Military History 2005-02

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Sometimes just the right leadership can make all the difference. RESOLUTE LEADERSHIP BASED on good

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. TlieHistoryNet.com Discussion: Does the war horse still play an important role on the 21stcentur\' battlefield—and if so, to what degiee?

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6 MILITARY HISTORY

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 20U5

judgment, whethei' in war oi" politics, is an asset that nevei" ages throughout the millennia, though it must constantly be replenished. It is also one of those talents that one either has or one doesn't. That is why, wliilc basic tmining for the enlisted soldier, in spite of its challenges, is fimdamentally designed to get him through, the added pressures of oOieer training are designed to discourage its students hxini completing the coui"se. The theoiy is ihat those who pass offieer training did so not because of what they learned, but because of what they had in them to begin with. In pmctice, however, the ultimate test comes when they take chaise in a real-world situation. As a tactician, General George Washington had a spotty record at best, though he rates among histoi>'s grand strategists for his dogged focus on bis ultimate goal. Ai"guably the greatest test of his leadei"ship during the American War for Independence was simply keeping his Continental Army viable. It took charisma and cajoling as well as conviction to convince his hungiT, cold, unpaid, dispirited troops lo extend their enlistmenis, but sometimes there was no substitute for the encouragement of victoiT. Washington had moments of tactical brilliance, most famously demonsti'ated at Trenton—the right victoiy at the light time if ever one was—^but also shown in the follow-up Battle of Pdneeton. where the "Old Fox" proved himself capable of outwitting the Btitish as well as Hessians (stoiy P. 26). This month marks the centennial ol a more recent case in point. The largest land engagement in histon' prior to World War I, the Baltle of Mukden saw 200,000 Japanese soldiei-s battle 275,000 Russians h-om Febmao 25 to March 10, 1905 (story, P. 58). Both sides used the latest in 20th-centuiy weaponi'v to murderous effect, with little to choose between tbe samurai discipline of the Japanese and the dogged courage of ibe Russian soldier. For all the technology and valor on both sides, tbe Hnal, albeit Pyirhic, outcome of

the battle was ultimately detennined by the leadership. As had been the case earlier at Liaoyang in August-September 1904 (see Mililaiy Hisloiy. December 1999), tbe more aggressive spirit of Field Marshal Twao Oyama and his chief of stafi, GentaiT) Kt)dama, prevailed over the able but .sluggish General Aleksei N. Kuropatkin—a duel of wills that American Civil War veterans might well have likened to that of Robeit E. Lee and Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson against George B. McClellan during tbe Seven Days' campaign of 1862. Outstanding leaders can be forgiven their eccentricities, but Orde Wingate's idiosyncrasies were as outsized as his talents as a tactician and trainer in the arts of both guenilla and countergueirilla wariare. it was in British-held Palestine that he firet got tbe cbance to devise bis strategics when he Poimed units of both British soldiers and Jewish volunteei^s to hunt down Ai'ab teirorists in 1935 (stoiy P. 50). In so doing, he laid the gi"oundwork for bis later Chindits in Burma dui ing World War U, and for the Israel Defense Force of ttxiay. His religiously inspiied involvement with Zionism—against the general policy of his brother officers^ also contributed In its way to tbe eurrenl situation between Israeli Jew and Palestinian Arab, seemingly no closer to peaceful resolution than it was 70 years ago. Even when capable leaders match wits on (he battlefield, there must always be a loser as well as a winner. Throughout history, however, the test of battle exposes commanders who were never really up to the daunting task. One such unfoiltinate officer was Charles Henn' Davis (stoiy, P. 74). Although he helped develop the Federal Navy's blockade strategy against the Confederacy during the Ci\ii Wai; his mediocre performance in command of the Western Flotilla on the Mississippi River eventually led to bis recall from combat. His principal claim to fame remains his prodigious prewar contributions to science and seafaring. J.G.

LETTERS

CHEATING OR JUST'SHARING'?

I commend Military History on the fine job your writers do. However, T do take exception to Robert Bateman's article in ihe "Perspectives" department of the June 2004 issue ofMHitmy History, stating that "U.S. Army officei's between World Wars I and II often placed personal ambition above honor." Mr. Bateman cites as evidence for cheating the fact that military students used class notes and work product from students in previous yeai's. This is an instance of the writer not being familiar with his subject. Many institutions of higher leaining allow and even encourage the shaiing of "lech," or coiirsework from prior years. The professors understand that they are tlirowing so much material at the students that it would be unreasonable for them to expect each student to complete every project fiom scratch. Students are not expected to copy the answers verbatim (and it is very obvious when they do, as in Mr. Bateman's example), but they are expected to attempt the problem and then use the prior work as a guide to reach their own solution. Perhaps if Mr. Bateman had undei-stood this he would not have been so suiprised at "the organization's later successes during World Warn." John Costello Jr. Oueenstown, Md. LEADING THE PLOESTI RAID

I just read C. Brian Kelly's "Best Little Storv'" about the Ploesti raid (Military History, August 2004). In addition to the five Medals of Honor, a number of participants received the Distinguished Service Cross, including my uncle, Brig. Gen. Uzal G. Hnt. Although he commanded the IX Bomber Command and did not have to go on raids, he believed thai the "Old Man" should lly with his command, and he flew some 13 or 15 of them. Shortly after the Ploesti raid, he returned to the United States, was promoted to major general and given command of the Second Air Force. It was he who selected then-Colonel Paul Tibbets to lead the Boeing B-29 unit that dropped the atomic bombs. Tibbetsflewthe plane that dropped the first bomb on Hiroshima. 8 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

Ent's back was broken in an aiiplane accident later in 1943, and he was paralyzed from the waist down. He spent his time designing braces for paraplegics. General Omar N. Bradley, who headed the Veterans Administration after the war, had the designs perfected and ordered ihcm into production. General Ent died in 1948, the \'ictim of an infection in a leg that had been burned by a too-hot hot water bottle placed there by a nurse. He was 47 years old. Incidentally, after the war it was learned that the Germans had tracked the planes from takeoff in Africa all the way to the target. My thanks to Mr. Kelly for his thoughtful article on these "forgotten" heroes of World War II. Brig. Gen. Uzal W. Ent Pennsylvania National Guard (ret.) Camp Hill, Pa. THE LIGHT BRIGADE CHARGES AGAIN

Thank you for the excellent iealure "Britain's Last Cavalier" in your October 2004 issue. It was refreshing for once to read an account of the Charge of ihe Light Brigade that not only related the British high command's many blundei^ but also told of the disciplined braven' of the rank and file. This heroic action, following the valiant defensive action by the intanti"y of the oiiginal Thin Red Line at the Alma, was instrumental in destroying Russian morale. This culminated in the defeat of the final Russian attempt to sally out of Sebastopol in the Battle of Inkerman. I would recommend Cecil Wodham Smith's Tlie Reason Why to anyone wishing to read a fuller account of the campaign and the people involved. I have been an avid Military Hisloiy reader foryeai^. Keep up the good work. Mike Sawyer West Jefferson, N.C. BURYING HOMER

In your October 2004 issue of Militaiy History, you included an informative article about Homer Lea, the enigmatic American hunchback who rose lo become an important adviser to Sun Yatsen and author of two books predicting the world wai-s, both before the outbreak of World War I. However, near the end of

the article, the author made a passing ref* erence to Lea's death and burial in 1912. You need to know the rest of ihe stoiy He was not in fact buried, but rather cremated. In 1935 his widow and secretary, my gi'eat-gi-andmother, Elhel Powere Lea, died and was also cremated (she had divorced my grandfather and manied Lea). Because Lea's desire had always been to be buried with Sun Yat-sen in Nanking, my grandfather, Joshua Bnant Powers Sr, kept their ashes in his attic for years hoping for a thaw in relations with mainland China so that Lea's wishes could be realized. In 1969, at about the point that my aging grandfather felt that he could not wait any longer, he received an invitation hom Chiang Kai-shek to have an interment in Taiwan, where Sun Yal-sen was also revered, instead. My grandfather accepted, and he and members of the family went to Taiwan for the intennent in a huge jade mausoleum. There were two ironies to the stor>, however. First, the thaw in relations between mainland China and the United States literally occuired on ihe plane ride home when China invited the American ping-pong team for a visit, suggesting that if my grandfather had waited a few more months. Lea's wishes would ptobably have been realized. Second, years earlier, when my uncle was small, he accidentally spilled both urns while playing in the attic, much to the chagrin of m\ grandparents, who ".scooped" Lea and great-grandmother back into their containers as best they could, likely with a litde e.xtra attic dust. Joshua B. Powers III Teire Haute, Ind. THE OTHER SIDE AT ARNHEM

The recommended reading al the end ol (he feature on Arnhcm in the October issue should have mentioned // Never Snows in September, by Robert J. Kershaw, which looks at thai battle from the GeiTnan side. In my opinion, it shows a much better picture of what happened in those weeks. 1 was there, as a medic of the 15th Regimenl, 5lh FallschinnjdfierDivision, whose 3rd Battalion remnants—45 men—went Continued on page 79

I N T R I G U E Eisenhower's strategy in the Taiwan Strait drove a wedge between the Soviet Union and China. By Michael D. Pixley

THE TRIUMPH OF CHINESE Communist

forces over Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang in 1949 and the latter's retreat to the island of Taiwan was regarded in the United States as a cataclysmic setback in the Cold War. Subsequently, however, as Mao Tse-tung's People's Republic of China threatened Chiang's Nationalist government on Taiwan, the mounting tensions in the Taiwan Strait provided President Dwighl D. Eisenhower with an oppoitunily to implement a bold straleg>' of using nuclear pressure to divide a poweiful Communist alliance. In 1953 Eisenhower developed what his State Department's director of policy planning, Robert Bowie, described as a plan to "diive a wedge between the Soviet Union and the Chinese over time," adding, "This was based on the idea that

there were deep potential differences of interest between the two, even though they were cooperating at the time." Despite all indications of healthy SinoSoviet entente. Eisenhowers wedge strategy became official in October 1953, with the formulation of National Secuii ty Council Policy 162/2, intended to apply "pressure on China, partly for the purpose of forcing it to depend on the Soviet Union." Eisenhower's first opportunity to implement his strategy was the Eirst Taiwan Strait Crisis. In August 1954, Mao issued threats as Chiang reinforced his Nationalist strongholds in the Quemoy and Matsu island groups, only miles away from the Chinese mainland. On September 3, Mao commenced a massive artillery bombardment of Ouemoy With characteristic skill, Eisenhower balanced his re-

sponse, using the threat of tactical nucleai" weapons to maximize pressure without becoming inextricably engaged in a Chinese wai: In December 1954, Secretan' ol State John Eoster Dulles stated that the cun ent policy "will gradually include the use of atomic weapons as conventional weapons for tactical puiposes." Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai decried that as "brandishing atomic weapons" in the Tiiiwan Strait, but took the thi-eat seriously enough to order the t'valuation of China's defenses and its militai^y-industrial complex for nuclear vulnerability. As Chinese shelling continued, Dulles warned on March 8,1955, that U.S. forces were "equipped with new and powerful weapons of precision, which can utterly destroy military targets." Such thinly veiled references to tactical nuclear weapons communicated a reduction of restraint over using those smaller warheads. Eisenhower was more overt at a iVIarch 16 press conference. When asked about using tactical nuclear weapons if the Communists invaded the offshore islands, he responded: "In any combat where these things can be used on strictly militar> targets and for strictly military purposes, I can see no reason why they shouldn't be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else....Yes, of course they would be used."

United States Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and President Dwight D. Eisenhower confer at Geneva, Switzerland, in July 1955. Four months earlier, they had threatened China with nuclear retaliation. U

MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

A week after that declaration, Chou En-lai announced: "The Chinese people are friendly to the American people. The Chinese people do not vvant to have war with the U.S.A. The Chinese government is willing to sit

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down and enter into negotiations with the U.S. government." On May 1, 1955. China ceased its eight-month bombardment ot Quemoy. While Eisenhowers immediate objectives to deter Chinese designs against Taiwan were obvious, his nLiclear pressure simultaneously supported his wedge strategy'. During the crisis, on Febnian 10, 1955, Eisenhower wrote British Prime Minister Winston Churchill: "I do not believe that Russia wants wai' at this time— in fact. I do not believe that even if we became engaged in a serious fight along the coast ot" China, Russia would want to inter\'ene with her own forces....I am convinced that Russia does not want, al this moment, to experiment with means of defense against the bombing ihat we eouJd conduct against her mainland. At the same time, I assume that Russia's treaty with Red China comprehends a true militai^' alliance, which she probabh' would either have to repudiate or take tlic plunge. She would probabl\' be in a considerable dilemma if we got inio war with China. It would not be an easy decision for the men in the KremUn, in my opinion," That view was reinforced by national intelligence estimates that Moscow would not risk war as long as Soviet interests and Chinas .survival were not threatened. Just as Eisenhower strained Communist relations, he was keenly aware thai Mao also intended to strain the BrilishAmeiican alliance. Despite disagreements over the Taiwan Strait situation, Eisenhower and Churchill worked lirelessl\ 10 guard Anglo-American entente. hi a Februai> 10, 1955, letter, Eisenhower thanked his octogenarian fiiend: "I have heard ho\^ earnestly you suppoiied.. .the proposition (hat nothing niLUSt create a serious rift in British-American relationships. Not only do I applaud that sentiment but 1 am most deeply grateful to you for your successful efforts....There is no question in my mind that one of the principal reasons for [Chinas] constant pressing on the Asian frontier is the hope of dividing our two coLmtries." He expressed to Churchill his firm conviction that "nothing is ever going to separate us or destroy our unity.... We must show no lack offiiTnnessin a world where our political enemies e.xploit evei-y sign olvveakness, and are constantly attempting to dismpt the solidarity of the free world." Churchill replied that he and his government "deeply desire to do oui- utmost to help you and our strongest resolve is to

keep our two countries bound together in their sacred brotherhood."

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1957, Eisenhower deployed nuclearcapable Matador cruise missiles in Taiwan. Continued inlroduction of smaller tactical nuclear warheads further concerned Chinese leadei^s, as did an April 1958 announcement that the Defense Department was considering deploying intemiediate-range ballistic missiles to Taiwan. Discussing the matter before the Chinese Eighth Party Congress in May 1958, Mao said: "We have no experience in atomic war, so how many will be killed cannot be known. The best outcome mav be that only half of the population is left....We are afraid of atomic weapons and at the same time we are not afraid ol them....We do not fear them because they cannot fundamentally decide the outcome of a war; we fear them because theyreallyai^e mass-destruction weapons." Eisenhower's pressure during the first crisis convinced Mao that China needed its own nuclear weapons. On Januan- 15, 1955. he discussed the matter with scientists and the Communist Party secretariat. He sought technical aid fi*om Moscow and on October 15, 1957, the USSR secretly agreed to assist Chinas nascent nucleai program. By 1958, however, Moscow had become exceedingly waty of Chinese ambitions in the Taiwan Strait. While Nikita KhiTJshchev was advocating his peaceful coexistence policy to avoid nuclear war, Mao was provoking the United States and eliciting nuclear threats fiom Eisenhower. During a meeting in Beijing on August 1, Khrushchev became exasperated with Mao's seeming indifference to Eisenhower's pressure. He was especially infuriated when Mao referred to America as a "paper tiger." He later recalled, "I tried to explain to him that one or two missiles could turn all the divisions in China to dust, but he wouldn't even listen to my ai guments and obviously regarded me as a coward." As a show of insolence, Mao gave Khiushchev no indication of his plans to provoke another crisis in the strait, later stating, "the islands are Kvo batons that keep Khmshchev and Eisenhower dancing." On August 23, 1958, Mao ordered another massive bombardment of Quemoy and openly threatened invasion. Eisenhower immediately ordered two additional aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Continued on page 24

P E R S P E C T I V E S The kings of France and England were thwarted in 1528-bya louse. By Richard D. Callahan

Robert Hooke depicted a louse in his Mlcmgraphia in 1655, but his contemporaries still did not understand just how that pest could have annihilated the French army besieging Naples in 1528.

BODY LICE GET LITTLE respect during their brief lives, especially from historians, who are usually concerned with putatively greater things such as war and the fate of kings. Nevertheless, on at least one occasion Pediculus humamis coiporis was instiumental in determining the balance of power in Eiinape and the religious future of England. Given the problems of maintaining personal hygiene while conducting miliIB MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

tary campaigns, the common body louse and the soldier have been inseparable since warfare began. Nesting in the hair or clothing of a human host, this parasitic insect emerges several times a day to insert its mouthparts into its host to drink its blood—an unpleasant, not to mention uncomfortable, scenario. When the louse catches and transmits a disease, the situation becomes more than merely annoying, as both the insect and its host can

become the unwitting perpetuators of an epidemic. And epidemics clearly affect history, military or otherwise. Such was the case in 1528. The previous year had seen Pope Clement Vll, an illegitimate member of the Medici family, cringing in fear in a comer of Rome. An imperial army dispatched to Italy by Charles V of Hapsburg—the only Holy Roman emperor to reign simultaneously as king of Spain— had seized the city after a bitter, costly fight during which the army's commander, Charles de Montpensier. due do Bourbon, had been killed on May 6. 1527 (see Military Histoiy, Febiuaiy 2003). The imperial troops, mostly mercenaiy companies, were hungrv and unpaid, and in the wake of Bourbon's death discipline broke down. Over the next eight days, frenzied GeiTnan and Spanish troops murdered priests, raped nuns, destroyed church property and tortured Roman citizens "by the privy members" to make them confess where their treasure was hidden. Forced to llee the Vatican by a secret passage, Pope Clement and his cardinals holed up in the Castel Sant'Angelo from May 6 to December 7. WHILE IMPERIAL FORCES rampaged in Rome and dominated northern Italy, in France, King Francis I burned for revenge. Since his defeat at the hands of Emperor Charles' Spanish arqucbusiei-s at Pavia on February' 23, 1525, Francis had spent a year in Spanish prisons. After Charles finally released him on promises of a huge ransom in 1526, Francis refused to surrender the teiritories conceded, even though two of his sons were still being held as hostages. They remained in Spanish captivity for the next four years while Francis worked to raise another army. On April 30, 1527, he and King Hem> VIII foiTned an alliance by signing the

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neaty ol Westminster. When Francis' reconstituted forces were ready, he and Henry declared war on Emperor Charles the following year. In the campaign season of 1528, France was ready to .send that army into noiihem Italy to challenge Emperor Charles once more. The e.xpeditionan forces 43-year-old commander, Mai^shal Odet de Foix, vicomte de Lautrec, had been victorious with Francis at Marignano {near Milan) in 1515, bul had suffered defeat at La Bicocca in 1522. Lautrec too had been captured and ransomed alter Pavia in 1525. His sister was one of ihe King's mistresses. Early in the campaign, the French exacted revenge on Pavia by taking and sacking the city As Lautrec's arniy moved south toward Rome, the remaining imperial troops fled the city ending a ninemonth occupation that was marked by extortion and teiToi. Ten thousand \'ictims were buried in shallow graves. Another 2,000 Roman coipses decayed in and around the Tiber River. As the Spanish and Geiman soldiers departed, they earned an estimated total of 3 to 4 million ducats' worth of loot. Plague, famine and the stench of death remained in their wake. Pursued by the French, the imperial army took refuge in Naples, and Lautrec's forces invested the city. All Europe condemned the excesses of the imperial troops. Public opinion, as much as was possible in the !6th century, heavily supported the French cause. Lautrec was lauded as the savior of the Catholic Church and the Pope. Admiral Andrea Doha of Genoa dispatched a fleet, commanded by his nephew Filippo Doria, to cut off Naples from relief by sea.

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but would remain so only il Laiili cc could pi'evail at Naples. For weeks the Spanish and German mercenaries remained safe behind the city walls. Summer dragged on, and the French army, backed by the Genoese ileet, maintained a siege, hoping to starve the imperial army into final, decisive capitulation. It was at that point that Pedicidus liiimanis corpoHs entered the picture with the French themselves. Body lice had latched onto Lautrec's soldiers as they marched into northern Italy. Nesting in the men's woolen clothing, the lice emerged several times each day to take a blood meal from theii" hosts. Ordinaiily, this would have been a stan-

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M I L I T A R Y H I S T O R Y JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

dafd annoyance of an aimy on campaign, but unknown to anyone P. corporis was sick. Small bacterial parasites known today as rickettsia infested its gut. The louse would defecate near ihe puncture wounds it made in the coun^e ot taking its daily meals. The soldiers scratched because the small bites itched. The scratching pushed the infected louse feces into the broken skin—and with it the rickettsia, which then entered the host's bloodstream. Several days to a week after being bitten by the liee, soldiers suddenly began to suffer from chills, fever and severe headaehes. Genera! body aches Ibllowed. The victims felt exhausted and took to their straw beds. High fevers eonlinued. A skin rtish appeared on the Euink and spread to the arms and legs. Fingers and toes turned black as gangi ene set in. Men became delirious, too sick to move. Their livers, kidneys, hearts and brains failed. There was no cure, and most of the men died. The minority who sunived could not recover their strength for weeks. Surgeons schooled in medieval medicine tiied bleeding the victims or purging their bowels with noxious substances. The general effect of that treatment was to hasten death h om shock oi' kidney failure. Unaware of the nature of the disease, let alone the cure, the doctors also became sick and soon died off. The typhus epidemic raged through July and August outside Naples while, ironically, the imperial defenders, cut off within the city, were spared its effects. The lice were not immune—they all died within one to tluee weeks, but not before they had spread the malady to others. Healthy lice bit sick men and became infected. Their hosts died, and the lice infested other men—until they, too, died. Meanwhile, Andrea Doria broke his pledge of fealty to King Francis over pay issues and recalled Fiiippos fleet from Naples. Not lor the Brst time since the war began, Genoa's loyalty shifted fiom Pope Clement to Emperor Charles. The ailing French army in Italy was on its own. Lautrec himself fell ill in August. He had witnessed the decimation of his men by this pestilence, but he was spared having to watch the final demise of his army as he slipped from delirium to coma and died on August 15. By August 29, a force of 25,000 soldiere had dwindled to merely 4,000 weakened survivors. As the Fiench tried to escape, the imperial cavalry emei^ed hom Naples

and struck most of them down. Once again the imperial army dominated Italy and intimidated Pope Clement VII. That in turn would have unexpeeted consequences in faraway Fngland. There, 37-yeai-old King Heniy Vlll wanted to divorce his queen, Catherine of Aragon, declaring they were never truly manied despite hall a dozen pregnancies and one living daughter, Mai"y, but no son and heir. Heni'y wanted a 23-year-old lady ol the court, Anne Boleyn, but she judiciously withheld her favoi^ until lie took whatevei' steps would be necessai^ to make her his queen. To achieve his royal heart's desire, HeniT needed the pt>pe to appi'ove the annulment oi his marriage to Catherine. He charged his lord chancellor. Cardinal Thomas Wolsey, with the task. There was a problem, however: The wife Henrv' was .so anxious to discard was the daughter of King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella of Spain. Catherine's older sister, Joan the Mad, was the mother of Emperor Charles V. In 1527 Pope Clement VH was in no position to grant an annulment that would most certainly anger the man whose tfoops were already mai^auding in Rome. Wolsey's only bope of accomplishing his mission was a French victoi-y that would break the Spanish-imperial aiTny's control in Italy—and remove Charles' dagger from Pope Clement's ihroat. THE NEWS OF Lautrec's defeat outside

Naples reached France and England b\ early fall ol 1528. Charles remained the undisputed master in Italy, leaving Francis and Clement with no choice but to make a deal. Francis gave up all claims in Italy, leaving the papacy tinder the imperial thumb. Consequently, the pt>pe would not approve an annulment that would dishonor Charles' aunt. Although circumstances in Italy had been beyond Cardinal Wolsey's control, the failure of his royal mission sat poorly with his disappointed king. In 1529 Wolsey retired to his bishopric in York, and by 1530 he was facing charges of treason. Death from dysenterv while en route to the Tower of London spared him hom the headsman's axe. With the pope disinclined to give him what he wanted. King Henry took matters into his own hands. He divorced Catherine, an action that also divorced his kingdom from the Roman Church. He replaced it with the Church of England, stalling the Protestant RefbiTnation

in Britain. Anne Bole^ii, whom Henw mamed in 1533, gave birth to a daughter, Elizabeth. later that year; but like her predecessoi; she produced no son. Within three years, Hcni-y would send Anne to the block. He had found a simpler means of divorce. Francis finally ransomed his two sons in 1530, even while he and Emperor Charles f(5ught one another intennittently over the next two deeades. One prince eventually became Henry 11, King of France, following Franeis' death in 1547—the same year in which Heni>' VUl died. SUCH WAS THE 16th-century emergence of typhus on the European political stage. It would also alleet militaiy history thereafter. In 1812 the disease contributed to an estimated 50 percent of the casualties sustained by Napoleon's Grande Ariiiee during his ill-fated march to Moscow. In the chaotic conditions in Russia following World War I, an estimated 30 million persons contracted lyphus and 3 million died between 1918 and 1922. When typhus threatened Britain's Royal Navy between 1816 and 1819, James Lind—who had earlier recommended lemons and limes to prevent scurvy—persuaded the fleet to see that sailoi^s were regularly stripped, washed, shaved and issued clean clothes. Even Lind was not sure why, but the epidemic abated. The bacterium behind typhus was ultimately discovered in the first two decades of the 20ih century by Howard Ricketts and Stanislaus von Prowazek. Its name, Rickellsia prowazekii, is also their epitaph^both scientists died of the disease whose mysteries they worked so hard to unravel. Another wartime epidemic at Naples, this time in 1943, was abated with a novel approach—exterminating the lice with DDT. The introduction of DDT signaled the end of epidemic typhus. More recently, effective antibiotics have been developed to treat nckettsial infections. In ihe time of King Francis I, Emperor Charles V, Pope Clement VII and King Henry VIII, however, nobody had ever heard of the microorganisms that killed human host atid insect cairicr alike. All they perceived was an invisible force that destroyed Marshal Lautrec and his army, bringing the grand schemes of many men to naught. Thus do the best-laid plans of Uce and men oft go awi-\. MH

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INTRIGUE Continued from page 16 Strait and subsequently authorized U.S. pilots to pursue hostile aircraft over China if fired upon. Dulles warned Beijing that any "naked use of force.. .would pose an issue far transcending the offshore islands and even ihe security of Taiwan....[It would] forecast a widespi'cad use of force in ihe Fai' East which would endanger vital free world positions and the seeuiity of the United States." Shocked at Mao's recklessness, Khiushchevsent Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to Beijing. Arriving on September 6. Gromyko expressed deep concern that the siluation might escalate into total war. Robert Bowie recalled that "the 1954 crisis was mer ely a source of tension and controversy with them, but hy the second crisis in 1958,1 think the Chinese probably drew the conclusion that these so-called allies, the Soviets, were really not ver>' helpful." THESECONDCRISIScomdnced Khmsh-

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24 MILTTARV HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

chev thai he could not tmst Mao with nuclear weapons, and in June 1959, just months after the crisis ended, Moscow abrogated its 1957 nuclear aid agreement and recalled its experts. Later that summer, KliRishchev and Mao met for the last time in Beijing, where their talks frequently degenerated into shouting matches. Furious that Mao had not warned him before shelling Quemoy, Khrushchev declared that "in our day only madmen and maniacs" advocate war, "co-existence is the only...path to take; any other way means death and destruction for all of us." He later warned Mao that those who brand the United States a paper tiger should remember that "the paper tiger has nuclear teeth." Meanwhile, China's position was that nuclear war with the United States would result in a Communist civilization "thousands of times higher than the capitalist system." From such an apocalyptic war, Mao stated, "China...is sure to emerge the victor.... The sooner they make war the sooner they will be wiped from tbe face of the earth." Following the explosive 1959 meeting. Mao concluded that "under the existing complex international conditions, our policy is to resist pressure...from two directions, Khnishchev and Eisenhower." In 1964 China's People's Dailv stated that "the Soviet Commutiist

Party leaders have completely reversed enemies and comrades.. .and are bent on seeking a Soviet-United States cooperation for the domination of the world." In the 1960s, Eisenhower's wedge strategy was vindicated as China and the USSR diifted apart. In spite of the withdrawal oi Soviet aid, China detonated an atomic bomb in 1964 and a hydrogen bomb in 1967. Soon after that, Moscov^ began sounding out the United States and Europe for support in the event of a Sino-Soviet war. On March 3, 1969, Chinese and Soviet forces clashed along the Amur River while the Soviets began moving 40 divisions to the border. As hostilities escalated, worldwide media reported Chinese ptx'parations fora nuclear exchange that included extensive digging of sheltere in Beijing and other cities. Meanwhile, Moscow planned a preemptive strike on the main Chinese nuclear facility at Lop Nor. According to the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, Marehall Green, "our [Central Intelligence Agency] estimated that the chances of an iron [conventional] bomb attack by the Soviet Union on China was one in three... .China's reaction, of course, was that they looked to the United States. That was the beginning of the rapprochement." In July 1970, Moscow proposed a "joint retaliatorv' action" agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in I esponse to any provocative acts or direct attacks by Cliina. American policy at that time, however, was to oppose Soviet hegemony in Asia. Ambassador Green recalled the thinking at the time was that "if the Soviet Union gained an upper hand in a war against China, it was in our interests to support China so that it prevented China irom being overtaken by the Soviet Union." When Eisenhower established his wedge strategy in 1953, he had no evidence that conditions would favor it so thoroughly or that his pressure in the Taiwan Strait would so effectively exacerbate Sino-Soviet differences. With Mao providing favorable circumstances, Eisenhower peifoiTned a strategic balancing act using nuclear pressure to support his wedge strategy while avoiding escalation into war with China. Certainly Eisenhower must have agonized over his decisions during the crisis, but his strategy provided a framework for effective action. The final result was a grand sti-ategic victoi> that ultimately led to rapprochement with China. MH

B A T T L E OF

PRINCETON

The Fox Bares His Fangs

Right: George Washington at Princeton, by Charles W. Peale. Far right; British Commander Charles Cornwallis, by John Smart

Facing Maj. Gen. George Washington's army at Assunpink Creek on January 2, 1777, Lt. Gen. Charles Comwallis expected to I^ag the fox' the following day, but the next morning brought an unpleasant surprise—the fox had vanished. BYROSSROSENFELD

'E ARE DEVISING such measures, as 1 hope, if they succeed, will add as much or more to the disti'ess of the enemy than their defeat at Trenton, and 1 promise myself the greatest advantages from having engaged a number of the EasteiTi troops to stay six weeks beyond their time of enlistment, upon giving a b
tion of having his men pushed off Harlem Heights w hile a British bugler played a fox hunting call. ("It seemed to crown our disgrace," noted one of his aides.) Following his calculated gamble of doubling back across the Delaware River to suiprise the Hessians at Trenton the day after Christmas, Washington felt that the cards were in his hand. But it takes money to play the game, and Washington's troops w^'re starving. There was a mmor that a chest with 70,000 pounds sterling in it resided on the British side of the river. Washington was not about to discourage such a mmor, with the proviso that it would be better if such a chest were in American hands. Washington had already ordered that "the sum that is lodged at Ticonderoga" be brought down from the Northern Department. But that would take time^—something he did not have, especially if he was to land a cmshing blow. He had told Congi^ess— and would tell it again—of liis need for food and supplies, but it could not provide them. In a last-ditch effort, he had called upon the personal foitunes of friends for much-needed pay and provisions. The [wo parcels of money (for both his soldiei^s and his spies) from Morris, Clymer and Walton had airived just in time. "At this trying time," a sergeant in his camp recalled, "General Washington, having now but a handful of men and many of them new reciiaits in which he could place but little confidence, ordered our regiment to be paraded and personally addressed us, urging that we should stay a month longer. He alluded to our recent victoiT at Trenton, told us that our services were greatly needed, and that we could now do more for our country than we

ever could at any future period, and in the most affectionate manner entreated us to stay. The dmms beat for votuntcere, but not a man turned out. The soldier-s worn down fi'om latigue and privalions, had iheir hearts fixed on home and the comfoils of ihe domestic circle, and it was hai d to forego the anticipated pleasures of the society of our dearest fiiends. "The General wheeled his horse about, rode in front of the regiment, and addressing us again said, 'My brave fellows, you have done all I asked you to do and more than could be reasonably expected. But your countiT is at stake, your wives, your houses, and all that you hcild dear '"You have worn yourself oul with fatigues and hardships, but we know not how to spare you. If you will consent to stay only one month longer, you will render that service to the cause of libeity and to your country which you probably never can do imder any other circumstances. The present is emphatically the crisis which is to decide our destiny' "The diTims beat the second time. Tiie soldiers felt the force of the appeal. One said to another, 'I will remain if you will.' •'Others remarked, 'We cannot go home under such circumstances.' "A lew stepped forth, and their example was immediately followed by neaily all w ho were fit for duty in the regiment, amounting to about two hundred volunteei-s."

T

OGETHER WITH A 1,600-man Pennsylvanian brigade commanded by Brig. Gen. Thomas Mifilin, and 600 Pennsylvania militia imdei" Colonel John Cadwalader, Washington had managed to muster about 5,200 men, though many of them were pooi'ly tniined. Cadwalader, in fact, had mi*ived too late to take part in the Battle of Trenton but occupied the town after Washington had pulled out. Not wishing Lo discourage (he newly anived reinforcements, Washington crossed the Delaware for the fourth time to join Cadwalader, then retired to the south bank of Assunpink Creek.

tress," and saying, "A man's private feelings ought to give way to the sei^vice of the public at all times." After expelling Washington from New York, Howe consolidated his victon' and rested his men instead ol pressing home ihe final, fatal blow. He had always considered his army more of an occupation force, and was certain that time and starvation would be his ultimate allies against Washington. And so, after foitifving Trenton, Bordentovivn, Burlington and various other posts around New Jersey, Howe had left his New Bmnswick headquarters for New York, to wait out the winter. Then, howevei; Washington achieved his stunning victoiT at Trenton, killing or capturing 970 Hessian troops. It was an embairassment that Howe could not allow to happen again. Howe had granted Lt. Gen. Charles Cornwallis leave to tend to his ailing wife in England. Cornwallis was moments from boarding his ship when news of the Trenton disaster anived, along with oi ders ftxtm Howe to deal with Washington's aimy once and for all. Journeying 50 miles thtxjugh harsh weiUher, Comwallis quickly oj'ganized British forces in southern New Jersey and plotted to strike back at the man who had kept him from returning home. Having left 1,400 troops at Princeton under Ll. Coi. Charles Mawhood and 1,200 ui Maidenhead (now Lawrenccville) under Brigadier Alexander Leslie, Comwailis had a tolal of 5,500 to 6,000 Redcoats with him.

Slipping away from his camp on the night of January 2, 1777, Washington moved around Cornwallis' army to strike the British between Princeton and Maidenhead.

Battle of Princeton

To the north, the ovei'all British commander, Lt. Gen. William Howe, remained cautious, for which his subordinates criticized him. Some might even have questioned his loyalty to King George 111, as Howe understood and even sympathized with the rebel cause in the American colonies. He had opposed the Coerrive Acts and at one time even declared that he would refuse an American command if it were offered to him. When the call came, however, Howe accepted, citing his duty to "serve my country in disJANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILITARY HISTORY 29

TO ALL BRAVE, HEALTHY, ABLE BODIED, AND WELL DISPOSED YOUNG MEN. IN THIS NEIGHBOURHOOD, WHO HAVE ANV INCLIN'ATION TO JOIN THE TROOPS, NOW RAISING UNDER

GENERAL WASHINGTON, roR

T H E DErENQE

07 THE

LIBERTIES AND JNDEPEN13ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES.

TAKE NOTICE,

A recruiting poster calling for young men to join the Continental Army in 1776. By December of that year, Washington was pleading with his beaten, unpaid, demoralized soldiers to stay with him.

he had taken part in a failed eoup aimed at placing Prince Charles Edward Stuart on the throne that his gr andfather, James 11, had lost in 1688. The last of "Bonnie Prince Charlies" Scottish followers were cmshed at the Battle of Culloden in 1746, and Mer'cer became a fugitive. Moving to Amei'ica, he fought for- Britain during the French and Indian War, dm'ing which he met and came to admire Washington. After that war. Mercer moved to Fr'edericksbur-g, Va., where he bought WashingIon's boyhood home, Feny Farm—though he would never aetually live ther'e—and even acted as a physician for Washington's mother. When the Colonists r^ose against ihe mother country in 1775, Mercer joined the Patriots' cause and was immediately made a colonel. He had distingirished himself again at Trenton, and it is likely that Washington had Mercer in mind when he wrote to John Hancock that the behavior of his officers "reflectfed] the highest honor."

OW IT WAS General Mercers job to cut off Comwailis' route to Princeton and on lo New Br\insOn January-'!, 1777, Comwailis led his main force toward Trenton, but hi.s progress was delayed by a wick across the Stony Brook Bridge. Unknown to series of attacks, ambushes iind fighting retreats or- him, however, another British force was also on its chestrated by rebel Colonel Edward Hand. The way to the bridge. After leaving the 40th Regiment of Foot to garriBritish did not reach Assunpink Creek imtil 5 p.m. on the 2nd, and Washington's troops I'cpulsed three son Princeton, Colonel Mawhood had set out with attacks before CorTiwallis camped for the night. 800 soldiei-s of the 17th and 55th regiments to join "We've got the old fox safe now," the still-confident Comwailis at Trenton. There were 276 troops of the Comwailis is said to have remarked. "We'll go over 17th Foot with him when he reached Stony Brook Bridge at about 8 a.m,; the rest trailed a mile behind. and bag him in the moming." Mawhood had expected an unimpeded march to HILE CORNWALLIS watched across the Trenton, but he looked back and noticed what way, fir'es sparkled by the rebel tents seemed to be a patrol of between 350 and 400 men through the night; men could be hear-d who were not his own. A moment of feai^ and panic moving back and forth, perhaps preparing their set in—how did they get behind him? Quickly he sparse artillery for the next day's desperate engage- turned his troops ar'ound and or^dered them back ment. As the sun came up on January 3, Cornwallis across the bridge. The high ground, not Trenton, was rose and gazed across at the enemy lines. Except now his primaiy objective. there was no enemy there. The rebels were gone. Mercer, loo, realized the hill's importance and led While CorTiwallis slept, Washington had put his his men there. The race tumed into a confused melee own plan into action. Leaving only 400 of his men as the two forces confronted one another at Clark's to maintain a semblance of nocturnal activity in his Orchard. In the first exchange of girnfire, 26-year-old camp, he had withdrawn his baggage and heavy ar- Captain William Leslie, nephew of Gener'al Leslie, tillery, with their wheels wrapped in rags to muffle was struck in the left breast and side while leading the sound, south to Burlington. At 1 a.m., the bulk a company of the 17th Foot. He died moments later of his aiTny had departed on an audacious march in the arms of his seiA'ant, Peter MacDonald, who ar'ound Cornwallis' force to strike at the detachment hastily put his body in a baggage wagon. the Briton had left behind at Princeton, To cut After" several more volleys, the I7th FootfixedbayoPrinceton off from reinforcements, Washington de- nets. Only about 20 of Mercery's militiamen carried tached 350 troops under Brig. Gen. Hugh Mercer lo muskets that mounted bayonets, and most had rifles destroy the Stony Brook Bridge. that wei e slower to load than smoothbore muskets. Hugh Mercer had been labeled a rebel long before In consequence, they fell back before the intimidatthe American Colonies' insurrection. As a young man, ing British rTish. "No," Mercer ordered. "Forward!

N

W

30 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

FoiA\'ard!" A bayonet pierced his chest, then another and another. A dozen hlows or more, and the general slumped down near the hill that would later bear his name. At that point, some of Colonel Cadwaladers ti^oops came up over Orchard Hill, but the more experienced Biilish pushed them back t
After outflanking the British defenses at Frog Hollow, Major General John B. Sullivan drove the 40th and 55th regiments of Foot back toward Princeton, taking 194 prisoners at the College of New Jersey (Library of Congress).

diers north to Kingston, then up the east side of the Millstone River to Somerset Court House (now Millstone). At Pluckemin, someone discovered the body of Captain Leslie in a captured baggage wagon, along with a letter to him from Continental Army surgeon Dr. Benjamin Rush, who had been a friend of the Leslies while studying medicine at Edinburgh, Scotland. Willie Leslie was buried with liill militaiy honoi^ at Pluckemin churchyard, and alter the war Dr Rush paid for a suitable headstone. On Januat>' 5, the Continental Army completed a AWHOOD REALIZED that his only chance was to break through to Trenton. With 70-mile trek as its first units reached Monistown, bravado still admired in England to this where Washington established winter quarters on day, the colonel led the 17th Foot in a bold charge in the 6th. From there, with the Watchung Mountains defiance of the numbers against him and managed protecting his eastern flank, Washington effectively to escape. Washington followed him closely for a controlled most of New Jersey for the time being. time, capturing several more prisoners, but he knew Comwallis pui-sued him only as far as Kingston, then it was only a matter of time before Comwallis would retired to New Bmnswick, his only secure base in show up with fresh Regulai-s. Wisely, he had his men New Jersey other than Amboy. destroy Stony Br
M

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILITARY HISTORY 31

Advancing to within 30 yards of the British line, Washington survived a musket volley. Crying, "It's a fine fox hunt boys." he urged his troops on to a modest but morale raising victory.

missing." His total was 276. As for Washington's men, Howe stated, "It has not come to my knowledge how much the enemy has suffered, but it is certain there were many killed and wounded, and among ihe former a General Mercer, from Virginia." He also noted that "The bravew and conduct of Lieutenant Colonel Mawhood, and the behavior of the i-egiments under his command, particularly the I7th, are highly comm[e]nded by Lord Cornwallis." Even Wasliington obsewed that the British regiments had made "a gallant resistance." Some estimates have Continental Army losses as high as 100 or 150, some as low as 40. By any estimate, the Americans achieved a convincing success in spite of their failure to captui e—or even confirm the existence of—the 70,000 pounds. News of their victoi>' at Princeton, coupled with that at Trenton, spread worldwide. In London it brought out ever more criticism within Parliament and among a public already having grave doubts about the war. By Febiiiai^- 1778, following the Franco-American treaties. Prime Minister Frederick, Lord Noilh, was making an attempt at peace, but his plan was vague and did not include American independence. After Princeton the cause of American independence, once regarded as nothing but an ideal, became a distant but obtainable goal. The French, always ready to do whatever damage they could to the British, felt confident enough in the rebellions prospects to send supplies to America. After news amved of an even greater American victory at Saratoga in Octobei" 1777, the French would go fuitheT; ofticiatly recognizing the United States and committing to an alliance. But that was yet toeome. In (he meantime, Washington settled his troops in Motristown for a harsh winter. Had Trenton and Princeton not given his men

MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

a moi^e-sustalning taste of victory, the Continental Army very well might have disintegrated. Now Wasliington began seeing new enlistments. The army, and therefore the cause, was still alive. As for Howe, his star was fading, but he managed to hold on to his command and even succeeded in capturing Philadelphia, also defeating Washington at the battles of Br andwvine Creek in Septem1 icr and Gcmiantown in Octol")ei; Alter the capitulation of Lt. Gen. Jolin Burgovne's army at Saratoga, however, Howe offered his resignation, fearing > that he would be blamed for 1 yet another militan' disaster. 2 The offer w-as accepted, and S after being replaced by Lt. Gen. Sir Henn Clinton on Ma\ 8, 1778, Howe saiJed home to England on May 25. Cornwallis, on the other hand, was somehow able to steer clear of most of the criticism. His next action would occur in April of that year, when he defeated Brig. Gen. Benjamin Lincoln's men in a small skirmish at Bound Brook that he and his supporters blew out of proportion in their reports. Coniwallis would later distinguish himself at Brandywine and march into Philadelphia alongside Howe. After returning from a trip to England to bury his wife, ComwalJis assisted General Clinton in securing the smrender of Charleston in 1780, handing the Americans their worst defeat of the war. He was then entmsted with the entire southern command. In a letter to Lord Gennain, dated January' 8,1777, Cornwallis had dismissed Washington's Princeton gambit as a desperate effort and assured him that if Washington were lo attempt another campaign, "the march alone [would] destroy his army." His perspective .seems to have changed, however, after suiTendering his aimy to Washington at Yorktown on October 19,1781. At that time, Comwallis reminded Washington of the nine-days' wonder that had pulled the Continental Anny from the brink of extinction at the stait of 1777, and declared that "When the illustrious pan that yom" Excellency had borne in this long and arduous contest becomes a matter of histoi>, fame will gather your brightest laurels rather fiom the banks of the Delaware than bom those of the Chesapeake." MH Ross Rosenfeld is a teacher and historian who is currently writing a biography of George Washingto}\. For further reading, liy: Decisive Battles of the American Revolution, by Ll. Col. Joseph B. Mitchell; and George Washington's Opponents, edited by George Athan Billias.

I N T E R V I E W

Jurgen Drogemiiller handled horses, treated wounds and hunted partisans until he discovered that volunteering for some duties can keep a soldier out of trouble. BY ROGER STEINWAY

An apprenticeship on a farm led Jurgen DrbgemCillerto an assignment in the German cavalry. In practice, it involved towing artillery, ammunition and supply wagons [Courtesy of Roger Steinway}.

34 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

Ithe

A German equine transport unit strives to,^ keep up with tine incredibly swift advance (l ttie Weht'macht's mechanized forces into Soviet Union during the summer of 1941 [National Archives).

'Basic training was tough.... It would con artillei'y shells. I lx-member going to the railroad station with my mother to pick him up on Fridays alter he was paid, We would immediately go to the stoiv to buy food. If you waited until the next day the money might not be worth anything. We were lucky that father was never out of a job. He was a haixiwo?-king businessman. MH: Do you think the Gemian people blamed the Allies for their problems? DrtigemuUen We nev ei- were angry with the United States. With France, it was ihe same old thing. The pioblems did not start with World Wai" 1. Look at AlsaceLorraine. This sort ol quaire! had been going on for many yeai^s. MH: Do you rememberany of the political uirmoil of the early 1930s? Drogemiillen I was still a boy at that time, but I knew that Germany was down in the early 1930s. President Paul von Reviving an age-old ritual, men and horses of Drbgemuller's unit line up for inspection Hindenburg had two choices in 1932. He between thrusts by a modem army that could not operate vi/ithout them. could appoint Adoli Hitler" chancellor [pri me minister] or have some sort of leftperation Barbarossa began on June 22, 1941. Dixided ist govertiment. The Communist Party was vew powerful, and into ihi ee aimy gixjups—North, Center and South— many people were afraid it would take over. Hitler was the tnost the Gemian forces smashed iheir \\a\ into the Soviet popular politician in Gemiany at thai time. He had a g(X)d orUnion iiJong a line from tlie Baltic Sea to the Black ganization, and the people listened to him because he promised Sea. The 29 divisions of Army Group North under the command action. [Note: The Nazis and Communists were the two largest of Field Mai-shal Wilhelm Riirer von Leeb swept out of East parties in the badly fragmented Gcnnan Reiclistag (parliament) Pm.ssia and Poland, ovenunning the Bailie coast and besieging in the fall of 1932. Hindenburg tunied down General Kurt von the city of Lcningi-ad. Schleicher's offer to form a moderate center-left coalition that Jiirgen Drogemuller was a pan of Amiy Group North as a would include Socialist Democrats but not Communists. The young cavalryman a.ssigned to a hoi-se-drawn transport unit. aging president appointed Hitler chancellor only altei being asFor the next three yeai"s DrogemiiUer would sene in the area sured by eonsenative politicians such as Fixinz von Papen that south of Leningrad. From tiie victories ol 1941 lo the ciushing the othci- parties in a right-wing coalition government could defeat of the summer of 1944, his career would follow the shift- control the Nazis.] Ing fortunes of the Gemian army in transportation units, anti- MH: How did conditions in Germany change during the 1930s? partisan actions and the front lines. Drogemuller. People weix' happv Ix'cause theiv was work. For "1 don't talk much about the war," DtogemCiller explained me. it was a beautiful time. 1 was a teenager in the Hitlei" Youth. when he agreed to be interviewed by Roger Steinway. "Being a This was foi- the lellows from 14 to 18 yeai-s old. It was volunsoldier was not what I wanted to do in life. It has been such a tar\' and gave the young people something to do. We did things long time, and.. .my mcmon about names and units might not that boys would enjoy. There were sports and music. I played a be ver\' good. But I will tell you w hat 1 remember." big di-Lini. We marched in the fields. We would camp out and MUJtary History: When were you bom? leam about nature. We played "cat and mouse" games. Drogemuller: In 1919, which was a fine year. II was ihe year MH: Some of the fun that you are describing was also usefiil afte?- World Wai" 1 ended. training for mililai> senice. MH; Did your father sei"ve in that wai? DrogemuUen Yes, but we never practiced with hand grenades DrogemiiUen Yes. He was at Verdun and was wounded twice. or iil]es. We leamed to shoot BB guns. We had a sailplane—a The important thing is that he came home alive without major glider. We didn't have much of a hill, but we would pull the plane physiciil injuries. He was called back to service in 1943 and also up to the top and one of the boys would Hy. I flew it and had retumed li"om World War II. fun. The Hitlei" Youth was like a big summer camp except ihat MH: Have you any childhood recollections of the 1920s? the Nazi Party ran it. DrogemuUen This was the time oi the great inflation. People MH: Fix)m today's vantage, that would seem to be a pi^etty big vveir paying billions of marks for even-'day items. We were living qualification. Wasn't theie Nazi indoctrination? in a small town in Mecklenburg called Zwedorf. My father Drogemuller: Yes, there were classes, but I reallv don't reworkc*d in a munitions l-'ahtik [factory] where they demobilized member them.! was always more interested in the soccer game

O

36 MILITARY HISTORy JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

)are to training for elite American units.'

A supply train passes through Borisov on the road from Minsk to Tolotshin in Belorussia on July 13, 1941. Trailing the convoy is a mobile field kitchen, which the Germans frequently referred to as the goulasch kanone Cgoulash cannonj.

after lunch. Most teenagers don't give a damn aboui news or politics. I was 15 in 1934, and the fun things were impoitant to me. When a boy lums 17 oi- 18, all he wants lo look at are girls. 1 didn't know that such things as the Nuremberg laws against Jews existed. I was aware that Jews were emigrating Irom Germany in the 1930s, but people leaving Gemiany was nothing new. My uncle went to America in 1928. MH: Some historians contend that the Gennan people were aware fi om the start what the Nazis planned for Jews, gypsies and nihcr minorities. Drogemiillen I don't ihink that this is tiTie. I didn't hear about what was going on until the winter of 1943-44, when I was in Estonia. I saw nothing myself. People told me things that they heard from other people. MH: When did you join the army? Drogemiiller: In 1939 when the war broke out. Basic training for all soldiers was tough in the German army—^very physical. It would compare to the training for elite American units like the Mai'inc Coips. Of course, we had to learn how to march properK to music and do the goose step. The Gennan army liked eveiTthing just so. 1 had a problem saluting because my little finger on the right hand is bent. It didn't line up with the other fingers and hung down a bit. My superiors wanted to straighten it by having the doctons cut the tendon in my finger. Fortunately, my orders came through before they had a chance

to do the surgery. My little finger is still bent and works fine. MH: In which branch of the army did you sei-ve? Drogemiiller: I had been doing my apprenticeship on a farm, so I knew how to handle horses. I was put into the cavali> They taught us how to ride properly, English style. Also how to keep the horses elean. Our job was to pull ammunition wagons and artilleiy This meant learning how to handle a teiun of horees. We also pulled baggage wagons for the inlantiy and the field kitehen, whieh we called the goulasch kanone [goulash eannon]. MH: Blitzkj'ieg usually conjures up an image of mechanized units, but didn'l the Wehniiachi in fact rely heavily on horsedrawn transpoil dming the war? Drogemuller: Yes, but remember that many men walked, in Russia we would can"y the foot soldiers' baggage, and the iniantn' could march 20 or 30 kilometers in a day. The speed of our advance was unbeiievable. MH: What did you see during the invasion of the Soviet Union in the summer of 1941? Drogemullen Once the Russians were trapped in a Kessel [a SLUrounded position], they gave up. Thei^ weix^ long eokimns of Russian prisoners, and ihey were happy to be out oi it. Their wivcked tanks lay along the road like dead monsters. I saw one of their big 60-ton tanks, lt canied tw ice as many crewmen as a Gemian tank and had two tuirets. MH: Many Soviet citizens were not happy under Josef Stalin's JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILITARV HISTORY 37

'Partisans ambushed us....I was out in the open v to an antipaitisan unit. Fortunately, I got leave and went home first. My brother Hans-Martin also was on leave. He was a Fallschinnjdger [paratrooper] and had fought in Crete in 1941. This was the last time I saw him before he was killed in Sicily in July 1943. MH: What was your new unit like? DrogemuUen It was one ol the old Austrian army's Vienna infantn' regiments. I think our Gemian anny designation was the 134th lnf£inti-y Regiment. It was a unit made up of older Austiians. 1 don't mean senior citizens. They were mostly manied men in their 30s with families. I was the youngest in my company and the only Reichsdeulscher [a German fi"om Germany]. Most of the men came from Vienna. Being with them was the best time I had in the aiTny. They spoiled me. The focxl was excellent. MH: What were your duties? Red Army soldiers surrender along the Zulwa-Slonim highway. In 1941 Drogemuller recalled seeing "long columns of Russian prisoners, and they were happy to be out of it." Drogemiiller: The medical officer took an interest in me, so I was trained as a medic. Our job was to patrol the railroad lines that connected Minsk with Leningrad. Patrols could be nile. How did civilians greet you? Drogemiillen The people came out and threw flowers at us in made up of from two men to the whole company. We would go one town. If you know the historv of Russia, you know that the out and hunt for the paiiisans. We rarely found them. This was Russian people liave always been oppressed—first by the tsars, lucky. The company was armed with machine guns and morthen by the Communists. They have never been free. I still don't tal's. The men canied the Mauser 98k rifle. I was issued an automatic pistol made in Belgium. It was a pretty little thing. think they are really free. MH: What happened when you mn into partisans? MH: Were they free under German occupation? Drogemiillen No. The whole thing went hayvvire because of our Drogemuller: There would be a fight. Once the whole compolicies. People like the Ukrainians thought that they would get pany was out moving toward a bridge. There was a wounded fi^edom to do what they wanted, but that was not the case. Their calf in a farm field, and the company commander told me to gr-ain and other crops went to Germany because of the war They finish him. I went out and fii'ed the shot. Then, boom—all hell started out welcoming u.s, but later turned into partisans. broke loose. Partisans ambushed us from some nearby houses, MH: When did transpoit operations settle down for your unit? and there was shooting all around me. I was out in the open Drogemiillen I have a map that my officer made showing our with nothing for protection except my medic's bag. I put it in area of operations from late Augu.st to late October 1941. We front of my head and slowly crawled back to our line, where I were south of Leningrad between Pleskau [Pskov] and Staraya. helped the wounded. The Obedeutimut [first lieutenant] comHe kept a log of the distances we traveled. We weren't moving manding the company was killed, along with several men. We as fast then. called in aircraft, and they bombed the partisans out. MH: What was life like in the field in Russia? MH: When did that first winter on the Russian Front start? Drogemiiller: The snow fell from October 1941 to May 1942. DrogemuUer: Well, everybody had lice. In the evening we It was dam cold. We were up around Leningrad with Army would take off our pants and jackets and use the heat of a lit Group No!lh. We had the blankets from the horses, and that cigarette to get them out of the fabric. helped us. Many of the guys at thefi-ontsuffered from frostbite MH: Weren't Geiman soldiere toid to be on the lookout for a and came back with black feet that had to be amputated. I was certain colored louse and to turn it in to the medical pei^sonnel? lucky to be at the front line only to bring up supplie.s. Drogemiillen Oh, yes. It earned a tNpe of fever. 1 gave out the MH: Were you still tranjiporting supplies duiing the summer shots that inoculated against it. I did a number of things as a otfensiveof 1942? medic. Russian civilians would come to me for help. There was Drogemiillen Yes, but we didn't make much progress. The a girl who had stepped on a land mine. I bandaged her up as church towers of Leningrad were in sight, hut that is as far as well as I could. The Russians were grateful and gave us some we got. The big advance was in the south to Stalingi'ad on the eggs, bread and even some home-brewed vodka. Volga River Everyone knows what happened there. It was in MH: Was the vodka any good? 1942 that our unit got rid of the horses, and I was transfeired Drogemuller: Probably not. I never liked vodka or strong al38 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

th nothing for protection except my medic's bag.'

When the Germans invested Leningrad, they had to adapt to static warfare in the harsh Russian winters. That included the use of sledge-borne transport and white camouflage-for animals as well as the soldiers who handled them.

cohol. I drank beer. MH: How long did you stay with the antipartisan unit? Drogemuller: Things were getting bad by the fall of 1943. There was a call for special duty volunteers. I was the t\pe who always had a hand up, so I volunteered. MH: Didn't thai mean you were violating a soldiers cardinal lTile—never volunteer? Drogemuller: I believe that when things get bad, you volunteer. This is true for some soldiers in any aimy. I was sent to Estonia to train in partisan-style fighting. This way we would become more like partisans ourselves and fight them more effectively. Estonia was a good place to train because there was little partisan activity. Estonia and Latvia, which we called Kurliuid [Courland], were vei^ anti-Russian. Many Germans lived in this area. My father's uncle was a veterinarian who settled in Latvia at the invitation of the old tsar's government.

MH: What special training did you receive? Drogemullen The thing 1 remember best is being put on skis. I had never had skis on my feet, but I learned with the help of Austrians. We wore the revei^sible winter camouilage uniform ihal was gray on one side and white when you turned it inside out. We continued training in Estonia for live months. It wa.s early 1944, and the situation was even woi^se for the GeiTnan aixny. The Russians were on the offensive, and I was put in the front lines. MH: Can yon describe the fighting? Drogemuller: 1 never was with tanks, only infantry. There was no line of trenches or anything like that. We were slowly falling back and fighting along the way. There was one attack where only the fu'st two lines of Russian infantry had guns. The next lines picked up the rifles from the dead. We also had problems with our precision-made weapons. They did not work well in the cold. We couldn't use oil to keep the machine guns going. JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILITARY HISTORY 39

MH: Where were you when the Red Army began its summer offensive in the ihird week of June 1944? Drogemuller: I was wounded on June 18, 1944. We were under aitillei-y fire somewhere along the border between Lat\ia and Russia. The guy who was next to me took shrapnel in the left shoulder and was killed. ] got it in the buttocks. It was a serious wound. I couldn't walk, stand or sit. The doctors took the shrapnel out and sent me back to Riga [Latvia's capital on the Baltic Sea]. I was put on a ship to Dan/.ig in East Pmssia and was finally sent to a militai-y hospital in Leipzig, Germany. This was in July 1944. MH: Were you discharged from the aimy because of that wound? Drogemullen No. When 1 was bettei; 1 got two weeks' vacation at home. In Because of German policies, many Ukrainians who initially welcomed the Germans as September, I went to Hainburg on the liberators turned into resistance fighters such as those shown above. Danube. This is on the border of Austria and Hungaiy and was the home of We used naphtha instead. When we could get our hands on the Austrian regiment I served with in Russia. them, we used captured Russian weapons. They had good ma- MH: What was your rank by this time? chine guns and a very good machine pisto! that had a round Drogemullen I was an Obergefreiter [lance coipoial]. My next asdnim magazine [the PPSh-41 submachine gun]. The woi-st signment was to a training school in the Bohemian Eorest, where things the Ru.ssians tised on us were what we called "Stalin Gemiany, Austiia and Czechoslovakia meet. They tried to make Organs." It was not as pi"ecise a weapon as artilleiy With it, vol- me into a partisan. We practiced living in the woods ^md making leys of rockets were fired covering a wide area. The rockets partisan-style attacks, vvilh big emphasis on camoullage. Our would pour down on top of us. [Note: Soviet multiple-rail ar- commander was a religious man and played the oi"gan in chuirh. tillery' rocket launchers were mounted on tn.icks and called He was full of sayings like, "The way you call into the forest is the "Kalyiisha." meaning "Little Katy" in Russian.] way it comes back." It's like the English saying, "The tune makes MH: It sounds as if you were face to face vvith the Red Army. the music." He had a saying for anything that was going on. Drogemiiller: There was one time when we took a gioup of MH: Was the purpose of your training to become a German Russian pilsonei^s. One of them said to me, "Hey; Bubi ['kid' in paitisan after the Allies took over parts of Germany? German], how are you? Remember me? You stayed in my Drogemullen No, 1 don't think so. The Americans and British house." He was right. I had been at his house a couple of months were still in France, and the Russians were in Poland when the before and eaten dinner at the same table with him. He said that training began. he had been "liberated" by the Russians, and they put him into MH: ll is surprising that you weren't sent to the fiont, with the a Red Army unilonn right away. I told the other fellows that I 1 hird Reich collapsing all around you. knew him, and we let him go. Drogemullen The partisan training was like life insurance. We MH: Wasn't it dangerous to be taken prisoner by either army went h-om one type of ti-aining to another. I stayed with this unit (111 liic Russian Front? until the end of the war. We were talking about food earlier. We Drogeniiiller: The biggest fear that most of us had was being had a baiTacks in Linz, Austria. The faimere around Linz would taken pnsoner by the Russians. You might be shot or sent to give us apple cider. Some Hungarian troops came into our area Siberia. The Russians captured my wife's brother-in-law and and hung up their hams and bacon in the basement of the barheld him for 10 years after the war ended. He was lucky to racks. We found oLit and went in and helped ourselves. Of return. Many GeiTnan prisoners did not. The same can be said course this was not allowed, but nobody was counting calories for Russian prisoners in Germany. As for shooting prisoners, or worrving about high cholesterol in those days. this is something that I would not do. MH: When did you suirender? MH: Wei c there any pix:)blems getting enough lood or supplies? Drogemullen The war ended on May 8, 1945, and I went into Drogemiiller: No. The food was pretty good during my time an Amei ican camp. I am not sui"e wher^e it was. They took up oui" in the East. While we were behind the lines, we were able to buy weapons, and we put up our tents. Then they called us in and things from time to time that were brought in especially for the gave us new papei^s. Tt wasn't long before they sent us home. I left soldiei"s—chocolate, whiskey and cigarettes. I remember Eng- with a large gix)up, but parted with them at the Danube River. lish cigarettes that had been left behind at Dunkirk in 1940. Anothei- fellow who lived in northern Geimany and 1 walked Even when 1 was in the h'ont line. 1 never had to break out my about 100 kilometei"s to Regensburg. The fanTiei"s along the way iron rations. Again, I was lucky. Cotilinued o>i page 80 40 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

Jack Tar s Life u

Genius though Horatio Nelson may have beer would have been impossible with BY MARK

T

he Bailie of Trafalgar was the ciilminalion nl an intense 2>:-year campaign waged by the Royal Navy to prevent a French invasion of Great Britain. Although it did not bring an end to the Napoleonic wars, it did finish Emperor Napoleon's dabbling in nava! matters and broke the spirit of the French and Spanish navies. The not inconsiderable price Britain paid for that cnishing victoi'y included the life of its chief architect, Vice Admiral Horatio Nelson. It was Nelson who devised the strategy and directed the tactical operations that climaxed in the effective anniliilation of the Franco-Spanish combined fleet on October 21, 1805, thereby establishing British naval supremacy for the better part of a cen-

MIIJTARV HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

tury. Nelsons own role along Europe's Atlantic coast, however, had little to do with the actual blockade of the channel ports, when 30 wai^hips were deployed to form a battle line along the French and Spanish shores between 1803 and 1805. That blockade kept enemy wai-ships bottled up in hai bor and unable to shepherd the invasion flotilla of more than 2,300 craft assembled between Boulogne and Dunkirk, which in turn was to transpoin three French army coips, totaling 170,000 soldiers, to the shores of Kent and the Thames E.stuaiy The man responsible for commanding and maintaining the Channel Fleet throughout that period— thereby preventing the French invasion and supplying Nelson with the nucleus of the fleet that fought at Trafalgar—was Admiral Sir William Comwallis.

Nelsons Navy From left: The ship's carpenter, a warrant officer, managed a fairly large crew that daily inspected, patched and caulked the vessel. Midshipmen were gentlemen as young as 15 serving to qualify for a commission as lieutenant A ship of the line could have 10-25 midshipmen. who were expected to qualify as master's mates by age 17. Ttie cabin boy, usually between 12 and 16 years old and often from a poor family or sentenced for vagrancy, was at the very bottom of the ship's hierarchy, and his duties included cleaning out pigsties and chicken coops. TTie master's cook was usually an elderly or disabled seaman who received his warrant for long service or a debilitating injury such as loss of a limb (Peter Newark's Military Pictures).

his triumph at Trafalgar on October 21, 1805, first-rate officers and seamen. SIMMONS

Never fomially thanked by the nation, he is better remembered as the younger brother of Lt. Gen. Charles Comwallis, who fought in the American War of Independence until his suirender to Genera! George Washington at Yorktovvn, Va., in 1781. Yet it was William ComwalHs. more than any othei" officer, who defended his country by harnessing the Royal Navy's supreme ability to remain at sea for months on end through all but the vei^ worst weather condilions. He sen'cd the navy for more ihan 50 years, only to be overehadowed by the more charismatic Nelson, who called Comwallis "a gallant, good officer." Nearly a century later historian John Leyland stated in his Dispatches and Letters Relating to the Blockade that Comwallis desei^ved "a higher place among our great seamen." and said his

blockade "was a masterpiece of administrative and seaman-like handling of a great naval force in operations of supreme importance to the countiy" The Men of Nelson's Fleet It was the crews of Nelson's and Comwallis' ships who gave those commanders the confidence to maintain the blockade and decisively wage war. Yet many popular m\lhs persist of a Royal Navy bixitalized by heartless press gangs, its rank and file flogged into obedience and fed on an appalling diet that led to men being lost due to malnutrition and disease. In 1793, seen as the start of the Napoleonic wars, the Bntish Parliament increased the navy's strength to 45,000 men, costing about 4 million pounds sterling a year. In 1800 it reached its peak in manJANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILITARV HISTORY 43

The Royal Navy. which had reached 120,000 men by 1799. always had trouble recruiting sailors. The Impress Service operated in every port in Britain, and its men roamed the surrounding countryside in search of recruits.

power—about 110,000 seamen and 20,000 marines, out of a total British population of 9 million. At the beginning of the war, the army was small and kept in a sorry state to prevent it from becoming a force to overthrow the government. Later in the war, at the height of the invasion scare in 1805, the anny and local militias had on their muster I'olls close to half a million men, but only some 300,000 were anything like properly armed. Given those figures, conscription in World Wai's I and II demanded far more in proportion to the Bi'itish population than did the Napoleonic Wai's. The Royal Nav>''s strength lay in its volunteers, hence the expression "Better one volunteer than three pressed men." The average seaman was likely to come from the southwest of England and have a prior knowledge of the sea. Most ships, before and dming the war, were manned mainly through the efforts of the captain. The reputation of a successful captain counted for much, and perhaps the biggest incentive was cash— not pay, but the likelihood of prize money that could and sometimes did transform even an ordinary seaman's life. When Captain Thomas Cochrane, later the Earl of Dundonald, was crewing the 36-gun Pallas, his reeiiiiting poster bore the heading "God save the King" followed by "Doublons, [doubloons] Spanish Dollarbag consigned to Boney," and began "My lads the rest of the Galleons with the treasure from La Plata, ai-e waiting half-loaded at Cartagena."

MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

Pallas was waiting at Plymouth for the expedition, but Cochrane warned that "none need apply but seamen, orstout lads...." With his renown, Cochrane had the luxury of tuming men away. In wartime, with dozens of extra ships being commissioned and a high death rate on certain foreign stations, the naw could not be manned by vokmteei's alone. The Impress Service, poorly organized when the Napoleonic wars began, was officially limited to seizing qualified men who were seamen, which some press-gang members inteipreted to mean any unfortunate soul they found in a seaport. What then did the "press" really amount to? For most of the 18th century a recruiting officer, army or navy, was always ready to offer "the King's shilling" as an inducement. If a civilian took the shilling, no matter how hesitantly, he had entered a contract to serve the Crown until no longer required. Britain had a large merchant marine as a potential source of trained seamen, but that worked to the detriment of the merchant ships, which were equally needed in wartime. The press gangs often did prey on the merchant ships as they entered hai'bor, leaving only enough men on board to navigate the ship. That drove up the wages of merchant seamen, as well as freight rates, which in tum enticed volunteers away from the navy and encouraged desertion, creating a vicious circle that was never really resolved. William Richardson was pressed fn)m a slave ship asitretumed toBritainin 1790. "Off Beachy Head,"

he later reported, "we were brought lo by the Nemesis frigate, Captain Ball, who pressed till our men except fotir Germans. Some of tbe poor fellows shed tears on being pi essed after so long a voyage and so near home. The frigate sent an officer and a paity of her men to take us into the Downs and bore up with tis, where we both came to an anchor. "Next day an officer came on board with our men to get their cloths and notes for their wages," he continued, "and our captain had the impudence lo deduct from each man £3 for the loss of two female slaves that got overboard and were destroyed by the sharks at Bonny. However the seamen rejected their captains claim and with the support of the naval ofhcers were given notes for their fiiU wages." Richardson was soon paid off when the Spanish crisis cooled down, and he joined an East India Company ship. He was pressed again in Calcutta shoitiy after the start of hostilities against Revolutionai"y France in 1793, and this time stayed in the navy. He rose to the rank of gunner (wan^ant officer), sening for a total of 23 yeai>;. In 1819 he was giTinted a pension of 65 pounds sterling a year—something lie would never have gotten in the merchant service, "for which 1 am satisfied," he wrote in retrospect. Robert Hay, a Scotsman, was 13 when he joined the navy in 1803. At age 21 he was serving aboard the fiigate Amethyst when it was wrecked in a storm in Plymouth Harbor. About 30 of the crew were drowned, but Hay got ashore clutching a hatch cover. At that point he decided to deseit and soon afterward signed aboard the merchant ship Edward. hound for Jamaica. He avoided the press on that island, and after returning to dock at Bristol, hid on his ship when the press gang came aboard and took away two other crewmen. Once ashore. Hay headed inland for Bath, then took a coach to London. There, he hoped to obtain passage to Scotland. As he was crossing Tower Hill, he was accosted by a pei"son in seaman's dress who tapped him on the shoulder, inquiring, "What ship?" Hay reported that after he told the str^anger he was no seaman. "He gave a whistle and in a moment I was in the hands of six or eight mffians who I immediately dreaded and soon found to be the press gang." Hay still protested that he had no knowledge of the sea as he was taken before a lieutenant, but later admitted that his hands had betrayed him, being too "discolored with tar" after long years of sciubbing decks. Hay was offered a bounty but refused to volunteet: Tn spite of it, he said he was sent below "with these words thundered in my ear, 'A pressed mati go below.'" Ships' mustei" rolls give little idea of the effect of the press. Most pressed men were given the chance of volunteering for a 5-pound bounty. That the press was needed is l^eyond dispute. In theoiy it could take anybody between the ages of 18 and 55, and often

those limits were ignored, for those who claimed to be exempt had to prove it. In practice it was skilled seamen who were the target. Landlubbei^s usually proved a liability. Often called "waisters" because they tended to be kept in the waist of the ship out of harm's way, they would be entered in the ship's muster book as landsmen. William Spavens spent 30 years in the navy and sewed in the press gang. In March 1809, he reported being sent ashore to Liverpool in a cutter fi'om the frigate Vei}gecuice "with some officers and a suitable reinforcement of men." They "soon picked up sixteen men, but only one of them being a seaman, him we detained and the rest we set at liberty." The next day the press gangs were ashore again, but ran into trouble when a mob of "seveiiil himdi'eds of old men, women and bo>s ilocked after us, well provided with stones and brickbats, and commenced a general attack, but not wishing to hurt them, we fired our pistols over their heads...." Spavens himself had been pressed into the navy from a merchant ship.

Left: On a regular 74-gun ship of the line 500 seamen slept in an area of 6,000 square feet each in a space only 14 inches wide. Below: The wardroom aft of the ship accommodated the officers' dining and social activities, and was lined with small personal cabins, which were taken down during action to allow its use as a gun deck.

Prisons were another source of reciuits, although hardly a desirable one. Captain W.N Glascock, writing 10 yeai-s after the end of the Napoleonic wai-s, commented that "the vei-y best disciplined ships... are fain to recruit their crews fi'om the hulks [old ships used as prisons] and jails of the Kingdom." The muster rolls for Royal Navy ships of the time reveal crews of vew tnixed origins. The schooner Pickle, one of the smaller vessels of the fleet, earned some fame for landing the dispatch describing Nelson's victoiA' and death at Trafalgar On October 28, 1805, it had 33 men on the roll, although its official complement was 40. Their nationalities were 17 English, nine Irish, one Scottish, one Welsh, one Channel Islander, two Americans and two Norwegians, The ship's second master, George Almy, came from Newport, R.L, and served happily in the Royal Navy.

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILITARY HISTORY 45

Although most warships carried a surgeon plus two surgeon's mates, few were qualified as physicians. Nevertheless, equipped with an array of medicines (as shown in this surgeon's chest) and a few primitive surgical tools, they were responsible for taking care of illness at sea and the wounds of battle.

For the most part, pressing Ameiican citizens into Royal Navy service caused friction between the two countnes and was a major factor leading to the War of 18 !2. While the Ameiicans regai'ded pressing as a simple case of violating the rights of seamen from an independent nation, the Biitish government took a different view. It declared a man bom a British subject remained British; he could not renounce his nationality simply by living in another country. The British also rationalized that there was no way of proving a man was an American subject, so it was left to the pres.s gangs to decide on the spot. The 74-gun Elephant, Nelson's flagship at the Battleof Copenhagen in 1801, had 14 foreigners on board, seven of whom were Americans. Victory's roll at Trafalgar listed 441 English, 64 Scots, 64 Irish, 18 Welsh, three Shetlanders, two Channel Islanders, and one Maaxman. Out of its 71 foreign crewmen, 22 were Americans and nine were Ahicans. Whether volunteers, pressed men or convicts, once the men were aboard ship the captain and first lieutenant drew up a general quarter list showing eveiy man s duty. The temi "general quarters" is still used in the U.S. Navy, but the Royal Navy now calls them "action stations," The crew was divided into groups. The first gi'oup, the fo'c'slemen, stationed on the forecastle, worked the anchor and the iore.sail (the bottom longest on

the foremast) as well as the jibs and bowsprit, and manned the six forwardmost guns during combat. The next group was the topmen, divided into three sections, one for each mast. They were younger men and well trained. Theii' task was the most dangei'ous, working high above the deck with thousands of square feet of flapping canvas in all sorts of weather. In battle they were spread out among the gun crews. The third gi'oup, the waistei^, worked the area between the forecastle and the quarterdeck, handling the fore and main sheets. Their work required more 46 IWrUTARV H I S T O R Y

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muscle than brains, and during battles they formed gun crews. The fourth gi oup, the afterguard, worked the quarterdeck, handling the braces, the ropes that braced around the yards to which the sails were attached. The social scale on board a British warship ran in descending order from topmen, fo'c'slemen, afterguard and waisters. Each of the four gi oups was divided into two watches, known as starboard and larboard (port). Every man had a number—evens belonged to the larboard watch and odd numbers to the starboard. There was a fifth group called the idlers, which included cooks, caipenters, officer's servants and pui-ser's assistants. Although they had plenty of work to do, they were called idlers because they did not stand a watch. The marines (who became Royal Marines in 1802) fomied another group. Tn battle half of them sniped at the enemy fi-om the decks or fighting tops while the others helped work the guns. A 74-gim ship had a marine captain, two lieutenants, four sergeants, four coiporals, two drummers and 110 men. The Real Enemy In the Napoleonic wars, which except for a short break lasted 22 years, tbe Royal Navy lost 1.875 men killed in the six major fleet and four minor fleet actions, compared to 72,000 who died from disease or accidents on board. Another 13,600 were lost at sea. The great killers weie scurvy, typhus and yellow fever. Scui-vy was the result of poor diet, and although the British had no knowledge of vitamins, they did know that fresh vegetables and fruit prevented it. William Tumbull, fellow of the medical societies of London and Edinburgh and foiTnerly a surgeon in the naw, listed in his book The Naval Surgeon the diseases of the various stations, beginning with the English Channel, "the most important station to which a fleet can be appointed." Typhus and intermittent fevers or agues seemed to affect the Channel Fleet the most, with scurvy being less of a problem except on long voyages. The West Indies station was "avowedly the most unhealthy," due mainly to yellow fever. Captain John Markham's ship Hannibal lost 200 men to yellow fever in six months. But if the navy suffered badly in the West Indies, the army regiments sent there were decimated. In May 1796, the 31st Foot mustered 776 men. and less than two years later 15 reported for duty. The 57th Regiment lost 620 men in Grenada in nine months. Conditions were markedly different in the Mediteiranean Sea, where malaria could be contracted but not yellow fever. Nelson wrote in May 1804, "The health of this fleet cannot be exceeded." In two yeai^s mostly at sea with an average of 11 ships and 6,500 men, he recorded that only 110 men died and 141 were sent to hospitals.

Crime and Punishment Another standard image associated with Napoleonic era navies is that of brutal punishment for minor offences. Even Nelson, often depicted as lenient and squeamish with the lash, flogged 54 of his 122 seamen and 12 of his 20 Marines in 18 months while captain of the higate Boreas. Later, when a fellow admiral objected to the execution of mutineers on a Sunday, Nelson said he would have hanged them "though it had been Christmas Day." It must be remembered, however, that in England at that time civilians, including those who would be considered children today, could be and were hanged for stealing the most trivial items. Seamen, on the other hand, could only be hanged for mutiny, treason or desertion. Where a seamiui might get a dozen lashes for an offense, his brother on land could spend a year in jail or be transported for life to an Australian penal colony. Indeed, many who found ihemseives in stinking, veimin-infested prisons opted to join the navy. Navy regulations instructed that the cat-of-ninetails was not to be used to "inflict any punishment beyond twelve lashes upon the bare back." For any offense deseiving more, a seaman was supposed to be court-martialed. The regulations were largely ignored by captains at sea, however, where 24 and 36 lashes were not uncommon, and e\'en 72 were recorded. The men's attitude toward flogging was that it was often necessarv, and it is significant that during the Great Mutiny of 1798 flogging was not mentioned once in the mutineers' list of complaints and demands. Even while the fleet at the Nore and Spithead were under the command of the mutineers, the mutineers ordered floggings.

A daily ration for common seamen included 4 pounds of ship's biscuit per week. Sometimes called "hardtack," the biscuits often contained weevils or maggots, which the sailors knocked out of the biscuit before eating. Their diet also included a gallon of beer per day.

For stronger drink a seaman received a pint of wine or half a pint of rum a day. Rum was mixed with water and called giT)g, with the amount of water used at the captains discretion. Seamen prefen^ed the grog to wine, which was usually red, called "Black Strap" and mostly issued in the Mediterranean. Once issued to a seaman, a ration of drink was called a "tot." Although the practice was forbidden by regulations, his tot was often used as currency to repay or buy a favor. Lime or lemon juice was the Royal Navy's most famous weapon against scuiyv, and the British use of lime juice led to the seamen being called "Limeys" by American sailors—a phrase still widely in use today. The nax'y did not adopt widespread use of juices until 1795, and suiprisingly it took the Merchant Shipping Act of 1854 to compel that sewice to enforce the use of that simple remedy against scurvy. Food and drink on board could vary widely from ship to ship, even in the same licet, for it depended chiefly on the skill of each ship's pui"ser. The purser was the man standing between the victualing suppliers and the mess decks where the seamen ate and slept, looking to profit from this an'angement. He was allowed a commission of an eighth of the value of evei^thing issued by weight or measure. The whole system was open to coniiption and suffered Food and Drink A popular myth of Nelsons navy describes sailors due to pursers' incompetence. In general, however, eating vermin-infested food or stan'ing, but this is the seamen of Nelson's navy ate better than many in far from the tiaith. A seaman's weekly ration was ad- civilian life and certainly better than in the merchant equate In most circumstances^—in quantity, if not in service or the army—and perhaps most important, quality. He was allowed a pound of bread and a generally better than their enemies. Such generous provisioning by the standards of the time was regallon of beer eveiy day, but the bread took the foiTn flected in the British crews' ability to sail and fight of hardtack biscuits, and the weak beer was doled their ships. out because it kept better than water. The rest of the rations were issued on different days of the week: two pounds of salt beef on Tuesday and Saturday; Fighting two pounds of salt pork on Sunday and Thursday; Lieutenant James Gardner of the 28-gun Hind detwo pints of peas in half-pint allotments on Monday, scribed an incident while on convoy duty to Quebec, Wednesday, Thursday and Friday; three pints of oat- when two French ships of the line pursued his meal, six ounces of butter and 12 ounces of cheese, convoy. It was blowing hard, he wrote, and "We imissued a third at a time three times a week. Some- mediately let two I eefs out of the topsails, set toptimes fruit was issued instead of one of the meat ra- gallant sails and hauled the main tack on board, with a jib a third in and spanker. It was neck or nothing." tions, to prevent s JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILriAKY HISTORY 47

Saturday night in Nelson's navy was spent relaxing at the mess table, which was suspended from rope to reduce swaying with the ship's motion. Conditions were cramped; tables were small and lacked chairs, so some men were forced to stand among the ramrods and sponges for the guns.

Gardner expected the ship to capsi/e under such wind pressure, but by making and shortening sails between the squalls "we escaped upsetting or being taken." Although Gardner gave credit to the Frencii for their seamanship, they did lose two sails in the chase, and he pointed out that "we should have been captured for a certainty if the Frenchman had possessed more patience." The chase covered 120 miles in 12 hours, but Hind was able to shorten sail and wore round to rejoin the scattered convoy. At the battle of Cape Saint Vincent on Febmai'V' 14, 1797, Nelson first famously disobeyed orders when commanding the 74-gun third-rale man-ofWdrCaplaiu. His ship was third from last of a British line of 15 ships, and he saw it would take a long time for his vessel to engage. His fleet commander. Admiral Sir John Jends, had signalled for his ships to tack consecutively and engage the van of the larger 25-ship Spanish fleet. Nelson wore his ship, however, taking a shortcut to engage three enemy ships at the head of the Spanish fleet. JeiMs himself realized the need for independent action, however, and actually signaled his ships to break out of the line one minute after Nelson did so.

average crew of 800-900 were experienced seamen, the rest being landsmen or soldiers. They had nothing quite like the Coips of Marines, an integral part of the Royal Navy. The British rate of lire was four orflvetimes faster than the Spanish, though that depended on weather and sea conditions. Collingwood recorded firing off three broadsides in 90 seconds at Cape Saint Vincent. At Trafalgar Viciory'-^ 32pounders, the heaviest guns on board, fired three rounds in two minutes. Admiral Jei"vis opined that no English officer had much to fear from the Spanish warships because they were "iU manned, worse appointed, and beaten in imagination before they leave port." The British seaman was firmly convinced that he was worth three Frenchmen and four Spaniards. The British tar saw his equal only in the Dutch, the Danes and briefly during the War of 1812 the Americans—who he considered to be British anyway. Nelson took San Nicolas and San Josef by boarding after he had been "battering and basting them for an hour." In all, four ships were taken at Cape Saint Vincent—a low total compared with what the British took at the Battle of the Nile or Tmfalgar— Nelson took on the 80-gun, third-rate man-of-war but in that iirst major action Nelson was fifth in senSan Nicolas, the 1 !2-gun first-rate San Josef and San- iority, a commodore with foui' admirals above him, tissima Trinidad, afii-st-ratebehemoth with 130 guns. though it was he w ho had led the way. HMS Cidlodeu, another 74-gun third-rate commanded by Captain Cuthbert Collingwood, one of Nelson Nelson's friends and later his second-in-command at On Saturday, September 14, 1805, Vice Adni. Lord Trafalgar, came to Captain'^ assistance, as did other Horatio Nelson, a few days short of his 47th birthBritish ships later in the day. Initially that meant 148 day, left England for the last time. He breakfasted at British guns had to trade shots with 322 Spanish the George Inn in Portsmouth early that morning. guns, with a 2-to-l Spanish preponderance in man- Then, after meeting some dockyard officials and power. There, however, the Spanish advantage ended, some of his captains, he left from Southsea Beach— for in genera! thev were lucky if one-tenth of their Continued on page 80

MIl.riARV HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

Sword GIDEON

Eccentric, passionate Orde Wingate countered Arab gueirillas in Palestine— and helped found the Israel Defense Force. BY ROBERT BARR SMITH

M I l . r r A R Y HISTORY'

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

I

n Israel today you can visit a home for children and a modem spoils complex that are both named lor a member of a slnct and dour Pi"otestant sect. Orde Wingate died >eai-s before Israel became a nation, but he is still called in Hebrew hayedid. "the friend." Wingate lias a deathless place in militai-y histon' as the creator and moving spirit of the Cliindits, Britisli units thai operated deep behind Japanese lines in Buima during World War II. Not long before, he had been an obscure captain in prewar Palestine, where his extraordinaiy talent first surfaced. Murder, treac!ier\, teirorism and ai^son are nothing new in Palestine. In the 1930s, that ancient, troubled land was a ciaicible of strife between the Arab population and Jewish immigrants seeking to resettle their biblical homeland. Arab gangs ambushed Jewish settlers on the roads and attacked them in their kibbut/im, killing men, women and children and sabotaging oil pipelines. The Jews fought back when they could and fornied an underground army, the Haganah. After widespread rioting in 1936, the British authorized a 3,000-nian Jewish police force, called the Ghafjirs. Most of those aimed and uniformed men were Haganah members, but the imderground army itself also remained in existence. After World War I, the British held a League of Nations mandate over Palestine—and found that I they were presiding over a I nest of mutually hostile J hornets. In 1917 the Bntish I gov'emment had annoiuiced, Z. in the Balfour Declaration, I its support for a Jewish i homeland, but alter ihe war ended in 1918, its official policy tuiTied in favor of the Arabs, in an attempt to maintain some sort of stability in the Middle East, important both strategically and for its oil resen-es. Many Brttish leadei^s tended to be pro-Arab, in pan because some Arab leadei's had fought with them against Turkish troops during the war. Arab teirorists—some from outside Palestine^attacked British convoys and patrols as well as Jews, and British regular forces, trained for conventional war, found it diilicult to find and destroy this elusive enemy, which seemingly had spies and informants evervwhere. The Jewish community, then number-

Opposite: Best remembered as the founder of Burma's famous Chindits. Orde Wingate is also the father of the Israel Defense Force. Above: Beginning in the autumn of 1937, Arab attacks on Palestinian Railway trains increased greatly, with Arab fighters destroying culverts and bridges, then sniping at survivors.

ing about 400,000, was hard-pressed to hold its ground, let alone expand. In the fall of 1936, Captain Wingate reported for service. His upbringing had been austere and strict, with emphasis placed on life's spiritual side, for his parents were members of the Plymouth Brethren, a radical Protestant sect deeply committed to literal acceptance of the Bible. The family spent much oi Sunday in church, dressed in black, studied the Bible and otherwise led lives of extreme piety. After graduating fi om the Royal Military Academy, Woolwich, Charles Orde Wingate was commissioned as an artilleryman in 1923. In 1926 he did well in an Arabic course and later served in the Sudan Defense Force, a sort of hybrid of police and iiregular militai'v, chasing poachers, smugglers and slavers along the Abyssinian frontier. After a tour in England, in 1937 Wingate was transfened to Palestine. There, Arab gangs—controlled, as much as anyone could control them at all, by Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the mufti of Jerusalem since 1936—were striking at the Jewish villages and kibbutzim, mostly by night. The Arabs were augmented by Syrians and Iraqis, Driizes and Jordanians, but thev had no real central command structure.

Wingates Arabic was an unusual asset, and he was soon to acquire at least a working knowledge of Hebrew as well. Gr'adually he became friendly with a number of Jewish leadeiii, including officers of the Haganah, among whom was futur'e prime minister David Ben-Gurion. As time went by, they began to tarst him, realizing that this fierce Christian Englishman believed passionately in the Jews' biblical r'ole as God's chosen people. On the other hand, one of his officer's later wrote that Wingate was not gener ally anti-Aiab, and tr eated the ordinan Arab with courtesy. Wingale later became so deeply supportive of the Jewish cause that he wrote a paper for Chaim Weizmann, the future first president of the Jewish state. He realized that r"eal security for the infant homeland and its long border could be pro\ided only by a substantial defense force.

W

ingate urged that, as the fust line in a three-part defense system, "every able-bodied Jew witliin ten miles of a h'ontier should be taught to use a rifle, lo fight as a member of a rifle section and be issued with a ritle, bayonet andfiftyrounds." Every village should have a local defense unit organized along British infantry lines in squad-size sections of seven men. There was to be a Frontier Guard as well, with a headquarters and eight companies—some manning blockhouses along the borders, but most remaining mobile, ready to react to any threat. Andfinallywould come the Jewish State Defense Forces, a regular army cadre supported by ready reserves. In time, many of Wingate's proposals would be adopted by the new JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILITARY HISTORY S

Orde \Aflngate (center, in service cap] reviews Arab prisoners. The Arab fighters consisted of tribal groups, religious zealots and bandits, augmented by Syrians and Iraqis, Druzes and Jordanians. They operated with no central command structure.

nation of Israel. Beach suit, set off by the zigzaggy blue and red Royal Artillew Up to the time of Wingate's anival, much of the British mili- tie." King-Clark wi'ote much later that he wasn't impressed with tary efloit had been wasted. The countryside was riddled with Wingate's surly temper and apparent indifferx-nce lo the fact that Arab inforTners who reported every troop movement, so that the young officer's men were doing no more than their duty. any time the British emerged from their cantonments the ter- Wingate's blunt, almost bn.ital direction also sowed doubt roiists were instantly alerted. The borders with Syria and among some outstanding officers. One was the redoubtable Lebanon were porous and hostile Arabs crossed easily with Captain John (later General Sir John) Hackett, who said of aims and ammunition. Predictable patrolling, daylight opera- Wingate, "He had built himself up into this puritanical, firetions and static defensive posts were not the answer—the en- eating, dedicated Roundfiead-type Cromwellian soldier with a emies they were meant to thwart were shadows in the night who Bible in one hand and an alarm clock in the other, as it were...it did not stand to fight when faced with disciplined regular was possible to laugh at him but not when he was there." troops. They always struck at weakness. As for the Jews, Wingate also considered their efforts misdiingate was fortunate in his siLperiors, however. rected. They remained on the defensive. The resutl was that Brigadier Jack Evetts, commanding 16 Brigade at Ariib midei^s owned the houi^ of darkness and stmck almost at Haifa, saw merit in Wingate's propo.sals, and the overwill. The answer, Wingate thought, lay in small, mobile, mixed ail commander of British troops, Maj. Gen. Airhibald P. Wavell, gionps of British troops and Jewish settlers that would take agr'eed. Wavell, who would later achieve high command in back the night from the Ai^ibs. They would go on the offensive Wor Id War- II, was a brilliant, perceptive officer with an eye f or and keep it, ambushing and interdicting the raiding parties talented juniors. before they launched their raids. And so was bom the concept Wavell's successor, Lt. Gen. Richard Haddon Haining, trying of the Special Night Squads, Wingate's brainchild. to keep the peace with too few troops, had used his slender Wingate's intensity, his obvious partiality to the Jewish cause assets in setting np standing defense forces in the more popuand his peculiar pei"sonal habits led to considerable suspicion lated arcas. He too saw thi; merit in Wingate's ideas, and in May among some of his fellow officers. A young British officer of the 1938 he approved the Special Night Squads (SNS). His British Manchester Regiment who later served under him. Lieutenant units would provide some local security, leaving Wingate's new (later Colonel) Rex King-Clark, lelated that thefii"sttime he ever units fi'ee to go over to the offensive. With his idea blessed by laid eyes on his future commander, he saw an "extraordinary' the British command, Wingate now had to win the approval of figure in an uncertain Panama hat and a creased, dark. Palm the Jewish leader, at first skeptical of abandoning their defen-

W

52 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

sive posture and reluctant to put their full trust in any British army officer. Wingate kept tmng. On one occasion, he confronted Moshe Shertock, a powerful official of the Jewish Agency: "Shertock," he said, "why do you spend so much time flirting with your enemies and ignoring the help of your friends?" Shertock saw something in this messianic man that made him a believer; Wingate's fii"st opportunity came in March 1938, when a new Jewish settlement was begun at Hanita, in northern Palestine, close to an area used by the Ar'ab gucnillas infiltrating from Lebanon. Wingate went out alone at night to explore the area, then began teaching the Jewish fighters his basic tactics: Moving long distances by night across counti> and avoiding trails to set up night ambushes near hostile Ar'ab villages, thereby taking the initiative away irom the raiders. In addition to maintaining some semblance of peace in Palestine, the British command had to tiT to protect the Iraq Petroleum Company's strategically vital pipeline, rirnning 600 miles from the Kirkuk oilfields,crossing northern Palestine to the sea at Haifa. The teirorists wer-e fond of digging a hole beneath the pipeline, setting fire to an oil-soaked rag stuffed in the hole, and then shooting holes in the pipe. After r"epeated attacks on the pipeline, the British command gave Wingate's new ideas his official blessing. The Special Night Squads were born. Wingate began with a har d core. Brigadier Evetts directed

Wingate's Special Night Squads were led by top-notch young British officers such as Lieutenant Rex King-Clark, who rose to colonel and would lead his Manchesters in Burma during World War II.

that each of his three battalions furtiish Wingate 15 British volunteei's and an olficer. The troops came from the Royal Ulster Rifles, the Royal West Kents and the Manchester" Regiment, led by some .solid NCOs and three fir^st-class young British officei"s who had volunteered for the duty: Michael Grove, Rex King-Clark and H.E.N. "Bala" Bredin. Grove and Bredin would both lead battalions of the Parachute Regiment in World War 11; Bredin would finish an illustrious ciueer as a major general. King-Clark, who r ose to colonel, would lead his Manchesters in the brutal fighting through Naga Hills, past India's Kohima and on into Burnia. To his British troops, Wingate added Jewish Ghaffir volunteere—many of them also Haganah members—until he had formed a unit of more than 100 men. He then began to lead offensive patrols out into the darkness of Galilee. Wingate specified (he weaponry The leader of a squad carried the British Army's standard issue Webley .455 revolver Behind him came two bombei^s, revolver-aimed men each cairy ing a sack firll of grenades. The rest of the squad was armed with the reliable .303-caliber SMLE, or short magazine Lee-Enfield. The rilles were cairied with bayonetsfixedand with dark cotton sleeves pulled over the blades to eliminate any reflection. Wingate's otficere and NCOs pushed the trainees hard over the tenible rocky tei"rain of Galilee, thr^ough thickets of thom bushes. Wingate was a stem taskmaster, insistent on detail, driving his men to the edge of endurance, not above striking a man he thought was gixdng less than all he had. A young SNS squad tr'ainee, fiiture Israeli general Moshe Dayan, spoke for them all: "I really learned ham him." The high regard in which his tr-oops came to hold Wingate came about in spite of his distinctly odd habits. Dayan, for example, remembered an SNS unit

Lieutenant King-Clark (center, with hands behind back) observes members of the Manchester Rifles conducting a search in a Palestinian village in 1938. JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILITARY HISTORY 53

battle at Dabburiya, about four miles east of Nazareth. From thai town A!"ab midei's planned another strike, but one of Wingate's informers gave him enough warning to attack fii^l. Even with that advance notice, King-Clark considered the operation "a cock-up of the first water." Wingate was cautious as usual, always conscious of being watched by his enemies. On one occasion at least, he had tnicks' taillights moved to the fi*ont end of the vehicles, The Special Night Squad of the 1st Battalion, Manchester Rifles, poses for a photograph at so that distant obsei"vers Aijelet-has-Shaka, Palestine, in June 1938. would think he was going when he was coming toward preparing breakfast at its base the moining after a mission while them. This night, he would mount a complex deception. Wingate, stark naked, sat in a comer eating raw onions and Wingate sent several patrols out by tiuck in directions away reading the Bible. "There is no doubt that Wingate caught the fi-om his target. Wingate himself, with several other men. deimagination of the British soldiers," Lieutenant Bredin said. parted camp in another' vehicle with some women, apparently "They regarded him as more or less round the bend, hut de- headed for a party. Alter nightfall, his and the other elements serving of great respect for his courage, his energy, his un- were dropped off at preset positions and met near Dabburiya. doubted brains and the fact no obstacle ever deteired him." Covering the town with machine guns, he closed the ring To his peculiai- personal habits, Wingate added a little flam- around the village with other patrols. boyance. His unkempt uniforms and mismatched socks wore Before the ling closed completely, however, the operation went almost a trademark, as was the ln.il\' ugly old-style sun helmet bad, for one of the patrols humped into Aiabs in the darkness he sometimes wore, and he took to sporting a pair of revolver and had to open lire. A confused battle followed in the village, worn in what veteran NCO Fred Howbrook thought was with evei^-body blazing away at short range. Wingate, leading "cowboy style." Toward the end of his time in Palestine he would an ali-Jewish squad in the gloom, was hit five times in the leg, also grow a scmffy sort of Old Testament beard—a great I'arity apparently by rounds from a British Lewis gunner shooting at in the British Ai-niv^—and during training days at his base he what he thought were terrorists. Fortunately for Wingate, his walked about with an alami clock dangling from his arm. It wounds were from ricochets off the rocky ground. would ring whenever he had a new place to be or tiling to do, While Wingate's squads fired at each other in the darkness, a and it was meant to teach punctuality. British tarck driver chased a fleeing Arab into a haystack and ran over him. A West Kent soldier was mortally wounded in the arly in June 1938 one of Wingate's units drove a raiding chaotic fighting, and a Jewish squad member was killed. But •y- - partyoft the pipeline, and on the 11th two of his squads the Arabs were dispersed, by most accounts leaving behind at • ^ • 1 sui-prised Arab raiders in the act ot cutting the pipeline. least nine dead. The SNS killed two Ai abs, wounded another three and captured Wingate had to leave the SNS briefly, but he had trained his six more, weapons and all. There were four more clashes that men well. Two days later, while he was recovering from his wounds, a patrol under Lieutenant Bredin and his Ulstemien month, and attacks on the pipeline ceased soon thereafter. Wingate's operations wetv helped immeasm-ably by an exten- jumped anotheT" group of raiders along the pipeline and killed !4— sive and higWy secret intelligence system, the details of which the remains of the terrorist band attacked at Dabburiya. It was are still obscure today. It included paid Aixtb infoiTnei"s zealously the highest body count to date. And just after Wingate had r eprotected by Wingate, some of whom may even have been mem- joined his forces, he led an opieration to ambush amis smugglei"s bere ol the Aiab gangs. He is said to have met his informei^ very coming in from Jordan. He strTick at a place called Um Mejada, killing 11 of the smuggler's and capturing another foui: Shortly early in the morning, and-cXgieat risk he met them alone. alter that he received his first Distinguished Ser'vice Order The infomiation Wingate obtained led directly to tJie largest enIn July, King-Clat k led 10 Manchestei-s out toward the twin gagement of his early campaign against the raiders, a confused 54 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

hills called the Horns of Hittin (or Hattin), scene of SiUadin's gr'eatest victory over the C\T\saders in 1187. King-Clark's men bumped into one aiTiied Ar ab and killed him, then ambushed and killed three more as they came to aid the first. Wingate was soon active, both legs swathed in bandages, pushing his men in the night across the brutal, rocky slopes of some of the worst terTain in his district. The terrorists were now well aware of the identity of their worst British officers inspect aiiris seized duiing a search of an Arab rebel car in 1938. On one patrol, enemy and had put a price on Wingate chased down two taxis full of Arabs near Mount Tabor. his head. An Arab dropped a grenade into his car" on a sti'eet in Haifa, but Wingate's luck held—the gi'enade failed to explode. mouths. Over time the squads acquired an unsavory reputation, In August, neaj' Ein Hai-od, all three squads pad oiled together and civil administrotor's complained that SNS tactics were drialong rirgged Mount Gilboa, scene of the Philistines' defeat of ving uncommitted Aj'abs into the arms of the terrorists. King Saul. Wingate led every step of the way, even though his In early September the SNS striick again, this time near Beit legs were still bandaged. "How does he do it with those legs?" Lidd. In a textbook operation, Wingate dangled some bait in man,'eled King-Clark. "It's not his legs that eope with it," Bi edin fi ont of the terrorists—a disr'eputable farm truck driven by a explained. "It's his mind." That was as accur"ate a description of couple of his men dressed up as farm worker's. Wlien some of this Old Testament wanior as anyone has evei- made. the terrorists appr'oached the tnick the "dj-ivere" lied, and the low sides dr opped to reveal 15 soldiers and Jews lying prone, Success breeds success, and by the end of September Wingate's victories earned him the authority to reciiiit still more armed with rifles and a pair of Lewis guns. At the same time men. His training course now became the Coui'se lor Jewish other detachments closed in on the guertillas, and Wingate's Sergeants, the first prepar ation for a Jewish aiTiiy and the men men killed a dozen of them and captured two more without who would one day lead it. The School for British Sergeants casualties of their own. Among the dead was the Bedouin sheik had not been in oper^ation for long when Wingate again received who led the gang, killed in a close-i"ange shootout by King-Clark pr'ecise intelligence on an attack planned against the pipeline. and Corporal Howbrook. Again he .surrounded the tenorists' staging area, a camp near Those successes were followed by others, including a pitched Kafr Lidd. This time when the SNS went in just before dawn battle near storied Mount Tabor. It began almost accidentally, they achieved complete surprise: The Arabs who could, run for when Wingate saw two taxis full of Arabs and i-ecogni/ed two it, leaving behind two prisoners and 14 dead men. Wingate's known leirorist leaders among them. In a sort of Keystone Cops men also harvested aJi invaluable collection of documents, some chase, SNS men in trrrcks chased the taxis and eor'nered some implicating important local Arabs. Not long afterward, Wingate of the occupants. During the ensuing fight near the Church of caught another Arab band assembling for an attack and killed the Transfiguration, Lieutenant Bredin shot down Naif Zobi, a another 12 terroiists. terrorist leader, and his troops killed 14 of Zobi's men. Wingate was no stranger to gratuitous violence, though he For all his tactical brilliance, Wingate had no political sense, preached tolerance for Arab noncombatants and prisoners, and or perhaps he simply put his personal convictions above the renormally behaved with propriety himself. On one occasion, ality of what was politically possible in Palestine at that time. however, after a close Jewish friend was killed by an A] ab mine, In spite of the British policy of impartiality and noninvolvement Wingate flew into a rage and led a char-ge into the Ai'ab quarter in r'egional politics, Wingate publicly sided with the Jewish setof Beit Sfiean. The area was thick with teiTorists, but Wingate tlers before a British commission convened to try to solve the and his men indiscriminately beat anybody they met on the knotty problem of Palestinian partition. Then he took sides in str'eet and wrecked stores. They may also have left two or three an even mOT-e obvious way. corpses behind. There is also a stoiy that he punished Arab arThe commission having finished its work, both Jews and sonists along the pipeline by stuffing oil-soaked rags into their Arabs were sending delegations to London to lobby for their JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILHARY HISTORY 55

In the summer of 1940, Wingate met Leopold Amery, the new secretary of state for India. Himself a Jew, Ameiy both knew and approved of Wingate's activities in Palestine, and when an officer was wanted to lead native opposition to the Italians in Abyssinia, Amery recommended Wingate. The recommendation made its way to the general officer commanding Middle East, who happened to be General Sir Archibald Biitisl) liuupt'ib (jliui.oyiri|jii udpUiitid Aicib lebtiis in Haiuslinu in iy3d. \i it; u^slmitiluu iniii tiunng Wavell. hi the Ethiopian camhis time in Palestine, Wingate's officers conducted about 30 patrols against Arab terrorists. paign, Wingate directed with great .success a British-led ii"regular force of Ethiopians own interests. Jewish leader Chaim Weizmann telegraphed and Sudanese that he called, almost predictably, Gideon Force. Wingate to ask him to join the delegation. Wingate asked for "compassionate leave," asserting that he needed to take eare of avell would again call upon Wingate for a major role important lamily business back in Britain. Once there, he apin World War II, leading to the creation of the deeppeared publicly wilh Weizmann and Ben-Gurion to lobby for penetration force called the Chindits, regular British the Jewish position, and gave inter\'ie\vs with the media. This battalions trained to operate lar behind Japanese lines in did him no good wllh the British Army in Palestine, to whom Burma. Operating alone, supplied only by air, in some of the it was plain ihal Wingale had obtained the leave on a false most biTJtal teiTain in the world, Wingate's Chindits repeatedly premise, abandoning his command while it was in the presence cut enemy supply lines, pulled lai^e numbei"S of Japanese troops of the enemy. JeRisalem ordered him to return to Palestine, bul away from the front duiing the pivotal 1944 battles for Imphal Wingate would not lead the Special Might Squads again. In his and Kohima, and in June 1944, took the vital town of Mogaung absence, command had already passed lo the highly competent from a defending force twice their number. Lieutenant Eredin, who achieved seve)"al more small successes. By that time, however, Wingate was dead, killed when his North By then, more than 10 baltalions of British infantn' were American B-25 crashed on a remote hillside on March 12, 1944. coming in to reinforce the British in Palestine. The SNS was His trademark sun helmet was one of the tew items that sLim\ed moving inlo history. the ciiish. He lies now in Ai-lington National Cemetery, along with One of its oflicei^ estimated ihal over the life of the SNS, he his aide-de-camp and the American aircrew with whom he died. had done aboul 30 pati ols, which produced "two major and nuEarl Louis Mountbatten, another perceptive judge of men, merous lesser encounters" with Arab terrorists and during assessed Wingates impact on the campaign. Writing home to which he had "walked abotil three hundred miles across the his wile, he said: "i cannot tell you how much I am going to miss Galilean hills." Considering that most of that hiking had been Wingate. He was a ptiin in the neck to the generals over him, at night and across dangerous, rough, ixjcky country, with some but I loved his wild enthusiasm...." of the moves covering up to 15 miles, the squads' achievement The British went over to the offensive, driving the Japanese was something to be proud of. So was their body count. In any back across Bui-ma and back down the long, bloody road past case, Wingale had gone far beyond his duty as a British officer, Mandalay. This strange, almost possessed ofticer named Orde and indeed had imperiled his own reputation for vei acity. Late Wingate had as much to do with that lictoiy as he did with the in May 1939, Wingate left Palestine lor Britain, assigned as a genesis of the Israel Defense Force. brigade major of an artillen unit. In spite of his Zionist lanatiNot a bad legacy MH cLsm, Wingate had made his mai k pi otessionally. One man who recognized this impulsive, driven officer's talent was the per- Colonel Robert Barr Smilh, U.S. Army (ret.), is an attorney and freceptive Archibald Wavell. Paradoxically, Wingate's controversial public support of the Zionist cause would lead to his selection for his next major role. 56 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

quent coiiliibnlor to Military Histoiy. For further reading, he recoinnmids F'wc in the Night: Wingate of Bumia, Ethiopia and Zion, bv John Bierman and Colin Smith.

MUKDENF

Rus^o-Japanese ^ ^ r s Greatest

M • l'»^aK>•' .-.

This climactic land engagement of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 employed much of World War I's technology—such as machine guns and artillery—but good generalship decided the final outcome. BY WALT ALBRO

58 MfLITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

N EARLY 1905, an Ii'jshman covering the Russo-Japanese Wai" for Russian newspapers visited Russian soldiers stationed near the ancient Chinese city oi Mukden, provincial capital of Manchuria. Ftancis McCullagh saw the trenches, the barbed-wired entanglements and (he bombprool loitilicalions and concluded thai the Russians' positions were impregnable. He was puzzled, however, by the fact that "Nearly all the soldiers I came across.. .were depressed, sadtoned men, w ho Irequentlv sighed as if they were suffering ft-om some fatal internal malady." The Russians were demoralized in part because of a string of

Land BattL Russian Cossacks, whose pertormance at Mukden was disappointing, confront Japanese horsemen, in Cavalty Engagement at the Gates of Mukden. 25th February 1905, by N.S. Samokish.

The correspondent was referring to the opening phase ol the Battle of Mukden, which ultimately developed into history's largest battle up to that date^—involving nearly a hali-million soldiers and lasting three weeks, across a battlefield that stretched 100 miles. Contemporary military obsei"vers recognized Mukden as the prototype of a new type of waifarc—one in which massed aimies made widespread use of trenches, together with such modern inventions asfieldtelephones, barbed wire, machine guns, rapid-fire heavy artilleiy and obseivation balloons. Those techniques would spread to Europe nine years later during World War 1. But althotigh Mukden involved aspects of a new kind of warfare, it was won through the application of traditional techniques of the ancient art oi war— namely knowing the enemy commander and using that knowledge to trick him and lure him into a trap. The Russians had helped precipitate the war a decade earlier by acting on their impulse to acquire a sphere of inlluence in Manchujia, a province in China's noilheast corner thai was lich in coal and iron. Unfortunately for the Russians, the Japanese liarbored identical ambitions. In 1896 the Russians signed a treaty with a weak China that allowed them to build a portion of the Trans-Siberian Railway across northem Manchuria. Two years later. Russia wangled Chinese permission to lease the Liaotung Peninsula. The Russians converted Port Arthur, at the peninsula's southeiTi tip. into an ice-free naval base. In 1900 a Chinese uprising against foreign interference known as tbe Boxer Rebellion gave Russia an excuse to deploy troops in Manchuria, ostensibly to pnMect its railiTjad interests. Those troops threatened Japanese aspirations, and the Japanese insisted that they be l emoved. When the Russians refused, the Japanese secretly prepared for war. A Japanese attack against Russia might have seemed as implausible as a midget's assault on a giant. Russia was an establi.shed Etiropean power wilh a large industrial base and a regular army of 1.1 million soldiers. Japan, with few natural emban"assing defeats they had suffered during the previous resources and little heavy industi^y. had an army of only 200,000 year. "Even the songs 1 heard the orderlies crooning to them- men. On closer examination, however, the contest was not tbat oneselves were very moumtril," noted McCullagh, who also had visited Japan earlier in the war. "One of the saddest of them, sided. By pumping up its regular army with resei"ves. Japan which described a conscript's leave-taking of his home, made could create a temporary strike force of almost 600,000 men. me think, by way of contrast, of the gay pnjcessions I had often Since Manchuria is located near Japan, the Japanese benefited from short lines of supply and communications, enabling them seen escort Japanese conscripts to bairacks." McCullagh Ined to cheer up one young conscript, but failed. to shift manpower quickly Irom one strategic spot lo another. The reporter noted, "On the contrary, he succeeded in making Russia, on the other hand, was hampered by the logistics of me very doubtful of the Russian chances of success in the battle Hgbting far from home. In early 1904, Russia bad only 80.000 trcx>ps stationed in the Ear East—and these were mostly inwhich had just begun...." JANtJARY/FEBRUARY 20D5 MILITARY HISTORY 59

ferior, second-string regiments. The quickest way for reinforcements ftx>m European Russia lo reach Manchuria was by the Trans-Siberian Railway, whicli then strelched 5.000 miles from Yekaterinbui^ in the Urals to Vladivostok on the Sea of Japan. Japan saw its best chance in striking quickly and overwhelming Russian forces in Manchuria before they had a chance for reinforcement. On Februiiry 8, 1904, the Japanese navy launched a suiprise attack on the Russian Pacific Fleet at Poi't Arthur, resulting in considerable damage. The Japanese next landed thi"ee invasion forces, two in Manchuria and one in Korea. The westernmost force, the Third Army under General Maresuke Nogi, landed about 60 miles north ofPoit Arthur. Its assignment was lo capture the port and then link up wilh the other two forces for an attack on the supply base at Liaoyang, northeast of Port Arthur. The Japanese expected the decisive land battle to take place at Liaoyang, but that didn't happen because Nogi failed to quickly capture Port Arthur. His Third Army was still preoccupied with the siege when the other two aims of the enveloping movement reached Liaoyang in late August 1904. The Japanese attacked Liaoyang anyway, even though they were outnumbered. In a daring gamble, about half of the Japanese First Aniiy, which was positioned on the eastern wing. crossed the Tai-tzu River and threatened to cut the Russian line of communications. The flanked Russians evacuated iheir positions andreti^'ated40 miles north to the next major cit\, Mukden. In late March 1904, Tsai- Nicholas II had appointed his minis-

ter of war, Aleksei N. Kuropatkin, as commander of the Russian field armies in Manchuria. "The general stands higher than any other Russian officer." wrote John Murray, the militai>' con espondent of the London Times, "not only in Russian opinion but in that of professional soldiers all the world over, and if any human agency can change the deplorable situation to Russia's advantage. Kuropatkin may be the man to do it."

B

ORN TIIE SON of a Russian provincial official in 1848, Kuropatkin rose to the top because of an engaging personality. He knew when and how to Hatter his superiors. He also had a fortunate connection to Russia's most admired general in the latter half of the 19th centuiy. Mikhail D. Skobelev. Kuropatkin had entered the aiTny as an officer cadet at the age of 18. By 20, he had distinguished himself in combat and was promoted to a company commander. By 1876, he was serving on Skobelev's stalf. A Swedish observer. Sven Hedin. who knew both men, noted that Skobelev was a man of action who lusted for battle. In contrast, Hedin wrote that Kuropatkin regarded war "entirely from its serious side, as an unavoidable evil, an art that must be studied with industw and thoroughness, leaving nothing to chance, or to the enthusiasm of the moment." One of Kuropatkin's critics commented that the general, who was 60 when he participated in the Battle of Mukden, tried to choreograph his battles as if they were ballets. For the first few months of the war. Imperial Army Headquartiers directed its three field aiTnies fiom Tokyo. Then, in \

60 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

GENERAL ALEKSEI Kuropatkin's 275,000-inan army was tne largest ever rielaea in Russian liistory.

Hun River, and 10 miles south of that is the Sha River. The South Manchurian Railway passed along the western edge of the city, mnning from the southwest to the northeast. Kuropatkin commanded three amiies positioned in a thin defensive line extending about 100 miles from west to east. The First Manchurian Army was on the left, in the hills about 30 miles southeast of the aipital. The Third Manchurian Anny was in the center, about 10 miles south of Mukden. That aimy held a bridgeheiid on the south bank of the Sha River, including several strategic fortified hills. The Second Manchurian Army held the right, about 20 miles southwest of Mukden, with its exti-eme light wing anchored on the south bank of the Hun. Kuropatkin's 275,000-man army group was the largest ever fielded in Russian histoiy

June 1904, the army decided to appoint a theater commander who would direct all operations from Manchurian soil. Rather than rely on a single leader, the aimy hedged its bets by dividing responsibility between two gencials with complementaj-y talents. Iwao Oyama, age 62, was named commander in chief, with Gentaro Kodama, 52. as his chief of staff. The piirtnership was based on the undei"standing that the older Oyama would In mid-FebruaiT, the Japanese had three aimies south of the be the figurehead, leaving Kodama a free hand lo make opera- Sha Rivei' opposite the Russian line. Their Second Amiv was tional decisions. on the west, the Fourth Army in the center and the First Army Tall and heavy, Oyama had a pockmarked face that was fre- on the east flank. The two lines, which had both dug in, ranged quently distorted by displays of volcanic temper He was cau- in distance fixim each other from several miles to several huntious and conservative—sometimes to the point of indecisive- dred yards. Recently airivcd from Port Arthur, the Third Arm> ness—^but he was also steadfast and dependable. Kodama. on bivouacked in an area about lOmiles west of Liaoyang, behind the other hand, was a tiny, energetic man with a Vandyke beard, the left wing, bringing the total of Japanese troops in the area elllike chann and a good sense of humor. Kodama was the gam- to 200,000. bler who, after cold calculation, was willing to let everything Kuropatkin's attack, planned for Febi\iai> 25. was a repetiride on one roll of the dice. Although an odd couple, the two tion of the one he had tried unsuccessfully at San-de-pu. The generals worked well together. Second Manchurian Aimy (right wing) would spearhead the The Russians spent most of the fall of 1904 reinforcing their move, outflanking the Japanese left at San-de-pu. The Third manpower, stockpiling supplies and upgrading their defenses Manchurian Anny (center) would support the offensive only to ai^OLuid Mukden. Port Ai*thur suiTcndercd on Januai^ 2. 1905, the extent of demonstrations and artillci>'fii'c.Inexplicably, the fi^eeing up the Japanese Third Arniy to join the other armies Fii"st Manchurian Army (left wing) was assigned no role. outside Mukden. Before it could anive. however, on Januarv' 25 Although the situation called for quick action, Kuropatkin Kuixjpatkin launched a preemptive attack against the west end of dawdled for weeks drafting his customarily elaboi"ate plan. As [he Japanese line, tiding to turn the flank in the Battle of San-de- the days slipped by, Kuropatkin circulated the proposal among pu. The offensive failed because of a series of Russian blundei-s. his subordinates, soliciting their opinions. Even after the subBy Februaiy both sides were under duress. The Russians ordinates had finished squabbling over the details, there were needed a victory to reverse their string of humiliating defeats. additional delays. The Japanese needed to end the war. since they were running Oyama and Kodama. in contrast, wasted no time gathering all out of money, ammunition and manpower. They were also mnning out of Battle of Mukden time, fora Russian fleet had left the W. 1905 Baltic Sea in October 1904 and was steaming around the globe to challenge Japanese control of the waters off Manchui'ia. The Japanese had to win before the Russian fleets arrival, (ir risk having their anmy cut off. Mukden (its modern name is Shenyang) is located on a Hat plain, with rolling hills and mountains to the east. A few miles to the south is the

Left: A Japanese image shows "A body of Russians coming to surrender to our fighting Line near Mukden." Right: While General Aleksei N. Kuropatkin dawdled for weeks in launching his offensive, Japanese General Iwao Oyama proceeded with his own plan to flank the Russian armies. JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILITARY HISTORY 61

remaining manpower, includingrawrecruitsand elderly reserves, for one last efforl to destroy the Russians. Although outnumbered, ific two generals decided ihat tJieir best chance was to seize I he initiative. In the battles they had fought with Kuropatkin in previous months, Oyama and Kodama obsened that the Russian t\)ught like a bureaucrat—^strictly by the plan. Ho tended to slump into paralysis or disorientation whenever his plans were dismpted or when he faced an unanticipated threat. The Japanese aimed to exploit those weaknesses. The newly organized Japanese Filth Army would begin the offensive on Febiaiai>' 18, a h-ill week before the Russians planned to move. The Filth Amiy would strike at the mountain passes at the eastem end of the line, creating the impression that the Japanese w ere attempting to outllank the Russians, Oyama and Kodama gambled that Kuropatkin might be caught o0 guard and aish his resen'es east to meet this threat. Once the Russian reseiTes were committed, the Japanese would launch their tiTte offensive in the west: The Third Aimy would swing wide ai'ound the Russians' right llaiik, cutting their communications line, the South Manchui ian Railway. As the Russian right pulled back to meet that attack, the entire Japanese line would advance, bending the Russian line into a U shape and bagging the entire enemy amiy group. "The object of the battle is to decide the issue of the war," Oyama wrote tersely in his orders. "The question is not one, therefore, of occupying certain points or seizing tracts of countiT. It is essential that the enemy should be dealt a heavy blow. and., .it is imperative upon this occasion to pursue as promptly and as fni' as possible."

/'

^

•tf

62 MELITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

The Russian positions in the east consisted of scattered forts overlooking strategic roads or mountain passes. Maneuver was difficult because of the intense cold, and in places the slopes were coated thickly with ice. The Japanese struck with energy and enthusiasm, attempting to outflank the fonnidable positions. Dining the attack on Beresnev Hill, evei>' Japanese soldier went into battle canning a sandbag on his shoulder. As each section came into the clear and faced Russian infant^' fire, the Japanese threw down the sandbags and la\ behind them, providing covering fire for the soldiers coming up. While this mountain battle developed into some of the fieirest fighting of the war, the rest of the Japanese line remained eerily silent. Over the next several days, a diumbeat of tclcgi~ams arrived at Kuropatkins headquarters reporting that one position after the other had fallen in the east. Kuropatkin grew alanned at a report identifying one of the Japanese units fighting in the mountains as the 11 th Division, which had previously been part of Nogi's Third Army at Port Arthur. Did this mean that the Third Anny was somewhere in the east?

B

tFORl: DAWN ON Febmai^ 24, Maj. Gen. UkhachOgorovich, in charge of the Russian secret sei^ice in Manchuria, received a report fi"om one of his spies that the Japanese knew of Kuropatkins offensive plans scheduled for the following day. The report was believable since a disturbingly large number of Russian battle plans had previously fallen into the efficient hands of the Japanese intelligence service. Ukhach-Ogotovich reported the news in person to Kuropatkin. "Go to General Baron [Aleksandr V.] Kaulbars fcommander of the Second Manchurian Army] and tell him what you have told me," Kuropatkin directed. •'Tell him, too, from me that 1 beg liim to decide upon the possibility of the of(ensive, and ask him to let me know at once by telephone whether the Second Anny will attack the Japanese tomoirow or not."

Because Kuropatkin himself had recognized the urgency of the situation. Ukhach-Ogorovich may have assumed that he planned to telephone Kaulbai"s himself. For an unknown reason, Kui^opatkin failed to do so. Kaulbai"s' headquartci^ was 20 miles away, and Ukhach-Ogorovich didn't arrive there until 5 that afternoon. Kaulbars, meanwhile, was preoccupied with bad news of another nature. Patrols had spotted an unexpected concentration of Japanese troops to the southwest of San-de-pu. (This was Nogi's Third Aimy. the location of which continued to elude the Russian intelligence semce.) Kaulbars was planning to hit the enemy with 90,000 men. yet the new Japanese concentrations suggested that he would be attacking at a numerical disadvantage. During a council that Kaulbars conducted with his subordinate commander's, they concentrated on one question: Can Kuropatkin send us reinforeements before we attack? The council was suspended while Kaulbars held a long telephone com'ei-sation with the commander in chief. At the conclusion, Kaulbars reconvened the meeting and reported

Left: A 1904 sketch by Sydney P, Hall of General Kuropatkin. one of whose critics remarked that he tried to choreograph his battles as if they were ballets. Right; As their line finally starts to crumble, Russians cross an ice-clogged river during their retreat from IVlukden in March 1905.

AT DAWN ON FeLmary 28, the Japanese opened up witli more tlian 100 lieavy ^uns, ana tne Russians replied witii an equal numDer.

Kuropatkins answer: "Not a bayonet will be sent..,.fMikhail Vasilivich] Alekseyev f the commander of the eastern mountain passes] is being hard pressed." That response, together with the report (later proved false) that the Japanese had learned of the Russian attack plans, clinched the decision (or the Second Manchuiian Aimy commanders. Kaulbai-s telephoned Kuropatkin again and said that the offensive had been "indefinitely postponed." On the psychological level, Kuropatkin lost the battle at this point. He had suiTendered the initiative to Oyama and Kodama and would never regain it. Kuropatkin feared that the Japanese were launching their main offensive in the east, where he was weak. His low-risk response was to postpone his own attack in the west and Rish reinforcements to the threatened zone. A more detemiined commander would have trusted his original plan and stuck to it. O\er the next several days, Kuropatkin stripped the Second Manchurian Army of its reserves and sent them cast. He then whittled away at the aimy group's general reseiA'e. He eventually dispatched the entire I Siberian Corps, the 72nd Division, the 2nd Brigade of the 6th East Siberian Rille Division and the 146th (Tsaritsin) Regiment. Oyama and Kodama sprang their trap on Febaiai^ 27. The Japanese Third Army, consisting of 40,000 men and about 200 guns, swung around the Russian right Hank. Despite the Russian cavalry's overwhelming numerical superiority, the vaunted

Cossacks assigned to the Russian right failed to detect the enemy's presence until dinnertime, when their commander was suiprised to lcam, just as he was sitting down to eat, that a column of Japanese was approaching. Next, Oyama and Kodama ordered their Second and Fourth armies, holding the center, to begin a huge artillei^ bombardment to pin down the Russian center and prevent it from shifting to meet the Hank threat. After the successful siege of Pot1 Arthur, the Japanese had transported six of their massive 11 inch howitzeiTs by railroad to their lines outside Mukden, Those weapons, the lai'gest-caliber guns evei' used by a field army, were positioned on concrete pads opposite the Russian fortified positions at Putilov and One Tree hills southwest of Mukden. At dawn on FebuiaiA' 28. the Japanese opened up with more than 100 heaw guns, and the Russians I'eplied with an equal number. Noise fi'om the cannonade, which lasted all day, was heard 30 miles away. Since the Russians had started building some of their fortifications as early as April 1904, they were well protected. Troops stationed on Putilov and One Tree hills were pounded by an estimated 1.000 shells but suflered only 33 casualties. The Japanese aimed their 11-inch howitzers at the maze of trenches around the base of the two fortified hills. A Russian physician at a nearby field hospital. Dr. A.A. Veresaev, witnessed the incoming 250-pound shells: "The steel monsteiis, snorting, fiashed by fi'om an unseen distance, and hit the trenches, the entanglements and the covered pits. Grayish yellow and dingy black clouds of smoke from the explosions rose into the air, spread, and branched out like enormous bushes. They separated from the crater and melted away, soiling the sky, and ft-om below rose new columns of smoke." The bombardment succeeded in distracting Kuropatkin for a critical 24 hours. He made only two tentative actions in the west that day. First, he ordered his Cossacks to pi obe to the west and determine the strength of the enemy's flanking maneuver. Next, as insurance, he threw out a brigade of infantry to the

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MILITARY HISTORY 63

northwest of Mukden. On the following day, it became clear that the Japanese main thiTJsl was targeled at the Russian western flank. Kuropatkin ordered two infantiy divisions to be redeployed to the village of Kaolitun and two more to Sal-in-po, both northwest of Mukden. Once these two troop concentrations were in place, they would represent a formidable roadblock for the Japanese, since the Russian forces totaled 72 battalions—almost double tbe size of the Japanese Hanking force, which had only 42 battalions. At best, however, it would take more than 24 hours for these divisions to reach position. On March 2. heavy snow fell during the morning. In the eastem mountains, the snow put ihe attacking Japanese at the disadvantage, since iheir moving soldiers were easily seen against the while background. During an aftemoon attack against the village of Wa-hei-pu-tzu, the Japanese were greeted by concentrated rifle, machine gun and ailiilery fire the moment they exposed themselves. The fire was so heav\' and kicked up so much snow that ihe battle reproduced the effect of a blizzard. One Japanese brigade suffered 128 casualties within 20 minutes. A series of small successes like this brought stability to the east end of the Russian line. Kuropatkin, now concerned about the situation in the west, started to countermand his earlier ordei"s dispatching troops to the east. The excellent 1 Siberian Corps, which had spent days traveling to the east, was ordered to revei-se direction and return to tbe west. The marching and counteimarching covered 125 miles, exhausting the corps and keeping it (^ut of action for seven crucial days.

THE IMPOSING-LOOKING attack was undercut hy incompetence ana tne Russians* pervasive pessimism and deiensive preoccupation.

pation. The commander of the decisive right column was slow to move. By the time he budged, the Japanese had launched a preemptive str'ike against the left column. Kaulbars immediately withdraw troops fiijm the right column to help defend the left column. Robbed of weight, the right column was unable to deliver an effective punch. To make matters worse, Kuropatkin had launched the counter'attack in isolation. Neither the Third nor the First Manchurian armies were ordered to make attacks or demonstrations in support of the counteroffensive. Reviewing battle reports that evening in his headquarler-s, Kuropatkin concluded that "\v\y little had been done." Tbe Russian commander insisted that Kaulbars renew the attack the following day. Kaulbai"s did so on March 6, with results that were even less impressive than the day before. By Marrh 7, the Japanese Third Aimy was within four miles of the Russians' railroad line. The Japanese flank attack had bent the line of the Second Manchurian Army—which had faced south at the beginning of the battle—into a right angle, N THE SAME DAY, the Japanese Third Army received with one arm facing south and the other facing west. The a temporary check about fO miles west of Mukden. Second Manchurian Army had been divested of much of its Kuropatkin's revised plan was to slow the Japanese long manpowei" to build up the infanti^- screen west of Mukden. In enough to accumulate a reserve capable of striking a coun- addition the Japanese Second Army had Joined the offensive teiblow, perhaps as early as March 4. Unfortunately for and was striking the Second Manchurian Army from the south. Kuropatkin, however; the troops he earmarked for the infanti"y The rest of the Russian line, including the Third Manchurian scr"een were thrown out piecemeal and without much coordi- Army (center) and First Manchurian Army (east), remained nation. Therefore, they were not vei"y successful in slowing more or less in a straight line that extended east of the Second Manchurian Arniy. down the Japanese advance. KLU opalkin was hamper ed by many of the problems that had Kur-opatkin realized that the only way he could effectively plagued the Russian army since the war's beginning. The cav- commandeer' more troops fiom his center and east armies alry commanders were unaggr'essive and incompetent. The would be to conti"act their front. On the night of March 7-8, he commander in chief couldn't get reliable reports about the ordered the two aiinies to retreat about 10 miles north to ihe enemy's str'cnglh and dispositions. Subordinate commanders Mukden side of the Hun River. The Japanese were not expectwere uncooperative. ing the Russians to abandon excellent for-tified positions and General Kaulbars disappointed his commander in chief more were slow to follow up—losing their best chance to annihilate than once. Assigned by Kuropatkin to command the western the enemy. infantr'y .screen, the Second Manchurian Army commander Kuropatkin launched his final counterattack on Marcfi 9. blundered on Mar'ch 3 by withdrawing tv^-o infantiy divisions Luck, as usual, seemed to reside with the Japanese. A violent from an excellent defensive position along an abandoned rail- windstoiTTi swept out of the southwest, blowing dust from the way embankment. The Japanese immediately moved in and plains directly into the faces of the attacking Russians. Visibiltook over the strategic site. ity, at times, was reduced to 100 yar-ds. The attack suffered hom KaLilbai"S kumched Kuropatkin's counleistroke on March 5, all the pr-oblems of the pr-evious Russian efforts—confusion, spearheaded by three columns. Kaulbars had concentr'ated his misdirection and lack of coordination—and succeeded in only sti'ength in the right column, which consisted of 48 battalions temporarily slowing the Japanese. (making the column lai'ger than the entire Japanese Third That evening Kuropatkin ordered a general retreat to the Amiy). In his center column, Kaulbar s had tbe 26th Infantiy mountains near Tiehling, which was the next major Russian Division; on the left, 32 more battalions. The force was sup- strongpoint along the raih'oad, about 40 miles north of Mukden. poi'ted by 199 guns. The Russians blew up their amrriunition dumps and set fire to The imposing-looking attack was undercut by incompetence tbeir supply war'ehouses. The First and Third Manchurian and the Russians' pervasive pessimism and defensive preoccu- aiTnies withdrew first, marching north in a line parallel to the

O

64 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

lost prisoners—two-thirds of the aimy escaped to Tiehling. These manpower losses were quickly replaced. The Japanese losses—15,000 killed and 60,000 wounded—were irreplaceable. In terms of manpower, the Japanese actually found themseives in a worse strategic position after the Battle of Mukden than they had been in before. A few days after the defeat. Tsar Nicholas dismissed Kuropatkin as commander in chief and replaced him with Nikolai Petrovich Linievich, the fomier commander of the First Manchurian Army. For several months after Mukden, the battle lines in Manchuria remained quiet as both sides waited for the arrival of Russia's Baltic Fleet, which had been renamed the Second Pacific Squadron. This fleet neared the Chinese coa.st in the spring and headed for the Russian port at Vladivostok, northea.st of the Korean Peninsula. On May 27, the Japanese Combined Fleet under Vice-Admiral Heihachiro Togo attacked and destroyed the Russian fleet in the Battle of Tsushima Strait. Of the 12 Russian battleships, eight were sunk and the remaining four were captured. This final humiliation of the Russians fueled antiwar as well as revolutionary sentiment at home. Under political pressure, Nicholas agreed in August 1905 to negotiations mediated by U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt. General Oyama and his senior officers, including his energetic chief of staff, Gentaro Ironically, the Russians gave up at the precise moment when the odds in the Kodama (mounted at right], triumphantly enter Mukden on March 10,1905. land war had shifted decisively in their favor By summer 1905, reinforcements railroad. The Second Manchurian Army served as the rear had swelled the Russian army group in Manchuria until it had three times the manpower of its Japanese opponent. General guard. At first the retreat was orderly, but eventually the Japanese Linievich ur"ged the tsar to let him attack, claiming that he could Third Arniy reached the railroad line and, using the embank- ciaish the Japanese with his massive force stiffened by elite regiment for cover, poured rifle and artillery fire into the Russian menLs horn European Russia. Nicholas, however, was no Peter tiocips shuffling north. This led to a rout. The Russian aimies the Great. He ihrew in the towel. were scattered in the hills like sheep without a shepherd, wrote Mukden provided many military lessons. It showed the diffione correspondent. Observers noted a square-mile ai^ea that had culty of maintaining centralized control of mass aiTnies. It also been strewn with old mess lins, overturned carts, canteens, demonstrated that the deployment of machine guns, barbed wire b(X)ts, dead horses, bags of flour, rifles, bayonets, cartridge clips and rapid-fire ariillei"y had shifted the advantage to the defense. and cartridges. During the battle, the Japanese generals were able to size up their opponent and predict how he would react under certain Kaulbai's was thrown from his horse and suffered a broken collarbone and cracked dbs. While resting beside the road, he cii'cumstances. That knowledge enabled them to set a trap and heard another officer inquire about the 7th Regiment. "The 7th defeat a numerically superior enemy. Although Mukden inauRegiment?" snorted Kaulbai's, "1 do not know whal has become gurated a new era of fighting, it also reinforced the notion that ol my whole army, and he asks me where my 7th Regiment is!" the fundamentals of war are never outdated. MH The Japanese entered Mukden on March 10, scooping up 20,000 Russian prisoners. Exhausted by weeks of marching and Wall Albro is a Maryland-based magazine editor and freelance fighting, Oyama and Kodama's .soldiers were unable to push on writer specializing in history and biography. For further reading, any further to complete the rout. As it was, the Russians lost he recommends: Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: Russia's 20,000 killed and 49,000 wounded, but—even subtracting the With Japaa by Richard Connaughton. JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MIUIARV HISTORY 65

REVIEWS Dresden's citizens thought they were exempt from air attack, but that changed in February 1945. By Glenn Bamett

THE TERM "WEAPONS OF mass destruc-

tion," or WMDs, has been overused of late. In World War 11, however, it was pait of militai>' doctrine to kill as many enemy civilians as possible. That way, the opponents' morale would be damaged. The atomic bomb is the most obvious WMD used during the war, but a close second would be (irebombing. The idea was tor hundreds ot bombere to di^op mixed loads of incendiary and highexplosive bombs to set fire to a city center With luck, the fue would bum so hot that it would create a iirestonn and suck all of the oxygen out of the air. That cataclysmic fate befell the German city of Dresden on the night of Febaiai^ 13, 1945. In just a few hours as many as 25,000 people, mostly women, children and the elderiy. either burned or suffocated in their shekel's. Until now, many Americans knew about the firebombing of Dresden cliiefly through the novel Slaughterhouse-Five, whose author, Kurt Vomiegut, was a U.S. Amiy soldici' and POW who witnessed the holocaust rn"sthand. Now that cataclysmic event is recounted in comprehensive detail in Dresden: Tuesday, February 13, 1945, by

Frederick Taylor (Haipei'ColIins, New York, 2004, $26.95). Part of the tragedy of Dresden was that its populace and the thousands of i^efiigees who had taken shelter them thought they were exempt hwm Allied air attack. A cultiLiul treasure, the city had no war-related industries, unless one counted worldclass optics and electronics production. It was also defenseless, its anti-aii'craft guns having been shipped to the Eastern Front. Was the bombing of Dresden so late in the war justified? In hindsight ceiiainly not, but in Febmary 1945 the Gemian army's counterattack in the west had only recently been i-epulsed in the Battle of the Bulge. V-1 and V-2 guided missiles were 66 MILITARY HISTOm' JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

March of Death: Sir John Moore's Retreat to Conuma, 1808-1809, by Cliristopher Sunimerville, Greenhill Books, Lionel Leventhal Ltd., London, UK, and Stackpole Books, Mechanicsburg, Pa., 2003, $34.95. The tixie measure ol an army is taken neither on the drill field nor on the battlefield, but when its soldiers face extreme adversity. In the winter of 1808, General Sir John Moore's British arniy embarked Frederf on a misconceived mission to support the Spanish anny against Empei or Napoleon. The outcome was a morale-shattering • 194.6' winter retreat that would have destiwed most armies. In spite of all their privahitting London and Antwerp, and Messer- tions, however, the Bi itish managed to schmitt Me-262 jets were beginning to outfight their French pursuei"s and exstrike fear into Allied bomber foiTnations. ecute a successful evacuation to Britain. It seemed that Germany had plenty of [f it is remembered at all, Moore's exfight left. Meanwhile the Russians, then pedition is regarded as an unfortunate just 60 miles from Dresden, were de- footnote in the Peninsular War, led by an manding that their Western allies support incompetent general whose timely death them with strategic bombing. Altogether, cletued the way lor his far more capable Dresden was doomed. successor, Arthur Wellcsley, Duke of WelFrederick Taylor is a meticulous histo- lington. Yet as Christopher Summewille rian who has mined every known pri- explains in his new book, March of Death, mary source to document that fateful Moore's mission was doomed to fail night and all that led up to it. He relates before it crossed the Spanish frontier. the history of the city, its Jewish popula- Summemlle places most of the blame on tion and the rise of Adolf Hitler He then the ill-advised policy of the British govchronicles the development of aerial ernment in general, and of Foreign Secbombing and techniques of fii^ebombing. retary George Canning and Secretary of The reader sees the gathering storm Wai" Robert Stcwail, Viscount Castlereagh, through the eyes of bomber crews, sur- in particulai: vivors and rescue worker's alike. After Napoleon high-liandedly replaced In some ways Tayloi"'s book is an oveiitill Spain's king with his own brother Joseph, of infonnation. But the vivid hoiTor of the Spanish rose up against him. The Dr'esden's Gdllerddiumening is all there, Spanish bombastically pioclaimed that with no moralizing or antiwai^ sentiment. their forces were defeating the French at His evenhanded, dispassionate approach evei>' turn. At the insistence of Canning allows the reader to see for himself how and Castk'R-agh, Britain dispatched some easily man can use WMDs against his of its amiy's finest units to fight alongside fellow man. Dresden: Tuesday, Fel?maiy 13, the Spaniards. However, after entering 1945 is history at its best, recounted as Spanish tenitory from Portugal at the well as the \^^^tten word can describe the head of 35,000 troops on November I, indescribable. 1808, Mooiv soon learned that apart from

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a few scattered successes, Spain's muchtouted i^esistance had proven disorganized and ineffectual—and that the inhabitants' attitudes toward the British ranged from indifference to hostility. Learning that he had to contend with no less than 100,000 veteran French troops. Moore decided that his best possible move would be to decoy them to the north, away fi'om Madrid, in order to buy time for his Spanish allies to reorganize their ovm anny. By the time he reached Sahagun on December 13, however. Moore found not one but two French armies closing in on him—that of Marshal Nicholas Jean de Dieu Soult, due de Dalmatie, from the south and one led by Napoleon himself from the northeast. In any case, Madrid had already sun"endered to the French, and Moore saw no alternative but to withdraw to the noitheastem seaport of Conmna. That 20-day, 250-mile retreat over the most desolate mountains in Spain in midwinter, with the French following close at the British anny's heels, is the principal subject of Summeivilles book. The British troops' morale was sapped by their commander's unwillingness to fight, as well as by the antipathy of the Spanish villages through which they passed. Suffering severely from cold and hunger, many soldiers perished along the way, as did many of the wives and children who accompanied them. The retreat's climax occun^ed outside Corunna, where the exhausted, outnumbered and outgunned British stopped Soult's army in its tracks. Killed during the battle, Moore was initially vilified even by many of his subordinates, but he was subsequently recharacterized as a tragic hero. Summerville's gripping account demonsti^tes that, though much of the blame did lie with the unfortunate commander, the bulk of the responsibility for the debacle belonged to those in the government who placed Moore and his army in an impossible situation. Summerville's dramatic nan"ative is enhanced with numerous quotations from the memoirs and lettei"s of officers and men who took part in the retreat, including Moore's dispatches to his superiors in London. The result is a cautionaiy tale of what can happen when a government initiates a military campaign based on faulty intelligence. It is also a riveting story of one of the most dreadful episodes in British military histoiy culminating in a withdrawal that made Dunkirk seem like a weekend at the beach. Robert Guttman

Intelligence in War. by John Keegan, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2003, $30. John Keegan can always be counted on to write enteriaining books on war, and his newest volume. Intelligence in War, is a very good read. It is, however, not so much about intelligence as it is a collection of battle stories themed on the degree to which intelligence played a role in the outcome. The book's most appealing chapters are those on World War U code-breaking triumphs, including the Ultra decryptions of Enigma signals by the Bletchley Park experts and the Magic decrypts of Japanese naval codes by the American Secret Intelligence Sendee's OP-20-G code-breaking group. Bletchley Park eventually discovered the German codes for each area of the Atlantic, allowing convoys to receive accurate information about U-boat positions and picket lines. Still. Keegan says, the Battle of the Atlantic turned in favor of the Allies because of the introduction of better antisubmarine warfare detection equipment and weapons in the spring of 1943. He makes it clear that intelligence was simply one element oi many. Of special interest and relevance in the post-9/U era is the discussion of human and reconnaissance intelligence during the GeiTiian development of guided missiles. Winston Churehill's intelligence and scientific analysts clashed over whether or not the Nazis were developing one weapon or two—a question that went unresolved until the autumn of 1944, when both pulse-jet-powered V-1 "buzz bombs" and V-2 rockets began bombarding London. The moral of the story is that questions of enemy capabilities and intent are not deteiTnincd by the volume oi information one gathers but by how it is interpreted. Keegan discusses intelligences relationship with combat from Horatio Nelson's time to the current War on Ten or. The latter conflict gets the shortest shiift despite the fact that the gathering and interpretation of the mountains of intelligence prior to September 11. 2001, and before the invasion of Iraq in 2003, and alleged failures to draw the right conclusions in both instances, are issues of major national and worldwide public and official interest. It is a shame that Keegan's discussion of intelligences role is not of greater depth, especially in light of the issues raised by the current world war. Brian Murphy

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The Face of Naval Battle: Hie Human Expetience of Modem War at Sea, edited by John Reeve and David Stevens, Allen & Unwin, Australia, 2003, $24.95. Naval battles are quite different frotn those on land, at least as perceived by historians. They are usuallv in remote locations with no local populations to view them, and the losers literally sink from \iew, leaving posterity to base its schematics of relative movements on best estimates over a surface no one can walk. With John Keegan s landlocked The Face of Battle (1976) and The Price ofAdmiralty (1988) clearly in mind, two Australian historians have presented a collection oi 17 essays to describe The Face of Naval Battle. Twelve of the essays are by Australians, and what they trv to present would have been done bettei' by a single author testing his theses against a variety of historical scenarios. Instead, we essentially have a thesis followed by a miscellany of independent studies. That said. there is a wealth of material here, ranging from the Sino-Japanese War of 189495 to the 1991 Gulf War. Most chapters deal, obviously with Australia's Pacific theater, involving botli German and Japanese naval forces in different wars. Some subjects are vei> particular, such as the treatment of casualties fiom the 1914 Sydney-Emden action; others are general, covering the development of the aircraft earner, of British antisubmarine tactics and concluding thoughts on the future of naval warfare. If we accept all the accounts of naval battle as grist for the mill of considerations presented by the editors, then we are asked to keep in mind three factors: the nature of the events of naval battle, the nature of those involved, and the nature of w hat remains aftenvard. The people involved are in a distinct subcommitnity, absent from regular society, exercising skills unique to the nautical realm. The major records of this world, as m Jane's Fighting Ships, are of things, not people. This excellent prologue to considering combat at sea does capture the flavor of naval life—that the seaman is bonded with the vessel, unable to am away from battle but forced to "fight the ship," not only against his human adversat7 but a formidably omnipresent third foe, the sea. Roderick S. Speer For additional reviews, go www.historvbookworld.com.

to

W E A P O N R Y Circumstances at the Battle of Isandlwana fatally reduced the Martini-Henry rifle's effectiveness. By Edward J. Langer

the distance to the tai^get changed. Isandlwana in South Africa, two formiThe Martini-Henrv' bullet weighed 480 dable armies clashed. The fighting men grams and had tremendous stopping of both forces were renowned for their power. It could easily travel through a training and discipline, but their weapons man and have sufficient power to kill anwere as different as night is to day. After other wairior behind the fii^t. When fired, thi'ee hours of intense fighting, the the black powder in the brass cartridge modem British army sticctimbed to the would produce a dense cloud of black primitive but more numerous Zulus. smoke. Repeated firing could cause the Only 400 of the 1,700 British and allied barrel to become fouled, with the black African troops survived the debacle. powders residue jamming the empty The popular explanation of the stunning shell, preventing extraction. A soldier Zulu \ ictoi^v at Isandlwana, as written in then had to use his knife or bayonet to exbooks and poitmyed in motion pictures, tract the shell, a very time-consuming was that the British quartermasters were procedure, expecially when he was being slow to issue ammunition. Other factors, pursued by the enemy. ho\^ever, may have weighed more heavily In addition to the rifle, the soldier carin the British defeat—including the ried a 20.7-inch-long bayonet, v\ith a blade misuse of the British soldier's primary length of 17 inches. Other British weapons weapon of the time, the Maitini-Henr\' liile. The Maitini-Henw was a single-shot, breechloading, centerfire weapon that fired a .45-caliber bullet to a distance of more than 1,400 yards, although its ma.\imum effective i-ange was about 1,000 yards. A trained soldier could fire 10 rounds per minute, making resupply of ammunition critical. Black powder propelled the bullet at a muzzle velocity of 1,350 feet per second. The i-elatively low muzzle velocity gave the heavyweight bullet an arcing, long-range trajectoiy The rifle's rear sight was graduated with various distances, As their line disintegrirites UIKIOI a liuzzsuw nf Zulu ussegaisat and it was necessary to Isandiwana, four members of the British 24th Regiinent of Foot make resight the weapon if a final stand, in \Mien Tune and Bullets Run Out. by Bud Bradshaw. ON JANUARY 22,1879, at a place called

72 MILITARV HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

at Isandlwana included two 7-pounder muzzle-loading cannons and one rocket batteiy The cannons assisted the volle\' riflefire,using case, shrapnel and common shells to tear great holes in the attacking enemy line from a good distance away. In addition to the British soldiers at Isandlwana, ihere was the Natal Native Contingent, most of whose warriors were armed with assegais (slender speai"s) and rawhide-covered shields similar to those of their Zulu opponents, from whom they were distinguished by their red headbands. Some of the NNC warriors were outfitted with rifles. The wanioi's of the Zulu army or itnpi were also outfitted with several assegais and a hide shield. A few carried rifles or muskets. There were two types of assegais. One, used for throwing, was about 6 feet long and tipped with a 6-inch steel blade. The other, known as the iklwa, was 2'A feet long and tipped with a wide 10inch blade. More of a short sword than a spear, this weapon was for close-in combat. Some wairioi-s preferred to cairy a club or knobkeiTie called the iwisa. Zulu waniors traveled light and fast. They had no baggage train, and each man carried his weapons on his person. The i)upi organization was based on social ties that demanded strici obedience. All men above age 15—even into their 60s— \^ere waniors. Essentially standing miUlia, the Zulus were nevertheless well trained and well organized within cwiiihittho. or regiments, thai were built .iround warriors of the same age group and distinguished by the colors of their shields (the more white over a black or red shield, the older and more experienced the regiment). In battle, the Zulus would begin throwing their long assegais at 60 yards and then close in for hand-to-hand combat with the iklwa. Their main battle tactic Continued on page 78

P E R S O N A L I T Y Charles Henry Davis' brilliant U.S. Navy career was interrupted, not enhanced, by the Civil War. Bv Robert C. Suhr

was born in Boston on Januan'6, 1807, and entered Harvard University in 1821. Although he received his degree in 1841, he did not gi'aduate. After iwo years he left Hai'vard to join the U.S. Naw as a midshipman. At that time there was no naval academy or organized system of instruction for naval officers. The midshipmen took pail in a long ciTiise to gain \\hatever seafaring skills they cotild, then undei^went a thorough examination upon their return to port. In October 1823, Da\'is boarded the fiigate United States for a cRiise to the west coast of South America, during which he studied seamanship with fellow midshipman Andrew Foote. On August 31, 1824, Davis transleired Rear Admiral Charles H. Davis had already distinguished himself to the schooner Dolphin in the U.S. Navy prior to the American Civil War, when this at Valparaiso and for photograph of him was taken. the next several months searched the Mulgrave Islands for mutineers FOR MOST PARTICIPANTS, the American fi'om the whaler Globe. After finally reCi\'il War was their moment of glor\'. turning home on April 30, 1827, Davis Many of them gained fame during the took his exam a year later, finishing sixth fighting only to die in battle or fade into in a class of 39. He was on a subsequent obscurity after the smoke had cleared at cruise to Europe aboard USS Ontario Appomattox. Charles Heniy Davis was a when the Naw Department notified him notable exception. His contributions to oi his promotion to lieutenant. science and seafaring had already enLater, while at his father's home on the sured his place in histor\' before the con- edge of the Hai-vard campus at CamHict began. If anything, the war inter- bridge, Davis met Benjamin Pierce, a iiipled his already stellar careen mathematics professor who became The voinieest of 13 children, Davis Davis' mentor, teaching him advanced 74 MILITARY HISTOIO' JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

mathematics. From his association with Pierce, Davis also met the professor's sister-in-law, Haniette Pierce. Davis married her in 1842, a union that would produce three .sons and three daughters. In that same year, Davis faced a prolonged period of shore duty after almost 20 years at sea. He had applied for seiTice with the Coast Suivey in 1832 and was accepted 10 years later. Although it had been established in 1807, the Coa.st Survey had accomplished little when Professor A.D. Bache took over in 1843 and expanded its scope to include astronomy, geodesy, mathematics, geology and natural sciences. From April 1842 to July 1849. Davis studied the speed and direction of tides in New York Harbor, Long Island Sound and Nanlucket Shoals. His findings were published in a pair of papere, "A Memoir upon the Geological Action of the Tidal and of Other Cuirents of the Oceans" in Memoirs A}nerican Academy, and "Law of Deposit of the Fl(X)d Tide" in Smitlisonian

Contiibntions to Knowledge. In 1844 Bache had reorganized the Coast Sun'ey, putting Da\'is in charge ol the coast fiom Maine to Rhode Island. His study of Nantucket Shoals resulted in the discoveiy of the New South Shoal. When Davis left the Coast Survey, Bache wroic the secretai> of the ti'easuiy: "The loss of his services will be deeply felt. The zeal, industry, knowledge and judgment, and experience, which he bixjught to the suney cannot be replaced." In 1849 Da\1s began work on theAniencan Epheniens and Nautical Almanac. Until then, American sailors had tised the Bntisli Nautical Almanac. A biographer, \\r\X\ng'm\hc Proceedings of the Ameiican Academy ofArts and Sciences, gave the motivation for the project: ".. .fii'st, to advance the scientific character and standing ol the countn by a publication of the highest order from a scientific point of view;

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on the outer bank. Although he and Professor Bache had originated the idea of hl(x:king Savannah by that method, Davis e.\pressed his tesei'vations in his joumal: "This is a disagreeable duty, and one ot the last I should have selected. I always eonsidered this mode of intenoipting commerce as liable to great objection, and as of doubtful success. But I have facilities for doing it greater than 1 could have expected." Davis knew that the plan would not succeed as originally contemplated. Even if he succeeded in blocking the channel with the "stone fleet," tidal fotres would simply open another instead, Davis decided to sink the ships in three rows in an attempt to create dangerous eddies and whirlpools that no captain would want to test. The worm-eaten hulks quickly fell apart, howevei", ending any hope ot closAFTER THE CIVIL WAR broke out in April ing Charleston by those means. 1861, Secretai^ of the Navy Gideon Baek with the squadron, Davis was Welles appointed Davis to the Buteau of given six gitnboats by du Pont and orDetail under Commodore Hiram Pauld- dered to try to find a way to get between ing. As the foreritnner of the Navy's pres- Fort Pulaski and Savannah. Although it ent-day office of pei'sonnel, the bureaus passed Fort Pulaski without drawing fire, responsibilities included purchasing the expedition came to a halt when it enships as well as assigning officcre to com- counteied a blockade of heavy pilings mands. Because of his advanced age, driven in double rows across the channel. Paulding played an inactive role, allowOn Febi-uaiT 10, 1862, Welles ordered ing Davis to nm the bureau. Davis lo Washington, but he stayed with At the same time, Davis also served as the squadron tmtil it took Fet nandina. secretaiy on the Blockade Sttategy En route, Davis heard the iximor that Board, which formulated the U.S. Navy's Welles wanted him to relieve Commoplan for blockading and seizing Southern dore William W. McKean as commander polls. Additionally, when Congress au- of the East Gulf Blockading Squadron. thorized Welles to establish a three-man When he arrived in Washington, howevei: board to promote the building of ironelad Davis discovered that the .secretary oi warships in August 1861, he appointed the Navy had changed his mind. He sent Commodore Joseph Smith, Paulding and Davis to New York to investigate the use Davis. of the Stevens Floating Battery. Soon after becoming chief of the Bureau Davis' combat command came not of Detail, Davis had to give up the position along the coast, as he expected, hut hum to pLirticiptite in the Navy's first waitime ex- the Mississippi River. During the bompedition, with the rank of captain. At the bardment of Fort Donel.son, a Confedrecommendation of the strategy board. erate shell had wounded Flag Officer Flag Oflicer Samuel du Pont's South At- Andrew Foote. Although the surgeons lantic Blockading Squadron sailed off to considered the wound minor, it continued seize Port Royd, S.C., as a base for future to bothei- Foote, limiting his ability to naval operations. Davis accompanied du command. He therefore asked for his old Pont as his flag captain and chief of staff. shipmate Davis to be assigned as his The town's Confederate defenders had re- second-in-command, to do for him what moved the buoys marking the channel, Davis had done tor du Pont. but upon his arrival Davis rc-marked the Davis was still in New York when Welles channel, then drew up the plan of attack ordeted him to the Western Flotilla. Two that swiftly secured Port Royal. weeks after Davis anived where the gunboats were stopped upriver ftom Fort IN DECEMBER, DAVIS got his first inde- Pillow, Foote's wound bothered him so pendent command when du Pont chose much that he had to leave. He depatted him to close the port of Charleston by on May 8, 1862. The next day, the Consinking 15 boats loaded with stone blocks federate ram fleet sortied against the

and, secondly, to promote the cause of astronomy ilseir, and render substantial services to navigation by pi*oducing a work on a higher plane than (he Brhish Nautical Almanac, fully confomied to the latest developments of knowledge, and likely lo give an additional stimitlus lo pmr research." Davis published his Nautical Almanac in Catnbridge, with Proiessor Pierce overseeing the theoretical department and reviewing the calculations. After 23 years as a lieutenant, Davis was finally promoted to lieutenant commander in 1856. In November he received his first sea command, the sloop of wdi-Saiiil Maiys. From December 1856 to Febniai'y 1859, he sailed the West Coast, where he caused controversy by evacuating filibuster William Walker and his cohorts from Nicaragua.

Union gunboats. Though Davis and the rest of the Union portrayed it as a victon; it was in fact a successful Confedetate raid. As the bulk of" the Union ironclad force approached, the Rehel boats retired lo the safety of Fort Pillow. A month later, on June 6, Davis led the llotilla to Memphis. While two U.S. Army rams attacked the Confederate boats at close quarters, shells from Davis' gunboats smashed boilers and machinery. The resulting victoi-y opened the Mississippi as far south as Vicksbui^. As Davis' and Rear Adm. David G. FarI'agiit's flotillas invested Vicksbiu"g in June 1862, they were confronted by the newly completed Confederate casemate ram ArkdJhSds. Emerging from the Ya/.no River, the improvised Rebel ironclad, commanded by Lieutenant Isaac Newton Brown, disabled the ironclad gunboat Caroiulek't and then ran a gantlet of more than 30 wai"ships of both fleets, keeping close to the Union vessels so they could not ram, and cannonading each one it passed. Relying on the cunent as much as ils unreliable engines, Arkansas narrowly missed ramming Davis' flagship Benlon in its embarassingly successful race to the safety of Vicksburg's defenses. In July 1862 Welles, who had never been comfortable with Da\'is in command in the West, appointed him chief of the new Buix'au of Navigation, but Davis declined to accept the post as long as there was a chance of attacking Vickshui^. "Had he captui^ed \.\vd Arkansas " Welles wrote in his diaiy "I would have had him come on immediately and take charge of the Bureau of Navigation." The Rebel ironclad threat finally ended in August, when Arkansas broke out from Vicksburg to support Confederate operations ai Baton Rouge, La., only to sufter an engine malfunction that forced its crew to scuttle it. hi Septembei' Davis went to Cairo, 111., to oversee the transfer of the Western Flotilla to the Navy. When low water brought naval operations on the Mississippi to a halt. Welles took advantage of the period of inactivity lo place Rear Adm. David Di.xon Porter in command of the flotilla. "Davis, whom he succeeds, is more of a scholar than a sailor," Welles wrote in his diaiA', "has gentlemanly instincts and scholarly acquirements, is an intelligent but not as energetic, driving, lighting officer, such as is wanted for rough work on the Mississippi; is kind and affable, bul has not the vim, dash— recklessness is the better word—of

Porter." II he fell short as a wairior, Davis was the ideal pe!"son to head the Bureau of Navigation, which united under one command the Navy departments of hydrography, astronomy, navigation and sui"veying, along with the Nautical Almanac, the Naval Obsewatoi-y and Naval Academy. Because of Davis' familiarity with it, Welles also put the Bureau of Detail under the Bureau of Navigation. Under Davis, it became the Bureau of Navigation's main tlnxist. Davis had other functions beside that of bureau chief. From November 1862 until the end of the war, he was a member ol the Lighthouse Board and boards for the design of new vessels, paiT)le of piisoners, steam expansion and choosing bureau chiefs. He also served on a permanent commission that advised on questions of science and the ails. (That commission later led to the creation of the National Academy of Sciences.) On FebiTjary 7, 1863, the Navy promoted Davis to rear admiral. When the superintendent of the Naval Observatoiy died near the end of the war, however, Davis resigned as bureau chief and took a demotion to replace fiim. In that position, he was used as an expert on practical applications of science. In 1866, following a Senate resolution, he prepared a review of previous surveys of pos.sible railroads and canals across Centra! Ameiica. IN 1867 DAVIS WENT to sea for the last time, as commander of the Brazilian Station. He led a smallflotillaof gunboats up the Plate River to demand the release of two prisoners held by Paraguayan dictator Francisco Solano Lopez. An investigation ensued regarding Davis' conduct during the incident, but quickly dissolved when it became apparent that he had done nothing wrong. Following that assignment, Da\is commanded the Noifolk Naval Yard from 1870 to 1873. He then returned to direct the Naval Obsewatoiy until his death on Febmaiy 18, 1877. In spite of his decades of semee with the Navy, Charles H. Davis' principal contributions to the United States were his scientific research and his leadership in foiTnalizing scientific study. But his military legacy lived on as well. Almost four decades after he first developed it. Rear Adm. George Dewey used Davis' battle plan lor the attack on Port Royal for his own battle plan to attack the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay on May 1, 1898. MH

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line more than 3,000 yards long and up to 1,000 yards from camp to explain the defeat. The battle line also suffered from Continued from page 72 not being contiguous and having large gaps. Furneaux blamed stingv' quarterwas known as the chest and horns of the masters who were slow in providing ambuffalo, in which a frontal force attacked munition and the fact that the lids on the an encmv while two Hanking forces en- woixien ammLinition boxes were sct^wed circled the enemy lo the I'ight and to the down, making it difficult to open the left and a resei^ve (the loins) waited lo ex- boxes. Moreover, with no prepared deploit the rout of the enemy force. Those fensive position in the camp and with the tactics, combined with a fierce determi- battle line in disan^ay, resupplying the nation, easily defeated other native troops with ammunition became almost amiies. Although the British army only impossible, and the British foiined up in had 1,700 men versus more than 20,000 several small, tight squares, using their Zulus at Tsandlwana, the British expected bayonets for a last-ditch defense. their firepower to prevail as long as they Ted Brown expresses a different view could keep the enemy at a distance. If the in his Some Tactical Notes on the Bhlish Zulus could close the gap, they would win. Army, 1837-1901, Wilh Particular Reference to the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. Brxiwn THE BATTLE BEGAN AT about 12:30 p.m., believes that British use of an extendedw ith the British (tpening fire at about 600 foiTTiation battle line proved to be inefyards-—100 yards farther than was stan- fective against a mass charge by the dard practice with the Mailini-Henr\'. Tlie Zulus. Being far from camp made resupmain British force, the 24th Regiment of plying ammunition difficult. Foot, was under Lt. Col. Henry Pulleine, Ian Knight, who has toured the battlewith the right Hank under Brevet Colonel field extensively, wrote that the British Anthony Dumford, Royal Engineei^. The were able to keep the Zulus at a distance batlle line was set up 600 to 1,000 yards for a good 20 minutes. In places, he beIrom the British camp facing a hastily lieves the Zulu attack was on the verge of foiTned Zulu buffalo formation. Initially collapse because of the devastating rille the British held the upper hand as volley fii-e. The British ligbt flank under Durnafter volley of dtle fire, along with the ford was clostT to the inipi. however, and cannons, decimated the Zulu ranks. was threatened with being oLLtllanked by Just after 1 p.m., however, several the left horn. As their ammunition ran things occuiTed at once to turn the battle short, Dumfoi'ds tiT)ops fell back toward in (he Zulus' favor. A paillal eclipse of the the camp, compelling the entire British sun put the battlefield into twilight. The line to pull back, to close tbe gap and proBiitish right flank under Dumford ran vide a tighter defense. While retreating, out of ammunition and began to fall the British fb-ed several volleys but were back. The NNC, anchoring a position unable to establish a new battle line. nearby, broke and ran. Simultaneously, Knight does not believe that ammunition the light hoiTi of the Zulus stiuck the was a factor, for there was sufficient amBritish left flank. munition in the camp and runners reguMany authors have desciibed the battle larly brought it to the fiTjnt line. Although and theorized as to the cause of the the ammunition was packed in wooden British defeat, in their HL'ilon- of the Zulu boxes that required a screwdriver to War and Us Origins, written in 1880, open, it was quite easy to use a rifle butt Frances Colenso and Lt. Col. Edward to smash open the lid. Durnford cited inadequate baniers and One factor that none of these writers defensive positions at the campsite and has considered is the ballistics of the Marammunition that was not readily acces- tini-Hem^ bullet. On a firing range, where sible, packed in wagons with regular the distance to the tai^et is known and the stores placed on top. In 1978 Cimstopber tai^et is stationai>', it is easy to set the reaiWilkinson-Latham in Vnifonns and .sight of the lifle foi- the conx'ct distance. Weapons of the Zulu War also attributed But in combat, as the target advances, reihe Biitish defeat to a shortage of amtreats or moves left or right, the distance munition and the difficulty the soldiei-s to the target will van', necessitating rehad ojiening the ammunition boxes. adjustment o{ the rear sight or the aiming In Tlu'Zulu War:IsandlwaiiaandRurke's point. If the rear sight is originally set for Diifi, Rupert Fiimeaux used both the am- 600 \ ards and the enemy advances to 400 munition resupply problem and a battle yards, the bullet will arc over them, miss78 Mll.rrARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

ing their heads by several feet, and strike the gnnind 200 yards to the rear. Even though they were barefoot, the harshly trained and conditioned Zulus were masters at rapidly closing the distance to an enem\; even o\'er the broken ground at Isandlwana. Although at least two volleys werefiredby the British as they fell back on the camp, most shots probably arced over the Zulus' heads. The lille sights had been set at 600 yards, and with the dai kness caused by the eclipse and the clouds of black-powder smoke—not to mention the confusion of battle, the retreating battle line and a rapidly advancing enemy—it would be almost impos.sible to continually readjust the rear sight or compensate by changing the aiming point. By the time the soldiere were in the camp, it would have been impossible to I'eplenish theirammunition bccaiLse the Zulus were among the tents and supply wagons. AT RORKE'S DRIFT only a few hours later, the Biitish were more outnumbered than their comrades at Isandlwana, but they were able to defeat the Zulus because they set up strong, compact defensive positions in which ammunition resuppK was not a ciitical factor. They also engaged the Zulus at a range of less than 100 yards, allowing their bullets to be fired in a flat hajectoiT. in consequence, they were able to hold off some 4,000 wanioi"s of Prince Dabulamanzi kaMpande's Undi Corps until the Zulu king, Cetewayo, i-ecalled him. Although the Isandlwana fiasco comp)elled the Biitish to withdraw from their territory in April 1879, it was nevertheless a Pynxhic victoi-y for the Zulus, who may have suffered up to 4,000 casualties—20 percent of their force. Moreover, the Zulus could not adjust quickly enough to the new technology, whereas the British adopted a multi-unit square that proved murderously effective during theij- second invasion of Zululand in June 1879, At Ulundi on July 4, the British used a box formation behind barricades, supported by Gatling guns and 12fieldpieces, to annihilate the main Zulu impi in little more than 30 minutes. They captured Cetewayo on ALigiist 27, ending the war Technology had enabled the British to create a global empire, but technology has its limitations. The Martini-Henn was an excellent rifle for its day, but at Isandlwana circumstances conspired to cancel its advantages, resulting in one of the most embanassing reversals of fortune suffered by a modem army. MH

LETTERS Continued from page 8 inLo Wyler as part of the 3rd Fallschinnjiiger Division in Kainpjgruppe Becker. In I he Battle of Mont Castre in Nonnandy, my 15lh Regiment had been more or less annihikUL'd by the 90lh "Texas-Oklahoma" Infanln Division, wliicli also had leiriblc losses. We were then put under the command of (he 3rd Fallschlnnja^er Division. From the original 3id Battalion, only three came away unscathed. I was later inten'iewed by Cornelius Ryan for his book 4 Bridge Too Far but only mentioned by name at the end. Alter several months at that stagnant hont in Wyler, I was assigned to a new 15th Regiment. 5th Fallschiniijdger D\\ision. and was captured on Christmas Eve in LiLxembourg by Lt. Gen. George S. Pal ton Jr.s combat command regiment. Later, as a member of the U.S. Arniy Reserve Medical Corps, during one annual (raining I had the pleasure of meeting ioiTnei- advei^aries of the 5O8tli Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, in Camp Blanding, Fla. After 37 years as the prosthesiologist at the local Veterans Administration, I am now retired and a great Ian of your magazine. Lt. Col. Max Weber U.S. Army (ret.) Columbia, S.C. MAYHEM ON HILL 472: THE MOVIE?

I lead thf inten'iew with Medal ol Honor recipient Ron Rosser in the October 2004 issue and was vei> impressed. He stated that he did not want a movie made based on his hei"oic actions in Korea because he did not believe that he should profit fiom ihe hIsloT-y of that battle in which so many others were killed or wounded. I would suggest, however, that a movie made with profits specified to go to the Disabled American Veterans would tremendously help those who are in dire straits. I've contributed to the DAV for more than five yeai^s, and I tiuly believe cxcry American should. Anthony D. Moi'eschi Noi-folk, Mass. Send letters to Military Histon' Editor. PiiniL'dia Hi.sioiy Group, 741 Miller Drive, Suite D-2. Leeshurg, VA 20175, ore-mail to [email protected]. Please include your name, address and daytime telephone number. Letters may be edited.

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JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005 MlLrTABY HISTORY 79

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KROM EUROPA BOOKS

INTERVIEW

NELSON'S NAVY

Continued from page 40

Continued from page 48

helped us. They \vould give us a meal and a place to sleep. At Regensbui^ we look a train to Mainz. Then we went to Hanover and on to Hanibui^. I was back home in Molln on June 25, which was the day before my mother's birthday. Molln was in the British zone of occupation, about live miles from the Russian zone. MH: Did you encounter any Russians? Drogemiillen No. Only the British, and they were no good. They drafted my 16year-otd brother Wolfgang for forced laboi; He was just a kid in the Hitler Youth. They kept the workei^ in an aluminum enclosure dining the hot summer. They fell ovei" like flies. You would think thai the British would have had the humanity to give a boy enough to eat. When my brother came home in September he weighed 85 pounds. My mother had to feed him oatmeal like a baby. His stomach wouldn't take other food. He recovered slowly. MH: What was life like for you in postwar GeiTiiany? Drogemuller: It was hard to survive. Everything was rationed with food stamps—250 grams of bread and 50 gleams of butter a week. The black market was going wild. There was a great demand for cigarettes and coffee. If you had these things, you eould get anything yf)U wanted. MH: Were you able to find work? Drogemiiller: Yes, 1 did find work. I worked at the Tuberculosis Institute as a gardener until I left for the United States. I applied for my family to immigrate in 1948, and there was plenty of paperwork. Fortunately, my uncle was here, and he was willing to vouch for us. We anived in 1952. I had to work hard, but America has been very good to me. MH: Do you have any final thoughts to share with our readers about your sen'ice during the war? Drogemuller: I was very fortunate to spend so much lime behind the lines. I survived when many othere did not. It might sound funny, but I have always thought that I had more luck than brains. MH

where a large and enthusiastic crowd had gathered to see their hero—and rowed out to HMS Victory, which lay at single anchor at Saint Helens. Nelson reportedly said to Treasurer of the Navy Geoi^e Canning on that occasion: "I had their huzzas before. 1 have their hearts now." At 8 a.m.. Victory weighed anchoifor its appointment with fate. When Nelson had come ashore at Poiismouth a month earlier, he looked gaunt and frail, and had been ordered home for a well-earned rest after more than two years at sea. He was in low spirits, having twice missed opportunities to get at Vice Adm. Pierre-Chailes de V'ilieneuve's fleet, first off Toulon and then in the West Indies. He told his mistress, Emma Hamilton, "1 have brought home no honor for my country, only a most faithful servant." He would have just 25 days of leave before seeking a thli'd oppoiiunit\ to engage Villeneuve at Trafalgar: On October 21, Nelson's 27 ships of the line faced 33 French and Spanish vessels—their 2,568 guns against his 2,148. Villeneuve's combined fleet had some 30,000 men against Britain's 18,000. It was even v\idely acknowledged at the time that the French built the best ships. Few Britons thought the outcome in doubt, however, not with the already demonstrated naval genius of Nelson—who, far from his immortal, martyred, saintly image, could be ulterly nithless. His victories at the Nile, Copenhagen and Trafalgar bear testament to his belief in fighting battles to annihilate tbe enemy. The foundation for victory and naval supremecy through naval administration and masterful seamanship had been laid during preceding decades. But it was the tireless efforts of Admiral Sir William Comwallis and the marked supeiiority of the British crews that gave Nelson the confidence to wage war so decisively. MH

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umred StaiBS PostsI Service STAItlUNI i f OWNERSHIP, MMAGEMENT, and CIRCUUlTIDN Requlrad b) 39 use 36B5 1. P u b i o m T t t . MiUTARYHlSTDRr 2 Publicatign [iLimM; 0889-'32B3.Fifc[igDat5 1OT1/W 4,lssyeolFreqijency Bi-WomWy 5.Nuni|jer ot Issues PublislMfl Annually 5 e.ArdualSubscriplicmPnce. 2395 7. Comdeie Mailing AdHress ot Kniwn OtficB ol Publicalioit iNoi PrintEi) Prmettia CMMG. 741 Wilier Dr., S.E., Suite M . leBsliijri, VA 20175 8. Corrpleie Mailing ftddress of Hesdquarlers or Gwerai Business Mice ol Publisher (No! Printed Primedia CHMG. 2M Madison Avenue. New Voik. NV10016 8. full Names inil CoinpletE Waiing Addresses ol Puttiisher, Ediloi, and Managing Editor • Pubiisto Josepn PetAi, 741 Uiiiei Or, SE., Suite 0-2 Leesl)urfl,VA 2017S, Editor Jon Guiman, 7J1 Uiiler Or., S.E., Suite D-2, LeesDurg, VA ?D175: Managing Ediloi' CatI Von Wodlke. 741 Milier Di. S.E, Suite 0-2, Leestufg, W 20t7S 10. Owner Fuil njrns. Primedia ing, 745 Fiflh Avenue. Mew York. NY 10151 USA. 11. Known BonillKiKlefS. MongageK.anil Ottter Secunly Holders DwFiir)B or Holding i Percent or More ol Tdal Amount ol Bortds, Moitgages or OiHer SecuntiBS None 13. Pubitcaiion Tide' UiLITARVHlSTDRV 14. Issue Dale foi Cmuation Data Bdow OcloDer2D04 IS. Extent anfl Uature of CiFcuijnon a. Totai Mumbet ot Cooies ( W press run) T^e aveiage number copies each issue during preceding 12 monllis ms 160,267. Tile number copes s i n ^ issue (lubiistieil nearesttoMingdaifiwffiH7,645. b,Mand/oifleijuestedCirculation (1)PaidffletpisstHl Oulside-CounJi' Mail SuCiscriptioiiE Staled m Fonri 3541. (Include adt
80 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

A former Royal Marine writing from Cornwall, England. Mark T. Simmons wishes to thank the captain, officers and men of HMS Victory for their assistance in this Roger Sleiinvay is a i-egular conlribulor to stoiy. For further reading, he recommends: Military Histoi"y who teaches at Stratj'onl Trafalgar: Countdown to Battle 1803High School in Houston, Texas. For further 1805, by Alan Schom; Life in Nelson's reading he recommends: Frontsoldaten, by Navy, by Dudley Pope; The Nelson ComStephen G. Fiitz; and The Forgotten Sol- panion, edited by Colin White; and Baltic at Sea, by John Keegan. dier, by Guy Sajer.

BEST

LITTLE

S T O R I E S

The Civil War's westernmost action was only a minor part of California's crucial role in the great conflict. By C. Brian Kelly

THIS IS THE STORY OF HOW California

won the Civil War.. .or something like that. No, no, really! What other state, for instance, contributed more volunteer troops to the Union cause per capita than California? None, it just so happens. Another question: By war's end, what single Union state's forces held more square miles in the West than all the Union forces dispersed throughout the East? The answer, again, is California. But who knows that? Hardly anybody today, notes Major Roger McGrath in an online article for the California Center for Military History (see www.militarymuseum.org/HistoryCW. html). "For most Americans," he declares, "the words California and the Civil War have nothing to do with each other" And yet, he adds: "California played a surprisingly important role in that epic conflict. Long ignored by most historians and documentary filmmakers, California's contributions and sacrifices, both in men and materiel, deserve a national audience." Among the highlights, of course, there was the gold. By 1861, the first year of the war, the great Gold Rush of 1849 had tapered off, but the California mines were still pumping out a considerable amount by anyone's measure. Add the silver from Nevada's Comstock Lode passing through the Port of San Francisco and you've got some $173 million shipped east from California in just the first 3M years of the conflict. By contrast, noted Major J. Norman Marshall in the Winter 1998 issue of the IJOS Angeles Westerners Corral, "At war's

outbreak there was in the seven Confederate states only $27,000,000 in specie [and] beyond that lay nothing save the dubious expedients of credit and confidence." Then, too, no other state could quite match California's number of volunteers relative to its total population. "Nearly 17,000 Califomians enlisted tofight,"says 82 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2005

McGrath. "Most of these men were kept busy in the West, but several companies of California volunteers saw action in the East as the California One Hundred or later the California Cavalry Battalion. These volunteers served with the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry and fought in 31 engagements, many of them in the Shenandoah Valley. Other California volunteers served with distinction in New York and Pennsylvania regiments." As a member of Lt. Col. John S. Mosby's Rangers once ruefuUy recalled, the men of the California Hundred were "especially notorious good fighters." California's proud volunteer roster came from a sharply divided state. In 1860, just before the war broke out, the state's total of 130,000 registered voters broke down into 50,000 who were Northem bom, 30,000 Southern bom and 50,000 foreign bom, the latter mostly Irish, British and German in origin. Meanwhile, the state's strong proSouthem faction proposed that California secede and join an independent Pacific Republic that would include Oregon and Washington, and perhaps even Utah and New Mexico, McGrath writes. In angry response, pro-Union Democrats held a huge rally in San Francisco, with 15,000 participating, "a figure equal to the number of voters in the city." Interestingly, unlike their eastem counterparts, the Califomia volunteers stationed in the West faced a two-front war of sorts. Not only did they have their campaigns (limited in number, to be sure) against Confederate forces, they quite often faced the challenge of warring Indian tribes. In the real war, though, the Union war against Johnny Reb, the highlight was the dispatch of the Califomia Column, or 1st Infantry Regiment, Califomia Volunteers, to the rescue of Santa Fe, Albuquerque and Tucson in New Mexico and Arizona territories, all re-

cently captured by Confederate Maj. Gen. Henry Sibley's forces out of Texas. Colonel James H. Carleton led his men eastward on the old Gila Trail, despite advice that the sheer number of his men would soak up and exhaust the scant water supplies to be found en route. He solved the problem by breaking his column into increments marching separately, with calculated gaps between the various segments. As events turned out. Union volunteers out of Colorado met Sibley's forces in the Battle of Glorieta Pass and sent the Confederates reeling back to Texas before the Califomians could arrive. Still, "eighty miles up the Gila Trail," notes McGrath, at a place ceJled Grinnell's Ranch, Carleton's scouts engaged in a skirmish with advance elements of the Texas-based Rebel force— "the westernmost action of the Civil War." Carleton and his men, then, in the littleknown Battle of Picacho Pass, "whipped the Texans thoroughly and retook Tucson." The Califomians pushed on eastward as far as Texas itself, where they then captured Forts Bliss, David and Quitman. Typical of the "second front war" often facing the Califomia Volunteers, the last battle of the Califomia Column's campaign would not be fought against fellow whites in Confederate gray, but against hostile Apaches in southern Arizona. All in all, adds McGrath, the Califomia Volunteers "occupied more than a million square miles of territory and had troops in the field from as early as August 1861 until as late as June 1865." Further, the state's pro-Union elements "were not only critical in keeping Califomia part of the Union and in keeping the fiow of gold to Washington uninterrupted but also in keeping the Far West Federal territory." If Califomia didn't quite "win" the Civil War, it is quite true that its solid contributions to the overall Union victory have long been ignored or little understood. MH