minutes dragged on, Detroit, Hiiiiler and Queen CharloUe poured broadsides into Lciwirnct'. The American flagship endured a hailstorm of cannonballs, grapeshot and canister, the iron shrapnel smashing the brig from stem to stern. The carnage was

iThe long months of hard work in the wilderness came to a head on Sept. 10,1813, when Perry and his flotilla finally met the enemy f terrible, yet Perry seemed to lead a charmed life. He stood in the thick of the fire, with men falling on all sides, yet remained unscathed. Lawrence finally closed within carronade range and struck out at her tormentors, but the contest remained unequal. The American ñagship was a wreck, ils bulkheads splintered, lines cut and sails so badly holed the ship could no longer maneuver. Perry decided to transfer his flag to Niagara, which remained on the fringes of the action. If he could bring Niagara into the fight, there was still hope of victory Perry climbed into Lawrence's undamaged launch and set off with four men at the oars. The half-mile passage under fire to Niagara exemplified Perry's extraordinary luck, as British musket rounds whistled overhead and nearmiss cannonballs chumed the water all around the launch.

Perry carried his personal flag with him, a banner that bore the legend DON'T GIVE UP THE SHIP. Romantic

painters depict him in full uniform, but he was dressed in an ordinary seaman's jacket. He was battle-grimed, his clothes likely splattered with the blood of his fallen crewmen. Bui Perry's gamble paid off. Upon reaching Niagara he took command and brought the brig into the battle, ordering Elliott to take Lawrencf's launch and urge the gunboats into closer action. Niagara's carronades soon had a telling effect on ihe British fleet, though even before the American brig's appearance, the British were in serious trouble. They had reduced Lawrence to a splintered wreck, but their own ships had taken severe punishment. Barclay was gravely wounded, as eventually were the captains and first lieutenants of every British vessel. Command thus fell to junior officers with much less experience. Noting Niagara's grim advance, the British tried to bring their vessels' undamaged starboard guns to bear But the inexperienced officers botcbed the maneuver and entangled Detroit and Queen Charlotte. Sensing his opportunity. Perry pounced, and Nia^tifa poured withering fire into the two immobilized British ships. Though Detroit and Queen CharloUe managed to free themselves, flesh and blood could stand no more. Tbe British Heel surrendered. Some of the smaller ships tried to flee but were caught and captured. The battle of Lake Erie was over. Each side suffered more than 100 dead and wounded, but tbe significance of this strategic victory could not be measured by casualty lists. The Americans had secured their nation's boundaries and its Western territories. British hopes of an Indian buffer state between Canada and an increasingly powerful— and assertive—United States had vanished in the gun smoke on Lake Erie. (^ Forßtrther reading, Eric Niderost recommtncis; Oliver Hazard Perry, hy David Curtis Skaggs, and The Building of Perry's Fleet on Lake Erie, 1812-1813, by Max Rosenberg.

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A 100-FOOT COLUMN IN ROME RECORDS THE 2ND CENTURY MILITARY EXPLOITS OF TRAJAN AND HIS LEGIONS BY RICHARD A. GABRIEL

ineteen centuries after its construction, Trajan's Column remains one of antiquity's great works of architecture, a magnificent work of art and a virtual history book preserved in Luna marble. The 100-foot-tall column in Rome commemorates Emperor Trajan's (r. 98-117) mihtary victories against Dacia (centered on modern-day Romania). Built between 106 and 113 utider the supervision of the ruler's chief architect, Apollodorus of Damascus, it comprises 29 marble drums, each 11 feet in diameter and averaging about 32 tons. ^ The column rises from a cubical pedestal 17 feet to a side. Forty-three window slits illuminate the hollow interior 1 of the column, and a 185-step spiral " staircase leads to the top. Although a marvel of Roman architecture and engi- i neering, the column may initially have served only to mark the height of Rome's Quirinal Hill, which workers had to cut inlOlMarcusUlpiusTraianus, back to make room for Trajan's new forum, the Emperor Trajan, mounted ^

a punitive expedition against

Shortly after the column's completion, Trajan (Marcus Ulpius Traianus) rededi,

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cated It to the m e m o r y of the bravest ot m e n w h o died for the republic," referring to the troops w h o fought with him in the r

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the defiant Kingdom of Dacia, which had flouted Trajan's predecessor Domitian a dozen

years earlier. Trajan trounced Dada within five years, then ordered the column, opposite, to commemorate his victory.

Dacian Wars of 101-102 and 105-106. The emperor had the outside of the column fashioned into a continuous scroll (volumen), a carved marble ribbon some 3 feet wide and more than 600 feet long, winding around the column in 23 spirals. The spirals depict more than 2,500 individual figures and relate, in ascending order, scores of scenes— 10 of which are detailed on the following pages. The reliefs were

originally gilded and painted in realistic colors, with weapons rendered in metal, and the column was capped with the statue oían eagle. Upon Trajan's death, the Roman Senate had his ashes and those of his wife. Ponipeia Piotina, sealed inside the pedestal in golden urns. It also replaced the eagle atop the column with a ¿0-foot bronze of the emperor, cast as a heroic nude with a spear in his right hand. In 1587 Pope Sixtus V replaced Trajans statue with one of Saint Peter, which remains atop the column.

account of the Dacian Wars, it is also a treasury of information about the hnperial Roman army—equipment, weapons, fortifications, hattle tactics and engineering—as well as our only source of information ahout the Dacian enemy it fought. The column enahles modern historians to evaluate the literary accounts of the period, which were often inaccurate or written mueh later by military amateurs, and to uncover details not recorded in those accounts. Upon becoming etnperor in 98, Trajan faced a major security problem in Daela, The Roman eastern frontier ran along the Danube from Germany to the Black Sea. Only Dacia remained unconc|uered, blocking land and sea traffic in both directions. In 86-88 Emperor Domitian's two military expeditions against Dacia ended in disaster, and the Dacians continued to attack Roman settlements along the river. In 101-102, Trajan fought three campaigns in the First Dacian War, followed in 105-10Ö by two more campaigns in the Second Dacian War. The latter ended with the capture of Sarmlzegetusa, the Daeian capital, the suieide of the nation's king and the displacement of its population. Latin speaking colonists repopulated the country, and of the original languages of Slavic derivation in Romania, only the Romanian neo-Latin language survived.

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The scenes and details on the column's panels are renditions of detailed sketches made by militar)' artists who accompanied the Roman army on campaign and recorded details of the events they witnessed. Each scene on the column Is an amalgam of several artists' sketches. It was prohably Apollodorus himself who assembled the master script from the war correspondents" reports and sketches and, perhaps, even from Trajan's own battle diary The monument thus provides a liistoricalty accurate, though not strictly chronological,

MILITARY HISTORY

In 98-99, two Roman annies—one moving east from Germany and the other sailing west from the Black Sea— converged on the Iron Gates of Orsova, a narrow, 12-mile-long gorge that controlled ihe Danuhe and formed the border of Dacia, Trajan's army comprised 100,000 legionnaires and auxiliary troops. The exterior of the 100foDt column is designed as a continuous marbie ribbon, 3 feet wide and 670 feet long, that wraps around a central pillar in 23 spirals. Roman artists rendered hundreds of vignettes in marble relief, depicting more than 2,500 individual figures.

On the March DETAILl The first panel on the column. shows Trajan (at lower centa) assembling his iiimics on Lhe south bank of the Danube and crossing the river on a bridge oJ boats (lower left) made from hollowed-out log canoes, ¡rajan ordered two boat bridges constructed

across the Danube, one upstream of the ¡ron Gates and the other downstream, which enabled both armies lo cross into Dacia and come at the capital from two directions. The soldiers on the panel are not wearing breeches because it is summer They are carrying their kit in satchels attached to poles (upper left). Each kit contained a saw, an ax, a sickle, a chain and a rope. The string-bag on the pole held the soldier's rations. Roman engineers carved a 12-milelong roadbed along the cliff walls of the Iron Gates on the south bank of tbe river. They then drilled holes in tbe rock and inserted wooden beams that supported cantilevered planks, upon whicb tbey laid a wooden roadbed.

Into Camp DETAIL 2 shows the Koman army entering camp at the end of a day's march. The legionnaires are wearing steel lorica segmentata body armor and crestless helmeis and are canying gladii (shoii swords) and tile-shaped scuta (shields). Portrayals of weapons like the pilum and spears, originally rendered on the column in metal, have long since vanisiied. Adjacent panels depict camp walls made of sod and beams, signifying a semipermanent facility Tbe baggage train consists of pack mules and twowbeeled carts. Bebind tbe camp walls, soldiers are erecting three types of tents: the large praetorium for the commander, the teníoriíí of tbe tribunes and centurions and tbe simple papiliones for the soldiers. Eight-man squads occupied a single tent.

Assaulting the Walls DETAIL 3 shows the Romans attacking one of the hill forts that defended the Dacian capital. The outer wall (at upper right) is a stout wooden palisade, while inside is a walled citadel. Auxiliary troops—which would have included Syrian bowmen and Germans, the latter naked to the waísí, armed with clubs and carrying small round shields^are pressing the main attack, while legion-

naires./ormed in the protective testudo Joimation (at center), attack the main gate supported by slingcrs and a company oj archers armed with the Turkish composite how.

As Rome lacked the manpower to defend its strategic perimeter, it became standard practice to recruit local peoples for frontier campaigns. When on parade, these units often wore masks to conceal their non-Roman identity. Trajan's column is remarkable for its open portrayal of these ethnic units.

Medic! Medic! DETAIL 4 is among the most important on the column, as it is the only extant illustration ojlhe Roman military medical service in action. It shows the special squads o/capsarii Oiterally, bandagers), who served as combat medics, caring Jor the wounded on the battlefield. The capsarii wore the same combat gear as the soldiers, and their job was to get to the wounded quickly and provide acute medical care until response teams could evacuate the soldier to afield hospital for proper treatment.

The great advance of Roman military medicine was its incorporation of a professional medical service into the legion to care for the wounded on the battlefield. The head of the medical service was second in command of the legion and reported directly to the commander. The army established its own medical schools, trained its own doctors, operated its own hospitals and published Its own medical textbooks. Many of the medical innovations of the imperial period—the tourniquet, hemostat, arterial clip, surgical amputation through live tissue, disposable sealpels, sterilization of instruments, arrow extractors, camp hospitals and psychiatric wards—were introduced by career military physicians or physicians who had once served as military doctors. Each legion employed special units of horses, wagons, carriages and stretcher-bearers to quickly evacuate the wounded. Roman military doctors

MiLITARY HISTORY

also practiced triage, separatitig casualties according to severity of wounds and evacuating and treating the least severely wounded first. One of the primary goals of the Roman medical corps was to return to duty as many wounded as possible. On average the Roman medical corps saved 70 percent of the wounded that reached the field hospital alive. Once in the hands of a trained physician, the wounded Roman soldier received medical care not equated again until at least the beginning of the 19th century.

Artillery on the Move DETAIL 5 depicts Roman field artillety supporting a ground attack- The weapon at center is a torsion-powered carrobaUista of the newly introduced Heron type. A pair of mules tows a hoxlike cart probably designed to cany the weapon and its ammunition.

Operated by a two-man crew, the carroballista fired a 30-inch-long wooden shaft bolt tipped with a dartlike iron head at the rate of four to five rounds per minute. When used as an indirect fire weapon, its maximum range was 500 yards. Used as a direct fire field gun, its effective range was 250 yards. Its crew often used the weapon to pick off defenders atop city walls. In these cases, the carroballista was dismounted and emplaced in a firing pit, as shown elsewhere on the column. Each legion had approximately 70 of these devices. One panel appears to show the guns firing over the heads of the advancing Roman infantry while still mounted on the carriage. If so, this is the first portrayal we have of Roman mobile artillery in action.

The Danube Bridge DETAIL 6 shows the permanent Danube hñdge (top) Trajan ordered built in 104 to replace ihe boat bridges. Trajan (at right, with one arm outstretched) is offering a sacrifice for his soldiers' welfare.

ApoUodorus designed this bridge, the first permanent structure over the Danube. It spanned the river at its nar-

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rawest point east of the Iron Gates, a distance of nearly 1,000 yards. Trajan acted when it became clear that Decebalus—the Dacian king who after three years of fighting had begged Trajan for mercy and peace—was dragging out negotiations only to allow him time to rebuild his forces. Decebalus realized the strategic importance of the bridge and attacked the bridgehead on the north side of the Danube in an attempt to destroy it. Previous panels on the column show Trajan and a large force riding to the rescue, using the 12-mile road through the Iron Gates to reach the bridge in time to drive off the Dacians. The bridge remained longest span in the ancient world for the next millennium. Like Caesar's bridge across the Rhine, Trajan's bridge was intended as a key link in his supply line. The bridge, which was barely completed when the Dacian attack in 105 sparked the Second Dacian War, stood for 150 years until Emperor Aurelian withdrew Roman forces back behind the Danube and had the bridge destroyed.

The Enemy Depicted DETAIL 7 reveals the peoples oJ the Danube area related to or allied with the Dacians—including Saiwatians. Scythians, Roxolani and Bastamiani—in their native costumes.

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D£TAIL 8 depicts Dacian weapons, including the infamous falx, a 4-jootlong sicklelike sword (center) brandished with both hands, which struck fear in the hearts oj Roman infantrymen armed with the much shorter gladius. Also shown is the distinctive Dacian military standard, a snakelike dragon (at right) with a canine head and gaping fangs, sewn into a sleevelike shape and fastened atop a pike to catch the wind.

Dacian infantry fought without helmets or armor, bui their nobles wore cuirasses and a pilleatus, or Phrygian cap, as a mark of rank.

Dacian archers used the doublebent bow, and infantry fought with clubs and battleaxes. In the heavy Sarmatian cavalry, peculiar to the Daeian army, both horse and rider were heavily clad in mail or scale armor. The cavalry so impressed the Romans that within a few years of the Dacian Wars, similar units joined the Roman army

Taking Sarmizegetuse DETAILS SÍ1ÍIW.S ííif Roman siege of the Dacian capital. The Romans have erected a wall of circumvallation around the city, and the Roman siegei camp occupies the left side of the pan-\ el Leading the attack are javelin- and' spear-hurling legionnaires behind a wall of shields. Accompanying them is CI unit of slingers tasked with keeping defenders atop the walls from firing on the attackers. One Roman soldier (center, top) lias already reached the top of the wall via an assault ladder and cut off a defender's head; he holds il aloft as a trophy. The ground outside the wall would have bristled with sharpened stakes intended to impale the attackers, and the city approaches would have been covered with metal caltrops interspersed with stake pits. The caltrops— sharpened rnetal devices shaped like childrens' jacks and intended to stop cavalry attacks—were the same as those used by Caesar at Alesia, and the Dacians may have learned their use from the Romans. The siege of the Dacian capital was successful, as the Dacians burned the royal citadel to keep it from falling into Roman hands. The Romans later burned the retiiainder of the captured city to the ground.

an act of collective suicide. King Decebalus and his nobles are not among them, however In a later panel, the Dacian king gathers his few followers around him and addresses them one last time. Once more some followers chose suicide, but Decebalus again took flight on horseback. A cohort of Roman cavalry pursued and surrounded him in a forest. Rather than fall into enemy hands, Decebalus cut his own throat. The Romans hacked olf his

iHistorians have largely ' ignored military archaeological collections and monument inscriptions. Access to such resources remains problematic, though electronic images of artifacts and collections are making their way on to the Internetf head and presented it to Trajan, who forwarded it to Rome as proof of his victory

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he Dacian Wars were a triumph for Trajan and Rome, The region's large gold mines The Price of Defeat helped finance future campaigns and DETAIL 10 is among the most dramatic the expansion of Roman towns across Europe. Aceording to the text sources, scenes on the column. While some Dacian defa\dersßee and others sunender, Trajan's forces sent 100,000 male slaves back to Rome, Rome permaseveral nobles (identified by their Phrynently stationed two legions in the gian caps) prefer death to defeat. Sursouthern half of the country, which rounded by commoners who acclaim it annexed as a province. The Romans him, a Dacian chief drinks from a pot expelled much of the Dacian popuof poison before passing it to others in

lation in a sort of ethnic cleansing, replacing them with Latin-speaking colonists and retired legionnaires awarded land grants in the new province. Trajan came to be remembered as one of Rome's greatest emperors. Apollodorus, alas, met a harsher fate. Legend has it he fell into an argument with Hadrian, Trajan's successor, and criticized the emperor's lack of architectural talent. Hadrian, who saw himself as a great huilder, had Apollodorus executed. For tbe modem historian, Trajan's column is an important retninder of the value of archaeological artilacts in reconstructing events and details of the ancient past. Historians have long been forced to rely almost entirely upon the surviving texts of the period, although they well understood the texts were untrustworthy and sometimes written centuries after the events they purported to describe, often by authors with no military experience. In the past two decades, however, historians have re-evaluated these texts through a number of empirical experiments, testing the eilectiveness of ancient weapons and the physical endurance of animals and humans under actual field conditions. And the republication of ancient maps and introduction of such Weh tools as Google Earth have enabled detailed battlefield analysis. As helpful as all this has been, historians have largely ignored military archaeological collections and monument inscriptions. Access to such resources remains problematic, given their wide dispersion among different collections and countries, though electronic images of artifacts and collections are slowly making their way on to the Internet, granting more historians ready access. Still, Trajan's Column remains one of the most encyclopedic and valued ''documents" of Rome's military history. (^ For further reading, Richard A. Gabriel recommends Trajan's Army on Trajan's Column, by Sir Ian Richmond, and Trajan's Column and the Dacian Wars, /ly Lino Rossi,

Reviews RECOMMENDED

The Perils of the Atlantic Theater A MEASUREIISS

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A Measureless Peril: America in the Fight for the Atlantic, the Longest Battle ofWoild War 11, by Richard Snow, Scribner, New York, 2010, $27.

From September 1939 through May 1945, war raged on, above and below the surface of the Atlantic Ocean. Ships, planes, cargo and corpses slipped beneath waves marred by seemingly innumerable oil slicks. Long after those 68 months ran their course, tnsting hulks and the bones of lost manners, aviators and unlucky passengers still htter the Atlantic's seabed, while the detritus of World War II's longest continuous battle occasionally enlivens the stroll of a beachcomber. It was, however, another, less obvious relic of war—a stack of yellowing letters—that inspired Richard Snow to research and write a fascinating narrative of nations in a shifting battle to dominate vital sea-lanes.

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provide an enlightening view of tbe Battle of tbe Atlantic. Though his story is primarily that of the Americans, be offers well-researched chapters on German naval philosophy tbe strategy and tactics of Admiral Karl Donitz and life aboard the U-boats. The Britisb, Winston Cburcbill in particular, are given less space. Snow correctly identifies tbe teeter-totter nature of the Battle of the Atlantic, whicb ultimately hinged on the research and development race eventually won by the Allies. He also argues, successfully, tbat quantity coupled witb good timing frequently outweighed quality, allowing tbe United States to become a true "arsenal of democracy"

But tbe strengtb of Snow's study are the vignettes of individual struggles scattered Successful architect Richard tle of the Atlantic as USS Fred- throughout the book. These B. Snow pulled strings to join eñck C. Davis and Germany's provide a ghmpse of the horthe Naval Reserve at age 36 U-546, both sunk in tbe last rors (lifeboats filled with the in a visceral response to Pearl engagement fought by Neun- frozen bodies of men, the rockHarbor. To mollify his wife, zer. Snow's recovery and tbe ing of tbe boats seeming to be promised (and, apparently, unexpected birth of a son, make them wave at would-be came close to keeping that also named Richard, when rescuers), the stresses (manpromise) to write daily while botb busband and wife had euvering in pitch dark amid in the service. She saved the abandoned hope of ever hav- tbe unlit ships of a convoy), letters, which traced his naval ing a child, speak to the hope the heroism (an officer-cadet career from shipyard iaspector and resiliency of Americans standing to his gun as bis through Sub Chaser School in a decade sundered by war. ship dies around him) and and a stint at the Consolidated That son, Richard Snow— the tragedy (a generation of Steel yard in Orange, Texas, former editor in chief of Amer- productive individuals thinned to the deck of the destroyer es- ican Heritage, writer of his- by tbe thousands) of tbe Batcort Weimer E. Neunzer. Then, tories, novels and scripts and tle of tbe Atlantic. Snow adds Emma Snow lived through frequent consultant for his- the human element to his the changes war wrought upon torical motion pictures—em- study of history, creating a narher husband, as much a vic- beds bis father's tale among rative fit for either historian tim of the stresses of the Bat- many others that collectively or layperson.

to

MILITARY HISTORY

Outnumbered, by Corniac O'Brien

This well-researched and richly illustrated volume examines how cunning, audacity, secrel weapons, sheer courage and even accidents of nature have helped armies facing almost certain annihilation by superior opponents to wrest victory from the jaws ol defeat, in battles ranging írom Salamis in 480 BC to Singapore in 1942.

Escape, Evasion and Revenge, by Marc H. Stevens

The incrcdihlc iruc stor>' of Peter Stevens—a German-Jewish youth who escaped the Nazis, became a pilot in Britain's Royai Air Force and, when shot down and held prisoner in his native iand, helped dozens of fellow airmen escape to freedom—is a tale of one man's hravery, détermination and selfless heroi.sm.

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Making History U: Tbe War ot the World, by Muzzy Lane, 2010, $39.99 (PC/Windows) As its name implies, Making History II allows players lo explore numerous whai-if scenarios and aller the course ofWorid War II. Players manage their chosen naliotis' politieal, eeonomic and military decisions, maintaining diplomaiit rclaiions wilh allies while marsiialing armed fortes against enemies. Choose from 80 nations and more than 800 regions. The game puts an emphasis on economics, presenting the elosest thing to a true world market yet offered in a video game, thanks to input from economic historian Niall Ferguson. "By giving equal measure to economic and military compionenLs, Making History H presents a more complete model of the driving forces behind World War II." said Ferguson. In addition to economics and warfare, you'll also dahble in culture, politics and religion. Like no other game, Making Hisloiy 11 explores the economic and political motivations of the nations involved in World War H and, as such, should appeal to strategy gamers seeking educational content. —Ryan Burke

This is not a story of at- Winston's War: tack carriers, battleships, Churchill, J940-J945, cruisers or even destroyers. by Max Hastings, Alfred Rather, Snow focuses on the A. Knopf, New York, small boys: the volunteer 2010, $35 yachtsmen and yachts of the Hooligan Navy, the abor- It's not as though the world tive (and deadly—to their was screaming for another own crewmen) Q-ship pro- book about Winston Churgram, the pocket-size destroy- chill, least of all about his er escorts, and the role in World War freighters converted 11. With the possito escort carriers— ble exceptions of WINSTON'S CVEs, in naval parAbraham Lincoln lance, though their CHURCHILL and John Kennedy, erews read that as there is no more ex1940-1945 "Combustible, Vulhausted biographnerable and Exical subject than HASTINGS Britain's wartime pendable." The latter two vessels proprime minister. Yet Max Hastings, the esvided invaluable service in the struggle against the U- teemed British journalist and boats; in fact, CVEs swung military historian, meanders the American strategy from down this well-trodden path convoy defense to hunter- with his new Winston's War. killer task forces actively And while the former Daily seeking and destroying the Telegtaph editor hasn't really found much new to tell, his elusive enemy. From The Cook Book of lively, opinionated volume the United States Navy (1940 is worth a read simply for the and 1944 editions) to Sam- author's profound knowluel Eliot Morrison's study edge of the topic and deciof the Navy during World sive judgments on the great War 11, Snow's bibliogra- questions of the period. phy features the key printed If anyone could fmd someworks dealing with the strug- thing new to say about Churgle for the Atlantic sea-lanes. chill's tenure, it would be HasAdditionally, he found un- tings. His seven books on the printed sources at the Na- period include Armageddon: tional Archives and the ex- The Battle for Germany, 1944cellent Oral History Collec- 1945 and Retribution: The Btiltion of the U.S. Navy during tle for Japan, 1944-1945. World War II in the Special Hastings' portrait of ChurCollections of J.Y. joyner chill is complex. Behind the Library at East Carolina Uni- brilliant rhetorician the auversity, in Greenville, N.C. thor perceives a heroic figure From these, Snow produced with human flaws—meddlean often moving, always eye- some, easily distracted, temopening and highly recom- peramental and a poor judge mended book. of advisers. Hastings high—Wade G. Dudley lights how Churchill's closest

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AMERICAN REVOLUTION 2O1O A Tea Party Patriot's Call To Arms by Glen A. Amos

A iriie st()r\' oí tlic Ten Piirt\' Movcnient's resolve to stop the lilxMiil/pro^ressives ckvstruc tion of our He|)ublic. (JET YOLT? COPY TODAY! Paperback: S 12.95 ISBN: 978-IGO844-482-3 \\ \v\v.ar201 Ocalltoarnis.foni .\lsi). .t\.iiUi))U- .11 .\ina/oii. li.inn's A Nnhlr .111(1 ti<>>4 I-'" l'Ml)!ishin><

Reviews aides often wearied of him, and how Brits and Americans alike questioned his usefulness as the conflict wore on and the PM dallied in ill-advised adventures in the Eastern Mediterranean. It's a given that Churchill's own "finest hour," to borrow his term, was his ability to rally the British Empire when it stood alone against Germany. Yet in Hastings' eyes, two other strategies Churchill pursued paid critical dividends in the Allied effort. Churchill was among the first to realize that to win the war, Britain must convince the United States that a Nazi defeat was in its strategic interests. The lobbying began years before Pearl Harbor or Churchill's famous 1941 Christmas at the White House. Second, Hastings argues that Churchill's deep understanding of Allied mili-

tary weaknesses drove him to delay the invasion of northern Europe until 1944, despite American enthusiasm for an earlier assault. "On the issue of the Second Front, lU.S. Army Chief of Staff General George] Marshall's judgment was almost certainly gravely mistaken," Hastings writes. "The 1942 strategic view adopted by Churchill and 1 Chief of the Imperial General Staff Alan] Brooke was right." This quote encapsulates Hastings at his best and worst. His knowledge of the period is exhaustive—every paragraph reveals a lifetime of research, and the sheer number of his primary sources is astonishing. Each quotation is perfect, honed to Hastings' central message. But, like most English-language histories of World War II, the author adopts the prejudices of his home country. Winston's V\/ar is definitely a

British record of the period, and Hastings buys in to the belief that a European invasion launched from the United Kingdom in 1942 or 1943 would have failed miserably. He never, of course, explains why it took two-and-a-half years after Pearl Harbor to launch the invasion, and he doesn't give the Roosevelt administration due credit for its financial and military aid to Britain, especially in 1940 and 1941. The author even makes the ludicrous claim that French and British arms purchases in 1938 and 1939 ended the Depression and spurred the wartime boom. In fairness, a biography of Churchill by an English author would inevitably have such biases, and they constitute only a minor ñaw in an otherwise profound and comprehensive work. —Peter Moreira

Is an Online Degree Right for You?

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• What is the classroom environment like? • How do I interact with other classmates and the professor? • Does the learning environment work with my schedule and learning style?

These are just a few of the questions that you will probably ask yourself if you are interested in getting your degree or simply taking a course or two. We invite you to join us for a series of virtual open houses and complimentary history program webinars to learn more about American Military University and how online education works.

To learn more about AMU*s history programs and to register for an open house, visit: www.amu.apus.edu/history

MILITARY HISTORY

American ^ Military AMU University Push Your Mind. Advance Your Career.

EXHIBIT "Discovering the Civil War" Part One, "Beginnings" (through September 6) Part Two, "Consequences" (Nov. 10, 2010-Aprill7,2011) National Archives Experience Constitution Avenue NW (between 7th and 9th Streets) Washington, D.C. (202) 357-5000 www.arch i\ cs .gov/exhibits/civil-war Primary sources are paramount, as any good historian knows. So where better to go for a sesquicentennial retrospective of the Civil War than the National Archives, depository of America's pivotal historical documents? The two-part "Discov-

VF-11/111 'Sundowners'

ering the Civil War" opened this spring with "Beginnings," a look at the causes of the war, the breakup of the Union, the buildup of troops, key early leaders, life on the home front and the broader impact of the war. The thematic exhibition draws on the archives' unparalleled collections, examining the war through period letters and journals, photos and maps, proclamations, patents and other primary sources. Running throughout the gallery is "the Current," a touch-screen presentation of interactive features and archive holdings, providing visitors deeper context. Among the documents on display are the Constitution (of the Confederate

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Part Two, "Consequences." will run through April 17, 2011, after which the exhibit will tour nationwide. —Editor

WHY DO YOU LOVE OSPREY? "Because learning about the past is essential for preparing for the future."

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States of America), Colonel Robert E. Lee's handwritten resignation from the U.S. Army, a proclamation by the governor of deeply divided Kentucky ordering the arrest of all Confederate sympathizers, and a proposed 13th Amendment that would have forbidden the federal government from interfering with slavery in states whose laws permitted it. The latter, also known as the Corwin Amendment, was a last-ditch effort (dated March 2,1861) to keep the Southern states from seceding; the war broke out the following month.

Hallowed Ground Fort Necessity, Pennsylvania By Edward G. Lengel

G

eorge Washington experienced combat for the first time on May 28, 1754. "I heard bullets whistle," he boasted to his brother two days later, "and believe me, there B was something charming in the sound." Britain's King George II read Washington's remark in a newspaper and reportedly quipped, "He would not say so, if he had been used to hear many" Washington would hear many more bullets whistle in his long military career, but he would never again find anything charming in the sound.

That first big moment in Washington's military career took place at a small glen in southwestern Pennsylvania, about 50 miles southeast of modern-day Pittsburgh. Leading a mixed group of Virginia militiamen and Iroquois warriors, Lt. Col. Washington, then 22 years old, attacked and subdued a force of about 35 French soldiers as they sat around their morning campfires. After the fighting ended, Washington discovered the French had not come to fight, but to parley. By then, however, it was too late. The French commander, 2nd Fnsign Joseph Coulon de

Jumonville, lay dead at Washington's feet, butchered by an Indian's tomahawk. The incident touched off the French and Indian War, which pitted the British and their colonial subjects against the French and their Indian allies on North America's wilderness frontier. The French did not hesitate to select their first target in this new war: George Washington. His command, the Virginia Regiment, was a ragtag volunteer mihtia completely unsuited to all-out warfare. The French, meanwhile, had several hundred experienced troops at hand in nearby Fort Duqucsne. "1 shall

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Washington's Virginia volunteers form up alongside their British allies as the French approach poorly sited Fort Necessity.

m MILITARY HISTORY

expect every hour to be attacked and by About a 90-minute drive from Jumonville, whom his Indian friends had unequal numbers, which 1 must withstand Pittsburgh, Pa., Fort Necessity killed in his presence just over a month National Battlefield centers on a if there are 5-to-l," Washington fretted. earlier. Fortunately the French were merPulling back several miles south of replica of the rough-hewn stockade ciful, allowing Washington and his troops jumonville Glen, Washington led his Washington s men built in 1754. to put down their weapons, abandon the men into a clearing known as Great fort and retum to Virginia. First, though, Meadows. There they set to work building a small circular Washington had to sign articles of capitulation, written in stockade comprised of upright logs covered with bark and French. As he penned his name, he did not realize the artianimal skins. Inside its walls stood a tiny hut stocked with cles declared him the "assassin" of Ensign Jumonville. ammunition, provisions and liquor. Washington named it Onjuly 4, Washington led his bedraggled men—many Fort Necessity and dubbed the surrounding area a 'charmstooped over with hangovers after having broken into the ing field for an encounter." liquor stores the night before—out of Fort Necessity. This The French found the location equally charming. Arrivterrible humiliation might have crushed a lesser man. Washing onjuly 3, they discovered that Washington had sited his ington learned his lesson with stoic fortitude, however, and fort amateurishly Hills surrounded and dominated the little moved on to take the first steps in what would become a stockade, and although the Virginians had worked furiously magnificent military career. to expand the clearing, they had left a point of woods standToday, the National Park Service administers Fort Necessity ing within easy musket range. National Battlefield |u\\ w.nps.gov/foticl, about 90 minutes' After skirmishing briefly with Washington and a recently drive from Pittsburgh, which includes a modern Interpretive arrived contingent of British regulars, the French seized the and Education Center and a re-created stockade. Dedicated point of woods and spread out around the clearing, taking historical interpreters staff the site in summer, and visitors cover behind stones, bushes and tree stumps. From there can explore the neighboring glen in which Washington they delivered a withering fire on Washington's tuen, killing heard the "charming" whistle of bullets during the attack 30 of them along with all their animals. A heavy rain poured onjumonvillc's French troops. Also nearby is a memorial down, further dampening the beleaguered garrison's morale. marking the grave of British Maj. Gen. Edward Braddock, After several hours of misery, Washington asked the who was killed during a July 1755 battle in which George French for a truce. To his dismay he discovered the French Washington, a year older and much wiser, distinguished commander was Louis Coulon de Villiers, brother of Ensign himself as a brave and decisive soldier. (JB

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ranklin Delano Roosevell wanted a bomber as reliable as his first Model T. So Edsel Ford's crack team of designers ereated the FF-l, known as the Ford Feckless. It had no propellers. It wasn't a jet. How it stayed aloft, which it was able to do for minutes at a time, is still a mystery, but the way it new is not. "It was a cross between a glider and pork roast," said Jimmy Doolittle.

By Rich Meyerowitz

"It dropped everything but bombs," said Eddie Rickenbacker, who added that he saw the FF-1 "crash into itself as it took off." "It is no Model T," said the president, as he cancelled the program right after the only prototype of the FF-l fell out of the sky, crushing a Chevy dealership in Grosse Pointe —ironically, its only contact with an enemy. (^