Military History 2006-01-02

EDITORIAL

OnlineCxtras January/February 2006

To stand or not to stand? That is the question.

You'll find much more ahout military history on the Web's leading history resource:

STANDS, ESPECIALLY THOSE involving a

HISTORY •Net

'. TlieHistoryNet. com Discussion: Which stand deserves the most honored place in militaiy histopv' books: Themiopybe. the Alamo, Rorke's Drift, Suomussalmi, Bastogne or another? Goto miiv. JlieHLstotyNet.cotnJtnh/

for these great exclusives: Freez.ing in Hell^Mosl Russians expected a quick victoiy when they invaded Finland on November 30, 1939. By 1940, however, "It seemed the war would never end," recalled Evgeny Huzhalsky. Xerxes'Greek Campaign—In 480 BC, Xerxes set out to swiftly but systematically finish what his father had begun 10 yeare before: the conquest of Greece. Birth of the Canadian Anny—The militia that defeated an American invasion force three times its size at Chateaiiguay represented a cross section of the population of what would later be the nation of Canada. Futile Fight for HiU 440— On October 25, 1951, while negotiations dragged on to establish a deniilitari/.ed /.one in Korea, elements of the U.S. 35th InfantiT Regiment moved to seize four rocky ridgeline knobs from the Chinese.

6 MnJTARV'HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

last one against daunting odds, are a universal favorite in the histoiy and lore of nations woi'ldwide. Americans remember the Alamo, Custer's Last Stand, Bataan, Bastogne, Pusan and Khe Sanh. The British have Rorke's Drift and the aerial battles of Britain and Malta; the French have Bir Hakheim and Dien Bien Phu; the Hungarians celebrate Szigetvar; the Russians have Leningicid and Stalingrad; and the Japanese {v\ ith the gmdging a.sscnt of their U.S. Marine opponents) might say the same of Tarawa, Peleliu and Iwo Jima. Some places have seen more than one celebrated stand—Vienna in 1519 and 1683,andWai-sawin 1920, 1943 and 1944. Ai^iably the prototype for them all was Thermopylae, where in 480 BC, a handful of vvaiTiors—King Leonidas. his renowned 300 Spartans and 700 forgotten but no less courageous Thespians—defied the lai-gest arniy yet seen in the Westem world. It's a saga that some readers may regard as long overdue, but Military History will now be telling it {stoi>, P. 38), along with a few other examples. Whether occupying a castle, a breastwork or merely a chosen piece of strategic real estate, stands ai^e not necessarily passive (go tell the Spartans). The monthlong Battle of Suomussalmi might be called a stand in that the Finns had limited room for retreat beyond that town, but as such it also sei"ves as a classic illustration of the best defense being a good, flexible offense. The only "stand" in the conventional sense was a 10-day effort made by 350 Finns to prevent the Soviet 44th Rifle Division from joining with the 163rd. Thai achieved, the Finns attacked isolated pockets of troops until they had annihilated both divisions. Though few Americans have ever heard of the battle, Suomussalmi is recognized by many students of the military art as one of history's tactical masterpieces (story, P. 46). Although certainly not as familiar as Pork Chop Hill (which had the benefit of being the subject ot a book by S.L.A. Mai'-

shall and a lilm by Lewis Milestone), Triangle Hill typified the agonizing battles that raged in Korea while the warring sides negotiated an armistice. Another reason Americans know little of Triangle Hill is because the Chinese ultimately won the battle, partly due to numbers as usual, but lai'gely because of their ability to dig in and, once they had, withstand the massive volume of firepower that preceded the American infatiti-y assaults (stoi>', P. 54). If the Chinese were as adept with shovels as they were with submachine guns in 1952. the same may be said of North Cai'olina Patriots who prepared hasty bul effective earthvvtjrks to withstand an onslaught by Nonh Camlinian Loyalists 230 years ago. In contrast to Thermopylae, Triangle Hill and Suomussalmi, the stand at Moore's Creek Bridge—and North Carolinas role in the American Revolu tion—^was decided within an hour, with what is sometimes called the last Highland charge pathetically evaporating in a hailoflead(stoiy P. 30). The question of whether or not to rely on static defense remains a matter of situation and circumstance, but histoi^ has presented numerous arguments againsi it. The Athenians abandoned Athens to the Persians in 480 BC but got it back after their naval victory at Salamis. Genei-al George Washington abandoned both New York and Philadelphia in favor of preserving his Continental Aimy, a choice that ultimately proved to be the right one—just as would be the case for Mao Tse-tung's decision to abandon Yenan to the Kuomintang on March 18, 1947. On the other hand. King Haakon Vs idea that the ingeniously designed Akershus Castle would suffice to defend Oslo, let alone all of Norway, proved more often than not to be disastrously wrong {stoi>, P. 10). As seen in this issue, stands are not necessarily static—and certainly not passive. The stories of many are yet to be told, and rest assured, in their tum. Military History' will tell them. J.G.

LETTERS

CHANGE OF COMMAND

VF-2, then returning to the same carrier Wilkinson and others. We probably will I read "Pioneer U.S. Navy Carrier Ace" and Gayler even being reassigned the same never know if Nolan was a spy or just an {Military History, September 2005) with in- Grumman F4F-3 (F-13, shown on page innocent horse-trader. terest, especiaJly since Admiral Noel Gayler 57, which went down with Lexington on I am quite surprised at the final parahad been on the carrier Lexington during May 8), he may well have overlooked the graph, referring to a Spanish patrol sent the Battle of the Coral Sea. As an acquain- change in admirals. We are no less remiss in pursuit of Meriwether Lewis and tance of Admiral Aubrey W. Fitch, whose for failing to double-check. William Clark's expedition. The Spanish wife once asked me if I would be. interreturned Louisiana to France by the secret ested in writing the admiral s biography (a SPECIALIZED ENFIELD Treaty of San Ildefonso on October 1, task I regretfully declined, as I didn't feel With regard to the short piece on muz- 1800. Emperor Napoleon agreed to sell the qualified at the time), I was surprised to zleloading Enfield rifles ("Weaponry," Louisiana Territory to the United States see Fitch not named in that portion of the September 2005), the piece pictured is in April 1803. Lewis and Clark started up article, since he was in tactical command identified as a P1856 short rifle. From a the Missouri River from St. Louis on May of the battle, and that Gayler claimed to distance, however, it appears to be a P1861 14, 1804. They started out about 300 hear Vice Adm. Wilson Brown Jr. tell Cap- artillery carbine, also sometimes known miles from Spanish territory and angled tain Ted Sherman it was time to go. It is as a musketoon. northwest, tending to get farther from easy to see how Admiral Gayler s memoKen Willis Texas. If the Spanish authorities had ries of the events, no matter how vivid, Ashbum, Va. heard about the Lewis and Clark expedimight have run together after more than tion, after almost four years they must 60 years. After all, he had been on a cruise MCCOOK TRADITION LIVES ON also have known about the Louisiana toward Rabaul with Brown on Lexing- I have just mailed the October 2005 issue Purchase. I don't doubt the story a bit, but ton. After that, Browns task force joined of Military History, the one with the arti- it certainly was a strange affair! up with Rear Adm. Frank Jack Fletcher cle on "The Fighting McCooks," to my Gordon C. Bassett and Yorktown for another operation, and boyhood chum. Commander John Anson Colorado Springs, Colo. then Gayler went ashore for a while but McCook, U.S. Navy (ret.). I had always rejoined Lexington in time for the Coral wondered why, from first grade on, John's Sea engagement. In the meantime. constant ambition was to go to Annapo- I always enjoy C. Bdan Kelly's "Best Little Stories," such as October 2OO5's account Brown had left Lexington, and Rear Adm. lis. It now makes sense. of the mysterious Philip Nolan. I wonFitch boarded it as second in command In 1943, when we all reached the critidered, though, why Kelly didn't describe to Fletcher. Perhaps Gayler was unaware cal age of 18 and scattered into various him as a "filibuster," a term the Spanish of that, or because of the course of events simply forgot. In any case, any account of services, John went triumphantly to An- applied to private armed incursions by the batde should inform you that on May napolis despite the huge competition. It's land, as well as to seagoing pirates. In 8, 1942, Fletcher gave tactical command plain now. With that background of both cases the customary penalty was to Fitch and that it was Fitch who said to famous admirals, they had no choice! And death, yet there were numerous filibuster Sherman, "It's time to go." Fitch left soon he went on to serve an illustrious career. attempts from east Florida to Texas. after, but Sherman stayed until everyone I was in the Air Force, and only once in Some involved aiding colonial revolts our 20-some years of service did we come while Napoleon occupied Spain, and had been safely taken off. close to meeting. He was in Manila Bay others were aU-American. Some of them Trumbull Rogers while I was in Vietnam, and just before added territory to the United States or New York, N.Y. we could plan a golf reunion in Baguio, segued into the Texan independence he sailed away, and I crashed my airplane. struggle. Nemesio Salcedo, chief of the Spanish interior provinces, must have Admiral Noel Gayler responds; My mother We haven't gotten together since. taught me never to start a letter with an I really appreciate your magazine and perceived Nolan's 1800-01 visit to Texas excuse—so I won't. It was indeed Fitch on eagerly look forward to each issue. You with two dozen armed men as a filibuster, as he sent Lieutenant Miguel Mtisquiz, Lexington, and I'll accept the excuse of 60' produce an excellent product. years! Dr. J. Bruce Carlock commanding at Nacogdoches, with some I'm not sure I mentioned that I was on Due West, S.C. 70 regulars and 50 militiamen to arrest them. They resisted, knowing the fate of board battleship Missouri for the surrencaptured filibusters, until Nolan was der ceremony with Douglas MacArthur in PHILIP NOLAN-FILIBUSTED? his arrogance. I thought Fitch should have I was very interested in the October 2005 killed. Some escaped, and the rest were taken that ceremony. The Pacific was the "Best Little Stories" piece about Philip taken as prisoners to Chihuahua. Only Navy's war! • Nolan. There seems to have been a lot of one returned to tell the cautionary tale. The Spanish also protested Americans covert activity in the Lower Mississippi exploring the Louisiana Territory as filiThe editor adds; While then-Lieutenant River valley and Texas at the tum of the Continued on page 71 19th century involving Maj. Gen. James Gayler's squadron, VFS, was changing to 8 MILITAKY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

WEAPONRY Intended to defend all of Norway, Akershus Castle teems with legends-and ghosts. By Terje Nordberg

One of the most ingeniously built fortifications ever put up. Akershus Castle was meant to protect Oslo, but more often than not the nearly impregnable fortress did the Norwegian capital more harm than good.

IN 1319 KING HAAKON V MAGNUSON

of Norway summoned the powerful men of the realm to his deathbed, where he made them swear an oath to defend the laws and not let control of the castles slip into foreign hands. The king knew he had done ever\ihing in his power to safeguard the kingdom. The church had been turned into a loyal instiiiment. Norway s German trading rival, the Hanseatic League, had been contained, and the machineiT of state was steadfast and efficient. Still, he feai'ed it wasn't enough. His foreign policy had failed, war loomed and 10 MILITARY HISTOm' JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

he realized that the survival of his kingdom would in the end depend upon Akershus, the castle he had spent his entii"e reign planning and building. iWost medieval castles were built with only local defense in mind. Others were of critical importance for guarding a watenvay or a busy town. Akerehus, ho\\'ever, was built for strategic purposes— to ensure the domination of a whole country. In the late 800s, many Viking provinces along the coast of Norway were united under one king. Converted to Christian-

ity 100 years later, the seafaring Norwegians gave up plundering foreign shoT'es and instead built an empire based on trade. The western cities of Bergen and Trondheim became centers of this empire, which stretched from Russia to northern Ireland, Greenland and beyond. During the 12th and 13th centuries, noithem Europe changed dramatically. Advances in shipbuilding and manufacturing led to a flourishing of trade centered on tbe textile industi> in Flanders, grain from the Baltic Sea and fish from the Noith Sea. Economic growth again

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led to embiyonic nation-states and changed the trade routes as well as the distribution of power. When Haakon V was crowned king in November 1299, Nonvay's situation was seiious. Veal's of mismle bv his mother and elder brother had left the countrv embroiled in a seemingly endless war with Denmark, while at home, lebellion and anarchy spread day by day. The kingdom's acute instability enabled the Gorman Hansealic League to make a bid lor control of Noi-way's lucrative foreign trade, undeimining the states finances. The new king seemed to have been e.xiremely well prepared for his difliculi task. ContemporaiA' sources dL'scribcd him as a deeply religious, even ascetic man. He had been educated by the wisest men of the chuich and was lUienl in several languages. More important, he was well auai"e of French and English eifoits lo tomi rudimenlai'v nation-stales. Haakon quickly ended Nnnvay's Wai's and uprisings. Judging that the fertile lowlands in the southeast were of great imporlance to the kingdom, he made ihe central city ot those ptovinces, Oslo, the capital ot the country. Before Haakon's reign, kings constantly moved from province to province, consuming taxes as they went, but he saw thai a sttong state needed a permanent center for its airhives and documents. To house and protect his administrative seat, he built Akershus. TIIE ISOLATED CUFF SURROUNDED h\

sea and marshes outside Oslo known a,s Akers Hill had iii'st been fortified by King Haiald II Sigurdson sometime beiorc his death at the Battle of Stajnford Biidge on September 25, 1066. Work on a towei' atop the cliff had begun in 1285, but Haakon initiated constRiction ofa lullscale castle sometime before 1300. It was probably not completed in his lifetime. In its final foim, the castle consisted ol n central courtyard pnitecled by tall, windowlcss buildings on three sides. On the fourth side was the 60-foot-high keep. A wall protruding from the North Wing and ending in a stiong tower, later called the Tower of Cannons, shut off access to the cliff fi'om the northern, landlocked side. Squee/.cd in between the wall, tbe West Wing and the sea below, the cliff sewed as an outer bailey where firewood was kept. To the south were two more baileys. The outer bailey followed the outline of the .sea closely and Iclt an enctny no space for maneuver unless he came by ship. Continued on page 70

P E R S O N A L I T Y E.P. Alexander distinguished himself as a Confederate artillery officer and aeronaut. Bv Jonathan W. Jordan

THE GRIMY MAN DARTING AMONG the

lluindering cannons did not look like a Conlederate commander. With his sweatslained shirt, torn pants and uneven beanJ, ihe gaunt 28-year-old looked more like a field hand riding home from a hard day's work. As he spiui^ed his .soiry-looking bay, Dixie, along the 150 heavy guns raining shrapnel upon the Union lines near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, his only symbol of authority was a long brass telescope that he (Kcasionally trained on the blue ranks crouching a mile in front of his belching, bucking cannons. But on this smoldering July afternoon in 1863, the haggard officer was about to set in motion the most spectacular military event the continent had ever witnessed. Frowning at the smoke-filled lines in the distance, he clapped shut his spyglass, pulled out a scrap of paper and scratched off a short note: To Gen. Pi;;kell The 18 guns have been driven off. For God's sake come quick oi^ we cannot support you. Ammunition nearly gone. E.P. Alexander Col. comd'g

The greatest charge of the Confederacy was about to begin. Hdw ai"d P(irter Alexander was bom May 26, 1835, to a wealthy plantation family in Washington, Ga. Setting his sights on a niilitai-y career, he obtained an appointment to the U.S. Militai'y Academy at West Point, N.Y., in 1853. A dedicated student with an aptitude for mathematics, he graduated third in the class of 1857 and entered the Aimy's prestigious Coips of Engineers. His postings took him to Utah in support of Colonel Albert Sydney Johnston s expedition against the Mormon rebels, and to Foil Steilacoom in Oregon Tenitory. He also taught artillery and mathematics at West Point and worked with Major MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

After serving as a signal and staff officer. Brig. Gen. Edward Porter Alexander earned his greatest notoriety commanding the Army of Northern Virginia's artillery.

ferson Davis, recalling Alexander's work on the Old Army's flag signals, ordered him to oversee the manufacture of signal apparatus and form a Confederate signal company. In July 1861, Alexander was posted to General P.G.T. Beauregard's Arniy of the Potomac, and at Manassas on July 21, he provided vital signals to Colonel Nathan "Shanks" Evans and General Beauregard. infoiming them of Union 1 Maj, Gen. Imng McDow5 ell's attempt to turn the 2 Confederate left flank. f After the Confederate victoiy at Mantissas, Alexander" Albert J. Myer to perfect a "wig-wag" flag was promoted to major and served a dual signal system for military communica- role as ordnance officer and signal chief tions. His signaling work brought the under General Joseph E. Johnston, Beauyotmg lieutenant to the attention of a regai'd's successor During the fall of 1861, number of prominent Icadei's, including when the Confederate Anny was within Mississippi Senator Jefferson Davis. sight of Washington, D.C, he established In early 1861, as the Southern states a system of signals for Confederate spies declared their secession fiom the Union, and also kept his superiors infoimed ol Alexanders engineer company was re- the strength and disposition of Maj. Gen. called to West Point in preparation for George B. McClellan's newly christened operations against the Rebels. Alexander AjTny of the Potomac. was, however, diverted to San FranIn March 1862, McClellan moved south cisco—a clear signal that the War De- to begin his Peninsula campaign. After paitment wanted him to stay out of the the Battle of Seven Pines on May 31, war—so he resigned his lieutenants com- Johnston—who had been iniured—was mission and proceeded to Richmond, Va. r-eplaced by President Davis' top staff ofThere, he was commissioned an army ficer, Genei"al Robert E. Lee. Lee, who captain, and Confederate President Jef- had been Alexander's superintendent at

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West Point in 1853 and thought well of the young major, ordered him on one of the most unusual missions given any Confedci"ate officer: 500 feet up, in a hydrogen observation balloon. The balloon Gazelle, built in Savannah, Ga., was shipped noith to Vii^inia and arrived just as the Seven Days' battles opened. Gazelle was capable of lifting only one pei*son, and Lee would not tnist the role of sei"ving as the eyes of his aiTny to a civilian hobbyist. Alexander—who had harbored a fear of heights ever since a bad fall from the Hudson Rivers cliffs at West Point—was ner\ous, but as he ascended during the Battle of Gaines Mill on June 27, 1862, he quickly grew accustomed to the sensation of being earned aloft. He used a set of signal balls of his own design to communicate his observations to the ground. Over the next week, Gazelle operated from the gunboat Teaser along the James River. On July 4, Alexander ascended to reconnoiter Union positions on MaJvem Hill, but high v^inds forced him to order the balloon hauled down, deflated and stored. Shortly afterward. Teaser became stuck in a mud bank near Haxall's Landing. To complete the days misfoitunes, the Union gunboat Mamtanzxi, backed up by the ironclad Monitor, turned up. After firing one shot. Teaser's hopelessly outgunned crew abandoned ship and the vessel— and its balloon—lell into Yankee hands. With his aeronautical career at an end, Alexander moved back to his old job as ordnance officer, this time in Lee's Amiy of Northern Vii^inia. He arrived too late to participate In the Second Battle of Manassas, and during the Battle of Antietam Lee sent him south to Haipers Ferry to collect captured Federal ordnance. Alexander was remarkably efficient as a staff officer and arlillei^' expert {he was "consulted oftener by Gen, Lee than was any other artillei"y officer," one veteran wrote), but he longed for a field command.

Less than two weeks later, word came that Union Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnsidc was moving toward Richmond via Fiedericksbui^, a small but important rjilioad town on the Rappahannock River. Hastening to Fiedeiicksbiii-g with Longstreet's other resei've artillei7 battalion, the famed Washington Ailillery of New Orleans, Alexander prepared Longstreet's artillery line on the slopes of Mar>e's Heights opposite Fredeticksburg, where about 120,000 Union troops were ready to confixmt Lee's 78,000 Confederates. Alexander's senior commanders wei^e skeptical about his gun positions, but the 27-year-old officer successfully argued that the guns should go on the forward slopes of the hill, and not on the crest as Lee suggested. Longstreet later recalled that when he suggested that Alexandei should not hold so many batteries in reserve, the engineer assured him: "General, we cover that ground now so well that we will comb it as with a fine-tooth eomb. A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it." The Battle of Fredericksbiirg proved him right. Longstreet's reseiTe artilleiy along with several infant^' brigades packed behind a low stone wall, repelled attacks by seven Union divisions. Unable to crack the Rebel lines, Bumside limped back across the river after losing nearly 10 percent of his amiy. In the spring of 1863, Alexander was i^ecalled to the Rappahannock to assist Lee and Lt. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson at Chancellorsville. Alexander led his battalion wilh the Second Coips on Jackson's famous Hank march, and enfiladed the Union XI Coips as its troops lied in disorder. When Jackson and his artillery commander were cut down by fi'iendly fire that evening, Alexander look command of Jackson's artillery for the remainder of the battle, earning praise fiom both Lee and Maj. Gen. A.P Hill. In the summer of 1863, Alexander's battalion moved with Lee's amiy to GettysTHE CHANCE TO PROVE himself in batUe burg, arriving on the battle's second day came in early November 1862, when Lee in time to tum his guns loose on Union summoned Alexander, now^ a lieutenant forces blundering into the Peach Orcolonel, to his tent to inform him that he chard. On July 3, Longstreet informed was being placed in command of a re- Ale.xanderthal Lee had ordered a charge serve artillery battalion under Lt. Gen. up Cemetery Ridge to break the Union James Longstreet, Lee's senior corps com- center, spearheaded by Maj. Gen. George mander. Alexander would replace Colonel Pickett's division. The attack would be Stephen D. Lee, a highly respected officer preceded by a massive bombardment who was being transfeiTed west. Alexan- from about 150 guns, the bulk of which der's battalion, consisting of about 500 would be sited by Alexander. men serving 26 guns, was one of two that Longstreet somewhat unfairly assigned would form Longstreet s artillery reserve. Alexander the duty of notifying Pickett

when the bombardment would make (.•onditions optimal for his infantrv advance—or to advise Pickett not to go forward if the bombardment did not break the enemy. Like Longstreet, Alexander had little faith that his bombardment would give Pickett a real chance of success, but he was unwilling to insist that the charge be called off—orders were orders, after all, and these came from General Lee himself. Alexander urged Pickett forward and supported his men with the relatively few guns that had any uppreciable ammunition left. Although he was not officially in command of the artillery of the Army of Northern Vii-ginia, or even of Longstreet s Firet Corps, circumstance placed Alexander in chaise of the largest concentrated Confederate battlefield bombardment of ihe war. Even so, it proved not enough to support Pickett's Charge to a victorious conclusion. Alexander had the guns, but he lacked sufficient ammunition to sustain their fire.

and rob. The country would be full of lawless bands, and a state of society would ensue from which it would take the country yeai"s to recover.... [T]he only proper and dignified cotu'se for me would be to Military & Civilian Decorations Atlantic & Medals sun"ender myself and take the conseCrossroads, Inc. Unitorms & Fpeld Gear quences of my actions. If the men can be P.O.Box144-MH Documented Award Groups Tenafly, NJ 07670 quietly & quickly returned to their homes Military Badges & Insignia Plione:(201)567-B717 Historical Documents there is still time to plant crops and begin Fax: (201} 567-6855 Reference Books to repair the ravages of the war. That is E-maii: All major credit cards accepted. what I must now try to biing about." sales@CollectFlu$sia.coni Large assortment & best prices. Lee's words, uttered shoilly before his Dealer inquiries welcome. Satisfaction Guaranteed! sutTender, instantly conveiied Alexander Visit us on the web to reconciliation. The Confederacy had been beaten, he concluded, and whatever romance there might be in the "Lost All of tfie guts, g/oiy, and va/or, Cause," he wanted nothing more than tO .../n m/nfoture/ return to what was left of his home in A Metal Toy Soldiers ', Georgia and make a li\ang for his family. * Plastic Toy Soldiers it 12"A<:tion Figures After the war, Alexander taught math* Wargaming ematics at the University of South Caro* Model Kits A Paints & Supplies lina and turned down a position as chief * Diorama & Scenic engineer for the khedive of Egypt Lo Materials launch a 20-year career as a railroad ex* Military Books & Publications ecutive. He was at the center of several financial battles during the time of the C..nlf*ACVV^7|-; AFTER THE DISASTER at Gettysburg, robber barons, and he began investing '.n )P Tel: I-781-321-8855 Alexander went with Longstreet s corps to real estate and wtiting historical aitichs lily 5aklier & Hobby Shop' E: [email protected] northern Georgia to support General on the Civil War in the East. He became www.hobbybunker.com Johnstons anmy. He anived too late to a director of the Union Pacific Railroad, Hobby Bunker Inc. 33 Exchange St. Maiden, MA 02148 take part in the Battle of Chickamauga, and President Grover Cle\ eland, who was but he did participate in battles at Chat- a hunting guest at Alexander's South Cai •> tanooga and Knoxville before Longstreet lina island estate, appointed the Geoi^^m was recalled to Virginia. From the spring to arbitrate a tum-of-the-cenluii' boun d\ Vodik-hon or Napcilenic meim of 1864 to the end of the war, Alexander ar\^ dispute between Niciu*agua and Costa 1 emained there, setting up gun lines and Rica over what was thought could be the Swords, Jewelru, defense works at the Wilderness, Spotsyl- route of a pan-American canal. vania and Cold Harbor before the army In 1902 Alexander became the first exSwords, Eagles, was imprisoned behind its ti'enches at Pe- Confederate to be publicly recognized at nags, Nutcrackers lei^sbui^. Now a biigadier general, Alex- his alma mater. His address to West ander commanded Longstreet's entire ar- Point, which summarized the case for See our worldwide pctures of miniature tillei^ resene, and al limes exercised reconciliation between North and Soulh, "Waterloo" Dattlerieid dioramas, command over most of the sun'i\ing ar- was published to wide acclaim, www.histliv.com E-mail at [email protected] tilleT-y of the Army of Noithem Virginia, In the early 1900s, the aging Alexander Or call \-8O\-198-0$23 On April 9, 1865, after the army pulled wrote a history of the Army of Noithem . Moss Hill Dr. * 5tiirtjf ul Utah ,3^010 out of Petersbui^ and abandoned Rich- Virginia, Military Memoirs of a CoujederCatalog online or sen mond, Lee sat by a dusty Virginia road ale Veteran, which garnered the praise of and pondered with his young artillerist veterans from both sides. Historian •k IHTERHATIONAL MILITARY AHTIQUES * what couree he should take. Although the Douglas Southall Freeman later called it WELCOME TO IMA... 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I N T R I G U E Britain's shadowy 14 Company played a dangerous cat-and-mouse game in Northern Ireland. By Michael Westaway McCue

NORTHERN IRELAND HAS LONG been

the proving ground for many of the United Kingdoms newest surveillance equipment and techniques. The nature of the conflict necessitated the steady development of advanced technology and the pei-sonnel to use it in order to counter a foe who, while lacking in resouixes, often compensated with skill and resolve. Thus many shadow\' oi^anizations have lui'ked around the si.\ counties of Ulster. One. a silent partner to the Special Air Service (SAS), comprised the best intelligence gatherei"s the UK had to offer. Designated the 14th Intelligence Company—"14 Company" or" 14 int" for short—it served as the eyes and ears of the British army. The personnel of 14 Company were not on the field to fight, but they could hold their own if need be. Such needs occasionally did arise—and the unit sometimes had its nose bloodied. In the early 1970s, the hard-core Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA, better known as "Provos") had a string of successes against the British security

forces in Northem Ireland. Reinvigorated by the Dem- riot of August 12, 1969, known as the Battle of Bogside, and more so by the "Bloody Sunday" slaughter of 14 Catholic civil rights marchers and the wounding of 12 others by British soldiers on Januai-\ 30, 1972. the PIRA stnick almost at will. In response, the British military embarked on a new and highly controvei-sial strategy, one of identifying and occasionally eliminating certain members of the PIRA. That responsibility fell to the storied SAS. Originally the plethora of intelligence necessary for the SAS to peiform this role came fiom the Special Branch of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). However, because of the suspicion of RUC collusion with Protestant loyalist extremists. Field Mai-siial Sir Michael Carver, chief of the general staff, decided in the mid-1970s that "the AiTny should rely less on Special Branch (RUC) and do more to obtain its own intelligence." Thus was bom 14 Company. The unit's roots were from the Mobile Reconnaissance Force, a severely com-

This photograph shows Captain Robert Nairac in uniform in Belfast three months before he disappeared and was allegedly killed by the PIRA in South Armagh, 18 MILITARY HISTORV JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

promised army intelligence group that had been disbanded in 1973. From its remnants I4th Intelligence Company was formed as an "elite surveillance unit." It enlisted a number of names lo maintain its cover, including the Noiihem Ireland Training Advison' Team, HQ Company, and the Int and Sy Group. Though the name 14 Company was not officiallv adopted until the early 1980s, it wa.s used to describe the group from inception. While members of the SAS were chosen from the ranks of the British anm for their ability to endure great physical strain, members oi 14 Company were chosen less for their braw n than for their capacity to withstand physiological pre.ssure. These agents were tasked with obsei"vation, not confrontation, and that meant close, almost intimate contact with targeted subjects. On occasion it entailed enduring the elements through operations involving days and sometimes weeks at observation posts hidden a few feet from armed and hostile opponents. The men of 14 Company did not remain behind to claim credit for the arrests or more intense confrontations they engendered. Rather, they allowed overt units, sometimes unknowingly, to claim credit for their woik while they melted back into the shadows. The initial screening process was brutal and included testing of endurance, mental stamina under pressure and niemow forminute detail. For the handful who survived the screening, a rigorous round of selection then took place to assess their aptitude for essential skills such as photography, defensive and offensive driving, and sm-vcillance. Those who rapidly developed these aptitudes were then graduated to learning highly specialized techniques: weapons, urban operations and anti-ambush training. The forte of 14 Company wiis its ability to see all but remain unseen. Members

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were expected to keep their hair long and unkempt and their clothes common, but not enough to stand out. Operator used static obsei"vation posts and unmarked cars (Q cars) as well as discreet locations for microphones and transmitters on the body, such as in the collai" or shoulder pad of a jacket or in the cuff of a sleeve. They typically carried 9mm Browning pistols and light Heckler and Koch MP-5K suhmachine guns for personal protection, not assaults. The weapons' interchangeable ammunition was an added incentive. The Walther PPK pistol was sometimes chosen because it was small, about the size of one's palm. DESPITE ITS INCLUSION in the dirty

tricks" allegations of ex-SAS Captain Fred Holroyd, author of War Without Honor. 14 Company generally is not accused of direct participation in the British army's policy of shoot to kill. Howevei; 14 Company is credited with the deaths of a handful of PIRA and INLA (Irish National Liberation Army) men. While the British militaiy does not make a habit of identifying members of its undercover units, some researchers, most notably reporter Mark Urban, have been able to connect both Irish Republican and British army casualties to 14 Company. INLA man Colm McNutt was the first shot in Derr\' in December 1977, Denis Heany was next, killed in June 1978 when he made the mistake ot trying to hijack a car driven by a member of 14 Company who was backed up by a trailing vehicle. While eyewitnesses and the PIRA contest certain facts, the most daring 14 Company encounter occurred just after noon on May 28, 1981, wben a single member of 14 Company found himsell stopped by a car carrying four hooded and armed men on Lone Moor Road in Deny Tensions were alteady running high in the city, as hunger striker Patsy O'Hara of Derry had died only days previously. The soldier in the car has been identified as Sergeant Paul Oram, but independent investigations into the incident identify him as an officer. According to a statement delivered on the soldier's behall during the inquest that followed, two men aimed with Aimalite rifles approached the Q car once it had stopped. As they drew near, tbe soldier fired bis 9mm and shot tbe closest PIRA man. He then fired through his rear side window at the other man who was behind the car. Further

shots were exchanged, and a third Provo was also hit. Both forensic evidence and PIRA statements suggest that there was more than one British soldier involved in the brief gun battle, perhaps coming hxim a backup car. Neveriheless, Piovisionals George McBreariy and Chaiies Maguire lay dead. Oram was later said to have also been involved in the fatal shooting of INLA man Neil McMonagal in 1983, for which he was awarded the Military Medal. His own comment on his v^ork— with a flip reference to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher—was: "Don't wony I'm just doing a job for Maggie."

movement. Mystery still surrounds the life and death of the most famous man believed to have belonged to 14 Company, Captain Robert Nairac. He was attached to 4 Field Survey Troop, Royal Engineers, based in Castledillon. County Armagh, a group that was understood to be yet another cover for 14 Company. Nairac tried to express an empathy with the locals, in the hope that he could better solicit information. He was known to frequent the most dangerous of republican strongholds in South Armagh, talking fi'eely to the locals and trying to convince them that he was from the west of the island, AT LEAST FOUR MEMBERS of the secu- an area he knew well from visits in his rity forces killed between 1974 and 1984 youth. He was often heard singing rebel are believed to have been members of 14 songs in pubs patronized by the PIRA. Company. Captain Anthony Pollen was Nairacs behavior was uncharacteristic shot in Dern s Bogside on April 14, 1974, of the typically nondescript 14 Company when the PIRA spotted Pollen and an- operator, leading some to speculate he other operator photographing a Sinn may have been actually a rogue operator. Fein Easter commemoration. In Decem- Some of the events to which he was ber 1977. Corporal Paul Harman of 14 linked were decidedly criminal, such as Company's Belfast Detachment was shot the Miami Showband massacre, in which in the back of the head at the staunchly three members of an Irish pop group repubhcan estate of Turf Lodge. A PIRA were killed by loyalist gunmen in Banaccount claimed that a treasure in intel- bridge, County Down. Due to the freligence documents was recovered, in- quency of his name being linked to cluding radio codes and surveillance almost every loyalist atrocity of the equipment. Uncharacteristically, the Brit- period, however. Nairac was likely a conish anny acknowledged Harman's role venient "bogey man" for republican prowith the intelligence service and ordered pagandists. 14 Company to stand down for months Nairacs luck ran out one night after he while the alleged compromise was as- finished singing a song at a bar in Dmsessed. On August 11, 1978, Lance Cpl. mintee. South Armagh. He was playing Alan Swift was killed on the edge of the an undercover role as a member of the Bogside when his car was riddled with Official IRA (OIRA). a group that had bullets by two PIRA men in a van. split with the Provisional years before. Sergeant Paul Oram would also be He was confronted by a group of men in among 14 Company's casualties. On Feb- the pub's car park. They questioned him mai7 21, 1984, a two-man 14 Company and, when unsatisfied with his answers. team was reconnoitering the Dunloy, forced him into the back of a waiting car. County Antrim, home of a known ultra- Nairac was driven into the Republic, republican and suspected Provo, Hemy where the men battei"ed and interrogated Hogan, when the PIRA became aware of him. Amazingly he managed to break their presence. A three-man PTRA team loose from his captors twice during the suiprised the British and shot Oram. The ordeal, In the end PIRA members took team, outnumbered, fled as SAS and over and Nairac was shot but his body RUC backups quickly swarmed the scene. was never found. It is believed that the A hail of bullets struck down Hogan and PIRA was hesitant to release his extenDeclan Martin as they withdrew. sively wounded body to the authorities It was after Oram's death, in a stoiy and opted instead to process his body in later disputed by many, that Oram was a meat giinder in Louth. identified as the single soldier involved in The tenuous peace in Northern Irethe deaths of McBreaity and Maguire in land surely comjjels the British to mainMay 1981. Speculation was that the tain some sort of intelligence network. British military may have falsely credited Suffice it to say that, peace agreement or Oram in order to cool PIRA attempts not, it will be some time before the game to find the actual man who had killed two of cat-and-mouse is truly finished in of their men and embarrassed the Ulster. MH

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Facel aceless Of the

SAHARA For centuries the Tuareg tribesmen were unchallenged rulers of their desert lair. Then the French arrived on the scene. BY EDWARD LBIMBERG

E

ven by desert standards it was a strange caiavan that set out from the Sahara Desert town of Ouargla in December 1880. More than 300 camels carded the supplies of 10 Frenchmen and 78 natives, including provisions for four months and lavish gifts for the chieftains of southern deseri tribes. The expedition was led by Lt. Col. Paul Francois Xavier Flatters, a French officer who had some experience in Saharan exploration. Its purpose was to trace a possible roLite for a prxjposed transSaharan railway fix)m the Mediteiranean across the unknown wastes of the desert to the Sudan, with its supposed riches. Among the French members of the expedition were two army officers, four noncommissioned officers, three mining engineers and an army doctor. There were also about 30 native camel drovers, mostly from the northern Saharan Chaamba tribe, plus another 50 drovei^s who were actually Algerian tirailleurs, light infantrymen of the French army disguised as civilian cameleers. It was to be a peaceful expedition, not a military campaign. These were the days when Eui^opean nations were carving up Africa, and the French were reluctant to let other powers know of their immediate plans. The Flatters mission was intended to be an exploration, not a conquest. The country through which the caravan would travel for the next few hundred miles was mostly unfamiliar to Europeans. Romans and Carthaginians had explored it to some extent, and during the 18th and 19th centuries adventurous individuals and small parties of Europeans had crossed its barren wastes. It was viitually waterless and trackless. Only the natives knew the lo-

Left: The Tuaregs, one of whom is depicted here by S.M. Durban, were fiercely independent and unwilling to countenance European intrusions in their desert realm. Right: French and Algerian cavalry and camel troopers fight off an attack by Tuareg warriors in French Mon-oco. 22 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MILITARY mSTORY 23

In 1899 a French captain in dress uniform (third from left) and a lieutenanl in desert fatigues Cfourth] confer amid troops of tirailleur Sahariennes and Meharistes, local auxiliaries whose knowledge of the North African desert made them essential to French efforts.

cation of its few wells, and they weren't teUlng. Commercial caravans had been crossing the desert for centuries using a few well-known tracks, but these were always dangerous journeys. Heat, exhaustion and disease inevitably look their toll, as did ihe depredations of brigand bands—particularly the Tuaregs. Colonel F]attei"s was actually a poor choice to lead the expedition. Although he was familiar with parts of the Sahara, he was in his 50s. over the hill for leadei^ship of such a perilous journey, and in poor health. He was described as having "a nervous and choleric temperament" and bedeviled by "personal problems." He was thought by some to have been attracted to the expedition by a death wish.

for centuries had raided oases, plundered caravans that refused to pay them tribute and tert^orized travelers in general. Exceptionally tall for desert dwellei^s, they were lean, tough men of Berber origin armed wilh unique Crusader-type broadswords, long lances, antelope-skin shields and. more recently, rifles. Fierce, treacherous, swaggering lords of all they surveyed, they wore long indigo robes that reached their ankles, accentuating their height. Most striking, their entire heads were concealed behind a veil, the traditional Tuareg liiluiiii, a 5-fo()t length of blue or white cotton wound around so that only iheir eyes were uncovered. Designed to protect their faces from the sun and sand, the litham also gave them a mysterious, menacing look that added to their terrifying reputation. FAR TO THE SOUTH WAS A BAND OF desert wairiore cheerFlatters had sent a messenger ahead to Ahitigal, chieftain of fully waiting to fulfill that w ish. Thev were membei^s of the Kel the Kel Aliaggar Tuaregs. through whose teiritory in the Hoggar Ahaggar Tuaregs, one of the northernmost tribes of the great Mountains the expedition planned to pass. The chieftain !"ealconfederation that roamed the desert from In Salah in the cen- ized what the French were up to. In some mysterious way the tral Sahara, east to Libya, as far south as Chad and as far west word was out in the desert, even to this remote comer ol the as Timbuktu. The Tuaregs were camel breeders and herdsmen Hoggar, that a railroad was being planned to cross the Sahara. \\ ho also organized and managed some of the caravans that To Ahitigal this was bad news. It meant French soldiei^s in his conducted trade across the desert. They were also brigands, who teiritory and no more caravans to raid. He sent a message back 24 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

to Flatters: Stay away. Find another route. Colonel Flaltei-s paid no atlenlion. That was his fii-st big mistake. By this time he and his party had traveled more than 400 miles from Ouargla over some of the world s woret territory. In spite of the bui'ning sun and teirible heat during the day, the freezing cold at night and other perils, the Flatters party had done fairly well in the month and a half it had taken them to reach the wells of Amguid. The colonel was feeling pi etty good about himself, and confident of the mission's eventual success. Amguid was then the entrance to the totally unknown countr\ of the Hoggar Tuaregs. There, the party picked up two Ifora Tuareg guides—the Ifora were at the time friendly to the French^—and started in a southeasterly direction into the tenifying plain of Amrador, the banen and unknown wastes that lay between the Tassili Mountains on the north and the Hoggar on the south. The Hoggar Mountains are among the most unusual geologic fomiations in the world. Rising to 9,000 feet in places, they are mostly extinct volcanoes that thrust skyward in fantastically shaped peaks and cones, with huge boulders strewn about. Throughout this desolate landscape are patches of scnib gi'ass and weeds on which Hoggar Tuareg camels and goats fed. This was their land, the almost impenetrable lair hxjm which they deployed to caiTy out their depredations in the less forbidding parts of the Sahara. When he learned that Flatters was drawing near, the wily Ahitigal changed his tune. He sent a messenger to the Frenchman to come deeper into the Hoggar, suggesting that he could help guide him further on his way to the Sudan. The bearera of this were a party of Hoggar Tuaregs who rode into Flatters' camp on the Amrador Plain. It was led by Ahitigal's son, Attici ouid Chikat. The Tuai^g appeared friendly. Attici volunteered to help guide the party through the Hoggar region. He suggested that Flatters dismiss his llora guides, since they were unfamiliar with the territory ahead. The colonel agreed. That was his second big mistake. Attici and his party rode away, leaving four Hoggar Tuareg guides to replace the Ifora. The Flattei's mission moved ever closer to the mountains. Two days later it was seiiously short of water. The guides suggested that part of the e.xpedition ride ahead to the wells of Tadjemout, taking all the baggage animals with them, along with empty watei^skins to be refilled and brought back to the main body. Flattere split his forces, setting out with a French officer, the doctor, two of the engineers and a complement of tmulleurs, plus the Tuareg guides and all Ihe expeditions camels, leaving the main body bivouacked behind. This advance party reached the wells in the Hoggar foothills, watered the animals and let them graze on the sparse gi^ass nearby while Flattei-s and the others rested in the shade of the few trees alongside the wells. All seemed well, but then it was noticed that the guides, including tfie one who was holding Flatters' horee, were edging away Flatters called out, but by that time the guides had disappeared among the i"ocks. At the same time, a group of camel-mounted Tuaregs led by Attici himself came chaiging out of the ravine straight for the colonel and his men. Flatters and the other French officer barely had time to draw their pistols and fire an elective volley before the Tuaregs were upon them. Lance thrusts and rifle fire dispatched all the Frenchmen. The attackers savagely hacked their

Although he had previous experience in the Sahara, Lt. Col. Paul Frangois Xavier Flatters made some fatal errors in judgment during his 1880 expedition to the Hoggar region.

bodies to pieces with their swords. The tirailleurs put up a spirited defense but were soon oveiwhelmed. A few managed to slip away in the confusion and make it back to alert the main body Flattei's had blundered into an ambush, and now what was left of his party was in a bad way. They were stranded in the middle of a frightful desert, in the temtoiT of a treacherous enemy and short of water and provisions. Fven woi-se, thc\ weir without camels. The entire herd had been scattered in the tighting at the wells and recaptured by the Tuaregs. The good news, however, was that they still had their weapons and plenty of ammunition to fight off any more attacks. Bui the mastei"s of the Hoggar did not attack, not there and then. They simply waited, knowing that the intaidei"s were' some 750 miles from their base at Ouargla and without the camels that were so necessaiy for desert sut\ival They had simply lo keep them in sight and wait for hunger and thirst to weaken them. Then the final massacre would begin. It was decided by the French lieutenant, who was now the only officer .still alive, to tn' to make it back to Ouargla on loot. Although he was nominally in command, much of the decisionmaking would now depend upon (he Chaamba member's of the party, the only ones who knew the northem desert well enough to guide the group to safety. After an unsuccessfiil attempt to find some of the scattered camels, the party started towai d Ouargla. Their first objective JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MILHARY HISTORV 25

the wells of Amguid, where they knew they could get enough water, and perhaps food, to cairy on. Tirailleurs were immediately sent out to the flanks to scout and soon reported they had company. A band of about 200 camel-mounted Tuareg w^uTioi^ was also mairhing northwai'd on a parallel route, keeping out of sight. There was no doubt that the Tuaregs would strike before their victims reached Amguid, for those wells marked the northem border of their territory. It was a long, hard march. For days the column struggled on, the \eiled wairiors riding silently, patiently on their flanks. Altliough the French mission was still amied, the men were now tmly fugitives. Their strictly rationed water had all but run out. They were starving, living on whatever they could find. Somewheie along the march they had rounded up a few stniy camels, used them as baggage animals and then slaughtered them for food. They were also able to occasionally snare some small desert lizaixis, which, while not gourmet fare, kept them alive. When the column was still two days from Amguid they were surprised to see a small party of Tuaregs ride up to their encampment making friendly signs. Communications with the Tuaregs was always difficult because they had their own language and knew httle Arabic, but these men seemed to have sympathy for the column's plight and offered to bring them food. The starving men were grateful. Hunger had stilled their suspicions. The next day the same Tuai egs rode up and dropped ofl some bundles of dates. As they rode off, the tirailleurs fell ravenously on the unexpected gift. It was typical Tuareg treachei>. The dates were poisoned. Among the desert tribes the drug was called ifalezlez'. it resulted ip hallucinations and disorientation, not unlike LSD. Within a jhort time the men ran screaming into the desert. Others raved around the encampment, and some tried to kill themselves. The last of the civilians died as a result of the diTJg. Why the Tuaregs didn't attack then is a mystery. Eventually tiie effects of the poison wore off, and the pitiful column moved on, although many of the men were suffering gi"eat pain and some were still half crazy. i T LAST THEY REACHED AMGUID. There they were not jurprised to see a line of camel-mounted Tuaregs stretched across their path, silently watching, lances and swords at the ready. The tirailleurs halted, and the antagonists simply stared at each other. Then suddenly the Tuaregs charged. Amazingly, the tirailleurs found the courage and discipline to meet the onslaught with a volley of well-aimed rifle fii'e. A dozen Tuaregs fell and the rest turned back, but they were not long discouraged. They charged and chained again, each time tiking severe casualties. Finally they gave up on mounted attacks and settled down to shaipshooting fi om behind the rocks of the sun ounding hilly terrain. Now the Tuaregs practiced some of their primitive and savage psychological warfare. They had taken a number of prisoners in ihe original fight at Tadjemout, and at this point, in full view of the tirailleurs, these were executed. Some they simply threw oif the sunounding cliffs, othei's they beheaded. If they hadn't fully realized it before, the hon ified spectatoi^s now knew what would happen to them if they were captured. The sniping continued until dark, with heavy casualties on both sides. The remaining French officer was killed, and the last French noncom, a Sergeant Pobeguin, was now in chaise. As 26 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

Femand Foureau, backed by Commandant Frangois Joseph Amadee Lamy's Algerian tirailleurs, sets out from Ouargla on October 22, 1898 (Rue des Archives/TAL).

the sniping died down, Pobeguin took advantage of the dai"kness to lead his tattered band around Amguid and continue north. Perhaps the Tuaregs simply let them escape. If any of the tirailleurs made it back to Ouargla, their sad tale could serve as a warning to the French to stay out of Tuareg territoTY At any rate, apparently satisfied that they had taught the intixidei's a sufficient lesson, the veiled men turned back toward the Hoggar. The remaining part of the tirailleurs' desert odyssey was a nightmare. They were still 450 miles from Ouargla, and they were still starving. They found some water along the way, but Uttle food. They were reduced to eating lizards and chewing on their leather belts. At firet the bodies were left where they lay, but eventually famished tirailleurs tumed to cannibalism. To stay alive, they ate the flesh of their fallen companions. On March 28,1881, a dozen ragged scarecrows stumbled into Ouargla. Sergeant Pobeguin, the last of the Frenchmen, was not among them—he had died on the terrible trail. Over the following weeks a few more survivor, some of whom had escaped Tuareg captivity, wandered into other desert outposts, and the w hole sad tale of the disaster came to light. Paris was horrified, and the French public demanded some sort of action to punish the Tuaregs. Gradually, however, the conquest of the Sahara, while not actually forgotten, was put on the back burner. It was not until 17 years later that another attempt was made to cross the Sahara to the Sudan.

ian lirailleurs, an experienced Saharan soldier who comprehended the requirements of such an expedition. This time it was to have enough muscle to be successful, and by the lime the Foureau-Lamy mission left Ouargla on October 22, 1898, Lamy had seen to that. It took 1,000 camels to cany all the men and equipment needed. Included in the expedition were four civilians, 10 officers, 32 French NCOs, 213 Algerian tirailleurs. 50 Sahaixin tirailleurs and 13 spahis, native Algerian cavab-ymcn. There weie also 49 camel drovers, 20 Chaamba guides and six holy men, both Chaamba and Tuareg. Adding to the expeditions striking power were two 42mm Hotchkiss guns, heavy aitilleiy for desert waifare. To be on the safe side, a Compagnie Saharienne. a unit of the newly organized French army camel coips of Chaamba tribesmen, joined the column for the first pan of the journey, scouting the flanks.

When Colonel Pierre Laperrine was appointed commander in chief of the Saharan oases at the tum of the 20th century, the region became relatively quiet-except for the Hoggar Tuaregs.

This new endeavor was ostensibly a scientific expedition led by a civilian, Femand Foureau, a seasoned ti^aveler and topographer who knew the northern desert well. He'd had previous dealings with the Ajjers Tuaregs, enough to know how volatile and unpredictable any wearer of the veil could be. And he was aware that he needed a military escort, no matter what tribe was involved. Foureau found the right military man in Commandant Frangois Joseph Amadce Lamy of the 1st Regiment of Alger-

FOUREAU AND LAMY'S HUGE caravan followed the track of the Flatters mission into the Hoggar country and right past the scene of the massacre without incident. There were no Tuaregs to be seen. The word was out in the desert that this new expedition was too well armed to assail. Even the always belligerent Hoggar Tuaregs got the message. As the column tra\'eled ever deeper into the leniloi-y of Kel Ahaggar, it found the hastily abandoned campsites of Tuareg bands. But the veiled men themselves had completely disappeared, There were other troubles, however, The countiy the expedition was now in was utterly unknown to Europeans. Foureau wrote in his diaiy: "This is appalling desert, desolate, treacherous, and discouraging to any but the stoutest hearts. The skeletons of camels litter the route and we add ceaselessly to their number. The figure of our camel losses over a week has risen to over 140 animals." The camels of the Foureau-Lamy expedition had begun to die of exhaustion, as well as lack of fodder and water. As it moved into the plateau of the southem mountain region, most of the camels were gone. Since there were few animals left to carry supplies, much had to be burned and extra ammunition buried. And now there was Tuareg tiouble. The column reached Ighezzar, a trading center where Lamy hoped to buy camels from the local tiibes. The tribesmen of the Kel Oui Tuareg, while appealing to be friendly, were as vacillating, untmstworthy and uncooperative as their northern brothere. At firet they agreed to sell the camels. Then they changed their minds. Held up at Ighezzar for lack of pack animals, Lamy stalled building a fort thei-e. Apparently that was too much for the Kel Oui. Some 400 strong, they attacked the French encampment in a wild camel charge with spear and sword, but were beaten off. They never returned. Evidently the Hotchkiss guns h id something to do with the French victory. Deadly in their dest^rt environment, the Tuaregs and their medieval weapons were no match ibr modem aimament when engaging in open, pitched battle—i.e. on the Europeans' terms. Eventually the expedition acquired enough camels to move on. Pei'haps some strong-ann methods were used to accomplish this. Charles Guilleux, a French sergeant of tirailleurs, who kept a diary, wrote: "Those cureed Tuaregs won't sell us any camels and most of ours are cluttering our tracks with their carcasses. Luckily, we have captured a nomad and won't set him free except for a ransom of 50 camels." They got their camels. JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 27

oi in Salah. It was a low-profile affaii" under the command ol an obscure young French officer. Lieutenant Gaston Cottenest. Although it was a small expedition, it was apparently extremely well organized, well equipped, well disciplined and well led. Starting out from In Salah on March 25, 1902, Cottenest and his men trailed the miscreants, never quite catching up with them. The Tuaregs threw many obstacles in ihc small force's way, including blocking the wells that marked the trail lo llic Hoggar. Il was moi e than a month after starting oui thai the pursuers actually sighted their quaiTy. Four days alter the first tentative contact on May 7, al a village in the foothills of the Hoggar, the Tuaregs turned to fight. Cottenest was ready for them. He had ihe high ground, and his men were dismounted and spread in a line along the rocks, awaiting the attack. The Tuaregs. greatly reinforced antl mounted on their best camels, came on at a slow trot, so slowly that for an instant the young lieutenant thought they were not going to charge. Then suddenly they broke into a gallop, screaming war cries and waving lances. In his after-action report, Cottenesl described il this way: "The ground allowed the Tuareg to advance up to us tiding their camels, with their besi mounts to the tore. Barbed spears whistled toward us and the men who had hurled them Irom the height of their camels dismounted with a riile in their left hand, a spear in iheirrighland a sword at their side. They were all ai med more or less the same and to our astonishment they nearly all had rifles. They were men of great height, of an imposing appeal ance, who marched straight ahead wilh a complete ct)ntempt of danger." In June 1902, one month after their defeat at Tit, the Tuaregs The disciplined fire of the Chaamba created great gaps in the returned to In Salah to ambush another French convoy, but they Tuareg ranks, but slill they came on. Their ovenvhelming nimibegan to submit to the French soon after that incident bers pushed the French force back, but Cottenest hiid planned well. He suddenly withdrew his men lo a pivarianged posilion higher up among the rocks and continued his heavy and accuThe Foureau-Lamy expedition stiTiggled on, enduring all the iiile fire. usual hardships of the desert: heat, sandstorms, thirst and The contest tumed into a fierce fiix'fight, which the Tuaregs hunger. More camels died, and Tuareg spies buzzed around gradually lost. At what point they decided to retreat is not their column, thieatening to attack. They never did. The expe- recorded, but the casualties tell the story. In the rather grandly dition was finally successful, reaching its goal at Zinder in the titled Battle of Tit, named for the village nearest the scene of the Sudan in the fall of 1899. fighting, the French lost three men killed and 10 wounded. The It was a gi'eat triumph foi" Femand Foureau and Comman- Tuareg counted some 90 dead, 22 of whom were killed, acdant Lamy. But Lamy didn't live to enjoy it long. Some months cording to Cottenest, "in our pursuit alter the battle." later he was killed leading a chaise against the king of Bomu Although Cottenest's people have been described in some acnear Lake Chad. The place where he died in now called Fort counts as an ill-armed partisan band, the results indicate othLamy and is the site of an airfield. eiAvise. Perhaps the Chaamba were French-trained veterans ot Lapenine's Sahariemies. Their disciplined victory against overNOW, AT THE HEIGHT OF FRENCH EMPIRE building, the whelming odds would lead one to think so. pace ol Saharan pacification quickened. Colonel Piene LaperThings changed in the Sahara after the Battle of Tit. The most nne. the creator of the Coiupagiiie Sahoiieuue. was named com- belligerent of Tuareg tribes, the Ke! Ahaggar ol the Hoggar, mander in chief of the Saharan oases. The entire region became made theii' formal submission to the Fix'nch. Others followed relatively quiet. suit. And with the patrols of the Saharan companies criss-crossOuiet e.xcept for the Hoggar Tuaregs, that is, who were biding ing the desert, the French Sahara remained relatively peaceful their Lime. Since they had massacred ihe Flatters mission, the Kel for many years. MH Ahaggar had grown more confident ihan ever. They continued their raiding outside the Hoggar, then disappeared back into it, Edward L. Bimberg served with a Nalional Guard cavalry regidefying ptu^suit. Something had to be done, but the government ment in North Africa, Corsica and Italy during World War II. For in Paris, fearing intemational criticism for its blatant imperial- the past 30 years he has owned riding schools in Nevwlersey. He ism in Alrica, was reluctant to draw attention by mounting a is the author of The Moroccan Goums: Tiibal Warriors in n major military effort. Instead, the authorities quietly sent out a Modem War. For more information on the Tuaregs and the small party of 130 Chaamba iiregulars to recover some camels French in the Sahara, read Touaregs: People of l!ie Desert. b\ stolen by a Hoggar Tuareg band in a raid neai' the oasis town Ednioud Benms and Jean-Marc Duron. 28 MIMTIRY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

, , - H E LAST

^

HIGHLAND CHARGE

I

N 1775 HIGHLAND SCOTS li\ing around what is now Fayt'Ueville wcrL' faced with three choices: Join lellow Noiih Carolina colonists in open revolt against Britain; stay as neutral as possible; or fight tor King George HI—the son of the man responsible for many ol" them fleeing to America in the wake of the failed Jacobite Rebellion of 1745-46. That bitter past notwithstanding, they decided to fight for the Crown. To do so, they planned to form a regiment, march to the mouth of the Cape Fear River below Wilmington and rendezvous with seah(jiTie British foires. The British, however, anived 10 weeks late, by which time the stranded Loyalist unit had been broken up by the newly formed Nonh Carolina militia 18 miles north of Wilmington. Once the British arrived, they simply burned houses at the mouth of the river, picked up some refugee slaves and departed for Charlestown, South Carolina. 30 MILITARV HISTORV JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

North Cajolina's Scots—the fii'st of whom came fi'om Argyll^ had become quite settled in the ?>5 year's preceding the American Revolution. The Argyll Scots had arrived in 1739 and settled in Cioss Creek (modern-day Fayettevilie) on the Cape Fear River, 80 miles upstream from Wilmington. As more Highlandei^s continued to airive, Cross Creek became a key trading center between the port of Wilmington and settlements as fai" inland as the Moravians at Salem. The immigration rate increased after 1746 following ihe victoiy of William Atigustus, Duke of Cumberland, over the Highland Anny ol Prince Charles Edward Stuart on Culloden Moor. Cumberland was not kind to his defeated foes. His tr(X)ps killed some prisoners and their wives outright, while others were starved to death. Further, the British broke up the clan system in the Highlands. Highland dress, music and language were oul-

Below left: North Carolina Patriots fire on Loyalists assaulting their earthworks from Moore's Creek, in a painting by Gil Cohen. Below: Another Cohen painting depicts the Loyalists, mainly Scots Highlanders, preparing to cross Moore's Creek to the skirl of a bagpipe in the predawn hours of February 27,1776.

At Moore's Creek Bridge on February 27, 1776, Patriots and Loyalists fought to decide North Carolina's role in the Colonial rebellion against Great Britain. BY PETER R. JOHNSTON

lawed. Englishmen became landowners, driving the High- BeiTi on July 2. They elected John Hai-vey (namesake of Harvey's landers into poverty. America, where rich torestland was being Neck, 17 miJes east of Edenton) as moderator and also gave him given away to anyone willing to cultivate it, offered a new be- the power to call a meeting whenever he chose. This new ginning. In the Cross Creek area, settlei-s rejoiced in Highland Provincial Congress also elected three delegates to attend the dress and music, and a Gaelic press. Even the slaves spoke new Continental Congress in Philadelphia. Gaelic. North Carolina's government came to be managed by comIn 1754 the North Carolina Legislature decided to create mittees of safety in each county and major town. Those comCross Creek as a county seat, naming the county Cumberland^— mittees acted as judge and jui^ in enforcing the wishes of the apparently to keep the Highlanders in their place. In 1774 the North Carolina Congress. For example, they prohibited any myal government in North Carolina collapsed. King George ITT more imports of slaves, tea or wine, and banned all gambling. had closed the port of Boston and put troops ashore until the The second meeting of the North Carolina Congress was held people would make restitution for a shipload of tea tossed into in New Bern in May 1775. just as the delegates received news the harbor. When North Carolina Govemor Josiah Martin re- from Massachusetts of the battles of Lexington and Concord, fused to call a meeting of his legislatiu-e (for fear of what that fought on April 19. Also in May an agent from British Lt. Gen. body might do), the legislators called their ovm meeting in New Thomas Gage, commander of troops in America then based JANUARVyf EBRUARY 2D06 MILITARY HISTORY 31

A wiitercoloi sketch by Richard Schiecht yives iin ovtiivit-vv ol ilit; well-prepared earthworks and defensive positions that Colonels Richard Caswell and Alexander Lillington's Patriots prepared along Moore's Creek in anticipation of the Loyalists' march.

in New York, called on Governor Martin and told him that his requested shipment of arms (intended for Loyalists) was on the way. The rebels, however, knew about it. (On receiving one letter from Martin in London, Secretaiy of State for the Colonies William Legge, 2nd Earl ol Dartmouth, saw the notation. "Opened by the Committee of Inspection at Charles Town, G. Roupell.") Martin dispatched his private secretaiy to Ocracoke, the poil of enti"y for New Bei"n, to divert the vessel to Fort Johnston, at the mouth ol the Cape Fear River, and sent his family to Now York. He then slipped out of the palace at New Bern and boarded HMS Cruzier, anchored off Fort Johnston, on June 2. In August the third North Carolina Congress met in Hillsborough, to get away from the heat of the coast and to be at a more centralized location. Samuel Johnston of Edenton was elected president, replacing the recently deceased moderator, John Harvey. Responding to a call from the Continental Congress, the 184 delegates authorized raising two 500-man regiments of Continentals for service of one year, along with 3,000 Minutemen to he on standby for SL\ months. Probably one-third ol the people in the province, however, were loyal to the king. To reach those people, some of whom were Highlanders, the congress created a special committee of a dozen people to explain to them "the Nature of our Unhappy Controversy with Great Britain, and to advise and urge them to unite with the other Inhabitants of America in defence of those rights which they derive bxtm God and the Constitution." The Continental Congress was supposed to pay the Continental soldiei-s, but it had no uniforms for them and asked the different provinces to tiy to pnwide them (the French later provided unilorms). Noith Carolina Minutemen were paid by the 32 M I L I T A R Y E-irSTORV

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 200fi

province when actually on duty. The men were initially given a bounty of 25 shillings to buy a hunting shin, leggings and black garters as their uniform. The Minutemen were sheltered from the punishments that could be inllictcd on a Continental soldier, such as 39 lashes, "the Law of Moses less one." The maximum punishment that could be accorded a Minuteman was confinement lor 24 hours and loss of 14 days' pay. By contrast, the ruling class in South Carolina at fii^t resisted the I'aising of Continentals, prefeiring instead to raise its own state Uoops. 1( felt that the Continentals' regulations were "too mild f(n" the perverse Soldiery of this Meridian, to whom 39 lashes would prove hut a light breakfast." AMONG THE HIGHLANDERS who showed loyalty to the king was Flora MacDonald, who had become famous in 1746 when she hid Charles Edward Stuart, aka "Bonnie Prince Charlie," after his defeat at Culloden, allowing him lo escape to France. She married Allan MacDonald in 1750 and moved to North Carolina in 1774, where they established a 474-acre spread .55 miles west of Cross Creek, just south of what is now the town of Pekin. She and Allan, like many other Highlandei's who owned land in Scotland, had no choice but to suppoil the king. That loyalty was not overlooked by Governor Mailin and ihe British command in America. On July 21, 1775, Samuel Johnston, in his capacity as a member of the Edenton Committee of Safety, wrote the Wilmington Committee: "A vessel from New York to this place brought over two [British] officers who left the Bar to go to New Bern, they are both Highlanders, one named McDonald the other McCloud. They pretend they are on a visit to some of their countrymen on your river, but 1 think there is reason to suspect their eirand is of a base nature. The

Commitlce ol ihis lown have vs.Tote to New Bem lo have them secured. Should they escape there I hope you will keep a good lookout for ihem." When those two Highlanders arrived in New Bem, they were questioned by the town's committee. The visitors declared thai, having been wounded at Bunker Hill in June, they had connto Noflh Carolina to seek out finends and I'clatives and settle among them. They convinced the New Bem Committee that they had no hostile intentions and were released, then proceeded to Cross Creek without passing through Wilmington. In Pact, Lt. Col. Donald MacDonald and Caplain Donald McLeod—as their names were actually spelled—were under orders from General Gage, in Boston, to raise a regiment of Noiih Carolina Highlandei^s. Both men wei'e indeed sunivors of Bunker Hill (on ihc British side}, and MacDonald, in hismid60s, was also a veteran of Culloden. In the overall plan, Highlanders would march to Bmnswick, eight miles north of Fort Johnston, to arrive no later than February 15,1776, and join invading troops of Maj. Gen. Charles, U)rd Comwallis, who would sail from Ireland. The two Loyalist officei-s were not idle in recruiting soldiers from the Highland commimities. Allan MacDonald, commissioned a major by Govemor Martin, and Flora helped in the i-eciTiiting program. Each recniil was promised full pa\ as a British soldier, nofightingoutside North Carolina, and 200 acres after the war. Today il may seem slrange that the Highlanders would want tofightfor the British. Some, like Allan MacDonald, slill held land in Scotland in spite of having paid penalties to the Crown for being on the losing side in "The Forty-Five." Others, such as the Campbells from Ai-gyll, had always been loyal to the Crown. Still othei"s were British officers on half pay. Highlanders who were newly anived and destitute, having just been given land on swearing to support the king, had not been in Amcdai long enough to appreciate the situation, or al least could not see how ihe colonists had a chance at standing up to the British army They followed llieir heivine Flora MacDonaid. All "loyal subjects" were promised that their families and property would be protected and that any supplies or equipment seized would be paid for. Representing the other side of the argument, the ihii'd North Carolina Congi'ess sent out religious and lay leadei-s to speak lo all people. Their arguments were that although present taxation was modest, without representation in Parliament, it was only the beginning of what could be an endless succession of additional taxes. They also pointed out that in the north British troops were already killing people for resisting taxes, and Notth Carolina mu.st be prepared for the inevitable invasion. In October 1775, ihe Royal Navy allowed a shipload of Highlanders to enter Wilmington. In December another shipload landed at Norfolk, and those Highlanders were marched to Cumberland County. James Moore, of ihe Cape Fear area, colonel of the Lst Regiment of the North Carolina Continentals (500 men), was the senior rebel military man in the pro\ince. He readied his unit at Wilmington (the 2nd Regiment, under Colonel Robert Howe, was off lo Norfolk to assist the Virginians in a battle wilh their governor). The people of Wilmington threw up bi"eastworks and mounted cannons along the river. Women and children were mo\ ed Inland, along with male slaves who seemed likely to run lo the British.

Infantrymoii n[ ihc 1st North Caiolina Regiment after it joined the Continental Army and adopted uniforms. Commanded by Colonel James Moore, the unit first saw action at Moore's Creek.

ON FEBRUARY 5.1776. Donald MacDonald, whom Govemor Martin had promoted to brigadier genei^al, gathered his troops at Cross Hill {modem Carthage), 36 miles northwest of Cross Creek. While he was undei orders to reach Biunswick by FebriiaiA' 15, some of his ofriceT"s advised him to wait for the British troops to land first. MacDonald followed ordei^s to make the February 15 deadline. On that same day, however. Colonel Moore had set up camp six miles south of Cross Creek, on ihe south bank of Rockfish Creek, with 500 Continentals and 600 Minutemen. On Febniarv' 19, MacDonald moved down to ihe north bank of Rocklish Creek, partided 1,500 Highlander's for- Moore to see, then senl over a note offering clemency if he would lay down his arms. Moore declined the offer. Both commanders ended their notes wilh the usual "Your most obedient and hu mbie servant." With MacDonalds path to Bmnswick blocked, he was forced to try another route. When the sun went down, he silently fell back to Cross Creek, crossed the Cape Fear River, bumed his boats and then continued east. He would cross the bridge over the South River and then tum south. Moore, looking at his map, reasoned that the logical place lo stop MacDonald was at Corbelt's Fen-y over the Black Riven Moore sent a message to Colonel Richai d Caswell, moving fiom New Bem to Cross Creek with 800 men, to change coui-se and JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 IWatTARY HISTORV 33

head toward Corbetts Fern; Moore ordered tAvo of his battalions to occupy Cross Creek, whiie the bulk of his army would stall south lo Elizabeth Town, and there eross the Cape Fear. Caswell was the first to reach Corbetts Feny, and he set up camp on the south bank of the Black, impounding the ferry. When ihe Highlander airived at the north bank, they could see Caswell's camp on the other side, and the two sides exchanged a few shots. The Highlander distracted Caswell with fireworks and music while constnjcting a bridge four miles up upstream. On the night of Febnian 26, they crossed that bridge witli their 13 wagons and proceeded to capture 21 bullocks and two wagons ol meal destined for Caswell, along with the 22-man crew. By the time the Highlanders reached Caswell's camp, however, all they found were a few footsore horses among campfires Caswell had puipo-sely left burning. Moore, still on the way, had ordered Caswell to fall back to the bridge over Moore's Creek (many MOOR'S lived in the Cape Fear area). Colonel Moore had already detached Colonel Alexander Lillington, with 150 light infantrv; to tloat down the Cape Fear and huny to the bridge. Moore's Creek meandei^s through swampy terrain, and this bridge was built over one of the few sand lisings. Lillington arrived at the biidge on February 25 and began throwing up earthworks 30 yards from the eastern side. Caswell anived the next day with his 800 men and two cannons, a 2poimder called "Old Mother Covington" and her "daughter," a half-pounder swivel gun. Caswell placed 200 of his men on the western bank, establishing his two guns and his other troops 100 yards fi*om the eastern bank, within an earthwork fence around their camp. When MacDonald was six miles from the bridge, he sent a note to Caswell offering pardon if he laid down his aims. Caswell, like Moore, declined. The pereon canning Caswell's answer reported to MaeDonald that Caswell was camj^d on the western side of the bridge. The council of officers reasoned that since Caswell was not on the other side of the creek, he could be easily attacked. By that time MacDonald, who was staying at a farmer's house, was too sick to lead his tnxips. He passed his command to Captain McLeod—who just before the campaign became engaged lo one of Flora MacDonald's daughtei^s—along with a nominal promotion to lieutenant colonel. The Highland camp held 1,600 men, bul only had amis for 500. At 1 a.m. on Feb27, McLeod led 500 men toward ihe bridge.

The bank of Moore's Creek preserves remnants ot the Patriots' breastworks, along with the 2-poiindei cannon called "Old Mother Covington" (right background) and her half-pounder "daughter."

ceiving no reply, McLean ordered his men to fire toward the opposite bank. Upon hearing those shots, McLeod headed toward them, as his aimy began the rallying ci"y "King Geoj^e and Broadswords," and diimis and pipes began to stir the morning air. The LoyaliM army had no uniform—the men were wearinLwhat Highland dress they had, the plaids of many different clans. Accompanying McLeod in his lun for the bridge was Captain John Campbell and his company of broadswordsmen. As McLeod and Campbell came Lipon the bridge, they found that ihe cross planks had been removed and the sills had been greased w ith soap and tallow. McLeod managed to walk across on one sill, Campbell on the other. (The reconstnicted bridge at the modem site contains three sills, a more logical choice from the weight of wagons that routinely used the bridge.) The hi'oadswordsmen tried to follow their two leaders towaid the east bank, though some slipped and fell into the creek and some drowned. Once on the east bank, McLeod immediately made an estimate of ihe situation. The road from the bridge was a causeway, with water on his left and swamp on his right. Thirty yaixls ahead and to his right were the earthworks Lillington had ifu'own up, now empty. As the road pnxieeded lo the 80-yaixl mark, it made a 45-degiTee left tum to higher giound, now defended with earthworks. On a straight line from the bridge, at a distance of 100 yards, also on higher ground, McLeod could see two guns behind earthworks. Just as MeLeod took that all in, the two guns opened up wilh grapeshot. McLeod and his companions, some wounded, ran ahead. As ihey came close to the earthworks ami weie within range of Caswell's muskels, both McLeod antl Campbell died, along with about a dozen of iheir men. MeLeod alone stopped 20 pieces of lead and fell just a few paces in front AS HE CAME CLOSE lo the creek and could see Caswell's camp- of ihe earthworks. Caswell's men, seeing the two Highland leadfires, McLeod formed his men into three columns, ordering ers down and their followei"s hesitating, jumped over their pro* them to quietly pounce on the camp. McLeod, however, soon lective mounds and began chasing the broadswordsmen, who found that Ca.swell had done it again—left his campfire bum- tried to make it back across ihe bridge. ing while falling back, this time across the creek. Meanwhile, upstream from the bridge. Lieutenant Ezekiel Just then McLeod heard shots from where he suspected the Slocumb led a platoon that forded ihe creek and began firing bridge might be. Lieutenant Alexander McLean (one of the half- on the Highlandei-s' left flank. Slocumb's action started a panic pay officere in the province), leading a patrol, had come upon among the Highlanders along the east bank, who then began the bridge. A few men on the opposite bank challenged him out running back to theii" camp. of the darkness with "Who goes there?" The battle was over in 10 minutes. Caswell's men suffered onl\ two casualties, wilh one. Private John Gradv of Dupplin Count\, "A friend," McLean answered. dying of his wounds four days later. His company commander "A friend of whom?" came the question. "A fiiend of the king," replied McLean, at which point the buried the body on the battlegi-ound, where a monument to him shadowy figuies fell to ihe ground. McLean, thinking that the was erected in 1857. Perhaps 30 Highlanders were killed, wounded or" captured in men might be some of his own, ciiallenged them in Gaelic. Re34 MIIJTARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

V A

ihe lighting in front of Caswells guns. Many more were likely left dead or wounded in the swamps and woods and creek. As the retreating Highlanders r'etumed lo iheir camp, iheir sick commander, General MacDonald, order"ed them to march together for protection to Smiths Ferry (modem Smithfield), 75 miles north, whei"e they would disband and make for their homes. The Highlanders did not march together, however—it was every man for himself, with three aboard each of whatever horses were available. Caswell s men were close on their heels. As Moore's troops arrived the next day, his cavalr\ joined in the chase. General MacDonald was captured al his campsite and canied to Colonel Moore, to whom he offered his sword. Moore immediately reluj ned it. MacDonald was carried to New Bem, then lo the jail at Halifax. Most of MacDonalds retr eating army was rounded up and corralled al Smiths Feny The 850 enlislcd men captured were released lo r-elLim home after they signed a pledge swearing they would never lake up anris against "the Inhabitants of the United Colonies of America.. .and would not cairy out more than 50

pounds of Gold & Silver" About 50 officer prisoners were marched to Halifax. They included Major Allan MacDonald, his son Alexander, another major and assorted captains and lieutenants. North Carolina's booty from this battle included 1,500 lKles, 350 muskets and shotbags, 150 dirks and swords, two new medicine chests from England—one worth 300 pounds—and 13 wagons with teams. At Cross Creek, a slave revealed the hiding place of 15,000 pounds in gold coins. Each of Moor'e's soldiers was awarded half a bushel (about 40 pounds) of precious salt. On March 1, 1776, the Continental Congress promoted .lames Moore and Robert Howe to brigadier general. On April 8, the North Carolina Congress, feeling its oals, appointed a committee led by Comelius Hamett "to take into consideration the usurpations and violences attempted and committed by the King and Parliament of Britain against America, and further' measures to be taken for faistrating the same, and for the betler defen.se of this Province." The Hamett Committee answered on April 12: "Resolved, that the delegates for this Colony in the Conlincntal Congress be empowered to JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MlLrTARY HISTORY 35

pointed to look after the families of the Loyalist prisoners, :tt their old homes or' new ones. Further, in contrast to British treatment of the deIcated Highlanders at Culloden, the North Carolina Conmrss published, in English and in Gaelic: "We administer llris consolation—thai [the families of the prisoners] may rest assured that no wanton acts of cmelty, no severity, shall be exercised to the prisoners. We have iheir security in contemplation, not to make them miserable. In our power, their errors claim our pity, 1 liL'ir situation disarms our I'escnlment. We shall hail their Cohen depicts the climax of the Moore's Creek bridge battle, as the Loyalists' charge disii refomiation with increasing in bloody ruin before a deluge of gunfire from the Patriot earthworks. pleasure, and rexeive ihcm lo us wilh open arms...and shall concur with the delegates of the other Colonies in declaring In- bless the day which shall restore them to us friends ol liberty, dependency, and forming foreign alliances...." to the cause of America, the cause of God and mankind.,.." A copy of this resolution was immediately dispatched to That decree, however, didn't stop weslem militiamen, too Joseph Hewes in Philadelphia to be placed bcforx- the Conti- timid to have joined ihc earlier lighting, from plundering Loynental Congress. Thus North Carolina was the fii'st colony to alist Highland homes and stealing salt f r"om ihe merchants' for nially move for independence. While North Carolina "em- shops and warehouses. They even stole Highland garb. Many powered" its delegates to "concur" with olber colonies in de- Highlander's I'eluming to their homes wer^e forced lo hide in ihe claring independence, Vii"ginia "instriicted" its repr'esentative lo woods from marauding "Patriots." In hindsight, Moore's troops "propose" it. On June 7. Richard Henry Lee of Virginia moved who had occupied Cross Creek should have stayed awhile "That lhe.se United Colonies are, and of a right ought to be, fr'ee longer. Highlander's with ihe means began booking passage to and independent states." New York or Nova Scolia. The junior Highland officers held at Halifax wer'e released NOT UNTIL THE FIRST week of May did thefii-stBritish ships after they signed a pledge not to resist ihe Patriots' cause. The drop anchor off Fort Johnston. Major" General Sir Henry Clin- senior officers were sent on to Philadelphia lo be exchanged for' ton, sailing from New York, dillydallied along the way, dropping American officers captured In the northem campaigns. in on Chesapeake Bay. At Fort Johnston he found Govemor The Br'itish did not make the exchange easy. For example, Martin, still aboar'd Cntzier, half slai'ved. when General MacDonald wasfir'stoffered as an exchange forClinton, from HMS Pallas, sent ashore copies of a proclama- American Brig. Gen. William Alexander (Lord Stirling), the tion to be circulated lo al! magistrates, entreating the people to British maintained that MacDonald was only a major, refusing avoid the miseries of a civil war by throwing off the tyranny of to recognize the rank Govemor- Martin had conlcrred on him. the PiT)vincial Congress. All persons were offered pardons except While some Highlandei's left North Carolina, others stayed. Comelius Hamett (whose home was just north of Wilmington, Later, in 1781, when Comwallis moved through Cross Creek, he site of the modem water woi ks) and Brig. Gen. Robert Howe. was disappointed at nol seeing Highlandei"s flocking to his Since Howe's plantation was only fives miles upsU'eam fi"om banner Apparently they had had enough of British pi'orrriscs. Flora MacDonald, without her husband and son. having seen Fort Johnston (now the site of the Sunny Point Army Depot), on May 7 Clinton led a I'aiding party to it that look away goods her plantation robbed and having losl tw o daughter's to lyphus, worth 1,500 pounds. Five days laler General Comwallis, after decided to call it quits. In 1779 she sold whal she had left toi' being delayed by a storm al sea, anived and put 900 soldier's passage back to Scotland. On her way back horrre, she was ashore. They pr'oceeded to bum Howe's home and plantation wounded while helping ihc ship's crew fight ofi pirates. On her death in 1790, several thousand people around Skye attended and the town of Brunswick. By the end of May, all the British had departed for Charlestown, her fimeral. Her body was wrapped in the sheet on which with Josiah Martin added lo their passenger list. The records ol Bonnie Prince Char'lie had slept many yeai"s beloic. MH HMS Scorpion r-eveal that 36 slaves were canied away, of whom 12 were women. From that group 15, including one woman, Peter R. Johnslon, who lives in North Carolina, is writhig a history joined the Royal Naw. Other ships probably cariicd away many of the slate during the Revolution. For further reading, he recommor e .slaves. mends: The Moore's Creek Campaign, 1776, l?y Hugh Rankin;and Certain delegates to the North Carolina Congress were ap- The Highland Scots of North Caiolina 1732-1776, lyy Duane Meyer. 36 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

38 MILITARY inSTOR\' JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

IN A NARROW PASS IN NORTHERN GREECE. A FEW THOUSAND WARRIORS SOUGHT TO HOLD, OR AT LEAST STALL, THE LARGEST INVASION EORGE OF ITS TIME. By David Frye

I

n the 5th century BC, the Persian empire fought the city-states of Greece in one of the most profoundly symbolic snuggles in history. Their wars would detemiine the viability of a new diiection in Westem culture, for even as Greece stood poised to embark on an unprecedented voyage of the mind, Persia threatened to prevent the Hellenes from ever achieving their destiny. Persia represented the old ways—a world of magi and gcxl-kings, where priests stood guard over knowledge and emperors treated even their highest subjects as slaves. The Greeks had cast off their own god-kings and were just beginning to test a limited concept of political freedom, to innovate in art, literature and religion, to develop new ways of thinking, unfettered by priestly tradition. And yet, despite those fundamental differences, the most memorable battle between Greeks and Persians would hinge on less ideological and more universal factors: the personality of a king and the training and courage of an extraordinary band of warriors. The long path to battle at Themiopylae began in what is now Iran, heart of the once vast Pcreian empire. Nowadays, ancient ruins attest lo its longvanished greatness, but to the Greeks of the early 5th centur-y BC, the Persian empire was young, aggiessive and dangerous. Persian expansion had begun in the mid-6th century, when its first shah, or great

In 1814 French painter Jacques Louis David revived an inspirational Greek legend, in Leonidas at Thermopylae, 480 BC (Louvre Paris, France, Giraudon/ Bridgeman Art Library]. JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MILHARV HISTORY 39

king, Cvrus, had led a revolt against the dominant Medes. By 545 BC, Cyrus had extended Persian hegemony to the coast of Asia Minor. The Greeks of Asia Minor were blessed during their period of subjugation only insofar as the Persian kings generally remained remote figures ot power. Stories abounded of executions and tortures ordered on the whims of angry monarchs. One shah's wife reportedly had 14 children buried alive in an attempt to cheat death. There seems lo have been little escape from the arbitrary tyranny of the nilers known by the Greeks simply as "the King" or "the Great King," enforced by a system of spies who acted as his eyes and ear's. Such was the gener^ atmosphere of oppression that one Per'sian nobleman who failed to do the shah's bidding was for'ced to eat the flesh of his own son—and upon being shown that he had just done so, could muster no more potent a reply than to say, "May the king's will be done." ll was inevitable, then, that there would be tension between the Greek and Persian ways of life, and in 499 BC several Greek cities in Asia Minor revolted against ihe Persian King Daiius. Darius had seized power In 521, when he and six other men crushed a conspiracy of priests on a day that became celebrated on the Persian calendar as Magophonia—"The Killing of the Magi." A vengeful man, Darius had ordered that the severed heads of the magi be paraded through the streets on pikes. According lo the Greek historian Herodotus, Darius was especially furious to learn that a distant city called Athens had

dared to assist his rebellious subjects in Asia Minor "Grant, O God," he said, shooting an arrow into the air, "that 1 may punish the Athenians." He even commanded one of his servants lo inter'rupt him during every dinner three times to remind him of his goal with the admonition, "Master, remember- the Athenians." The first Persian War ended badly for Darius, however, when his troops were defeated by a smaller Athenian army at Mar-athon in 490 BC. Greece was saved—but only for a while. DariLis' son Xei:Kes does not seem to have been especially diiven to complete his late father's unfinished business. He waHled over whether the long-delayed punishment of Athens merited such a far-flung campaign. At last a phantom allegedly appeared in his dreams, ui^ng him to invade Greece—this being interpreted by his magi as a portent for world conquest. Xerxes spent more than four year's gathering soldiers and stockpiling supplies from eveiy comer of his er-npire. The r"esuiting host amounted to a colossal cosmopolitan am-iy of armies. In it were Peraans, Medes and Hyreanians, all wear'ing felt caps, tunics, mail and tn>users, and armed wilh shoit spear's, light wicker shields and deadly powerful composite bows. Assyrians joined ihem, protected by bronze helmets and shields, and bearing spears, daggers and iron-studded wooden clubs. Bactrians, Parthians and Chora-smians added short bows and spears. The Scythian Sacae, in their tall pointed hats, bristled with bows, dagger:s and battle-iixes. Cotton-wearing Indian auxiliaries were armed with bows that shot iron-lipped arrows. There were Paiicanians, Pactyans, Ai'abs, Ethiopians, Libyans, Paphlagonians, Ligyans, Matieni, Mariandynians, Syrians, Phrygians, Lydians, Thracians, Pvsidians, Cabalians, Moschiaus, Tibareni, Macr'onc and Mossynoeci. The list, even in abbreviated form, reads like a catalog of lost peoples. Together; they formed an ar'my that the Greek historian Herodotus estimated at 1.7 million, excluding the navy. When be added ship-borne fightei's and European allies lo the total, he came lo a sum cif 2,6 million, a figure that he reckoned would have lo be doubled lo account for servants, crews and camp followers. Herodotus' numbers must sur'cly beover'stated, although we will never know by how much. We can only accept that Xerxes' arTiiy was a vast and apparently awe-inspiring Motivated by their mission and conditioned for war from childhood, Spartans face a Persian force—according to Herodoonslaught with characteristic ferocity, in a painting by Stanley Meltzoff. tus, whenever il stopped to 40 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

WATCHING HIS OWN ARMY PASS

IN REVIEW, XERXES

HIMSELE

IS SAID TO HAVE WEPT AS HE

acquainted with Greece's otber most powerful city-state. At one point he asked a Spartan e.xile if anyone in Greece would dare REELECTED ON THE BREVITY resist his force. The exile, for whom there was no love lost for the city tbat bad expelled him, admitted that no length of odds OF HUMAN LIFE. could possibly convince tbe Spartans to subniil. Tbe Spartans, he said, feared only the law, and tbeir law forbade them to retreat in battle. It commanded tbem to stand firm always and to conquer or die. slake its thirst, it drank entire rivers diy. Knowing that tbey could not bope to defeat the Pei^ians as Within Xei"xes' aiTTiv. the native Persian contingent was most individual cities, the Greeks convened a conference in order to privileged. Caniages full of women and sei"vants accompanied coordinate a Panhellenic defense. It was there that the Sparthe Pei^sians on the march. One Pei'sian unit was particularly tans, who.se own city was unique in that it bad no walls (relying esteemed: a crack fighting torce that Herodotus called the Im- instead upon the braveiy of its citizens for defense), advocated mortals, alleging that any dead, wounded or sick soldier in its the construction of a wall across the Istbmus of Corinth, thereby ranks wa.s replaced so swiftly that its 10.000-man strength never protecting only the southernmost part of Greece. The cities seemed to diminish. north of Corinth, bowever, knowing that Xerxes could swing Watching his own army pass in review, Xei^xcs himself is said around tbe Aegean and strike Greece from tbe north, sought an to liave wept as he reflected on the brevity of human life. Not earlier defense. The congress adopted their strategy. Tbe Greeks one of them, he obsei'ved, would be alive in 100 years' time. It elected to draw tbe line at Themiopylae. was an unlikely moment of insight for a king who had once orTo the Greek strategists in 481 BC, Tbemiopylae represented dei'ed one of his own soldiers split in two. their best chance to stop or al leasl delay the Pereian aimy long The Persians maintained a splendid marching order. At the enough to allow their combined fleets to draw the Persian navy front was more than half the anny, succeeded by a gap to keep into a decisive sea battle. A nan-ow mountain pass. TheiTnopythose ordinary tj-oops fixim being in contact with ihe king. There lae was a bottleneck through which tbe Persian aimy somehow foUowed 1.000 of Persia's finest horsemen, another 1,000 picked had to proceed. Forced to fight thete, the Pci^ians would be speannen, cairying their spears upside down, 10 sacred hoi"ses, unable to take advantage of tbeir massive preponderance in a holy chariot drawn by eight horses, then Xerxes' chariot. The numbers; instead, tbey would bave to face the Greeks in closeking was then followed by 1,000 noble Persian speannen with quarter, hand-to-hand combat. ihcir spears pointed upward, another 1,000 picked cavaliy Two armies now prepared to converge on tbe tiny mountain 10,000 inianti>, man\ with gold or silver ornaments on their pass. For Xerxes no force, not even nature, would be allowed to spears, and finally 10,000 more horsemen before another gap resist bis progress. Wben a violent storm tore up tbefii'stbridge that sepai ated those fine troops fi^om the ordinaiy soldiers who bis engineei-s had built across tbe Hellespont, the great king orbrought up ihe rear. dered his engineers put to death, and be had his men whip and It is entire]\ possible that Xerxes did not anticipate having curse the waters for defying him. New engineers then to fight any significant battles in Greece. Tbe magnibridged tbe Hellespont again. Constructed from tude of his force was so great that he must have nearly 700 galleys and triremes lashed together, anticipated only demanding surrender in order ihe bridge was a mawel of makeshift mililan' to receive it. Like his father before bim, he engineeT'ing. Flax and pap\njs cables beld the sent messengei^i ahead demanding the traboats in line, and sides were constRicted to ditional tokens of submission—earth and keep animals from seeing tbe water and watei". Many Gi'eek towns relented in tbe panicking during their crossing. The Perlace ol certain destiiiction. To the Persian army advanced inexorably into sian king, they conceded, belonged the Greece. land and tbe sea. The Greek force tbat now raced to Two cities were spared tbe indignity Thennopylae was ridiculouslv small ior of the Persian ultimatum. Xerxes well the challenge tbat awaited it: 300 Sparrecalled tbe fate of the messengers his tans. 80 Myceneans, 500 Tegeans. 700 lather had sent to Athens and Sparta. Thespians and so forth, totaling about I he Athenians had thrown tbem into a 4,900. The countrymen tbey left behind pit. in Sparta the Persian diplomats were shown the place to find tbe earth and water tbey sought—by being pusbed down a well. Lconidas selected to stand with him at Xerxes was familiar witb the willful AtheniThermopylae 300 middle-aged Spartans with ans wbo had thwarted his father at Maratbon 10 heirs to leave behind after their deaths (Ancient veai-s earlier, but along tbe marcb be slowly became Art and Architecture Collection). JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 41

seem to have put little faith in this army. The Athenians voted to evacuate their city. Their men of military age embarked on ships, while women and children were sent to the safer territoi> of the Peloponnesus. Only treasurers and priestesses remained behind, charged with guarding the property of the g(xis on the Acropolis. If any Greek understood the danger of his assignment, it was almost certainly the Spartan commander, Leonidas. Although each city's contingent had its own leader. Leonidas had been placed in overall command of the Greek army. One of two Spartan kings—Sparta had no kingship in any real sense—Leonidas traced his ancestry back to the demigod Heracles. He had handpicked the 300 wairioi s under his command; all were middleaged men with children to leave behind as heii"s. He had selected men to die, and done so apparently without the philosophic reluctance of Xerxes. Leonidas and the Spartans had been trained to do their duty, and, having received an oracle that Sparta must either lose a king or see the city destroyed, Leonidas was convinced that his final duty was death. On the way to Thermopylae. Leonidas sent his widely admired Spartans ahead of the other troops to inspire them with confidence. They arrived to find the pass unoccupied. It was only 50 feet wide and far narrower at sonje points. There were hot springs there—these gave the pass its name—an altar to Heracles and the remains of an old wall with gates that had fallen into ruin. The Greeks now lushed to rebuild it. As Xerxes' anny drew closer, a Persian scout rode to survey the Greek camp. What he saw astonished him—the Spartans, many of them naked and exercising, the rest calmly combing their hair. It was common practice foi' the Spartans to fix their hair when they were about to risk their lives, but neither the scout nor his king could comprehend such apparent vanity. The Greeks, too. began to receive intelligence on the size of the Persian force. Sometime before the battle, the Spartan Dieneces was told that when the Persian archers let loose a volley, their airows would hide the sun. To Dieneces that was just as well. "For if the Pei"sians hide the sun," he said, "we shall fight in the shade." Despite the imperturbable courage of Dieneces and the other Spartans, the Greeks were shaken when the Persian host finally neared their position. At a council of war the leaders debated retreat, until Leonidas' opinion prevailed. The Spartan would do his duty. The Greeks would stay put and ti^y to hold off the Persians until reinforcements could arrive. The Pereian aiTny encamped on the flat grounds of the town of Trachis, only a short distance fi'om Theimopylae. There, Xerxes stopped his troops for four days, waiting upon the inevitable flight of the overawed Greeks. By the fifth day. August 17, 480 BC. the great king could no longer control his temper. The impudent Greeks were, like the storm at the Hellespont, defying his will. He now sent forward his first wave of troops— Medes and Cissians—with orders to take the Greeks alive. The Medes and Cissians were repulsed with heavy casualties. Detemiined to punish the resisters, Xerxes sent in his Immortals. The crack Pei'sian troops advanced confidently, envision42 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

ing an easy victory, but they had no more success than the Medes. What Xerxes had not anticipated was that the Greeks held the tactical advantage at Thermopylae. The tight battlefield ntillified the Persians' numerical preponderance, and it also prevented them fi"om fighting the way they had been trained. Persian boys, it was said, were taughl only three things: to ride, to tell the truth and to use the bow. There was no place for cavalry at Thermopylae and. even more critical, no place to volley arrows. The Greeks had positioned themselves behind the rebuilt wall. They would have to be T ooted out the hard way. The Persian amiy was neither trained nor equipped for such close fighting. Its preferred tactic was to volley arrows from a distance, the archers firing from behind the protection of wicker shields planted in the gixjund. They wore very little armor and carried only daggers and short spears for hand-to-hand combat. Although .students of military history aigue that true shock waifaie has seldom been practiced—since it is antithetical to the soldier's natural desire for self-preservation^—the Greeks had made it their standard tactic. Greek soldiers perhaps drew some confidence from their heavy aiTnor and their long spears, which could outreach the Persian swords. But the Greeks also had another, more intangible, edge: something to fight for. They were defending their homes, and they were doing their duty—they were not fighting as slaves of some half mad god-king. As heavy casualties sapped their soldiei^s' resolve, the Persian commanders had to resort to lashing them with whips in order to drive them against the determined Greek defendei^s. During that long first day of fighting, the Spartans led the Greek resistance. Experienced Spartan warriors would come out from behind the walls, do fierce battle with the Pei'sians, then feign retreat in order to draw the Persians into a ti-ap. Xerxes reportedly leapt to his feet three times in fear for his army. The second day of Thermopylae followed mtich the same course as the first. The various Greek contingents now took tums fending off the attacks, but the Persians failed to make any headway. It is difficult to say how long the Greeks could have held olT the Persians at Thennopylae—their casualties thus far were comparatively light—but the question was soon made moot. When the Greeks had first arrived, they leamed that the pre-

sumabK impregnable site possessed a hidden weakness: There was a track ihrough the mountains that could be used by an enemy force to suiTound and annihilate the defenders of the gate. Recognizing the danger, Leonidas had dispatched his Phocian contingent to guard the path. Thus the already small number of Iroops available at the gate was made smaller still by the division of the Greek forces. The Phocians themselves were charged with the difficult task of defending a route with no natural defenses. Their best hope—Greece's best hope—lay in the mountain ti'ack remaining unknown to the Pei'sians. It was, in the end, a Greek who betrayed that secret. The traitor, Ephialtes, was app^irently motivated by greed when he revealed the mountain path to Xerxes. Acting immediately on the new information, the king sent Persian troops up the path during the night, when darkness concealed their movement

Leonidas' men block the narrow middle gate, in Massimo Taparelli's Battle of Thermopylae 480 BC. When a traitor revealed an altemate route to the Persians, the Greeks vwere doomed.

among the oak trees. Near the top, they completely suiprised the luckless Phocians. At last free to fight in their usual fashion, the Persians rained down arrows as the Phocians frantically sought to gather their aims. In desperation, the Phocians raced to higher ground for a last stand. The Persians, however, had no interest in chasing the Phocians higher but instead tumed down the trail, aiming for the pass at Themiopylae. Lookouts raced down the hill to wam Leonidas of the descending Persian amiy. There was little time left. A quick council of war led to the decision to split up the Greek force. There JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 43

HERODOTUS WROTE. THEY RESISTED TO THE LAST WITH THEIR SWORDS IE THEY HAD THEM. AND IF NOT WITH THEIR HANDS AND TEETH....'

was no reason for the entire army to be annihilated at the wall. Most contingents were now allowed lo retum home and prepare for a later showdown. Leonidas and his Spaitans, however, would remain al Themiopylae. Standing by them were the loyal Thespians, who eonsidered it an honor to die Hghting beside ihe Spartans. Leonidas also kept as hostages some 400 Thebans whom he suspected of having Persian sympathies. Although some have questioned ihe wisdom of Leonidas' decision, wondering it he was overly intiiienced by a mumbojumbo oracle prophesying his sacrificial death, the situation gave him no alternative. If the entire Greek army had fled, it would have eventually been caught from behind and slaughtered by the faster-moving Pei^ian cavalry. Leonidas was giving the retreating troops the only chance they had to escape and fight another day. It is in many ways the irony of TheiTnopylae that Sparta, arguabl> the least fi'ee of all the Greek states, now stood as the final deiender of Greek freedom. Afl the things that would make Greece great—science, art, poetry, drama, philosophy—were foreign to Sparta. The Spaitans had developed a constitution of almost total subordination of the individual to the community. Spaiian elders deleimined which infants could live or die. Spartan boys were sent into militaiA training at the age of 7. Spaiian men lived in bairacks, away fmm their wives, for much of iheir adult lives. The Spartans ate at a eommon table, they distnbuted land equally in an almost communistic fashion and they were forbidden to engage in what were deemed the "superfluous" aits. Such freedoms as their warrior elite enjoyed did not extend to non-Spaitans living in their leniton; the Helots, who served as their slaves. Yet the Spaitan elite believed passionately in their freedom, and their sense of duty, imbued at an early age, guaranteed that no Spaitan commander would ever have lo resoTi to whips to drive his soldiere into battle. On August 19, the Greeks elected to inflict as much damage as possible on the Persian army. Knowing that this day's struggle would be their last, they pressed stolidly fonvard, leaving behind the safety of ihe wall to fight in the widest part of the pass. There, they would battle the massive Persian army on open ground. They would do so, however, without the Thebans, who as Leonidas had e.\peeted suiTendered to the Persians before the final assault began. Xerxes ordered his men in for the kill. Once again his commanders lashed their own troops to drive them forward. Many Peraans were trampled to death by their own comrades. Others, shoved aside, drowned in the sea. All the while, the Spartans and Thespians did their deadly work. "No one," wrote Herodotus, "could count the number of the dead." MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

The Greeks fought with their long spears until the sliafls had all broken. Then they fought with swords. In the coui'se of the struggle, Leonidas fulfilled the prophecy that had doomed him. Four times the Gteeks then drove the enemy away from his body before the Persians (inally succeeded in dragging it away. It was about then that the second Persian fotx^e arrived from the mountain pass. Now completely surrounded, the exhausted Greeks withdrew for the last time behind the wall and fonned themselves into a single compact body. "Here," wrote Herodotus, "they resisted to the last, with their swords, if they had them, and, if not, with their hands and teeth, until ihe Pei"sians, coming on from the front over ihe ruins of the wall and closing in ivam behind, finally ovei"whelmed them." The Batlle of Thermopylae was over. Leonidas and his 300 Spaitans all lay dead, as did the 700 Thespians who had slood by them. The Pei^sian dead were said to numloer around 20,000, alihough Xerxes tned lo conceal this honx-ndous loss by having mo.st of them secretly buried, leaving only about 1,000 Persian bodies for his aimy to see as it marched through the pass. it was customai> in Spiiita to make great ceremony over the death of a king. Ridei"s would can^ the news throughout the countrv'. and women would go around the capital, beating cauldrons. But Leonidas was denied even a proper burial, Xerxes ordered his head cut off and fixed on a stake. The rest of the Gi eek dead he ordered buried in order to conceal how few had held up his army for so long, and to remind his veterans of Thermopylae ihal the Spartans were mortal afler all. The Greeks' courageous stand at the mountain pass had hardly even slowed Xerxes' advance. Four days of waiting and three days offighting—Leonidas'heroism had bought only one more week lor his compatriots. Athens, all hut abandoned, was soon sacked. And yet Themiopylae was nol a total failure. Tlie invading army had been bloodied—badly, if Hemdotus is to be believed— and it must have had some effect on Pei>;ian morale. The battles influence on the Greeks was indisputable. When ihe war was over—for Greece did finally defeat the Persians—ihey established holidays commemorating Thennopylae and erected memorials over the battlefield. "Four thousand men from Pelops' land/against three million once did stand" read one. Another celebrated Leonidas and his 300 men; "Go tell the Spartans, stranger passing by/that here, obeying their commands, we lie." Thermopylae thus acquired a significance that transcended its tangible militar\ impact. In ihe end, the battle's value lay not in land gained or lost or in men killed or captured, but in inspiration. The Spaitans and Thespians had lauglit Greece and the world an enduring lesson about courage in the face of impossible odds. MH David Frve is chainnan of the Department ofHistoty at FM.steni Con}iecticul State University. For further reading, he recommends:

The Histories of Herodotus; and Thermopylae: The Battle for the West by Enile Bradford.

Snom ond Slouyhier oi

SUOMUSSflLM

Amid Finland's forgotten Winter War occurred one of history's overlooked tactical masterpieces, in which the Finns annihilated two Soviet divisions.

IWrLITARY H I S T O R Y

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

BY JOHN HUGHES-WILSON

T

he Soviet invasion of Finland on November 30. 1939, and the so-called Winter War that followed have been almost totally ignored by Westem militaiy historians. Some reputable works even manage to completely omit any reference to ihe Winter Wai; Yet the Finnish defense of their tiny countiy was a militaiy triumph. David thrashed Goliath. The Finns humiliated their invaders, ripping the Red Army to shi'eds and inflicting perhaps 125.000 killed and at least 330,000 oveiull casualties, losing roughly one-fifUi that number tJiemselves, before finally yielding to the inevitable. Perhaps Finland's greatest single triumph was the decisive Battle of Suomussalmi in December 1939, when a liimdful of light infantiy completely destroyed two fully equipped Soviet mechanized divisions in open warfare. It was a victory that desewes to rank with better-publicized militaiy epics such as Crete and Bastogne. More than those two. Suomussalmi can genuinely lay claim to being one of the battles that shaped the 20th century. For Russia, control of access to the Baltic Sea has always been vital to its national interest. As the war clouds gathered over Europe in the late 1930s, Josef Stalin and his fellow Bolsheviks in the Politburo looked unL-asily at developments in the Baltic States. Key to their strategic dilemma was Finland's role in any fcture crisis: Would the Finns side with the Union o! So\iet Socialist Republics, stay neuti al or support Germany? It was a question that Stalin felt had to be resolved. Although diplomatic negotiations had been underway between Finland and the USSR since early 1938, two key events crystallized Soviet suspicions of Finnish intentions. Adolf I litler's annexation of Austria was seen as a clear waming of trouble to come from a GeiTnan dictator hungry for tM: v^Lehensraum, or "living space." For almost a millennium, such ambitions on the part of the Germans had taken the form of "Drang nach Oslen"—the quest for land in the east. Second, Moscow viewed the anival of a German mililarv delegation to celebrate the 20th anniversary of victory over communism in Finland's struggle for independence in 1918 with deep misgiving. To Stalin this was a key indicator of Finnish sympathies. From 1938 on, Stalin tumed to the Finnish leadere. among them Field Mai'shai Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, with a clear message: It was no longer acceptable for Finland merely to remain neutral. Finland must

either cooperate with the USSR or face dire consequences. Desperate, Mannerheim and the Finnish cabinet sought a diplomatic settlement. They might as well have tried to negotiate with a hungry wolf over its next meal. Events accelerated in the late summer of 1939. First, to universal astonishment, Stalin signed a nonaggression pact with his rival dictator in Nazi Geimany, Almost before the ink was diy. Hitler invaded Poland on September 1. Less than one month later, Stalin moved into the Baltic States to snap up Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, establishing control of the southem Baltic coast. Europe was again at wai: All that remained to finalize Stalin's Baltic pf)licy was for Finland to fall into line. A bairage of propaganda began to hammer Finnish eai's and increase diplomatic pressure. "We of Leningrad.. .look out at the world." thundered its commissar, Andrei Aleksandro\ich Zhdanov. "Round us lie .small countiies who dream of great adventures or pennit other adventurei-s to scheme within their boi-ders. We ai'e not afraid of small nations... .We may indeed call on our Red Amiy to defend our country!" The message— and the threat—was obvious. For the final tum of the screw; Stalin personally demanded territorial concessions of the Finns in October 1939, offering to trade the cnicial Karelian Isthmus for bairen tundra in the far north. The USSR demanded that the Finnish border near Leningrad be pushed back out of artillery range, fiom 20 to 45 miles. Helsinki's diplomats, though shaken, refused. In mid-November. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and Stalin pointedly demanded to know whether the Finnish delegation was "deliberately seeking a conflict." The stage was set for war.

In David Pentland's Frozen Hell, ski troops of the Finnish 9th Division take up a blocking position against advance elements of the Soviet 44th Rifle Division beside a disabled Soviet T-28 tank (David Pentland/ Bangor, N, Ireland].

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n November 15, General Kirill Meretskov, commander of the Leningrad Military District, was summoned to the Kremlin and given his ordere: Attack Finland by the end of the month and seize the Karelian Istlimus and access to the Gulf of Finland. Finland was tiny, and had not the Red Aimy's new aimor and tactics just cnjshed the Japanese aimy at Khalkin Gol in the Far East? Finland would be a walkover. The district artillery chief, Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov, was not so sure. "How long have we got?" he asked confident Deputy Defen.se Commissai- Grigori Ivanovich Kulik. "Twelve days," replied Kulik. Suiprised, the old soldier remarked, "I'll be happy if it can be sorted out in three months...." In the last days of November, a series of Soviet artiller\' demonstrations on the border opposite Leningrad were denounced as "Finnish provocations." The USSR unilateiuUy tore up the 1934 Treaty of NonAggression. Finally, at 6:50 a.m. on November 30, the Red AiTny struck. From Lapland in the north to the Karelian Isthmus opposite Leningrad, more than 600,000 Soviet troops poured across the frontier behind a massive artillery bombardment, vastly outJANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 67

Colonel Hjalmar F. Siilasvuo was the nominal mastermind at Suomussalmi, but he owed his success to numerous officers' initiative in carrying out their commander's intent (Finnish War Archives).

After allovi/ing the Soviet advance elements into Suomussalmi. scattered Finnish units ambushed and cutoff sections of two divisions strung out along the road, isolating them into manageable pockets to be destroyed one by one.

numbering Finland's total combat army of only 250,000. Twentytbree divisions, 2,000 tanks and more than 1,000 aircraft backed up the invasion force. The Winter War had begun. The Soviet plan was simple enough—on paper. In the south. the Seventh Army was to brush Finnish opposition aside, breach the Mannerheim defensive line between Lake Ladoga and the Gulf of Finland and move on to seize Viipuri (now Russian Vyborg), Finland's second largest city. On the right flank of Lake Ladoga, the Eighth Army was to swing around and drive for the Finnish lakes, cutting off the Karelian Isthmus fiom the noith. In the far north. Red Anny divisions were ordered to pin down any Finnish reserves. And in the center, at the narrowest part of Finland, the Ninth Ai-my was given the key task of driving straight through to the port of Ou!u, only 140 miles to the west on the Gulf of Bothnia. General Mikhail P. Dukhanov's suiprise strike would cut Finland in half. The axis ot attack led to a key crossroads in a small parish of 4,000 people called Suomussalmi.

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rom the start the Soviet master plan went wrong. The bombing of civilians in Helsinki aroused genuine anger and support from an international

Suorrussat

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community that had not yet experienced the horroi-s of Rotterdam, Coventry, Hamburg, Dresden, Tokyo and Hiroshima. Worse for the Russians, it swung Finns unhesitatingly behind their government. Soviet plans to destabilize Finland by .setting up an internal puppet govemment of "patriotic Finnish Communists," waving Soviet flags of welcome, were mined fiom day one. After the bombing of civilian towns, all of Finland—including its Communist Party, whicb walked out of the Comintern—rallied to tbe fight. In the Karelian Isthmus, the Russian infantry surged forward on a 90-mile frontier, shouting "Ural" As they slowed and began to trudge ahead, almost shoulder to shoulder behind the advancing tanks, a Finnisb defender made a prophetic remark: "So many Russians! Where will we bui"y them all?" Finnish bluster aside, as the Russians advanced toward the defensive positions of the Mannerheim Line, a number of unpalatable facts (to the USSR) quickly became evident. First, the Finns were not coming out to welcome their "liberators" as the propagandists had told them. On the contrary, they were resisting. Tme. they were melting away—but only to conduct a skillful fighting withdrawal, drawing blood at every ambush. Second, too many Russians were packed into too small an area. In heavy snow, traffic jams began to slow the advance of the Seventh Army's nine divisions. Traffic regulators were remoi"selessly sniped at by invisible figures in the woods. Frustiated artillei-y units could not press forward to support Ihe advance, and any attempt to leave the roads led to

Field Marshal Carl Gustav Emil Mannerheim inspects one of the few British-built tanks at his disposal. Finland's heavily forested ten^ain proved ill-suited for Finnish amior-and all the more so for Russian tanks.

chaos, with annored vehicles sliding into frozen mud and ice. Gucirilla attacks in the Soviet rear by mobile Finnish ski troops added to ihe growing confusion. Third, the whole area had been comprehensively booby-ti"apped. Every fallen tree, every cottage, eveiy bridge was wired with explosives or mined. Even lavatories and dung hills were mined. The giiL'at advance slowed to a hopelessly muddled crawl, and casualties mounted. Worst of all was tbe weather. As the December mercury' chopped to minus 30 degrees, the real hell of talvisota, "war in the winter," began. Wounded men stopped bleeding: Their blood froze. Basic rations had to be doubled. Just to keep the men alive. Medicai orderlies learned to hold a moiphine ampoule in their mouths to keep it from freezing. The merest touch on metal flayed a soldier's skin open like red tissue paper. Oil froze unless vehicles were kept ninning, and the grease on breechblocks jammed solid in the cold. Tanks even froze to the ground. The Finns di>'!y refened to the Soviet advance as "the moving zoo," or "our neighbors—the targets." To be cut off meant death—Soviet forces relied on the quartermaster's supplies lo keep them alive, let alone fighting.

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ther lessons rapidly became apparent. The Red advance relied entirely on the roads as its main axes. Free-roaming groups of Finns couJd ski anywhere, emerge from the forest, blast anything in sight with iheir submachine guns and get away before any counterattack could be mounted. And once three or four trucks were blazing on the road, great Russian aiTnored columns became as packed and vulnerable as the Roman legions that had

slogged through tbe dense pines of tbe Teutoburg Forest 1,930 year s before. Another lesson that the Finns leamed in tbe advance on Kai^Iia was that Russian armored tactics were based on unrealistic doctrine. The Soviet tanks tumed out to be easy meat once they had been separated fiom their infantt> support. Within ihefiretfive days, General Hugo V. Osteiman, commanding the Mannerheim Front, reported at least 80 Russian tanks destroyed and the aimored advance reduced to probing along the forest roads. Special antitank units were raised at every combat level, from platoon to battalion. Over-night, the Finns became an aimy of tank hunters. Even the National State Liquor Board was pix-ssed into action. The fct ciiide antitank pipe mines had worked well but were too passive for the aggressive Finns. They needed something better—and quickly. The Molotov Cocktail was invented in tbe fu'sl week of December 1939. Special antitank teams waited in their well-camouflaged holes by the roadside for the rumble of an approaching tank. When the vehicle was on them, thefii"eteam would spray any supporting infantry with submachine guns, forcing the Russians to dive for cover. Meanwhile the antitank team would lob a glass bottle filled with a lethal mixture of the Liquor Board's new "mixed drink"—alcohol, tar, resin and kerosene—onto the tank engine decks. If the tanks were separated from protecting infantiy, then the increasingly bold tank hunlers would swarm aboard to drop their deadly ixHtles in through a hatch. The advance in Karelia slowed to a standstill. In the words of Kaarlo Erho, a young lank hunter, "every day was broiled Russian, for sure." By the end of 1939, the Finns iiad manufacJANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MlUTAffV HISTORY 49

tured and distributed no less than 70,000 of their deadly new antitank ambush weapons. Should the Red armor leave the roads to try its luck across the now deep-frozen lakes, the enterprising Finns were also prepared for that. As war threatened, they had anchored lines of antitank mines, buoyed up with enough air to float just below the ice once the lakes had frozen. In shattering explosions, 20-ton tanks crashed through the ice, taking their unfortunate crews to a wateiy gi'ave. The Russian advance slowed and stopped. Viipuri, let alone Helsinki, became a distant dream. By the end of thefirstweek in December, the Soviet attack in the south had stalled. Farther north, however, the attack against the Suo-

A Finnish ski patrol sets up an ambush in the snow. The Finns' familiarity with their forests gave them a decisive advantage over the largely steppe-bred Russian troops, who were compelled to stay close to the roads.

mussalmi waist still offered a chance of victory. On November 21, the War Coimcil of the Leningrad Military District had issued the following order to the commander of the Soviet Ninth Army: "The Ninth Army...is to mount an attack with the mission...to destroy the forces of the enemy by operating its forces in the direction of Kajaani with the near objective being to advance to the line Kemijarvi-Kontiomaki station and in the shortest possible time, capture Oulu." It was sound enough strategy and a good plan. If the Ninth Army succeeded, it would cut Finland in half, sever all communications with the north, guarantee the Murmansk railways ability to keep Soviet supplies coming and render the Mannerheim Line useless. Dukhanovs general staff plotted a 20-mile pair of pincers to catch the Finnish border defenses. The aim was to trap them against some frozen lakes by seizing a vital crossroads, leaving the Ninth

50 MILITAR\' HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

AjTny's victotious armor to push on to the west coast and cut Finland in half. The plan depended on the Ninth Army's officers and men to put it into execution, however, particularly those of the 163rd and 44th divisions. The exact spot where Dukhanovs staff planned to catch the Finns was the administrative village of Suomussalmi. The village lies about 25 miles west of Raate, on the Russian border, lt is at a crossroads connected to the border by a network of dirt roads weaving through a wilderness of lakes and forest. At the start of the war, the local Finns had mobilized their Home Guard for the region and formed an emergency battalion for local defense, Er P-15, commanded by Lt. Col. L. Kyander under the distant control of the "North Finland Group." With a force of less than 1,000 men and the belp of iwo weak half-company-isi/ed bordei" detachments, Kyander was tasked to defend a 30-mile front again.st invasion. He called for reinforcements. Facing this tiny force were two Soviet regular divisions. Twenty miles to the north at Juntusranta, moving down a newly cut road, were two regiments of the 163rd Rille Division, foimed near Moscow, a collection ol hardy, poorly trained conscripts with foimidable supporting artilleiy plus a battalion of tanks and a reinforced gi oup ,„ of assault engineei^s. Farthersouth, I foiining up on the Raate road 20 miles to the east of Suomussalmi, I was the third regiment of the 163rd, and arriving from that di> rection was the 44th Riilc Division, S an even more formidable threat. The 44th was an elite division, drawn mainly from the Ukraine, with first-rank officers, men and equipment.

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he Finns had superiorities, too. Citizen soldiers and reservists led by well-trained professionals, they were formidable individual soldicre. They knew the ground and were used to living in the forest. At subunit levels they were infinitely resourceful and flexible, and they enjoyed the challenge of new tasks. Above all, they were dedicated to killing Russians at minimum cost to themselves. They had another advantage: They lacked i^adios and so were forced to communicate by telephone lines. This meant that so long as they controlled the telephone lines, communications were secure and their intentions unknown to Soviet intelligence. As a result the Soviets were attacking blind, without good intelligence on their advereaiy Although the Finns were slowly becoming aware

of the Soviet buildup in the center, the 163rd Rifle Divisions attack on the northern pincer took them by surprise. The new Finnish area commander. Colonel Hjalmar F. Siilasvuo, evacuated Suomussalmi, offeiing it as bait to the advancing Russians. Pushing down from the northeast and the southeast and harassed by the retreating Finns, the 163rd seized an eerily empty Suomussalmi. By December 7, General Vladimir Zelentsov had consolidated his positions in the village and along the northern i oad. Like Napoleon at Moscow, he looked around to see what would happen next. Where was the southem half of the pincer, the 44th Division? By that time Finnish SIGINT (signal intelligence) personnel were regularly reading the Ninth Army's

ing reinforcements from his newly formed 9th Division—brought his attention to bear on the late arriving southem half of the Red pincer. Advancing slowly fi^om the east along the Raate road, a Red armored column began to move to join up with its comrades in Suomussalmi. Although the Finns had succeeded in picking otTthe Russian advances separately, there was still a veiy real danger that the powerful 44th Division might break through to relieve Suomussalmi. It was the decisive moment of the battle. In a daring blocking maneuver on December 14, a tiny force of 350 Finns set up a defensive plug to stop this new Russian column on the east-west road on a narrow isthmus between two lakes. Attempts to get around the bottleneck by outflanking across the A Soviet T-26 tank and an ammunition carrier supporting the 44th Rifle Division, disabled by Finnish antitank gunners, are added to the war booty recovered from Suomussalmi in February 1940.

communication traffic. Realizing that the two halves of the Red pincers were uncoordinated, and still with no real sign of the southem attack. Colonel Siilasvuo began the Finnish counterstrike. Using companysize detachments and even companies of military police as mobile infanti^ fi'om December 11, he concentrated against the 163rd Division's extended column and began to cut it into bite-size chunks. Zelentsov's tnx)ps were staing out in static defense over 12 miles of road and fast running out of supplies in the frozen wastes. The focal point was the village itself. Cut off and desperate, the Soviet soldiers went into all-round defense among the abandoned bams and houses and fought ofl an increasingly bold series of counterattacks, as more Finnish units were fed into the fighting by Mannerheim's high command. Wilh the trapped 163rd Division slowly being ground down in the village by the 27th Infantry Regiment, Colonel Siilasvuo—now effectively command-

frozen lakes were easily spotted, and the attackere were shot down in the open by concentrated machine gun fire. As the month wore on, despite bitter hand-to-hand fighting at the roadblock, the 44th Division could not break through to Suomussalmi. Finally, on December 23, the baffled and exhausted Soviet vanguard recoiled, to be gi-eeted with the news that tlie Finns had cut off the column 15 miles to the east, back toward the border. Bumper to bumper, strung out along a narrow road in a 20-mile column, the 44th Division was now trapped. What happened in this fourth and final phase of the battle was the slow destruction of two Soviet divisions. In a steady series of counterattacks in the north. Finnish forces sliced the remnants of the I63rd Division to ribbons, gradually cutting the surviving units into ever-smaller pockets. Cold beyond belief, low on ammunition and with no food and JAr^UARY/FEBRUARY2006

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51

nowhere to go but the white wildemess of the arctic forest, the 163rd Division disintegrated. Some of the sunivors threw away their weapons, abandoned their positions to tiie north of Suomussalmi and congregated like a herd of cattle in the open on the ice at Lake Kianta before beginning the 25-mile tmdge northeast across the ice toward the USSR. They left behind the pathetic litter that eveiT soldier recognizes as the evidence of a defeated aimy— paper, discarded equipment, wounded men and above all bodies, manv of them frozen in the con-

Finnish ski troops pass the frozen bodies of Russians as they complete the destruction of the 44th Rifle Division on January 5. 1940.

torted poses of death. Even the ruthless Finns took pity on the sui^vivors. helping the mob on its way with random shots and trying to save the wounded and prisoners. During interrogation one POW told his captors that he was a civQian, a fish packer from Archangel. He had been shopping for shoes for his wife when an angry political commissar frogmarched him into a barracks demanding to know "why such a healthy young man was iimning loose when the Amiy needed eveiT man in Finland?" He was lucky. Most of the 163rd Division disappeared, never to be seen again. The taiga forests of the northem wastes are unforgiving in winter. The division had suffered more than 5,000 soldiers killed and was destroyed as a fighting force. The sundvors huddled in the loiins of Suomussalmi, awaiting their inevitable end.

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s Christmas loomed, the Finns turned their attention back to the south and closed on the trapped "snake" of the 44th Rifle Division. In one action on December 23 against the cui-oiiniolti. or pockets, an infantry battalion killed or wounded more than 100 Red Army soldiei-s for the cost of only two of its own men wounded. More important, they 52 MILITARY HISTORY

JANUARY/FEBRUARY Z0D6

destroyed a Soviet Beld kitchen, now a prime target, to further tighten the screws on the starving Russians. Desperate attempts were made to resupply the division, but to no avail. The division commander. Maj. Gen. Anton I. Vinogrxidov, was repeatedly urged to retreat by his staff. Mindful of Stalins reconl purges and suspecting the fate awaiting failed Soviei commandei-s, he hung on as the Finns remoisclossK sliced up his command into smaller and smallei' pockets. By the New Year, even Viiiogiadov saw no choice but to admit defeat. On Januaiy 4, he called Slavkti. the Soviet high command, for fresh orders. On January 6, the division was ordered to pull out. When the survivoi's finally staggered over the USSR border two days later, the once proud division had been reduced lo a mere skeleton. With 1,000 dead, 1.500 wounded and no less ihan 2,250 missing, the 44th Division would requii*e months, if not years, to retur'n to ihe \
Attack on

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One of the smoke generator of 1st Lt. Peter R. Johnston's platoon, attached to the U.S. Army's IX Corps, provides concealment for an M4A3E8 Sherman tank firing from a position southeast of Hill 598-a k a Triangle Hill.

ii4 MrLfTARY HISTORY' JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

In October 1952, an American attempt to seize Hill 598 put the U.S. 7th Infantry Division and Chinese 45th Division through a grueling test of wills. FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT BY PETER R. JOHNSTON

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he Battle of Triangle Hill that I witnessed in 1952 was no more horrific than many othei"sfoughtduring the Korean War. Nonetheless, it was my battle. Years later, at a high school reunion, I leamed that one of my classmale-s had sen'ed with the tank regiment in the same battle. 1 also leamed that two other classmates Lieutenant Johnston sports an M2 were killed over there in other battles. carbine, a standard officers weapon On April 10, 1951, with the United during the Korean War. Nations and Communist forces in a stalemate in Korea, truce talks began at Kaesong, then moved to Panmunjom. The talks went on and on while bitter fighting continued. The slow pace ol the talks centered on the desires of the North Koreans and Chinese to get back all their piisoners, while the United Nations demanded that the prisoners be allowed to make that choice. That issue would not be settled until April 1953, when it was decided that prisoners from either side who did not want to retum would be placed in the custody of a neutral nation for 90 days to allow either side to persuade its men to retum. Until then, the war went on as each side tried to gain a few hundred yaixls to straighten its lines or to control the high ground. Amid that period of violent stalemate, 1 spent August to December 1952 on the centi"al front, between the ruins oi Kumhwa and Choi-won, seiving as a fii-st lieutenant in the Chemical Corps and leading a 48-man smoke generator platoon assigned to the DC Corps. I was assisted by 2nd Lt. Charles Shields. My orders came from 7th Infantr>' Division headquarters via the division chemical officer. My company commander was in Chunchon, 30 miles to the southeast. Luckily for us, our platoon sergeant, Othal M. Lester, a Regular Aimy man, was a veteran of World War IT, when he had made smoke in Europe. The Stalemate War Although the 21-month period of the Korean peace talks has sometimes been likened to the stalemate at Flandere during World War 1, there were distinct differences. Koreas mountainous ten^ain had better drainage than the muddy plains of Flanders. Troops in Korea benefited from frequent changes of clothes and showers, and generally didn't have to contend with athlete's foot {clean socks were medicated). Riflemen on the line had hot meals for breakfast and supper, while lunch came out of a can. Bretikfast included real eggs, but milk and potatoes were powdered. Supper included steak at least once a week, and the fresh bread was good—even with margaiine from a can. Candy was provided for quick energy, along with cigarettes and Prince Albert pipe tobacco. Beer^with 3.2 percent alcohol^—was available for troops during their periodic rests away from the fiont JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MILITARY HISTORY f.li

Intended to take pressure off the Chorwon front. Operation Showdown began as a twopronged assault to drive the Chinese from Hill 598 on October U, 1952. By the end of that day, however, the operation's nickname had become unexpectedly apt

less rifles and 3.5-inch rocket launchers. Forward observers from artilleiy batteries were present with the infanti^/ to call in more firepower. At night a Signal Coips unit stationed on a neai"by hiU manned a searchlight tnick. The 1st Battalion of an infanti7 regiment contained A, B and C companies, along with the heavy weapons Company D. The 2nd Battalion contained companies E, F, G and H; the 3rd contained companies!, J, Kand L. A battalion front covered about 4,000 yards (2.27 miles). The battalion command post (CP), located about IK to 2 miles behind the MLR, took care of supply via men of the Headquarters Company. Also attached to each bailine, in closereserve.Empty beer cans were hung on talion were about 200 Korean laborer who carried the barbed-wire fences as warning bells. supplies up the hills on their backs and retrieved the For the first time in a war, badly wounded troops wounded and the dead. They had their own mess, were regularly evacuated by helicopters to a nearby which served rice and other foods they were used to. MASH (mobile army sui^ical hospital) unit—an inEach battalion had a chaplain. A surgeon ran the novation especially appreciated by WWII veterans battalion aid station. When a soldier was badly offightingin the Italian hills who remembered when wounded, a medic from the aid station threw a colortheir wounded had to endure long and wrenching coded smoke grenade onto a nearby relatively flat truck rides to a hospital. Moreover, in Korea, no man clearing so that a medevac helicopter pilot knew served more than 12 months in the combat zone. where to land, weather permitting. WWII veterans called up from resei've status reBoth the battalion commander and the chaplain fen'ed to themselves as "retreads," and I once heard spent eveiy night wilh ritlcnicn on the line. At night a battalion staff officer refer to the enemy as "those each company sent a few men out, trailing telephone damn Krauts." No matter what war they were fight- lines, to occupy listening posts. Patrols occasionally ing, however, men were killed or were maimed, and ventured past no man's land to keep tabs on enemy in Korea the casualties wei"e very heavy. activity, and some of those men inevitably became When I went on the line in August 1952, the DC casualties. I remember one evening, as I was dining Corps had three divisions holding a 25-miIe front. with a battalion staff, a red-headed second lieutenant Within that sector, the 31st Regiment of the 7th In- fresh from school was brought in to meet the comfanti> Division held the line just to the north and left mander before going on the line for the first time. of Kumhwa. In those days a regiment consisted of At breakfast the next morning, I leamed the boy had three battalions, with two on the line and one biv- been killed in the night. ouacked in the near rear. The three battalions freWhen Americans were not patrolling beyond the quently changed positions, as did regiments and di- MLR at night, searehlights were used or parachute visions, to give all the men a chance to spend time flares were shot from mortars to keep the outer area in reserve, and the chance to assume what might lit up. A four-barrel .50-caliber "quad fifty" anti-airtum out to be an easier place on the main line of re- craft machine gun might also be employed to lay sistance (MLR). down harassing and interdicting fire on known A single battalion, 850 men at full strength, main- enemy paths and positions. Korean civilians were tained a front with three 205-man rifle companies. kept 20 miles south of the MLR, below the 38th parEach company consisted of thi^ee rifie platoons and allel. a weapons platoon. Where needed, elements of a heavy weapons company provided support. Besides AJI Impending Attack the M1 rifle—and carbines for officers—a company On October 3, 1952, the Eighth Amiy learned from had Browning Automatic Rifles (BARs), machine prisoners that the Chinese were planning an attack guns, 60 and 81mm mortars, 57 and 75mm recoil- on Whitehorse Hill, 2% miles northwest of Choi-won.

56 .MILITAIO'HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

The loss of that hill would likely force the LX Corps to abandon Chonvon and the ix)ad net supporting tJie MLR. On October 5. the Eighth Army commander. General James "Big Jim" Van Fleet, asked the Far East commander in Tokyo, General Mark Clark, for pennission to launch a limited-objective strike just north of Kumhwa to put the Chinese on the defensive and take pressure off the Chorwon front. In some places north of Kunihwa, American and Chinese troops manned trenches as close as 200 yai'ds apart. On Hill 598 (the number refen-ed to its height in metei^s), the enemy obsetvation post had a clear view of the Kumhwa Valley and the American positions, as well as the supply road from the south. Van Fleet told Clark that if he took Hill 598, the enemy would have to retreat 1,250 yards to its next defensive position. Clark approved the plan, which had been developed by the IX Corps, and it was dubbed Operation Showdown. The 7th Division would take Hill 598, while the 2nd Republic of Korea (ROK) Division, on the right flank, would keep the Chinese off adjacent Sniper's Ridge. Kumhwa, Chorwon and Pyonggang (the first two held by U.N. forces, the latter held by the Chinese) fonned the Iron Triangle, an area that had seen many battles earlier in the war. Because of its position within tiuit area, the press would refer to 598 as Triangle Hill. The initial battle plan called for a battalion-size assault. The 7th Division commander, Maj. Gen. Wayne Smith, assigned that job to Colonel Lloyd

Moses' 31st Infantry Regiment. Moses and his staff reasoned that one battalion was not enough and that at least two would be necessary, attacking from two directions. Operations began with five days of airstrikes that dropped tons of explosives on the Chinese defender's. Before Operation Showdown was over, a totiil of 2,217 sorties were flown by U.S. Air Force and cai^rier-based Navy pilots. During one of those flights, I witnessed a tremendous explosion behind enemy lines, VA milesnorthweslof Hill 598, indicating ihat an ammunition dump had been hit. Six months later, in Corpus Cliristi, Texas, I met a Navy pilot who had been involved in that mission. The First Day At 0100 hours on October 14, 2nd Lt. Donald Opitz led two squads through the peaks of a twin hilltop we called Jane Russell onto the route to Sandy Ridge and Marilyn Monroe HOI, to cleai mines. They employed 40 Bangalore torpedoes to cleai" a path 18 feet wide. The noise alerted the Chinese, who rained down mortar and artilleiy fire, yet all of Opitz's men suniv«.i. At dawn, after a 30-minute artillery preparation from the 7th Division as well as from the 3rd Division (wliich had moved over for the assault), Lt. Col. Myron McClure di]-ected his 1st Battalion of the 31st Regiment (1/31) to pass through the peaks of Jane Russell and to attack Marilyn Momoe. The troops moved along a creek bed lined with small stones. (During a later action along that same creek, I remember how Chinese artillery fire that splashed in

A soldier of the Republic of Korea CROK) Army's 9th Infantry Division observes the crest of Whitehorse Hill as his troops take it for the 24th time in three days on October 8. 1952. The battle there influenced the American decision to try to seize Triangle Hill.

Right: Brigadier General Wayne Carleton Smith at Fort Campbell, Ky.. shortly before his promotion to major general in command of the 7th Infantry Division (National Archives]. Below: A view from the southwest of Hill 598, with its much-contested sandbag castle at the top.

MILITARY

the water would result in pebbles from the creek raining down on us, pinging on our steel helmets.) At the same time as tbat movement, Major Robert NewbenT directed his 3rd Battalion to attack a position referred to as the "sandbag castle" on the southern face of Hill 598. His men moved up along the Bowling Alley, which led from the road just north of Kumhwa. Fii-st Lieutenant Bernard Br-ooks Jr: led L Company, and K Company was led by 1st Lt. Charles Martin. In reserve was Captain Max Stover with I Company. First Lieutenant Edward R. Scbowalter-Jr. led the reinforced A Company through Jane Russell, while B and C companies, under Captains William Young and Roy Pr^eston, stood in reserv^\ From the head of the Bowling Alley, at the MLR, Brooks' objective—the sandbag castle—stood a horizontal distance of 500 meters, but al an average slope o( 30 degrees, wilh the (ina! angle near 70 degr-ees. From Jane Russell, Schowaiter had lo march 800 meters while climbing only 100 melere. But after that his goal, Maiilvn Monroe, was still ahead for another 400 horizontal meters, with a 140-meter climb up a 20-degree slope.

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

As Brooks and his L Company advanced from the Bowling Alley, the Chinese above bim immediately began throwing grenades and also rocks down on them. In less than 30 minutes, 65 percent of the company, including Brooks and his platoon leaders, became casualties. Those not wounded were pinned down in a depression just below the top. The wounded men who could move managed to crawl into cre\ices in the billside for shelter. Lieutenant Manin, with his K. Company in reser^ve, called in tank fire on tbe Chinese, tben moved up the hill while gathering the remnants of L Company. Soon after leaving Jane Russell, Schowalter was wounded by grenade fragments. His A Company was pinned down by Chinese entrenched 50 yaids away. Colonel McClure immediately committed Companies B and C to the fight, Meanwhile Schowaller; ignoring his wounds, led his men into the trenches and used grenades in an attempt to rout its defenders from their bunkei-s. A burst of gunfire from a hidden cave wounded Schowalter again, but he remained in command as his men secured the tiench line. By early afternoon Companies A, B and C had reached Marilyn Monroe and had beaten off three counterattacks. When the fourth attack came, however, McClur"e orderx'd a retreat, since tbe companies had run out of ammunition. Korean laborers, meant to cam ammunition, had been too fearfiil to rim the gantlet. They lacked ihe aiinored vests—new to the infantry-—as well as the steel helmets worn by Americans. Schowaller; still commanding A Company's

evacuation despite his wounds, would receive the Medal of Honor after the war for" his actions that day. Meanwhile, Martin with liis K Company and remnants of L Company reached the trenches ar'ound the crest of Hill 598, as Stovers I Company moved to tbe right, headed for Sandy Ridge. All three companies came under attack by masses of Chinese who looked as though they might have been drugged— they walked thi'ougb American gunfii^ with no apparent fear. Oetober" 14 had been the 31sts costliest day in its two year-s in Korea—96 of its men killed and 337 wounded. That night Colonel Moses, seeing so many casualties and the shortage of ammunition, decided io pull his two battalions back lo ihe MLR. He notilied General Smith, wbo concurred with his decision.

mount and wounded him, he cradled the gun in his hands and kept on firing. Wounded a second time, he kept firing until his ammunition was spent. He tben used his gun as a club in hand-to-hand lighting until he was mortally wounded. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor. Renewed Effort On the morning of October 16, General Smith ordered the 2nd Battalion, 17th Infantry, less F Company, to join Colonel Russ' 32nd Infanlr-y in attacking Marilyn Monroe. The 2/17, under' Major Louis Buckner; took the objectiye without serious opposilion, but the men of tbe 2/31 made no progress against the slrongpoinl in front of Pike's Peak, which was pocketed with deep caves. Fighting continued during the nighi, during whieh E Company's Lieu-

Day TWo

On October 15, Smith ordered two fresh battalions to take Triangle Hill, with Colonel Moses still in command. Moses would use the 2nd Battalion, under Major Warren Phillips, to attack the sandbag castle. To assault Marilyn Monroe while passing thi'ough Jane Russell, he would use the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry, under Major Seymour Goldberg. Attack.s would begin after the bills were again satmated with artillei\ and mortar fii-e. Al 1000 houi-s, Ist Lt. William Knapp led E Company, 2/31, from the head of the Bowling Alley and took the sandbag castle against weak resistance. Captain Joseph Giesemann, following with his F Company, passed through E Company near the sandbag castle and then moved onto Sandy Ridge. G Company moved onto the sandbag caslle grounds, after which E Company moved toward a new objective, known as Pike's Peak. Meanwhile, from the creek side 1st Lt. Rudolph Tamez led his A Company of 1 /32 ihr ough Jane Russell. He was followed by Captain James Ear'ly with C Company, while B Company, under 1st Lt. John Green, stood in reserve. Both A and C companies, however, were soon beaten back to theii' line of departure. Following ihe 1/32's failure to lake Marilyn Monroe, Goldberg was given I Company of the 31 st Infantry and moved bis people onto Sandy Ridge, already occupied by F Company of the 31st. Late in Ihe day. General Smith passed ihe control of the battle from Moses to Colonel Joseph R. Russ, commander of the 32nd Infantry, who would shepherd the men on the hill for ihe night at three locations: near Pike's Peak, on the sandbag castle gi"ounds and at Sandy Ridge. The Chinese, who sliU held Marilyn Monroe, launched platoon-size attacks that night, bul were driven back. Private First Class Ralph E. Pomeroy of Company E, 31st Infantiy manning a machine gun in front of Pike's Peak, blunted one such assault. As the Chinese answered with artilleiy and mortar fire, he kepi firing. When a moitar' round disabled his gun

tenant Knapp was killed. On ihe morning of the 17th, Russ still had three battalions on the hill. The 2/31 was in front of Pike's Peak, the 1/32 occupied the sandbag castle grounds and the 2/17 held Sandy Ridge. Thai afternoon the fresh 3/17, under Lt. Col. James Spellman, relieved the baltle-scan'ed 2/31 in front of Pike's Peak. The battle-weary 1/32 wiis taken olT wilhoirt replacement, leaving Russ with two battalions for the night. On the moming of the 18th, Spellman directed his battalion to attack Pike's Peak. Leading the way was L Company under 1st Lt. William Cantr^ell, who r*eached the top. On Cantreil's heels came I Company under Captain Joseph Hoffman, which passed through Cantreil's men and began driving the Chinese from their trenches. Hoffman met heavy r"esistance and was forced to break off his attack. That night the Americans and the Chinese stared at each other under the glare of flares and seaix-hlighls. October 19 dawned with two American battalions still on Pike's Peak but knowing that the Chinese were not about to leave. That evening two Chinese companies stomied into the L Company Irenches, wounding Canti^ell and forcing Hr"st his company and

Johnston rests beside what was once the bank in the war-ravaged ruins of Kumhwa, from which the Americans staged their many attempts to take Triangle Hill.

JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MILITARY HISTORY 59

An observation post of the ROK 2nd Infantry Division keeps a wary eye on Triangle Hill-still in Chinese hands-on November 25, 1952.

then the whole battalion to fail back to the sandbag castle. Chinese prisoner repotted that they had been ordered to fight to the death. Colonel Russ ordered two companies fi^om the 1/32 to go to the aid of the men around the sandbag castle. Artilleiy and moiiar fire were dropped on the Chinese during the night. While I was at a battalion CP that night, I saw a captain ordered up the hill. I learned later that he died that night. At 0600 on the 20th, the Chinese began falling back to their caves on Pike's Peak, at which time al! available ai1;illei"y and moilars gave them a send-off. Then a lull fell over the battlefield. Led by the 7th Division chemical officer, a major, I visited troops between Maiilyii Monroe and Sandy Ridge. By then engineers had installed steps on the hill's steep banks, making our climb easier. On October 23, two fiesh battalions relieved those atop the hill. Major John Szares, leading the 2/32, took position on the arm west of the castle, while Major Thomas Brown and the 3/32 took up a position on the eastern ami. Shortly after nightfall the Chinese mounted a joint attack, one assault coming from Pike's Peak, the other from Marilyn Monroe. After intense fighting, both assaults were beaten back. Again a lull fell over the area. On the night of October 25, elements of the 2nd ROK Division, which had been battling the Chinese on Sniper's Ridge, relieved the troops on Triangle Hill. At dawn, as the Americans fell biick from the eastern arm, elements of my platoon laid smoke along the creek bed, which sei^ved as the route to the rear Major Brown of the 3/32, with whom I had dined in his mess, stopped to chat with me while watching his troops fall back. On October 30, the Chinese swept the 2nd ROK Division off the sandbag castle grounds. The ROK lost the eastern ai'm two days later, but the DC Coips, through the efforts of tlie 9th ROK Division, man-

60 MILITARY HISTOm- JANUARY/rEBRUARY 2006

aged to hold onto Wbitehorsc Hill, the contested possession of which had initiated the Battle of Triangle Hill. On Thanksgiving Day I was ordered t(t Chorwon and the command post of the 27th "WoKhound" Infantrv Regiment, which was then holding Whitehorse Hill against Chinese attack. When the staff asked whether I could provide smoke screens to help with the effort, I explained that one smoke generator devoured a .55gallon drum ol oil each hour. Thus the generator had to be reached by a truck. And the position had to be upwind from where the smoke would fall. The staff thanked me and asked me to wait outside while they talked. While I waited, the regiment's sei^geant major asked if my boys could eal an early Thanksgiving dinner with them, and I answered yes. I was eventually thanked lor my input and dismissed. By then we had set up our own platoon kitchen and camp a few miles south of Kumhwa. We had scrounged the many wooden ammo boxes lelt behind by artillery units and used them to build tables and chaii-s. Up to that time our boys had generally eaten with the infantiy without benelit of tables and tents. When we returned from Chorwon we found that our plat(X)n cooLs had also prepared Thanksgiving dinner for the evening meal. Thus the boys who had gone with me to Chorwon enjoyed two tm key dinners that day. The 7th Infantry Division, which initially estimated that an assault on Triangle Hill would cost 200 casualties, ended up repotting 1,540 casualties among the eight battalions committed to the battle—365 dead, 1,174 wounded and one taken prisoner The 31 st and 32nd regiments took 784 casualties from among the first 1,000 men engaged. Apparently no American was missing in action. Lloyd Moses later wrote that the Chinese 45th Division, which we had faced, lost 10,000 men. For whatever that sacrifice was woith, they had won the battle—they held the hill. Lieutenant Brooks and his rifle company, who walked up the steep slope below the sandbag castle on Hill 598, suffei'ed 65 percent casualties. The dead were quietly removed at night in trucks. On one occasion I went to look at a small draw off the Bowling Alley, searching for a possible place to store oil diums, only to find the draw filled with stacks of American dead. Silently, I walked away. On a few occasions 1 dined with the staff of a regimental service company. The warrant officer in charge of recovering the dead never smiled. MH For futiher reading, Carrboro, N.C.-based contributor Peter R. Johnston recommends: Uoyd R. Moses' memoir Whatever it Takes; and This Kind of War, by T.R. Fehrenbach.

REVIEWS From 431 to 404 BC, Athens and Sparta waged a 'dirty war' unequaled by any other conflict. By Michael Washbum

ANYONE WHO VISITS ATHENS today,

writes Victor Davis Hanson in his new book A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War {Random House, New York, 2005. $29.95), can see right away ihal the city is not in an ideal position to cope with a plague. Humidity grows acute and often unbearable in the afternoons, and Mounts Aigaieos, Pames, Pentelikon and Hymettus cut the city off fi'om major rivers and the sea. Given those conditions, one can imagine the situation in 431 BC, when ferocious Spar'tan hoplites marched on the city while hundreds of thousands of civilians huddled amid the misery and stench inside. The complex melange of policies and methods that led to Pericles' fateful decision to move 150,000 of Attica's rural populace to its governing city at the hottest time of the year ran counter lo Greek tnidition. The Spartans may have erred in their assumptions about how flammable Attica's fields of crops were, but Pericles' move led to a disaster that killed morx' citizens than the enemy could have hoped to. Pericles, adds Hanson, also blundered in supposing that Athenians, who had previously taken on the Persians at Marathon in 490 and at Salamis in 480 BC, would sit calmly inside the city while the Spartan marauders advanced. These, however, were just some of the unprecedented aspects that made the Peloponnesian War, as the book's title suggests, A War Like No Other, Hanson quotes Thucydides to help us grasp the irony that a proud democracy To see these reviews and hundreds more by leading authorities, go to our new book review section at www.thehistorynet.com/reviews

62 MIMTARV HrSTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

How I h e A T H E N I A N S a n d S P A R T A N S F O U G H T [lie P E L O P O N N E S I A N WAR

A

WAR LIKE

was shunting tradition aside on the orders of one general. Moreover, he points out that Athens was now in the tricky position of assuming a defensive pose at home, even while trying to make faraway protectorates carry out its war plans. But even harder to swallow than those ironies is the way that both Sparta and Athens grew more desperate and waged an escalating "dirty war," using increasingly reprehensible tactics. Another unique aspect of the war was its effect on the primacy of the hoplites, heavily armed and armored citizensoldiers who rushed to meet the enemy face to face. Hanson suggests that 21stcentury Americans' horror over suicide bombers and insurgents wielding rocketpr'opeDed grenades is akin to the ancient Greeks' reaction to bowmen, eatapult operators and other irregular forces that changed the face of war. There are no "good guys" in this story. In 416, for example, the maverick Athen-

ian general Alcibiades voyaged to the citystate of Ai'gos and kidnapped 300 citizens whose politics he felt might lead to a pr'oSpartan coup. Athenians later butchered all the helpless captives. Hanson chart.s the general's involvement in the assassination of politicians whose views he found inconvenient, and cites many sources linking Alcibiades to the r-uthtess siege of Melos. Even more nrthles.s—and in r-etrospect stupid—was the attack thai Aicibiades engineered on Sicily's capital, Svnrcuse. In Hanson's view, few ironies k an surpass the spectacle of Athens, the arbiter of democracy, attacking a city thai was fairly democialic. Alcibiades also schemed to induce states on ihe enemy's fringes to tum against Spaila and fracture the already unstable Peloponnesian League, and he hoped to foment revolt among the helots, rtrral serfs of Laconia and Messenia, making Sparla's worst nightmare a reality. In a part of the world where soldiers had long respected the line between civilians and combatants. Spartan gener-al Brasidas racked up an even more depraved fighting record, threatening to lTjin the grapes on which the town ol Acanthus depended, sending out soriies to loot ihe faiTns of Amphipolis and taking and keeping Scione in violation ol the armistice of 423 BC. Hanson does not hesitate to apply the phrase "ethnic cleansing" to what Athens did to many islands, such as Delos, whose entire populace went into exile in 422. Diplomats, traditionally given respect and protection wherever they went in Gr eece, became fair game. When envoys from Spajta traveled through Thrace '\w 430 with a view to reaching Per^sia and getting funds. Athenian politicians persuaded the Thracians to detain and extradite ihe diplomats to Athens, where they were put to death without a trial. When the Athenian presence at Pylos

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64 MILITARY HISTORV JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

raised fears of a helot revolt on Messenia, the Spaitans told the helots that if they could Rimish proof of past militaiy service, tiie\ would be granted Ireedom. When 2.000 of those warriors stepped lor'war'd in response, the Spartans crowned and paraded ihem as heroes thrxjugh the streets, then spirited them off to a secret location and slaughtered ihem. In the end, none of these horrific acts gave either side a decisive victory or fulfilled any of its leaders' dreams. Athens lost the war and fell under the temporary suzeraint>' of a weakened Sparia. While casting a.side many hallowed traditions of democracy, Athens enlorred others al its own expense. Generals in the field enjoyed scant autonomy, and almost every leader on the Athenian side eventually laced a fine, e.\ile or execution. While Hanson often cites Thucydides in .4 War Like No Other, his command of ancient sources is broad enough that he never sloops lo slavish paraphrasing of any one classical author. He noles, for example, that Thucydides omits the fact that Pericles died after a bout with the plagire in Athens. Hanson cites Ditxiorus, who argues that crowding was the cause of polluted air—a critical point, omitted by Thucydides, for anyone wondering whether- Pericles' policy caused the illness or just enabled il to r^each disastrous proportions. Hanson's provocative synthesis will seem brilliant to some readei-s, and likely prove upsetting to al! who cling lo comforting historical assumptions. \o Quarter: Unlawful Killing and Sunender in the Australian War E.xperience, 1915-18, by Dale Blair, Ginninderra Press, Chamwood, Australian Capital Territory, 2005, $17.50. War is often said lo bring oul both the best and worst in men. The wilting of accepted history is often done at ihe leisure and pleasure of the victor, so il comes as no suiprise that honific actions by the vanquished enemy are recounted in minute detail, while dubious actions on ihe victor's part ar"e glossed over, if officially mentioned at all. Such is not the case, however; in No Qttarter, in which Australian author Dale Blair- exposes the bmtal tactics often employed by Australian units during World War 1. In this concise work, Blair examines the killing of Ger-mans tiying to suirendei; ihe outright mur der oi prisonei"s of war, and the unwiitten order of "no quarter" that was often passed along before the soldiers

v\enl "over the top." By examining firsthand accounts as well as unit histories, Blair reveals the attempts by Austr-alian commanders lo justify those actions. Blair does not portr-ay the Australians a.s bloodthirety monslei-s, but ralher as men caught up in ihe madness of war, wilh iheir officers taking advantage of that madness. Blairs work is an exceptionally well-researched, objective and well-wrilten examination of an unpleasant reality of warfare. This book should be consider-ed an essential work for any student of the Greal War, for Blair balances the horr oi-s of "no quarter" with accounts of humane treatment between enemies—agenlle reminder thai while war" is lenible, man's humanity can still iran.^cend it. Nick E. Efstathiou Tiie Command of the Ocean: A Naval Histoty of Britain. 1649-1815, by N.A.M. Rodger, Pengiiin/Allen Lane, London, England, 2004, $45. "Anyone who has studied the greal amphibious operations of ihc 1940s will find much that is familiar in the careful plans drawn up in the 1750s." That is only one of the fascinating pieces of information and insights that Nicholas A.M. Rodger pro\ides in his majestic .second volume on Britain's naval histoiy, filled with details such as the fact that it was at Aboukir Bay, Eg\p[. in 1801, ihal the fir-st "beachrnaster" made liis appeaiance. The strength of The Command of the Ocean is that ihe book's authoi' provides context at all times—with links lo the present and by comparisons wilh Europe's other navies—so that we read about, and in effect witness, the evolution (and sometimes the biiih) of things we take for granted, and arc made to understand how the strengths and weaknesses of the various lleets were inslmmenlal in shaping Eui'opean and world hislory. As the professor of naval history al Exeter University says, "this is a book which iries to make connections." A typical insighl concerns Latin America's independence movements of the early 19lh century. If Spain's colonies started to grow restive at precisely that lime, Rodger explains, it is Ix'cause Spain, noi its French ally, was ihe biggest loser of the Battle of Trafalgar. Wilh its Heel destroyed by Horatio Nelson, Madrid could no longer pr*ovide for' ihe defense of its American possessions, allegiance to the Crown weakened and indepenCon tinned on page 72

PERSPECTIVES The Corps of Canadian Voyageurs maintained Britain's frontier during tfie War of 1812. By Andrew Hind

hard drinkers, carousers and undisciplined rowdies, true enough, but invaluable in the conflicts firet critical year of campaigning. The War of 1812 is an oft-overlooked conflict, perhaps because it ended in status quo, or maybe because it was ovei"shadowed by the Napoleonic wars. For the young Canada, however, it was a defining moment in thai future nation's history. Ther'e were sevei'al key issues behind the United States' decision to declare war against Brit;iin in June 1812. The British practice of stopping American ships at sea and arbitrarily impressing American seamen into Royal Navy service was the most \idely decried, but perhaps the nost contentious issue—and the one with greatest implications for the future—was control of the westem frontier. American settlers were moving into Indiana and Michigan, brushing up against a hostile native confederation led by Tecumseh. Since the Indians were intimately 1 i nked to the fur trade enterprise of the British North West Company (NWC) and lirmly allied with the British againsl American western expansion, many Americans blamed English mischief for the Indian troubles. Along with the issue of who controlled frontier settlement was the revival of American hopes, first kindled in the illfated Quebec expedition of 177576, of extending their hegemony lo the north. In August 1812, former president Thomas Jeffer'son wrote that "the acquisition of Gerry Embfeton depicts a Canadian voyageui who Canada this year, as far as the performed scouting and otfier auxiliary services for neighbourhood of Quebec, will British forces during the War of 1812. WITH ALL BUT A HANDFUL of British

regulars tied down in the war r'aging in Europe against the "Little Corporal" from Cor*sica, the defense of British North America in the face of American aggression fell to Canadian militia and a host of irregirlar units. Of all that motley collection, none was more unusiral and colorful than the Corps of Canadian Voyageurs—

66 MILITARV HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

be a mere matter of marching, and will give us experience for the attack on Halifax the next, and the final expulsion of England from ihe American continent." Lieutenant Governor' John Graves Simcoe had tried to warn Britain of the dangers of bor der conflict with the United Slates as early as the 1790s. He also recognized the inherent weakness of Biilain's reliance on the Great Lakes as lines of communication, since they could be interdicted by American naval forres at multiple points, Soon alter war was declared, Simcoe's concerns regarding the piecariousness of the British position were proven accurate when Americans based at Ogdensburg, N.Y, began frequenl interceptions of convoys headed fr'om Lachine (Montr'eal) to ihe naval base al Kingston. This threatened ihc supply of all British forces farther- lo the west. It was partly in response to ihis threat that ihe North West Company raised the Corps of Canadian Voyageurs from among its seasonal employees. On October 1, 1812, at leasl 500 voyageurs and their "bour'geois," the weallhy Scottish merx:hanls in the company, offered iheir services to the governor-general, Sir George Prevost, who gratefully accepted the offer: The coips was designed to militarize the voyageur-s. who—utilizing their secure French River r'oute across northern Ontario (rtrnning west from the Ottawa River to Lake Huron)—wer^e integral to keeping supplies moving from Montreal to the westem outposts and maintaining the vital fur Irade. William McGilli\Tay and Angus Shaw, both important officials in the NWC, sei"ved respectively as commandant ami vice commandant of ihe corps. The unit consisted of a captain, 10 Heutenanls, !() "conductor's'' (sergeants promoted from among the voyageurs) and some 400 privates. Onlv "the most robust and well

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made" men were selected from the moie than 500 who stepped forward, all oi whom were expeii boat handlers and adept himtei^s and woodsmen. Originally, the British intended to dress the voyageui's in the distinctive red coatee of the army, but the men refused, saying ihey were impractical for their work. Instead, it was agi*eed that they would wear clothes more typical of their standard utilitarian dress. They thus wore a capol (woolen overcoat made from thick blankets) and red toque, with moccasins and loose-fitting leggings. In humid weather, these clothes were often stripped off, and the individual might wear only a shirt and breeches. Standard equipment included a rifle, tomahawk or small ax and a knife. The Crown issued each man a sword, pike and pistol, but most voyageurs sold or simply discarded those extt aneous items as soon as possible. Only the British officers retained those weapons. THE VOYAGEURS WERE atypical soldiers, to say the least. Their independence made them ver>' poor at parade ground tactics, and they were not amenable to uniformity. Moreover, there were numerous infractions of discipline owing to their ceaseless pranks, dnmkenness and constant cheeifulness. British officers chai'ged with instilling discipline in the corps were understandably aghast when the voyageurs appealed on the paradegrounds with pipes in their mouths, unshaven for days or weeks, and with theit rations of pork and bread stuck on iheir bayonets. "In this condition," wrote Ross Cox, a contempordiT observer, "they presented a curious contrast to...the British soldiery with whom they occasionally did duty." Their impertinence sometimes led to temporary confinement, but such measures were usually in vain. The voyageiti^s were swindlei"s, bribers and chamiers oi the highest order, and often managed to convince their guards to pass them food or drink, or even slip them out for a brief leg-stretching. The British observer added that when a fellow voyageur was ihe sentw, a prisoner could even expect to be allowed out to caiouse for the evening, to "sleep with his woman and come back early next motning." For all their ill-disciplined behavior, however, the Coips of Canadian Voyageurs played a valued role in the War of 1812. To a man they were skilled at hanContinued on page 73

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Exhausted and facing ruin, Finland reluctantly accepted Molotov's terms for peace on March 12. The territorial concessions the Finns had to make were humiliating. Helsinki went into formal mouming. Many of the returning soldiers, skiing back to their homes, u^ept at the terms of an imposed peace that could only lead to more fighting. They were right. Fifteen months later hostilities would resume in the Continuation Wai", as Finland launched its anny back at its mighty neighbor, this time as a cobelligerent in support of Hitlers invasion of the USSR. But the lessons of tiny Finland'sfightin the Winter War and the Russian defeat at Suomussalmi were to have widespread consequences. Stalin's enemies—including liis foiTner ti'eaty partner Hitler—took note of the USSR's humiliation. If tiny Finland could inflict such a crushing defeat on the mighty Red Army, ran the reasoning during that spring of 1940, what might the Wehnnacht's panzer divisions accomplish? Operation Barbarossa was only 15 months away, and the steppes offered plenty o{ Lebensraum for a Nazi empire in the east. By an ironic twist of fate, it was Timoshenko's reforms, begim in the aflennath of defeat by the Finns in 1940, that were to lay the foundations ol the newly professional Red Army that would eventually transform Russia's clumsy legions, drive to the gates of Berlin and defeat Nazi Germany. The forgotten victorv of Suomussalmi and Finland's Winter War indeed cast a long shadow. MH

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Colonel John Hughes-Wilson retired from NOTE: If onlv FREE choict's are ueleclcd, liarnilini! the British army's Intelligence Corps in must still \K indudedl! NO CASH OR 1994 after a 30~year career that saw active charge CREDIT CARDS ACCEPTED. Please miikf chcxk or service in Cyprus, Dhofar, Norther^i Ireland monc\ order' in LI.S. lunds payable io Mililary Mi.sl(iry and the Falklands. A regular broadcaster Magazine, aiiii mail ir> address above. Please do nol use this addres-s foi chatigf ni address or iin\ oiher for the BBC, he is the author of Military Incorrespondence. Addit;s.s above is for Reader Service telligence Blunders; The Puppet Masters: information only. Please allow 6-8 weeks for delivwy. Spies, Traitors, and ihe Real Forces Behind World Events; aMJco-fl«//io?i with Name Cathryn Corns, o/ Blindfold and Alone: British MilitaiT Executions in the Great Address War. For further reading, he recommends: City Molotov Cocktail: The Russo-Finnish State Zip War, 1939-1940, by John Virtanen; and Winter War: Finland Against Russia, COUPON EXPIRES 2/28/06 JAN/F1.B -Ob 1939-1940,^7)' V?a«o A Tannev. JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006 MILITAR\' HISTOIO'

WEAPONRY

an inner gate tower. Like most medieval castles, Akershus Continued from page 12 had its share of ghost stories, and a significant number of them are set in the Dark Passage. For example, the cold, Here were situated the stables and the damp passageway was said to be hatmted blacksmith's shop. If an attacker suc- by a beast from hell called Mai Canis—a ceeded in penetrating the bailey, the de- creature so impudent that it thought fendei"s could retire across a drawbridge nothing of attacking and seriously into an inner bailey protected by a huge wounding one of the castle's commanstone wall, and if that also fell, they eould ders. withdraw into the fortress proper. The corridor over the Dark Passage is For an attacker, the only possible ap- in fact one of Akershus' most ingenious proach to the castle was fi^om the north, features. Besides enabling the defenders but due to the difficult terrain there, only to attack intruders from a safe position a few foot soldiers could line up for attack the entire length fiom the gate tower to at any one time. The Norih Wing was pro- the courtyard, the corridor was also part tected by its thick stone wall, provided of a larger system of walkways that alwith an^ow slits and hoardings. In addi- lowed the garrison to move soldiers tion, the Tower of Cannons could provide quickly hom one end of the castle to anHanking fire along the side of the build- other. From the inner gate tower, the coring. SuiTiving attackers would have to ridor continued through the West Wing proceed along the east side of the castle, and North Wing, then along the crenelwhere they encountered the keep, also lated wall to the Daredevil Tower, along called the Daredevil Tower, with its 9- a new wall thtough the South Wing, and foot-thick walls. back to the Tower of the Virgin. South of the keep, the attacker had to Connected directly to that walkway pass beneath a system of walls and system was an iron door high up on the hoards until he came to the castle gate. wall of the West Wing. Well hidden from An interesting feature is that all along that any attacker on land, tlie dcxir gave access northern-southern attack route, missiles to a path leading down to the sea. shot or thrown fi'om the castle would Through that secret door, ships with mufthreaten the attackers' right flank, forcing fled oars could send in reinforcements them to hold their shields with their right during the night or, if worst came to aims while wielding their weapons with worst, evacuate the ganison. War in their left hands. Since most waniors were Norway always meant combined landright-handed, that would leave them at a sea operations, and the king felt confident disadvantage thi'oughout the passage. that his castle could withstand a siege Only 15 feet lower than the keep, the until ships from eveiy fiord along the gatehouse was a strong tower with a coastline could come to the rescue. drawbridge and portcullis. The king must have been absolutely certain its defenses AKERSHUS FIRST SAW ACTION before it couid not be penetrated—so sure, in fact, was completed. Erik Magnusson of Sothat the tower was nami^dJomfrntaantet, dermanland, a Swedish duke who had the Tower of the Virgin. One of Akershus' carved out a separate kitigdom from termost pectjliar features is that the passage ritories belonging to Sweden and Denthrough the Jomfrntaamet did not lead to mark, attacked during the winter of 1308. one of the baileys behind it but into a cor- The duke's assault on Akershus failed, ridor in the huge wall that separated the and he was forced to withdraw, but not two baileys called the Dark Passage. This until Oslo was sacked and bumed. In con'idor's defenses included a portcullis 1502 the rebel leader Knut Alv.son failed and strong iron dooi's. A shaip right tum in his attempt because he walked into a about halfway to the South Wing effec- trap and was killed. Knut's body lay untively prevented the use of rams. From buried in one of the towei^s for 12 years another corridor, running parallel and di- as a warning to other insurgents. Tbe rectly above the Dark Passage, the de- Swedes laid siege to the castle in 1521, fenders could control evew movement Denmark's ousted King Christian II tried below. Protected by the defending coni- to stomi its walls 10 years later, and the dor, the Dark Passage continued through Swedes attacked again in 1657 and 1716. the entire length of the wall, under the On each occasion the castle passed South Wing and up a steep incline into its test, often with a garrison of less than the central courtyard, emei^ing through 30 men. 7n MILITAKV HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

For the city of Oslo, however, Akershus was a disaster. The city's location placed it squarely in the front line of every invasion and internal power struggle. To be sacked and burned became the Norwegian capital's destiny. Finally, after a fire completely destroyed the city in 1624, King Christian IV ordered it to be rebuilt—not on its original site, but under the very walls of the castle. If building towering Akershus Castle on its cliff by the fiord was a testimony to Haakon V's strategic insight, Christian's order to move the city to a landfill beneath the castle was sheer stupidity. The city and its civilians actually weakened the castles ability to defend itself, while at the same time providing attackers with ready material for bulwarks and ramparts. In even war after 1624, Oslo was directly in the firing line. Cannonballs can still be found lodgedin the walls of old buildings; ironically, most of them seem to have been fired from Akerehus. Not only Oslo but also the entire kingdom came to suffer beneath the castle's gray walls. In a grim realization of Haakon's fears at his deathbed, dynastic and economic problems weakened the Noi-wegian state. The Black Death of 1348-49 decimated the population, and Nonvay drifted into dynastic unions with its neighbors, putting foreign interests in control of Akershus. As gunpowder replaced stones and arrows, bastions and earthen ramparts were added, but the castle remained perched on its cliff. Five centuries would elapse before Akershus was in Noi'wegian hands again. By then, the old castle's strategic role had been taken over by a series of fortifications in the Oslo area. In April 1940, Germany invaded Norway and by that sumtner Akei'shus was semng as an administration center for the Nazi occupiei's. The Wehnnachi used the castle for detention pui'poses, and the old walls witnessed the execution of large numbei's of imprisoned resistance fighters. A few months after Norway's liberation in 1945, the last shots were fired within Akershus. This time they were aimed at Norwegian Fascist Vidkun OuisHng. Ouisling had helped the Gemians take control of the country's fortresses while Nazi decrees replaced the country's democratic laws—exactly the kind of situation thai King Haakon had wamed about. The king must have nodded his grave conseni as the echoes of the shots drifted dowti into his royal ciypt deep in the basement of Akershus Castle. MH

REVIEWS Continued from page 64 dence ensued. Rodger warns that "Readers whose primaiy interest is in war at sea may be disappointed that almost half the book is devoted to the background rather than the foreground of naval hislory." In fact, the 36 chapters are divided into four categories—opei^ations, ships, administration and social hisloty—and the author goes on to add ihat the presence of his in-depth study of the dehberations and decisions of the London ministries' officeholder's "is quite deliberate, for there is no understanding campaigns and battles otficiAvise." This brings us to another connection— that with Britain's main foe, France. Rodger makes a per'suasive case for attributing the growth and success of the Royal Navy to the Anglo-Saxon propensity for efficiency and to Britons' embrace ot competition, free mar^kets, capitalism (or an early version thereof") and progress (Rodger points out thai Britain's "dockyards had enter*ed the industrial age 100 years before the rest of the country")—or lo sum them up in the expression of the time, the "liberties of Englishmen." By contrast, the Gallic tendency to talk and philosophize, without following up with action, and to have society follow the dictates of the state led to an administration that was, if not cortupt, inefficient, lt left little room for people with vision. Rodger makes a strong case for how the Royal Navy became the symbol of English liberty, inspired by Parliament, but at times he takes ihis too far; as American r'eaders in particular will discover. As taxation was the domain not of the king but of Parliament, he implies tiiat the American colonies' r^evolt was not against the Ciovvn (as the rebels claimed in their Declaration of Independence) but an attack on representative democracy. He does not pause to consider the possibility that the crisis ar'ose not because of the colonists' resistance to Parliament per se, but pr'ecisely because they were denied repr^esentation there at all (unlike, say, the far less numerous planters of Jamaica). Apart from thai, ihe only mistakes that seem to have slipped into the book have lo do with the French language. These enors are trivial in a volume that is comprehensive, and whose comparisons. MriJTARY HISTORV JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

thoughts, insights and conclusions are thoroughly illuminating. The exhaustive indices and notes include 31 pages' worth of maps, and never before do I remember having held a history book where every single geographical place mentioned in the text could be found on one of the maps. The Command of the Ocean is destined to remain the definitive reference on the subject for coming generations. Erik Svane

makes clear, that principle was never more evident than during the Seven Years' War; In contrast lo World War II, where combatants demanded unconditional surrender, every battle won and losl and every scrap of real estate ihat changed hands were merely bargaining chips in a great complex diplomatic chess game of negotiating the best possible peace terms. Caughl in the middle of ihat diplomatic and administrative maelstrom was The French Na\y and the Seven Years' the French navy. Already the poor relaWar, by Jonathan R. Dull, University tion to the far stronger and better-funded of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, and army, the Fr ench navy's position was furLondon, 2005, $35. ther complicated by the fact that it douTo students of American history, the bled as the administrator of France's Seven Years' War is usually knovm as the overseas colonies. French and Indian War. The latter title is Apart from a few early successes, nosomething of a misnomer, for the conflict tably the capture of the island of Minorca was far more than a parochial dispute and subsequent defeat of the British over control of the North American Meditett-anean Fleet commanded by Adwilderness. It was, in fact, the first truly miral John Byng (who was .subsequently global war; fought In Eur-ope, North shot for cowardice), the French na\y was America, the West Indies, Africa and Asia. able to accomplish little more than surIn a similar manner the title of Jonathan vival. During the remainder of the war, R. DuU's new book. The French Naiy and the British captured all of France's posthe Seven Years' War, is also somewhat sessions in Canada, India and West misleading. Far fi'om being an examina- Africa, as well as several of its most imtion of merely naval matters, the book is portant West Indian possessions. actually a thorough study of the military, Dull explains in gi'eat detail how the political, diplomatic and financial aspects most important naval victory the French of a very complex conflict. were able to secure was won at the diploThe Seven Years' War was one of the matic level. They managed to persuade most important conflicts of the 18th cen- Britain to return the West Indian islands Urry. establishing Britain as the leading of Martinique, St. Lucia and Guadalupe, imperial power in North America, Afiica as well as grant France the right to fish and Asia. In Central Europe, the conflict off Newfoundland and the Gulf of St. saw the emergence of Prussia as a major Lawrence from the tiny islands of Mipower, as well as the beginning of the ero- quelon and St. Pierre. sion of Austrian supremacy. The financial Much to the chagrin of their North and military burdens imposed upon Brit- American colonists, the French considain's North American colonies set the ered fishing rights of infinitely greater stage for the American Revolution, while value than the rest of New France put tothe even greater burdens imposed upon gether Dull estimates that rxjughly a third the French people eventually led to the of the French navy's sailors learned their French Revolution. trade in the Newfoundland and St. As Dull's book explains, the Seven Lawrence fishing fleets, and thai "France Years' War was actually several interre- would not have risked involvement in the lated wars. There was a trade war con- fRevolutionary War] had the navy been ducted by France (and later Spain) weakened by the loss of the fishery." against Britain throughout the world. Fans of the broadsides and boarding Britain and France were also engaged in parties in C.S. Forester and Patrick a land war over King George II's German O'Brien novels will undoubtedly be disprincipality, Hanover. In addition, the two appointed in The French Navy and the countries were involved on opposite sides Seven Years' War. Nevertheless, those inin a Central European conflict, in which terested in lear-ning the inside story of France was allied to Austria, Russia and how governments actually conduct wars Sweden in their joint hostilities against will find this a fascinating wor'k, and a Prtissia, with which Britain allied itself. sobering reflection of how they probably Karl von Clausewitz wrote that war is still carry on today. merely an extension of diplomacy. As Dull Robert Guttman

PERSPECTIVES

Rottote to determine where their alle- part thanks to the coips that the British giances lay. Serving alongside him was were even able to engage in limited ofSergeant John McGillivray, the 22-year- fensives in the west, such as the attack on Continued from page 68 old son of corps Commandant William Frenchtown (or the Raisin River) in McGillivray. Michigan on January 22, 1813. Before dawoi a 400-man detachment of dling boats, accustomed to life in the Successes notwithstanding, the corps wilderness, and were naturally suited to American soldiers from Plattsburgh de- was disbanded on March 14, 1813, when the skirmishing that characterized the scended upon St. Regis and surprised the the British, deeming that a more fomiat war in the west. Cox summarized their picket. Lieutenant Rottote and Sergeant and regimented unit would be more suitvalue hy noting that "notwithstanding McGillivray organized a hunied defense, able lor handling military resupply duties, these peculiarities the voyageui-s were ex- but the numbers against them were over- gave the task to its anny commissariat. cellent partisans, and, their superior whelming. The battle was over before it Neveilheless, recognizing the voyageui"s' knowledge of the countiy being of im- even began, but not before a total of eight innate value, the commissariat authovoyageurs fell dead^McGillivi-ay and rized the raising of its own such corps. mense value to the British." After years of mingling, intermarriage Rottote among them (the latter earning On April 8, 1813, the Provincial Comand business dealings the voyageurs and the distinction of being thefirstBritish of- missariat Voyageui^s officially entered Indians were on excellent terms. That too ficer killed in the war). The surviving 23 service and for the rest of the war set proved useful for gathering intelligence defenders were captured, the village was about applying the old Corps of Canadian about American movements and for plundered and homes sacked, and a Voyageurs' skills—with fewer of its lax maintaining cordial relations with tribes Union Jack taken. The Americans habits—to maintaining the frontier outboasted it was the first standard taken in posts. As for Jefferson's words of August being wooed by the enemy. 1812, they proved to be as misplaced as It was during one such diplomatic the war. they were confident. After fouryeaiV exoverture that the Coips of Voyageui's was Despite the loss of more than a tenth of first blooded. October 23, 1812, saw a 31- its complement, the Corps of Canadian penditure of blood and treasure in dozens man detachment encamped al the Akwe- Voyageurs proved of immense value to of battles and skiiTnishes, the war ended sasne village of St, Regis along the Lower the British war effori in the following with nothing gained by either side, save Canada (Quebec) and New York borders. months. It helped keep the isolated forts perhaps for the gi'oundwork laid for a The Akwesasne, like the other Iroquois of the noiihwesi supplied, especially Fori greater sense of national identity in both peoples, had remained neutral until then, Michilimackinac, the key to controlling the United States and the future indeand it fell to 43-veai'-old Lieutenant Pierre the vital region, and it was in no small pendent dominion of Canada. MH

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JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2D06 MILITARY HISTOR\' 73

BEST

L I T T L E

S T O R I E S

Meet Sergeant Patrick Gass, little known 'third leader' of the historic Lewis and Clark Expedition. By C. Brian Kelly

AS IS WELL KNOWN, two U.S. Army officers led the historic exploratory party making its way through the iargely uncharted American West 200 years ago, but there was a third, often-overlooked leader among the intrepid men who journeyed to the Pacific Ocean and back from a starting point just above St. Louis, Missouri. A sergeant rather than an officer, Patrick Gass would be the first to publish an account of the Lewis and Clark Expedition's travels, he would be the first to call those involved the "Corps of Discovery" and he would be the last of the entire history-making group to die. The two officers, of course, were Meriwether Lewis and William Clark...and then, as events turned out, there would be the briefiy also-famous Patrick Gass. Sergeant, did we say? The bureaucrats in Washington would have been aghast at the means by which the party's longestsurviving member became a sergeant— by a vote among his fellow enlisted men. Then, too, Gass, a first-class carpenter as well as soldier and frontiersman, would produce the expedition's first published journal despite an educational background of hcirdly any time ever spent in a schoolroom. Yet that didn't stop him from leaving a legacy of perfectly clear notations on the expedition's day-to-day experiences, such as his entry of Sept. 28, 1805: "We had a pleasant moming and all hands, that were able, employed at the canoes...." Or from the sarne entry: "Game is very scarce, and our hunters unable to kill any meat...." And the same day: "Salt also is scarce without which fish is but poor and insipid...." Earlier he had told the story of the Corps' first Christmas at newly constructed Fort Mandan in the Dakotas on December 25, 1804: "Captain Clark then presented to each man a glass of brandy, and we hoisted the American fiag in the garrison, and its 74 MILITARY HISTORY JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2006

first waving in Fort Mandan was celebrated with another glass." To be sure, Gass had editing help—and perhaps more—from his partner in the publishing venture, former schoolteacher David McKeehan of Pittsburgh, owner of a book and stationery store. Even so, most historians feel that, if often paraphrased, the Gass journal of 1807 came out substantially true to the factual account he had written down while en route to the Pacific and back. But that's not all. "As his most lasting literary legacy," notes the PBS.org Web site on the expedition,. Sergeant Gass "holds claim to popularizing the explorers' proudly coined Corps of Discovery name, featured boldly on the title page of his 1807 published journal."

(Idaho)," while also building the wagons needed to portage the canoes around the series of falls that blocked the Corps' further passage upstream on the Missouri River at today's Great Falls, Mont., notes the PBS Web site. A product of the westem Pennsylvania frontier, Gass had joined the Army in 1789, while still a teenager. He was serving at Kaskaskia in the Illinois Territory when he learned that Lewis was seeking recmits for the expedition west and eagerly joined up for the great adventure. It was afrer Sergeant Charles Floyd died of a ruptured appendix near today's Sioux City, Iowa, the Corps' only casualty, that Gass became a sergeant—by acclamation, you might say For the rest of the 28month, 8,000-mile joumey he proved so dependable that Lewis and Clark chose GASS BRIEFLY GAINED intemational at- him as a group leader when they temtention with that first account of the porarily divided the Corps into three parexpedition by a Corps member, but the ties for part of the retum trip in 1806. possibly ghost-written journal wasn't ex- Lewis and Clark each led a party, and actly a financial boon for the soldier-ex- Gass was in charge of the third. plorer, according to the 2004 book The Later in life, Gass fought in the War of Fate of the Corps, by Larry E. Morris. "Al- 1812, during which he lost the sight of an though Gass received an initial payment eye. After marrying a 20-year-old woman and one hundred copies of the volume, just before turning 60, he settled down McKeehan retained the copyright," near his onetime home of Wellsburg, Va. Morris wrote. "Gass likely received little (West Virginia today), as a farmer and or nothing from subsequent printings soon father of six children. He became a (McKeehan found himself in the same widower when his wife died of measles in boat when other publishers reprinted her mid-30s, leaving him in his mid-70s Gass' journal without permission—and to raise their young children alone. without paying McKeehan anything)." Bom just before the American RevoluMeanwhile, both Fort Mandan and Fort tion, then having survived the War of Clatsop at Astoria, Ore., the Corps' winter 1812 and its bloody Battle of Lundy's quarters of 1805, owed their construc- Lane, he now lived on past the American tion—and possibly much of their design— Civil War. In the meantime, other Corps to the sergeant's carpentry expertise, al- members were dying off one by one, until though his fellow explorers certainly only the aging Patrick Gass was left. One pitched in when it came to assembling of the oldest men to go west with the each of the log compounds. In addition, Corps of Discovery in the first place, he fihe "applied his talents toward the hewing nally joined his compatriots of the great of dugout canoes at Mandan, neeir White joumey west in 1870, just two months Bear Island (Mont.), and Canoe Camp short of his 99th birthday MH