THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD Archbishop Mitty High School Media Center
5000 San
Way CA 95129
Mitty
Jose,
VOLUME TWO 1914-15
12876
THE MARSHALL CAVENDISH ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WORLD Editor-in-Chief Brigadier Peter
Young
Board Barker; Dr. John Bradley
Editorial
Lt.-Col. A. J.
Professor John Erickson; Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp John Keegan; Kenneth Macksey; S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard; Norman Stone Revision Editor
Mark Dartford
MARSHALL CAVENDISH NEW YORK, LONDON, TORONTO
Editorial Staff Young
Editor
Brigadier Peter
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Kenneth Macksey
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Lt.-Col. A.
J.
Barker
Dr. John Bradley Prof. John Erickson Lt.-Cdr. Peter Kemp
John Keegan S. L. Mayer Lt.-Col. Alan Sheppard
Norman Stone Military Consultants
Reference Edition Published 1984 Published by Marshall Cavendish Corporation 147 West Merrick Road Freeport, Long Island N.Y. 11520 Printed and
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Marshall Cavendish Limited 1984 B.P.C. Publishing 1970 now a Division of Macdonald and
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Barrie Pitt
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The Marshall Cavendish illustrated encyclopedia of World War One. 1. World War, 1914-1918 II. Pitt, Barrie I. Young, Peter, 1915III.
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ISBN 0-86307-181-3
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Contents of Volume 2 313 Japan Declares Ian Nish
War
All Poles and Czechs Otto Pick
475 Germany:
320 Tsingtao Terence Wise
Leo Kahn 481 Serbia: The September Campaign Leo Kahn 484 Serbia: The Second Onslaught
330 The British at Tsingtao C. T. Atkinson 334 Clearing the Pacific Christopher Dowling 341
Josephine
Goeben and Breslau
Richard Wright 348 South Africa rebellion and invasion
—
Patrick Scrivenor
—
354 East Africa fiasco at Tanga Major R. J. Sibley
—
West Africa seizing German Colonies David Chandler 366 The Role of the Neutrals 361
Rodney de Bruin 369 Sinking of the Aboukir, Cressy Richard Milton
Hogue and
374 The Siege of Antwerp Christopher Duffy
384 First Battle of Ypres Brigadier Anthony Farrar-Hockley 397 Turkey enters the war
405
409
416 425 435
John Stephenson British and French war aims D. R. Shermer German war aims Imanuel Geiss The Emden's last cruise /. Lionel Fanthorpe Turkey: The unknown quantity A. J. Barker Britain, India and the Middle East /.
Stephenson
442 Mesopotamia: the advance to Basra Gregory Blaxland
454 The Second Battle of Warsaw Norman Stone 460 Lodz 468
Norman Stone War in the Mediterranean Peter
Kemp
A New Strategy
Newcombe
490 November in Galicia Norman Stone 499 The Campaign in Armenia Eugene Hinterhoff
504 Economic Rivalries A. S. Mil ward
593 The Winter Carpathian Campaign Norman Stone
509 The Battle of Coronel
598 The Winter Battle in Masuria Norman Stone
Barrie Pitt
519 Converging of the Fleets
David Mason 526 The Battle of the Falkland Islands David Mason 537 The Air War D. B. Tubbs 544 The Battle of Limanowa- Lapanow
Norman Stone 552 The Christmas Truce Henry Williamson
560
War
Plans for 1915 Brigadier C. N. Barclay
Ian
First
Gas Attack
Hogg
612 The Capture of Memel Peter Fiala
614 Winter Fighting O. C. Taslauanu 616 Przemysl: Siege and Surrender Christopher Duffy 621 The Bombardment of the East Coast David Chandler 626 The Battle of the Dogger Bank
Paul Kennedy 636 The Dogger Bank: A German View Paul Kennedy and Oskar Eckert
War at Home Arthur Mar wick
565 The
577 Trench Warfare
638 The First Zeppelin Raids
John Keegan 589 Preconceptions of /. F. Clarke
609 Bolimow and the
War
John Edgcumbe 646 Bombs on Southend
1914 SEPT
3
French government quits Paris for Bordeaux. Russians capture Lemburg. Battle of the
8
2nd Austrian invasion of Serbia
10
1st
Rava Russkaya. Russians
11
Battle of 1st
22
1st British
6 9
fails.
Masurian Lakes.
Battle of the
13
OCT
Marne.
5
isolate Przemysl.
Battle of the Aisne.
warships torpedoed.
Germans force Russians back Germans take Antwerp.
in
Poland and Galicia.
of Ypres.
11
1st Battle
12
Germans withdraw ten miles outside Warsaw. Germans retreat from Warsaw.
21
NOV
1
Battle of Coronel. Russia declares
2
Germans
from Poland. Russia invades
retreat
Prussia. British
Navy mines North
Sea.
5
Great Britain and France declare war on Turkey.
9
Sydney-Emden engagement.
11
3rd Austrian invasion of Serbia
22
British take Basra.
DEC
war on Turkey.
fails.
2
Austrians take Belgrade.
3
Serbians force Austrians out of Serbia.
4 18
Battle of the Falkland Islands.
Egypt becomes British protectorate.
1915 JAN
Dogger Bank.
23
Battle of
31
Germans use gas
in
winter battle of the Masurian
Lakes.
FEB
MAR
APR
MAY
18
declare British waters to be war zone.
19
British raid
28
Germans
on Dardanelles.
retreat
from Upper Poland.
blockade Germany.
1
Allies
3
Allies repulsed in Dardanelles.
14
Battle of Saint Eloi.
18
4 French and British warships sunk
22
Przemysl taken by Russians.
12
Turks
22
2nd Ypres, Germans use
fail
in
Dardanelles.
to take Basra.
gas.
and Anzac forces land
25
British
26
Treaty of London signed between Britain, France, Russia to cede territory to Italy on her joining Allies.
in Gallipoli.
4
Austro-German offensive on Russians between Gorlice and Tarnow.
7
Lusitania torpedoed
9
French and British campaigns begin
23
JUN
Germans
Italy declares
in Atlantic. in
war on Austria-Hungary.
2
Germans take Przemysl.
3
British
occupy Amara.
22
Austrians re-take Lernbcrg.
23
1st
Battle of Isonzo.
Flanders.
DECLARES When Japan
declared war on Germany in August 1914, it was partly to repay Germany for the humiliation Japan had suffered at German hands over Port Arthur and the Kiaochow Peninsula, but also to gain an important foothold on the Chinese mainland, vital if the growing Japanese economy was not to be starved of raw materials and outlets for its trade. In this article, Ian Nish draws together the reasons for Japan's entry into the war and vividly describes the course of events leading up to the Japanese ultimatum to Germany and the declaration of war. Below: Burning oil tanks on the Chinese mainland. Essential raw materials such as oil were unavailable on the Japanese islands in sufficient quantity to support a
booming industrial
.
.
state
.
V
uf W *', #pF*iP***'-*;
?%,..
!
*
.
&
'*•**-•'
When Japan went
to war with Germany in August 1914. it was the third war in which she had been engaged in two decades. She had fought the Chinese in 1894 on the soil of Korea and Manchuria and gained from the peace settlement of Shimonoseki April L895) a large section of the Liaotung peninsula, an important strategic area in south Manchuria which includes the towns of Port Arthur and Dairen. But Russia, France and Germany had stepped in, made threatening gestures, and offered the I
'friendly advice' that the peninsula should be returned to China. Japan, which had been exhausted by the war, agreed in the end to give back Liaotung and received a
money indemnity from China in return. The intervention of the powers was a bitter experience for the rapidly developing Japanese nation. The fact that Germany, who had only minor interests in
area, had joined with Russia and France and that her minister. Baron von Gutschmidt, had presented a memorandum which was more offensive in tone than those of his partners, rankled with the Japanese and was to have some bearing on the events of 1914.
the
In 1904 Japan made war on Russia, primarily on account of the Liaotung lease which the Russians had acquired from China in 1898. It was doubly humiliating for Japan to be deprived of the territory and then to see it taken by her principal enemy, Russia. The Japanese gained command of the seas by making a surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur before war had been declared. Using this advantage, the Japanese transported their troops through Korea, which had concluded a treaty of alliance with Japan, to Manchuria, the main battleground. There they won the large-scale battle of Liaoyang in September and after a long siege captured Port Arthur in January 1905. At the battle of Mukden in March, 400,000 troops were thrown into the fray and the Manchu capital was taken. The Japanese, however, realised that Russia had resources of manpower, as well as munitions and weapons, which Japan did not possess, and also had the Trans-Siberian railway with which to convey them to the Far East. Thus they were in favour of holding on to the ground they had acquired and suing for peace. But before this could happen, the Japanese
t
navy under Admiral Togo defeated the Russian Baltic fleet in a battle in the Japan Sea (Tsushima) on May 28, 1905, sinking six battleships, four cruisers, five destroyers and capturing five other vessels of war. Despite Japan's successes on land and her resounding naval victory, the war had brought the Japanese government to
realise the country's limitations. Japan could only fight the war with the aid of foreign capital. She depended on a number of war loans amounting to £82,000,000. For a short war her resources were adequate; but, when the war dragged on for 18 months, she found that she had fought herself to a standstill. Her economy and her manpower were severely strained, while Russia had untapped reserves of men, money and arms. Whether or not Russia would have found it so easy to transfer them to the east is an open question; but it was not a risk which the Japanese general staff was prepared to take. Thus Japan won the battles, but her victory in the war was limited and her success in the peace settlement was a disappointment to her people.
The peace conference was held, through the good offices of President Theodore Roosevelt of the United States, at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, in August 1905. Russia promised not to interfere again in Korea and agreed to transfer to Japan the Chinese territory of Liaotung for the remainder of her lease, and to hand over without compensation her railway line from Port Arthur to Changchun, together with all its rolling stock. Although the railway was in a shambles as a result of the war, it was a tremendous gain for the Japanese and went some way towards atoning for their failure to secure a war indemnity. Japan became a world power as a result of her victory over Russia. In Europe and in Asia she had established her reputation as a military power. In Europe she was popular for having exposed the weakness of the unpopular Russia. In Asia she enjoyed the prestige of having defeated a white army. But the difficulties which her wartime experiences had revealed were only imperfectly understood outside Japan. Since she had failed to secure an indemnity from the Russians as part of the peace
-
- -
"
-•-
settlement and found it impossible to raise foreign loans for her national rehabilitation at economic rates, she was forced to draw in her belt after the war. An economic depression set in during 1907 and continued until 1910. It was a time of increased taxation; and the campaign of the militant party politicians in parliament against heavy taxes was sufficiently successful to curb any excesses in government expenditure. Thus, whatever Japan's inclinations after her military victory, the immediate postwar years turned out to be years of retrenchment, and not of expansion.
Two valuable footholds Japan took as one of her first need
to consolidate
priorities the her position in the two
areas where she had positively benefited from the war. In Manchuria she set up the semi-nationalised South Manchurian Railway Company as the instrument of economic development. In Korea, which had been occupied by her armies for strategic reasons during the war, she set up a protectorate after the war. This protectorate did not involve much interference in Korean affairs under the first governor-
Marquis Ito Hirobumi; but it became increasingly rigorous after Ito's assassination by a Korean in October 1909. Finally in August of the following year the Japanese government decided to annex Korea and add it to its colonial empire. Thus, Japan had acquired two valuable footholds on continental Asia and had become virtually the most dominant force in the commerce of north-eastern China. Japan wanted international recognition general,
her newly-acquired territories. Instead she found that her methods and policies in Manchuria — and to a lesser extent in Korea — led her into commercial disputes with other powers. In order to prevent these getting out of hand. Japan negotiated a series of treaties with most of the important world powers. She signed an agreement with Russia in 1907 which defined the spheres of influence of the two for
signatories in Manchuria. The treaty was in 1910 and 1912. This had the incidental effect of overcoming any spirit of revenge which the Russians might have harboured, and thus eliminated the possi- c bility of a renewed Russo-Japanese conflict. Japan also reached an agreement 1
renewed
~**fc.
covering the Par Kast with Russia's European ally. France. Si nee Japan was already Britain's ally, she now had understandings with all tlu- Entente Powers of Europe, Britain, Prance ami Russia. Rut it would not he reasonable to conclude from this that Japan had joined the Entente'. Japanese diplomacy at this time was
concerned only with the Far East; and her obligations should not be understood to extend to Europe. On the other hand, she was more than a Far Eastern power: she had become a Pacific power. As a result of this, there were recurrent crises with the United States from 1906 onwards about apanese emigration to California. The issue gave rise to war scares in both countries but was handled with good sense and coolness by both governments. An attempt was made during 1908 in two arrangements to hold public opinion in check; but they were only partially successful in reducing American- Japanese tension, which remained a constant feature of the Far Eastern scene for some years to come. These fears about Japanese emigration were shared by Britain's dominions, especially Australia and Canada. But the Japanese were always determined not to confuse 'top-line' policy, namely the alliance which they had with Britain, and 'second-line' policy, such as the minor issues arising from local emigration disputes. The leaders spoke of the British alliance as the marrow of their policy. The alliance, which was originally signed in 1902 and renewed in 1905 (during the final stages of the Russo-Japanese war) was renewed again in 1911. When one partner to the alliance was attacked by another power, the 1911 alliance imposed an obligation upon the other partner to go to the aid of the first. Its purview did not extend beyond the Far East and India; its duration was to be ten years. The British intention when signing the 1911 alliance was to exclude from its scope the United States, with whom Britain hoped shortly to conclude an arbitration treaty. This seemed to weight the alliance rather in favour of Britain: whereas Japan was obliged to go to Britain's aid in many eventualities, Britain was not compelled to go to Japan's aid in the eventuality, which particularly troubled Japanese I
of hostilities between Japan and the United States. For this reason, the alliance came increasingly under attack in strategists,
Japan from 1911 onwards, though the governments of the day were unquestioning supporters of the alliance which had brought Japan world status and given her a foothold in the white world of respectability. The existence of the AngloJapanese alliance did not mean, however, that the two partners had — or could be expected to have — identical policies in respect, for example, of the most important issue of the day — China.
Revolution in China In October 1911 an army mutiny occurred at Wuchang, and this touched off the spark of revolution in China. Within three months the Manchu dynasty which had ruled China for two and a half centuries had been overturned, and a republic set up under President Yuan Shih-kai. Yuan had been anti-Japanese throughout his career, and the Japanese were highly suspicious of him. Thus when the south rose up against him in July/August 1913 316
what is generally described as the 'second revolution', many Japanese supported the southern armies. This was the work of the pro-south party in Japan, who supplied arms and money to the southern leaders and, after the failure of the rising, arranged asylum in Japan for the refugees.
in
Although it was under strong pressure from the pro-south party, the Japanese government maintained a studied neutrality to Yuan's republic until the Nanking incident, in which a few Japanese nationals were killed. Many Japanese called for a positive policy after this but, while the government called for retribution
against the general responsible for the crime, it was content with Yuan's apology. The consequence of these revolutionary outbreaks was to destroy central government in China. The chaos that ensued attracted the Japanese who wished to improve Japan's position on the Chinese mainland. Whereas her sphere of interest had hitherto been in Manchuria where she controlled the monopolistic South Man-
churian Railway, Japan now began to show
an interest
in railway-building and in industrial enterprises farther south. The Japanese consolidated their political support of the south by entering into commercial bargains. But they could only enter into the traditionally British sphere in the Yangtse valley at the risk of incurring British hostility. From 1913 on-
wards there was much animosity between Britain and Japan over the latter's apparent encroachments into that area. The government, careful of Japan's weak international position, did not press matters against an unwilling Britain. But there were others in Japan who were calling for a more forceful line. The merchant houses and industrialists, knowing that Japan was a country without great natural resources, saw what a valuable contribution China's raw materials could make to the Japanese economy. There were also the expansionists who thought it politic to abet the activities of the Chinese opposition leader, Sun Yat-sen. Army leaders also kept close contact with all parts of China, largely through Chinese who had gone to Japan for their military training. There were, therefore, many influential
groups in Japan, anxious to profit from China's condition of chaos. The government was restrained, however, by the presence of vigilant foreign powers who supported Yuan.
The advent of war On August 4, 1914, Britain declared war on Germany. The question immediately arose whether the European war would spread as far as British and German naval power extended, that is, to the Far East and the Both powers made declarations in the hope of preventing hostilities being extended to the Far East or the status quo there being interfered with. The Germans told Japan that their East Asian squadron would be instructed to avoid hostile acts against Britain provided Japan remained neutral. Britain, for her part, initially held similar hopes. On August 1, when Grey was telling Japan that, if Britain did intervene it would be on the side of France and Russia, he added that he did not expect that Britain would have to call on Japan for assistance, since the war was unlikely to spread to her area. These preliminary views of Germany and Britain were the Pacific'.
result of wishful thinking, however. It is doubtful whether the war could have been excluded from the Far East or the Pacific, when it so speedily developed into an allout war. The next problem was for Japan to establish her exact obligations under the Anglo-Japanese alliance. The most recent alliance treaty had been signed in 1911 and had laid down that Japan would be required to go to the assistance of her ally if British possessions were attacked by a third power. Since the treaty was limited to the Far East, Japan's obligation would only take effect in the event of an attack on Britain's colonial possessions there, Hongkong and Weihaiwei. Britain told Japan that, in such circumstances, 'we should rely on your support'. The Japanese cabinet met to discuss this question on August 4 and decided that Japan would maintain a strict neutrality towards a European war but, 'in the event of an attack on Hongkong or Weihaiwei or a similar concrete act of aggression, the Imperial Government will be ready at once to support His Majesty's Government if called upon'. The implication seemed to be that Japan would not involve herself in the war, unless Britain asked her to do so. The possibility that Japan might have turned her back on the British alliance and associated herself with the German side does not seem to have been considered seriously. Before the war Japan's attitude towards Germany had been correct without being friendly. But there were grounds for resentment against the Germans. For one thing, the actions of the German minister, Baron von Gutschmidt, in urging Japan to abandon Port Arthur in 1895 had not been forgotten. For another, the Kaiser had during the Russo-Japanese war spoken passionately of the dangers of the 'Yellow Peril'. His remarks had been widely reported in Japan and had been interpreted as being a deliberate affront to her. Nonetheless steps had been taken by Germany to improve relations between the two '
countries. Visits by prominent German leaders had been arranged in the hope, as it was expressed, of winning over the Japanese nation to a more friendly conception of the German Empire. It had been
hoped that the German Crown Prince would visit Japan at the conclusion of his Far Eastern tour in 1910, but he had to give up this intention because of the plague in China. Thus, when the German ambassador, Baron Mumm von Schwarzenberg, left Japan in 1911 at the end of five years, he confessed that he had not been very successful. His successor, Count Rex, faced the same problem. He could rely on certain groups for support: senior army officers and university professors were in many cases German-trained and German-speaking and were well disposed to Germany. The fact remains, however, that successive Japanese governments kept their distance from the Germans. Although the Japanese government an-
nounced its intention of remaining neutral, there were indications that the Japanese navy was ready for action against Ger-
many. The cruiser squadrons at
at
Sasebo and
Masampo
in the south of Korea were to be prepared for war. Indeed
reported there were indications that Japan was more willing to enter the war than her diplomatic statements seemed to suggest.
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JAPAN 1905
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Meanwhile the British Admiralty had been surveying the situation and had found that the British and German squadrons in the west Pacific were so evenly matched that could result in serious damage to British trade in the area. On Admiralty advice, the British government came to the conclusion that Japan should be asked to help in dealing with German marauding raids on British shipping. In a message on August 6, which represented a complete volte face on the part of Britain, Grey told the Japanese: As our warships will require some time to locate and destroy the German warships in Chinese waters it is essential that the Japanese should hunt out and
this
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Port Arthur
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1
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Ceded to Japan
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German Territory Treaty Ports International Ports
destroy German armed merchant cruisers who are attacking our commerce now. If the
Japanese Government would employ some of their warships in this way it would be of the very greatest assistance to us. It means of course an act of war against Germany but we do not see how this is to be avoided. Japan's naval role, as envisaged in this message, was a minor one and did not appeal to the Japanese navy. While it was to be concerned with chasing commerce raiders, the Royal Navy would in due course deal with the main strength of the German squadron. But Britain's request also had implications which went far beyond naval considerations.
Top
left: Japan and the Chinese mainland From 1842 onwards the European powei scrambled for concessions on the Chit coast, and in the harbours of the gre Japan found herself excluded and markets vital to her grown a war involving the Europe, inevitable that she would finI
side or the other
in
an
atte
(hold
on the Chinese mainland Japanese war was th. strength. Delegates gat Peace Conference of 1 is
flanked
!
-
representative officers pose tog after the fall of Porl established herself
•se
vorld
Right: Admiral Togo, the victor of Tsushima,
was more than any other man instrumental
in
raising Japan to the status of a world power. Far right: Port Arthur, Japan's great bone of
contention with Russia. Below left: Two Russian vessels on the bottom after Togo's raid of January 1905, on Port Arthur. Below right Native troops training under German instructors. German possessions in the Pacific continually worried the Japanese with the spectre of encirclement
The Japanese prime minister, Count Okuma, considering that an emergency now existed, called a cabinet meeting in
pm on the following After a long session, the cabinet decided to take a part in the war. The strongest advocate of this course was the foreign minister, Baron Kato. He argued persuasively that Japan should use this opportunity to drive Germany out of her base of Tsingtao and from her Pacific islands and thereby improve Japan's standing in the world. To those who said that it was uncertain who would be victorious in the war, he replied that Japan had nothing to lose. To the question whether an attack on Tsingtao would not violate China's neutrality, he countered that there was time enough to be worried about that. He. won the Cabinet round to the view that Japan's best policy in the new emergency was to enter the war on the side of the Entente. On the next day, this decision was placed before the Elder Statesmen. (The Elder Statesmen, the Genrb, were an extra-constitutional body of statesmen who had brought about the Meiji restoration, and as such wielded enormous power. They were the Emperor's personal advisers, and as it was restricted to the original members, the body gradually died out.) Although they were not sure about the timing of Japan's entry, they did not object to it in principle. Thus within 36 hours of Grey's request, the Japanese had agreed to enter the war. his residence at 10
day.
Consternation in Britain On August 9 Kato told Britain that it would not be possible to limit Japan's actions to defending merchant ships, but that she would have to destroy German power wherever it lay and that she would have to take part on a broad front. This reply
created
consternation
in
Britain.
Grey replied that he believed that for the present acts of war in the Far East would be restricted to the sea alone and that it was desirable to keep it so: Britain would therefore 'refrain for the present from invoking action under the Treaty'. This was to cancel Britain's appeal of August 6 for help and to reject the formal decision of the Japanese cabinet. Behind Grey's rejoinder there were several influences: Britain did not welcome any military action by Japan against China; nor did she look favourably on any Japanese attack on Germany's island possessions in the Pacific. Moreover Grey was under some pressure from Britain's own dominions, from the Dutch and from the United States to prevent Japanese expansion into the central and southern Pacific area. Kato, far from being cowed, pressed ahead with the negotiations. Grey, there-
took the view that it was hardly likely that Japan would reverse her decision and tried to make the best of a bad job. He invited Kato to subscribe to a joint AngloJapanese note to China, stating that fore,
318
Japanese action in the war would not extend beyond the China seas to the Pacific Ocean nor to any foreign territory with the exception of territory on the continent of Asia which was in German occupation. Grey was clearly anxious lest Japan should go on to attack China. While Japan was prepared to make a statement of a vague character, she was not agreeable to making the blanket declaration which Grey suggested. Grey had to concede that Japan alone had the right to decide for herself what action to take, especially after the
German ambassador
Tokyo had used abusive language to Kato on August 9. Kato claimed that the ultimatum to in
Germany
could not be longer delayed, as the matter would leak out. Also, military preparations had been made, and imperial sanction received. So, without reaching any agreement about the restrictions within which Japan's action would take place, Japan moved to the final, crucial stage. The cabinet met on August 15 to approve the
ultimatum, which was endorsed
at
an
Imperial conference in the afternoon. At 7 pm it was handed to the German ambassador, Count Rex. Since the latter was not in telegraphic contact with his home government, the ultimatum was also delivered via Japanese diplomatic channels in Berlin on August 17. To allow for the difficulty of delivering the ultimatum, Japan gave the Germans until noon on August 23 to reply, a longer time than is generally allowed. The Japanese ulti-
matum
called on
Germany:
• To withdraw immediately from Japanese and Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of all kinds, and to disarm at once those which cannot be withdrawn; and • To deliver not later than September 15 to
Japan the entire leased territory of Kiaochow with a view to the eventual restoration of the same to China. The only safeguard which China received from this was in the promise to restore the territory eventually to China.
But the Chinese who had already been negotiating with the Germans for direct restoration to them had little faith in
Japanese good intentions. Yet Japan professed to be acting in the interests of China in getting rid of the
German
lease.
Later
Kato was to claim that Japan was not committed by any specific agreement to return the Kiaochow lease to China. Japanese ambitions in China were beginning to bear
fruit.
While Britain called for some statement on the geographical limitations of Japan's actions, Japanese statesmen were studiously evasive in their public pronouncements. In a long-awaited public speech on August 18, Premier Okuma gave the
assurance that: Japan's object
is to
elimin-
from continental China the root of German influence which forms a constant menace to the peace of the Far East and
ate
thus to secure the aim of the alliance with Great Britain. She harbours no design for territorial aggrandisement and entertains no desire to promote any other selfish ends.
did not act in accordance with Britain's wishes but to attain her own ends. In his writings Kato makes clear that his first aim was 'to build up even more Japan's position in the east', that is, he was seeking status for his country in the
by improving her trade, by showing her naval prowess and by capturing territories. An equally important end was to use the opportunity to improve Japan's position in China and Manchuria. Pacific area
In this sense, the declaration of war against Germany was a symbol of the start of a more expansionist phase of Japanese continental policy. Kato's views were generally shared and were adopted by the cabinet; but there
were also many who had grave doubts about Japan's unilateral declaration of war against Germany. Had Japan chosen the right side? It was a gamble; and not everyone had the abounding confidence of Kato. There were critics of the timing. Was necessary to plunge the country so rapidly into the war? Could she not afford to wait awhile? There were those who distrusted Japan's exclusive attachment to Britain. Large sections of the Japanese population were pro-German; these views were particularly deep-rooted among lawyers, professors, army officers and journalists. So there were important bodies of dissent who were influential in policymaking circles. And the opposition parties were quick to seize on their arguments in order to attack the government's decision. So Japan had once again become involved in a major war; and the story had come full circle. Japan went to war against Germany for a variety of motives, of which hostility towards Germany was a comparatively minor one. These motives, these ambitions, had been manifested gradually in the decade since the Russo-Japanese war. There was her maturing interest in all aspects of China which was very much in evidence in the years preceding the war. It came as no surprise therefore that she wanted to take over the German territory and to entrench herself in north China. 1914 was a golden opportunity to further her interests when her European rivals there were compelled to be inactive. It can be said that it was China who paid Japan's price for her entry into the First World War. Then there was the seemingly intractable issue of the increases in tinarmy and navy estimates. It was easier to justify these to the population at largo after Japan had entered the war alongside some of the world's leading powers and had made substantial gains in its early stages How these gains were achieved we nuist it
the United States. Such statements cannot be expected to be free of ambiguities; and Okuma's was deliberately vague on a
acquired at the end of the 19th Century. In October the Japanese navy took the Marshall, Caroline and Mariana islands, groups of islands lying to the north of the equator. For Japan to occupy permanently a girdle of islands strategically placed in the western Pacific, was welcome neither to the Americans nor to Australia and New Zealand. Japan knew, however, that Britain was so dependent on her help in this area of the globe that she would avoid
number
any dispute.
Japan's warlike operations will not therefore extend beyond the limits necessary for the attainment of that object and for the defence of her own legitimate interests. This was the nearest that Japan came to issuing a statement of war aims at this stage of the war, and was clearly intended to reassure opinion abroad, especially in
of points. did not in any case reach London in time to prevent the publication in the British press on August 18 of a remarkable statement, purporting to set out Britain's understanding of the limits within which Japan would act on entry into the war: she understood that Japan's action would not extend to the Pacific Ocean beyond the China seas, nor beyond Asiatic waters west of the China seas. For the British Foreign Office to issue such a deliberate, unilateral statement was a considerable rebuff to the Japanese, and a revelation of the weaknesses within the But the Anglo-Japanese partnership. Japanese continued to refuse to give specific assurances about their objects if they entered the war. No reply was received from the Germans by August 23, and Japan accordingly declared war. Within three days she commenced operations against the German fortress of Tsingtao, but before this fell, the Japanese had taken action against the Pacific islands which Germany had It
Japan seeking status The person who brought Japan
into the war was her strong-willed foreign minister, Baron Kato. He was confident that final victory would go to the Entente Powers but that, even if that were not so, Japan would not stand to suffer much. He was an anglophile and a fervent believer in the
Anglo- Japanese alliance. Indeed, he professed to be taking Japan into the war in fulfilment of Japan's obligations under that alliance. It was perhaps permissible to make this claim in commending to the public a course which was not altogether palatable, but it is historically unsound. Japan was not under an obligation to go to war unless Hongkong or Weihaiwei were attacked, and this did not take place. Britain specifically asked for Japanese assistance, but later positively withdrew the request. Britain tried to limit the range of Japanese activities, and she disliked many aspects of Japan's campaign against Tsingtao. It has to be concluded that Japan
now
see.
Further Reading R. H., Woodrow Wilson and the Far East (New York 1952) La Fargue, T. E., China and the World W.u (Stanford 1937) Millard, T. F., Democracy and the Eastern Fifield,
Question (New York 1919) IAN NISH was educated
He saw
at
Edinburgh and London
in Japan during the He has taught Far at the University of Sydney and the of Economics, and is author of The Anglo-Japanese Alliance and The Story ot Japan
Universities
postwar Allied Eastern history London School
service
occupation
319
1
TSINGTAO Japan's main contribution to the Allied cause on her entry into the war was the reduction of the German base of Tsingtao on the Chinese coast, together with the capture of some German islands north of the equator. The weather during the siege was appalling, and despite their great numerical superiority, it took the Japanese over a month of concentrated effort to reduce the well-fortified stronghold. Below: A creek liberally strewn with barbed wire — part of the natural defensive position much strengthened by the Germans
Terence Wise
When Great
Britain declared war on Germany, Japan promptly offered to assist her ally and on August 15 delivered an ultimatum to the Germans, ordering them to withdraw their warships from Eastern waters and surrender 'without condition or compensation, the entire leased territory of Kiaochow' in the Shantung province of
China. The ultimatum was ignored and Japan declared war on August 23. Four days later a Japanese fleet was blockading the bay of Kiaochow. To understand the full significance of this action one must go back to March 1898 when Kiaochow and surrounding territory were leased to Germany for 99 years by the Chinese. Possession of Kiaochow gave Germany domination of the Yellow Sea, and meant the exclusion of Japanese influence from the mainland of Asia. Previously, in 1884, Germany had seized the Marshall Islands and part of New Guinea, leading to the eventual annexation of the Solomon Islands and Bismarck Archipelago. In 1899 the Palau, Mariana and Caroline Islands were purchased from Spain and in the same year the Samoan islands of Upolu and Savaii were ceded to Germany. Thus by the turn of the century Germany had established a network of bases that spanned the Pacific. Of prime importance among these possessions was Kiaochow, where lurked a strong naval squadron that threatened world trade routes in the Far East and played an important part in Germany's aim to become the dominant power in Europe, which involved challenging the naval supremacy of Britain.
Kiaochow was chosen to become an example of the best of German colonialism, and so a new city was built on the tip of the peninsula that shields the bay. The city, Tsingtao, was set out in European style with broad, tree-lined streets, beautiful public buildings and gardens, schools for the natives, smart cafes, beer gardens and the best hotels in Asia. With its excellent climate and sandy beaches Tsingtao soon earned a new name — the Riviera of the Far East. Trade boomed, a railway line was built and a commercial harbour with building yards and dry docks was constructed. Germany was justly proud of her
Chinese protectorate. In 1902 Japan signed a treaty of alliance with Great Britain and Tsingtao suddenly became a trap — a trap that could not be sprung without Germany losing face. Millions had been lavished on the building of the city: in the next decade many more millions were spent on its defence. The peninsula on which Tsingtao stands is spanned by two ranges of low hills divided by a wide valley. On the hills nearest the city the Germans constructed three ferro-concrete forts, protected on each flank by open batteries of 4- and 6inch guns. Moltke and litis forts were each armed with two 9-4-inch guns; Bismarqk fort, on the highest hill and in a commanding position at the centre of the peninsula, was armed with four 11-inch howitzers. Hsiao-ni-wa fort was built on a promontory to the south-east of the city and was equipped with two 9. 4- inch and three 6- inch guns in revolving turrets, with a searchlight that could be raised or lowered on a lift. Other batteries of 6and 9. 4- inch guns were positioned on promontories along both sides of the peninsula. The valley of the Hai Po river four miles
north-east of Tsingtao is over a mile wide with bare, sloping sides that meet in a marshy bottom. Narrowed by the Hai Po river and inlets on the opposite side, the valley bottom measures only four miles in
chow. Sufficient stores to last a year were stockpiled and although the water supply was liable to be cut off, there were wells and a distilling plant inside the city. A large shipment of ammunition, on its way
length, offering the best site for a main defence line. However, it had one major fault — Tsingtao was only about four miles away. This lack of depth meant that once the Hai Po line fell the entire peninsula
when war was
was lost. Towards the bottom
of the slope from the bed a line of six concrete redoubts was constructed, each 200 yards long and armed with field guns and machine guns. Trenches strengthened by machine gun posts linked the redoubts together and the whole was backed by a reserve trench. Two hundred yards in front of the redoubts the earth was cut away to form an escarpment, whose face was revetted. At its base a 10-foot- wide ditch was dug from sea to sea and filled with barbed-wire entanglements strengthened by sharpened stakes. Just in front of the wire a 6-foot-high wall was built and for some distance beyond the area was strewn profusely with land mines. In the middle of the minefield was an electrified fence that when tampered with would set off the mines around it. The whole belt of obstacles could be swept by searchlights at night. The third defence line on the second range of hills north-east of Tsingtao and beyond che river was dominated by Prinz Heinrich Hill, a 1,200-foot-high crescentshaped peak on the eastern side of the peninsula. At this point the peninsula is 12 miles wide, impossible to man with the garrison available, and consequently the hills were to be used only as advance strong points where small bodies of men could fight delaying actions. The king-pin of this line was Prinz Heinrich Hill, for if this fell the southern end of the line was overlooked and must also fall. Two main lines of trenches were dug to connect the hills but no defence works were erected on Prinz Heinrich. This negligence by the Germans is difficult to understand, since they realised the importance of the hill. Admittedly its steep sides made the summit almost inaccessible but for this very reason a small fort, armed with heavy guns and protected by machine guns, could have controlled not only any assault on the trench line but also any attempt to cross the valley beyond. This omission on the part of the Germans is even more difficult to understand when it is realised that they had had 12 years in which to complete the system of fortifications. By July 1914 a total of 53 heavy guns and howitzers, 77 lighter guns and 47 machine guns were positioned on the peninsula. The number of men stationed there during the forts to the river
is uncertain. The Marine Artillery and 3rd Marine Battalion, which totalled 3,000 men, formed the backbone of the garrison, but this number was swollen by reservists and volunteers who flocked to the base from all over the Pacific. With
seige
the crews off the ships in harbour, the garrison probably totalled just under 6,000
men.
The naval squadron stationed
declared, failed to arrive,
a grave hampering factor to the Germans. In command was the naval governor of Tsingtao, Captain Meyer Waldeck. Towards the end of July, Captain Waldeck reduced the civil population from 55,000 to 30,000 and moved troops from Tientsin to Tsingtao. These men were part of the International Force maintained in the treaty port since the Bcxer Rising of 1900. Buildings and trees that might provide cover for an enemy, or be useful to artillery observers, were razed to the ground, and the Hai Po bridge was blown up.
On August 4 Admiral von Spee left Kiaochow with SMS Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and five light cruisers, one of which was SMS Emden. The balance of his squadron (the old destroyer S90 and five gunboats) was left to help in the defence of the base, assisted by the Jaguar from Shanghai and an Austrian light cruiser, the Kaiserin Elizabeth. From this time on the garrison could do little but improve their defences and await the onslaught. The Japanese had been watching Tsingtao for many years and knew exactly where every fort, redoubt and battery had been built and had an approximate idea of the number and calibre of the guns. (Most world powers were aware of these facts, although their Intelligence reports on the calibre of the guns were usually fairly inaccurate.) Before war broke out Japan had already organised a special Expeditionary Force to deal with Tsingtao and every officer had been instructed in his duties, every soldier trained to perfection.
under Lieutenant-General force, Kamio, with Major-General Yamanashi as his Chief-of-Staff, consisted of 50,000 men, 12,000 horses, 102 heavy guns or howitzers and 42 field or mountain guns. It was to be supported by six aeroplanes and a naval
This
force of four dreadnoughts, four battlecruisers, 13 light cruisers, 24 destroyers,
four gunboats, 13 minesweepers, nine guard ships and a vast fleet of repair, hospital and transport ships.
Brisk naval skirmishes Embarkation was hindered by violent storms along the Japanese coast and a blockade of Kiaochow could not be established before August 27, though on the 23rd the British destroyer HMS Kennet, keeping an eye on the bay, had chased S90 back into harbour, suffering several casualties in the action. Minesweeping operations were begun at once to enable the fleet to move within range of the land
During
this work, which continued week, a Japanese destroyer ran aground on one of the two small islands in the bay. The German gunboat Jaguar darted out of harbour, pumped shells into the destroyer until she keeled over on her side, and retired smartly when more Japanese ships appeared on the On September 2 Major amada with the 24th Infant r\ id 22nd ungkow Cavalry Regiment B Bay, 100 miles frorr to establish a supply base. A B hindered disembarkation and cavalry wen landed the first They were sent to forts.
for
a
I
in the
bay
could not hope to withstand the entire Japanese navy and the bay was therefore extensively mined for a radius of eight miles to prevent an attack from the sea. The air force was represented by a monoplane flown by Oberleutnant-zur-See Pliis-
I
(
scout the approach route to Tsingtao. Conditions were atrocious. Bridges and roads, such as they were, had been carried away by rams and w inds that were the worst for
60 years; rivers were impassable and even small streams had become raging torrents iOO yards wide. The Japanese troops were well known for toughness yet these men, living off a land that could not produce to teed its own population, did not reach their first objective, the village of Tsimo, until the 12th. Here they had to halt tor three days to recover stragglers, though scouts managed to capture the village of Kiaochow the next day. Yamada could not land the last of his men before the 6th: the main force should have been ashore here by the 7th. Because of the delay General Kamio changed his plans and ordered Major-General Horiuchi to take the 23rd Infantry Brigade to I.aoshan Bay. effect a landing and cover the massing of supplies and artillery there. The bay was only 30 miles from Tsingtao and Kamio was taking a chance, as the Germans might oppose the landing, but he had no choice. His troops were already on half rations, without artillery support, and there was little hope of either being forwarded from Lungkow in the near future. Yamada was meanwhile ordered to con-
enough
General Horiuchi's force arrived at Laoshan Bay on the 18th and was ashore by the following day, an advance post manned by two German officers and 30 men being driven off without loss to either side. Meanwhile, at Lungkow Bay the 29th Infantry Brigade under Major-General Hojoji, and units of the heavy artillery under Major-General Watanabe, were being landed. At both landing points engineers began constructing piers, roads and a light railway to send the vital supplies to the front-line troops. By the 25th the floods had subsided considerably, the 24th and 29th Brigades, 22nd Cavalry Regiment and units of the 24th Field Artillery were concentrated
round Tsimo.
On September
27,
General
his position round Tsimo and Kiaochow villages and wait for the rest
solidate
army to catch up. By the 13th conditions had improved
of the
columns to start from Lungkow. also enabling the German monoplane to make its first reconnaissance flight. sufficiently for
Pluchow reported that the Japanese were round Tsimo but that the area between there and Tsingtao was still badly flooded. This was the first information the Germans had of the overall situation.
Kamio gave the order for a general advance commence the next day.
to
Japan's intervention in the war, while obviating the threat of the naval squadron based on Kiaochow, placed Britain in an embarrassing position. In the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, countries whose security was menaced by Japan's territorial ambitions in the Pacific, there was considerable anti-
Japanese feeling. The British government had already issued a statement to allay these fears: 'with a view to protecting the general interest of the Far East and particularly the integrity of China, Japanese actions will not extend beyond the China Seas except so far as the safety of her own shipping makes it necessary, and to no foreign territory except that under German occupation.' To back up this statement Brigadier-General Barnardiston, commanding British forces in North China, was ordered to proceed to Laoshan Bay with the 2nd Battalion South Wales Borderers and half of the 1st Battalion 36th Sikhs and to place the force under the orders of General Kamio. The force of 1,400 men left Tientsin on September 19, escorted by the pre-dreadnought battleship HMS Triumph and destroyer HMS Usk, and after stopping at Weihaiwei to pick up 250 mules, arrived in Laoshan Bay on the 22nd, finding it crammed with more than 50 Japanese transports and warships. Two days were needed for disembarkation, then the force set out to cover the 21 miles to Tsimo. The half rations, their column
men were on Above: Meyer Waldeck ably defended Tsingtao for two months against greatly superior Allied forces. Below: A wide, well-paved road in the Chinese quarter of Asia's only German town, called by the
Germans
'the Riviera of the East'
was constantly broken by Japanese lery and supply teams, and the lack
artil-
of
an
interpreter added to their difficulties. Most of their heavy equipment had to be left behind because of the thick mud and the
1
jmBl
men were
half frozen in their tropical doubtful that the British troops realised that they were fighting for the 'Riviera of the East'! shorts.
It
at
Unopposed assault
On September 17, for instance, men Bismarck fort were informed that a Japanese staff officer had been caught trying to poison the city's water supply and had been executed as a spy. Such reports side.
in
cannot be
verified.
When
Horiuchi landed
German
believed
soldiers
that
20
Japanese had been killed in the lighting'. Only five companies of troops confronted the initial Japanese advance three in front of Tsimo and two further east watch ing Laoshan Hay. Consequently Horiuchi's 23rd Brigade, advancing in the south, met
The force reached Tsimo on the 26th and was ordered to march another ten miles the next day to support the Japanese attack on the first German line. However, a 'redoubt' that the Borderers were instructed t.o assault turned out to be an uninhabited trench and the British force took no active part in this action. While the Japanese were landing troops, establishing supply depots and sealing the territory off from the rest of the world, the German defenders could do little but await the inevitable grand assault. This inactivity, added to the conditions on the peninsula, mosquito-infested after a month of continual rain, made the garrison anxious for any sort of action — especially in the big forts where water streamed from the walls and ceilings. A private in the Marine Artillery wrote in his diary on September 7: 'News of Japanese landings. At last they are coming — sighs of relief.' Sealed in their fortresses the men were prey to wild rumours and throughout the siege they knew less about the course of events than their compatriots on the out-
Laoshan Bay the next day, unopposed,
the
is
with no opposition at all, although Yama da's 24th Brigade to tlio north came under fire from litis fort and the ships in Kiao chow Bay, and met stiff resistance as nighl fell. At dawn the advance continued The 24th Brigade soon came under hea\\ lire from the ships and litis again and General Horiuchi was ordered to despatch a com
pany of his field artillery to assist them Three aeroplanes were put up to slop the naval bombardment and although all their
bombs missed they succeedi-d m driving crews of the ships under cover. Neither side suffered any damage hut it was a significant the first instance of an engagement between ships and aircraft. That evening both brigades were within
action
striking distance of the
Genera] Kamio called Top: Most of Tsingtao's artillery was placed in armoured cupolas in the forts which mada up the main defences of the town. This sort of defence had been shown to be ineffective by Germans themselves in Europe During the siege several of the forts were put out of action by the heavy shells of the Allied blockade squadron. Above: 1 he pilot of the only German aircraft in Tsingtao, Pluschow, was unable to spot for the guns as he was always chased off by one of the Japanese aircraft
first
a
German
line
bah and ordered
Prinz lleinrich Hill to be taken during the night so that the advance might continue in the morning. Pacing the Japanese there were 1,000 riflemen half a compain on Prinz lleinrich and the remainder seal tered along the line of trenches and Strong points. They were backed h\ '1 light guns, 12 machine guns and any lire the ships
could bring to bear A company of Horiuchi's 46th Regiment (named Kesshitai by the other soldici
tlved
'troo]
to
tlie"
•
was given the
honour of storming the hill, and sot out at midnight. They had to climb and conquer the lull before daylight exposed them, hut as they neared the top they mot such fierce resistance that the} were pinned down, both their officers being among those killed. Luckily, as dawn broke, a small patrol that had been sent to scout the other side of the hill appeared on the summit behind the
Germans who surrendered
at once, believing themselves surrounded. With this key position taken the assault was launched against the whole line. Soon the thin defences were pierced and the
Germans began
to withdraw, having failed advance or inflict heavy casualties. By 1100 hours the entire line was in Japanese hands and cavalry was sent in pursuit oi' the Germans, who now abandoned much valuable equipment. Many soldiers' were found propped paper against the ramparts to give an impression of strength. Total Japanese casualties for this action were 46 killed and 146 wounded, a small price to pay, for Tsingtao was now doomed. The advance was halted and the to halt the
A German counterattack was launched on the 30th but failed. The Japanese regarded this as proof that the garrison was contained hut the Germans claimed the attack had only been a feint to draw the
struck a mine. She was listing sharply to port, and was steaming slowly eastwards. That they were not aware the damage had
enemy
Japanese battleship subsequently sank. During the 22nd a Japanese naval aircraft achieved some success in aerial bombing by inflicting slight damage on the electric works in the city. Whether this was
the open, and certainly the suffer considerable casualties as a result of machine gun cross fire during this action. German general orders that day claimed 1,784 Japanese killed and 8,000 wounded, in exchange for only 110 Germans killed and wounded, but these figures were probably quoted to boost morale and certainly the garrison was jubilant at this time. However, a discordant note is introduced by the private in Bismarck fort, whose diary records on this day: 'Our infantry appeared to be very done up when they fell back: their toes sticking out of their boots, helmets shot througb etc. Here we sit and are allowed to do nothing.' Of the big forts only litis into
Japanese did
had
so far
put
to
positions, while
contentedly
to
work preparing
artillery
General Kamio sat back await the arrival of his
artillery.
Aircraft over Tsingtao The next morning a German observation balloon stationed near litis spotted a battery of howitzers behind the nearest heights and called down artillery fire on the position. This balloon also hampered the British force, Pliischow's monoplane joining in the harassment, and the following day their position was so heavily shelled tbat the British were forced to move camp. Work on the gun emplacements was seriously delayed and after several days an aeroplane was sent over to shoot down the balloon. The Germans managed to get it down in time but some damage was done to the cables. The balloon broke fron its moorings on October 7 and although PI schow tried to spot for the guns in its pi ce he was unsuccessful as several Japanes, aircraft were sent up in pursuit wheneve he became airborne.
324
been allowed to fire — Bismarck fire until October 9.
General Kamio now realigned his forces the main assault (from north to south: the 29th Brigade under Hojoji. the British
for
further
gun power
to the large Allied
squadron bombarding Tsingtao
under Barnardiston, Yamada's 24th Brigade and Horiuchi's 23rd Brigade*. Kamio's plan was simple, slow but sure. When the bombardment began, a line of trenches would be dug on the forward slope, connected to the reverse slope by communication trenches. A second line of trenches would then be excavated further down and finally a third line dug by the river, only a few yards from the German lines. Because all these trenches were on the exposed forward slope the digging would be done at night with patrols out force
protect the working parties against raiders from the German lines — a pattern soon to become all too familiar to soldiers in France and Flanders. S90 was ordered to make her escape on the night of the 7th but was spotted sneaking through the harbour mouth. A brisk chase ensued during which a Japanese battleship was torpedoed and S90 beached on the Chinese coast to avoid capture. On the 19th men in Bismarck were able to study the Japanese battleship through to
their
telescopes.
They thought she had
how The
deliberate or not is uncertain but with these works out of action the electrified fence in the valley was useless. Not until the 28th were the artillery positions completed, but that night work was started on the first line of trenches. The next day a bombardment of the defences began, the Germans scuttling the ships that remained in the harbour. Over the next two days the remainder of the Japanese artillery arrived and at 0615 hours on the 31st (the Emperor of Japan's birthday) a tremendous bombardment began that was to continue until the fall of Tsingtao on November 7. By day the guns fired shells to penetrate the fortifications: by night star shells and
did not open
The Japanese cruiser Yakumo, armed with four 8-inch guns, added
troops
inflicted by S90 illustrates totally isolated these garrisons were.
been
shrapnel to prevent the garrisons carrying out repairs. Aeroplanes directed the gunners and on both sides of the peninsula Japanese and British capital ships added their huge shells to the rain of projectiles. It was a bright clear day. An hour after the barrage commenced fires burst out in the ship yards and at 0800 hours the oil tanks were hit. A vast pall of black smoke mushroomed over the city. That night the hills and forts were dramatically outlined against the lurid flames. The defenders replied with a counterbombardment but this soon fell off until by November 2 the great forts were firing only occasional shots. There are various accounts of the damage inflicted on the forts
during this bombardment. The Japanese claim that they silenced the forts, and the British battleship to
Triumph was believed
have put Bismarck
fort
out of action
with only seven shells, yet photographs taken between the world wars show that the forts bore little visible damage to either guns or concrete housings. Hsiao-ni-wa fort, for instance, was supposed to have
The garrison of Tsingtao, isolated and completely surrounded The Japanese 150-mm Howitzer used bombard the German trenches at Tsingtao.
Right:
Weight: 6, 160 lbs. Length: 20 feet 9 inches. Elevation: 65 degrees. Crew: 6 or 7. Rate of
to
fire:
Four rounds-per-minute (maximum). Range: 10,464 yards. Muzzle velocity: 1,344 feet-persecond. Projectile weight: 80 lbs. Below left: A Japanese poster of the time depicts Japanese artillery supporting the attack on Tsingtao. Below right: The defences of Tsingtao were based on the natural obstacles provided by the terrain, and the formidable line of redoubts and forts on the southern side of the River Hai Po. Because Prinz Heinrich Hill was inadequately protected, however, the first line
was
easily taken,
and thereafter the
Tsingtao was only a matter of time
fall
of
The
victor of Tsing-
Japanese soldier and his
tao: the
weapons Left:
A Japanese infantryman
in his
standard winter service
The Japanese were unique among the combatant powers the First World War in issuing their troops with both greatcoats and mackintoshes in the winter. The latter was worn over the former, and thus the wearer was kept both warm and dry — in theory. As the Japanese were unable to distinguish between British and German troops at Tsingtao, Japanese mackintoshes were issued to the British troops as a means of identification. They were, of course, useful in their proper function, as the British troops serving at Tsingtao were poorly equipped for the dress.
L. 326
of
atrocious conditions which were prevalent during the campaign. Below: Standard small arms of the Japanese. Among these are (top) the infantry rifle -the Arisaka Model 38/1905 6.5-mm; (centre) the Arisaka Model 44/ 19 1 1 cavalry carbine, 6.5-mm (note the bayonet folded underneath the barrel) (bottom) the Arisaka Model 38/1905 carbine, 6.5-mm; (top right) the Nambu Model 1902 automatic pistol, 7.92-mm (below right) the Model 26 1893 revolver, 9-mm (based on the American Smith and Wesson revolver); and (below centre) the standard Japanese infantry bayonet. Boffom.'The standard Japanese heavy machine gun — the Nambu 1914 Model 3, 6.5-mm (based on the French Hotchkiss machine gun). The Arisaka infantry rifle was exported widely, and was even used in Great Britain as a training weapon during the acute shortage of infantry small arms up to 19 16. Right: A Japanese infantryman in his basic standard issue uniform carrying an Arisaka Model 38/1905 6.5-mm rifle. The colour of the uniform had been changed from blue to green as a result of the lessons learned from the Russo-Japanese War of 1904/05. The only way in which it was possible to distinguish between the various branches of the army was by the colour of the collar patch - red was the colour of the infantry. The Japanese needed all their physical resilience to withstand the rigours of the campaign for Tsingtao ;
;
X.&S.
%
*
I
.
*
Left:
General Kamio,
i
*f
commander of the
Japanese Expeditionary Force sent to reduce Tsingtao. Above: the Japanese arrive at Tsingtao railhead
been annihilated by naval guns yet only one gun was knocked out and the fort was still intact in 1937. It is far more likely that, as the German record shows, the forts
began
run short of ammunition and reserved their remaining stocks for the to
last assault.
The
i
'
.
3BaMW
first
line of assault trenches
was
completed by the night of the 1st, the work being speeded up by the use of nullahs [ravines] running down the slope as communication trenches. The second line was started at once, 400 yards further down and in places only 300 yards from the Germans, who did all they could to hamper the work by constantly switching their searchlights on and off and spraying with
machine gun fire any working parties caught in the beams. The Japanese made several probing attacks against the two central redoubts, but without success.
A bomb such as this ttheGemv -
neratin
the observation dome and two of the howitzers put out of action by direct hits, yet continued to function. Ammunition in this fort was now reduced to 200 high explosive shells and 120 shrapnel. That night the third line of Allied trenches was started, almost on top of the German line. In the British sector flooding caused the digging to be abandoned and a sandbag parapet was begun instead. By the evening of the 5th much of the minefield and other obstacles had been rendered useless by the Japanese barrage. In Bismarck fort ammunition was down to 40 high explosive shells and 20 shrapnel,
and the two remaining howitzers ceased firing, the spare gunners moving forward to serve in the trenches. That night B Company of the South Wales Borderers was caught by fire from two machine guns while crossing open ground between the trench lines and suffered 30 casualties be-
Crushing bombardment
fore
On
company had six casualties. General Kamio had ordered the third line held at
the 3rd private buildings in the city were badly hit by the barrage. The Japanese protested that this was accidental but it is significant that at last the electric works were put out of action. By the 4th many of the open batteries and the redoubts had been destroyed, together with their guns, while large stretches of the linking trenches had been obliterated. Only the big forts were able to withstand the crushing bombardment, though the garrisons were badly shaken and seized any lull in the shelling to get outside, even if only for a minute or two. That day Bismarck fort had two great holes blasted in
withdrawing.
Their
other
forward
costs and the Borderers sent forward more picquets to hold the position, despite the fact they had no trenches here. The British force was not warned of the impending assault and took no further part all
in the final advance.
Hsiao-ni-wa fort received a direct hit on the 6th and ceased to fire. It was believed out of action but in fact only one gun was destroyed; like many other positions, it was out of ammunition. The Germans now began to demolish these positions and destroy the guns, an act that provoked the
328 .
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who had no desire to capture a set of useless ruins, into sending over an aeroplane to drop leaflets urging the de-
Japanese,
fenders to stop an action that was unworthy of true soldiers. With the fall of Tsingtao imminent, the German monoplane was seen to fly off southwards. At 2100 hours the grand assault was launched. Despite the wire entanglements and exploding mines the Japanese infantry pressed home their attack fiercely, climbing over their dead and wounded. The Germans fought back stubbornly, Moltke fort and Bismarck fort especially causing many casualties with their last shells. Redoubt 4 fell but was quickly retaken, the attack on Redoubt 1 failed, and the Japanese retreated. Just after midnight General Yamada personally led four companies of infantry against Redoubts 2 and 3. Soon the Japanese flag was flying over these redoubts. The attack was resumed and, with the centre of their line pierced, the German defence began to crumble. Redoubts 5 and 6 fell to General Horiuchi, who also led his men personally, and the rest of the line was swiftly occupied. Many of the defenders surrendered, but some scurried back to the main forts to make a brave last stand.
A white flag There still remained almost half a mile of hillside dotted with obstacles to be crossed by the attackers before the big forts
could be captured, and skirmishers began at once to clear the way. Not until 0630
W*
&m\
hours were the Japanese in a position to launch this final assault and then, as the infantry waited tensely for the order to charge, a white flag was waved from the observatory of one of the forts. Other white flags soon appeared. Tsingtao had fallen. Japanese casualties in the campaign were 1,455 killed and 4,200 wounded; the
been paralysed. With Germany banished from the Pacific the Royal Navy was free to drive German merchant shipping from the seas, contain the High Seas Fleet and combat the growing submarine menace in home waters. As the defeat of France had depended upon the success of the
14 killed and 61 wounded. German losses were only 200 killed and 500 wounded, but nevertheless the fall of Tsingtao was a bitter blow for Germany. In October the Japanese had occupied the Marshall, Palau, Mariana and Caroline
had depended upon dividing the Royal Navy. Both plans had now misfired,
British were
August and September Zealand had taken Samoa, New Guinea, the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago. With the fall of Tsingtao the German flag had disappeared from the Pacific and her empire there had vanished for ever. But these actions, insignificant in themselves, had a far greater effect than the mere loss of prestige. Germany had leased, purchased and annexed her eastern empire Largely for Islands:
Australia
Schlieffen
Plan, so the defeat of Britain
during
and
New
the purpose of dividing the might of the Royal Navy between defence of home waters and defence of world shipping routes in the event of war. By this strategy she had hoped to be able to defeat a weakened Home Fleet with her own navy and obtain mastery of the English Channel. By occupying the network of harbours and wireless stations in the Pacific, the Allies had obtained a stranglehold on the German commerce raiders and within three months of the outbreak of war a vital facet of Germany's strategy had
Further Reading
Army Quarterly Volume XXXV, 1938
(Article by Robertson) Atkinson. C.T..A History of the South Wales Borderers 1914-18 (Medici Society 1931) Dane, E British Campaigns in Africa L. B.
.
Pacific (1919) Godshall. L Tsmgtau under three flags (1929) Journal of the United Services Institution
W
,
Volume LXXXI (Article by F. P. Nosworthy) Naval Review Volume VI, 1919 (Diary of a Ger-
man
artilleryman)
TERENCE WISE was born in London in 1935 and was educated at Rutlish Grammar School, Merton Park He |Oined the army for three years in 1953, serving in Germany with the 17th/21st Lancer was followed by three years whaling in the Antarctic and six years in a bookshop In 1967 he beca freelance writer and books published include a Guide to Military Museums, An Introductn Games and a book on modern whah 1
THE BRITISH AT T*l M.T iO C. T. Atkinson
The siege of Tsingtao was not wholly a Japanese undertaking. Part of the investing force was drawn from the British and Indian contingents of the garrison at the treaty port of Tientsin, North China, the two battalions being chosen to take part in the siege being the 2nd South Wales Borderers and the 36th Sikhs. The Borderers embarked on September 7, 1914, and, under British naval escort, set sail two days later for the theatre of operations further to the south. Below: Watched with curiosity by the Japanese, British troops land in Laoshan Bay in
1
After crossing
Taku Bar the convoy and
Gulf of Chihli to Weihaiwei, picked up some mules there (September 20) and proceeded to Laoshan Bay, on the east coast of the Shantung Peninsula, about 40 miles north-east of escort stood across the
Tsingtao, the well-fortified main German settlement on Kiaochow Bay which was the objective of the expeditionary force. Here the Japanese main body had begun dis-
embarkation on September 18, by which time the original landing force had already seized Kiaochow town and established itself at the head of Kiaochow Bay, thereby isolating the
German
territory completely.
Laoshan Bay, which was crowded with Japanese transports guarded by a strong squadron, was reached on September 22. At 0800 hours next day disembarkation began, the men being soon ashore. Landing the mules, however, proved difficult. They had to be slung over the ship's side by a crane and lowered into lighters which were then towed as near to the beach as the shallowness of the water would permit.
Then the the
real fun began, that of inducing
suspicious
and
unaccommodating
jump out of the lighters and wade ashore. They did not yield easily to persuasion; and what with overcoming animals
to
their reluctance and landing ammunition, carts and stores of all kinds, the battalion had a strenuous time. The bodies of the carts
had to be taken ashore separately and then have the wheels fitted to them. Fourteen days' supplies had to be landed, as well as forage for 300 mules and ponies. The men had no coolies to help them, the Chinese who were working the donkey-engine kept on refusing to work and had to be forcibly encouraged to keep going, but by unflagging exertions the ships had been cleared by 0800 hours, September 24. The battalion's labours were not over then, for the stores had to be transferred to the Base Supply Depot and ther j was a shortage of appliances for moving them. However, as General Barnardiston's dispatch of October 9 testifies, the battalion 'worked hard and cheerfully', and on September 25 it could move forward to Puh-li, six miles from the landing-places.
This march was a foretaste of difficulties come; the road, or rather track, was bad, narrow and congested with traffic; while to add to the confusion hardly anyone in the battalion knew a word of Japanese and only a very few Japanese (ftficers knew much more English, Mai'eover, the Japanese commander, General Kamio, to
proposed to employ the British force in the centre of the line, and not, as General Barnardiston wished, on the left where it would have been in touch with the ships. This not only entailed a longer march than would have been needed, but greatly increased the difficulties of supply, and consequently the privations the British contingent was to endure. Indeed the very first day of the advance found the battalion already on half-rations for want of transport, and for the same reason all crowbars and felling-axes and most of the picks and shovels had to be left behind. The second day's march to Tsimo, 14 miles further on, was peculiarly trying. Chinese roads at the best are apt to consist of a succession of boulders in a river of mud; these, moreover, were blocked with Japanese transport and guns, making halts and checks frequent. Japanese ideas of march-discipline too were not ours, and the driving of their guns was distinctly poor; they frequently broke right into our marching column and drove the men off the road into the potato fields where the long tendrils of sweet potatoes wound themselves round the men's legs and seriously hampered progress. At Tsimo the battalion encamped beside a good stream and managed to
supplement us rations by purchasing on its own account bullocks, fowls, eggs and pes. On the third day (September 27) the battalion had only nine miles to cover to Liuting. where it could hear guns firing and see the masts of German vessels in Kiaochow Bav which were replying to the Japanese fire. The intention was that the German advanced position north-east of Tsingtao should be attacked at dawn next morning, the battalion being assigned a front of 1,600 yards and having a redoubt to carry. However, as the Germans decamped during the night, the battalion was not engaged and bivouacked after a tenmile march at Yang-chia-chung, a village about three miles from the German lines. Here the 2nd South Wales Borderers spent ten days while heavy artillery was being brought forward, ammunition and siege equipment accumulated and the initial stages of the investment begun. The weather was bad, heavy rains reduced the
mud and greatly impeded the forwarding of the guns and
so-called roads to rivers of
other materials, besides making the troops very uncomfortable. The South Wales Borderers being in thin summer clothing with only one blanket and a waterproof sheet apiece, came off specially badly. However, the work was steadily pushed on, though German aeroplanes and observation balloons were much in evidence and their activities were a nuisance, reducing greatly the amount of work that could be done by day. The Japanese, who had plenty of coolies to help them, before long constructed a light railway to connect the base with the advanced positions and were able to bring forward their heavy guns. An interesting episode was the visit, on October 2, of an aide-de-camp of the Emperor of Japan who brought a present of saki for the officers, with cigarettes for them and the NCO's, and expressed the Emperor's great satisfaction at the cooperation of British and Japanese troops. Eventually, on October 10, General Barnardiston received orders from General Kamio for the 2nd South Wales Borderers to take its place in the front line, about 600 yards frontage being assigned to it. It had already had a few casualties from the German shell fire, but considering the weather and the conditions in which it was living the sick- rate had been extremely low.
Knee deep in mud This outpost line had by now been advanced in the centre to the Shibosan or Shuang Shan Ridge about a mile from the German redoubts. This was a clay ridge intersected by ravines which would have given good cover in dry weather, but in heavy rain the loose soil was easily washed away, dug-outs in the sides of the ravines collapsed, streams carried down quantities of mud to fill up trenches and reduce roads to quagmires, and a piece of work was no sooner completed than it was washed away and had to be begun afresh. To struggle against such difficulties and in unfavourable conditions was a severe trial. The troops were thinly clad and usually soaked through, much digging was needed, and, as no wheeled trant )rt was available, rations, ammunition and 'ores, including heavy beams for use in th* trenches, had to be carried up to the front by hand over a mile and a half of tracks often knee-deep in liquid mud. Two companies only were actually in line, A and B going in first.
332
The
arrival of the 36th Sikhs, the first Indian
troops to see action
while D and half C took up their position in a nullah Iwater course] about 300 yards from the village of Huang-chia-yiang, the rest of C remaining at the old bivouac to dismantle the splinter-proofs it had erected, bring the precious wood up to the new line
and
provide
parties. All
man
the
necessary
carrying
were within range of the Ger-
guns, but the battalion suffered far
more from the bad weather and the discomforts and hardships it entailed than from the enemy. Bully beef and biscuits Moreover, largely owing to transport difficulties, the troops had to carry on their heavy task on barely adequate rations, certainly on much less food than they were accustomed to in peace. Bully beef and biscuits they did receive, but no bacon or cheese; bread was occasionally issued and was usually not more than soddened dough; while the men dug up the Chinese sweet potatoes and ate them raw. They sometimes got some rice from the Japanese. It was difficult to find anything dry to make fires,
so
when
a tea ration
w as r
available,
which was not often the case, it could not always be used. 'Tea when made was a peculiar affair.' writes one survivor of Tsingtao, 'the only water available was from a stream that was in flood, and this was of a rich muddy colour which looked like good milky tea." Luxuries like sugar and jam were very occasionally issued, but for the most part the men were on the barest minimum of rations, and in the six weeks there were only two issues of tobacco. The Shibosan Ridge on which the battalion's front companies were estab-
in
the First World
War
entanglement, with a mine-field and a live wire in front. It was therefore necessary to proceed by regular siege operations, digging a succession of trench lines at intervals, 'Artillery
known
respectively
as
the
Covering Position' and the 'First'. 'Second' and 'Third Attack Positions', connected by communication trenches. The southern slope being in full view of the enemy, night work only was possible; by day picquets held the most advanced completed position, the remainder of the outpost companies being in support and reserve further back and generally engaged on carrying fatigues or in improving and maintaining the communication trenches, tasks which kept them fully employed.
The frontage allotted to the battalion was in the centre of the ridge, being roughly delimited by two low knolls, known respectively as '54' and '45.5'. The first task to dig communication trenches up to the crest, prior to the construction of the 'Artillery Covering Position' on its further side. The battalion was handicapped, especially at first, by a great shortage of tools, other than the ordinary small entrenching tools carried by the men. These,
was
though admirable for the purpose for which they were intended, were hardly fitted to deal with rock, for to add to the difficulties the ground proved to be very rocky. Moreover, while only 20 picks and shovels per
company were
available, even sandbags were extremely scarce. Thus the British troops were at a great disadvantage as with better equipped the compared Japanese, who had ample supplies of every
lished
kind of material, plenty of coolies to bring forward stores and supplies, and
obtainable behind it, but to the south it sloped gently down towards the bed of a river without affording a vestige of cover. The German front line was very strong; it consisted of a line of low-command redoubts constructed of ferro-concrete and armed with field guns and machine guns, the heavier guns being in the larger forts to the rear. Trenches defended chiefly by machine guns linked up the redoubts; 200 yards in front the ground was sharply cut away, the face of the cut being revetted, and at the foot of it was a really good wire
larger and better maps than were available for our troops. A section of Japanese engineers was attached to the battalion and did excellent work, despite the language difficulty, the NCO's often managing to explain by dumb show what they wanted done. The Germans indulged in fairly liberal shelling — on the night of October 11/12, for example, they regularly bombarded the neighbourhood of Huang-chiayiang, though the support companies, being well sheltered in the nullahs around, escaped with only two casualties. The weather was the most serious trouble however. From October 15 to 17 it rained
was partly covered with fir trees, and some degree of protection from the enemy's observation and artillery was
B Company of the Borderers lost 30 men and were driven back to the 'Second Attack Position': and so, although C Company and the Sikhs had managed under cover of the diversion to dig their trench, General Barnardiston reported to the Japanese commander-inchief that he did not yet consider the 'Third Attack Position' fit for permanent occupation. He received the reply that the general scheme of assault required it to be held, so that evening it was occupied by picquets. D Company was put in to complete C Company's work, and about midnight Lieutenant Somerville took out a patrol to ascertain the truth of the rumours, which were now current, that the Germans were evacuating their trenches. The position in front of the battalion proved to be held, and the working parties were accordingly withdrawn after completing their night's task. However, both to right and left there was unusual activity, searchlights playing freely and heavy firing going on all night. Actually the Japanese were forcing a decision, and during the night they assaulted and took a fort at the western end of the line, with the result that just as their main assault was about to be delivered at 0700 hours next day November 7 the white flag went up and the siege was over. The sudden termination of the operations robbed the little British contingent of any chance of distinguishing itself in the action which followed,
Barnardiston,
almost incessantly. Not only did it delay the work, but it meant that the men, being without tents or dug-outs or a chance of drying their clothes, 'just got wet and remained wet', as one account tells. Apparently the hard work kept the men fit, for the sick-rate
remained remarkably low.
Clashes with the Japanese The working parties were always covered by standing patrols pushed well out to the while smaller parties reconnoitred the ground between our lines and the German position. To avoid any mishaps through chance encounters with patrols from the Japanese units on the battalion's flanks a Japanese NCO and some men were usually sent out with the South Wales Borderers' patrols; this precaution was fully justified, as our patrols were nevertheless fired upon more than once by front,
patrols and sentries, though fortunately without much serious harm being done. As a further safeguard our patrols were fitted out with Japanese overcoats, 'thin khaki drill affairs with a hood' they are described, and this served the purpose of preventing the Germans from British and distinguishing between
Japanese
Japanese.
The Germans proved very unenterprising and made little effort to interfere with our working or covering parties either by fire or by patrols, so the work proceeded without more delay than the state of the ground imposed. On October 28 a half-battalion of the 36th Sikhs, which had landed a week earlier, reached the front, and one of its companies took over the right of the South Wales Borderers' frontage; two days later (October 30) the 'Artillery Covering Position' just over the crest of the ridge was occupied, whereupon the artillery were brought up into position and next day the bombardment began. It was exceedingly effective, the forts and redoubts suffered severely and some oil-tanks near the dockyard were set on fire, causing a tremendous conflagration. As soon as the 'Artillery Covering Posi-
had been occupied work was begun on the 'First Attack Position'; some nullahs leading to it provided ready-made communication trenches, and on the evening of November 1 the companies from the tion'
covering
position
occupied
it,
while
commander
of the Imperial forces
those in reserve worked in the communication trenches and Battalion Headquarters were brought right forward. Almost immediately preparations were begun for the occupation of a 'Second Attack Position' 400 yards further down the slope. The approach to this lay over the bare open, no convenient nullahs provided covered ways and the new position was in places only 300 yards from the German lines. The soil was crumbly, and as the line was on the edge of the river bed water welled up in the trenches, making the parapets subside and seriously impeding progress. The only thing to be done was to spread potato vines along the bottom of the trench and tread them in; this afforded a tolerable foothold, but quite failed to prevent water oozing in, and on the next night it was decided to substitute a sand-bag parapet for the
A and C Companies were employed on the front line, B and D working at the communication trench connecting it with the 'First Attack Position'. The men worked well, and though so many sandbags were required that the supply ran short good progress was made, useful help being given by the Japanese engineers who managed to drain part of the trench. The Germans, who were well supplied with searchlights, were constantly turning them on and opening machine gun fire on the targets disclosed, with the result that the working parties had to lie down in the mud and wait till the searchlights were turned off and the machine guns stopped fire. This delayed the work greatly, but the battalion tried to make a point of being ahead of the Japanese regiments working on its flanks, although they had so many more men avail-
trench. That evening
able for the work. On the night of November 4/5, the 'Second Attack Position' was practically completed and the communication trench brought through, though lack of sandbags again hindered progress and delayed the starting of communication trenches leading to the 'Third Attack Position', which was to be on the far side of the river bed.
Hitherto neither British battalion had encountered the enemy at close quarters. On the night of November 5/6, however, digging parties sent out by both battalions to complete the 'Third Attack Position' ran into strong German patrols. In the
stage. The Japanese intention to force a finish on the night of November 6/7, whether deliberate or the result of a sudden decision, was never communicated to General Barnardiston, and it certainly came as a complete surprise to the 2nd final
•
South Wales Borderers, who, through no unwillingness or fault of their own, missed a share in the culmination they had worked so hard to bring about. The battalion was waiting to join in that assault, and found it hard to believe that the Japanese did not know it was ready or had inadvertently omitted to warn the British of their intentions. Not having shared in the assault, however, the battalion had come off fairly lightly as regards casualties, its total being 14 men killed or died of wounds or disease and 2 officers and 34 men wounded. Nevertheless the siege of Tsingtao had been an exhausting and trying experience. The battalion had had to work hard in the face of serious difficulties and handicaps. Many of these have been mentioned, want of tools and maps, shortage of rations, the absence of adequate shelter and fuel,
summer
clothing which was ill-suited to the severe weather; perhaps the most serious was the difficulty of co-operating with allies whose ways were not our ways and whose language was unfamiliar. The Japanese, it must be admitted, were interesting rather than easy people with whom to co-operate. Though they welcomed the presence of a British contingent at the siege and liked to serve alongside a British regiment, they seemed anxious to impress on us their extreme efficiency. It looked almost as if they wished the British to be there mainly as spectators, to see how well the Japanese could do the work. [The publishers are grateful to the Regl mental Committee of the South Wales Borderers for permission to reproduce extracts from their Regimental Histor the Great War by Professor (\ T Atki) and published by the Medici Society. |
•Bombay
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MADAGASCAR
NOV 9 MINOTAUR to
Cape
SOUTH AFRICA Freemantle
NOV1 ANZAC convoy puts to sea
500 500
1500
1000 1000
2000
2000 Miles
3000 Kms
CLEARING
THE
PACIFIC
The outbreak
of war brought an immediate response from the governments of New Zealand and Australia. An expeditionary force for service in Europe was raised, but while it assembled there were more pressing problems on their own doorstep
Christopher Dowling
334
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Occupation by
Japanese
ANZAC
troops
Route taken by
ANZAC
Route taken by
HMAS AUSTRALIA
Other main naval
convoy
movements by
Allied ships
Route taken by German ships
German wireless
stations
Above: The clearing of the Pacific and the ANZAC convoys. On the outbreak of war, the offers by New Zealand and Australia to supply troops for service in Europe were gratefully accepted by Britain. The dispatch of the convoys, however, was held up by the uncertain position of the various elements of the German East Asiatic Squadron. While the first convoy
was
waiting, several Allied expeditionary
groups were sent out to capture the Germanoccupied islands in the Pacific and destroy the wireless stations on them. After this, the convoy was able to set out as the German squadron was known to be heading for South America. Below: A powerful Japanese contribution to the Allied naval forces in the Pacific was the baltle-cruiser Ibuki. Displacement: 14,600 tons. Length: 450 feet. Beam: 75 /2 feet. Power/speed: 24,000 hp/22 knots. Armament: Four 12-inch, eight 8-inch and fourteen 4.7-inch. Armour: Belt and turrets 7 inches. Crew: 817 men 1
On
July 29, 1914, the British government sent a telegram to the Governor-Generals of Australia and New Zealand warning them that war was imminent. The following day New Zealand offered to provide an expeditionary force if the need arose. Australia took longer to reply. The Prime Minister, Joseph Cook, was away from Melbourne campaigning for the forthcoming general election. An urgent message was sent to him in cipher but as he did not have the key he could make nothing of it. The Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro-Ferguson, was in Sydney. The Australian Chiefof-Staff. Colonel Legge, was at sea on his way back from England. The Cabinet was hastily summoned and after an emergency meeting on August 3, the government announced that it was prepared to place the Australian navy under the control of the British Admiralty and to raise an expeditionary force of 20,000 men. This offer was gratefully accepted once war had been declared, the British government requesting that the force be sent as soon possible. Andrew Fisher, the leader of the Labour opposition, had already made his party's position clear when he declared in a famous phrase that Australia would support Britain 'to the last man and the last shilling'. Although the Empire was automatically drawn into any war involving the mother country, none of the dominions was bound to provide armed forces for service overseas, and only tentative plans had been made for joint action with Britain in wartime. However, as a result of measures taken during the previous decade, both Australia and New Zealand had in 1914 the nucleus of an effective fighting force. Compulsory military service had been in existence for several years. The setting up in 1907 of the Imperial General Staff, on which Australia was represented, ensured that the dominion armies were trained and organised on similar lines to those of Britain. Australia had her own military college at Duntroon, which had been established on the advice of Lord Kitchener. Contingents from Australia and New Zealand had fought with distinction in the Boer War and many of these veterans were still fit for active service. In addition, Australia had her own navy, paid for out of her own revenue and largely manned by Australian crews. In peacetime this navy was controlled by the Australian government, but it had been agreed that in wartime it should be put at the disposal of the British naval a,s
Rabaul
in the Bismarck Archipelago. Patey was given permission search the islands and hurried north with the Australia, Sydney and the three destroyers. On the night of August 11 the destroyers stole into Blanche Bay expecting to find the German cruisers at anchor but the harbour was empty. Spee was in fact at Pagan in the Marianas, 1,600 miles away. Unsuccessful attempts were made the following day to locate the wireless station, which could be heard reporting the movements of the Australian ships. After wrecking the post office at Rabaul and capturing a steamer loaded with equipment for the elusive wireless station, Patey withdrew to refuel. On August 12 a task force from the China Squadron destroyed the wireless station at Yap, which linked Tsingtao with German New Guinea and its dependencies. The signals to and from this station had given the Australians a rough idea of the position of the German squadron. These signals now ceased, and nothing was heard of Spee for nearly a month. On August 6 the British government telegraphed the Australian Government proposing that it should seize the German wireless stations at Yap, Nauru and New Guinea. A similar message was sent to the New Zealand government in regard to Samoa. It was inevitable that both Australia and New Zealand would be involved to
JOin TOGETHER- TRAIN TOGETHER
EMBARK TOGETHER
FIGHT TOGETHER
authorities.
The main units of the Royal Australian Navy in August 1914 were the battle-cruiser Australia, the light cruisers Melbourne, Sydney and Encounter (the last-named on loan from the Admiralty), the destroyers Paramatta, Yarra and Warrego and the submarines AE1 and AE2. The commander of this squadron was Rear-Admiral Sir George Patey. On the New Zealand station, which was an independent command, there were three antiquated 'P' class light cruisers. The third and most important British naval force in the Pacific was the China Squadron, with one battleship, two armoured cruisers and two light cruisers. When the warning telegram from London was received there seemed little doubt that the enemy would be Germany. Between 1884 and 1914 Germany had acquired a string of colonies in the Pacific with the aim, it was suspected, of furthering her growing naval ambitions. The chief German naval base was at Tsingtao, which had been garrisoned and fortified. The other German possessions were German New Guinea, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Solomons, Palau, Mariana, Caroline and Marshall Islands and Samoa. These territories, with the exception of Samoa, were administered from Rabaul, where there was an excellent harbour. At Tsingtao, Yap, Nauru and Apia there were powerful wireless stations and a fifth was being constructed at Bitapaka near Rabaul. The German squadron in the Pacific consisted of the armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, the light cruisers Leipzig, Niirnberg and Emden and several smaller vessels under the command of Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee, an able and experienced seaman. The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau carried 8.2-inch guns — a heavier armament than any ship of the Australian Squadron apart from the Australia, which mounted 12-inch guns and was capable of sinking both the German cruisers. While he was reasonably confident of being able to deal with the China Squadron, his immediate adversary, Spee recognised that there were two contingencies which could tilt the scales decisively against him — the bringing up of the Australia and the entry of Japan, and her powerful battlefleet, into the war. Admiral Patey, faithful to official doctrine, regarded the hunting down of the German squadron as his primary task. Of its whereabouts at the beginning of August little was known. Then, shortly before the outbreak of the war, the Australian wireless stations began to intercept messages which suggested that the German squadron was much nearer than had been assumed, possibly at
336
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on Australians love
of sport
in operations against the German colonies but the suddenness of the British request took the Australians by surprise: they were in the throes of recruiting and organising the main expeditionary force, and the German squadron was still at large in the Pacific. Nevertheless, both countries set about raising the necessary troops. The New Zealand expedition was the first to be fitted out. The only escorts on the New Zealand station were the three 'P' class cruisers, which would be no match for the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau should they encounter them, as seemed possible, in Samoan waters. Patey was therefore ordered by the Admiralty to cover the expedition with the Australia and was forced, very reluctantly, to abandon the search for the German cruisers.
Bloodless surrender At dawn on August 15 two transports left Wellington Harbour with 1,363 men under the command of Colonel Robert Logan. Patey met the expeditionary force at Noumea with the Australia and the Melbourne; waiting in the harbour was the French cruiser Montcalm, which had been ordered to join the expedition. The fleet arrived off Apia on August 30. The Germans, who had
'
made no defensive preparations, surrendered without a shot being fired and Samoa was formally occupied. The New Zealanders were thus the first Commonwealth troops to set foot on enemy soil. Shortly afterwards Patey departed with the Australia, Melbourne and Montcalm to escort the New Guinea expedition. On the voyage back the Me/bourne was detached to destroy the wireless station at Nauru, the naval landing party being helped ashore in the heavy surf by a friendly native. The New Guinea expedition left Sydney on August 19 in the troopship Berruna. The Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force, as it was called, consisted of a battalion of infantry and six companies of the Royal Australian Naval Reserve, with supporting units. In command of this force was Colonel William Holmes, a part-time soldier who had served in the Boer War. Some 500 men of the Kennedy Regiment, a citizen battalion garrisoning Thursday Island, volunteered for service outside Australia and were sent to Port Moresby in the Kanowna. Patey gave instructions that the Berruna was not to proceed beyond Palm Island, or the Kanowna beyond Port Moresby, until he returned from Samoa. After more than a week's delay at Palm Island, during which the troops were systematically trained,
HMAS Sydney,
one
of the escorts
on the attack on Rabaul
orders, Patey having been led to believe that there were two wireless stations near Rabaul. No opposition was offered to the landings. The German commander, Captain von Klewitz, planned to lure the Australians inland and then ambush them. He had at his disposal 52 Germans, some of whom had received military training, and about 240 native levies of indifferent quality. As the wireless station was likely to be the main object of any attack, he had stationed the bulk of his forces to cover the approaches to Bitapaka.
Bowen's party soon found the road to Bitapaka and threaded way through the thick jungle which fringed it on either side. The Australians had advanced about half a mile when one of the scouting groups suddenly came upon 20 natives under a their
German NCO, crouching
in the scrub. The natives scuttled for cover as the Australians opened fire and the German, Sergeant-
Major Mauderer, was wounded and taken prisoner. Bowen (contrary to the rules of war) forced Mauderer at gun-point to call out to his comrades that further resistance was useless since there were 800 Australians close behind. Hearing Mauderer's voice, two other Germans emerged from the bush and were at once captured. They turned out to be senior officers and were found to be carrying detailed maps of the road. Bowen sent back for reinforcements and pushed on under sporadic sniping. At about 1000 hours the Australians were held up by heavy fire, which came from a trench across the road. They had already begun to suffer casualties, one of them being Captain Pockley of the Army Medical Corps, who was mortally wounded. Lieutenant Hill now arrived with 59 men from the destroyers and he and Bowen decided to send parties to work round the flanks of the German position. This movement had scarcely begun when Bowen was wounded. As Hill's men crept forward in the stifling heat further reinforcements came up under Lieutenant-Commander Elwell, who took over command of one of the flanking parties. Elwell got to within 80 yards of the trench and ordered a charge. He was killed almost immediately but the Germans, whose position had become untenable, hoisted a white flag. After a lengthy discussion the senior German officer, Lieutenant Kempf, reluctantly agreed to surrender the wireless station. Kempf was sent with a party of men under Lieutenant Bond to round up the rest of the Bitapaka force. Bond, displaying considerable resource and daring, succeeded in disarming some 19 Germans and 60 natives. At about 1900 hours he took possession of the wireless station, which had been partially destroyed by the Germans. Patey decided that it was too isolated to be permanently occupied. Accordingly it was made inoperative and the landing parties were re-embarked. The party which went ashore at Herbertshohe under SubLieutenant Webber had a less eventful day. Webber advanced half-way to Toma without meeting any resistance but, not surprisingly, was unable to find any trace of the wireless station. Fearing that he might be cut off if he went further into the interior, he returned to Herbertshohe.
'No more "Urn Kaiser" On September 12 Australian
troops
marched
into
Rabaul and
Herbertshohe, which had not been fortified by the Germans. The following day the British flag was ceremonially hoisted and Inoccupation formally proclaimed. A thoughtful official provided a translation for the natives: 'All boys belongina one place, you savvy big master he come now, he new feller master. He look out good you feller. He belonga British (English); he more better than other feller. No more Kaiser. God save King.' The acting governor of German New Guinea, Dr Haber, insisted that he had no authority to surrender the colony and its dependencies How ever, after protracted negotiations, terms of capitulation were drawn up and on September 21 all German troops still in the field laid down their arms. In the next few months New Ireland, the Solomons, Madang, Nauru and the other German possessions south of the equator were occupied by Australian troops. The conquest of German New Guinea cost the Australians six dead and four wounded. One other loss, which resulted indirectly from the campaign, was the disappearance on September of the submarine AE1 with 35 men on board. The German casualties were one European and some 30 natives killed, and one European and ten natives wounded. Had the native troops been better trained and disciplined they might have inflicted heavy losses on the Australians, who had to advance over difficult and unfamiliar terrain. Klewitz later admitted that the skill of the Australians in bush fighting came as a surprise to him. By keeping to the edge of the jungle the Australians avoided two large mil which had been placed in the middle of the Bitapaka road Curiously enough, the false report about the 800 troops, wl i
The
first
ANZAC convoy
out for Europe
finally sets
Um
Patey ordered the Sydney to escort the expedition to a rendezvous in the Louisiade Archipelago off the eastern end of New Guinea, calling at Port
Moresby
to pick
up the
rest of the convoy.
At Port
Moresby, which was reached on September 4, Colonel Holmes inspected the Kanowna contingent and pronounced them unfit for active service. Patey was unwilling to discharge them but he had little option when, shortly after leaving Port Moresby, the Kanowna's crew mutinied, refusing to take the ship outside Australian waters. She was promptly sent back to Townsville in disgrace.
The
I
Louisiades on September 9 consisted of the Australia, Sydney, Encounter and Berrima, along with three destroyers, two submarines and several supply ships and colliers. In the early hours of September 11 the destroyers reconnoitred Blanche Bay and St George's Channel and reported the area clear of enemy shipping. At 0600 hours, 25 navai reservists under Lieutenant Bowen were landed at Kubakaul with orders to seize the wireless station, which was thought to lie some distance inland. Another party, under the command of SubLieutenant Webber, was put ashore at Herbertshohe with similar fleet
Um
which assembled
off the
I
Bovven put into Mauderer's mouth, completely disorganised the defence. Somehow the report reached Klewitz, while messages giving the true strength of the landing parties failed to get through. The German commander despaired of defending the coastal areas against such overwhelming numbers and persuaded the governor to order a withdrawal inland. On September 15 Admiral Patey, having handed over the command in New Guinea to Colonel Holmes, sailed for Port Jackson with the Australia. Melbourne and Sydney to prepare for the departure of the convoy for Europe. The Montcalm was left to protect Rabaul. Two days later Patey received a telegram from the Admiralty which completely altered the situation in the South Pacific. On September 14 the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had appeared off Samoa. They had steamed away without firing a shot and had last been seen steering to the north-west — a clever piece of deception on the part of the German admiral. The possibility that Spee might double back to New Guinea could not be ruled out, Patey also learnt that the Emden had begun to cruise against shipping in the Indian Ocean, and while she was at large no convoy could be considered safe. Acting on instructions from the Admiralty, Patey sped back to Rabaul with the Australia and Sydney to support the expedition which Colonel Holmes was fitting out for the occupation of Madang on the mainland of German New Guinea. This operation was successfully accomplished on September 24. Meanwhile, the Sydney was detached to destroy the wireless station at Anguar. Patey was at last free to resume his search for the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, for he had been informed by the Admiralty that the Australia was no longer required for convoy duty. He had, all along, forecast the movements of the German cruisers with remarkable accuracy and he had been convinced for some time that they were making for the coast of South America. News which came at the beginning of October, that Spee had bombarded Papeete, seemed to confirm his view. On October 3 Patey steamed out of Rabaul with the bulk of his squadron and headed eastwards. While Australia and New Zealand were carrying out local operations against the German colonies the main expeditionary forces were being trained and equipped. Recruiting for the Australian contingent began on August 10 and the military headquarters were at once besieged by crowds of eager applicants. One young Queenslander travelled over 2,000 miles to enlist. Medical standards were high and many of those who offered themselves were turned away. Men who were rejected in one capital tried their luck elsewhere. Some sailed to Britain to enlist in British regiments. In New Zealand there was a similar rush to join up. Even before the British government had formally accepted the offer of an expeditionary force the ranks were filled to overflowing. The organisation and command of the Australian expeditionary force was entrusted to Brigadier-General William Thoresby Bridges. Of Scottish birth, Bridges had served with the British Cavalry Division in the Boer war and later went to London as Australia's representative on the Imperial General Staff. He was something of an intellectual and had an impressive grasp of the principles of warfare. In manner he was gruff and forbidding, his most characteristic utterance being a grunt. As his Chief-of-Staff he chose Major Cyril White, who had been the first Australian officer to attend the Staff College at Camberley, where he had attracted favourable attention. White was only 38 when the war broke out but he had already shown himself to be a gifted organiser. Bridges was determined that the Australian contingent should preserve its national identity, and he managed to prevent the War Office from splitting it up and distributing the various brigades among British divisions. He christened the new army the Australian Imperial Force. The AIF consisted of the 1st Australian Infantry Division and the 1st Light Horse Brigade, with a total strength of 20,226 men. Of the three brigades which comprised the infantry division, the first was drawn from New South Wales, the second from Victoria and the third from the remaining states — Queensland, South Australia, Western Australia and Tasmania. The same principle was followed with the three regiments which made up the light horse brigade. The 1st Light Horse Regiment was recruited from New South Wales, the 2nd from Queensland and the 3rd from South Australia and Tasmania. The 4th Light Horse Regiment, which was raised in Victoria, was attached to the infantry division as divisional cavalry. The artillery was equipped with the British 18-pounder gun. The brigadiers and regimental officers were mainly drawn from the Australian militia. They were supplemented by a number of British regular officers who happened to be in Australia. A Sydney barrister, H. N. MacLaurin, commanded the 1st Infantry Brigade; a lawyer, James M'Cay, the 2nd. As commander of the 3rd Bri-
German
338
gade, Bridges chose a personal friend, Lieutenant-Colonel E. G. Sinclair-MacLagan, a British regular officer. Command of t he Light Horse Brigade went to Colonel Harry Chauvel, the Ails " tralian representative on the Imperial General Staff. The st aff of the 1st Australian Division was of high quality and no few' er than 11 of its members were to become generals before the ef^ of the war. One of the most brilliant, and certainly the mc>st eccentric, was John Gellibrand, a retired British officer with st aff college training who had settled in Tasmania. Unathletic aP d unkempt, he was unlikely to have progressed very far as a st a ^ officer in the British Army. The New Zealand Expeditionary Force numbered 7,761 men aP d consisted of an infantry brigade and a mounted rifles brigad e Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago each provided oiie battalion of infantry and one regiment of mounted rifles. Tlie New Zealand field artillery was armed with the 18-pounder ar1(* the new 4-5-inch howitzer. The staff officers were mostly British regulars, but almost all the regimental officers were New Ze a ~ -
landers. The commander of this force was Major-General Alexander Godley, a resolute but rather pompous soldier.
S* r
Thirst for adventure of these contingents were the pick of Australia ar " Zealand. They went to war in a spirit of romantic enthusiasrf1 They had volunteered because the 'old country' was in dange r because they disliked what Germany stood for, because the v thirsted for adventure and because they felt a subconscious nee" to prove themselves and their nations in the fiery test of battl e They were tough, self-reliant and of magnificent physique. JoF n Masefield, who saw them later in the war, wrote that they 'walkc and looked like the kings in old poems'. The average height °f the Australian was 5 feet 8 inches; that of the New Zealande rs was over an inch more. One battalion of New Zealanders average3 "
The men
1
New
-
'
-
-
5 feet 11 inches.
Bridges was anxious to get the AIF away as soon as possib* e and had planned to send the horses off in the slower transports c)n August 28. However, as German warships were believed to P e cruising in the Indian Ocean, the Admiralty refused to allow tlie transports to sail except in convoy, and escorts could not P e provided until the Samoan and New Guinea operations had bee 11
wound
up.
Japan's entry into the war on August 22 greatly simplified tP e problem of the escort. The Japanese took over the blockade P* Tsingtao and the protection of trade north of Hong Kong, releasir £ the China Squadron for other duties. The Admiralty propose" that the New Zealand force should leave Wellington on Septembr r 20 under two of the 'P' class cruisers and join the Australia ^ fleet, which was to assemble at Albany. The whole convoy wouF sail for England in the first week of October under the Sydnr^ and Melbourne. This plan assumed that the Scharnhorst ar " l
1
1
Gneisenau would have been located or, better still, sunk, by tH e time the convoy was ready to depart. But the date of embarkatic,n drew near and the German cruisers were still at large. By now the New Zealand authorities were becoming increasingly uneasy about sending their transport to sea with an escort P* only 'P' class cruisers, obsolete vessels liable to frequent breaF" downs. The news of Spee's descent on Samoa caused a flurry r" alarm both in Australia and in New Zealand. The sudden rr" appearance of the German cruisers forced the Admiralty to revis' e 1 its arrangements for the convoy. The Australia, as we have see/ belonging New Guinea. Two ships was sent to cover the troops in to the China Squadron, the armoured cruiser Minotaur and tr ^ powerful Japanese battle-cruiser Ibuki, were ordered to procee' : to Freemantle to escort the combined Australian and New ZealarP convoy across the Indian Ocean. However, no additional measure s were taken to safeguard the transports on their voyage to tH e rendezvous. The Australian government now began to hav.^ 11 serious doubts about the wisdom of allowing its ships to sa round the coast of Australia without a naval escort. On Septembe r 24 the Governor-General of Australia, unable to conceal h iS e anxiety, confided to his opposite number in New Zealand that H Zealand goverrl" New did not consider the Tasman Sea safe. The ment immediately recalled two transports which had just le" Auckland on their way south, and postponed the sailing of th e remainder. Although the Admiralty still believed that an escoi*' was unnecessary, they decided, in view of local feeling, to sen ; the Minotaur and Ibuki to collect the New Zealand convoy an d bring it to Western Australia. '
1
Top
right:
The landings on Direction
Island. Centre: Admiral Patey.
commander of the Australian naval forces. Right: Tough and relatively untrained. New Zealand infantry embark
fit,
but
still
it
i
tL
Much to General Bridges's annoyance, the embarkation of the A1F was cancelled and those transports already at sea were ordered hack to port. This false start was extremely frustrating for the troops and had a had effect on discipline. At the end of September news was received of Spee's attack on Papeete. As Papeete was 2.300 miles from New Zealand, the German cruiser could no longer he regarded as a threat to shipping in the Tasman Sea Nevertheless, the New Zealand government Stubbornly insisted that the Minotaur and Ibuki should come to escort transports as arranged. At long last the great convoy began to assemble. On October 16 the New Zealand transport left Wellington under the protection of the Minotaur, Ibuki and two of the 'P' class cruisers and headed out into stormy waters of the Tasman Sea. Almost simultaneously the Australian transports started to make their way towards Albany. By October 28 all 26 ships lay at anchor in the harbour oi' King George's Sound. Hard on the heels of the last Australian transport came the ten ships of the New Zealand convoy. Early on November 1 the Orient liner Oroieto, carrying General Bridges and his staff, led the convoy out to sea. Off Freemantle it was joined by two large Western Australian transports and the ships took up their final stations. The convoy covered an area of over 20 square miles. At the head steamed the graceful Minotaur whose Captain, Edward Kiddle, was the senior naval officer. The Australian transports followed about five miles behind, arranged in three parallel lines. Then came the New Zealand transports in two lines. The Sydney hovered about four miles away on the port beam; the Ibuki, belching dense clouds of smoke from her three funnels, was on the starboard beam. The Melbourne brought up the rear. The speed of the convoy was dictated by the Southern, which could make barely ten knots and was the target of many a curse and gibe. The discipline of the convoy left a good deal to be desired, the Australian transports being the worst offenders. Their stationkeeping was poor, and at night, some of them, disregarding the order to dim all lights, twinkled like floating hotels. Rubbish was constantly being thrown overboard and the commander had to remind his charges that 'this is not a paper-chase'. Strict precautions were taken as the convoy approached the Cocos Islands where, it was thought, the Emden and possibly the Konigsberg might be lying in wait. It would have been suicidal for the Emden to make an attempt on the convoy in daylight but, in view of the skill and daring of her captain, Karl von Muller, there was a danger that he might try to slip in among the transports at night. Actually, Muller had no idea that the convoy was at sea.
'Strange warship approaching' On October 8, when the convoy was about 230 miles south-east of the Cocos Islands, the Minotaur was ordered to proceed to the Cape of Good Hope, a change of plan brought about by Spee's victory at Coronel. The Emden, which was at this moment about 250 miles ahead of the convoy, intercepted the Minotaur's signals, but supposed them to come from the light cruiser Newcastle. With the departure of the Minotaur, Captain Silver of the Melbourne took charge of the convoy. As dawn broke on November 9 the convoy was some 50 miles east of the Cocos Islands, ploughing through a tranquil sea. Suddenly, at 0624 hours, the wireless operators intercepted a message in an unknown code and heard the Cocos wireless station calling: 'What is that code?' After trying unsuccessfully to raise the Minotaur, the Cocos station put out a general call: SOS Strange warship approaching.' Then there was silence.
The Melbourne at once pulled away from the convoy and had begun to steam at full speed towards the Cocos Islands when Captain Silver remembered that his first duty was to protect the transports. Reluctantly, he turned back, ordering the Sydney to go in his place. The Sydney got up steam and soon disappeared over the horizon, travelling at 20 knots. At 0940J|j|MMgi||Brehwards ported that she had sighted an enemy cruiser steeriH|j|
and the Melbourne moved over and took up a position far out on the port beam of the convoy. The Ibuki had also heard the Sydney's signal and was eager to join the fray. The troops thronging the decks of the transports saw her race across the bows of the convoy, smoke billowing from her funnels, her decks cleared for action and two huge ensigns of the rising sun streaming out in the breeze. But the Melbourne refused to let her leave the convoy. Officers and men gazed across the sea and strained their ears for the distant rumble of gunfire, but the only sound of battle was the spluttering of the wireless. At 1144 hours the Sydney signalled: 'Emden beached and done for.' This was the first time that the enemy ship had been positively identified and the news of the Sydney's success was greeted with cheers. The convoy sailed on, and after another night of steaming without lights a report was received that the Konigsberg had been run to earth on the coast of Africa. This meant that the only two enemy cruisers in the Indian Ocean were now accounted for. The convoy was broken up and 13 of the transports were sent ahead to
Colombo
to fuel
and water.
From Colombo the convoy proceeded in three divisions to Aden. From there they were sent to reinforce the garrison in Egypt, a disappointment to many of the men who thought they were going to the Western Front. Arrangements were made for the Australians and New Zealanders to encamp near Cairo and on December 3 the troops
began
to
On December 28
disembark at Alexandria. a second contingent of Australian
and New Zealand troops left Albany for Egypt. The Australian troops on board included the 4th Infantry Brigade and the 2nd Light Horse Brigade. In command of the former was a man who was to become one of Australia's most famous soldiers: Colonel John Monash. By the end of 1914 Germany had been stripped of all her Pacific colonies and her warships had been driven from the surrounding seas. While the Australians and New Zealanders occupied the German islands south of the equator, the Japanese occupied those to the north. The German colonies were weakly defended and, since British sea power prevented reinforcements from being sent out, their fall was only a matter of time. The German cruisers achieved negligible results and Spee only succeeded in delaying the departure of the Australian and New Zealand convoy, of whose existence, owing to poor Intelligence, he was unaware. By a strange irony the Australia scarcely fired a shot in anger during the First World War. Yet the part she played in 1914, if unspec-
was of immense importance. The presence of the Australia helped to drive Spee from the western Pacific and certainly deterred him from venturing into Australasian waters, where he might have done serious damage. As it was, the Admiralty considered the Pacific so secure that it withdrew the Australia, Melbourne and Sydney for service elsewhere. During the remaining years of the war the troopships crossed the Indian Ocean unhindered, often without an escort, carrying the youth of Australia and New Zealand to the battlefields of Europe. tacular,
Further Reading Bean, C. E W.. Anzac to Amiens (Canberra: Australian
War Memorial,
1946) Corbett. Sir Julian
and Newbolt, Sir Henry, Naval Operations (Longmans 1920-1931) Lucas. Sir Charles. The Empire at War (OUP 1921-1924) Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 (Sydney Angus & Robertson 1938-1939) Schuler, P. F. E.. Australia in Arms (T. Fisher Unwin 1916) Waite, W., The New Zealanders at Gallipoli (Wellington: Whitcomb &
Tombs, 1921)
CHRISTOPHER DOWLING was born m New Zealand and educated at Highgate 5 School and Oriel College, Oxford After a year m industry he returned to Oxforc \ to complete a D.Phil thesis on naval his^^urirK^^^jgieontc wars. He is £•
SociefplPP^^SIWHhe
Councillor of the Navy Records Museum Services at Londa^s Imperial
Department
War Museum
...
GOEBEN & BRESLAU
The ones that got away At the very moment of Britain's declaration of war, confusion at the Admiralty and lack of the 'Nelson Touch' among her commanders at sea allowed two German ships, the Goeben and the Breslau to escape the British Mediterranean Fleet. Richard Wright describes their escape into the Dardanelles which was to have far reaching effects on the course of the war At the beginning of August 1914 the French Fleet was the largest in the Mediterranean, totalling 16 battleships, six cruisers and 14 destroyers. Only one of its battleships the flagship Courbet, was of the dreadnought type, six of the remainder being of the Danton class, built between 1908 and 1911. The designed speed of the Danton class ships was no more than 19 knots, and they were armed with four 12-inch and 12 9.4-inch guns. The rest of the French battleships were of older vintage still, and quite obsolete. The principal task of this force, at the beginning of the war with Germany, was to safeguard the passage of the transports conveying the 80,000 men of the French Colonial Corps from Algeria to Marseilles for service on the Western Front. The Fleet's Commander-in-Chief was Admiral Boue de Lapeyrere, a forceful and
competent officer, who had been largely responsible for the modernisation of the French navy. The British Mediterranean Fleet consisted of three battlecruisers each of 18,000 tons, with an armament of eight 12-inch guns, and a speed of 25i knots, four armoured cruisers of 14,000 tons, armed with 9.2-inch and 7.5-inch guns, lour light cruisers armed with 6-inch and 4-inch guns, and a number of destroyers Its commander was Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne, with the four armoured cruisers forming the Fust Cruiser Squadron under Rear-Admiral Troubridge. Admiral Fisher had linn opposed to Above. The Goeben and the Breslau Under command of the German Admiral Souchon, their task was more diplomatic than naval
Milne's appointment to the Mediterranean Fleet in 1911, regarding it as a Court appointment since Milne, who had heen Groomin-Waiting to Edward VII. was still an intimate at Court and had spent a good deal of his service on the royal yacht. Milne was of a somewhat inflexible cast of mind, and even wrote of himself that he never disobeyed an order and never used his discretion. These characteristics were to prove a considerable handicap during the opening days of the war. The mam tasks of the British Fleet were to assist the French in the event o\' war and to watch for the three dreadnoughts and three other battleships belonging to the Austrian Fleet at the port of Pola in the Adriatic, In addition, since Italy had been negotiating with Germany and Austria for some time and it was uncertain whether or not she would remain neutral, Milne's fleet had to keep an eye on her navy, with its three modern dreadnoughts. Germany, with the second largest fleet in the world, maintained only two ships in the Mediterranean. The larger of these was the battle-cruiser SMS Goeben of 23,000 tons, mounting ten 11-inch and 12 a. 9-inch guns, and with a trial speed of 27.2 knots. She was superior in individual speed and fire-power to any other ship in the Mediterranean. Her consort SMS Breslau, on the other hand, was only a light cruiser of 4,550 tons, armed with 10 4.1-inch guns. The squadron's commander was Admiral Souchon, 'a droopjawed determined little man in a long, ill-fitting frock-coat, looking more like a parson than an admiral', but he seems to have been as skilled a diplomat as he was a sailor, displaying throughout the next few days a strong awareness of the political implications of his orders, and often anticipating them. The task of his squadron was ostensibly to show the flag, but in reality to be in readiness to attack the French troop transports. Eventually, however, it was to be required for quite a different purpose. The Goeben was at Haifa when the news came through of the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo. Her boilers had been leaking water for some time, and she was due to return to Kiel for repairs in October. Souchon, realised that war was approaching and made for Pola, where he telegraphed to the Admiralty in Berlin to send new boiler tubes and skilled repair men there at once. At Pola repairs were carried out throughout July, but were still not completed when Souchon received the telegram warning him of the imminence of war. He left Pola
SMS
Goeben. At the moment of her entry into the Dardanelles with her consort, Breslau. Turkey was still holding back from entering the war The sale of the two ships, conducted with extraordinary diplomatic skill by the Germans, brought the Ottoman Empire a step nearer to joining the conflict. After the sale, the Goeben was renamed the Yavuz Sultan Selim
with the intention of breaking out into the Atlantic after inflicting what damage he could on the French transports, but his fuel was insufficient, for though he tried to coal at Brindisi, he was refused supplies by the still-neutral Italians and had to make for Messina where he could obtain coal from German merchant ships. On the way Goeben was joined by Breslau at Taranto.
Under false colours At Messina Souchon requisitioned a German merchant steamer, the General, and took on 2,000 tons of coal. At 1300 hours on August 3 he left Messina and headed towards the Algerian coast where he intended to bombard the French embarkation ports of Philipeville and Bone. News of the declaration of war with France was received at 1800 hours and Souchon pressed forward towards the Algerian coast. Eight hours later he received instructions to proceed at once to Constantinople, as the German government wished to sway Turkish opinion in favour of entering the war on the side of the Central Powers. These he disregarded temporarily, ran up the Russian flag, contrary to the Hague Convention, and bombarded Philipeville, whilst the Breslau attacked Bone. This action only delayed the departure of the French transports for a few days until convoys could be formed. Souchon then turned back towards Messina intending to take on more coal before proceeding to Constantinople. In the meantime Milne's fleet had assembled at Malta with instructions to watch the mouth of the Adriatic for the Austrians and to shadow the Goeben. Two battle-cruisers were sent to the Adriatic together with Troubridge's Cruiser Squadron, while the light cruiser Chatham was sent to watch for Goeben in the Straits of Messina. Chatham failed to find Goeben, and Milne, having heard reports of a German collier at Majorca, concluded that she would make for the Atlantic. He therefore detached the battlecruisers Indomitable and Indefatigable from Troubridge's squadron, and sent them westwards to hunt for the German ships. In point of fact Lapeyrere with the French fleet had been moving southwards from Toulon since 0400 hours and would have effecGoeben 's exit. Britain was still officially neutral, however, and full wireless communication had not been established between the French and British commanders, although Milne tried to contact Lapeyrere all day without success.
tively barred
Then at 0930 hours on the morning of the 4th Indomitable and Indefatigable encountered Goeben and Breslau returning eastwards from Philipeville and Bone. Germany and Britain were not yet at war. though Kennedy, the senior British officer, in Indomitable, knew that it was imminent. The two forces crossed one another's path, guns trained fore and aft, omitting the customary salutes. Then the British ships turned and followed Goeben for nearly five hours, determined to keep her in sight until war should he declared, reporting her position to Milne, who informed the Admiralty: 'Indomitable and Indefatigable shadowing Goeben and Breslau, 37.44 North, 7.56 East.' Churchill telegraphed hack 'Very good. Hold her. War imminent.' and tried desperately to persuade the Cabinet to authorise an attack on the German ships should they attack the French transports. But the Cahinet refused to permit an attack before the expiry of Britain's ultimatum to Germany at midnight, and a British opportunity was lost. The chase continued. Souchon drove Goeben to her utmost. Stokers who normally could not work for more than two hours at a stretch were kept at work in the heat and four of them died between morning and evening as speed was maintained. Slowly the German ships drew ahead, until only the light cruiser Dublin still had the enemy in sight. In London the First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, pointed out There is still time to sink the Goeben before dark". Churchill, his hands tied by the Cabinet decision, could make no reply. During the night of August 4 the Goeben and Breslau, still pursued by the Dublin, disappeared into the fog off the north coast of Sicily. During the 5th and 6th the two German ships took on coal at Messina. Milne had been instructed to respect Italian neutrality and not to go within six miles of the kalian coast. This precluded him from entering the Straits of Messina, and he therefore set Inflexible and Indefatigable to patrol west of Sicily, while the light cruiser Gloucester, backed up by Troubridge's squadron in the Adriatic, patrolled in the south. Twelve hours
after
he reached Messina Souchon was warned by
the Italians that the rules of international law required his departure from a neutral port within 24 hours of arrival, but he persuaded the authorities to count the 24 hours from the time he had been warned rather than his time of arrival. The respite gained was important, since coaling was being carried out. under
great difficulties, from German merchant ships whose decks in some cases had almost to be dismantled to allow the fuel to he transferred. At noon on August 6 he ordered his men, exhausted by their efforts in the heat, to rest, and decided to sail at 1700 hours when the ultimatum expired. The 1500 tons of coal which had heen taken on were insufficient to reach the Dardanelles, and a collier was therefore sent on ahead to a rendezvous at Cape Malea on the south coast of Greece. Then, just before he set out, Souchon received a telegram informing him that entry into the Dardanelles w as inadvisable for the time being. Enver Pasha (Turkish Minister for War) had agreed to the entry of the German ships, but the Grand Vizier and other members of the anti-war party in the Turkish Cabinet were anxious to maintain Turkish neutrality, or at least to keep both sides guessing. Souchon was also informed that no help could be expected from the Austrian Fleet. Despite this he decided to make for the Dardanelles, in his own words 'to force the Turks, even against their will, to spread the war to the Black Sea against their ancient enemy, Russia'. 7
Those about to die That afternoon the officers of the two ships made their wills and prepared for a fight against odds. Sicilian newspapers published highly-coloured accounts of the Germans' anticipated fate at the hands of the powerful British fleet, which they, as well as the Germans, assumed to be lurking at the exit to the Straits. Hawkers crowded the quays selling postcards and souvenirs 'to those about to die".
In fact the only British ship waiting for them was the light cruiser Gloucester, commanded by Captain Howard Kelly. Souchon set a course east and Kelly signalled this course to Admiral Milne. Later Souchon altered his course to north-east to give the impression he was making for the Adriatic, where Troubridge's cruisers were patrolling. The possibility of Souchon's making for the Dardanelles did not occur to Milne. The Gloucester continued to shadow the Goeben and Breslau. As night fell Kelly began to lose sight of the German ships against the dark mass of the Italian coast. He therefore changed course towards the coast so that the Goeben should be visible in the light of the moon when it rose. In order to do this he had to steer direct for
whose vastly superior armament was capable of blowthe ing his ship out of the water. The Goeben did not open lire since time, ami the precarious state of her fuel supplies, did not permit of this, but instead Souchon sent the Breslau to head off the British light cruiser. Thus the Gloucester was forced hack through lack of sea room, hut continued to shadow the two German ships. Soon. Souchon could no longer persist in his falsi' course and later that night turned south-eastwards, at the same tunc trying to jam the Gloucester's wireless messages. He was not successful, and a message reporting the German change of course reached Milne and Troubridge about midnight. Troubridge with his four armoured cruisers began to steam south from the Adriatic. At the same time the Dublin turned north from Malta to attempt to head the enemy off, encountering the Breslau and attempting to find the Goeben - hut without success. Troubridge reckoned that his was a superior force at night or in fading light, hut an inferior force in lull daylight. His ships' combined firepower amounted to 22 9.2-inch guns, 14 7.5-inch and '20 6-inch. The total weight of his broadside was about one-third as much again as that of he German ship, with a far higher rate of tire Yet at 0400 hours Troubridge decided to give up the chase. Among the reasons he gave for this were that Admiralty instructions at the beginning of the war had heen that a superior force was not to he engaged by day. though this, Churchill said later, was intended only to refer to the Austrian Fleet. In addition Troubridge listened to the advice of his Flag Captain. Fawcet Wray. a gunnery expert, who took the view that the Goeben, with her superior speed and the greater range of her guns, could circle round the four British ships and destroy them one by one. In addition Tn.ubridge's destroyers were almost out of coal, which ruled out the possibility of a torpedo attack, and finally he was expecting the despatch of two hatt le-cruisers from Milne. So the Cruiser Squadron slowed down, and when the expected battlecruisers did not appear, put into the port of Zante before resuming its watch in the Adriatic. Both Troubridge and Wray can be criticized for their exaggerated respect for German naval i
t
gunnery and
for letting slip
an opportunity of
at
least
delaying
the Goeben.
Meanwhile Howard Kelly in the Gloucester was still shadowing the German ships. At 0530 hours Milne signalled him to drop astern gradually in order to avoid capture, but Kelly nevertheless continued his pursuit. The Breslau rejoined the Goeben. and passed back and forth in front of the Gloucester as though to drop mines. Kelly pressed on. however, and the Breslau dropped hack in order to ride the Gloucester off. Kelly opened fire with the intention of delaying the Goeben by forcing her to protect the Breslau. and the Goeben did in fact open fire, whereupon Kelly broke off the action, but continued to shadow the enemy for a further three hours, until Milne ordered him not to continue the chase beyond Cape Matapan. This point being reached at 17:50 hours on August 7, the Gloucester turned back, and the Goeben and Breslau disappeared among the isles of Greece to rendezvous with their collier. Shortly after midnight Milne left Malta with three battlecruisers and the light cruiser Weymouth, and headed slowly eastwards. At about 1400 hours the following afternoon he received a code telegram from the Admiralty stating that Austria had entered the war, and decided to group his forces together against this new threat. He therefore signalled to Troubridge to join him. and took up a position where he could not be cut off from Malta should the Austrian Fleet emerge from the Adriatic. The telegram had been released in error, and was corrected 24 hours later, but nearly 40 hours had heen lost before Milne resumed the now cold trail. Milne still did not believe Souchon to have any intention of making for the Dardanelles, but considered it his task to prevent the two German ships from bombarding Fort Said and Alexandria. The Goeben and Breslau coaled during the 8th and 0th off the island of Dhenousa in the Aegean, with steam up. ready to depart short notice. Souchon believed that the British ships were nearer than they really were, and dared not use his wireless to communicate directly with Constantinople. He therefore sent Captain Fiedler in the General on to Smyrna to act as a wireless link, relaying messages from Constantinople at low power. He sent a message to the German naval attache urging him to go to any lengths to arrange a passage through the minefield- ol the Dardanelles, with or without the formal permission of the Turkish government. Early on the morning of the 10th Fiedler relayed a reply to Souchon: 'Enter. Demand surrender of forts. Capture pilot.' The German ships left Dhenousa at dawn, reaching the entrance to the Dardanelles, under the guns of Cape Holies and Kum Kale, at 1700 hours, and Souchon signalled for a pilot. at
3
1
At Constantinople. Finer was in conference with a member of the German military mission when another member of the mission. Colonel von Kress, entered with the news that the Goeben and Breslau were at the entrance to the straits. He asked Enver to allow their passage. Enver tried at first to temporise, saying that the Grand Vizier must he consulted, hut Kress insisted on an immediate answer. Finer consented, and Kress asked a further question: 'If the British warships follow them, are they to be fired on?' Again Enver hesitated, and again Kress insisted. Finally Finer consented, and the two ships were led through the minefields by a pilot cutter. Milne, meanwhile, was searching for the Goeben and Breslau among the Aegean Islands, still convinced that it was Souchon's
Below: The German light cruiser. SMS Breslau Sold in the early days war to the Turkish Navy, she was renamed the Midilh Displacement: 4550 tons. Length: 446 feet. Beam: 43 feet Armament: 12 4 1-inch guns. Crew: 370 men
of the
^?*$& Captain von Kotner (seated centre) and officers of the Breslau. After her sale, the Breslau's crew was replaced by Turkish naval personnel. Right: Admiral Sir Berkeley Milne. His mishandling of the Goeben and Breslau chase stemmed Left:
primarily from his conservative cast of mind.
A former Groom-inWaiting to Edward VII, he wrote of himself that he never disobeyed an order and never used his discretion
I
\
I
+ £ i
t 9 I
f
i
'
t
t
The German
battle-cruiser,
SMS Goeben.
Beam: 96%
Displacement: 23,000 tons.
Power/Speed: 70,000 hp/27 knots. Armament: 10 11-inch, 12 6-inch and 12 24-pounder guns. Armour: Belt 11 inches, turrets 8 inches. Crew: 1107 men Below: The escape of the Goeben and the Breslau. The start of the war found the Breslau in Taranto. She was joined by the battle-cruiser Goeben en route for Algeria where together they shelled the French embarkation ports of Bone and Phil ipeville. Passing back via Messina, Goeben and Breslau managed to shake off the British cruisers Dublin and Glouceste/^anti proceeded towards Turkey. Milne, whose handling of the chase wastQkCost him hrrs.job, remained committed to bottling up the Adriatic and faile^tkto anticipate^ the German Admiral's motives Length: 610
feet.
feet.
for sailing east
AUQ
Goeben Breslau British
Ships
French troop transports 100 Miles
160 Kms.
Sardinia
TYRRHENIAN
SEA
Sicily Str. Phili
ppevilte
of Messina
TR0UBRIDGE
Bone
Tunis*
ALGERIA
TUNISIA
^7
INDOMITABLE & INDEFATIGABLE
AUG
3
Malta
,4
3 BATTLE
A/
346
intention to make for Pola or for the Atlantic. Even on the following day, when Milne heard that the two ships were at Constantinople, he continued to patrol the Aegean, to ensure that they did not re-enter the Mediterranean. At Constantinople, Allied ambassadors insisted on the replacement of the crews of the two ships by Turkish naval personnel. The Turks, still hoping to hold on to their neutrality, asked the Germans to disarm their ships 'temporarily and superficially only', but Wangenheim absolutely refused to consider this. Finally the suggestion was made that the arrival of the ships could be regarded as a delivery under contract, since Wangenheim had informally promised them to Enver after Britain had requisitioned the two Turkish battleships. The ships could be regarded as being sold to Turkey. The sale was announced to the diplomatic corps, and the Goeben and Breslau were re-named the Yavuz Sultan Selim and the Midilli respectively, with Souchon named as Commander-in-Chief of the Turkish navy. The replacement of the requisitioned battleships by these two fine ships was a German diplomatic coup which brought Turkey a step nearer entering the war as Germany's ally. Milne, when the full facts about the episode became known, was informed that he would not be taking up his next appoint-
ment. He was never again employed. Troubridge demanded a Court of Enquiry which ordered his trial by Court Martial on a charge of 'From negligence or other default forbearing to pursue the chase of HIGM's ship Goeben, being an enemy then flying'. He was acquitted, but feeling in the fleet ran so high against him that he was never again employed at sea, finishing the war in command of the naval guns landed in support of the Serbs. Captain Wray was another officer whose part in the episode spelled the end of his professional career. Captain Howard Kelly of the Gloucester, apart from his brother John, the only British officer to come well out of the affair, was awarded the Companionship
Bath for his tenacious pursuit of the German ships from Cape Matapan. The escape of the Goeben and Breslau was, on the British side, as much a strategic and diplomatic failure as it was a naval one. It had its roots in a failure to take Turkey seriously. Churchill's comment, 'scandalous, crumbling decrepit, penniless Turkey', adequately expresses the prevailing British attitude, which ignored or underestimated the revival of national pride under the Young Turks. On the naval side there was a lack of clear direction from the top. Admiralty orders to Milne were confusing and badh' worded. Then there was a lack of communication and co-ordination between Milne and Lapeyrere. For Germany the episode was a strategic success of the first of the
Sicily to
magnitude, strengthening their already good relations with the strategically placed Ottoman Empire. Souchon and Wangenheim anticipated, and sometimes exceeded their orders, showing considerably more initiative than their British opponents. The British official naval history records, justly, 'few naval decisions more bold and well-judged were ever taken'. Further Reading Corbett, Sir Julian, Naval Operations. History of the Great War Vol. (Longmans, 1921) Hough, R., The Big Battleship (M. Joseph, 1966) Milne, Admiral Sir B., The Flight of the Goeben and Breslau (1921) Souchon, Admiral, Der Krieg zur See (Reichsarchiv) Tuchman, B., August 1914 (Constable, 1962)
1
RICHARD WRIGHT was born in Plymouth in 1933. He comes of a family with naval associations, and has taken an interest in naval history, with special reference to the two world wars, for some years. He is at present Technical Information Officer for a London engineering firm.
O Dardanelles^ Canakkale/£
Constantinople.
//& ^*
UG %//Cape He lies"?
Cape Matapan AUG 7 1730 hours
Crete ..
SOUTH AFRICA
Rebellion and Invasion South Africa was the
of the Dominions to take up arms on Britain's behalf, but in doing so she seriously imperilled her own internal security. Although greatly in South Africa's own interest, the invasion of German South West Africa aroused deep opposition among Afrikaners in whom bitter memories of the Boer War still lingered. South Africa's leaders faced not only the problems of invasion but also of rebellion. Patrick Scrivenor
On May vaal
first
31, 1902, the forces of the Trans-
and Orange Free State Republics
finally surrendered to the British. For just under three years a total of 66,000 Boers had tied down 300,000 British troops in South Africa, and in doing so had driven the British to adopt measures that left an inerradicable mark on the Afrikaans consciousness. With the collapse of the regular forces of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, the Boer leaders had fallen back on guerilla tactics, to which their way of life, and skill with rifles and horses, so ideally suited them. Unable to pin down the elusive 'commandos', the British forces under Lord Kitchener saw fit to cut off the Boers from their sources of supply by burning farms and packing the inhabitants into concentration camps. In the camps, as a result of maladministration and malnutrition, 22,251 Afrikaner women and children died, and for each
348
family in the camps there was a wrecked homestead on the veldt. In effect, the Boer War brought about the complete destruction of the two republics, and hastened the end of their already declining
way of life. Whatever its rights and wrongs, the importance of this war
pastoral
here is the great bitterness of feeling caused among Afrikaners.
it
Throughout their struggle the Boer republics were supported, materially and morally, by Germany. The Kaiser's notorious telegram to President Kruger, the consignments of Mauser rifles and ammunition to the republics, and the outcry in the German press against the British policy of farm-burning and concentration camps, brought relations between Britain and Germany to the lowest ebb they had yet experienced. Yet in spite of these tragic events, in spite of the deep division between Briton
A South Africa
in
1914.
The former
British
colonies combine with the former Boer republics to form the Union of South Africa. In August 1914, the Union undertook the invasion of the German colony of South West Africa on behalf of Great Britain, but this move was so unpopular that it provoked a rebellion
among until
dissatisfied Afrikaners. It was not. new year of 1915 that the invasion
the
got fully under
way
and in spite between Germany and the Afrikaners, South Africa entered the First World War in 1914 as a united nation, as an ally of Britain, and under the leadership of two of the most resolute and skilled former opponents of the British, General Botha, and Jan Christiaan Smuts. Although it will be seen that this
and Boer within South
Africa,
of the natural rapport
unity was not as complete as it seemed, it is remarkable that it was achieved at all. The task of reconstruction that faced
the victorious British in 1902 was formidFor three years the British Army had used the High Veld of South Africa as a sort of giant Salisbury Plain. Agriculture in the Transvaal, the Orange Free State, and to a lesser extent in the Cape, was virtually at a standstill. The inmates of the concentration camps, black and white, had to be repatriated, and those whose able.
homes Lord Kitchener had thoughtfully burned, had to be provided with new ones. Only money, and a great deal of it, would solve these problems, and only the British Treasury could find enough money quickly enough. Under the terms of the surrender, the British government paid an outright indemnity of £3,000,000 towards the cost of repairing the ravages of the war in what had now become the Crown Colonies of the Orange River and the Transvaal, and this was followed by a redevelopment loan, negotiated by Lord Milner and Joseph Chamberlain, of £35,000,000. In addition to this help from the British government, the Colonial governments provided their own schemes of compensation. South Africa was now divided into four British colonies: the Cape Colony, the Orange River Colony, the Transvaal, and Natal. The idea of a United South Africa
been present, particularly the British (who naturally thought of a United South Africa as a British possession), and after the upheavals of the Boer War, it became increasingly obvious that South Africa's problems could only be solved by some kind of union or federation. During the years between the end of the Boer War and the Act of Union, 19021910, the Milner administration laid much of the groundwork of union. As governor of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, Milner was able to unify under his control the South African constabulary, and the South African railways. He further set up the Intercolonial Council to coordinate all other matters of mutual concern to the four colonies. In 1903 a customs conference was convened at Bloemfontein, and this swept away the tariff walls between the colonies.
had
always
among
No new exodus At the same time, other changes were taking place within the four colonies. Hitherto, the Afrikaans had always been able to escape from the burden of British government by trekking further and further into the interior. This escape was no longer open to them. All Africa was parcelled up among the European powers, and there was nowhere that a new exodus of Boers could go to establish their own nation. The British victory and the ruthlessness with which it was accomplished forced the Afrikaners to realise two things. Firstly they had to accept that their immediate future lay in South Africa under British rule; and secondly they were forced to realise that they were a people, with an identity and potential of their own. In the years after the Boer War the Afrikaners began to find their feet, at first culturally and then politically. Afrikaans, hitherto a despised offshoot of High Dutch, began to be treated as a language in its
own
The 'Second Language Camwas lent strength by the extreme unwisdom of the Milner administration in right.
paign'
trying to impose English as the medium of instruction in schools throughout the four colonies. The two ex-republics set up 'op-
position' schools with Afrikaans and High Dutch as the medium of instruction. Afri-
kaans also made great strides as a spoken and written language against High Dutch. By the end of the first decade of the century, High Dutch was confined to a few old guard Afrikaners and the Dutch Reformed Church. Side by side with this cultural revival went the beginnings of political organisation. Initially the Boer leaders stood aloof from the post-war colonial administration. In 1903 Botha, de la Rey, and Smuts declined seats in the Transvaal Legislative Council, and confined their energies to reconciling the divisions among their own people. In January 1905, Botha formed the Het Volk party in the Transvaal, pledged to conciliation with the British and self government. In May 1906, Steyn and Hertzog formed the Orangia Unie party in Orange River Colony, and in the Cape Colony Hofmeyr's party, formerly called the Bond, was renamed the South African Party in the hope of attracting moderate
English support and counterweighting the aggressively English Progressive Party. All this political activity rapidly bore fruit.
The Liberal government
in Britain
favoured responsible government for the ex-republics, and in July 1906 elections in the Transvaal returned Het Volk with a majority over all the other parties. Botha and Smuts took office, and in December 1906 limited self government was granted to the Transvaal, and subsequently to the Orange River Colony (under the leadership of Fischer and Hertzog). In February 1908 the South African Party ousted the Progressives in the Cape Colony Legislative Council Elections. In this way, three of the four colonies had passed into Afrikaner hands within five years of the end of the Boer War, and in June 1908 the governments of the four colonies agreed to send delegates to a National Convention in October of that year, to discuss the possibility of union.
to
The Convention May 1909, and
sat
from October 1908
at the end of that time
proposals were accepted by the governments of the Cape, Transvaal and Orange River colonies, and by a referendum in Natal. Embodied in the South Africa Act, they were duly passed by Westminster and received the Royal Assent. The Union of South Africa was brought into being as a legislative union under the Crown. The executive power was wielded by a GovernorGeneral and ten ministers. The legislative body was to be a two-house parliament consisting of a Senate of 40 members, and an Assembly of 121 members. The former colonies each became a province, and the seats in the Assembly were shared out on a proportional basis between them. Each province had its own Provincial Council, its
elected for a three-year term, exercising what powers the central parliament saw fit to delegate to it. One Supreme Court for the Union was established, organised in Apellate, Provincial and Local Divisions. Local pride was appeased by the device of a split capital: Cape Town became the legislative capital, Bloemfontein the seat of the judiciary, and Pretoria the executive capital. The franchise was confined to Europeans, except for the Cape Coloured community who received voting rights. No sooner had the South Africa Act become law, than the political parties in South Africa prepared themselves for 1
battle. The Progressives in the Cape, Orange Free State, and the Transvaal, had already combined in the Unionist Party under Dr Jameson (of Jameson Raid fame); Botha's Het Volk combined with Hofmeyr's South African Party to form the South African National Party; the Natal representatives all stood as Independents: and the small but fast growing Labour Party, mainly centred on the mines, threw its weight behind Botha. The elections established Botha and the South African Nationalist Party firmly in power, and he was able to exercise considerable breadth in selecting his Cabinet. Smuts became Minister of Defence, and Hertzog Minister
electoral
of Justice. In 1910 Botha found himself at the head of a nation, which while it had a unitary constitution, was very far from being effectively united. The next four years were to be devoted to easing the strains and stresses that threatened to tear the new nation apart. A better team for this task
than
Louis
Botha
Smuts would be
and Jan Christiaan
difficult to
imagine. Botha,
a Natal-born Afrikaner, brought up and trained in the Transvaal, had fought with great distinction against the British during the Boer War. He was possessed of great charm and tact, but had a resolute will and a great deal of determination. In 1910 he was looked up to almost as 'a father of his people' by many Afrikaners, and had the sympathy of a large part of the Englishspeaking population as well. His Minister of Defence, Smuts, must rank as one of the most remarkable men of this century, and certainly as the greatest South African of his time. Born of Afrikaner stock in the Cape, he was educated at Stellenbosch University" and Cambridge, where he read law. He thus absorbed from an early age the twin South African culture of English and Dutch. He became State Attorney to the Transvaal under President Kruger before the Boer War, and at the outbreak of war took the field against the British. After the collapse of the Transvaal forces, he led a brilliantly successful commando raid into the Capo to within 100 miles of Cape Town. A hard worker and a relentless task master, he presented during these early years an unsympathetic, rather cold figure, but the driving force of his personality showed in
everything he set his hand his
hand
to the
making
of
and he set ho now South
to, I
Africa with a vengeance.
A sharp reaction at once the divisions within South Africa began to show themselves. South Africa had outgrown the traditional Afrikaans way of life and the mentality that matched it. Railways, commerce, the need for centralised administration, taxation and all the trappings of a modern state meant nothing to the farmers of the Transvaal, the Orange Free State and the north-west Cape. As soon as they realised that union and self-government did not
Almost
1
1
simply mean Afrikaner hegemony and a resumption of the Lekker Lewe (the good life' or, to an Afrikaner, freedom from all authority), but on the contrary carried with them the responsibility of running an industrial state, a sharp reaction sot in. It was felt that there were too many British strings attached to union, and that Afrikaners were being dragged into expensive and possibly dangerous world affairs m the
ARCHBISHOP MIT7Y HIGH SCHCOL MEDIA CENTER SAN JOSE. CALIFORNIA 93120
Planned rebellion or spontaneous uprising? Right: The rebellion of 1914 involved only a minority of Afrikaners and was put down by loyal Afrikaner troops Above: The brother of a rebel gives information to loyal troops (left) General de la Rev (right) was shot in a police ambush at the outset of the rebellion Below: General Christiaan de Wet (left) raised troops to march on Pretoria and proclaim a republic
He was defeated by loyal troops and later hunted down by motonsed units (right)
wake
of an Empire whose last major undertaking had been the destruction of their independence, and as they saw it, of their \\a\ of life. They were apprehensive that the union government would accept large numbers of British immigrants, thereby weakening the Afrikaners' numerical position in the country, and they were deeply suspicious of Botha's attendance of the Imperial Conference of 1911, and what
commitments
that might imply. Added to these political discontents were more serious economic ones. The Lekker Leive was over. There was no more land to trek to. Advances in scientific farming, several years of drought, large families, and the spread of the towns, all conspired to drive the less efficient farmers to the wall. The number of 'Poor Whites' increased alarmingly, and sons of Boers were even to be found in the mines — a degradation unthinkable a generation earlier. All these grievances found a resting place in the bosom of the Minister of Justice. Hertzog. He first quarrelled with Botha over the language problem. Hertzog supported a 'mother tongue' educational policy, but while in theory this seemed a fair and sensible system, in practice the expense of duplicating teaching facilities, and the rarity of fully bilingual teachers, made it impracticable. Any alternative scheme was regarded by Hertzog with the gravest suspicion, and although he and Botha did not quarrel openly on this occasion, it was clear that Hertzog represented a powerful section of Afrikaner opinion, and that he was beginning to drift into uncompromising, die-hard attitudes. In October 1912, for reasons that still remain unclear, Hertzog made a bitterly partisan speech at Ny 1st room in the Orange Free State. His subject was harmless enough — the possibility of two independent streams of culture in South Africa, Afrikaans and English, but his tone was an unmistakable challenge to Botha's leadership. Two months later at De Wildt, he made a speech attacking the idea of conciliation with the British, the very idea that had been Botha's watchword since the formation of Het Volk. This was a direct attack and could not be ignored. Botha resigned, was immediately asked by the GovernorGeneral to form another ministry, and did so excluding Hertzog. This action split the Afrikaner community down the middle, and seriously weakened the government's standing among the disaffected Afrikaners.
From
this
moment onwards many
kaners
regarded
traitors
who had
Botha
and
Afri-
Smuts as
'sold out' to the British,
and grouped themselves behind Hertzog in his newly-formed Nationalist Party. Discontent among the Afrikaners was not the only problem that the young South Africa had to face. From 1910 onwards the mines were in a state of spasmodic
350
unrest. The gulf between labour and capital was becoming very wide, and at the same time the imported Chinese and even the native Bantu were becoming capable of skilled work. This situation gave rise to a labour movement among white skilled workers that was at once extremely left-
wing and immovably
racialist,
demand-
ing segregation of the races and the restriction of coloured labour to unskilled work. In July 1913 a strike on the Witwatersrand mines developed into a riot which had to be put down with troops, and in January 1914 a proposed general strike was crushed by prompt measures on the part of the government. Nine strike leaders were deported, arbitrarily and entirely illegally, by Smuts, an action which provoked a storm of criticism. The debate which followed this event showed a significant trend: the Unionists made common cause with the South African National Party, while the Labour Party and Hertzog's nationalists joined in attacking
Botha and Smuts. South Africa in 1914 therefore stood as follows. Botha and Smuts and the South
African National Party held power, drawing their support from the moderate British and Afrikaners. The disaffected Afrikaners, particularly in the Orange Free State, backed Hertzog who took a
uncompromising anti-British line. mining community supported the small but powerful Labour Party, and the English speaking community supported hard
The
the Unionists, temporarily in alliance with
Botha and Smuts. One more thread needs to be added to the situation in South Africa in 1914. In 1911 Botha had attended the Imperial Conference in London. This automatically involved Botha and South Africa in British and Empire foreign policy planning, and he was taken into the full confidence of the Foreign Office and the Committee of each theory, In South Africa, was entirely at liberty 'to do just as she pleased' in the event of Britain's being engaged in a war. In practice each Dominion, belligerent or not, could have found herself the target of Britain's enemies, so this freedom of decision was to a large extent illusory, and Imperial
Dominion,
Defence. including
two important naval radio stations, one at Luderitzbucht and one at Swakopmund. These and the anchorage of Walfisch Bay, situated on the flank of an important sea route, could not be left in the hands of the enemy. The South African government's motives in accepting this scheme were more complex. Outwardly their case was that as allies of Britain
they could not well decline
to do a service well within their capacity. Behind this however lay a long standing
ambition to possess the territory of German South West Africa, and the fear that if they declined to take part in this operation, it would be performed by Australian or Indian troops, thus robbing South Africa of any claim to the captured colony. If the government were anxious to undertake this campaign on behalf of Great Britain, there were many to whom the decision caused grave misgivings. The area of the Cape Province bordering on German South West Africa was one of the most depressed economically, and disaffected politically, in South Africa. Relations with German South West Africa had always been friendly — there was even a small Boer community within the German colony. The Germans had helped the Boers in their struggle against the British, and many Afrikaners saw them as more 'natural' allies than the British. The small German garrison posed no threat to South
and many thought it unwise to antagonise a power that might, after all, win the war. On August 14, 1914 Botha and Smuts called the commandants of the South Africa Defence Force together to brief them on their wartime obligations, and to make arrangements for raising troops to replace Africa,
South Africa, occupying as she did the vital of Good Hope, would have found it difficult to refuse to take action on Britain's behalf. One result of the Imperial Conference was the South African Defence Act, which provided for a small regular force in South Africa (with a cadre of officers) to be supplemented in time of war by a combination of existing urban volunteer units and the old Boer Commandos. All members of this force were liable to service anywhere in Africa in the event of war.
Cape
Vital wireless stations
August 1914 war came. No sooner had Great Britain declared war on Germany than the South African government cabled its willingness to free the Imperial Garrison in South Africa (6,000 men) In
for service elsewhere.
On August
7 Britain
accepted this offer and suggested in the same cable that the South African governseize German South West Africa. The advantages of this scheme from the British point of view are obvious. Apart from the general policy of stripping Germany of her colonies, there was the need to capture the
ment
the outgoing Imperial garrison. The question of invading South West Africa was not under discussion, but nonetheless an intransigent and hostile attitude was displayed by many of the officers present, particularly three of them, Beyers, Kemp and Maritz. On August 26 the invasion policy was debated in the Assembly, and was hotly opposed by Hertzog. The decision to invade was nonetheless carried, although in the Senate another Boer War general, de la Rey (in all other matters a devoted adherent of Botha), refused to vote for the policy. £2,000,000 was voted for the maintenance of 15,000 troops for six months, and the Defence Force was warned to hold itself in readiness for service any-
where
in Africa.
On September
13 Beyers and Kemp commissions, giving the decision to invade as the reason, and Beyers and the old general, de la Rey, set out on September 14 for the Defence Force camp at Potchefstroom, where 1,600 men were already gathered. What their intentions were must remain a matter for speculation, as a police patrol on the watch for motor car bandits, opened fire on their car and killed de la Rey. There is no doubt that Kemp, at any rate, intended to use the men at Potchefstroom to march on Pretoria and stage a coup d'etat, and it is probable that Beyers and de la Rey were implicated as well. Beyers denied any such intention, but joined de Wet (a leading anti-government figure in the Orange Free State) in denouncing the campaign
resigned
their
and calling upon the government to withdraw their troops from the German South West African border. Botha's response to
was to give an undertaking that only volunteers would be used against the Germans, and to assume command Of these forces in person. This concession might at this stage have mollified Afrikaner opinion, had it not been for the activities of Maritz, the commander of the Union Forces at Upington on the South West African border. Maritz should never have been entrusted with this command, and Smuts, with many misgivings, had consented to his appointment only under intense pressure from Beyers. An unbalanced man, obsessed with many deep prejudices, Maritz hated the British, Jews and native Africans with equal intensity. He had been in collusion with the German authorities in South West Africa since August 21, and only the fact that they did not trust him, prevented their supplying him with sufficient arms to raise a full scale rebellion in the northern Cape. Early in October he crossed the South West African border with his forces and handed over to the Germans such men as would not join his rebellion as prisoners of war. On October 10 he proclaimed the independence of South Africa and declared war against Great Britain. The government's reaction to this treachery was sudden and decisive. A state of Martial Law was proclaimed, and the troops already gathered in Defence this challenge
Force camps were promptly commandeered to crush the rebels. In the Transvaal a party of commandeered troops mutinied, and fled with other sympathisers to the farm where Beyers was staying. In the Orange Free State de Wet and his supporters used force to try to stop the recruiting of volunteers, and while Botha was occupied crushing Beyer's mutineers near Rustenburg, de Wet proclaimed his intention of getting in touch with Maritz, marching to Pretoria and declaring a re-
From the government's point of view the situation was grave. Beyers, although his forces were scattered at Rustonburg, was still at large; Kemp, having 'requisitioned' men and material in the Western Transvaal, was on his way across the Kalahari to join Maritz; and it was known that a German squadron had sunk two British warships at Coronel and might well be on its way to South Africa. However, the mobilising of tin- Defence Force was almost complete, and as the majority remained loyal Botha had 40,000 public.
men
in the field, all Afrikaners. English-
speaking contingents were kept in the background to prevent any racial bitterness being added to the strife. On November 9 government troops and de Wei's forces clashed at Doomberg on the Sand River. De Wet's son was killed, thus destroying any chance of negotiating with his now embittered father. Therefore on November 12 Botha It'll upon de Wet at Mushroom Valley and routed him. De Wet himself escaped hut was run down l>\ troops in motor cars while trying to reach Maritz on December 2, and on December 8 Beyers was drowned while trying to cross the Vaal.
The
and purposes
was to all intents Kemp, after an epic
rebellion over.
crossing of the Kalahari, joined Maritz, and on January 25, 1915 they attacked and
captured Upington. Within a week however Kemp saw the futility of his cause and took advantage of Botha's earlier amnesty terms to surrender. Maritz fled to South West Africa, and later to Angola.
.
able to turn his attention to the long deferred invasion of the German colony. Three months of precious time had been it was now high summer. As August 10, L914, the decision had been taken to seize the wireless stations of Swakopmund and Liideritz-
and
lost,
early
as
bucht
with small expeditionary forces assisted by the Royal Navy. Since then these forces had been stagnating in the two ports mentioned, and they now provided Botha with the solution to the otherwise overwhelming problems of terrain and supply that faced him. The German garrison in South West Africa was not large, 2,000 regular troops and 7,000
IMP
and against it Botha could 43,000 men. However South West Africa, although its central plateau pro-, vided fair grazing, was protected on all sides by desert. To the east lay the Kalahari; to the south the only slightly less desert wastes of Namaqualand; and the whole of the western coastal strip of the German colony consisted of a waterless plain, 40 miles wide. The Germans had command of the railway, which ran north and south along the spine of the colony, with branches to Luderitzbucht and Swakopmund. As they withdrew from these two places, they destroyed the railway reservists, field
zr***' r Bombs from capital of the
Much
German aircraft German colony
a
lines. fall
on Botha's forces encamped on the way
discussion has taken place as to collusion there was between the rebel leaders in 1914. There is strong circumstantial evidence to suggest that plans were made between the rebels as early as August 14, but a conspiracy, even if it did exist, was not the prime cause of the rebellion. The desire for independence, still very strong among Afrikaners, was not appeased by the terms of the Act of Union, in which the Afrikaner farming community thought itself to be very much a 'poor relation' of the mining and commercial interests in South Africa. Many bitter memories lingered from the Boer War, and all those economic and social
how much
to
Windhuk, the
overwhelming superiornumbers, Botha faced great difficulties. Clearly an attack from the east across the Kalahari was out of the question. The southern route, from the Orange river So, in spite of his
ity
pressures which had led to the decay of the old independent Boer way of life were, with some justice, laid at the door of Britain. Maritz's outburst that he did not want the land ruled by Englishmen, niggers and Jews' expressed the feelings of many of his compatriots. The rebellion was the last fling of the spirit of independence that had previously led the Boers to face Zulu impis rather than British government; and to scrape a living from the sour veldt of the Orange Free State, rather than pay taxes in the fertile Cape.
Overwhelming problems With the rebellion
at
an end. Botha was
in
northwards, was feasible, but transport prevented its use for the main body of an attack on the German colony. Botha therefore decided to attack with four columns. The expeditionary force at Swakopmund was to be built up, and the main column, commanded by Botha, was to attack eastward from this base towards the central plateau and the colony's capital, Windhuk. Three lesser columns, commanded by Smuts, were to strike, one east from Luderitzbucht, and two north from the border with South Africa to Keetmanshoop and Gibeon. These three southern difficulties
Commando 1914 style The South African forces in 1914 were raised from both the British and Afrikaans sections of the population. The Afrikaans units
were organised
Commandos, and in many cases each man was
in
expected to supply his own weapon and horse A variety of rifles were used, including
German Mausers
columns were to join forces at Keetmanshoop and press north together. In February 1915, Botha arrived at Swakopmund and at once set about repairing the railway, and solving the supply difficulties posed by the waterless coastal belt. Inefficiency (and some sharp practice) by the Remounts and Transport service of the Union Defence Force, and also Botha's need to treat the relations between British and Afrikaner troops 'serving together for the
first
much
time)
delay.
with kid gloves, caused
The problems
of
communica-
with comparatively small numbers of troops operating in four columns widely separated over vast distances of desert, were huge. It was not until April that operations got seriously under way. As the German Commander-in-Chief, General von Heydebreck, was content to tions,
withdraw into the interior, the coastal columns gained the edge of the central plateau, at Jackhalswater and Aus rewithout spectively, encountering any difficulties worse than a lack of water caused by the pollution of wells with sheep-dip by the Germans. From Aus, Smuts moved forward to Keetmanshoop, where his two southern columns converged with excellent timing. All three
columns pursued the Germans north, and on April 25 fell upon the German rearguard at Gibeon, inflicting severe losses. The main German body escaped north. At Gibeon the southern columns halted, while attack in the north developed. On 6 Botha took Karibib, and by the 20th had entered Windhuk, where, on the strength of 4,000 troops still at large in the north of the colony, the German governor tried to negotiate a partition of the colony. Botha, whose patrols were already in pursuit of the remaining German forces, rejected the governor's proposals, but the need for fresh horses, and slowness in the repair of the bridge blown by the Germans at Usakos, prevented pursuit with his main force until June L0. On July 9, 1915 the last German forces surrendered at Tsumeb, after a march, incredibly rapid in the circumstances, of 120 miles in one week by Botha's forces. Of his force, which by the end of the campaign totalled 50,000 men. Botha had lost only 1 13 killed and 31 1 wounded.
the
May
Further Reading Davenport, T. R. H., The South African Rebellion 1914 (English Historical Review No 78, 1963) Gifford and Louis, Britain and Germany in Africa (Yale University Press, 1967) Hancock, W. K., Smuts, Vol 1 The Sanguine Years (Cambridge University Press 1962) Segal and First, South West Africa (Andre Deutsch 1967) Thompson, L M The Unification of South Africa 1902-10 (OUP, 1960) Walker, E. A., A History of South Africa (Long.
,
mans, Green & Co., 1935)
m Jr
PATRICK SCRIVENOR was born in 1943 in Jerusalem. Subsequently he lived in West Africa and South Africa, where he was at school in Cape Town He was educated at the King's School Cantertnnv and Oriel College Oxford, where his special subiect was military history From 1964-67 he served as a regular officer in the 1st Battalion, The Royal Ulster Rifles, with whom he spent six months confronting President Sukarno In 1968 he joined the staff of Purnell's History of the Second World War, and became Executive Editor of the History of the First World War.
Fiasco at Tanga
Above: East Africa: theatre of operations. All along the coast, the Germans had observation posts in constant communication with each other. The movements of British ships were thus accurately charted. Over this vast area, wide variation in climate, wild animals and diseasecarrying insects added further hazards and discomfort to the combatants
354
— Allied and German
alike. Inset:
The
Battle of Tanga.
The
British
suffered a decisive defeat at Tanga through their apparent disregard of elementary principles of war, particularly that of surprise. Right: This photograph (presumably posed) shows a German colonial officer with two Askaris in bush' country
Major R. J. Sibley. Britain's assumption that the war in East Africa would be quickly over left her woefully unprepared for a full scale conflict. High quality reinforcements were withheld in favour of other theatres of war and what troops were sent (from India) were under-trained and inexperienced, lacking arms, ammunition and transport. The senior officer inspecting them prior to their departure remarked that 'the campaign would either be a walk-over or a tragedy'
t,
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The uniform and equipment worn by these soldiers were usually modified to suit the particular conditions of war: the puttees
and boots, for example, were frequently dis-
In the scramble for Africa and the subsequent Anglo-German agreement of July 1885, Germany had acquired an area of 700 miles from north to south and about 600 miles from east to west known as German East Africa (present day Tanzania), an area of land nearly as big as France and Germany together. The boundary line between German East Africa, British East Africa (present day Kenya)
carded. This Askari
and Uganda was an arbitrary line drawn on the map with little or no reference to the
carries his rolled
African population or the natural features.
blanket on his back; his
The Germans had been harsh in their colonial approach to the Africans and the Maji Maji Rebellion in the early 1900's was put down with great severity on the part of the German forces. Later, many reforms
rifle
would be an
SMLE.303
introduced by Dr Dernburg, changed the attitude towards the Africans, and during the period 1906-1914 some Africans appreciated the Germans did have a little
German
more to offer than just oppression. They were harsh, but they were just, and during the years 1914-1918 there was no revolt by the Africans against the Germans. There were many features peculiar to German East Africa which made this theatre of war so different from the others. There was a wide variation in climate, from the sweltering damp heat of the coast near Dar es Salaam and Tanga, to the
356
fierce penetrating sun and dust of the Central Plateau. Furthermore, there were the cold mists of the highlands near Moshi and the foothills of Kilimanjaro and also further south, near Iringa and Sao Hill area, or as they are commonly known, the Southern Highlands. Most of the area over which the campaign was fought was covered in 'bush' — scrub ranging from an open park land to a thick, dense forest. Whatever type, it was in many cases an obstacle to military operations. There was also a plethora of other hazards to plague the soldiers who had to contend with rhinoceros, elephant, lion, crocodiles, climatic conditions and a constant battle against mosquitos, tsetse flies, jigger fleas, ticks and a host of tropical diseases caused by some of these insects — malaria, bilharzia and sleeping sickness. There were also scorpions, warrior ants and wild bees. It is even said that some of these insects were put to use by the German commander in
Europe during the First World War would not work in German East Africa, so a new system — particularly of fire and movement in difficult country, and communication over vast distances, had to be designed. The vast distances involved made the movement of troops from one theatre of operations to another very difficult, and this was further accentuated by the lack of accurate maps. The Germans started the cam-
Bottom: German Askaris line up in front of a reconnaissance plane. The lack of accurate maps in East Africa lent an added importance to reconnaissance work. Below: Lieutenant-Colonel Paul von Lettow Vorbeck (far left) with officers of the German Schutztruppe and friends in East Africa. Lettow Vorbeck's drive and professional ability were vital factors on Germany's side
in
the East African
campaign
his battles.
Clearly the problems that beset the comin German East Africa were not to be found in other theatres of operations and this fact must always be kept in mind. The problems of logistics — that of obtaining food, water and ammunition — were a constant headache, not to mention the
manders
problem of health. The
tactics
employed
in
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paign with an advantage because they were working on interior linos of communications, whereas the Allied powers had to fight with exterior linos of communications, so for them the task of troop movement and resupply wore much more difficult.
At the outbreak of war, British East Africa and Uganda were totally unpre-
pared
for
The telegram from
hostilities.
the Colonial Office to Sir Henry Belfield on July 29, 1914 stated that precautionary measures were to he put into force. In fact, the military forces in British East Africa and Uganda at the time were the 3rd Battalion The King's African Rifles, the 4th Battalion The King's African Hitlos and four companies of the 1st Battalion The King's African Rifles. In all, this totalled 17 small companies and there was no existing organisation which could
expand them. Rifles (KAR), who to bear the brunt of the fighting in
The King's African were
the initial stages of the war, were spread over three territories. The 3rd Bn KAR had its headquarters in Nairobi but the five
companies and its Camel Company were dispersed throughout British East Africa. The Headquarters of the 4th Bn KAR were in Bombo and the seven companies were dispersed in Uganda. The governor was overall Commander-in-Chief and exercised his authority through the commanding This naturally led to a certain degree of friction. The British strength on August 4, 1914 was 62 officers and 2,319 African ranks, a ratio of roughly 30 Africans to one European. The soldiers, or Askaris as they were known, were infantry soldiers carrying rifles, and each company had one machine gun. There was no artilofficers.
lery in this force. It
was
significant that
there was no organisation to expand the KAR and therefore, as the campaign progressed, reinforcements had to be diverted from India to this particular theatre. It is interesting to speculate why there was no organisation for reinforcing the KAR. Possibly it was because the British did not expect the war in East Africa to be prolonged and that the Germans and British would come to some agreement to terminate hostilities quickly, since any indication that there was hostility between the European races, they felt, would inevitably affect their position vis-a-vis the Africans.
European volunteers There was no shortage of European volunteers at the beginning of the war and nearly 3,000 came forward, but there were no arms, no ammunition, no transport, and no staff to organise them. Nevertheless a volunteer reserve was set up and the East African Mounted Rifles and East African Regiment were formed. The defence
force (Schutztruppe) of GerEast Africa was commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Paul von Lettow Vorbeck, a Prussian officer who had considerable experience of colonial or guerrilla-type warfare. This he had gained in China during the Boxer Revolt of 1900-1901, in South West Africa in the Herero Campaign of 1904-1906 when he served on the staff of General von Trotha, and as an independent company detachment commander. He had been wounded in 1906 in South West Africa and had visited German East Africa on his way back to Germany. The strength of his character, his drive and outstanding professional ability were to be major factors in the campaign about to begin. At the outbreak of the war the German forces were organised on much the same
man
lines as the British. Their defence force
was composed
of independent regular companies (each of three platoons which were self-contained, mobile tactical units containing their own supply and transport i,
sub-unit. These companies were known either as Feldkompangie (FK) or Schutzenkompagnie (SehKi and there were 14 of them with an overall strength of 260 Germans and approximately 2,472 Askaris. Each company had from two to four machine guns and also 250 carriers to lift supplies and ammunition. The 1871 pattern rifles, which used black powder, was still in use in eight of these companies, and this was tactically significant since the smoke from the black powder gave away the soldiers' positions. This had had little or no effect during tribal wars but in a war with more sophisticated opponents it could have severe repercussions.
Lettow Vorbeck
lost
no time
in
taking
the offensive and persuaded the Governor, Dr Schnee (who still hoped that there would be no war so that his colonial development could proceed unhindered) to allow the German troops to concentrate in the north of the colony. The vital sector, from the standpoint of either side, lay on the boundary of the two territories between Mount Kilimanjaro and the sea. This was not only the main area of German settlement but, more important, the place where, on either side of the border, ran two railways—the British railway linking Uganda and Nairobi with the outside world and the German line from Tanga to the settled areas around Kilimanjaro. The British railway was most vulnerable where it approached the border in an area of uncultivated and uninhabited bush, but the German line was protected by the Usambara ranges and was, in some measure,
Under fire, German Askaris carry supplies across open country during the fight for Tanga
tPOif
*
•«./y.*:
IT
' Tlr*,
*
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t
?c:
; secure from raiding parties. Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck took the view that the Germans could best protect their colony by threatening the enemy in their own territory at the sensitive point, the Uganda railway, but his long-term strategy was to force the British to commit as many troops to East Africa as possible, thus preventing them from going to the other, more important, theatres of operation. After he had completed his initial. tour of inspection, he realised that communications and supplies would be of vital importance if a successful long-term war was to be fought, and so he appointed MajorGeneral Wahle, a retired officer who was visiting Dar es Salaam at the time, to take charge of the lines of communication. The first German move was to be against Taveta, a small post at the south-eastern foot of Mount Kilimanjaro. The German commander at Moshi, Captain Tom von Prince, demanded that the post at Taveta should be evacuated and on August 15 (just as the landing of the BEF in France was nearing completion), Colonel von Bock and Lieutenant Boell moved across the border of German East Africa and seized
Taveta and then attempted to exploit their success by pushing further into British territory, striking for the
and
in the direction of
Uganda railway
Mombasa. They were
met, however, by the King's African Rifles under the command of Colonel L. E. S. Ward, who had quickly deployed on their own to meet the German threat. Alone in the field they prevented further incursion into British territory.
When
Governor of British East Africa, Sir Henry Belfield, asked for reinforcements, the Colonial Office turned to the India Office. They had already been asked to provide troops for the main the
theatres of
passed
to
war and so the request was Committee of Imperial was decided that India should the
Defence. It provide two forces, one
to
capture the
principal German port, and another to reinforce the King's African Rifles. The Indian Expeditionary Force 'C\ as it was and to be known, was to reinforce the comprised of 29th Punjabis, two Imperial Service Battalions (made up of half battalions from the states of Bhurtpore, Jind, Kapurthala and Rampur), 27 Mountain Battery Royal Artillery, Battery of
KAR
Calcutta Volunteers and a machine gun This force was commanded by Brigadier General J. M. Stewart. battery.
Prompt
action, quick results Arriving in Mombasa on September 1, 29th Punjabis provided a much needed reinforcement in the Kilimanjaro area where the KAR had successfully held the enemy thrusts from the foothills of the mountain, in addition to putting down tribal unrest which had been instigated by German propaganda. Colonel von Lettow Vorbeck had commanders, 'prompt telegraphed his action promised quick results', but it was the equally prompt action of the King's African Rifles that had saved the British Protectorate, and now the Germans realised that an easy victory was impossible. Meanwhile another Expeditionary Force, 'B', was assembling in Bombay, having taken a lower priority to the demands of Europe, Egypt, Persian Gulf and North West Frontier. The 27th Bangalore Brigade and an Imperial Service Brigade were selected, but their title was misleading as they were assembled from the length and breadth of India and were strangers to each other and to their new commanders. Command of Expeditionary Force 'B' was
held by Major General Aitken. The quality of the one British battalion in this force was unquestionable, but the Indian battalions were not of this quality: the 63rd Palamcottah Light Infantry and 98th Infantry had not seen active service for a generation and these deficiencies were magnified by the lack of training and knowledge of each other. Prior to embarkation, the regiments equipped with a converted MLE Rifle were rearmed with a standard short Lee-Enfield, which was totally unfamiliar to them. The senior staff officer remai'ked to General Aitken, after inspecting the troops at Bombay that 'the campaign will either be a walk-over or a tragedy'. General Aitken left India with Expeditionary Force 'B' on October 16, with the task of bringing the whole of German East Africa under British authority by effecting a landing in Tanga while Expeditionary Force 'C pushed forward to Moshi. The presence in East African waters of the German cruiser SMS Konigsberg presented a threat to shipping and particularly to ships bringing reinforcements from India. The Konigsberg, the sister ship of SMS Niirnberg, carried ten 4.1-inch guns and was faster than any of the three British cruisers in Admiral King-Hall's Cape Squadron — HMS Hyacinth, Astraea and Pegasus. On July 31 Captain Max Looff, commanding the Konigsberg, slipped out of Dar es Salaam for the open sea and on August 6 sank the City of Winchester off Aden, but was not seen again until Sep-
tember 20 when he sailed into Zanzibar and sank HMS Pegasus.
The effect of these successes was to bring three more British cruisers into East African waters, HMS Chatham, Dartmouth and
Weymouth
v'"?;-'
NA *<&< *?/'
4Jk TJk
'MY.
IV
under
Captain
Drurv-
Lowe, with orders to find and destroy the But the Germans had obser \ation posts all alone the coast in communication with each other. Thej also had agents in all the major towns. When British ships loft harbour or were spotted along the coast the information was passed rapidly to Tabora or Dar es Salaam and signal to S\\ Africa, Berlin and back to !<> this method the Kbnigs the A was verj much in the picture- as to what our ships wore dome and parth as a result was not discovered until October 30, hiding in the Rufiji River, the hanks of which wore well defended. General Ait ken was not prepared to detach troops to secure the land defences, and Kdnigsberg was n< prepared to venture to sea, but her ten 4.1 -inch mms were nevertheless a source of danger to the British forces in East Africa from then on. The journey from India to Mombasa was miserable for the Indian troops of Expeditionary Force B'. Even physical training was a problem as their ships were so small that all available space was taken up. This was particularly true of the Assouan of ,900 tons carrying the 63rd. whose future performance in action could be partly attributed to the rigours of the voyage. On arrival at Mombasa General Aitken conferred with the governor, and Tanga was settled on as his force's destination. What scant Intelligence there was about the German dispositions indicated that the coastal areas were lightly held and that '
1
the German force was concentrated at Moshi. Captain Meinertzhagen (GSO 3 Intelligence) who had already seen service in East Africa, indicated that the Germans could get troops to Tanga with the greatest of ease, but his advice was disregarded. So too was an offer of assistance from the commanding officer of the KAR. The value of the KAR in bush warfare had yet to be recognised. General Aitken for the first time was informed by Captain Caulfield RN that the Royal Navy had made a truce with the
Germans
at
Tanga and Dar
es
Salaam and
the Germans would have to be told if this truce were to be broken. The naval officers insisted, and Aitken reluctantly agreed that the Germans would have to be warned of the repudiation of the Admiralty's local truce. So at one stroke, a cardinal principle of war, surprise, was sacrificed. On November 2 Captain Caulfield in
HMS the
Fox steamed abrogation
into
of the result that
Tanga
to
truce,
with
notify
the
Lettow Vorbeck immediate despatched from Moshi down the railway to Tanga one and a half companies, and lour more companies and headquarters followed on November 3. Captain Baumstark with two companies north of Tanga was also ordered to move on the town. Captain Caulfield now refused to take HMS Fox inside the harbour for fear of mines, and mine-sweeping operation^ were begun. Aitken was therefore forced to look for other landing places and beaches 'A', 'B' and 'C were selected. Darkness fell quickly on the night of November 2. At about 2200 hours the 13th Rajputs and 61st Pioneers landed in full moonlight at beach 'A' after wading through deep water from the lighter. Their objectives were found empty and the covering force secured its foothold, 'but the men both of the 13th and of the 61st, debilitated by nearly a month of sea sickness and
360
were thoroughly exhausted', according to the Official History. The German 17/h FK had constructed a defensive position in depth based on well sited machine gun positions. The machine guns were always the basis of German tactics in East Africa because rifle fire in the hush always tended to be
Cramped quarters,
aimed high and was
not really effective.
'No spirit or grit' The 13th and 6 1st advanced on Tanga township, came under very heavy (ire from the German defensive position, and were held. Brigadier-Ceneral Tighe committed his reserve, and at this moment the commanding officer of the 13th and his adjutant were severely wounded. The newly arrived German FKs began an enveloping movement and the British force pulled back in great disorder. The GSO 3 Intelligence wrote in his diary, 'We suffered some 300 casualties today and our men behaved disgracefully, showing no military spirit or grit. I never have had much faith in our second-rate Indian troops.' General Aitken decided that the Rajputs and Pioneers were unreliable and decided all troops except the gunners would be landed as soon as possible at beaches B' and 'C\ No orders were given for reconnaissance and in fact at that time Tanga was deserted, the German FKs having pulled back from the town. The German commander was more active than his opposite number and personally made a
reconnaissance into and through Tanga on a bicycle. He also appreciated the value of artillery and in his memoirs much regretted that his artillery, which would have been annihilating at such close range, had not arrived. Lettow Vorbeck, from his personal experiences in East Asia, felt that British troops were moving clumsily in battle and h'e was certain that in unknown close country, such as Tanga, their difficulties would be immense. General Aitken decided to advance on November 4 on a frontage sufficiently wide to turn the enemy's flank, the direction of the advance to be maintained by the 2 Loyal North Lancashire Regiment with the
other
less
reliable battalions the best battalions.
sand-
Dense wiched between sisal and the heat made it impossible for battalions to advance at the same speed and maintain contact Inevitably straggling occurred and the expected drill movement of a body of troops became the stampede of an uncontrollable mob.
The superior German fire tactics took and the 63rd Palamcottah Light
their toll
Infantry ceased to exist as a fighting unit, those remaining departed at great speed for the beaches forcing the battalion on their left to move to the right filling the gap caused by their departure. The 98th
whose morale suffered when 63rd moved back through them, were plagued by wild bees who had been roused from their Infantry,
hives in the trees by the high rifle fire. A little progress was made into Tanga by the two Kashmir battalions but on the extreme left the 101st Grenadiers, after putting up a stubborn fight, were forced to pull back. The German counter attack was developing against the British open left Hank. Lettow Vorbeck had appreciated that it did not reach further south than the right wing of his own, and as the troops began to withdraw panic was caused by carriers
who.
coming under
fire,
dropped
their
made for the beaches. They were German Askaris and this was
loads and
mistaken
for
the signal
ments
for
dash
the
more unreliable
regi-
Lettow Vorbeck pressed home his counterattack and the British assault crumbled. Aitken gave orders to re-embark the next day (November 5), and the embarkation was covered by the 2/Loyal North Lancashire and Kashmir Rifles. Even the sound of rifle fire caused the Indian troops to panic and many carriers attempted to swim for the boats. Orders were given that all supplies, ammunition and machine guns were to be left behind and a last appeal by the North Lanes to take the machine guns they were carrying was refused. As predicted the battle of Tanga ended in tragedy. The simple principles of war had been disregarded, the complete lack of surprise, the lack of Intelligence, the failure to make a reconnaissance, and the lack of co-operation between the navy and the army combined with the use of troops of questionable ability had made the Battle of Tanga a decisive defeat for the British and it was to have its repercussions for some considerable time to come. On November 8 Expeditionary Force 'B' arrived back in Mombasa, with over 800 to
casualties,
for the beaches.
and a
of morale
loss
many units unfit The Germans were able
rendered
which
to fight.
rearm three and discard their old 1871 pattern rifles. They collected vast amounts of ammunition and companies
with
modern
to
weapons,
clothing that the British left on the beaches, but above all they had achieved a victory with a loss of only 60 men over vastly superior numbers, and their morale had reached a peak which was to carry them through the remainder of the war when all other colonies had surrendered. Lettow Vorbeck wrote afterwards that 'Tanga was the birthday of the soldierly spirit in
our troops."
Further Reading Sketches of the East African Dolbey. Capt Campaign (Murray) Gardner. Brian. German East (Cassell. 1963) Lettow Vorbeck. Colonel von. My Reminiscences of East Africa Listowel. Judith. The Making of Tanganyika .
(Chatto&Wmdus.
1965)
Meinertzhagen. Colonel R Army Diary 18991926 fOhver 1960) Moseley. L Duel for Kilimanjaro (Weidenfeld .
..
& Nicolson) Moyse-Bartlett. H The King's African Rifles (Gale and Polden Ltd.) The Official History East Africa vol 1 (HMSO) .
MAJOR
R.
J.
SIBLEY, a serving Army
officer,
was
commissioned from the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst in 1955 into the Essex Regiment, and served with the Regiment in Hong Kong and Germany He was seconded to the 3 Bn The King's African Rifles in Kenya and later the 6 Bn The King's African Rifles in Tanganyika from 1958-61 Whilst in East Africa many of the battlefields of the 1914-18 East African Campaign were visited. From 1963-5 he was attached to the British Embassy in South and 1965-6 served in Berlin. From 1966-7 he was a student at the Royal Military College of Science and the Staff College Camberley Now in a staff appointment which entails lecturing officers in Tactics. He is a member of the Institute for Strategic Studies and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and has been awarded the Ogilby Trust prize for research in the field of Military History Africa,
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tin
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Seizing the German Colonies David Chandler. At the outbreak of war it was vital that the Allies should capture the German harbours and radio stations in West Africa; but little in the way of men and equipment was available for this difficult operation. Above: Troops of the 1st Battalion, Nigeria Regiment, commanded by British officers, board a train for Lagos. It was on these troops that the Allies' hopes of success depended Compared with the momentous events taking place in Europe, the first military operations in West Africa were insignificant in both size and scope. Nevertheless, the problems posed by the need to conquer the German colonies bordering the Bight of Benin and Biafra were highly complex, and the resulting military operations are of considerable interest. The Allied commanders, with only a few thousand British and French native troops, a handful of guns and one or two naval vessels at their disposal, were called upon to conquer areas totalling some 360,000 square miles of tropical country presenting great contrasts of climate and terrain, endowed with few roads and even fewer railways, and defended by European trained and officered African battalions which were in certain respects better-equipped than their
opponents. The conduct of these campaigns presented huge administrative difficulties, and were waged as much against Nature as against the Germans. In many ways the operations were reminiscent of the imperial expeditions of the previous half century, and indeed were actually under the control of the Colonial Office until April 1915. Germany had entered the 'race for Africa' considerably later than the British and French, but had gained control over several areas by 1914. The explorer and trader Dr Nachtigall laid claim to both Togoland and coastal Cameroon in 1884, and Germany had won international recognition for the former by 1890. As for Cameroon, its size had been vastly expanded in 1911 at the expense of French Equatorial Africa following the Agadir crisis. The natural French desire to regain
their former 100,000 square miles was one good reason for their eagerness to mount operations against the German joint colonies in 1914. There were also strategic considerations that made such action desir-
At Atakpame near Kamina in Togoland the Germans had constructed a power ful radio station and this, together with other stations built earlier at Douala in able.
Cameroon and Windhuk
in South West enabled Berlin to monitor— wi the assistance of a 'friendly' station in Brazil — all naval and mercantile radio messages in the South Atlantic and to issue instructions to her own shipping. Further, Douala possessed one of the finest natural harbours in Africa, and as Admiral Sir Henry Jackson pointed out, 'if the Germans had ever got command of the sea, or had B force in Douala, they would have made
Africa,
t
.1
the route to the
Cape very uncomfortable
indeed.'
Yet in spite of this awareness there were tew contingency plans for the reduction of the German colonies in existence at the outbreak of war Sn 1914. Indeed the British government only set up a subcommittee ol' the Committee of Imperial Defence to consider operations outside the European theatre on August 5, with Admiral Jackson serving as Deputy-Chairman. As a result much depended on the initiative of the men on the spot and their ability to extemporise expeditionary forces from such forces as were at their disposal. The British forces in West Africa were as follows. An Imperial Garrison was established at Freetown in Sierra Leone to protect the important coaling station there. This consisted of the 1st West India Regi-
were British
officered,
and
in total strength
possibly 7,000 men (exclusive of porters). However, a large proportion was perpetually engaged in internal security and policing operations in the various artificially created and feud-dominated countries to which they belonged, and could not be spared for invasions of neigh-
numbered
territories. The same was equally true of the various constabularies in the British colonies. The French were not much better off.
bouring
General
Aymerich,
Commander-in-Chief
of French Equatorial Africa, exercised military control from Brazzaville over
Middle Congo, Chad, Gabon and UbangiShari. His total force in 1914 comprised
575 French and 7,020 native troops, including two camel squadrons (in Chad), two battalions of Senegalese Tirailleurs,
Above: A workings
armed constabulary. The Germans
1,500
were also prepared to raise levies as need arose — a policy never permitted by the British colonial authorities. Furthermore the Germans were able to equip each company with three machine-guns, and this advantage in fire-power, together with that derived from superior local knowledge of terrain, went a long way to redress their numerical disadvantage, particularly in Cameroon. The campaign against the Germans in Togoland proved the shortest and one of the most successful of the First World War. Despite the absence on leave in England of both the governor and the commanding officer of the Gold Coast Regiment, the Acting-Governor, Mr Robinson, and Captain F. C. Bryant, RA lost no time in taking
the
initiative
without
awaiting
gun crew demonstrate the 12-pounder gun outside the fort at Dschang. The fort was captured from the Germans on January 2, 1915 and occupied briefly by the British who destroyed it (left) before retiring. Right: Sava Hill, Mora, the base of Allied forces in September 1914. British
of a naval
This dry, rocky country bordering the
Mandara Mountains
is
starkly different
from
much of the land further south which is low and swampy and has a ten-month wet season Far right: The theatre of operations, German Cameroons. Allied successes in Togoland had encouraged hopes of an early settlement of the war in West Africa; but the task facing the British and the French in the German Cameroons was to take months of arduous campaigning to achieve
ment, the West Africa Regiment, two companies of garrison artillery, one of sappers, and various supporting services. Permission to use any of these troops for operations outside Sierra Leone had to be obtained from the War Office, and the Colonial Office (initially entrusted with controlling the expeditions against Togo and Cameroon) had little wish to be beholden to another department of state. In therefore, this left only the West African Frontier Force (the WAFF, founded in 1897) immediately available. The Gold Coast Regiment comprised eight companies of infantry and one battery of guns; the Nigeria Regiment boasted four battalions (one company of mounted infantry and 32 line companies supported by two >atteries); Sierra Leone contributed one battalion, and tiny Gambia was defended by only a single company. All these forces
effect
362
and a few mountain guns. The French forces in Dahome and the Ivory Coast numbered possibly 3,500. But as in the case of the WAFF, the primary duty of these forces was to police the tribal areas where risings and revolts were endemic. Moreover, the French were very short of machine-guns. The British forces could boast about one per company, but their allies were nothing like so well provided for. As for the Germans, their troops were well-trained, well-equipped and generally well-led,
if
somewhat
inferior in overall
Togoland, the Acting-Governor, Major von Dbring, could call upon 300 European and some 1,200 native troops besides a number of police. In Cameroon, Herr Ebermaier, the Governor, was supported at the outset by 200 European officers, 3,200 African troops and three batteries of artillery, besides
numbers
to their opponents. In
instructions from the Colonial Mobilisation was rapidly completed, and by the outbreak of war the Gold Coast Regiment was ready to take the offensive. The ominous import of these preparations were not lost on Major von Doring, and on August 5 he promptly suggested that the two colonies should declare a state of local neutrality — hoping thereby to ensure the safety of Kamina radio. His suggestion was referred to London and rejected.
formal Office.
Tribal loyalty
Rumours that the Germans were
raising the tribes within their region induced certain British officers to ask leave to take similar measures in the Gold Coast, but this the colonial authority would not allow. The dangers of inter-tribal warfare, made all the more dangerous by the arti-
men from
ficial
colonial frontiers
which had
in
many
cases divided African peoples, were deemed far too serious. However there is no doubt that the Gold Coast tribes, particularly the Ashanti, were very keen to see active service — against whom was a matter of indifference. At a rally of chiefs held at Sunyani in late August, the provincial commissioner had the greatest difficulty in persuading the Paramount Chief of western Ashanti that the best contribution he could make to the war effort was to guarantee local order, and thus release police and troops for more active roles. The chief first wished to offer 5,000 warriors to assist the 'all-same canoe boss on the great river' (the translator's pidgin rendering of George V, 'the Sailor King'). When this was politely refused, he offered as many porters. On receiving the same response, the chief played his last card:
north and east of Togo. When news of these steps were signalled to London the Colonial Office was horrified and ordered that no further moves were to take place without their express permission. However, before the day was out London intercepted a German message sent from Kamina in clear, revealing that Doring was proposing to abandon the coast and fall back 100 miles towards the interior. The Colonial Office promptly executed a volte-face and ordered Bryant to occupy Lome and prepare it for use as a base for an advance towards Kamina. By the 7th the French had undertaken to send 28 officers and 450 Tirailleurs with two guns from Cheti and Grand Popo into eastern Togoland, while 500 irregular cavalry and a further force of infantry moved from Ouagadougou into German territory in the
*N^—V |
by a British or Empire soldier in the First
World War
(or so it is believed)
was aimed
a German rearguard by RSM Alhaji Grunshi. Bryant advanced along the line of the railway whilst a second column, at
commanded by Captain
P. E. L. Elgee prepared to march from Kete Krachi in support. The Germans, contrary to their withdrawal agreement, sent two trains of troops southward to delay the advance, but both engines and men were soon captured after the death of their commander, Captain Pfaeler. German demolitions were frequently encountered, but the column covered 60 miles in ten days to reach Nuatja, after crossing two rivers, the Lili and the Haho. Meanwhile a second column pushed on up the western railway line to guard the flank of the main party, and Bryant was Lake
^P*
British
<^D
French Forces
Forces
British
<=3
Forces
Chad (Brisset)
French Forces .'
Gold Coast
Army
German Forces
Dikwai
ft
Lamy« KousVen!
/
Land over 1600 feet
Nigerian Forces
Land over 1600 feet
Railway
50 Miles Railway
80
Kms J.
W
Takum
*
Sept 17
COL MAIRS COLUMN
IT
-nkom*~-^.0ssld
A
Nsanaking'
Sept 6
|%
GERIAN
'
n9 e
»°m, Manen- k *
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Mt.
Railway
Cameroon Buea« Victoria*
\ /, (Aymench)
22/77 Fernando Po Poito
Lome-Ke'a
•
Segum BRITISH
.
Aug
?
nmM
ROYAL NAVY •Knbi
COLUMN
MAIN
COLUMN (Bryant)
if
the
Germans
defeated,
why
Togoland were almost
north-west. That evening, as the French
not attack the French? In
advanced on Anecho, Captain Barker returned to Lome to receive the formal surrender of the 120-mile coastal belt from Herr Clauswitzer. He was joined there two days later by troops advancing from Afolao. Two days later Bryant (newly promoted to temporary Lieutenant-Colonel) was supervising the build-up of men and material at Lome. Eventually he had gathered 558 troops (including 23 British), 34 civilian experts, and 2,000 porters, many of whom arrived by sea having been safely transported through the boiling surf by the endeavours of two Elder-Dempster Shipping Line employees, Captain Minto and Mr Longhurst who were later awarded money grants 'charged against the expenses of the Togoland expedition'. On August 13 the advance on Kamina began. A day earlier the first shot fired
in
the end the Ashanti gave way, promised to keep the peace, and for good measure threw in a guarantee that they would refrain from eating any German nationals that might stray their way. The loyalty of this warlike people could not have been more convincingly demonstrated. Captain Bryant lost no time in taking measures to secure the occupation of Togoland.
On August
6,
Captain Barker was
sent to Lome under flag of truce to demand the surrender of the colony within 24 hours. Meanwhile three columns (varying in strength from one to four companies) formed up at Ada, British-Krachi and Gambaga ready to cross the frontier. The Governor of Dahomey had responded favourably to a suggestion that French forces should take similar action against the
joined by 158 Senegalese Tirailleurs at Abilafoe. As Bryant's patrols approached the
River Khra on August 21, enemy opposition stiffened. Reconnaissance revealed that the Germans were holding a stronglyentrenched position provided with wellsited machine-gun positions several hundred yards north of the demolished railway bridge over the river. On the 22nd, Bryant launched two columns against the position; the first (two companies strong, including a party of Frenchmen) was to attack up the railway line and simultaneously try to turn the enemy left. The second (one and a half companies and three light guns) was to hold the road and turn the German right. The battle raged from 1130 hours until dusk. The Allied force suffered heavily from the German machinegun fire (the first time British native
d3
troops had encountered this type of ordeal), and at nightfall the Germans— reinforced to 460 troops dining the day — were still in possession of all their positions. Bryant's force had suffered 75 casualties (including 21 killed) for Little gain. During the night, however, the Ger-
mans decamped
to
the northwards.
The
reason was the rapid advance being made by the French column from Cheti towards Kanuna. Nevertheless, it took Bryant two days to regroup his exhausted troops, and he deemed it necessary to call in Elgee's column from the west to reinforce him before pressing his advance again. The Germans, however, were about to concede that the campaign was lost. Early on the 25th they blew up Kamina radio station, and sent out emissaries to ask for terms. Bryant demanded unconditional surrender — and this was agreed on the 26th. Bryant forthwith signalled the Colonial Office as follows: T have the
Native troops under
German command
fire
a 2.95
honour
to inform you that Togoland surrendered unconditionally to me today. I occupy Kamina at 8 am tomorrow.' It must have been especially satisfying for a substantive captain to have conquered an area not much smaller than England in a mere three weeks.
'Dum-dum' bullets Kamina was occupied by
the French Comand Captain Elgee's
mandant, Maroix, column the next morning. They rounded up 260 German prisoners and much war material, including 1,000 rifles and a great deal of ammunition, including a quantity of softnosed dum-dum bullets. This last discovery confirmed earlier suspicions: 'Excuses will avail you nothing,' Bryant warned Doring, and charges of violating the Hague agreements were eventually preferred against the German Acting-Governor. Severity could be tempered, with magnanimity where noncombatant enemy nationals were concern-
Bryant declared that 'Englishmen do not fight women' and allowed a number to proceed to Lome under escort. He also went out of his way to inform the Baroness Codelli that her husband was safe and unharmed on the coast. So ended a brief and highly successful campaign. Admittedly the Germans had not offered much resistance before the Khra, but the advance represented a considerable administrative achievement. The War Office lost no time in promoting Bryant to forestall the accumulated wrath of the Colonial Office, occasioned by his repeated pressing-ahead without specific permission. The whole operation had been an object lesson of what local improvisation and determined leadership could achieve. The first moves against German Cameroon from Nigeria did not share the same
railways. The responsibility for planning and executing the invasion of Cameroon, with the radio station and natural harbour of Douala as the prime objectives, was from the first laid on the shoulders of MajorGeneral C. M. Dobell, Inspector-General of the WAFF. He was told that the French were very keen to participate in Cameroon's reduction in order to regain 100,000 square miles of territory in the Middle Congo region. General Dobell left England on August 31 accompanied by a small staff, and after calling at Gambia and Freetown to pick up British and French reinforce-
good fortune. Geography made 'tropical Prussia' easier to defend than Togoland.
ments, he reached Lagos in mid-September. He faced a difficult situation. Besides the
ed.
cm
gun.
German
resistance
in
the
in places. Communications were few and far between. A good road ran from Kribi to Yaounde, and two small railways linked the capital Douala with Eseka, and Bonaberi with Bare, known respectively as the Northern and Western
desert
Cameroons took months
of difficult fighting to
subdue
Roughly triangular in shape, measuring some 600 miles to Lake Chad, it presented marked variations of terrain and climate.
natural hazards and enemy forces already described, he found a newly-united Nigeria (the northern region had only been made
The
subordinate to Lagos on New Year's Day, 1914) with many racial and tribal problems beneath the surface. Towards the end of August three columns had assembled at suitable points along the
plain comprised dense rain to the north-west by Mount Cameroon (13,000 ft), and elsewhere by a number of rivers, tributaries and mangrove swamps. The rivers usually had dangerous bars at their mouths, and were not navigable for many miles before falls were encountered. The region had a ten month wet season and was diseaseridden. The western frontiers adjoining Nigeria were well protected by the Mancoastal
forest,
dominated
dara Mountains, which provided many natural fortresses to a defender. The centre of the country formed a temperate plateau of veldt-type country, but the eastern approaches from French Equatorial Africa were partially obstructed from an invader's point of view, by the neutral Spanish colony of Rio Muni. As the far north of the country was approached, the bush became sparser, merging into semi-
Nigeria-Cameroon frontier. That commanded by Captain Fox (four companies strong, including
some mounted
infantry)
advanced from Maiduguri until encountering the fortified position at Mora — dominated by a 1,700 foot mountain — on August 26. This was too strong to tackle with the forces available, so Fox decided to await the arrival of promised French reinLieutenant-Colonel under forcements Brisset from the Lake Chad area. The second column (600 rifles, five machineguns and two artillery pieces) conducted a difficult 100-mile march from Yola (March 22-28). Its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel P. Maclear, then attempted a night attack
364 i«
a
against the enemy detachment at Garoua on the River Benoue (August 29/30), but was driven back after sustaining 63 casualties. This setback sparked off a revolt among the peoples settled around the middle-reaches of the Benoue, but when the
Germans
tried to exploit this situation
by sending a raiding party against Wukari on September 17, it was beaten off with heavy losses by a detachment of the Nigeria Police. This restored the local situation. The third column, under LieutenantColonel G. T. Mair, proved even less fortunate. Advancing with four companies and as many guns on August 17 from Ikom, Mair successfully passed the Cross River and occupied Nsanakang over the Cameroon frontier. However, German reaction was swift. Rushing 500 riflemen supported by five machine-guns from Douala by train, the German commander, Kapitan Ramstedt, surrounded the 220-strong advance guard of Mair's column within Nsanakang on September 6. Decimated by superior fire-power, only 62 soldiers made good their escape. For a loss of perhaps 126 killed and wounded (including the force commander), the Germans killed 89 troops and captured 67 prisoners, two guns and five machine-guns. This tale of checks and disasters was only slightly ameliorated by the French record. Their initial drive from Fort Lamy against Koussery in the far north of Cameroon was repulsed with considerable loss and it was not until mid-September that a second attempt captured the frontier town. Such was the situation that Dobell found awaiting him. Insufficient forces was clear to the General that the forces already engaged and those accompanying him were insufficient for the task ahead. The Colonial Office now agreed that representations should be made to the War Office for permission to use part of the Sierra Leone Imperial Garrison, and in due course six companies of the West Africa Regiment and a battery of guns were sent to Nigeria. Similarly the Royal Navy made available Cumberland, the gunboat Dwarf and a few minesweepers to join Challenger and the French cruiser Bruix. These naval forces, together with a flotilla of the Nigeria Marine, were put under the command of Captain C. It
HMS
HMS
HMS
Fuller, RN. Dobell's initial
was
capture Douala by a combined operation. The Royal Navy moved first, and began the task of replacing the buoys and lights marking the channels. This done, Fuller discovered 11 blockships sunk across the river some miles below Douala, and also a minefield. Trying to find a way round this obstacle through the creeks, the flotilla came under repeated attack by the Hertzogin Elizabeth and Nachtigal, but by September 22 a plan
way through had been
to
discovered.
The
next day, HMS Challenger, and the main body of the expeditionary force in ten illequipped coasters, arrived at the river mouth. It was vital for health reasons to get the troops ashore with a minimum delay, and a combined reconnaissance force was sent off up the Dilamba Creek in an attempt to reach the Eastern Railway and cut it. Mangrove swamps made the going extremely hard. Two days later on September 25, the French transports arrived, and the same
afternoon HMS Challenger (lightened to reduce her draught from 22 ft to 19 ft 7 in. forced the passage past the wrecked blockships, while minesweepers tackled the mines. An ultimatum was then sent to the German Governor, only to be rejected, and so on the 26th the troops were disembarked in Dilamba Creek whilst the Challenger i
shelled Douala for several hours.
The Germans promptly dismantled
their'
radio station and destroyed certain key installations before surrendering Douala and Bonaberi to force majeur on the 27th. The Allies took possession of 95 vessels of all sizes, a floating dock, an ice-factory, a. good hospital and large amounts of stores (which were very welcome as the expedition had only been supplied with a month's rations). By the 28th, the Allies had 208 British and French officers, 436 white NCOs and ORs, and 4,310 native troops ashore, and three batteries. Dobell now faced a double problem. On the one hand he had to extemporise an administration to run the captured area — and his resources were slender in the extreme. Aided by his single administrative staff officer, Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Rowe, the General used civilian experts
and junior officers to create a nucleus of a staff and service system, and thanks to their joint knowledge of tropical countries, this proved sufficiently adaptable to meet and defeat successive crises in the realms of public health and supply. The second facet of Dobell's problem was the need to advance inland to conquer Cameroon as a whole. The Colonial Office — which, as in the case of the Togoland operations, was in charge of the theatre at this juncture — was alarmed because key German radio personnel escaped inland from Douala, taking some of their lighter equipment with them. There was, therefore, a chance they could establish a new radio station in the interior. The expedition set about this second task by mounting operations up Dilamba Creek on October 6 to dislodge German forces holding the Eastern Railway. After some very heavy fighting, three French columns converged on Edea on October 26 — the capture of which forced the enemy to retire up the River Sanaga. Meanwhile a second force was preparing to expand the conquered coastal area westwards. After overcoming daunting natural obstacles and considerable opposition, Colonel Gorges and a British column took Buea (4,000 ft) below Mount Cameroon. At this juncture 1,200 German military and civil prisoners had been taken, including nuns, women and children. All were shipped off to in-
ternment decision
in British or French colonies — that drew a loud protest from
Germany. Dobell was now free to concentrate against the Northern Railway, and by December 10 the railhead at Bare had been reached and occupied. Three weeks later Dschang was captured and razed (January 2, 1915). In an attempt to mount a counteroffensive, a strong German force attacked the French occupying Edea on January 5, but were driven off with over 200 casualties. However, a study of this attack made General Dobell realise that his forces were over-extended, so Dschang was evacuated. Heavy fighting continued around Bare for several months, and it became clear that without further reinforcements the Allied chances of subduing the rest of
Cameroon were
limited. Pending the arof further aid something of a lull descended over the theatre, although there was still plenty of local activity particularly in the northern sectors. On Februrival
Lieutenant-Colonel 3, for example, Cockburn. at the head of troops of the Nigeria Regiment, successfully stormed an enemy camp at Mbureku on Mount Manenguba. The German commander. Zimbecoming increasingly merman, was anxious about the security of Yaounde, the second most important town in Cameroon, as Nigerian and French columns began to probe towards it from the west and east. By March the front line therefore ran from Edea to Yabashi, thence to Bare, N'kongsamba and the area west of the Northern Railway. The capture of Campo, Kribi and Victoria had almost completed ary
the Allied control of the coastal area. Away to the north-west, Nigerian troops led by Brigadier-General F. C. Cunliffe were observing Mora and Garoua, while another detachment was holding Ossidinge on the Cross River. As for the forces of General Aymerich, they were making slow progress in their advances from the south
and
east.
By
this time it had become clear that a change in the direction of the campaign in London was necessary. Accordingly in April overall control was transferred from
the Colonial to the War Office — to the great relief of most of the British commanders. It was widely hoped that a few more weeks would encompass the final destruction of German resistance in Cameroon, but in fact ten more months of heavy fighting (interspersed with occasional lulls when the climate made effective operations virtually impossible) still lay ahead of General Dobell and his Allied forces. Despite a rapid success in "Togoland and some progress in Cameroon, the war was not yet over in German West Africa.
Further Reading Bryant, Colonel F. C, The Capture of Togoland (in the Cavalry Journal, 1926) Dobell, Major-General Sir C, The Campaign in the Cameroons 1914-16 (in the RUSI Journal, 1922)
Haywood, Colonel
A., and Clarke, Brigadier F., History of the Royal West African Frontier Force (Aldershot, 1964) Jouin, Marechal, Conquete du Togo (in La Revue Historique de I'Armee, 1965) No 2 Jouin, Marechal, Conquete du Cameroun (in La Revue Historique de I'Armee, 1964) No 3 Moberly, Brigadier-General F. J., History of the Great War, Togoland and the Cameroons 1914-16 (London, 1931)
Ramsden, Lieutenant-Colonel B. V., Sunyani and All That (in the Army Quarterly, 1965) Schwartze, Der Grosse Krieg Vol 4
DAVID CHANDLER
is
a
Senior Lecturer
in
the
Department of Military History at Sandhurst. A Yorkshireman by birth, he was educated at Marlborough and Keble College. Oxford. Appointed to a Short Service Commission, he spent 18 months on secondment to the RWAFF, 1 958-60. He is author of The Campaigns of Napoleon and edited the Memoirs of Parker and Merode-Westerloo He has contributed to Purnell's History of the Second World War and many other historical and military jounals He was appointed Visiting Professor in Military History at the State University of Ohio for 1970
THE ROLE OF THE Rodney de Bruin. In 1914 several countries abstained from entering the world conflict. As 'neutrals' they held a unique economic position which it was in their interest but not always in their power to preserve. The demands of the combatants for war materials could lead to rapid industrial development in neutral states but trade with either side was often dangerous \\ ar can be a profitable business for neutral countries it' thev are able to meet the increased demands of the combatants for goods and war materials. This was not entirely true of the First World War, although many European countries remained neutral. Norway. Sweden, Denmark, the Switzerland, Netherlands, and Spain preserved their neutrality throughout the conflict, but in many cases geography made their positions difficult. British control of the seas meant that they could not continue their overseas trade without British consent, and the Allied blockade affected them all at some time, preventing them from taking full advantage of their neutrality at the expense of the combatants. In fact, they were at the mercy of British good will and sense of justice, and on the other side of the Atlantic the United States, the greatest neutral power, naturally wished to continue her profitable trade with Europe after the outbreak of war. There had been an attempt to clarify the situation concerning blockade, contraband, prizes and convoys in the Declaration of London, which was issued on February 26, 1909. This declaration was ratified by all interested parties except Britain who declined on the grounds that the conditions it laid down were unduly favourable to neutrals in time of war. Britain did not make her intentions known until August 20, 1914, when a British Order in Council was issued w-hich stated that Britain was willing to abide by the Declaration of London, but with some additions and modifications. The different categories of contraband were declaration in the established abolished and all prohibited goods destined for enemy countries, even if carried by neutral shipping via a neutral port or country, were to be considered contraband. This was a severe blow to the carrying trade of the non-combatant states. The British immediately set up a Prize Court as part of the Admiralty Court and the president of the latter was ex officio president of the Prize Court. In September 1914 Sir Samuel Evans was appointed judge for prize affairs and held this position throughout the war. His office was in London, but other British Prize Courts were set up in Egypt, Zanzibar, Cyprus, Gibraltar and Malta. France had had her own Conseils dcs Prises since 1861. Accordingly Germany and Austria-Hungary set up Prize Courts in their European territories, as well as in the German colonies in Africa and the Far East, and the combatants had already produced lists
366
relations with the Central Powers, and she so favoured by Britain economically that she was practically under British protection. The Republic of Portugal was proclaimed on October 5, 1910 and its first president, Dr Manoel de Arriaga, faced a difficult His supporters became dissituation. illusioned when it was obvious that there was to be no significant improvement in their conditions, and the royalists con-
was
tinued to plot against him. When war broke out in August 1914 Portugal was firmly in the Allied sphere of influence. The rebellion of the pro-German General Pimenta de Castro prevented Portugal from entering the war on the Allied side, and she remained neutral. De Castro's
Britannia takes Belgian refugees into her care
of contraband goods. Allied and German minefields were being laid in the North Sea and Britain intended to force neutral shipping to sail under her coasts where it could be easily controlled by the Royal Navy. The Germans intended to blockade British ports on the east coast and many neutral ships were sunk by German mines in the North Sea. It is not surprising that the neutral states, especially the United States and
the Netherlands, protested vehemently against this state of affairs. The Central Powers declared their willingness to obey the Declaration of London of 1909, and the British replied with a new Order in Council on October 29, 1914 but this did not contain any improvement for the neutrals. Spain declared her neutrality on August 1914 and the king gave France as7, surances that she might denude her Pyrenean frontier of troops. The Spanish government was soon fully occupied with internal problems as the peoples of Catalonia renewed their agitation for autonomy and the army had to be used to restore order during native risings in Morocco. Spanish industry, which centred on Catalonia, was able to supply the belligerents with iron, munitions and other goods, and this trade stimulated its growth. Rapid industrial expansion produced conditions in which socialism gained ground and this gave the upper classes cause for alarm. Spain had no opportunity to continue trade
dictatorship was not overthrown until May 14, 1915. The position of Switzerland was quite different, as that country is bounded by Germany and Austria to the north and east, by France in the west and by Italy in the south. The Swiss have no direct outlet to the sea and were therefore dependent on the good will of both sides. They produced certain industrial goods, and their precision instruments were needed by the Allies and the Central Powers. Both sides tried to exert pressure on Switzerland but they could not be too harsh because of the danger of crippling the Swiss economy, thereby interrupting or stopping the production of important goods, and Switzerland was granted economic concessions by all the belligerents. However Switzerland's dependence on the Allies, particularly Britain, was so great that she was compelled to follow the Dutch example and set up a trust trading company. This company consisted of Swiss import firms and exporters who regulated the import of raw materials and the export of industrial products, under the strict supervision of
the Swiss government.
An impregnable redoubt The Swiss announced their neutrality on August
4,
1914, but they mobilised their
and remained on a war footing throughout the First World War. They were prepared to defend their neutrality by force and the Alps made Switzerland an ideal defensive position. The German and French speaking communities were divided in their sympathies, and the powers of the Federal government were increased to forces
enable it to distribute food supplies evenly. Switzerland was able to supply the combatants with certain goods and this led to the development of Swiss industry.
Finally the geographical position of the country made it useful for spies of both sides.
The Netherlands, traditionally a seafaring and trading nation, was very concerned with the rights of neutral shipping and trade. They possessed a vast overseas empire from which important raw materials were supplied and offered for sale in Amsterdam. They had close commercial with Germany, the greatest buyer of Dutch colonial raw materials and Dutch agricultural produce and the biggest ties
supplier of many industrial goods. When Britain announced her blockade measures Dutch overseas trade practically ceased and Dutch ships were held up and experienced considerable delays. In
an attempt
A Swiss
to
improve this situation,
frontier post at the
end
of
Netherlands.
Francis
Oppenheimer
his British confrere on December 26, 1914. Although Dutch neutrality was desirable for both the Allies and the Central Powers,
became
were occasions in 1914 when the narrowly escaped being Netherlands dragged into the war. In the first weeks of the war the Royal Navy discovered some there
trawlers among Dutch fishing boats in the North Sea. The Germans were equipped with carrier-pigeons which were meant to carry news about the movements of the British navy to the Germans. It is not surprising that the British consequently scrutinised all fishing fleets and minelayers would inthat suspected filtrate these fleets to lay mines close to the British coast. They repeatedly exercised
German
Munition stores were
fence.
many. The Germans agreed to this scheme 15, 1914 and Baron Hartogiensis was appointed German commercial attache to supervise contraband in
their
verifying
rights,
which
interfered
with the catch of Dutch fishermen. The Dutch also refused to allow the British passage up the River Scheldt, either to confiscate German and Austrian ships interned in the harbour at Antwerp or to send reinforcements there. Queen Wilhelmina had ordered general mobilisation in the Netherlands on July 31, 1914 and the Dutch army of 203,657 men quickly got under arms. The Dutch navy was also alerted. Lieutenant-General C. -I. Snijdera was appointed C-in-C of the Dutch forces and the nucleus of Dutch defence was the fortress of Holland. The army may have been ready but it was certainly not well-equipped, even for de-
insufficient,
the railways lacked carriages and clothing stores were inadequate. Compulsory service was unpopular and only 2,000 men enlisted in the voluntary landstorm. The Netherlands retained this army on a war footing for four years. There was a considerable amount of antiGerman feeling in the Netherlands after the invasion of Belgium, and especially after the fall of Antwerp when many Belgian refugees crossed the Dutch border. Although the greater part returned home, their grief and distress made a great impression on the Dutch people. The Germans were attacked verbally in the press and anti-British feeling, a legacy from the Boer War, receded. In Protestant circles Germany had more
1914 To maintain her economy, Switzerland was dependent on the good
the Committee for the Trade of the Netherlands called a meeting with representatives of seven large shipping companies on November 10. They decided to form a trust company and the shipping companies agreed not to carry any goods unless they had first been authorised by this company or the Dutch government. The Netherlands Oversea Trust Company was thus established, and the Dutch believed they would now be able to comply with British demands concerning the supply of goods, and also come to some agreement with Ger-
on December
the
will of all
support 'pagan'.
and
her neighbours
France
Abraham
was regarded as Kuvper. who had
sympathised with the Boers, thought necessary
explain away the Belgian neutrality.
to
violation of
it
German Ho wrote
in his party organ Do Standaard thai there could be a state of necessity in which a government should have the right to break the statute law in order to maintain the absolute right. Many people admired the military organisation of the Germans and their successes in the war. and among hem there were some Dutch officers who hoped t
German
Their wish was but understandable in view of their dissatisfaction with the deplorable Dutch military equipment lor
a
politically
victory.
short-sighted
King Christian had
alliance with autocratic and reactionary Russia added to these suspicions. One might conclude that there were no truly neutral states in Europe during the conflict. Many of the neutrals sympathised with the Allies and were perturbed by the brutal German invasion of Belgium. To countries with a seaborne trade Allied blockade was a great inconvenience, but as these countries were also small, weak, land powers, the Royal Navy was seen as a lesser threat than the German Army.
sat on the throne of 1912, and in 1914 important changes in the Danish constitution were made. The suffrage was extended
Denmark and
all
since
men, and most women were quali-
fied to vote at the
age of 25 years instead of
The predominance of the upper house was broken and a. more regular parliamentary government established in Den30.
mark.
German supply source Denmark also had difficulty in adjusting trade relations to meet the new circumstances and many exporters posing as Americans tried to carry contraband to Danish harbours. Britain proposed that Denmark follow the Dutch example but the Danish government feared German intervention. On October 29, Britain classed Denmark as a source of German supply and declared that all contraband destined for Denmark would be seized. It was not until January 1915 that the Danish government conceded
to British Strategically Denmark was in an unfortunate position between the German naval bases and that militarily weak
pressure.
constant danger. Sweden had little to do with the Allies and close connections with Germany. The Swedish sold all their copper supplies to Germany and British pressure to stop the sale of ores to the Central Powers was unsuccessful. Russia also used Sweden as a transit country for American goods which were desperately needed. In Norway democratic reforms had taken place in 1907 when the suffrage was extended to women ana he royal suspensive veto was abolished. In ntrast to Sweden, Norway was wholly in ti British sphere of influence, and had economu ties with that country through the carrying trade. An agreement concerning restrk ions on Nornation
felt in
1
368
Above top: King Gustavus V of Sweden. Above: Pope Benedictus XV. He was elected in 1914. Above left: King Christian X of Denmark. Above right: Manoel Jose d'Arnaga, President of Portugal
wegian trade with the Central Powers was reached on October 29. 1914. The United States tried to carry on trading with Europe on the same footing as before the war. President Woodrow Wilson was determined to remain neutral but the sympathies of the American people were divided. Those of Irish origin were antiBritish and those of German origin were often sympathetic towards Germany. There were also many who were pro-British, and the sale of war materials to the Allies and the purchase of war bonds issued by Allied
governments brought about a vested terest in an Allied victory in certain fluential circles.
When
inin-
not isolationist, the
mood was one of sympathy towards France and Britain since their victory would clearly advance the cause of democracy, freedom and progress far more than a German victory. On the other hand, there was some doubt about the true motives of the British and the French, and their general
Further Reading Bonjour, E., Geschichte der schweizerischen Neutral itat (Basle, 1965) Churchill, W. S The World Crisis 191 1-1 8 (Four Square) Japikse, N.. Die Stellung Hollands im Weltkrieg, Politisch und wirtschaftlich (The Hague, Gotha, 1921) Livermore. H. V., A New History of Portugal .
(Cambridge University Press, 1966) Oervik, N., The Decline of Neutrality (Oslo. 1953) Payne, S. G., Politics and the Military in Modern Spain (Oxford University Press, 1967) Smith, D. M., The Great Departure. The United States and World War I 1914-20 (New York, 1965)
RODNEY DE BRUIN was born in 1924 in Bandung, West Java, Indonesia and endured the hardships of the Japanese occupation of Java. After the Indonesian
Revolution
(1945-49)
he
studied
economics and Asian history at the Teachers' Course in Djakarta. In 1956 he was repatriated to Holland and since then he has been a member of the staff at the State Institute for War Documentation in Amsterdam and became head of the Indonesian Collection there. In 1967 he delivered a lecture on the Japanese sponsored Three A Movement in Java during the first year of the Japanese occupation to the 25th International Congress of Orientalists at Ann Arbor, Michigan. He took a doctor's degree at the University of Utrecht.
-
Sinking of the
Aboukir Hogue and Cressy Less than two months after the beginning of the war, Britain's confidence in her mighty navy was rudely disturbed. Three armoured cruisers were sunk by a single German submarine — a weapon whose potential had been guessed at and which now seemed about to be realised. The loss of life was considerable, though the sinking of the three ships was of little coiisequence to overall British naval supremacy. Below: JiMS Aboukir, first of the U 9's victims. RichardjJMilton
HMS Hogue and in all
(right)
HMS Cressy
ways- they were designed,
served together, and
finally
sister ships
and went down together built
In late September 1914, the Royal Navy experienced its first contact with a new form of naval warfare. It was a shock which brought home the vulnerability of surface warships to an invisible underwater enemy. On September 22, three armoured
HMS Hogue,
Aboukir and Cressy, were sunk in the North Sea by a solitary German submarine in an action which lasted scarcely an hour. For the first time, many naval chiefs and commanders of some of the world's largest and most powerful fighting ships were brought face to face
cruisers,
with the practical possibility of destruction by a craft inferior in armament and size, operating secretly in the enemy's home waters. The unhurried but inexorable progress of technology since Nelson's victories 100 years before, had at last come to fruition.
Hogue, Aboukir and Cressy were predreadnought ships whose design and construction dated from 1898 to 1902. They were three of the four Cressy or Bacchante class ships which made up 7th Cruiser Squadron, stationed at the Nore under Rear- Admiral Henry Carpbell. The fourth ship was HMS Baccht te, Campbell's flagship. This squadron, U. ether with the 1st and 3rd Destroyer Floti as at Harwich and ten submarines of the ^th Flotilla,
formed the 'Southern Force -all
command
Christian, whose
370
under the
of Rear-Admi al Arthur flagship was Eur-
HMS
yalus — yet another Bacchante class cruiser. The task of the Harwich flotillas was to keep the area of the North Sea below the 54th parallel free of German minelayers and torpedo craft, and one of the 7th Cruiser Squadron's duties was to support the destroyers in these sweeps. Two areas of the North Sea were earmarked for patrols by Southern Force — the Dogger Bank, and an area off the Hook of Holland known as the 'Broad Fourteens'. The Broad Fourteens was an area of concern to the Admiralty both from a tactical point of view and for political reasons. Firstly, it was an ideal position from which to get early warning of any attempt by German ships to attack the transports taking the BEF, and later its supplies, across the Channel to France. It was also a good station from which to intercept enemy minelayers making for British coastal waters. Apart from its purely tactical importance, however, dominance of the
Broad Fourteens was necessary politically in order to honour a pledge given to Bel-
gium
at the beginning of the war. Part of Britain's guarantee to Belgium — the ostensible cause of Britain's entry into the war — was to ensure that the river Scheldt, Belgium's chief exit to the sea, remained clear for shipping. In order to fulfil the guarantee the Admiralty was anxious to maintain a British presence in the area and accordingly ordered patrols.
The four cruisers of the 7th Squadron and Euryalus. which had to undertake patrol duties as a result of the general shortage of cruisers, were usually split between the patrol areas. On September 17, bad weather conditions forced both destroyer flotillas to return to Harwich, leaving Rear-Admiral Campbell patrolling the Dogger Bank area with the four cruisers alone (Bacchante was in harbour for repairs at the time.) At this time, Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, was visiting the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow, and on the same day as the destroyers were forced back to port a conference was held on board Jellicoe's flagship, HMS Iron Duke. The conference was attended by Churchill, Sturdee, Chief of the War Staff, Keyes, in charge of the Submarine Service, and Tyrwhitt, commander of the Harwich Force. During his visit to the Grand Fleet, Churchill had been infuriated to overhear the expression 'livebait squadron' and on enquiry discovered it was the fleet's nickname for the 7th Cruiser Squadron. When Churchill raised the matter of the Bacchantes, Keyes and Tyrwhitt took the opportunity to point out the danger of exposing the cruisers to such an advanced position, especially without a destroyer screen and in an area where numerous fishing boats could report their
movements. Churchill recognised the danger in which
| §
s § « g.
-
Armoured cruisers: outdated, outmoded, too slow, too weak and idefal submarine prey
the cruisers were, and the following day, on his return to London, he recommended to the First Sea Lord, Lord Louis Battenberg, that they should be removed. His minute read: The Bacchantes ought not to continue on this beat. The risk is not justified by any service they can render. The narrow seas, being the nearest point to the enemy, should be kept by a small number of good modern ships. The Bacchantes should go to the western entrance of the Channel and set Bethell's battle-
ships—and
later
Wemyss'
cruisers — free
convoy and other duties. The first four Arethusas (light cruisers of 1914 vintage) should join the flotillas of the narrow seas. for
A
major blunder
Battenberg concurred with Churchill's recommendations, especially since he had never been very enthusiastic about the Bacchantes steaming up and down alone in the North Sea. He was willing therefore to adopt Churchill's plan. But two days later, on September 19, Sturdee persuaded the First Sea Lord to approve an order moving the cruisers not to the western approaches, but to the southern patrol area. Meanwhile, Admiral Christian was patrolling off the Dogger Bank with the Bacchantes, still unescorted. He signalled to the Admiralty that he intended to maintain his position, but before this was received, the Admiralty sent him this
message: The Dogger Bank patrol need not be continued. Weather too bad for destroyers to go to sea. Arrange for cruisers to watch Broad Fourteens.' Churchill did not see the signal, which was described as 'routine'. Admiral Christian duly moved his patrol south, and by dawn on September 20 had reached the Maas Light Vessel, where it was found that his flagship Euryalus needed coal and repairs to her wireless. But as the weather was too bad for him to transfer his flag to another ship, Christian returned to port leaving in command the Senior Officer, Captain John Drummond of the Aboukir. At last, on the night of September 21-22, the weather moderated, and the cruiser Lowestoft and eight destroyers, under Admiral Tyrwhitt, left Harwich late on September 21. This force had not, however, joined up with the three cruisers by dawn on the 22nd. At dawn on September 22, the stage was thus set. The three elderly cruisers were deployed in a regular order, steaming at a dangerously low constant speed of under ten knots, in an area sandwiched between the Dutch coast and a German minefield, without escort and almost on the enemy's doorstep. Only the other principal in the drama, the (7 9, had yet to appear. In common with the adversaries she was soon to meet, the U 9 was not a modern craft. Her surface propulsion was by Kort-
ing diesel engines, underwater propulsion f being by electric motors whose batteries § needed frequent recharging. For arma- ^ ment, she had four torpedo tubes of 17-7- § inches, two bow and two stern, and one « 2-inch gun. The bow tubes had reloads, §. giving the U 9 a total of six torpedoes. Under the command of Leutnant Otto Weddigen, the U 9 sailed from Kiel on
same day as the Bacmoving to their southern patrol area. Her destination was the Flanders Bight, where she was to try to September
20, the
chantes were
prevent landings by British troops on the Belgian coast during the battle of tin Marne. On the voyage south, her gyro compass proved to be faulty and, unable to navigate precisely, Weddigen found himself off the Dutch coast, some 50 miles from his destination, on the night of September 21. Here the U 9 encountered the tail-end of the heavy weather that had forced the Harwich destroyers to rot urn to 1
and was obliged herself to remain submerged at a depth of 50 feet all night. port,
A single torpedo At dawn on September 22 the weather moderated and Leutnant Weddigen surU
9 in order to recharge her faced the batteries. Visibility was good and Weddigen soon saw the masts of the three cruisers to the south of him. The U-boat's heavy-oil engines were making a lot ofsmoke, hut as
for
action
it
was hotter
to
operate sub-
merged, Weddigen dived immediately without completing the recharging of the batteries Once submerged, the U-boat commander eould see that the cruisers were without a destroyer screen and were approaching on a steady course of about nine knots m line abreast, two miles apart. \\ eddigen at first took the ships to be light cruisers, possibly of the
Birmingham
class.
fired only a single bow the Aboukir from a range of 500 yards. The torpedo struck the Aboukir on the starboard side and she began to sink. Captain Drummond apparently believed that he had struck a mine and signalled to the Hogue and Cressy to close in, but to keep ahead of him. The captains of the other cruisers complied with Drummond's signal and stopped their ships to pick up survivors. The 9 had dived deep after her first shot to reload the torpedo tube and now returned to periscope depth. The sea was still choppy following the bad weather and four-to-five foot whitecaps helped obscure the periscope. The U-boat commander saw the Aboukir going down and the other two ships standing by. Now he correctly identified the targets as armoured cruisers,
At 0620 hours he torpedo
at
and full-throated at
first,
but they gradu-
ally subsided into a low wailing chant fell like surf on a distant shore.'
and
As we have seen, the Harwich destroyers had eventually set sail to rejoin the cruisers, but they arrived too late to participate in the action. Now they were redirected to Terschelling at the mouth of the Zuider Zee in order to try to cut off
the U 9. But the submarine steered a northerly course close in along the Dutch coast to make Kiel without further contact with the British and to receive a jubilant welcome. Leutnant Weddigen was awarded the Iron Cross for his exploit by a Kaiser reported to be 'in seventh heaven'.
First real defeat In Britain the news was a bombshell. At first it was widely believed that the sinkings were the work of a 'pack' of sub-
U
and at 0655 hours he fired both bow torpedoes at the stationary Hogue, from a range of only 300 yards. Both torpedoes hit and the U 9 was so close to her target that she had to manoeuvre to avoid a collision. The Hogue was doomed, however, as she began to heel over a moment after being struck for the second time. One of her officers recalls: Within three minutes of the first torpedo hitting, the list had increased to about 40 degrees, and realising that her end was very near all hands began to tear off their clothes and crawl down the high side or jump overboard to leeward. To add to the general confusion the stokehold
crowd suddenly poured up on deck,
dear
Undeterred by any thought of a British counterattack, Weddigen recklessly surfaced to ascertain whether the Cressy was stationary or still moving, and found her stopped with her boats away picking up survivors from her two sister ships. The U-boat's batteries were almost completely exhausted by now, but she still had two stern torpedoes and a single reload left for a bow tube. The U 9 submerged and manoeuvred for a stern shot but her periscope was spotted by the Cressy just before she fired. The Cressy's captain ordered full speed ahead, but one of the two torpedoes hit and stopped her. The U 9 turned again for a bow shot and with her last torpedo sank the remaining cruiser. The U-boat then l -engaged and surfaced north of the scene o 'he action to recharge her batteries. In the distance
victims were the struggling for survival seen by one of their number as 'Two tho isand swimming :
drowning men all herded together, hardly with elbow room. Strong swimmers were dragged under in the frenzied clutches of weak swimmers or men who could not swim at all. The cries for help were loud
or
372
position, but made it clear that it was unable to evaluate properly the reasons for so positioning the ships.
What
the enquiry showed was that the was not clearly understood and that the command arrangements were not clearly laid down, especially regarding the responsibility for ordering the Harwich destroyers to sea again. There was also the question of why both admirals were in port at the time of the incident, with the knowledge and consent of the Admiralty. The court was not given an explanation as to why Admiral Campbell had not transferred his flag when the Bacchante had to put in for repairs. In the case of Admiral Christian, the bad weather object of the patrol
shifting his flag to
one of the other cruisers when the Euryalus the patrol. in looking for the culprit, in a more objective mood, the whole of 19thcentury naval thinking should not be overlooked. The submarine was still a relatively unknown quantity (although great left
Perhaps
had been made in improving it since it would not be fair to say that the Admiralty ignored the threat posed by the submarine. Indeed, extensive memoranda had been written on its importance by Fisher, Jellicoe, Bacon and Keyes. The strides
1900), but
their
life.
Aboukir was hit. The captains of the Hogue and Cressy were blamed for stopping their ships to pick up survivors, and all three were blamed by the court for failing to anticipate the possibility of submarine attack and failing to post sufficient lookouts. The court criticised the Admiralty for placing the cruisers in a hazardous
had prevented him from
blackened faces dripping sweat and tense with apprehension. It was now a case of every man for himself, and tearing off my boots and clothing and then fastening to my wrist by its chain my gold watch, which I greatly prized, I walked down the sloping deck into the water and struck out for
ment, the court blamed the captains of the and also criticised in strong terms the Admiralty's decision to place them on the Broad Fourteens. The report of the court blamed Captain Drummond for failing to 'zigzag' the formation when the weather moderated and also for ordering the other two ships to close when the cruisers
point
German view of British naval powerformidable on top but vulnerable below
Trie
marines ravaging unescorted
ships.
When
became known that only a single U-boat was responsible, both the public and naval chiefs were shocked. The total complement of the three ships was about 2,200. Of these, 62 officers and 1,397 men had been lost in the action. The public was appalled both at the loss of life and at the loss of three it
cruisers, not realising that the ships were virtually obsolete, and that their loss did not materially diminish the superiority of
the British navy over the Germans. But Britain was also smarting under her first real defeat, and outraged public opinion demanded that culprits be found. As was often the case in the war years, Churchill came under fire. He was blamed for taking on himself the responsibility for the positioning of the cruisers, against the advice of the Sea Lords. Few of his critics knew that the disposition of the ships was the result of the signal of September 19 from the First Sea Lord and the Chief-of-Staff.
A
court of enquiry sat to ascertain who to blame for the disaster and interviewed the principals involved. In judge-
was
is,
though, that although the naval
command
realised the danger represented by the submarine, the same was not true throughout the navy. Before September 1914 no one had experienced the full potential of the submarine in action. Thus as no one really knew what to expect of the submarine in war, no extensive precautions had been taken against them in the planning of evasive manoeuvres and what to do in the event of submarine attack. Perhaps the men of 1914 were not so much negligent as short-sighted when overtaken by technical development.
high
Further Reading Churchill, W., The World Crisis (Four Square) Gretton, Sir Peter, Former Naval Person (Cassell)
Hezlet,
Sir
Power Marder,
(P.
Arthur,
The Submarine and Sea
Davies 1967)
A. J.,
From Dreadnought
to
Scapa Flow
(OUP
1965) Stafford, E. P., The Far 1968)
RICHARD MILTON was
and
born
the
in
Deep (Barker
London
in
1943
Following a technical education, he spent eight years with a major industrial organisation working principally as a technical author. In 1 967 he decided to make journalism his career and at present he is News Editor of a weekly journal in the electronics field
He
lives
and works
in
London.
.Great Yarmouth
rjLowestott
Displacement: 493/61
Beam: 19%
feet.
1
ISTROYER
<
German submarine U 9
,
FLOTILLAS
S EPT 20
t<\
Ipswich
the
tons. Length: 188 feet.
Power/speed: 1,050/1,160 hp
^Z^r 'SEPT 22 U*
Harwich
and 14/8 knots. Armament: four 17.7-inch torpedo tubes and one 2-inch gun Crew: 28
?v Huok
ol Hiillnnil
MJ
fy
H »« ue
# Rotterdar
HOLLAND
NORTH SEA The southern
patrol area of the Royal Navy in the North Sea. Here a series of coincidences, bad management and the weather brought together four old vessels and led to the loss of three British ships and 1,459 men
Zeehni||go
a
Oslond,
9 Dovt!i Fnlkifstnno
Calais.
Dunkirk
FRANCE
BELGIUM
Antwerp
-CJ*
*'
I
4KB
&"'
jac v*
«*• Jm
4:
C
^
***.
»><
A,
V
-
V,
*i a
IE SIEGE OF
•>* '
5*
1 tb
*
*** '*a^?
-'
Antwerp — the final Belgian defence and their planned 'national redoubt'. The Belgian High Command, however, had made a fatal error, for they chose the positions in a spirit of 'pious neutrality' rather than with proper strategic and tactical considerations. This, and the excessive trust placed by the Belgians in the outgunned and outmoded fortresses, meant that inevitably the Germans broke through onto the first line infantry, whose morale had been eroded by years of neglect. The arrival of a few British troops could do little but delay the loss of Antwerp. Above: Poorly led and poorly armed, Belgian troops wait by a makeshift barricade for the next onslaught. Right: General von Beseler, originator of the new siege tactics which took Antwerp so economically in terms of first line troops. Christopher Duffy
On August
18,
80,000
men
how
even the newest of these works were behind the times. The principle of the monolithic fort, with its 500 men and scores of guns, was already outmoded by the dispersed arrangement of defences which the Germans had adopted for their Feste at Metz in 1900. At Antwerp, as at Liege, the dimensions of the armour and concrete protection had been based on the
(five divisions)
the Belgian field army left their untenable position on the river Gette. By the morning of the 20th they had abandoned the greater part of their homeland to the
ot'
Germans, and fallen back northwards to the levels and heathlands around the great fortress-port ot' Antwerp. The direction of the retreat had been dictated partly by the impossibility of establishing contact with the French army, now fast withdrawing southwards, but more particularly by an idea that had been at the heart of Belgian strategy since the 1850s. This was the idea of using Antwerp as a retreat in the event of invasion, a notion which had recently taken concrete form in the plan of campaign drawn up in 1905, which regarded the position as 'the refuge of the government, the redoubt whose fall would spell our defeat and the loss of our independence'. Unfortunately for the Belgians, the 'national redoubt' failed in nearly every way to live up to the demands of the 20th Its position, tucked up against the Dutch province of Zeeland, had been chosen largely out of a spirit of pious neutrality, as being equidistant from France and Germany. As the engineer and strategist Brialmont pointed out, that consideration held little force once the FrancoPrussian War had shown Germany to be by far the more likely of the two potential enemies. From the point of view of the British and French, King Albert and his men could hardly have stranded themselves in a more inconvenient corner of their country. Foreign naval access up the Scheldt to Antwerp was barred by the Dutch through right of ancient treaty, and the one overland route of relief was confined to the vulnerable corridor, some 13 miles wide, which ran between the Scheldt and the frontier of Zeeland. Any respectable 18th-
Century.
.
century strategist would have thrown up hands in horror at the thought of thus running his line of communication perpendicularly across the front of the enemy.
his
The civilian sniper or franc-tireur. Probably no more than a handful existed, but the German advance lived in fear of them. Below: Undertrained and too few in number, the Belgian artillery could do little other than hamper the continuing German advance 'national redoubt' did not make up for its awkward situation by any great tactical strength. Decades of energetic
The
had encrusted the countryside around Antwerp with 48 forts and redoubts, but it had been made clear at Liege that it was to take no more than one day's fire from the super-heavy Skoda and Krupp siege howitzers to show that most of the building had been in vain. The inner core of the fortress of Antwerp had been designed as long ago as 1859, and consisted of a continuous city rampart and a 27-mile circumference of forts. An enormous new perimeter of 66 miles was begun in 1878, with the construction of Forts Lier and Walem, and it was rounded off when Stabroek and Waver Sainte Katelijne were building
built in 1906.
Few
people appreciated just
far
calculation that the 210-mm howitzer shell was the heaviest projectile that the materials would be called on to withstand. It is easy to appreciate the alarm of the Belgian General Deguise, as he saw the devastating effects of the 280-mm le Creusot howitzer which the Russians employed in their siege experiments at Ochakov in 1912. He promptly sent a report to the War Ministry, and the document was just as promptly filed away and forgotten. August 1914 found the forts in disarray. Important works such as Walem were filled with reels of wire for telephone and electric light installations which were far from complete. Worse still was the state of Waver Sainte Katelijne, with its gaping shafts for cupolas (gun turrets) which had ninth-hour burst of not yet arrived. activity did little to strengthen the position:
A
trenches could seldom be dug deeper than one foot, owing to the high water-table, and the clearing of fields of fire had the effect of making the forts stand up like 'islands in the midst of a calm green sea'. These impoverished forts were supposed to hit back at the siege batteries by means of 150-mm guns of 1886 to 1892 vintage. Black or brown powder charges propelled the shells up to 9,000 yards, which already fell short of the range of the monster artillery of the Germans, and the effective reach of these fortress guns was shorter still, for the artillery had no external observation posts for directing their fire.
Mentally and physically unfit The 70,000 fortress troops were impressive in numbers only. They were reservists, whom family life and Belgian beer had ren-
i
dered unfit mentally and physically for a return to the colours which some had left as long as 13 years before. It would certainly have been a mistake to have locked up Belgium's best troops in the defence of fortifications, but the authorities forgot that there is a limit to just how bad a garrison should be allowed to become. What was needed was a mixture of the reservists and the younger men whom Major de Witte described as young lads who care for nothing'.
The strategy of King Albert, as commander in chief, was to harass the Germans from his position on their flank and rear, and to hold the Antwerp position as long as his retreat along the coastal corridor was not compromised. General Galet, Chief of the General Staff, was in full agreement. Albert's and Galet's wishes were, however, distorted, misrepresented and contravened at every level of command. The eloquent and forceful de Broqueville, who combined the offices of Prime Minister and War Minister, gathered about him a circle of staff* officers who dreaded the thought of being stranded in Antwerp, and ceaselessly pressed for a retreat. At the other extreme the governor of Antwerp, General Deguise (of the Ochakov experiments), regarded the defence of the position as an end in itself, and was bent on putting into practice the lessons he had derived from a lifetime's study of fortress warfare. Thus no real unity of command could be achieved, even after the field army and fortress staffs had been joined together in a Supreme Council of War on September 6. The demoralisation and disunity of the defenders go far towards explaining how the German siege detachment, which probably stood at no more than 100,000 men, was able eventually to conquer Antwerp. While the mass of the German armies wheeled south against the French and British, only a mixed force of second line troops could be spared to contain the Belgians. The demanding task of guarding the Aachen-Liege-Louvain-Brussels road
The Germans were able
to
and rail communications was entrusted to the III Reserve Corps (5th and 6th Reserve Divisions) and the Marine Division (sailors, cavalrymen, coastal and Landwehr gunners: a scratch force characteristic of this phase of the war). In the following weeks the Germans were faced with the still more taxing business of mounting their own attack with the help of the slight accession of force represented by the 4th Ersatz Division. The Germans were at least fortunate in their commander, Infantry General von Beseler. He was a sapper by training, and his former post as Assistant Chief of the Prussian General Staff had fitted him both for shouldering heavy responsibilities and for putting into effect the theory of the 'short and forceful' siege attack which the Germans had evolved before the war. The Belgians had not been long in the Antwerp position before the critical situation of the French and British, together with the tempting weakness of the enemy screen north of Brussels, prompted Albert to attempt something enterprising against the German rear. On August 24 the Belgian field army began an advance — something between a small offensive and a large sortie — on an miles.
uncomfortably cramped front On the next day the 5th Division penetrated to within three miles of Vilvoorde, but further to the east the 2nd Division was checked at the LouvainMalines Canal, and it became increasingly clear that the Germans were everywhere superior in artillery. There was little purpose to be served by holding the captured ground, now that the Battles of Mons and the Sambre were over, and on the 26th the Belgians fell back to Antwerp. of 20
The
'sortie'
of
September 9 was an
more ambitious affair, being mounted on a front of 44 miles with the purpose of allowing the 2nd Division to altogether
turn the German right in the area north of Louvain. Things already began to go wrong on September 10 when the 2nd Division, which
break through the Belgian defensive lines with extremely
skilful
should have been advancing fast, allowed itself to be halted by a local check at
Wygmael. The
division
remained
station-
ary on the 11th, which allowed the Germans to bolster up this threatened flank and then launch a counterattack on the 12th. That day found the Belgian centre heavily engaged north of Vilvoorde. An American correspondent recorded his impressions as he saw the troops and dog-
drawn machine gun batteries streaming back after an unsuccessful attack on Weerde: 'Every now and then a soldier would stumble, as though he had stubbed his toe, and throw out his arms, and fall headlong. One man was hit as he was struggling to get through a hedge and died standing, held upright by the thorny branches. A young officer of chasseurs, who had been recklessly exposing himself while trying to check the retreat of his men,
suddenly spun round on his heels, like one
wooden toys which the kerband then crumpled up, as though all the bone and muscle had gone
of those
vendors
sell,
A man plunged into a halfditch and lay there, with his head under water. I could see the water slowly redden.' Something of the bitterness of the contest is conveyed by the fact that the same division recovered from this reverse and managed to take Weerde in the out of him. filled
evening. The Belgians were probably as severely weakened by their bloody success in the centre as by the repulse of their left, and it took no more than the briefest of German counterattacks to push them back to Ant-
werp on September
13.
Failing morale The second 'sortie' had cost the Belgians 8,000 men in casualties and missing. Albert knew that the inroads on the morale of the army had been greater still, and he was convinced by the reasoning of telegram of the night of September 24, which claimed that a third push would almost certainly succeed. As Galet renot at
all
Joffre's
combined use
of infantry
and
artillery
marked: 'His Majesty had been struck by the physical exhaustion and disorganisation ef the army after each of the earlier sorties. It was clear to him that two or three days of active operations were enough to render our t loops incapable of with-
Albert's headquarters. The first shell to on Waver Sainte Katelijne had cracked open a vault and filled the inside of the fortress with fumes, a circumstance which was particularly alarming, for this was a modern concrete fort, and the older
standing an enemy counterblow, let alone continuing their own offensive.' Also, the roads of central Belgium seemed to be alive with columns o\' German troops and guns. Against his every instinct Albert nevertheless concentrated his burnt-out army between Malines and Dendermonde for a final blow, this time against the German left Hank. The troops had scarcely assembled on the start line when, on September l'T. they were thrown back by the German attack which signalled the beginning of the last phase of the contest for north Belgium. Beseler had meanwhile been cudgelling his wits to devise a means of reducing Antwerp with the small force at his disposal. The grandiose prewar siege plan was of no use at all, for it envisaged a push by 1 1 well-endowed divisions over the dry heathland to the east of Antwerp. With the equivalent of just five or six divisions at hand, Beseler«would have laid open the
masonry works were bound to suffer still more when the enemy turned his attention in their direction. The unchecked destruc-
whole of German-occupied Belgium if he had committed his forces on that side of Antwerp. He instead decided to confine his attack to the third sector of the defences, to the south-south-east of the fortress. The defence works on that front were backed up by the flooded rivers Nete and Rupel, but Beseler reckoned that this inconvenience was of small account compared with the advantage of being able to protect the communications of the main German
armies engaged against the French and
He
ordered the Marine Division Reserve Corps to carry out the main attack, while the 4th Ersatz Division hovered on the eastern flank, and the 37th Landwehr and 1st Reserve Ersatz Brigades tested the Belgian corridor extending between the Scheldt and the Dutch border. Prewar studies served Beseler well in the question of siege tactics. In place of the old practice of the sap attack, where the besieger literally dug his way towards the enemy, the Germans substituted an attack which alternated vigorous infantry and artillery onslaughts: • the infantry first went forward to win ground for artillery observation posts; • the super-heavy siege guns could then crack open the permanent forts, while the field artillery evicted the enemy from the intervening trenches; • finally the infantry advanced to occupy the devastated defences and prepare the way for the next bound. September 27 saw the accomplishment of the first phase of siege operations. A methodical advance put the Germans in possession of Malines, with its soaring towers, and of the high ground between the Dijle and the Grote Nete rivers. The batteries of 160 heavy and super-heavy artillery pieces could now be concentrated in the area to the east and south of Malines, and by the early fternoon of the 28th they were in full act n against the forts of Walem, Waver Sa te Katelijne, Koningshooikt and Lier, ana '\e redoubts of Boschbeek and Dorpveld. i e Belgian gunners were blind and outranged, and thanks to their black powder 'great plumes of smoke showed to the enemy the emplacecleai ment- oi 'he defending artillery'. Report of extensive damage flooded into British.
and the
378
///
fall
tion of the forts offered a powerful argument to those who beseeched Albert to abandon the whole position at once. The king was not to be panicked, but he
recognised
that
the
Antwerp
position
offered much less security than possible just two days before.
had seemed Measuring the resistance in weeks now, rather than months, Albert took the first steps towards transferring
the base of operations to Ostend, and from the night of September 28, stores were moved to the west bank of the Scheldt over the two pontoon bridges in Antwerp, and the dangerously-exposed railway bridge above the city. The bombardment continued without respite on September 29. A defender recalled that the shells were all the more
coming in volleys: 'A distant rumbling gradually swelled into the roaring of an express train, and ended in a frightful detonation which moved and shook the entire fort. We went through this moment of indescribable agony regularly every seven minutes, and every time each of us asked himself whether the shell that was coming was the one that was going to terrifying for
crush him to death.' In the morning one of the 150-mm cupolas in Walem was ripped open, and at 1230 hours the magazine exploded, with horrible effects in the troop accommodation: 'More than 70 men were buried under the ruins; about 70 more were badly burned and roamed about the fort, filling it with the terrible impression of their screams, their blackened and bloody faces and hands, their burnt clothes. In the postern casement lay charred corpses
and torn
limbs!'
On the 30th the endurance of the garrisons was tested to the utmost. At each impact, Redoubt Dorpveld was momentarily pressed into the ground, then sprang back and tossed the defenders about as if they had been in a ship. At Walem. Commandant de VVitte was reduced to the expedient of ordering his gunners to cease fire and suffer in silence, in the hope of luring the German infantry into a premature assault. He was rewarded by seeing the Marine Division venture within range, and recoil again as the fort suddenly sprang into life. Waver Sainte Katelijne continued to be the target for some of the heaviest German guns, and one shell had the spectacular effect of propelling a cupola bodily out of its shaft. The defenders had had enough, and they abandoned the fort in the course of the day. The
first
breach
breach in the ring of forts was exploited by the Germans in an otherwise unsuccessful infantry attack late in the afternoon of October 1. The 5th Division soon found the gap, and pushing half, This
first
a mile northwards it occupied Waver Sainte Katelijne and swarmed over Dorpveld, where Commandant Deschaet and 13 faithful men held out until two successive mines broke open the last place of refuge and compelled them to surrender at 0500 hours on the next morning. The bombardment was renewed on October 2, and the German 6th Division was brought up to help in the work of widening the breach. Fort Koningshooikt and Redoubt Tallaert were occupied with little or no resistance after the explosion of their magazines. Walem for a time kept up an active defence, but many of the garrison were fast cracking under the new bombardment: 'Heaped up in the single postern casement that gave them any confidence, most of them lay on the floor, physically and morally exhausted. Some were in the grip of a nervous depression, and the explosion of each 30.5-cm shell
Igian canals, nistoncally the aetensive lines in the tace of invasion, and hamper, if not stop, the inexorable German advance towards
to deter
once again helped Antwerp
The sacrifice was prepared; we awaited it firmly and would sell
our lives dearly'
One of the groups
multitude of small stands made by and retreating Belgians
of cut-off
would provoke a start and a trembling which even the bravest of them could not always master!' On two occasions knots of men broke away and fled across the open country, but each time they were engulfed by the German artillery fire. Commandant de Witte and the 150 survivors gave themselves up to the surrounding German infantry at 1700 hours. The events of October 1 and 2 had thoroughly justified Beseler in his decision to depart from normal siege practice and launch an attack on the principles already described. He had been motivated by the rapid exhaustion of his stocks of superheavy shells, and by a well-grounded fear that the Belgians were about to receive help from their allies. On September 7, when the fall of Antwerp had still seemed far distant, the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, had urged Kitchener and his colleagues in the Cabinet to consider the importance of the fortress-port from the standpoint of the naval war with Germany. Kitchener, however, was not to be persuaded to divert forces, including Territorial divisions from France, while the Foreign Secretary, Grey, could not bring himself to ask the Dutch to allow free passage for British forces up the Scheldt. At 8.30 pm on October 2 Sir Francis Villiers, the British Minister in Belgium,
telegraphed to London an alarmist report to the effect that the Belgian field army would begin to abandon Antwerp on the next day. This placed the situation in so urgent a light that Churchill, instead of completing the first leg of an intended journey to Ostend, was brought back in his train from Victoria Station from where he hurried to Kitchener's house. There the hastily-reassembled Cabinet sent word to the Belgians that they could expect the rapid help of a force of Royal Marines, and at the same time urged them to hold on at Antwerp until the issue of the battle in northern France had been decided. Churchill was to go to Antwerp in person and supply the Cabinet with first-hand information for further decisions. The British help to Antwerp had so far been confined to the activities of an improvised armoured train of six 4.7-inch
guns under Commander A.S. Littlejohn. Manned by British sailors and Belgian troops, the contraption would rattle up and down the tracks around Antwerp, getting off a number of rounds, then retire again before the Germans found the range. The British and French had plans for throwing 53,000 men into Antwerp, but in the event the resistance collapsed so fast that there was time only for two small reinforcements to arrive. The first of these was made up of General Paris and the 2,082 men of his
Royal Marine Brigade, who reached Ant- I werp by train early on October 4, and were > immediately rushed into action to plug §, the breach in the line of forts. Two days §. when Antwerp seemed already later, beyond salvation, there arrived the last reinforcement, in the shape of two 'Naval Brigades', a rather grand title lor a collection of coal miners, and reserve naval officers, stokers and ratings, many of whom had not handled small arms until they received their rifles at Walmer a week before embarkation. Churchill himself arrived at Antwerp in the middle of the afternoon of October 3. By then the third sector was, in effect, one great gap, and the Belgians had retired behind the broad but shallow Nete inundation. Churchill's tour of the battlefield was discouraging, and at 1800 hours he had to tell London by telegraph that the Belgians could not promise to hold on for nunc than three days, unless the British could assure them within that time that a large force would be coming to their help. A relative lull in the fighting was prolonged into the 4th, since the Germans were building up their forces for the next bound. In the evening Churchill watched the Marines in action against the German troops who were creeping and darting along the streets of Lior. and was mined to offer his resignation as First Lord in
return for the
command
of all the British
Antwerp. The British Cabinet turned down the suggestion, as Lieutenant Genera] Henry Rawlinson was already chosen for thai post. forces
in
-
Improvised bayonet attack Early on October 5, the decisive day of the siege, the Royal Marines and the 5th Belgian Division were still managing to keep a large German force bottled up in Lier. They did not notice, however, that two battalions of the German 6th Reserve Division were building a trestle bridge across the flooded Nete one mile below the town. Beseler reinforced the bridgehead so rapidly that within a few hours it was able to withstand the counterattacks of the 2nd and 5th Belgian Divisions. After nightfall the Belgians made their last
army
to the west bank of the Scheldt, and the consolidation of the 2nd Division and the British on the 11-mile line of the 1859 forts on the east bank. The Belgian army made its crossing on the same night, accompanied by Rawlinson, Churchill and an uncontrollable mass of refugees. Albert stayed in Antwerp until noon on the 7th, when he left General Deguise instructions to defend the position to the bitter end. Defense a I'outrance was by now a devalued term, and there could be little real prospect of the fortress troops and the 2nd Division staying long in their defences now that they had been forsaken by the field army. The 37th Landwehr Brigade had already forced the Scheldt upstream at Schoonaarde, and the corridor of retreat was fast
lead the way was largely a recognition of a fait accompli. The movement over the Scheldt on the starlit night of October 8/9 was hidden from the Germans by the low-hanging smoke billowing from the burning oiltanks at Hoboken. The skeleton of the 2nd Division completed its crossing over the lower pontoon bridge at 2330 hours. The 2nd Naval Brigade and three battalions of the Royal Marine Brigade marched simultaneously across the upper bridge, and on the next day they moved by train down the shrinking coastal corridor. Thanks to their own steadfastness (and muddled staff work) the remaining British
being constricted. All the time the Germans were bringing
fortress.
forces encountered
much more
difficulty in
extracting themselves from the doomed
The 1st Naval Brigade underwent a series of tribulations which began with its guiding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Ollivant, waiting in vain for the sailors at the lower bridge; 'he was very shortly afterwards kicked by a horse and for a time rendered incapable of performing his duties'. The brigade instead made its crossing by ferries and barges at the site of the now-destroyed upper bridge, and spent the morning of the 9th in pushing through the crowds of refugees on the far side. Weary, hungry, thirsty and short of ammunition, the formation was finally broken as a fighting force by the news that the Germans were across the path of retreat.
men
Commodore Henderson
led 1,500
internment in Holland. One thousand more were gathered up by the disciplined and aggressive Royal Marine rearguard battalion, as it fought its way through to safety at Zelzate. Unfortunately the Marines set such a cracking pace that almost all the naval stragglers were left by the roadside. into
Sense of abandonment The Belgian fortress troops had long
since
been overtaken by a depression that was compounded of a sense of abandonment and an all-too-justified mistrust in the strength
The result of a round from one of the giant Krupp or Skoda howitzers on one of the old Belgian masonry forts. None could stand more than a few days' pounding before collapse or surrender
throw in a bayonet attack by troops already thoroughly demoralised by the enemy account reads: 'This attack was improvised in darkness, without preparation or reconnaissance, and was launched in broken ground by battalions taken from different regiments, brigades and divisions. The difficulties of the terrain and the weight of the enemy rifle and machine gun fire therefore caused this assault to sink into onfusion.' The penetration of the Nete line left the defenders with no intact ne save the ring of antiquated forts of 1859 intage. General Rawlinson arrived at Antv ^rp at noon on October 6, just in time to take part in the deliberations which determined on the evacuation of most of the Belgian field artillery.
380
Galet's
their artillery forward for the final blow
against Antwerp. At midnight on October 7/8 the retreating Belgian field army saw the sky to the north-east suffused with the purplish glare which told of the beginning of the bombardment of the abandoned city. The coming of daylight allowed the besiegers to turn an accurate fire against the 1859 forts, and the outer forts which were still being held by the Belgians on either side of the breach. All day long the defenders deserted in droves, and at 2000 hours General Paris, as commander of the British forces, decided that he could no longer expose his men to the danger of being stranded at Antwerp. Deguise gave his assent to the British evacuation, but his order to the Belgian 2nd Division to
of their fortifications. It was exceptional even for a garrison commandant to resist the urge to take to his heels before the Germans arrived on the scene. On October 10 Beseler merely had to occupy the abandoned works, and arrange for the surrender of the four forts still garrisoned by the defenders. In Fort Sainte-Marie, on the west bank just below Antwerp, General Deguise waited the summons in the company of General Tollen, the fort commandant, an NCO, and a single loyal private soldier — Private Sianne of the 12th Regiment. Deguise recalls: Towards three o'clock on the afternoon of October 10, a German colonel accompanied by an hostage and several armed soldiers, presented himself at the fort. He saluted me with the greatest possible deference, then announced 7 am Colonel von Kleitz.' I replied 7 am Lieutenant-General Deguise. The resistance of Antwerp is now at an end, and I deliver up my sword to you.' 'Your Excellency,' said the German colonel, 7 understand that the present circumstances must be very painful for you. I have to accept your sword, but I have no doubt that it will be returned to you. May I ask what has become of the garrison of the fort? I believe it should number about 400 men.' I showed him the and the soldier who had stayed with me. The German colonel very politely
NCO
refrained from any comment.
Germans. Beseler's perilously-stretched force had contained the 'sorties' against the communications of the main German armies, and then evicted the Belgians from a position which offered the Allies the chance, if they had been able to seize it,
The Belgian survivors of Antwerp rallied soon on the Yser, and afterwards took part in the unfolding war as an element in the great mass of Allied forces. That was small consolation for the loss of Belgium's richest city, and the destruction of the basis of more than half a century of strategic
of retaining Belgian Flanders in their grip. It is an open question as to whether this gigantic salient could have long been tenable, or whether the Allies would have
calculation.
The German Staff History speaks generously enough of the significance of the help rendered by the British: 'It was of moral rather than tactical value. At the same time the British brigades performed inestimable services as rearguard to the Belgian field army which had left two days before. They thus delayed the fall of the fortress for a few days. From the standpoint of operations as a whole this gain of time, short though it may have been, was of importance for the enemy alliance in view of the struggle on its north wing, and the considerable delays and difficulties caused to enemy sea transport by the U-boat danger.' By holding back five or six German divisions from the main theatre during a critical period, the resistance of Antwerp quite possibly saved Nieuport and Dunkirk for the Allies. The balance of strategic loss and gain nevertheless leans heavily in favour of the
contented themselves with denying the ports to the Germans. We can at least say that the shape of the war would have been radically different, if the defence of the fortress of Antwerp had been equal to the effort
Above: A dog-drawn machine gun cart. The Belgians made much use of dogs in their army Below: The siege of Antwerp. Faced with the problem of getting past a series of forts as quickly as possible and with the minimum
number of troops,
Beseler, the
German com-
mander, decided to use artillery to reduce positions, rush up infantry to occupy these and then repeat the procedure to move further forward. In this way Antwerp was gradually taken by the
German
forces
which had gone into
its
construction.
Further Reading Churchill, Sir Winston, The World Crisis (Four Square) Deguise, Lt-Gen., La Defense de la Position Fortifiee d'Anvers en 1914 (Brussels 1921) Essen, L. van der, The Invasion and The War in Belgium from Liege to the Yser (London 1917) La Campagne de TArmee Beige (Paris 1915) L.F.R., Naval Guns in Flanders (London 1920) Military Operations: France and Belgium 1914 (Macmillan 1925)
[For Christopher Duffy's
page
138.
biography,
see
]
381
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of Ypres marked the final German attempt of 1914 to break through the Allied line in the West and take the Channel ports. But the attempt was frustrated by the tenacious Allied defence of the salient which formed around Ypres. This, of doubtful tactical importance in itself, was defended by the British and the French, while the Belgians held the line further to the north. Both sides suffered appalling and crippling losses, and here the British regular army stood and was destroyed. In the midst of this destruction, however, the British and French halted the German thrust. Brigadier Anthony Farrar'-Hockley describes the battle which finally ruined any chances of an outright German victory. Left: A British 6-inch howitzer. Use of such guns was greatly
The
First
Battle
hampered by bad communications. Right: General Smith-Dorrien, commander of II Corps, was pessimistic of the Allies' chances, especially in the latter stages of the battle
No victor emerged from the Race to the Sea, but, when it ended, the opposing high commands, German and Franco-British, each preserved the illusion that they had outstripped the other. Believing that the Germans had exhausted their reserve divisions, Foch, commander of the French northern group of armies, was convinced that his enemy would not be able to extend a defensive line to the coast. North of Lille there must be a gap between the right flank of the German line in the city and the German occupation force in Antwerp. Discounting the German cavalry who might temporarily delay, but would not long be able to oppose a general Allied advance, there was nothing to halt the French strategy of enveloping the German flank. Unfortunately for Foch, there were scarcely any French units to carry out what he termed 'this glorious enterprise'. On the Channel coast, the Field Army of the Belgians had reassembled behind the Yser; but its condition was not good either in morale or equipment. Foch might exhort the Belgian High Command to turn to the offensive but he failed to understand how much their unfledged divisions had suffered in their gallant defence along and behind the Meuse. They had lost many of their best leaders, and in these battles, as in the succession of subsequent withdrawals, had been deeply impressed by the immense power of the German armies. The Belgians held Nieuport on the Channel coast and the short line of the Yser south to Dixmude with a few outposts to the east. The town of Dixmude, also east of the river, was in French hands, however; the defences had been prepared and manned by a brigade of French sailors under Rear-Admiral Ronarc'h. Below Dixmude, covering the Forest of Houthulst, was de Mitry's cavalry corps with two divisions of elderly French Territorial infantry under command. From Ypres to the La Bassee canal, the BEF under Sir John French was already advancing. The British advance had begun at the latter end of the Race for the Sea at a time when it had still been thought an easy matter for the British to capture Lille and pass beyond. The lack of fire and leadership by Smith-Dorrien and Pulteney as their corps arrived in Flanders, while not leading directly to the loss of the city, had certainly permitted Crown Prince Rupprecht to get there before them. On October 18, Sir John French needed no urging by Foch. Chafing at the delay by Smith-Dorrien and Pulteney, encouraged by the success of his cavalry under the thrusting leadership of Allenby, the loss of Lille had not shaken his expectation of a continuous advance to Brussels. There were now eight British divisions in the line: two each of infantry in II and III Corps, two of cavalry under Allenby close to the Lys and an infantry and a cavalry division under Rawlinson in IV Corps immediately west of Ypres and in contact with de Mitry by the Forest of Houthulst. Soon, the Indian Corps arriving from India and Haig's I Corps brought up from the Aisne should be available to strengthen their numbers. Could the Germans possibly match such a force? As it happened, the Germans could do better in numbers and were about to prove it. The surplus of untrained young men in
Germany had been formed into six and a half new corps during summer and four of these began to entrain for Belgium on October 10. Though none of the junior ranks had undertaken
the
training beyond company, battery or squadron level and were in these sub-units by reserve officers, cadets and noncommissioned officers excluded from the first line, they were animated by a passionate idealism which, combined with their youthful vigour, promised much to Duke Albrecht of Wiirttem-
commanded
army commander. The new Fourth Army under the Duke's command was already in the field. The siege troops at Antwerp had been formed into /// Reserve Corps under Beseler and they now advanced steadily westward both to screen the arrival of the new corps from Germany with the cavalry and to close up as far forward as possible to the Allies' line. Between October 15 and 18, the four new corps passed through Brussels in numerous railway trains which were directed into VI rural stations and sidings some miles west of the city, and set off on foot along the Belgian country roads. Both Falkenhayn and Duke Albrecht were informed in general terms by Monday, October 18 of the enemy opposing them. On the other side, Foch, more calculating than he often seemed, had perceived that the gap in the German line had closed. He warned Ronarc'h in Dixmude against any idea of manoeuvring; your tactics under present circumstances must be confined purely and simply to resisting on your actual position. Your mission is to stop the enemy in his tracks.' To Joffre at GQG he sent word of a need berg, their
French reinforcements, most importantly to cover the rear of the Belgian army. He ordered de Maud'huy at Arras to extend his flank on to the north bank of the La Bassee canal so as to shorten the line Smith-Dorrien need hold and wrote to French advising reconnaissance and preparation of a defensive line in rear of the BEF. for
Massed columns The apprehensions of a major clash of arms were felt no less by Sir John French's staff, his corps and divisional commanders. The Royal Flying Corps had reported massed columns of troops marching westwards towards Roulers, Thourout and Court rai. Beseler's corps had been identified in the coastal zone, where its including the massive siege guns used at Antwerp, was ranging on the Belgian line and Honarc'h's posts. A host of refugees fled before the advancing Germans, dodging the pickets of Beseler's screen and the Fourth Army cavalry. Beside this was the hard evidence encountered by the infantry attempting to secure the ridge overlooking Lille. In both Pulteney 's corps and Smith-Dorrien's, next to the south, they were opposed h British divisions, regular troops which, they judged ctly, outnumbered them. A successful offensive is not susl insl this type of opposition. It must be said for French that he had been several times during the preceding week, as he protested his corps com manders that the infantry advance was slow tiff opposition', only to learn next day that the enemy had sen vanquished or artillery,
t
I
385
followed the Jdger and there were brief exchanges of shell and rifle fire. But they wore opposed only by small parties of de Mitry's cavalry, holding a succession of ridges ahead, and the morning was occupied by short marches followed by prolonged halts as the French were engaged and driven back. Few men saw action, scarcely any saw the enemy at all. It was different in the afternoon. At 1300 hours the leading brigade of the 45th began to attack the village of Kortemark while almost the whole of the 46th Division deployed to capture the low ridge of Hooghe, topped by the village of Hooghlede. The fields were either of stubble or the remnants of vegetables, many being intersected by ditches or streams. As they came within range of the French guns, the men changed marching formations as they had practised on the drill square and manoeuvre grounds at home, the ranks turning finally into line for the assault, while the officers and non-commissioned officers called out instructions to the men to keep their dressing. In each company, the sergeant-major marched behind to see that none fell out without a wound — an unnecessary measure with these young men. The light was waning when the battalions of the 46th took the ridge. The French dragoons had gone and all they found amongst the smoking red brick and tile of Hooghlede were a few civilians crouching terrified in their cellars.
By Monday evening, Duke Albrecht and his Chief-of-Staff, Generalmajor Use, were not dissatisfied with the progress of Fourth Army. Beseler's /// Corps, with XXII Reserve Corps, had captured
The cavalry was ready
to exploit the
breakthrough, but none
came
forced back without difficulty, but he misinterpreted the actions of the German cavalry completely. The Uhlans — such were the light cavalry — were simply drawing aside as a screen. Their task was now to reconnoitre for the marching columns fast coming into position between Beseler's corps in the coastal zone and the Sixth Army on either side of Lille. Slightly ahead of their fellows, the 45th and 46th Reserve
Divisions, of Generalleutnant von Kleist's XXIII Reserve Corps, spent the night of Sunday, October 18, in and around the villages of Lichtervelde and Ardooie in which they were wakened in
darkness on the Monday morning. After breakfast from the field kitchens, they formed into regimental columns. Behind the leading brigade, two regiments, a total of six battalions, was the artillery, drawn by horses. Ahead, detachments of cavalry moved in bounds to reconnoitre, supported closely by the Jdger (light infantry) companies stripped of their packs and ready to give quick support to the cavalrymen. The 46th Division had not been marching for more than about 30 minutes when a cavalry scout galloped back to say that the enemy was ahead. Ten minutes later the 45th was halted by a similar report, clearly true as the leading battalion was almost at once shelled by French 75s. The first test of war was now upon them and in both divisions there was excitement and some confusion as artillery parties ran their ladders up trees or climbed buildings to find observation posts while the infantry broke column to be dispersed on either side of the divisional route.
Short marches, long halts Those that had looked for an immediate epic action to follow were disappointed. The guns fired; one of the leading battalions German
troops, veterans of the
These were now
to
be replaced
advance and retreat in France. the line by raw, young recruits
initial
in
the Allied outposts covering the Yser, leaving only outskirts of Nieuport east of the river in French and Belgian hands respectively. Both towns and the interconnecting defences had been drenched by heavy artillery and mortar fire. To the south the other three German Reserve corps had everywhere crossed successfully the main road and railway running north to the coast through Menin, Roulers and Thourout to a depth of about five miles. The fact that these corps had been opposed only by a light force of cavalry was known to the Duke and confirmed the Intelligence reports of French capabilities. Next day he expected his ardent novices to drive in among them or to force them back in a rout. For the main offensive was to begin on the 20th when, in the darkness of the Tuesday morning, the Fourth and Sixth Armies would advance together after a preliminary all
Dixmude and the
bombardment.
On
the advice of his Chief-of-Staff, Generalmajor von DelmenCrown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria had withdrawn his XIII Corps into reserve during the night of the 18th, relieving them in the line by six divisions of cavalry. These he believed would be more than adequate to overcome the two British cavalry divisions under Allenby along the Lys, and that the substitution would put into his hand two more strong infantry divisions for the offensive. North of the La Bassee canal, he now outnumbered the BEF by three to one in units and somewhat more in individual strength as none of his battalions had less than two-thirds of their full war strength while most were more than threequarters up to strength. The British had less than half their complement, some less than a quarter. It was his immediate intention to destroy their positions on the ridge overlooking Lille; as a preliminary to breaking out into the low ground between Bethune and Armentieres. Very early on the Tuesday morning, two Westphalian battalions were led by guides along the road to Le Pilly through mist and
singer,
>
j
darkness. In the darkness one company lost touch and was still absent when the regimental commander gave the order to advance. They used the road as a guide to direction until dawn, when they saw the houses of Le Pilly above the ground mist. Le Pilly was a tiny village and its buildings had been seriously damaged by the morning bombardment. The commanding officer of its garrison was Major E. H. E. Daniell, and he had expected such destruction. He had placed his battalion, the 2nd Royal Irish, outside buildings, the trenches being dug along the hedge-rows of the gardens and orchards. Every man he could muster was waiting in skilfully sited positions as the Westphalians came out of the mist and the German artillery lifted to allow their infantry to close.
However excited or apprehensive they might have been, the long years of training and campaigning now permitted the Royal Irish to fire accurately and easily into the massed Westphalian ranks. Within a few minutes, the British Royal Field Artillery began to drop shells among the assault force. The tight enemy formations broke up. For the next five hours, the Westphalian regimental commander attempted by one means or another to get his men into the village. The majority of these were by infiltration under cover of artillery fire. In the middle of the morning a fresh company appeared — probably the one which had lost its way when the battalions first formed up — but its arrival made no difference. The regimental commander sent back for his third battalion and arranged a completely fresh bombardment with as many guns as were available.
A motley group
A
expense and while certain prudent measures had been taken towards a rearward defence, the most important measure was to fight and defeat the Germans where they stood. With these words and a formal farewell, the French Commander-in-Chief left to visit the Belgian headquarters at Fumes. He arrived at this little town at about the same time as the first regiment of the French division sent from the south, the 42nd under the swarthy and indomitable Grossetti. This first regiment, the 16th Chasseurs, was at once ordered to parade and march past the Belgian king, who was also the executive Commander-in-Chief of the national army. Joffre's journey to Flanders had been designed to encourage and, if necessary, exhort his allies as they passed once again into a slogging m&tch with the Germans, all hopes of an advance into open country as a grand manoeuvre having passed. His reminder to both British and Belgians that he would share freely his resources as they were needed reflected sincerely his intentions. But this upright policy in the high command was not and could not be expected to be reflected uniformly throughout the chain of command. The prime reason for this was that there was no
battalion destroyed Despite the successful morning defence, the 2nd Royal Irish at Le Pilly were not well placed to resist indefinitely. The village stood in a salient which was now wholly isolated by the fire of the Germans lying south and east. When the assault was renewed by the three Westphalian battalions at 1500 hours, only 300 officers and men remained to resist, more than half of them wounded. Shells had blown in many of the open trenches as the Germans assaulted, reaching at last the village street. Daniell ordered everyone still fighting to fix bayonets. For some time small groups struggled among the buildings but at the end of the day they were overcome. Daniell was dead with 256 of his men, 240 of the remaining 290 were wounded and of these only 30 managed to escape to their own lines. The battalion had been destroyed. It was not, however, the type of prize which Crown Prince Rupprecht sought, for the capture of Le Pilly had been planned as the first stage of an attack to capture Herlies and to move towards Aubers. Elsewhere in VII Corps and along the entire front of XIII and XIX Corps immediately to the north, the Sixth Army captured nothing. Its commander ordered XIII Corps to persevere if necessary into the night. At 1800 hours, under the fire of the whole corps artillery, partly by chance, partly by force, five battalions broke in on the 2nd Battalion, Sherwood Foresters, to fight amongst the villages of La Vallee and Ennetieres until, at 0515 hours on the 21st, the defenders were crushed and the unit destroyed. French knew nothing of the loss of Daniell and the 2nd Royal Irish during the 20th, and could not know that the 2nd Sherwood Foresters were destroyed until much later on the 21st. The low cloud and continuing intermittent rain prevented air reconnaissance, but the news from his own four corps, de Mitry and the Belgians was that the line was holding generally in the face of persistent attacks throughout the morning and afternoon. A new French headquarters appeared, with General d'Urbal to take command of all the French elements in Belgium, including the division sent to strengthen the Belgian defence line. LieutenantGeneral Sir Douglas Haig reported that his I Corps had begun to march into the battle zone through Ypres. The prisoners taken the previous day were reported to be youthful and ill-trained. All these facts sustained French's optimism and enabled him to order I Corps to 'march in the direction of Thourout' and to 'attack the enemy wherever met'. During the night, however, his mood changed until, next morning, when Joffre called at his headquarters, he asked the French Commander-in-Chief 'for facilities to make a great entrenched camp at Boulogne to take the whole Expeditionary Force'. Joffre refused. It was clear to Joffre that his British colleague was apprehensive once more of a repetition of the retreat to the Marne and remembered himself what defeatism had prevailed at that time with French and his chief-of-staff. Concealing his anger at such a want of confidence when the line was holding adequately
— he was that that
to confess all his
anger later — he reminded his
allies
was not only Flanders but the whole line south to Arras was under attack. France would not favour her own at their it
of British waits for the
Germans
in
Plugstreet
Wood'
command of the international forces in the Flanders sector, and when crises arose there was a tendency for local national commanders to look after their own security without regard for the consequences of an ally on right or left. Thus as Sir Douglas Haig advanced his corps on Wednesday morning, October 21, he discovered that Rawlinson's cavalry and a brigade of de Mitry's had fallen back from the important Passchendaele ridge without more than brief resistance and then, Haig wrote in his diary, 'about 2 o'clock in the afternoon, without any warning whatsoever, the French cavalry corps on our left received orders to retire west of the canal. The reason for this withdrawal was said to be that the enemy was advancing in strength of about a division. The GOC of the French Cavalry Division on the immediate left of the 1st Division fully realised the effect of this withdrawal and declined absolutely to obey this order until it was repeated. He refused to uncover our flank without "une ordre for me lie".' single Allied general in
Abandoned without
contest
was repeated and the Forest of Houthulst contest. If de Mitry was at fault in this. Rawlinson, on Haig's right, was a greater offender. He had allowed Passchendaele village to pass by default to the enemy on the previous day — for want of proper orders — and had placed out his All the same, the order
was abandoned without
infantry, the 7th Division, to the south on open forward slopes, a line drawn arbitrarily on the map without any appi >n or reconnaissance on his part, and despite representatii MajorGenera] Capper, the division's commander, he sti ck to these poor dispositions. Three of the new German infantn divisions and a cavalry division from those on the Lys attackoci the 7th Division throughout the day. The advance of Haig's corps eased their plight in the afternoon when the line might have been resiled j
But Rawlinson
let
matters
drift.
3H7
AJlenby's professional outlook and methods provided an admirable contrast on Rawlinson's right. As with II Corps, the Ca\ airy had now been fighting continuously for more than a week. The strongest of his units comprised only 300 men, many had less and two were down to 180. With the essential tasks of manning and maintaining trenches, patrolling by night or carrying in supplies, commanding officers were unable to permit more than two or three hours oi' sleep a day. The artillery contingent was smaller in number and had a lighter weapon than that of the other
Sixth
Yet the commander's ability made all the difference. Allenby 's line covered the most important piece of ground in the Ypres /one. the Messines ridge. It was as well that Allenby had sited his force with the utmost care and insisted upon the same standard of devotion to the work amongst his subordinate commanders. He knew that dismounted action of this kind ran contrary to the independent and sometimes impulsive characters of the cavalry officers but a single command from him was enough; all respected their robust and determined chief and none doubted the need for their presence in the line. Even so, the frequent visits of Allenby and his divisional commanders, the use of administrative troops to stand relief and other measures to ease the burdens of defence, could not prevent accumulated exhaustion. When five of Crown Prince Rupprecht's cavalry divisions attacked Allenby's two divisions early on the morning of the 21st, ambiguous orders were issued in one brigade, and within two hours the whole of 2nd Cavalry Division's line began to retire without being under serious pressure. The system of personal command now paid dividends; Hubert Gough, the divisional commander, came forward and restored his brigades in person, moving up and down the line between headquarters and units until all was secure once more. The Messines ridge was threatened more seriously from the south, whence a force of Saxons got into Ploegsteert Wood — Plugstreet to the British — from which they were ejected by a strong counterattack later in the day. Sixth Army had resumed the offensive before dawn once more from Arras to the Lys, across which the cavalry attacked Allenby and Rawlinson. On the ridge, 11 battalions of General von Claer's VII Corps struck again from the morning mists, concentrating now upon four of Smith-Dorrien's battalions beyond Le Pilly, while the remainder of the corps with five regiments from XIII Corps attacked Conneau's cavalry posts and Pulfeney's battalions immediately to the north. They did not gain much ground but caused many casualties amongst the British, one battalion losing its last eight officers. Conneau had neither the men nor the fire power to resist sustained attack by strong parties of infantry. In the afternoon his foremost trenches were abandoned. Everywhere along the front airmen flew seeking information. A British observer flying above the Forest of Houthulst recorded, 'Dixmude can hardly be seen for a mass of shells. French sailors having hellish time — much smoke rising from area of Nieuport — difficult to see enemy movement nearer than Clercken but close to 3,000 troops moving forward on road in that area.' Like the
Crossing in darkness
Army, the Fourth was attacking
at every point, and though break through anywhere, both Duke Albrecht and Crown Prince Rupprecht gained ground of tactical importance. Encroachment was not enough, however, for the royal army commanders or their chiefs-of-staff; what they were expecting — what Falkenhayn expected of them — by the end of this second day of the offensive was the opening of a breach towards Estaires opposite Lille, and across the Yser in the coastal zone.
unable
corps
to
Facing the Yser, the dogged Beseler was equally determined to get across the river. Deliberate assault under artillery bombardment by day having failed, he decided to attempt a crossing in darkness by stealth. At Tervaete, the river looped eastward, making a salient into which the Germans might fire from three sides. After dark, his artillery maintained a slow harassing fire on all the Belgian river posts while engineers brought light pontoons, boats and planks up to the bank. These were slipped into the water without being discovered. As soon as the infantry
were ready to cross, the German guns and mortars concentrated their fire on the trenches and fortified houses of the Belgian 1st Division. The German infantry began to cross at a run, scrambling up the bank on the far side. Behind the first wave came reserve detachments helping to carry machine guns and reserve ammunition. The artillery bombardment switched to Belgian positions on either side while the heavy guns returned to shell the Belgian artillery lines. But this was scarcely worth their attention; for all that was available by night to support the 1st Division were a few light field batteries, and even for these ammunition was scarce. At daybreak, more guns were made available by the Belgian command, while the Royal Navy began to fire from the sea. With this aid, the 1st Division counterattacked to retake some of their positions. But they could not drive the Germans back across the Yser. Though confined to the loop, Beseler's men had gained a footing on the western bank. By the morning of the 22nd, Foch believed that the Allies were losing all initiative. He ordered d'Urbal to mount an offensive with French forces, while he sought to engage the Belgians and British in co-operation.
D'Urbal had under his command Grossetti's division on the coast, Ronarc'h's sailors at Dixmude, de Mitry's cavalry and the Territorials. Close behind was IX Corps, sent by Joffre as a reinforcement. But the corps could not get into the line by the early morning of the 23rd to attack — they were still getting out of their
| $
railway trains at Poperinge, seven miles behind Ypres, on the evening of the 22nd. So the orders sent to them to commit the leading division to an attack at 0900 hours, over ground none had seen, with two cavalry divisions as yet unassembled, was meaningless. The request that Haig's corps should co-operate closely was equally fruitless; the request reached his headquarters at 0200 hours on the 23rd and, misjudging the British positions, showed an advance directly through Haig's units. Moreover, a reinforced brigade of I Corps was at that moment moving to counterattack Kortekeer Cabaret and could not be stopped. French decided on a compromise whereby the British would draw aside, yet guard the French flanks — a measure jibed at unpleasantly by d'Urbal. For a few hours there was some anxiety in both I and IV Corps headquarters, not least because of the danger that the French artillery might fire into their lines. But the morning developed in an unexpected way: there was no sign of any units of IX Corps at 0900 hours and at Kortekeer Cabaret the counterattack triumphed, killing or capturing 1,281 members of the 45th Reserve Division. When the first French battalions were able to get forward at noon, there was some doubt as to what they should do. Common sense prevailed. To establish a continuous French line, Haig's corps was relieved, passing into reserve. By the 24th, the line from Dixmude to Zonnebeke was held by French troops, leaving only Grossetti's French troops detached with the Belgians. The British carried on the defence with Rawlinson's, Allenbv 's, Pulteney's and Smith-Dorrien's corps on much the same ground as they had held since the 18th, except that Smith-Dorrien had withdrawn altogether from the ridge. Foch's plans for a counteroffensive had therefore achieved nothing. Though the Germans had, by a glance at the map, achieved a
great deal, Falkenhayn for his part was aware that his own plans 5 had not been significantly successful. He gave a plain warning to | the royal army commanders and their chiefs-of-staff that he must « shortly consider whether their offensive operations ought to be |
A gun crew prepares
388
to
open
fire
from a
hill
opposite Messines
abandoned. The two army chiefs-of-staff were, unlike their royal commanders, career officers whose reputations were at stake. They had been appointed to ensure professional standards, and both
Use and Dehnensingen were aware that, quite apart from their general wish to see Germany triumph, their particular sectors would be denied full reinforcement and supply if they did not succeed. Use therefore decided that Fourth Army should attack two points only: Dixmude and the ridge east of Ypres. Delmensingen persuaded Crown Prince Rupprecht that they should shorten their line of attack to the sector from the La Bassee canal to Menin, for this would not only permit a greater concentration of troops but give power to, and derive power from, Fourth Army's offensive immediately to the right.
A bond
of suffering Facing Dixmude, Duke Albrecht's gunners had now an excellent observation post suspended below a sausage-shaped kite-balloon. Powerful field glasses magnified every target in and around the town. Except for those back in the ruins, the French sailors found it necessary to spend daylight hours in primitive shelters of broken timbers and rubble built as far above the water line as possible. The surface water and the wind, chillingly cold in the late autumn, however, sapped the strength of the Dixmude garrison more than the shells. The north of the town was held by Commandant Delage and the south by Commandant Varney — though one of Varney's battalions was held back by Ronarc'h at the Caeskerke railway station, west of the Yser bridge, as a reserve, with one section of machine guns covering the approaches against a sudden break-in by the Germans. Hard by was Colonel Meisser's regiment of Belgian infantry, with whom the French had formed a bond of suffering. Before midnight on the 24th, the steady harassing artillery fire of the day increased progressively, battery by German battery, the weight of shells falling on the east and south of the town. At 0100 hours on the 25th, the line of bombardment began to move west, concentrating at 0130 hours on the defences round the Yser bridge. At this hour, as the seamen expected, an assault began. But after they had beaten this off there was another and another and another. By 0630 hours they had stood to for 15 separate assaults, each interspersed by local bombardment. The original defence line was no longer discernible. When the dawn came, the vestiges of the German storming parties fell back, the defenders of Dixmude sought for shelter among the reeking ruins of the town. Exhaustion struck both sides and the peace of inaction settled over the area for some hours. Nearby, along the Yser, a new battle was developing. Though his bridgehead across the river had not been chosen as the schwer-
punkt (point of main
effort) of the renewed offensive, Beseler continued his own attempts to break through. During the night, his engineers had ferried field guns over to the west bank and when these were in position he attacked. The Belgian division in front of him fell after an hour or so into a desperate confusion as a German brigade — attached from another corps— joined the fighting. Demoralised by fear and fatigue, men began to leave the battlefield. In daylight, the foremost storming parties reached the railway line about two miles from their original bridgehead. In Furnes, plans were made to evacuate the main army headquarters to Poperinge, leaving only a small advanced command post for the king and his military operations staff. In the hour that the Germans began finally to break the remnant of the defence on the railway line shielding Peroijze and the Furnes road, Grossetti came suddenly from Nieuport, marching with the first of his two brigades. He attempted a counterattack but wisely did not push it beyond the railway embankment. This offensive gesture gave him time to lay out his complete division in the area. Having seen his battalions into position on either side of Peroijze, Grossetti had a chair brought to the open cross roads where, in full view of his own and such Belgian soldiers as remained, he sat down as shells and bullets dropped all round. 'I don't know how much will be left tomorrow of the 42nd Division,' he signalled to d'Urbal, 'but so long as one man remains, the Germans will not cross the railroad.' Meanwhile, the Allied formations southward to the La Bassee canal had not remained aloof from the struggle. Three of Duke Albrecht's 'schoolboy' corps, reinforced by such reserves as he had been able to draw in from Antwerp and the intermediate coast defences, attacked along the low ridge which covers Ypres. Those attacking out of and immediately parallel to the Forest of Houthulst shortly after dawn were disconcerted to find themselves caught in the open by a French bombardment, the preliminary to an attack by Dubois' IX Corps. A little later, the French 17th Division made two sharp assaults with the aim of regaining the crest of the ridge in this sector. On the left there was a head-on clash with the advancing Germans so that, despite their dash, the French infantry gained only a mile of
ground beyond Langemark; but the assault on the right met the advancing Germans on the quarter flank. The leading regiment caused the Germans to falter, then to begin breaking out of formation. Those immediately behind swept on through their own comrades' ranks and those of the enemy, recapturing Zonnebeke on the western side of the ridge. While this action was taking place, two divisions of Fourth Army fell upon a brigade of the British 7th Division immediately to the north of the Ypres-Menin road. The defending battalions were required, as earlier, to hold a line on the open forward slope of the ridge, from Polygon Wood at its highest point through the village of Reutel
down
to the outlying
mound
of Kruiseecke.
South of the Menin road, Sixth Army was attacking in co-operation with these forces to assist Duke Albrecht to break through the British line towards Ypres. A generous ration of shells had been allocated for the operation and these started bursting in heavy concentrations among the British trenches at 0430 hours. By 0600 hours, the exposed defences, lacking any form of buttressing by sandbags, were severely damaged, many blown in. A number of companies, close to buildings, had managed to cover their trenches or build crude strong points with masonry and timber. Their rifles and few machine guns were able to drive back the assaulting German infantry. But in the centre of the line, towards the village of Reutel, 244th Reserve Regiment came up very quickly — the leading companies actually ran into their own bombardment — while one battalion marched through a gap created by the annihilation of a company of the 2nd Scots Guards. The 2nd Wiltshires in Reutel thus found themselves attacked from front and rear by the three battalions of 244th Reserve Regiment and were, before 0800 hours, wholly overcome.
Clerks, orderlies and signallers Before mid-morning then, on the 24th, what Duke Albrecht had commanded to be done had been accomplished: the British line had been opened. There were no reserve positions behind the Wiltshires so that the way was open for the remainder of XXVII Reserve Corps to march to Ypres. At the headquarters of 7th Division, Major-General Capper mustered staff officers, clerks, orderlies, signallers and transport men to compose a blocking force. He expected 'the Germans to appear at any moment, even while the men were being called in and staff officers were being told off to the command of detachments'. This alarm, strange to say, was not needed. The commander of the 244th Reserve Regiment does not seem to have been aware of his success, except in the task of capturing Reutel. He made little attempt to press his advantage. General Capper's calls for assistance were by now being answered. Haig's 2nd Division, relieved from the line by the French IX Corps, was stood to and the 5th Brigade turned quickly out of its billets and bivouacs to hurry forward. But nearer and speedier were Dubois' cavalry which came at a gallop to help the British. This prompt action stabilised the line until the remainder of the
2nd Division came up
Belgian troops played a
in the afternoon,
vital,
if
when
not so famous, role
in
British and French
the north
Approximate front lines October
Miles
N^-
r—i—
German
i
Km
w
—^^—
10
—__
French
•Roubaix
•
16, 1914
Belgian British
Lichtervelde
• Roulers Thourout
•
Lille
• Kortemark
Ostend
NOR TH SEA
PHASE
1
-
OCTOBER
PHASE
18-21
2
-OCTOBER 23-25 \i%f. Forest
of'!
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Top: The basic front line during the First Battle of Ypres. At the beginning of the battle, the front line was extremely fluid as the Allies retreated north and south of Ypres. Although there were French forces as far forward as Roulers, it was already anticipated that the main defensive line (even though
Oct 25 Oct
25
an Allied offensive in the direction of Bruges was being planned) would have be established along the line which did in fact exist during the main battle. Above: Four major phases in the battle. There was little large scale movement during the course of the battle, and the most noteworthy
to
Below left: Belgium flooded by the Belgians. While the British and the French held the Germans in head-on combat to the south, the Belgians flooded parts of their homeland and held the Germans at bay in this fashion. Below: Ypres as it will always be remembered — mud, water and improvised
The First Battle of Ypres — last battle of the
trenches,
'Old Contemptibles'
in this
instance occupied by Belgians holding onto the last corner
of their overrun country
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Oct 26
Oct 27
Oct 28
Oct 29
British front
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— —
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2300 hrs Nov
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•
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French front
Oct 26
Oct 27
Oct 28
Oct
French front
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———
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Nov
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29
aspect of the two months' fighting was the enormous reinforcement of the German front. While the Allied front received replacements, it did not receive much in the way of reinforcements. Nevertheless, although the Allies were forced to give up ground, they could not be forced out of
•
•
his
the salient and inflicted huge losses on the German forces opposing them. It should be emphasised that the map at the top of the left-hand page has been turned through 90 degrees, and so the long axis of the map is in fact the north-south axis
infantry threw off a late counterattack and advanced a further half mile on the western side of the ridge. South of the Menin road, the other two brigades had a terrible day under intense shellfire as they lay in their crumbling, sandy trenches in and behind the salient of Kruiseecke. Fortunately, the two divisions attacking consisted of dismounted cavalry, whom the British rebuffed at every approach. A similarly successful defence was maintained along the Messines ridge. On Pulteney's front, nine German battalions rushed forward in the clear and sparkling dawn to capture Le Quesne, Bois Blancs and La Houssoie, 111 Corps' last foothold on the ridge facing Lille. All day the battle continued, the guns of either side firing as much upon each other's batteries as upon the infantry. At dusk, the assaults were renewed. Close by. Smith-Dorrien's corps was attacked at 2100 hours by seven battalions which drove into the British trenches between the 1st Gordons and the 15th Sikhs, a battalion of the Jullundur Brigade which had just entered the line. After the fine morning, heavy grey clouds had spread so that the night fighting was unilluminated apart from weapon flashes. Before midnight, it was raining heavily. Roused and formed up in these unpleasant conditions, the 4th Middlesex marched forward through the downpour and mud to counterattack. They took back
German dead and wounded in and around their positions. To the Germans it began to seem that, no matter what they did, the Allied line would never break. They gained the Le Quesne salient on the 25th when Pulteney withdrew his battalions, but this simply meant that the line remained intact a little to the west. To the Allied troops in the trenches, it seemed that the
every trench and found next morning almost 400
f
of
As each body Germans is destroyed,
we surge forward and take on the next, shooting and charging alternately, bayoneting the survivors until by sheer exhaustion and losses we come to a standstill'
British,
French and German casualties
at
Ypres totalled about 250,000
in less than 12 hours. Smith-Dorrien reported that he had sent to de Maud'huy to ask for help but had not yet had an answer. After a further unhappy hour of discussion, it was agreed that additional guns and a higher ration of shells should be made available to II Corps and, for the rest, they must trust that the
would hold. Next day, the line still held — and the soldiers of II Corps showed that weary and diminished as they were after 14 days' continuous fighting, they could take much more than their corps and divisional commanders believed possible. From de Maud'huy came a message offering to relieve the right flank battalion of II Corps with a unit from his XXI Corps and generously adding that line
'Conneau's cavalry corps is entirely at your disposal'. 1,000 British reinforcements arrived in the II Corps' area on the 26th, and a second 1,000 on the 27th.
Terror-stricken
men
was not only in the II Corps area, however, that there were signs of crisis. The pounding of the Kruiseecke salient continued throughout the 25th and Monday the 26th. Haig, who still had It
only a fraction evening of the some stuck to sustaining first
of his corps engaged, noted in his diary on the many units had fallen back but that their trenches. Haig was given to writing and impressions and conclusions in his diary, even
26th that
German
capacity in manpower and shells was inexhaustible. The British were particularly conscious of shortages because they were a small band of regulars whose reservists had long since joined them. The sources of reinforcements had to be such regular divisions as could be brought to France from overseas, including Indian army divisions, and men recovered from sickness and wounds suffered in the days of Mons and the Marne. There was therefore much relief at Sir John French's headquarters when word was received that a large draft, comprised mainly of officers and men in the latter category, were ready to sail for France. They began to arrive behind Ypres on the 25th. It was known, too, that a third and shortly a fourth French infantry division would be in the line with Dubois' soldiers. The continuing reports of German losses, the persistent defence of the Allied line, the successful advance by Dubois' IX Corps and the arrival of reinforcements all served to elate French so that his evening report to Whitehall on the 25th noted that, 'The situation is growing more favourable hour by hour. My anxiety is over.' Then at midnight, after a drive in rain and wind, Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien appeared at to say that he feared his section of the line might break at any moment. He gave this grave opinion to French in his sitting-room at St Omer in the presence of Wilson, the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, who wrote in his diary: 'Sir John was rather short with him.' But despite French's suspicion that II Corps' commander was a man easily dismayed, he could not disregard the warning. Yet there was little immediately to hand to give him. The only reserve was the 1st Division at Ypres, 28 miles from II Corps. Even if sent at once, they could not be turned out and march this distance
GHQ
A new 'home'
for the
army-the
wet, cold
and disease-ridden trench
392 II
these were shown subsequently to be misjudged. He was not wrong in stating that the salient had been abandoned piecemeal or that terror-stricken men had fallen back from the line. But he was as yet inexperienced personally in the horrors of the firing line and was unaware of the losses suffered by the infantry of 7th Division. For 36 hours, the trenches of the salient had been bombarded with little respite, mostly by 21 -cm shells. When the assaults ceased, the direct bombardment — which had lifted to pound the British batteries in rear — began again. More men were buried under the falling, sandy earth. Some were dug out, their faces blue and swollen, in time to be revived — some were not. Some were wounded but stayed to help their friends while others were ordered to make their way back by the doctors in the regimental aid posts. Those still forward were increasingly in difficulty with the sand blown into the guideways and faces of their rifle bolts and machine gun locks. In the early afternoon, as a fresh assault began on them, those Germans who had infiltrated through the lines during the morning darkness began to shout 'Retire! Retire!' The British, without thinking, scrambled from their trenches, led by their officers, where any survived, and thus the line of the 20th Brigade crumbled. What is remarkable is that all those who thus fell back — whether as individuals or groups — of their own urgent initiative reassembled by units within a matter of hours. But the 'units' were skeletons and could not have held a battalion front again
when
A temporary German casualty
station near the line at Ypres
save for the appearance of 100 or so to each from the reinforcement draft. Much the same breach of the line and recovery happened on Smith-Dorrien's front by the village of Neuve-Chapelle. Heavy bombardment was followed by an eight-battalion assault by the 16th Infantry Regiment with units from the 56th, 57th and 142nd Regiments. The line of the 2nd Royal Irish Rifles (not to be confused with the Royal Irish Regiment destroyed at Le Pilly) was infiltrated in early assaults, then crushed and finally broken. Yet the line reformed quickly, the survivors of the Irish Rifles combining with the 1st Wiltshires and the 2nd South Lancashires to a total of 587 all ranks, with the strength and spirit to make a counterattack. If the trials of the BEF were intensified as a result of their lack of trained reserves, the Germans, as has been seen, could not afford to continue such a prodigal expenditure of soldiers without achieving decisive results. On October 27, Falkenhayn came forward to Crown Prince Rupprecht's headquarters to speak plainly, as was his habit. Notwithstanding their superiority in numbers, neither Fourth nor Sixth Army had exploited a breach in the Allied line. Astonishingly, the French had been able to operate a brief offensive towards the Ypres ridge, their successful advance only being stopped by the committal of the 2nd Ersatz, 37th and 38th Landivehr Brigades between two of the new reserve corps. The only advantageous factor which emerged was that, in order to reinforce the Flanders front, the French had reduced their power to threaten
The bewilderment of being in a strange country and the numbness his wound mark the face of an Indian of the Lahore Division as he walks through the rain and mud of a French village in Flanders
of
393
the south and hence Falkenhayn felt able to withdraw two regular corps. // Bavarian from Peronne and from the Aisne, for service in Flanders. By other measures, two more divisions could be brought up for the offensive. These six divisions, additional to the strength already in Flanders, were to be used as an army group under General von Fabeck, the whole under the supervision of down Prince Rupprecht as a new right wing of bis army. Reinforcements of heavy artillery were also being sent by rail to Flanders from the Argonne and Champagne. A special allocation of shells had already been despatched from the reserves in Germany. Once these resources had been combined, the plan was for Fourth and Sixth Armies to attack along their fronts to prevent any movement of troops to assist the sector attacked by Group Fabeck. Group Fabeck was to attack where the numbers were weakest, the line of approach most direct: against the British, from 'Plugstreet' Wood to Gheluvelt on the Menin road. to
XV
'Incapable of attack?' Buoyed up by the fact that his line was holding, whatever the pressure, by the belief that the Germans, due to losses, were now 'quite incapable of making any strong and sustained attack' — so he reported to Kitchener on the evening of October 27 — and exhilarated by Foch's optimism and the arrival of the French 31st Division, Sir John French agreed that the time had come to attack again. He did not demur when d'Urbal extended the width of his assault beyond even his new strength and happily expected that Haig's contribution would share in a triumph. He disregarded the fact that this attack failed to carry the line forward more than a few hundred yards at a cost of 2,000 French soldiers and a proportionate number of his own. They would attack again on October 29. There was further evidence to hand, however, to convince him that the Germans were not spent. On the 28th, the Bellini Tosi station used by British Intelligence to monitor the German wireless intercepted a message from Fourth Army to XXVII Reserve Corps, ordering it to join the neighbouring Bavarian Reserve Division in a general attack to be launched at 0530 hours on the 29th. This Intelligence was received at Haig's headquarters at Hooge Chateau at 1500 hours on the 28th — Haig had now taken command of the 7th Division from Rawlinson and the 3rd Cavalry Division had passed to Allenby's corps. Due to the continual cutting of the telephone cable by shellfire and the losses amongst runners, it was after midnight when the battalions in the line passed the information out to their rifle companies. As the company runners made their way out with these details, one young Scot suggested that the rumbling noises to the east meant that the Germans were retiring. What in fact they were listening to was the mass of heavy guns — held back hitherto for secrecy — moving down the pave into position. At 0500 hours it was still dark and densely foggy. At exactly 0530, silently and without a preliminary bombardment, the Germans appeared to the north of the Menin road. A chance wind, blowing aside the curtain of fog at one point and a last-minute loss of direction in another deprived them of the full benefit of surprise which their skill had otherwise earned. The British began to fire steadily except at one point where, due to an issue of badly made cartridges — the brass cases were slightly oversize — the
was low. By 0550 hours, the Bavarians had broken in at this point and were exploiting their breach. Now the German bombardment fell on selected targets, principally reserve positions, headquarters and the routes between them. Immediately south of the Menin road, the Germans were also now appearing en masse like 'a crowd coming on to the ground after a football match' with many more behind. As the two sides closed, confusion grew. The 1st Black Watch, 1st Cameron Highlanders, 1st Scots Guards, volume of
fire
1st Coldstream Guards, 1st Gloucesters, 1st Grenadier Guards, 2nd Scots Guards, 2nd Gordon Highlanders, 2nd Royal Scots Fusiliers had by the end of the day beaten off all assaults except for an encroachment by three battalions of the 16th Bavarian Reserve Regiment 500 yards along the road towards Gheluvelt. The 1st Coldstream Guards had been destroyed, the few remaining men having been taken under command of Lieutenant Boyd,
their quartermaster, the only surviving officer. The Gloucesters, as an example of casualties in other units, had lost seven officers
and 163 men. Yet Group Fabeck had not been committed: the massed foe had so far only come from the combined resources of Fourth and Sixth Armies. The main attack was yet to begin — on the 30th. Some hint of Group Fabeck' s presence had been detected by III Corps on October 29 when, during the course of 11 hours' fighting, it was discovered that a new formation, XXIV Reserve Corps, had
come
into the
German
line.
What was
not realised
was that they
had been brought into position to dispose a greater density of troops for the offensive on the 30th. The effect of this squeezing up was felt also by III Corps north of Armentieres. A dawn bombardment greater than any they had previously known was followed by the attack by two regiments on Le Gheer where the defences, 2,000 yards in length, were held by a single weak battalion, the 1st Hampshires. The front trenches were quickly lost but the flank battalions stood coolly to fire at this assault brigade from the German 40th Division, the left flank formation of Group Fabeck. In two hours, almost 700 of the division were killed, the assault brigade so weakened that it fell back before a surprise attack in open order by the Somersets under Major Prowse and the whole line was restored. In the front trenches, the Somersets found each man of the original company lying dead at his post. The fire from the 250 heavy guns, howitzers and mortars allocated to Fabeck, supplemented everywhere along the front of attack by the field guns firing on precisely registered targets, caused widespread devastation through the morning of the 30th. The storming parties north of Le Gheer were less menacing, advancing in daylight with the loss of many casualties. Those regiments that quickly broke out of their massed formations to infiltrate in small parties, a practice slowly being developed through the autumn by the Germans in Flanders, made useful gains, forcing Gough's cavalry back from Hollebeke and the 3rd Cavalry and 7th Division from Zandvoorde. Haig began to fear that if this pressure were maintained the line would break. The five battalions in the area were very weak — the 2nd Royal Warwicks consisted of Captain Sydenham and 156 officers and men, for example. Dubois, asked also for assistance, sent almost his whole reserve. But the Germans stopped when they had captured their first objectives and when a lull came between 1900 and 2000 hours, the British cavalry were surprised to hear a band playing selections from light opera in the Hollebeke Chateau.
'Profoundly disappointed' There was general disquiet in the higher headquarters on either side of the line on the night of the 30th. Crown Prince Rupprecht informed Fabeck that he was 'profoundly disappointed by the achievements of the day', and was informed that an attack was being made that night by way of continuance without respite, the aim being to capture Messines ridge. Duke Albrecht was disturbed to learn of the spread of the waters west of the Yser— the Belgian engineers were operating the sluice gates in reverse. The growing flood would soon prevent further attack in this sector. Falkenhayn, Crown Prince Rupprecht and Fabeck gave clear and stern orders that the offensive must be pressed with greater vigour. Amongst the Allies, Smith-Dorrien had been told to send forward his strongest brigade to support the Cavalry Corps (his II Corps had been relieved by the Indian Corps) and there was a small body of Territorial Force battalions arriving with a yeomanry regiment. Haig planned to recapture Zandvoorde and Hollebeke — all that had been lost on the 30th — with a composite force. Foch grew alarmed at the spirit of pessimism and inactivity he detected at French's headquarters and drove to Saint Omer. It was half an hour after midnight .vhen he saw the British Commander-in-Chief, who was gloomy. 'We're
all in for
it,'
said French.
'We shall see,' Foch replied. 'In the meantime hammer away, keep on hammering, and you will get there. It's surprising the results you attain in this way.' A dose of Foch optimism was what French needed; and the dose was fortified with a promise of eight battalions from the 32nd Division and three batteries of artillery. As so often, these troops were still travelling when Foch spoke of them as being immediately to hand but this was a detail which fortuitously did not matter on this occasion. As the two men parted, their own soldiers watched or slept. The Germans completed their reliefs with fresh battalions for the morning of the 31st. At 0800 hours, the bombardment opened. Seven hundred artillery pieces of all types were firing— 'the worst we had ever had', in the opinion of a sergeant of the 1st Queen's. 'The ground was literally shaking as if we were in the middle of an earthquake.' Opposite the Messines ridge, nine battalions of German veterans began a cunning assault, rarely revealing more than a small group or two to the waiting cavalrymen. By about 1100 hours, two thirds of the 119th Grenadiers had insinuated themselves into the southern edge of Messines village while the three battalions of the 125th worked forward into the north-east through the cemetery. Their gunners now dragged forward a field gun to snipe at the houses held by the foremost British squadrons. Nearby, opposite Hollebeke and Zandvoorde, the disjointed attacks of the French and British came to nothing as they ran directly into
394
.
Communications — the nervous system of all^ modern armies — ff^gile But of paramount importances^* % German thoroughness justified. While the Allie%,suffered from"|SO©r field communications, the Germans were able to relyon an ex eel &rk service I
I the
German bombardment and massed infantry. They struck
back,
however, with their own somewhat lighter bombardment against the assault forces of the Bavarian Corps. The centre of the battlefield saw therefore a stalemate, while immediately to the south the issue on the Messines ridge hung in the balance. To the north, on either side of the Menin road, the fighting had risen progressively to a frenzy from 0800 until 1145 hours. In the last hour before noon, four battalions of British infantry perished but for a tiny fragment, such as the 1st Queen's, which had two officers and 12 men left that night. Gheluvelt village and chateau had been captured so that, apart from the British guns in their battery positions along the road, there was nothing to prevent the reserves of Group Fabeck marching into Ypres. m Brigadier-General FitzClarence had been warned of this position by the telephone of the 1st Scots Guards — the only cable to brigade headquarters still uncut at this time. With his staff captain, Thorne, he reconnoitred and found that a small element of the Scots Guards and 1st South Wales Borderers had combined under the latter's commanding officer, and this force managed to regain the stables of the chateau but was too weak to advance any further. FitzClarence had no reserve of his own but was given the 2nd Worcesters, the divisional reserve, to do what he could. As he returned to prepare a counterattack, the commanders of 1st and 2nd Divisions conferred in their joint headquarters to plan a blocking operation forward of Ypres, but at 1300 hours a German heavy shell landed directly in the room where they were talking, killing or mortally wounding a divisional commander and almost all those present. There was now no authority to prepare the defence of Ypres and only the Worcesters to counterattack. One of their companies had been detached to watch the village while at 1345 hours the remainder set off towards Gheluvelt Chateau under Major Hankey, their commanding officer, and the adjutant, Captain Senhouse-Clarke. After a march of 1,700 yards, they drew into open country and could see the trees of the chateau park a mile ahead. Shells were bursting in their path, the German artillery seeking to deny just such a counterattack as the Worcesters intended. Far sightedly, packs and all other impedimenta except for rifles, bayonets, cartridges and water bottles had been left
behind. Thus lightened, the Worcesters were now able to double forward to the trees, pause in their shelter and then, in two waves break into the park towards the house. There were about 1,200 Germans in and around the chateau, of whom some were inside the buildings looting. Two companies had been placed out to watch the western approaches to the park but had not crossed into the trees. They were all from the reserve regiments and had been allowed to relax into that dangerous state of euphoria which follows the dangers of a close battle won. The accurate fire, mature discipline and spirit of the
Worcesters caught them unawares. They were routed. To the rear, Haig had heard of the casualties in his two divisional headquarters. Leaving French, who promised to obtain all help possible from Foch, I Corps' commander rode deliberately forward along the Menin road. He sat as ever upright in the saddle, his service dress tunic, breeches and boots immaculate. Whatever the faults history may find in him now, he had a cool head and a practical brain. He had never shunned regimental service and, though a cavalryman by profession, bad taken pains to learn the infantry art. In all the BEF, he was certainly the best commander for such a situation as he now faced. The obvious and the easiest course would have been to withdraw at ever} point. It was a tempting option. But Haig knew that many of tbo fragmented units would find it difficult to break cleanly from the Germans and that there was consequently a danger of high loss if he took this course. Instead he instructed his chief engineer to site a new line while he rode forward to order all his troops to hold firm.
Slow and painful adjustments As adjustments were made slowly and
painfully through the after noon, officers and soldiers forward did what they thought best while waiting for fresh commands. Colonel Lovett oftheGlouces ters formed up an ad hoc force of survivors and counterattacked the leading Saxon battalion in his area, supported bj three batteries. Lieutenant Blewitt of the Royal Field Artillery brought a sniping gun into action from 54 Battery. His crew hit a German sniping field piece and then turned on to the Saxons General BuKin organised a counterattack with what was left of five bat-
group of cavalry and the 13-pounders of C Battery, Royal Horse Artillery. A company of field engineers, the 26th, joined the assault. For the loss of over 1,000 of their number this little force drove the Germans back from the ridge and combined with the French and the mixed force of cavalry and infantry which still held Messines and the ridge. On the road to Poperinge. French found Foch. He told him that: the troops (1 Corps are in full retreat towards Ypres, the heavy artillery were retiring at a trot towards the west, the roads were blocked by ammunition wagons. It was the beginning of a defeat.' As a personal point, if he had to continue the battle without help, 'there is nothing left for me to do,' said French, 'but to go up and be killed with I Corps.' It is probable that the British Commander-in-Chief was for once less downcast than he appeared; for he knew that Gheluvelt Chateau and village had been recaptured. He was nonetheless sure that without French help his own dwindling force might not survive successive days of assault. November 1 did not bring the onslaught expected by the Allies. At various points along the line there were attacks but none were pressed except the night attack on the Messines ridge which established a German hold leading ultimately to its capture. The fact was that the German divisions were dispirited by their continual hardships and losses. The youthful corps in Fourth Army no longer thrust forward to be sure of a place in the forefront of the battle; they no longer cheered or sang spontaneously as they came forward. Despite official discouragement, the veterans continued to use their methods of infiltration, fire and movement by small groups in preference to the formal assault column and line prescribed. The regiments knew, too, when an assault was worth pressing and when it was not. Yet for all these changes in attitude, the Allied line continued to lose high numbers of casualties daily, and there was a growing tally of sick as a result of exposure. The BEF was delighted to welcome the units of the Territorial Force and Yeomanry which Kitchener had grudgingly released. Without their presence at this stage and that of the Indian Corps, the line could not have been maintained. During the first few days of November both Falkenhayn and Joffre had to consider whether they should continue to reinforce Flanders. The French Commander-in-Chief was anxious to concentrate forces in France for an offensive, but Foch convinced him that they could not survive in Flanders without greater participation on the part of other French forces. If they had it, he promised that they would continue to attack. Grossetti was brought down to command the corps south-east of Ypres. Falkenhayn had to decide whether or not any potential remained in the battle. He was under pressure by the Kaiser and the government to send major reinforcements to the Eastern Front but decided early in November to make one last attempt to reach Calais. He withdrew part of // Corps from Roye, a brigade from each of the 1st and 2nd Guard Divisions in Artois and artillery from Arras. General von Linsingen, commander of 77 Corps, was appointed to command this new 'group', to which was added Corps from Group Fabeck. Once again, Sixth and Fourth Armies were to mount strong attacks from La Bassee to Dixmude while Linsingen pressed up the road from Menin towards Ypres. Now that they had the Messines ridge in their possession, there seemed to be every reason to hope that Fabeck would break through to Poperinge and Linsingen at Ypres simultaneously. Fourth Army began its offensive on November 10 on its right wing. Dixmude fell at last. It was an empty victory, however, as a result of the completion of the inundation of the Yser bank. Ronarc'h and his sailors, and the Zouaves who had recently reinforced them, withdrew from the ruins across the bridge and saw it demolished. On the 11th, from dawn until 0900 hours, the German bombardment fell on French and British lines, the fury of sound, smoke, flame and blast rising to a peak in the final hour. On the left of his front, Linsingen's 30th Division managed to push back a French brigade along the railway line running into Ypres, capturing Hill 60 and the cutting below. Just south of the Menin road, the 39th and 4th Divisions were thrown back after a bloody struggle between British and German riflemen amongst the trees and houses along the crest of the ridge. North of the Menin road, the four Guard regiments advanced in the old formation, regimental column, appearing 'like grey ghosts coming down out of the clouds'. talions, a
I
XV
driven back by the 2nd Guard Grenadiers, who marched steadily on into the trees beyond. They believed that they had made a breach but were in error. From three sides they were hit by a hail of rifle fire and soon the leading battalion was beyond relief. To the left, the 4th Guard Grenadiers had been shot at from 0900 hours onwards and had retained a fighting strength only as a result of the fog which screened them intermittently from their foe. But a forward observation officer of the Royal Artillery, whose telephone cable had been cut in the swelling bombardment, doubled back along the line to tell his battery to fire. The gunners fired shrapnel and the perfectly disciplined, apparently indestructible ranks now reeled, halted and fell back. To the north, Brigadier-General FitzClarence was again fighting a critical battle such as he had undertaken twice before. The 1st and 3rd Foot Guards had reached the British fire trenches to find many of them empty. It was now the policy to abandon these during a preliminary bombardment, taking shelter immediately in rear and doubling forward just as the bombardment lifted to admit the German assault. But this morning, the attackers had reached the trenches at a jog trot and their packed numbers overwhelmed those few platoons which had got into position. Soon they had killed or captured those behind. On the extreme right, the 3rd Foot Guards had expected 54th Reserve Division of Fourth Army to be in Polygon Wood by mid-morning but the young reserve battalion did not leave their trenches. In consequence, the 1st King's in the wood were able to open fire at short range and from a flank directly into the 3rd Foot Guards. When the smoke of the action and the fog cleared a little in the rising wind, the King's saw the German dead banked in front of them, lying as they had fallen in their close ranks. Though the 1st Foot Guards had broken through the whole British front line during the morning, they had now to contend with the strong points of timber and packed earth which Haig had had built behind. Though scantily manned, they were able to delay the Guard regiment while the British guns by Hooge were brought to bear. When they fired, the 1st Foot Guards broke up, doubling into the shelter of Nonne Boschen (Nun's Copse). Brigadier-General FitzClarence had been engaged for several hours in firing with his headquarters staff at the regiment from a strong point. He was now sent the 52nd Light Infantry to counterattack, an operation joined by the 1st Northamptons, who were hurrying up and a company of engineers, ever ready to join the fighting. The 1st Foot Guards were forced back. Rain began to fall heavily. The wind drove into the combatants. Hoping finally to eject the enemy from the foremost trenches captured that morning, Brigadier-General FitzClarence sought for a further reserve while his brigade major and the colonel of the 52nd reconnoitred in the gloom. Returning with two battalions, he met them at the corner of Polygon Wood to be told that they could not locate the enemy precisely in the darkness, while in between lay numbers of dead and wounded of both sides. FitzClarence told everyone to wait while he went to see conditions for himself. A few steps along the path, he was mortally wounded by rifle fire. It was the end of the night's operations; and so far as the critical struggle for the Ypres sector was concerned, the end of this first great battle for the area.
Further Reading Blake, R. (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1918 (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1952) Cruttwell, C. R. M. F., A History of the Great War (OUP 1936) Deguise. Lt-Gen.. La Defense de la Position Fortifiee d'Anvers en 1914 (Brussels 1921) Dubail. Gen. A., Quatres annees de commandement, 1914-1918 (1920) Essen, L. van der, The Invasion and the War in Belgium from Liege to the Yser (London 1917) Falkenhayn, Gen. E. von, General Headquarters 1914-1916 (Hutchinson 1919) Farrar-Hockley, Brig. A., Death of an Army (Barker 1967) Liddell Hart. Sir Basil, Foch, Man of Orleans (Eyre & Spottiswoode 1931) Military Operations: France and Belgium 1914 (Macmillan 1925) Smith-Dorrien, Gen. Sir Horace, Memories of 48 years service (1925)
GENERAL SIR ANTHONY FARRAR-HOCKLEY GBE, KCB, DSO and bar, MC, ADC Gen, BLitt (Oxon) was educated at Exeter School and enlisted in the army when he was under-age
Hail of
rifle fire
had now been relieved. At Gheluvelt, the guards were met by some of Smith-Dorrien's battalions reinforced by part of a Zouave regiment. The British in the village were
The
396
British 7th Division
during the Second World War.
He served
in
the airborne
the ranks and as an officer. Since 1945 he has taken part in many campaigns including Korea where he was captured while serving with the Gloucesters and held for two and a half years. Among other books, he has published three on the First World War: Death of an Army, The Battle of the Somme, and Goughie: The Life of General Sir Hubert Gough, all of which were
forces
in
acclaimed
for their originality
and
insight.
i
a
ENTERS THE WAR For long the 'sick man of Europe', Turkey had been powerless to prevent the piecemeal dismantling of her European possessions in the years before 1914. The Young Turk Revolution of 1908 was one reaction to her decline; another was the growth of German influence, exemplified by the army reorganisation carried out by General Liman von Sanders. Yet, despite these remedies, Turkey's entry into the war in 1914 seems little more than a desperate throw by a small group of energetic and ambitious men to recoup her losses. She was handicapped by her poverty, technical backwardness and the inefficiency of her system of communications which placed her outlying provinces, Syria, Mesopotamia and Arabia, in extreme jeopardy. Yet by the summer of 1914 German influence in Turkish affairs was irresistible, and Turkey's entry on the side of the Central Powers seemed inevitable. Below: Turkish infantrymen — ill-clad, half-fed and often barefoot, they were indomitable fighting men. John Stephenson
Every European power had something both to gain and to lose by the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore they watched her tottering progress through the 19th Century with a blend o( parental solicitude and vulturine rapacity. Britain, while she would herself have liked to replace Turkish power in the areas that abutted onto the route to India, strove to keep the Ottoman Empire in being, for fear of Russia's filling the gap caused by Turkish disintegration. Britain's relations with Turkey were further complicated by public disapproval of Turkish methods disapproval so frequently expressed by W. E. Gladstone. But Britain was not the only power with an interest in maintaining the status quo in the Middle East. As adviser, guide and mentor. Bismarck's Germany had much to offer, and in place of Britain's moral nagging he initiated 30 years of sustained diplomatic, military and economic effort which resulted in Turkey being dragged into the First World War on the side of the Central Powers. Not that Bismarck himself desired or anticipated this end: he wished to preserve the Empire but had no desire for Germany to expand eastwards or to become embroiled there. Above arl he wished to avoid a conflict between Russia and Austria-
Hungary in which he might be compelled to take sides. The spring of 1882 saw the despatch to Constantinople
of a military mission under the leadership of the celebrated General Colmar von der Goltz to train and develop the Turkish army. His difficulties were many. Neither he nor his colleagues were ever given real executive command but the work they did gave the Turkish General Staff and many others the deepest respect for the German army, and began a period of German influence to the point of domination in Turkish military organisation and training which was to continue until 1918. With the accession in 1888 of the new Kaiser, Wilhelm II, the pace was to quicken and friction between the Kaiser and his Chancellor at once became apparent. The occasion was in 1889 when the first of two state visits to Constantinople by the Kaiser and Kaiserin was being planned. On the reports submitted by General von der Goltz the Kaiser wanted far more than influence with the Ottomans. To him Turkey was 'a bridge to world dominion'. Bismarck is said to have replied: 'world dominion is a term that finds no place in my political dictionary'. The visit nevertheless took place and Abdul Hamid was deeply appreciative of the compliment. Henceforth German influence gained ground steadily in Turkey while that of Britain and France waned. The next decade was one of feverish activity. In 1888 the Deutsche Bank had obtained the right to operate a short line of railway from the Bosporus along the east side of the Sea of Marmara. To this was now added a concession for an extension to Ankara, which developed into a trunk line through Asia Minor and on to Baghdad, under the aegis of the Anatolian Railway Company, itself the parent of the Baghdad Railway Company. Complications with Britain were to arise as to the proposed terminus of the line, whether to Basra or Kuwait, but these need not concern us at this point. German shipping companies, heavily subsidised, were active in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, and even in the Persian Gulf. German cable companies began to cut out existing British cables, extending into Asia Minor and Mesopotamia. German wireless stations were also set up. German trade advanced by leaps and bounds, particularly in armaments. German schools, German scientific and archaeological mis-
German
sions,
even German religious institutions were
active.
In the autumn of 1898 the Kaiser made his second visit to Constantinople where he was received with the utmost honour. From there he went on to the Holy Land, making a ceremonial entry into Jerusalem, and laying the foundation stone of a German religious hospice. In Damascus he demonstrated his enthusiasm for Pan-Islamism in a speech which both astonished and alarmed the world: 'His Majesty, the Sultan Abdul Hamid, and the 300,000,000 Moslems who reverence him as Caliph, may rest assured that at all times the German Emperor will be their friend.' Sentiments easily expressed by a ruler with no Moslem subjects. This was also the first occasion on which the Sultan's title of Caliph received any recognition from a European power. There were admittedly certain checks to the progress of German influence with the Ottomans and later with the Young Turks. Certain things needed explanation. The Kaiser's personal friendship with Abdul Hamid could hardly be approved of— until 'the Young Turks themselvc s were driven to using Hamidian methods. The Italian War of 1911/12, the declaration of independence by Bulgaria, the failure of Turkish forces in the Balkan Wars — all these reflected on the German connection. But the benefits derived from it outweighed the disadvantages. Many of the Young Turk revolutionaries had either been trained in Germany or by Germans. The personal prestige of two outstanding German
398
ambassadors, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, 1897-1912, and Baron von Wangenheim, 1912-15, and the appointment of General Liman von Sanders in 1913 to reorganise and train the Ottoman forces, made German influence appear irresistible.
'Union and Progress' The Young Turk revolution was declared been brewing
for long before that.
A
in July 1908, but had party was gradually formed
in the first years of the century among Moslems in Turkey in favour of constitutional reform. It was known as the Party of Union and Progress, and its members were called Young Turks. It had its origin in Turks exiled abroad, chiefly in Paris, and it was joined by groups of army officers located in Salonika, Adrianople and Damascus. The major and most dangerous type of discontent was the feeling that under the Hamidian regime the Empire would soon cease to exist. The Sultan and his ministers were becoming more and more the tools of the Great Powers and particularly of Germany. Rumania, Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus and Egypt had been lost, either de facto or de jure, and even in what was left of the Empire the Sultan's authority was frustrated and nullified by the powers, whose interference was rapidly becoming intolerable. Now, at the turn of the century, Macedonia appeared the next province to be lost, and the cause of this progressive decay was thought to be the Sultan himself. A movement for greater political freedom within the Empire received, as might be expected, strong support from non-Turkish communities, Greeks, Jews, Armenians and Arabs, who looked to Western intervention. But the Sultan could never be overthrown by propaganda from outside; only by internal revolt could this be done. For this there was but one spearhead — the army — and the revolutionary machine was ready. Hostile critics of the Young Turk movement have tried to explain it as of foreign origins with Enver as a renegade Pole, Javid a Jew, Talaat a Bulgarian gipsy. The movement was in truth a movement of Moslem Turks, mostly soldiers, whose first aim was to replace an incompetent ruler by a government more competent to defend the Empire against its obvious threats. The fundamental question was survival — how could the state be saved? History had been unkind to them, and not without some cause, but though their work was often ill conceived, incomplete and frustrated by events, they nevertheless helped to prepare the way for the new Turkey which was to emerge after their disappearance. Enver was born in Constantinople in 1881, the son of a railway official. Trained at the War College, he quickly became a leader among the Young Turks. During his period as military attache in Berlin he became an enthusiast for all things German and convinced of German victory in the coming war. In 1913 he became a general and Minister of War. Jemal was born in 1872 and was also trained at the War College. He was to become Minister of the Interior and later commander in Syria. He was regarded as highly competent and of a cold fanatical spirit. Javid was a Turk of the Dunmeh (Judaeo-Islamic) sect. He became a brilliant Finance Minister. Talaat was born at Adrianople in 1874, and was probably the most brilliant man in the movement. He attained a high position in the Posts and Telegraphs department. Early in July 1908 a Major Niazi Bey and Major Enver Bey raised the standard of revolt against Abdul Hamid and proclaimed the Constitution. On July 21 the Sultan surrendered completely to their demands. The parliament dissolved in 1878 was recalled and elections held in November produced a large majority for the Young Turks. Never was a revolution effected with so little bloodshed and with more complete success. Abdul Hamid, as before, promised to be the mildest of constitutional monarchs, and the powers which had been busy pushing through reforms in Macedonia abandoned them, leaving the apparently liberal Young Turks to manage their own affairs. For a time all seemed well but in April 1909 a counter revolution was proclaimed. It need not detain us. The Committee of Young Turks at Salonika authorised the III Corps under Shevket Pasha to march on Constantinople. It was not opposed and the outcome was the deposition of Abdul Hamid. He was deported to Salonika, but his methods survived with the new leaders. Very soon after the revolution of 1908 the process of dismemberment of the Empire was renewed and the wolves gathered round. The new government was now to receive blows from outside such as few can ever have been called upon to resist — and the Young Turks could not resist. On October 5 Ferdinand of Bulgaria threw off the suzerainty of the Sultan and proclaimed himself Tsar of an independent kingdom. On October 7 the Austro-Hungarian government took advantage of the crisis and
Sultan Mohammed V, who succeeded his brother after the Young Turk Revolution
General Colmar von d er Goltz. leader of the German military mi ssion to Turkey in 1882
first
annexed Bosnia-Herzegovina, and five days later the Cretan Assembly proclaimed the union of the island with Greece. The next blow to the Ottoman Empire came from an unexpected quarter, from Italy, which made a sudden and unprovoked attack on Tripoli. The war here lasted until October 1912 and reflected little glory on the Italian army which in the end was holding only a fringe on the sea coast. But by this date the Turkish army had to concentrate in defence of the homeland. The losses of Crete and Tripoli could be borne, but the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, though wounding the prestige
came
thunderclap to the powers. One million more Serbs were to be added to the 5,000,000 Serbo-Croats already under Austrian or Hungarian rule. Austria-Hungary paid £2,500,000 to Turkey in compensation for lost crown lands, and Russia, on behalf of Bulgaria, paid £5,000,000, thus easing the situation between the Tsar and Ferdinand, and causing a temporary rapprochement between the three Slav states. Germany, though horrified by the unilateral action of her ally, AustroHungary, stood by her and the stage w,as set for the Slav-German of Turkey,
like a
which seemed bound to cornel But before it came the Ottoman Empire was to suffer still more, for in October 1912 the First Balkan War broke out. conflict
-,
•
Unprepared and unwilling The genesis
of the
Turks,
of the leaders of the
was Minister
of
Marine
two wars which followed or of such action as was possible on the part of the powers. It is enough to say that when the First Balkan War finished, and the Treaty of London of May 30, 1913. was signed, nothing was left of the Ottoman Empire in Europe but a small area outside the Chatalja lines to the west of Constantinople. The League had been completely victorious, but the balance of power had been badly upset and the emergent free states had to face the problems they had brought upon themselves. The real significance of the demise of the Empire was becoming apparent.
As one commentator was to write: European statesmen had to realise that their failure to prevent the war had caused the disappearance of the Ottoman Empire in Europe. No doubt it was an ill-managed, tyrannous, ramshackle concern. But it filled a gap. In its place stood or crawled three young nations with more appetites than assets, the starveling infant state of Albania, and a mountain— for Montenegro was no more than that. The association of the four allies had been temporary, their jealousies dated from the Middle Ages. They could no more take the place of the Ottoman Empire than four loose flints can take the place of the most indifferent brick. Where Turkey had been the Powers had made a void into whwh they were drawn in 1914. Nature abhors a vacuum. So do politics. The Treaty of London was quickly torn up and the victorious fell to fighting over the spoils. Bulgaria treacherously attacked the Serbian armies and was heavily defeated, losing much of her territorial gains not only to Serbia but to Greece and Rumania — which was not to be kept out of any 'compensation' to be had. But in the meanwhile a Turkish force under Enver, making forced marches, slipped back into Adrianoplo. which was undefended and firmly retained it in the negotiations which ended the war. Serbia, Rumania, Greece, even Bulgaria, got something out of these wars either in territory or population. But the losses
allies
war was simple. Russia had temporarily
reconciled Bulgaria with Serbia. These two states, viewing with despair the sufferings of their fellow nationals in Macedonia, found Russia and all the other powers quite unprepared and unwilling to take any action to save them from the Young Turks. They decided to act together, and with the help of a man of genius from Greece, Venizelos, the Balkan League was formed of the three states, to be joined later by Montenegro. Military preparations went forward, to the undisguised dismay of the powers, who on October 7 solemnly informed the League that they were opposed to a rupture with Turkey and would in any case permit no change in the territorial status quo in the Balkans. They were to be quickly disillusioned. It is unnecessary for our purpose to go into the details of the
Jemal Pasha, one
General Liman von Sanders, military adviser to Turkey in 1913, increased German influence
in
Young
1914
Turkey affected it little, so it seemed at the moment, except that Albania, which had always been a fine recruiting ground For soldiers and statesmen, could no longer be' drawn upon. Christian subjects were no loss as they were not used as soldiers. Defeat in the field, as has sometimes been found in other nations, was
to
Talaat Bey, Minister of the Interior
and perhaps the most
brilliant of
in
1914
Young Turks
Enver Pasha, Younq Turk and Germanophih 1914 he was a general and Minister of W.n
399
a positive gain because it drove home to the Turks army reform must now be basic and unqualified. Germany was at hand to help, and the large mission under General Liman von Sanders worked wonders. The Ottoman Empire in Europe had indeed 'filled a gap'. Freed from its control the Balkan nations could now contrive and conspire in other directions. Turkey took no part in this, hut she was in
one waj
that
not to escape the holocaust which followed. \\ hen war came to Europe the climate of opinion in Constantinople was deeply influenced in favour of Germany. The Sultan
Mohammed V was
a nonentity; the Grand Vizier, Said Halim, a respectable figurehead. The Committee of Union and Progress was firmly in power, and the Cabinet contained Talaat as Minister of the Interior, Javid as Minister of Finance, Jemal as Minister of Marine (shortly to command Fourth Army in Syria) and Enver Pasha, recently become Minister of War. As early as
was
August 2 he had already negotiated with Baron von Wangenheim, the forceful German Ambassador, a treaty for the armed cooperation of Turkey. This was kept secret, even some of the ministers not being informed of it. Meanwhile a formal proclamation of neutrality had been made. At this period though the Entente Powers had retained little influence in Turkey the population retained memories of their friendship and snowed little enthusiasm for a war against them. But the Entente Powers
had allied themselves with Turkey's historic enemy — Russia — and two incidents now completed an estrangement which had become inevitable. The Turkish government had ordered two dreadnoughts, the Reshadiye and the Sultan Osman, from the Armstrong-Whitworth shipyard in Britain and had paid for them b\ a nationwide campaign for subscriptions from the populace. They were now ready for sea and Turkish crews were prepared to take them over. At this point the British government laid hands on them. Britain was perfectly within her rights and offered full compensation for the ships, but Turkish fury followed. While Turkish indignation was at its height the second and far more calamitous event occurred. The German battle-cruiser Goeben, already well known to the inhabitants of Constantinople, and its attendant cruiser, Breslau, evaded British pursuit in the Mediterranean, approached the entrance of the Dardanelles and were admitted. The breach of neutrality thus committed was countered on the following day, August 11, by the announcement that they had been purchased by Turkey. The German crews remained, exchanging caps for fezzes. Three days later the British naval mission under Admiral Arthur Limpus was dismissed.
Nightmare negotiations For two more months a nightmare of negotiations continued. On Aqgust 18 the Entente Powers made a declaration to the effect that if Turkey observed 'scrupulous neutrality' during the war they would uphold her independence and integrity against 'any enemies that might wish to utilise the general European complication in order to attack her'. But neutrality was the last thing Enver wanted and Germany had promised him the recovery of Egypt at least. So Turkey rapidly mobilised, and disregarding the advice of Liman von Sanders proceeded to plan an attack on Suez by way of the Sinai desert. Finally, at the end of October, while the Grand Vizier and other ministers were still murmuring smooth phrases, Enver with his German confederates took the final plunge. The Goeben and the Hamidieh sailed into the Black Sea and bombarded Theodosia and Odessa. On November 2 the British government published an official indictment of Turkish provocations and within days a state of war was declared to exist between Turkey and the Entente. Turkey's entry into the war was a desperate throw by a small group of energetic and ambitious men. She was handicapped by her poverty, by her technical backwardness and above all by the inefficiency of her system of communications which placed her outlying provinces, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia, in extreme jeopardy. Little remains to be said. Cyprus was at once annexed by Britain. On December 17 a British protectorate was claimed in Cairo with Prince Hussein, a son of the late Khedive Ismail, as Sultan in place of Abbas Hilmi, who remained in Constantinople and openly sided with the Turks. In return for the acquiescence of her allies in the British protectorate over Egypt, Great Britain, it was understood, would be willing to recognise, at the end of the war, Russia's claims to Constantinople and the Straits, and those of France to Syria. But the end of the war was still very far off, and not only the areas with which we have been dealing were to be involved. The vast but lesser known stretci s of the Ottoman Empire deserve a brief study.
400
The Ottoman Empire fell roughly into two parts: the vital European part where Islam was in constant strife with the Christian kafir, and the acquired part, mostly Moslem, which embraced Kurdistan, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Arabia proper. Between them was the Turkish heartland of Anatolia, with its large Christian minorities.
comparison with European Turkey, the Moslem areas have little attention from Western historians. One can read deep and learned histories of the Eastern Question in the 19th Century and the decay of what is called the Ottoman Empire without gaining a suspicion that it was anything more than the Balkans, part of Anatolia and, rather vaguely and spasmodically, Egypt. But these outlying dominions were not to remain in In
received
obscurity much longer. The transformation of European Turkey was complete; the process in the Islamic lands was about to begin. There were certain basic differences between the problems presented by European and Moslem subjects. First of these
was
religion.
Whereas
in
Europe differences of religion lay be-
hind all urges more often described as nationalism or liberalism, elsewhere in the Empire the religious factor took on a different aspect. Eastward and southwards of Anatolia Islam dominated almost the entire area. Admittedly there were schisms. The orthodox Sunni faith prevailed except in Mesopotamia where the Shiahs maintained their holy places and were in a majority. The Wahabis in central Arabia were a fierce puritanical sect whose activities dated from the mid-18th Century and for long periods were politically independent. The Emir Hussein of Mecca, guardian of the principal holy places of Islamic pilgrimage, had, as such, a peculiar position in the Moslem world, in veneration competing with that of the Caliph himself, and was believed to cherish hopes of political independence. The purity of Islam, as practised in Anatolia, particularly by the Young Turks and their followers, was much in question by the orthodox. But in spite of these divergencies the fact that Moslem ruled Moslem was of more importance than that Turk ruled Arab if this huge part of the Empire were ever in jeopardy. A jehad, or holy war, might be proclaimed.
Centralism or tribalism? Secondly, in Europe, even neglecting the question of religion, a case could be made, and was made, that government of their
own lands, individually, by Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgars and Greeks was intrinsically better and more efficient than rule by the Turks, however much these nations were torn in strife between themselves. But it was a difficult matter to make a similar claim for the Arabs, even if the Arabs as a whole, or in recognised divisions, had shown a genuine desire for independence. The saying that the logical conclusion of self-determination is tribalism applied here probably more than in other places. Quotations from writers of the period well versed in their subject can be multiplied to show that however great the genius of the Arab peoples for many of the arts of civilisation, government was not
SMS
Breslau flying
German colours just before Turkey bought
The German crew remained, exchanging caps
her
in
1914.
for fezzes
one of them. Turkish rule though lacking by European standards — and here we are not considering European subjects — had a firmness and consistency which kept order and controlled strife for long periods in many provinces. Mostly the provinces were run on a light rein. There was little persecution, but reforms for the benefit of the people were on a scale far greater than anything attempted in the European part of the Empire. It is interesting to note that these benefits were at no time more enthusiastically advanced than during the reign of Abdul Hamid II, the
commonly accepted
arch-villain of
Ottoman
history in Europe.
comparison with Europe, communications were inadequate. Roads were slowly developing particularly in Syria and Palestine. In
The Hejaz railway, ostensibly constructed for the Mecca pilgrimage, but in reality more as part of a centralisation policy, had been completed as far as Medina in 1908. It was slow, badly constructed in its southern section and chronically in difficulties over water and fuel. The proposed extensions to Mecca, the Yemen, and Akaba were unlikely to be completed. The Baghdad line extended only to Ras el'Ain, some 200 miles west of Mosul. A 1-05metre gauge line ran through Damascus and Deraa into Palestine as far as Beersheba with a spur to Haifa. Both the Syrian and Mesopotamian systems were limited by breaks at the Taurus and Amanus mountain ranges where the completion of tunnels had been long delayed. Telegraphs were reasonably efficient but the shortcomings of other communications made reinforcement from the centre slow and difficult. The result was a considerable measure of independence for local governors whose control sometimes depended more on personality than material resources. In the circumstances it is difficult not to admire what was accomplished. The unkempt Turkish gendarme with his rifle slung over his shoulder riding a donkey round a handful of villages was treated with respect. As for the shabby, poorly equipped soldiery, Gertrude Bell pays a memorable tribute, worth quoting at length: Of what value are Pan-Arabic associations and the inflammatory leaflets that they issue from foreign printing presses? The answer is easy: They are worth nothing at all. There is no nation of Arabs; the Syrian merchant is separated by a wider gulf from the Bedouin than he is from the Osmanli; the Syrian country is inhabited by Arabic-speaking races all' eager to be at each other's throats, and only prevented from fulfilling their natural desires by the rugged half-fed soldier who draws at rare intervals the Sultan's pay. And this soldier is worth a good deal more than the hire he receives. Other armies may mutiny, but the Turkish Army will stand true to the Khalif; other armies may give way before suffering and privation and untended sickness, but that of the Sultan will go forward as long as it can stand, and fight as long as it has arms, and conquer as long as it has leaders. There is no more wonderful or pitiful sight than a Turkish regiment on the march; grey beards and half-fledged youth, ill clad and often barefoot, pinched and worn — and indomitable. Let such as watch them salute them as they pass: in the days when war was an art rather than a science, of that stuff the conquerors of the world were made. It is difficult to assess the extent of Arab opposition to Turkish rule, or its nature. Syria was probably most affected. The list .
of
.
.
Arab freedom
societies, civil
and military, under many
titles,
formidable, but most of them had a short life and, as might be expected, rivalry between them was intense. The Turks, by nature suspicious, took them seriously but probably realised that unity could not be counted on. They knew how to deal with that sort of thing. But when unrest was connected with religion or foreign interest the matter became more serious. The high standard of education given by Christian schools and colleges, notably the American College at Beirut, disturbed Turkish hegemony; in Armenia the intense and well-meant efforts of missionaries, and of others whose zeal was equalled only by their inis
BULGARIA
states, weak in themselves and hostile to each other. Obviously their boundaries were not final. They might survive; they might be swallowed by greater powers or greater systems. But their condition was hardly one to encourage the similar self-determination of the various potential states, tribal areas, or provinces of Turkey in Asia. These were even less mature than their Balkan cousins, just as bitter in their rivalry and, potentially, just as determined to rid themselves of their particular 'yoke', light though that might be. They were still more susceptible to the greed of outside powers. But the pressing necessities of war do not make for clear long-term thinking, nor for memories of consistent policies of the past.
Further Reading S., The Eastern Question 1774-1923 (Macmillan, 1966) Antonius, G., The Arab Awakening (London, 1938) Bell, G. L, Syria: The Desert and the Sown (Heinemann, 1907) Eliot, Sir C., Turkey in Europe (F. Cass, 1965) Graves, P., Briton and Turk (Hutchinson, 1940) Kedourie, E., England and the Middle East (London, 1956) Lewis, B., The Emergence of Modern Turkey (Oxford, 1961) Marriott, Sir J., The Eastern Question (OUP, 1940) Seton-Watson, R., Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Eastern Question (F. Cass, 1960)
Anderson, M.
BRIGADIER JOHN STEPHENSON was commissioned in the Indian army in 1 91 of the First World War in Palestine, serving two
and took part in the last months and a half years in that country,
in Syria and later in Iraq. His interest in Middle Eastern affairs, particularly those pertaining to the break-up of the Ottoman Empire, dates from those years. Educated at Christ's Hospital, the Staff College, Camberley, and the RAF Staff College, Andover, he ended his army service in 1948, his last appointment being commander of the 51st Pakistan Brigade at Karachi, then the capital of Pakistan. He became Librarian of the Royal United Service Institution in 1957, and Director in 1961 He resigned in 1968
X
Batum
he
states. Though Russia and Britain had apparently accepted the inevitability of the Baghdad Railway to be built under German control, the question of its southern terminus was likely to cause further trouble. Ibn Saud of central Arabia had also been prominent in the area, and was in alliance with the British. None of these troubles equalled those suffered in Europe, but they indicated areas inflammable in a general conflagration. As the war starts, it is impossible to escape certain reflections. European Turkey, but for the Adrianople enclave, had been irretrievably lost. In its place were a number of raw inexperienced
Gulf
BLACK SEA
Adri anopl<5rdine)|j
vincible ignorance of oriental thought, tended to make the unhappy Armenians a race to be distrusted and terribly punished. Until the late 19th Century the Turks had called them the milleti-sadika, 'the loyal community'. In Palestine Zionism was already causing complications, not made easier by the German connection with it and with other colonising activity. In Mesopotamia there was the problem of the Shiah community, and the increasing British control of certain
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Cavalry Corps
Alexandria^
Planned Turkish Offensives 100
200
300 MILES
and forces in 1914. /Abovecartoon, captioned Turkish troops encounter first Serbian land and sea forces'. Left: Turkish plans
German -LB
2Q0_
4b0 KMS
401
Turkey goose steps towards the abyss
The
old,
decadent, fly-blown Turkey and her
straitjacketed Sultan are borne to war by Young Turks (including Enver Pasha), and
on by German General Liman von Sanders. Tsar Nicholas peers malevolently round the corner. On the left the Balkan
sternly urged
II
League
is
falling apart.
The
rulers of
Monte-
negro, Greece and Bulgaria look up anxiously as their counterparts in Rumania and Serbia are unbalanced by Franz Joseph's seizure of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unattached, Victor Emmanuel III of Italy looks on from Tripoli
402 t
FRENCH & BRITISH
WAR AIMS British and French
war aims were only embryonic
aim was simply
survival, but over
and beyond
in 1914. this the
By September of that year the major French
still
wanted to
liberate
Alsace-Lorraine and, of course, drive the Germans from northern France. For the British the liberation of 'poor little Belgium' was an emotional reaction which embellished the traditional desire to preserve the Low Countries as buffers. However, as the war bogged down at the end of 1914, both began to formulate more specific war aims, aimed partly at making the carnage seem worthwhile, partly at securing American aid. Below left: Front page of a French magazine. The original title read: 'Bad seed, but good manure.' Its violence manifests France's desire to drive the Germans from French soil. Right: British post card, October 1914. Its naivety typifies the diffuseness of British war aims in 1914. D. R. Shermer
404
of the First World War is immediately confronted with a paradox. The German September Programme was a model of clear-cut war aims. In contrast, the British and French had no detailed or
The historian
co-ordinated programme. In one sense the absence of a British or French 'blueprint' is not surprising. Each of these nations had gone to war for ostensibly defensive reasons. Naturally, therefore, the first priority of each was to gain victory over their enemies. More important, at first no one heeded Kitchener's warnings of the long struggle ahead before victory could be achieved. The war, men thought, would be over by Christmas, by Easter at the latest. Not until the end of 1914 did this euphoric view vaporise beneath the carnage of the battlefields. By that time, with early prospects of victory curtailed, the belligerents had time not only to intensify their search for allies, but also to reflect on what they were fighting for — and against.
Moreover, the continuation of the war
and after was itself the most pressing reason for formulating far-reaching war aims. Aims, even spoils, had to be found in order to make the holocaust worthwhile, in order to inspire the soldiers and their kin to carry on. As the war lengthened, it also became increasingly necessary to obtain American financial and material aid. Thus, the character of the Entente powers' aims was influenced by desire to win American approval. In this context the disparity between the September positions of the Germans and the Allies becomes more clear. Since the Germans had won the first campaigns, they planned to keep all or part of their territorial gains. In contrast, the Allies had first to reverse the German verdict of arms before they knew what they would be in a position to demand themselves. Thus the most pressing French aim was to clear northern France of the Reichsheer; that of the British, to free Belgium and to return the Low Countries to their former position of buffers between Britain and Germany. The Russians for their part were fully occupied with seeing how much longer they could survive as a Great Power, and even as a political entity. However, the Russian peasantry had neither the education nor the time to understand complex issues; it was better to speak to them of bearing arms to defend the Tsar and Holy Mother Russia. In France, the Chamber of Deputies had no opportunity to debate specific war aims, for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate were adjourned throughout the autumn of 1914. Once war began, if not overtly before, every Frenchman dreamed of the reunion of Alsace-Lorraine with the homeland, but few other objectives were formulated that year. Not until July 1916 did the French government begin to define into 1915
its war objectives. As autumn gave way to winter, a strong
seriously
current of French opinion felt that the Germans would be at a disadvantage in a long war, owing firstly to the Germans having a smaller pool of manpower than their adversaries, and secondly, to the Allied blockade which would eventually prevent Germany from continuing its war effort. For these reasons, only a small minority of Frenchmen thought of a negotiated peace. War d I'outrance was the rallying cry.
Only on the issue of Alsace-Lorraine was nearly every sector of the populace united. But even on this subject there was room for some divisions; the French
vehemently opposed to war, until the British people were outraged by the German violation of Belgium's neutrality. Yet now that war had begun for a suitably
socialists
(as well as opinion in Great Britain) favoured a plebiscite before the future of Alsace-Lorraine was settled. Most Frenchmen adhered to the somewhat tortuous argument that opinion in those two
righteous cause, these newspapers' Liberal principles forced them to belabour the war's aspect of righteousness in order to avoid the charge of inconsistency. Even though such editors as Scott of the
provinces had already been evidenced by the pro-French patriotism of the AlsaceLorraine deputies in the Reichstag in 1874. The future of the Saar was not seriously debated in the French Senate until the autumn of 1915. The publicist, Maurice Barres, discussed the future of the left bank of the Rhine in articles in L'Echo de Paris in early 1915, but these were discontinued in May under a government ruling forbidding the discussion of future peace terms beyond generalities. In short, the French seemed most preoccupied with bolstering morale at home and at the front and suppressing discussion of a compromise peace by dampening discussion alto-
Manchester Guardian and A. G. Gardiner of the Daily News found war itself the antithesis of liberalism and the epitome of Tory imperialism, the object was now to snatch victory from the vested interests by making war serve a just cause. Therefore instead of putting forward a specific
gether.
Prussian power broken Before his articles were discontinued, Barres had projected a defence zone for France against Germany. The population of the Rhineland should have a choice be-
tween attachment to France and independence in perpetual neutrality, he wrote. But informed opinion on this subject ran far ahead of official caution. According to Barres, President Poincare in August 1914 disavowed all territorial annexations except Alsace-Lorraine. Yet Poincare and his Foreign Minister, Delcasse, were adamant in their wish to break up the
German Empire. On October
13 Delcasse
was asked by the Russian ambassador in Paris, Isvolsky, to state French war aims; the French Foreign Minister, although he stated that one should not count one's chickens before they hatch, said also that Prussian power should be broken and the German Empire destroyed. According to Isvolsky's account, Delcasse did not speculate on the future of the Rhineland. On November 21, Paleologue, the French ambassador to St Petersburg, was received by the Tsar. Their discussion involved the 'necessary' destruction of Austria-Hungary, the Schleswig and Polish questions, and the idea of establishing an independent Hanoverian Kingdom in north-west Germany. Paleologue emphasised that 'without doubt' Delcasse would endorse Paleologue's personal view that 'perhaps' France would want an extension of territory into the Rhineland. In fact, Delcasse remained noncommittal. On receiving Paleologue's despatch of his meeting with the Tsar, he gave no indication of his own views. The French Prime Minister on December 22 spoke before the Chamber of Deputies after it had reassembled. While he spoke of the necessity of victory in order to reestablish 'that right which was outraged' (alluding to Belgium), to regain AlsaceLorraine and to break Prussian military might, the premier did not go beyond these aims. He remained inscrutable. In England, Parliament held its usual autumn session, and discussion about the war proceeded. The press continued to exercise its critical functions despite wartime restrictions. However, the principal newspapers supporting the Liberal government of Asquith had actually been the most
programme, these papers concentrated on moralistic generalities about the rights of small nations. On the surface, such idealism did not fit in handily with the chessboard machinations of statecraft. As early as August 8 Gardiner spoke of fighting, not against the masses of Germany, but to free Germany from the dominance of Prussia. H. G. Wells on August 14 called the conflict 'The War to End War'. Yet in practice the differences between idealists and practical
statesmen became more and more one
of vocabularies. Wells, after all, believed that the war was caused by German militarism, just as Grey was saying in November that, besides the sine qua non of the liberation and restoration of Belgium, peace must prevent either 'continuance or recurrence of an armed brute power in Central Europe'. Victory must 'end mili-
tarism
for ever', he said. Asquith on September 19 had spoken in the same vein.
'To withstand the arrogant claim of a single to dominate the development of the destinies of Europe', as Asquith stated, became the cardinal aim of British foreign
power
policy.
This attitude towards the Germans had important ramifications. If Germans were depicted as brutes -a judgement which many felt confirmed by the sacking of Louvain and the rumours of armless Belgian babies -then they were unfit to govern colonies. It was thought, however, that these areas were incapable of self-government in the foreseeable future. Thus, the idea arose of taking these peoples under he wing of those powers who spoke of the rights of nations and the rule of law. This t
situation also suited the realists nicely, for they saw the chance to rid Britain of the German naval danger and dilute the Ger-
mans' economic power by depriving them of colonial coaling stations, bases, com munications facilities, raw materials and
manpower.
German East Africa was the key to the Cape-to-Cairo route, the dream of the Cecil Rhodes school of empire-builders Moreover, many people believed that German East Africa and South-west Africa were potential bases for attacks on India and South Africa respectively. All these factors led the British dominions to overrun all the German colonies by early 1915 except East Africa. Lewis rlarcourt, the colonial secretary, agreed with Milner and other imperialists that (he war was being fought above all to achieve the security of the British Empire vis-a vis Germapy; the elimination of the German colonies would also contain German} in Europe. Plans were even mooted to defied Germany eastwards. The future of one of the German colo-
nies, the Cameroons, brought out a difference of approach between Harcourt and Grey, the British Foreign Secretary. Grey wanted to make concessions to the French in the Cameroons to help offset their sus-
picion that Britain was collecting the colonial spoils while France was decimated on the Western Front. Harcourt, on the other hand, valued the Cameroons for its im-
pregnable naval and coaling fortress station of Douala. Eventually the Cameroons
were divided between French and
British mandates. These facts show that the object of conquering the German
colonies went far beyond holding them (as some thought as hostages for the liberation of Belgium. Yet there was a qualitative distinction between Allied and German annexation. Klaus Fpstein has pointed out that 'only 1
German annexations threatened plete overthrow of the
the comEuropean balance
and all German annexationist plans were certain to violate the now fashionable principle of nationality'. On the other hand, all the large nations played the game of power politics and the Allies exaggerated the Germans' faults in order to make their own eventual annexations less conspicuous. In the Liberal government's attitudes
>
Newspaper
bill
boards denounce German
aggression. Next day Britain declared war
Despite all this, it is necessary to rethat these Allied ideas were not the products of any concerted Entente policies. A. J. P. Taylor has pointed out that 'There was no serious exchange of ideas between the Entente Powers on war aims during the first winter of the -war. Since they also failed to exchange ideas even on the conduct of the war, this is not surprising.' As Grey admitted to Theodore Roosevelt on December 18, 'We have not yet discussed terms of peace.' It is true that the Pact of London was a formal bond between the British, French, and Russians, but the pact was largely a practical necessity designed to make Britain a contractual ally of the other two powers: previously, while France and Russia were allied to each other, Britain was allied to
member
of power;
neither.
towards Europe, Gladstonian principles made themselves felt. The principle of
No separate peace The immediate origins of the Pact of London lay in the French defeat at Charleroi, August 21-23, followed by Russia's disaster at Tannenberg at the end of that month. Under the impact of these two events, Delcasse-, who was recalled to the Quai d'Orsay on August 27 from retirement and semi-disgrace, telegraphed on the
national self-determination was praised; according to Asquith, it was the only principle which was serious and lasting. There was a certain British sympathy with Russian designs in the Near East, and more with French claims on Alsace-Lorraine. There was much support for an enlarged South Slav State and for Rumanian claims to Transylvania. These principles were also expected to serve realism by winning Rumania and perhaps Bulgaria as allies.
'Poor little Belgium' Towards the end of the year, the French government began to be more specific in its objectives, and placed emphasis upon a precise system of security against German revanchism. Here some differences between the French and British positions emerged. On December 22, Deschanel, the President of the French Chamber of Deputies, for-
mally laid claim to Alsace-Lorraine, and also emphasised that Belgium must be freed. But the French were not as concerned as the British with Belgium; for the British, 'poor little Belgium' was a completely emotional issue. Moreover, the French cared less for national self-determination than the British, and were not averse to the continuance of Austria-
Hungary
in
some form.
Serbia than for care much for either. The French hoped that Russia could be mollified with freedom of the Straits; the British were not so sure. The Russians themselves remained taciturn, for in September the Foreign Minister, Sazonov, contented himself with stating that he favoured 'the destruction of German power and the principle of nationality' (even though too strict an applies ion of the national principle would undoubtedly disrupt Russia's western provinces with their large minorities!). The French were pleased to hear Grand Duke Nicholas's promises in
France cared
Poland;
less
for
Britain did
not
I
an autonomous Poland — which the Russians were already defaulting by December. August scheme
406
of
on
29th to the principal French ambassadors abroad: 'Never more than today has cohesion between the three Allied powers been more necessary.' Delcasse recom-
mended the closest possible co-ordination among Allied ambassadors. By coincidence, Sazonov on August 7 had suggested an agreement to forbid any of the three Entente powers to conclude a separate peace with the enemy, an idea which it was hoped would also influence Italy to enter the war by removing her fears of being abandoned or double-crossed by her partners. Spurred on by the Tannenberg debacle, on September 1 Sazonov proposed that a triple declaration be signed by Britain, France, and Russia. On September 5 the Pact was signed by Paul Cambon, the French ambassador to London, his Russian counterpart Count Benckendorff, and by Sir Edward Grey for Britain. The three governments agreed 'not to conclude peace separately during the present war'; when peace terms would be discussed, 'no one of the Allies will demand terms without the previous agreement of each of the other Allies'. The USA, as an associated power, never signed. The Pact gave Allied morale a powerful and badly needed boost. It helped to allay Russian suspicions that France might make a separate peace on the Western Front in order to gain Alsace-Lorraine without further loss of life. Still, the extent of Allied lack of co-ordination was revealed by the fact that only after the Pact was signed were the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance communicated to the British! Meanwhile, the Allied successes at the
Marne and Lemberg temporarily gave an illusion of complete
On September
and imminent triumph.
13 Sazonov intimated to the British and French ambassadors to St Petersburg that, as far as Russia was concerned, France was free to establish herself in the Rhineland-Palatinate. From the autumn of 1914 onwards, one further influence on the British part of Allied war aims made itself apparent. The
Independent Labour Party, a largely workwhich organisation ing-class socialist adhered closely to the orthodoxy of the Second International on the evils of war, in mid-August issued a manifesto deploring the war and sending sympathy and greetings to the German socialists. The Fabians, an intellectual socialist movement led by the Webbs, dissented from these views and expressed ideas on the war that coincided in many ways with those of the Liberals. The Parliamentary Labour Party supported both the war and the recruitment of soldiers for it. The party leader, MacDonald, was replaced by Arthur Henderson when he dissented. From September to November the idea of a ginger group for radical ideas on the war gained ground. In November a society called the Union of Democratic Control
was formed from an alliance of certain Liberals and Independent Labour Party Members. The UDC called for the prinof self-determination to be freely applied; for the ratification of all treaties by Parliament; for the abandonment of the Balance of Power Concept for a concert which would establish an international machinery for guaranteeing peace; and for the drastic reduction of armaments and the nationalisation of arms manufacturing in order to break the power of the 'merchants of death', as they called arms manufacturers. The expected democratic control of foreign policy to lead to the implementation of policy by the force of world public opinion. Above all, the society pressured for a just and moderate peace. ciple
UDC
The UDC, however, although an important Above: Arthur Henderson, new Secretary to the Labour Party. Below left, left to right: Count Benckendorff (Russian Ambassador in London) Sir Edward Grey (British Foreign Secretary), Paul Cambon (French Ambassador in London). All signed the Pact of London, September 1914, agreeing not to conclude peace separately'. Below: Asquith — 'national self-determination'
influence in later years, inflamed public opinion in the winter of 1914-15 with its proposals to such an extent that many considered its acts treasonable. The people had not yet suffered sufficiently to be receptive to its ideas.
may
be seen that British and French in 1914 were, in their different ways, half-formed and at best tentative. Neither nation was united behind a specificprogramme such as Bethmann-Hollweg's September demands. As Balfour told the It
war aims
House
of
Commons
at a later date:
'We
entered this War with little in our minds besides the necessity of defending Belgium and of preventing France from being crushed before our eyes.' He spoke the truth. Yet in relation to the Allies' war aims, it is well to bear in mind Cromwell's dictum: 'no man goes farther than lie who knows not where he is going."
Further Reading
Hanak, H., The Union of Democratic Control during the First World War (Institute of Historical Research Bulletin, 1966) Louis, W. R., Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-19 (Oxford University Press, 1967)
Pingaud,
A., Historie diplomatique de la France pendant la grande guerre (Paris) Taylor, A. J. P., The War Aims of the Allies the First World War in Essays Presented Sir Lewis Namier (Macmillan, 1956)
D.
R
SHERMER
campus
is
a lecturer University
in
history at the
in
to
London
Maryland and is principal of the Overseas School of London, Hampstead. He took his master's degree at the London School of Economics under D C Watt and gained a mark of distinction of
the
of
•107
GERMANY'S
WAR AIMS I
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Germany's leaders took seriously the first line of the German national anthem Deutschland, Deutschland ilber alles: indeed, they had developed precise aims for making Germany a 'Supreme Power'. German Weltpolitik, as manifested in the September Programme, was the political expression of the pervasive feeling that she had a right to find adequate territorial expression for her bursting energy. Unfortunately, the analogy to a coach with horses harnessed in opposite directions is only too apt: the policy of Mitteleuropa necessarily involved Germany in a war on two fronts, Bismarck's perennial fear, and those who favoured peace on the Eastern Front so as to permit concentration on the Western Front were never influential enough to effect changes in German policy. The grandiose colonial counterpart of Mitteleuropa was Mittelafrika: if both major aims had been pursued to a successful conclusion, Germany would have attained a power status superior to that of 'the whale' (Britain) and 'the bear' (Russia). However, with stalemate in the west and indecisive victories in the east, the reality of the war situation at the end of 1914 made Germany's war aims look awry. Below: The Kaiser and Crown Prince Wilhelm (wearing the bearskin of the Death's Head Hussars) reviewing troops bound for the Western Front. Imanuel Geiss
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When Genera] von Falkenhayn, Moltke's successor as German Chief-of-Staff after the Battle of the Maine, threw his hastily formed now arm> corps into the Battle of* Ypres, the regiments, consisting mainly of university students, are said to have stormed across the fog-bound battlefield to death at the hands o( British machine gunners, while singing Deittschland, Deutschland tiber alles. Whether true or not. this patriotic Legend about the students of Langemark still persists. The raw troops, sacrificing themselves for the greater glory of the German Reich, could hardly have imagined that their political and military leaders were taking the first line of their death song literally. It is true that German students could read in their history text-books that the Reich was on
way
to becoming a World Power or, for matter, already was one, for their Kaiser had boasted so for almost two decades. But most students, like the average German of prewar days, had probably no more than the haziest idea what that actually meant. While the students, blinded by nebulous patriotism, willingly gave their lives in the service of their beloved Fatherland, the men at the top of the Reich had developed precise aims for its
that
German supremacy.
War was the logical German Weltpolitik — the Ger-
Since the First World
outcome of
version of imperialism around 1900 — any attempt at assessing German war aims in the first few months of the war must go back to a short analysis of German Welt-
man
410
Germany
German
historians ever since)
from the status of an ordinary continental power to that of a world power, and indeed equal in prestige to the British Empire.
decided,
and
politik. Its
An
main aim was
to raise
excess of energy
German pression
German
Weltpolitik was the political exof a new sentiment pervading society, the feeling that Germany
was bursting with new energy and had a right to find adequate outlets for it. This excess of energy was the result of three
developments in Germany. The founding of the German Reich in 1871 after three short and easy wars between 1864 and 1871; the growing economic power of the new Reich due to rapid industrialisation; and the sharp rise of the German population due to industrialisation. Those three factors and the ideology of the Reich as the supreme symbol of Ger-
man
unity
and
power,
made German
Weltpolitik almost inevitable. It was not just the whims of the eccentric Kaiser or of a few cringing court politicians, for it
found enthusiastic support throughout a society which sought a higher political status in keeping with their increased economic power and their increasing military power. Yet right from the start of Weltpolitik until the First World War there were certain basic issues that the Germans had never clearly resolved. This uncertainty helps to explain the way German war aims sprang up and developed during the war. Firstly, was prewar Germany already a world power or not? German society (and
seemed un-
this in itself produced a dangerous instability. Secondly, how was the status of world power to be achieved or
consolidated so that there was no doubt about Germany's status? Was Germany to rely on her own strength, or to act as junior partner to one or other of the established world powers? On the whole, Germany strove to become a world power in her own right without the help of others. An alliance with Britain or Russia — whale and bear, to use a cliche of the time — was possible only in theory, because in practice it was ruled out by the social and political structure of the Reich. The landed gentry, in particular those in Prussia east of the Elbe, were interested in high agrarian tariffs to keep out cheaper Russian and American grain. Their bread and butter interests clashed with their traditional pro-Russian sympathies, because Tsarist Russia was one of the last strongholds of autocratic conservatism. Similarly, the economic interests of industry, commerce and later of shipping blocked an under-
standing with Britain. German statecraft never managed to coordinate the divergent forces which pulled the Reich in opposite directions. This inability proved to be fatal when Germany entered the period of imperialism by inaugurating Weltpolitik. Because she was unable to lay down priorities or to coordinate her tremendous forces properly,
Germany tried to expand in all directions at the same time, by peaceful means be-
and by military conquest and various war aims once war had broken out. This also explains why Germany never succeeded in concentrating her forces on one front after peaceful means towards Weltpolitik failed. Thus, the proud German Reich can best be likened to a coach with horses harnessed in opposite directions, or, less charitably, to the famous two asses bound together and faced with two bundles of hay in opposite directions. fore the war,
Grandiose dreams of Mittelafrika acquired Germany Ironically,
more
colonial territory before the period of Weltpolitik than after 1900, when the political effects of Weltpolitik and the building of the German battle fleet made themselves felt. Apart from a narrow strip in
the Cameroons, Germany made no more gains in the 20th Century. German colonies became almost self-supporting after the reforms of Dernburg, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and one, German South West Africa, even began to prosper after the discovery of large diamond fields in 1907. However, German public opinion
became dissatisfied with German possessions. The German colonies in Africa, disconnected as they were, reminded German colonial enthusiasts of grandiose dreams for a consolidated block of
German
colonies in the centre of Africa — Mittelafrika. Germany strove to finish what had to be left undone in the 1880s, to connect German possessions in West and South West Africa with those in East Africa by trying to gain
a foothold in the Belgian Congo and to acquire the Portuguese colonies one way or another. Mittelafrika as a colonial war aim can be seen, if only indirectly and obliquely, in the last days of July 1914, and triumphantly re-emerged during the it war itself as one of the most consistent German war aims. Another direction of German prewar expansion was the Middle East, where the Reich cultivated friendship with the Otto-
man Empire by penetrating Turkey economically, by the Baghdad Railway and by a strong military mission. Turkey, as part of a generously defined Mitteleuropa, became one of the favourite German war aims of the First World War. One of the most persistent grievances of Germans in the period of Weltpolitik was that their territorial basis on the European continent was too narrow. Consequently they attempted to broaden it, either directly by annexation or indirectly by means of economic penetration. This then is the sum of German war aims. It is very difficult, however, to isolate schemes for achieving these war aims at least as far as the government is concerned, because documentary evidence is largely missing. As Sir Eyre Crowe shrewdly put it
in his
famous memorandum of January
'Ambitious designs against one's neighbours are not as a rule openly proclaimed', and prewar Germany was no 1907:
exception.
The lack
of official
German
from the prewar period on future war aims is easily explained. If
documents
problems of foreign policy were never discussed in Wilhelmine Germany in constitutional bodies, which would have left adequate documentary sources at least for the historian, it is not to be expected that the problem of expansion on the Con-
basic
was discussed either. Even if there had been talks at the top of the Reich it is unlikely that anything would have been committed to paper. It is much more likely that such talks were hushed up and treated as top secret, because the knowledge of such ideas in peacetime would have been even more damaging to the Reich than they were in wartime, when, again, all discussion of war aims at government level was kept strictly secret. Yet it is inconceivable and would run counter to all historical and political extinent
perience that leading
Germans should
have given thought, at
the consequences of their persistent demand to make Germany a world power. The widely held idea that Germany's frontiers were too disadvantageous implied the intention to do something about them once the opportunity presented itself. A recent study of the German press between 1911 and 1914 brought out that at least the Pan-Germans and their allies saw and accepted that consequence. They either only hinted at the need to annex territories after 'the next war', to quote General Bernhardi's famous book Deutschland und der nachste Krieg, or they openly said that annexations would be necessary, but that it would be inopportune to go into
Mitteleuropa and Mittelafrika: hidden cards in Germany's bid for 'World Power' status Below
to right: Prince von Bulow (German Chancellor till Wilhelm's trust in 1909), Mathias Erzberger (Catholic politician with 'wild annexationist ideas'), Berchtold (AustroHungarian Foreign Minister) shaking hands with Bethmann-Hollweg (German Chancellor and author of the September Programme), Admiral von Tirpitz (he favoured a separate peace in the east). Below: King Ludwig III of Bavaria reviewing troops on the Western Front
he
not
least privately, to
left, left
lost
\
It
...:
t
**A
details now. A tow writers even ventured into the open before the war and their suggestions bore a striking similarity to plans formulated in government circles
war had broken out. As for the government and the Kaiser, we have only fragmentary evidence for the time before the war. but masses of evidence for the war period itself. Even the meagre prewar evidence suggests that the government and the Kaiser were affected after
expansionist ideas in German — and how could it have been otherwise? What we know about that time
by
the
society
fits both into the pattern of prewar publications and of actual plans during the war. As early as 1892 the Kaiser confided to his
quiet until the final phase of the crisis of July 1914. It is only then that indirect evidence of German desires to annex neighbouring territories in the west became apparent. In the German ultimatum to Belgium, which was drafted not by the Foreign Ministry, but by the German Chief-of-Staff, Moltke, on July 26, the Ger-
a plan of direct annexations and more subtle forms of indirect rule in the West as well. Once war had broken out, the Kaiser protested the innocence of German intentions by proclaiming that Germany 'was not driven by the lust of conquest', as, by the way, Crowe had predicted in his famous memorandum more than seven years
man government
earlier.
'offered' to respect Bel-
The Kaiser has been echoed ever
gian territorial integrity after the war, but on condition that German troops were allowed to march through without meeting any resistance. This meant that Germany would feel free to annex Belgian territory, if Belgium were to demand her neutrality effectively against the German invasion. Similarly, Chancellor Bethmann-Holl-
German propagandists and, until a few years ago, by practically all German historians in their almost uncritical apologia. Such protestations seemed roughly plausible only as long as official German war aims were not too well known. Of course the Reich and its leading political classes were not 'driven by the lust of con-
promised the British government to refrain from annexations of French and Belgian territory in Europe if Britain were to remain neutral in the
quest' but conquest by war had a pretty important place in their political thinking and their ambitions for Germany. Since the early 1960's German war aims have become sufficiently well known, in particular through the studies of Professor Fritz Fischer and his students, to dismiss the German protestations as sheer official
since by
Above: General von Falkenhayn: he favoured a separate peace with Russia. Right: One German war aim; peace and plenty-for Germans. Below: A German cartoon — the Tsar tells Franz Josef that his motive for attacking Austria is to rid himself of dissident elements
friend and adviser Eulenburg his dream of Germany's 'Napoleonic supremacy' albeit 'in the peaceful sense'. His peaceful dream included, nevertheless, a war against Russia, after which the Poles, 'liberated from the Russian yoke' by the Germans, would a; the Kaiser to annex them. Some 15 yt 'a later Bethmannv of State for the Hollweg, then Secre, suggested similar Interior, seems to haN horror of Chanideas to the Kaiser, to claims in his cellor Biilow, as the lai close
,
s
important is postwar memories. What cropped up that the same kind of idt very soon within the German governm.
World War hao Western Europe, everything
after the First for
412
As emained
arted.
weg, on July
29,
coming war. The Chancellor refused to clude Belgian and French colonies
in-
in
Africa in his promise, thus continuing Germany's prewar drive for more colonies. The Chancellor's move not only gave away Germany's definite intention to go to war and to violate Belgian neutrality, but also to have a free hand in the West, if Britain were to join the war against Germany. One might dismiss such indirect evidence as irrelevant if the German government had not followed up the threats implied in their 'offer' to Belgium and Britain by devising
propaganda. From then on it has not been possible to take the German protestations of innocence seriously, particularly as they are not consistent with the fantastic outburst of annexationist sentiment and propaganda inside and outside the govern-
ment after the war had started. It is not enough to play down that phenomenon as a regrettable
but
psychologically
under-
standable reaction to the stress of war, because, as has been shown earlier, the climate for 'annexationist fever' had been prepared well before the war. The only rational explanation can be found in the strong will for expansion and more power,
which propelled German society on its disastrous course. This strong will was restrained in times of peace only by the fear of giving away secret ambitions too early. Once that tactical inhibition had been removed by war and by the prospect of early victory, the dam burst and let loose a flood of annexationist plans, which increased with the likelihood of German victory. In victoria Veritas. On August 11, 1914, the Kaiser, now in a different mood, swore to his Imperial Guards, when they left Berlin for the front, that he would not sheathe his sword until
he could dictate peace. In a similar vein the Bavarian King made the same promise. Their most devoted political servants in the Reichstag, the Conservatives, did their best to prevent the only element in Germany that was at least theoretically antiannexations from stating their case in public. When, in the first days of August, the Social Democrats wanted to include in their formal endorsement of the government's policy the warning that they would resist any attempt to convert the defensive war into a German war of conquest, the spokesman for the Conservative Party, Count Westarp, forced them to withdraw this clause. Otherwise, Westarp threatened, the Conservatives would reject the Social Democrats' statement in the plenary session of the Reichstag at the risk of provoking an open debate on one of the most delicate points of German policy on the very day when the need for national unity was to be proclaimed. The Social Democrats, as usual, gave in. The government, in particular, was very interested in preventing a public debate on German war
aims when war had barely started, again
They apparently knew too well, and had no about the demands that would
for tactical reasons.
German sentiments illusions
come to the
fore.
Furthermore, they feared that public demands for far-reaching war aims would commit the government one way or another, in either case with dire consequences. If they came out against expansionist war aims, they would not only act against their inner wishes, but would also alienate the traditional supporters of an expansionist policy at home and abroad. If they came out in favour of expansionist war aims in public, they also feared a bad impression at home and abroad. The German working class, essential for waging any modern war, might rebel. On the other hand, the peoples of the Entente Powers would be even more determined in their resistance, and the neutral states would be unfavourably impressed.
printed 'privately' and spread amongst national groups and government circles, might have a considerable circulation. After the outbreak of war the Pan-Germans, a comparatively small, but closelyknit and influential group, were the first to fill the vacuum created by the government's ban on public discussion of war aims. On August 28 their Executive Committee held its first wartime session to lay down their plans for the period after victory, which, a week before the Battle of the Marne, seemed to be just around the corner. A few days later the Pan-German League circulated their views in a 'primemorandum to the vately printed' limited audience of people in the know that was so typical of politics in Germany during the first half of the war. The PanGerman overall aim was the creation of Mitteleuropa, comprising at that time no
more than Germany and Austria-Hungary, but 'inclusive of those areas to be acquired by the German Reich and Austria-Hungary'. Heinrich Class, the leader of the Pan-Germans, added cheerfully: 'The Netherlands and Switzerland, the three Scandinavian states and Finland, Italy, Rumania and Bulgaria will attach themselves to this nucleus gradually and of compulsive necessity, without need of the least pressure from the nucleus states. If one includes the dependencies and colonies of these states, the result will be a vast economic unit capable of asserting and maintaining its independence against any other in the world.'
'A land-bridge to the Caucasus' The Pan-Germans also explained what they understood by 'areas to be acquired' by Germany: Belgium in some kind of indirect rule; the area of Longwy-Briey in northern Lorraine, rich in iron-ore, plus the French Channel coast as far as the Somme and French border areas from Belfort to Verdun, including those two fortresses. In the East the Pan-Germans demanded the annexation of a broad belt of Polish territory along the German border, Lithuania and the Baltic provinces. Russia was to be reduced to her territorial status of the late 17th Century before Peter the Great. The Pan-Germans claimed that their demand for Mitteleuropa was not only 'absolutely imperative' but also 'widely accepted as such' presumably by the German public. And how right they were, because Mitteleuropa struck a note with the Germans comparable only to the mystical idea of the Reich, and in fact Mitteleuropa served as a kind of substitute for the old Mediaeval Roman Empire, which had been run by Germans. With their desire for annexations, the Pan-Germans found themselves more and in the mainstream of German polithought. Representatives of heavy industry, a potent political factor indeed, took up Pan-German ideas, and some went even further, such as Hugo Stinnes and August Thyssen. Since many heavy industry owners were notoriously close to the Pan-Germans, they served to increase the power of the extreme right in the debate on war aims.
more
Pent-up expansionist energies Since the German government had not sufficient trust in the intellectual and polithe German public, they imposed, in August 1914, a formal ban on any publications discussing peace terms and war aims in other than vague and general terms. This is why the pent-up expansionist energies in German society could only emerge rather furtively and in semi-public memoranda and meetings. Nevertheless, some of the memoranda, tical self-discipline of
tical
Yet industrialists also found
more
allies
respectable political groups. Catholic steel magnate, Thyssen,
in
The had
secured the assistance of Matthias Erzberger, a member of the Catholic Centre Party and one of the most active members of the Reichstag. Erzberger, a political busybody at that point in his career, set out his dreams for German expansion in a memorandum to the Chancellor. These were even more startling than those of the
Pan-Germans, perhaps because he added to the list of desiderata the creation of a 'liberated' Polish kingdom under German
hegemony, while Austria- Hungary was to be given the Ukraine, Rumania and Bessarabia. Erzberger modestly called his sweeping scheme 'the minimum which all sections of the German people should demand on the conclusion of peace'. That Erzberger's wild ideas were not the maximum is revealed by Thyssen's own war aims. He admitted himself that the main targets of his claims were the iron ore deposits in northern France and southern Russia. In the East he attained Alexandrian dimensions (which even Ludendorff caught up with only in May 1918), pleading for a land-bridge, dominated by Germany, across Russia and the Ukraine to the Caucasus. Outside and, indeed, inside German government circles the annexationist fever seemed to run so high in the first weeks of the war that one Minister, the Secretary of State for Colonies, Solf, thought it wise and necessary to divert general attention from the European continent to Africa. When asked by the Secretary of State at the Foreign Ministry, Jagow, to submit a memorandum on desirable colonial war aims, Solf proceeded from the assumption that, although victory over France was imminent, there would be no substantial annexations in Western Europe. As a kind of ersatz (substitute) Solf painted the emergence of Mittelafrika in the most glowing colours. Mittelafrika would be set up in three successive stages: annexation of Angola and northern Mozambique (although Portugal at that time was still neutral); of the French and Belgian Congo, plus Dahomey and parts of the Western Sudan as far as Timbuctu; and once Britain was conquered, the whole of Nigeria would be added to round off Mittelafrika. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg accepted the gist of the scheme yet continued to hope for annexations in Europe as well. For him Mittelafrika was apparently nothing more than the colonial
complement to Mitteleuropa. The government's war aims on the European continent developed with such ominous speed once war had broken out that it seems most unlikely that all those ideas should have arisen just from the excitement of war. Two days after the
Chancellor's oblique hints to the British possible German about annexations in France and Belgium, the Kaiser told the Prusso-Polish magnate and courtier Count Hutten-Czapski that he thought of restoring a liberated Polish kingdom with close relations to Germany once Russia was defeated. In early August, in fact, German troops in Poland did spread proclamations of the liberation of Poland, and this object remained one of the favourite slogans of German propaganda during the war. On August 6 the Chancellor first formulated the programme of reducing Russia to
government
its
ing
pre-Petrine territorial status when laydown instructions for fostering open
413
revolt
in
Finland against
On August
Russian
rule.
the idea of setting up the Ukraine as a buffer state was formulated by the Chancellor in an instruction to the German ambassador in Vienna. In the evening of August L'l the Chancellor and his entourage discussed the Polish question in the Army General Headquarters at Koblenz, probably in the way outlined above. What is more important, on the same occasion the proposals for Mitteleuropa, the central point of Bethmann-Hollweg's Sep11
tember Programme, were mentioned for the first time in the sources. There was talk 'Greater Germany' Gross-Deutschland), with Belgium. Holland and Poland as protected states (Schutzstaaten) in a narrow sense, and Austria in a wider sense. On September 9, 1914, at the height of the Battle of the Marne, the Chancellor formu-
o\
<
lated his so-called 'September
Programme',
which was found and first published about a decade ago by Professor Fritz Fischer. It was a provisional formulation of German war aims in the hour of expected victory over France. It has become such a key
document for understanding German war aims in the First World War that it seems justified to quote its most important passages in full. The Chancellor, in an opening paragraph, described
it
to the
Vice-Chan-
Delbriik, as 'provisional notes on the direction of our policy on the conclusion of peace' and he continued: cellor,
The September Programme The general aim of
war
is
to
any militarily important ports, must place her oast at our disposal in military respects, must become economi-
occupy
cally a solution,
German which
province. Given such a the advantages of
offers
annexation without its inescapable domestic disadvantages, French Flanders with Dunkirk, Calais, and Boulogne, where
political
414
Zollverband) through common customs treaties, to include France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Austria-Hungary, Poland
and perhaps
Italy,
Sweden and Norway.
This association will not have any common constitutional supreme authority and all its members will be formally equal, but in practice will be under German leadership
and must
stabilise Germany's economic dominance over Mitteleuropa. • The question of colonial acquisitions, where the first aim is the creation of a con-
tinuous central African (Mittelafrikanisches Kolonialreich) colonial empire, will be considered later, as will that of the aims to be realised vis-a-vis Russia. • Short provisional formula suitable for a possible preliminary peace to be found for a basis for the economic agreements to be concluded with France and Belgium. • Holland. It will have to be considered by
what means and methods Holland can be brought into closer relationship with the German Empire. In view of the Dutch character,
achieve security for the German Reich in west and cast for all imaginable time. For this purpose France must be so weakened as to make her revival as a great power impossible for all time. Russia must be thrust back as far as possible from Germany's eastern frontier and her domination over the non-Russian vassal peoples broken. As specific war aims, the following items appeared: • France. The military to decide whether we should demand cession of Belfort and western slopes of the Vosges, razing of fortresses and cession of coastal strip from Dunkirk to Boulogne. The ore fie Id of Briery, which is necessary for the supply of ore for our industry, to be ceded in any case. Further, a war indemnity, to be paid in instalments; it must be high enough to prevent France from spending any considerable sum on armaments in the next 15-20 years. Furthermore: a commercial treaty which makes France economically dependent on Germany, secures the French market for our exports and makes it possible to exclude British commerce from France. This treaty must secure for us financial and industrial freedom in France in such fashion the German enterprises can no longer receive different treatment from French. • Belgium. Liege and Verviers to be attached to Prussia. Question whether Antwerp, with a corridor to Liege, should also be annexed remains open. At any rate Belgium, even if allowed to continue to exist as a state, must be reduced to a vassal state, must allow us to the
most of the population is Flemish, can without danger be attached to this unaltered Belgium. The competent military quarters will have to judge the military value of this position against England. • Luxembourg. Will become a German federal state and will receive a strip of the present Belgian province of Luxembourg and perhaps the corner of Longwy. • We must create a central European economic association (Mitteleuropaische
this closer relationship
must
leave
them
free of any feeling of compulsion, must alter nothing in the Dutch way of life, and
must also subject them to no new military obligations. Holland, then, must be left independent in externals, but be made internally dependent on us. Possibly one might consider an offensive and defensive alliance to cover the colonies; in any case a close customs association, perhaps the cession of Antwerp to Holland in return for a German garrison in the fortress of Antwerp and at the mouth of the Scheldt. Mitteleuropa was hardly more than a veil German hegemony and a kind of umbrella for all the specific annexations and systems of indirect rule by economic and political means. A new source, the Riezler Diary, confirms that leading statesmen in Germany were perfectly aware of that function of Mitteleuropa. For Riezler and Bethmann-Hollweg it was a more sophisticated and effective way of establishing German domination than by crude direct annexations. Belgium and Poland were to be made satellite states and to be Germanised afterwards. A comparison with the Pan-German programme is instructive, because it reveals that there were only differences of priorities, methods and stress, but not of kind. The September Programme may be considered as a kind of blueprint for German war aims in 1914. It was not, however, a blueprint in the sense that it was a rigid programme that was constantly consulted and referred to. In fact, it was never referred to again after October 1914, but a closer analysis of later war aims programmes makes it clear that they were not too far from the September Programme. Apparently, it formulated ideas which were prevalent more or less during the whole war, with variations according to the military and political situation. The war had reached a turning point in the middle of November 1914, which made for
a fresh look at German war aims necessary. The offensive against France had, after the setback at the Marne, definitely failed,
while the situation in the East re-
mained precarious because of Austrian defeats. The German war plan first to crush France and then Russia had plainly gone sour. In this situation it was Tir-
who suggested a new strategy of separate peace with Russia in order to throw Germany's military weight against France and Britain. Falkenhayn took up the suggestion and elaborated it in a long conpitz
versation with the Chancellor on November 18. Bethmann-Hollweg agreed and passed on to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin a detailed report, in which he also gave an unequivocal definition of the aims he hoped to achieve by a separate peace with Russia: Then we could, if we thought it right, even reject any peace offer that might come from France, and if the fortune of arms favoured us, so force France to her knees that she had to accept any peace that we liked, and at the
same
time, if the
navy
lives
up
to its
promises, also impose our will on England. Thus, for the price of having our relations with Russia remain essentially what they were before the war, we would create what conditions we liked in the west. At the same time, this would end the Triple Entente.
Grandiose dreams After the failure of speedy total war on both fronts, the Chancellor was apparently willing to conclude a compromise peace in the East in order to gain total victory in the West. Zimmermann, the Under Secretary of State in the Foreign Ministry, however, opposed such a course. He still clung to the concept of total victory on the fronts. Zimmermann's opposition was typical of that of party politicians and spokesmen of vested interest who interpreted any partial compromise as a betrayal. Perhaps also to salvage as much as possible from one grandiose dream in the East, the Chanexperts to work out in cellor instructed detail what minimum demands should amount to in case of a separate peace treaty with Russia. Both civilians and military experts were asked, including Ludendorff
who was
Chief-of-Staff to
Hindenburg
in
the East, during the Chancellor's visit to Hindenburg's headquarters at Posen. The overall result of the enquiries was the advice to annex Polish territory along the lines suggested by the Pan-Germans. It was only in 1915 that the answer to the enquiries from the government crystallised into official policies.
The year 1914 thus closed with all the military plans of Germany and her allies awry, while the political leadership had not sufficiently adjusted to the new situation. The result was that a separate peace could not be achieved on either front. At the same time Mitteleuropa, the supreme German war aim, began to take shape. Further Reading Fischer, Fritz, Germany's Aims in the First World War (Chatto, 1967) Gatzke, H. W., Germany's Drive to the West (Oxford University Press, 1967) Geiss, I., Der polnischen Grenzstreifen 1914-18 (Llibeck, Hamburg, 1960) Krieger, L, The Responsibility of Power. Chapter on Bethmann-Hollweg and the War by Fritz Stern (New York, 1968)
[For Imanuel Geiss's biography, see page 68.}
THE CRUISE OF THE Leaving Vice-Admiral von Spee's East Asiatic Squadron early on the morning of August 13, 1914 the German cruiser Emden, accompanied by her collier Markomannia, set course for the Indian Ocean, then virtually a British lake. During the next three months she cruised 30,000 miles, sank or captured 23 merchant ships, disposed of a cruiser and a destroyer, inflicted £15 million worth of damage and occupied the attention of a combined Allied naval search force involving at one time or another nearly 80 vessels. Not surprisingly, she and her captain rapidly became a living legend in Germany, where she was seen as the epitome of German superiority. In Britain her captain's chivalry, daring and humanity were applauded by the public as romantic examples of what they thought war should be like. A formidable ship in her own class, the Emden was outclassed by the Australian cruiser Sydney, and her adventure ended in 'grim and bloody tragedy'. Below: SMS Emden; soon she added an oval fourth funnel in simulation of HMS Yarmouth. Lionel Fanthorpe
On
the afternoon of August 12, 1914, ViceAdmiral Maximilian von Spee, commander of Germany's East Asiatic Squadron, gathered his five senior captains around the chart table of his flagship, SMS Scharnhorst, anchored off Pagan Island. During their discussion it became clear that Spee
favoured a 'fleet-in-being' policy. This entailed keeping the Squadron united and its whereabouts a secret — a sinister, tenebrous but formidable threat. Like a chess player, Spee calculated that a threat was often more effective than its implementation.
He
also envisaged a
and operations against the America. The Indian
move eastwards Pacific coast of
Ocean — tempting hunting
the German Squadron — was virtually a British lake in the summer of 1914. and coaling problems made it impracticable for Spee's vessels to enter it. The 11,420-ton Scharnhorst and her sister ship, the armoured cruiser SMS Gneisenau, each used 93 tons of coal a day at an average speed of 10 knots; at an action speed of 20 knots consumption rose to 375 tons a day. Without ports and agents coal would be unobtainable. Captains Maerker of the Gneisenau, Schonberg of the light cruiser SMS Niirnberg (3,400 tons) and Thiereken of the auxiliary cruiser SMS Prinz Eitel Friedrich agreed with Spee. Captain Schultz of the Scharnhorst agreed in principle with a move east but suggested a preliminary squadron raid on an enemy port. Captain Karl von Miiller of the light cruiser SMS Emden disagreed. He argued in favour of activity in the Indian Ocean. Coal supplies were impossible for the entire squadron or the heavy armoured cruisers, but not for
ground
for
and his uncle, Rudolf von had led an early German nationalist movement. Miiller was quiet, withdrawn, lonely and conscientious. Trained on SMS Stosch and Gneisenau, he had been signal officer on SMS Moltke and officer of the guard on the cruiser SMS Gefion. He had also served aboard SMS Schwalbe and the torpedo school ship ily
tradition
Bennigsen,
SMS
Blucher. After a day and a half's cruising from Pagan, the Emden was unable to establish contact with the German radio station at Yap, north-east of the Palau Islands, and sent a cutter to investigate. Herr Schmidt in charge of the Jaluit Trading Company on the island showed the shore party the wreckage of the radio installation — shelled by three British cruisers: Hampshire,
steamed for Bali. While they cruised slowly and waited for darkness to cover their passage through Lombok Strait, Miicke (Muller's second in command) had an ingenious idea for disguising the Emden. Her three funnels were the trademark of a German light cruiser. British light cruisers had four. Miicke knew that the British Yarmouth had three round and one oval, and he produced a very fair simulation of this style. With her false stack in position, Emden passed through the Sunda Straits off Batavia, between the Indian Ocean and the Java Sea. From time to time Miiller intercepted heavy wireless traffic among Allied warships searching for German raiders. One shore station even asked, 'Emden, where are you?'
HMS
Yarmouth and Minotaur. The Emden's next objective was Angaur Island in the
Narrow escape On September 3 Emden was
Palau group, leased by a German phosphate company. Here a hoped-for rendezvous with the collier Choising failed to materialise but the Emden encountered
Simalur Island
Prinzessin Alice instead. When war was declared she had been carrying 4,000,000 dollars in gold for the Indian government, but she had promptly changed course and delivered it to the German Consul in the Philippines. Miiller took on extra men from this vessel and Markomannia. He put a letter to his mother aboard Prinzessin Alice, which was then directed to Cebu, a neutral port in the Philippines.
A
floating coffin
came within enough
approaching
Sumatra when she of the Hampshire — big
off
sight
blow her to pieces at long range. Despite this narrow escape, Miiller carried out his coaling and had succeeded in loading nearly 1,000 tons aboard before he was interrupted by a Dutch government yacht. During the coaling two spare five-pounder guns had been transferred from Markomannia 's storage lockers to Emden's wardroom. At 1100 hours on September 8, Emden encountered the 4,094-ton Greek steamer Pontoporos commanded by Captain D. Polemis and carrying 6,500 tons of coal from Calcutta. Miiller gave careful thought to
The Emden now steamed towards the
to their legal position. Technically the ship
was neutral but the cargo was contraband.
one light cruiser, which could, in an emergency, coal at sea. Captain Fieltiz, Spee's Chief-of-Staff, agreed with Muller's arguments that British naval strength would be diverted to Europe if there were no active German warships elsewhere. Miiller returned to the Emden to await
Moluccas with the idea of entering the Indian Ocean via Mindanao and the Dutch East Indies. On the night of August 20 Miiller was attempting to contact Tsingtao in the German colony of Kiaochow, the Emden's last home port, when he received a radio message from the old German light cruiser SMS Geier. During the British bombardment of Yap, Korvettenkapitan Grasshof had hidden Geier and her collier
Spee's decision.
Bochum
Coaling was
still in progress aboard the a cutter arrived with a message from the Vice-Admiral. Miiller was granted permission to detach his ship and operate as an independent unit. At 1730 hours on August 12 the Squadron steamed almost due east from Pagan, warships to port, Scharnhorst leading, merchantmen and auxiliaries to starboard led by Prinz Eitel Friedrich. Early next morning Emden detached and, accompanied by her collier, Markomannia, headed SSW at 12 knots along the eastern side of the Marianas. The Emden carried ten 10-5-cm rapid fire guns and two torpedo tubes. She was 395 feet long by 43i feet wide and her bow projected further at the waterline than at deck level. Her twin steam engines could propel her 3,650 tons at a top speed of 24-5 knots, and cruising economically she could cover 6.000 miles.
Emden when
The Emden 's 10'5-cm (4* 13-in) guns were 40 calibre ones (that is to say the barrel length was 40 times th barrel diameter). This gave them a high uzzle velocity of 2,835 feet per second, a. I, with a shell weighing 30-86 pounds an a rate of fire of eight rounds per minutt made her a formidable ship in her own c ss. ere young, Most of the Emden s men enthusiastic, dedicated and efh ient. Korvettenkapitan Karl von Miiller, corn June 16, 1873, had a long Prussian milit ry fam.
416
in a cove.
On August
met him and advised him Honolulu
to take the ship
to be interned. too old, too lightly armed to
21, Miiller
The Geier was and with her
maximum
speed of 12 knots too slow to be anything but a floating coffin in action. The Emden steamed on again. On August 22 she crossed the equator, and on August 23 she established radio contact with the German steamer Tannenfels and arranged a rendezvous with her at Timor to replenish coal and food. Emden and Markomannia reached the rendezvous and waited half a day on August 25 for Tannenfels, which did not appear. In desperation Miiller took 470 tons of coal from Markomannia, seriously depleting her reserves. While coaling was in progress a small party went ashore for fodder for livestock kept aboard the Emden as a dietary sup-
plement. A machine gun guard accompanied the party because of stories of Timor's head-hunters, but there were no incidents. Shortly afterwards the Dutch battleship Tromp arrived and prevented further coaling because it contravened the neutrality laws. It transpired that Tannenfels had kept her appointment but Tromp had driven her away. Emden was escorted to the edge of the three-mile limit and made off eastwards in the direction of the Pacific. As soon as he had lost sight of the Dutch battleship, however, Miiller turned west again and
Prize Officer Lauterbach studied the recent Calcutta newspapers discovered aboard
Pontoporos and they enabled him to calculate approximate positions of the ships sailing notices were published. On the strength of this Emden, Markomannia and the captive Pontoporos headed for the
whose
Colombo-Calcutta steamer lane. At 0900 hours on September 10
Emden
intercepted SS Indus, a British passengerfreighter en route from Calcutta to Bombay. Technically under charter to the British government, legally Indus was undoubtedly an enemy vessel intended to transport men and horses from India to the European theatre of war. Her captain had assumed Emden was a British cruiser until too late.
now
Markomannia's mate was
charge of Pontoporos, assisted by Vice-Steerman Meyer, Emden's senior NCO, while Lauterbach took over placed
in
the Indus. The personnel from Indus were sent aboard Markomannia where an armed guard under Kapitanleutnant Klopper ensured that the prisoners did not seize the collier. Having taken what he could from Indus, Miiller ordered her to be sunk, and a sinking party from the Emden (consisting of an engineer officer, a petty officer and three stokers) boarded Indus, removed the doors from the bulkheads between the boiler
rooms and engine room and opened
the sea cocks. Later four shells were fired into her at the waterline, but she took almost two hours to go down. During the morning of September 11 Emden encountered Lovat, an English ship bound for Bombay to pick up troops. Lauterbach was mildly embarrassed because her captain was an old friend. He and his crew were put aboard Markomannia, but Lovat sank as stubbornly and reluctantly as Indus.
Timor
Miles
200
(Port)
400
h OKms.
400
The elusive Emden kept 14 major Allied warships occupied.
One radio message even asked Emden, r
where are you?' Above: The Emden's 30,000-mile cruise, during which she twice only narrowly escaped detection by superior Allied warships. Tanks of the Burmah Oil Company in Madras burning fiercely after shelling by the Emden from a range of two miles
Right:
At 1100 hours on September 12 Emden intercepted the 4,657-ton Kabinga, an English vessel belonging to the Ellerman and Bucknell Steamship Company of London. Kabinga was carrying jute to New York, and sinking her would render the German government liable for the cargo. In any case, Miiller was looking for a lumpensammler (junkman or prisoners' repatriation ship). The crews of Indus and Lovat were placed aboard Kabinga, and with a German prize crew in command she steamed in Emden's wake.
Three unexpected cheers During the night, Killin, a Glaswegian heading from Calcutta to Bombay with 6,000 tons aboard, was captured and sunk. At 0300 hours on September 13 the
collier
7,600-ton Harrison liner Diplomat, loaded with 1,000 tons of tea, was also intercepted and sent to the bottom. At 1630 hours that afternoon the Italian Loredano was encountered. Despite the prewar Triple Alliance between Italy, Germany and Austria-Hungary, her captain broadcast the Emden's position as 86 degrees
24 minutes east, 18 degrees 1 minute north and this information was duly relayed to shipping from the Calcutta lightship. The 4,000-ton collier Trabboch, in ballast, was encountered and sunk at 1800 hours on September 14. Later that afternoon, with the crews of Killin, Diplomat and Trabboch also aboard the Kabinga, the
lumpensammler was escorted
safely
to
within 75 miles of the sandheads off the mouth of the River Hooghly, where those aboard unexpectedly gave three rousing cheers for the Emden. Emden's men were now becoming adept at boarding and sinking techniques. Their next encounter was with the Clan Matheson, another Glaswegian, heading from Southampton to Calcutta with a cargo of Rolls-Royce cars, locomotives, typewriters and thoroughbred racehorses. The horses were shot before the ship was sent down, and yet the whole process was over in less than an hour. Next morning Captain W. Harris and his crew were transferred to a small Norwegian freighter. Harris shook hands with the German captain before leaving and told Miiller to his face that at
least he appreciated the courtesy he his men had been shown.
and
On September 15, Emden, Markomannia and Pontoporos were cruising and coaling in the deserted ocean south of Calcutta. collier was then sent off to a rendezvous at Simalur Island. Two days
The Greek later the of Bengal
Emden
searched the upper Bay and crossed the Madras-Rangoon
and Calcutta-Singapore routes, but sighted no vessels. Miiller began to consider a fresh line of attack.
A raid on Madras commended itself to him for four basic reasons: it was a long way from the location given by the Loredano;
it
would disturb British supremacy
unchallenged for a century; the port installations were easily accessible from the sea; and one of the in India,
Madras
Emden's crew had once worked in the city and knew its geography well. The harbour was protected by Fort St George with a 30-year-old battery of 5-9-inch guns. At 2145 hours on September 22 Emden fired first of 125 shells from a range of two miles. Hits included the prominent white and red striped tanks of the Burmah Oil
the
417
From the moment Sydney picked up the radio signal Above:
Emdens fate was sealed
SMS Emden,
of the Dresden class. Displacement: 3,600 tons. Length: 395 feet. Armament: Ten 4. 1-inch, eight 5-pounders, four machine guns plus two 17.7-inch torpedo tubes. Power/speed: 13,500 hp/24.5 knots. Armour: Deck (amidships) two inches, conning tower four inches. Crew: 321 Below: HMAS Sydney, of the Dartmouth type (Weymouth class). Displacement: 5,600 tons. Length: 450 feet. Beam: A8V2 feet. Armament: eight 6-inch, four3-pounders plus two 21-inch torpedo tubes. Power/speed: 22,000 hp/26 knots. Armour: Deck two inches. Crew: 376
Beam: 43^
feet.
419
Company, which burned
Answer-
Hampshire. Minotaur, Weymouth and Yarmouth; the Australian ships Melbourne and Sydney: the French Montcalm; the Japanese Chikuna. Ibuki and Yakagi; and the Russian Askold. Despite them all Emden sank the 3,600-ton King hud and the sugar-laden Tymeric before apprehending the 4,000-ton Gryfevale to serve as
The world could scarcely fail to react to these exploits. Macaulay records Lars Porsena's grudging praise of Horatius when 'e'en the ranks of Tuscany could scarce forbear to cheer'. The Allied reaction to Muller was very similar. His chivalry was respected, his daring admired, his humanity applauded. He appealed strongly to British sporting instincts, but this did not lessen their determination to hunt him down. In Germany he was rapidly becoming a living legend, an almost mystical epitome of that superiority of the fatherland which Kaiser Wilhelm frequently preached. Emden needed good quality coal and found over 6,000 tons aboard Buresk, destined for Admiral Jerram's ships at
lumpensammler
Hongkong.
ing-
shells tailed to find
fiercely.
Emden and
she
steamed away from Madras unscathed. Muller now cruised south past the old French colony o\' Pondicherry, but finding no ships there lie pressed on towards the Singhalese port of Colombo. No fewer than 14 major Allied warships were now search-
HMS
ing For the German raider: of Asia. Empress of Russia,
I,
420
for their crews.
Empress
Gloucester,
The
collier
was
added
to
Miiller's retinue. Before
October 3 Foyle
and Ribera were captured and sunk. The raider then proceeded to the Maldive Islands and Chagos Archipelago where boiler tubes were changed and condensers overhauled. Her next call was Diago Garcia where the Germans were welcomed by the assistant manager of the island's oil company (a septuagenarian French Madagasque) who had heard no news for three months and knew nothing of the war. The Emden's men took care not to enlighten
him.
The ship was canted, scraped clear of barnacles and repainted. Muller then headed back towards his hunting area in the Indian Ocean where his next prizes included Clan Grant on October 13, with a miscellaneous cargo including live cattle,
.
The beginning of the end: Direction Island —Emdens last raid Top left: A lifeboat from the captured Buresk supports the severed Perth-
collier
Cocos cable salvaged after the German raid on the British radio and telegraph installation on Direction Island in the Cocos group. Top right: The instrument room after the Germans had gone. However, before it was wrecked the telegraph station had managed to signal tne Emden's presence to the nearby Anzac convoy. Below: Mucke's landing party leaving Direction Island — surprised by the Sydney's arrival, Muller had been forced to abandon the landing party and head out to sea
'Bran***
t».flG.a.».
9tt
HoTubir
ia*-*i
Mr, hor* the honour to request that in the aeae of boaaalty
I
tou bo* ourrw>der jour
(1)
Tot.
•.
to
ahl|.
appreciate your tal) entry,
In order to alto* hoe aucb
1
will recapitulate the poaltloa.
I
are oehor*, 3 funnel* an* 1 »*a* down and eoat
Cuoa disabled. (£)
Tou cannot leave thie lsltnd, a&d m$ ahi: is i«Uet,
Tn t*.e erent of your aurreoderlaj to which 1
restore to raalnd you lu no dUjrace but rather jour alafortuae I
will ead< arour to do all
can for /our sick and wounded and
I
take thea tu a boa;-itul.
1
!ur* the honour to be, Sir, Tour obedient Sarraat,
// B.I.8.K.S, 'Cad en"
.....
422
\J
veptala.
'Muller and Emden
seemed romantic survivals in a world sliding rapidly into the ruthless realities of total Top,
left to right:
war'
The Emden's
captain, Karl
von Muller— 'quiet, withdrawn, lonely and conscientious his chivalry and daring caught the imagination of the world; the letter from Captain Glossop requesting Muller to surrender his ship — sporting and polite, it reads rather like the winning captain's speech after a game of cricket; Captain John Glossop of HMAS Sydney: the Sydney immediately after action against the Emden - the latter's fourth salvo knocked out the Sydney's fire direction system, causing her to withdraw out of the Emden's ,
range.
Below: The wreck of the Emden aground on a coral reef south of North Keeling Islandplaced at a disadvantage by Sydney's greater range, her guns and torpedoes no longer operable, Muller decided that he should run her aground
42a
the 4,800-ton Benmohr carrying machinand the 7,500-ton Blue Funnel Troilus on October 19, laden with valuable metals and rubber. But even while Miiller was making these captures, Markomannia had been sunk. Markomannia was actually coaling from Pontoporos offPulo Topak, an island on the west coast of Sumatra near the south end of Simalur on October 12. ery,
When Yarmouth appeared Markomannia was sunk with 1,300 tons of coal aboard and Pontoporos was taken in prize with 5,000 tons aboard. Buresk was therefore Emden's last remaining source of coal. The 473-ton British ocean-going dredger Ponrabbel, bound for Tasmania, probably qualified as Muller's most unusual victim. She was captured and sunk on October 16. The sheer volume of prisoners was now causing problems which Miiller solved by intercepting St Egbert, an English ship bound for New York, to use as another lumpensammler. He also picked up the collier Exford and disposed of the 5,000-ton Chilkana. Early on the morning of October 20 Emden ran dangerously close to Hampshire and her companion Empress of Russia but was not seen. The Germans celebrated their Kaiserin's birthday on October 22 and the three following days were uneventful. On October 26 Emden and Buresk pulled into Nancowrie in the Nicobar Islands to coal. Miiller was planning a dawn attack on Penang harbour for October 28. Entering the harbour mouth as planned Emden passed within yards of a pilot boat which paid her no attention. As dawn broke the Germans saw the Russian light cruiser Jemtchug. At 0518 hours the first torpedo from the Emden struck the Jemtchug amidships causing severe damage. It was followed by heavy accurate salvoes from the Emden's guns. Jemtchug was ablaze and sinking fast, but some of her men had reached action stations and were grimly returning Emden's fire. The French destroyer D'Iberuille joined in. Emden put a second torpedo into Jemtchug, which finished the Russian completely, before heading towards the harbour mouth. What looked like a fast torpedo boat steamed rapidly from the open sea towards the raider. It was not until after Gunnery Officer Gaede had put a shell through her funnel that the Germans realised she was only a harmless pilot boat. Miiller ceased firing and the Emden headed out to sea. At 0700 hours the raider stopped the British Glen Turret, carrying explosives, but instead of being sunk she was sent into Penang as Muller's messenger. The German captain apologised to the survivors of the Jemtchug for not picking them up and to the crew of the pilot boat for unintentionally firing on their
unarmed
vessel.
Full naval honours The small French destroyer Mousquet appeared next and prepared to attack the Emden, manoeuvring as though to launch a torpedo. The Germans steered hard to port and fired three salvoes at Mousquet. Several shells hit her stern and detonated the magazine, but even after this she launched two torpedoes which the Emden
The French captain's legs were shot away during the action but lashed to the bridge he continued directing
easily avoided.
the fight until his shattered vessel took him down with her. The Germans picked
424
up over 30 survivors, two of whom died during the night of October 29 and were buried at sea with full naval honours. Meanwhile Fronde, sister ship of Mousquet, was following Emden, taking care not to close with her. The following day Miiller apprehended the 3,000-ton freighter Newburn carrying salt to Singapore and arranged for her to ship the French survivors to Khota Raja where the severely
wounded could
On
receive hospital treatment.
Emden met Buresk near North Pageh Island in the Nassau Group at 0330 hours, and two days were spent in October 31
coaling, cleaning, carrying out repairs and resting. During coaling a cable snapped and Emden suffered her first casualty of the war: a torpedoman's thigh was broken. Dutch patrol boat arrived to en-
A
sure
Emden was
limit
and brought the news of Portugal's
outside the three-mile
entry into the war.
Having arranged a further rendezvous with Buresk, Emden set off for the Sunda Straits dividing Java from Sumatra. Nothing offered itself as a prospective prize in the Sunda area and Miiller devised an alternative plan: an attack on the British telegraph and radio installation on Direction Island in the Cocos (or Keeling) group, where the Australian, African and Indian cables met. Early on the morning of November 9 Emden anchored off the island while Miicke led ashore his landing party of 50 men, threading shallow coral mazes with a
steam launch towing two cutters. At 0630 hours they landed and found Superintendent D. A. G. de H. Farrant, of the Eastern Extension Telegraph Company. No resistance was offered. Farrant gave Miicke the keys and congratulated him on the award of the Iron Cross, news of which had been picked up during a German broadcast. Firearms were handed over to the raiders and the islanders assembled in the square near the telegraph building.
The Germans were thorough and efficient wreckers. Even an innocuous seismometer was smashed along with the electrical equipment, but three sets of charges were needed to topple the mast and the undersea cables were difficult to locate and sever. The Emden's lookout reported a vessel with a single funnel and two masts, a description which fitted their anticipated the Buresk. An officer ascended to the crow's nest and confirmed the description, but it was either an optical illusion or the Buresk was accidentally obscuring another vessel. Bearing down on the Sydney, a protected Emden was cruiser of 5,400 tons carrying eight 6inch guns and capable of nearly 26 knots. She was bigger and faster than the Emden and carried weapons outweighing and outranging those on the German cruiser. Nor was it a fluke that she had arrived in so timely a manner since, in fact, the island telegraph station had managed to transmit a signal announcing the arrival of the Emden before the Germans could interrupt, and this signal was picked up by the great Anzac convoy nearby — of which the Sydney was one escort, sailing in advance of the main body of ships. From that moment the Emden's fate was sealed. Miiller was forced to abandon his landing party and head for open sea. To be caught at anchor would give Emden no chance at all. At 0940 hours the first three German salvoes bracketed Sydney; the fourth landed, collier,
HMAS
knocking out the
fire direction system. The Australian ship withdrew to 7,000 yards, out of Emden's range but well within her own. Shells fell near the German bridge and the wireless room disappeared following a direct hit. The crow's nest and a stern gun were struck. Another shell destroyed the gunnery control system. Hits below deck ruptured Emden's steam pipes and drastically reduced her speed. Multiple fires were spreading rapidly. A direct hit shattered the number one gun; number four's ammunition port exploded wiping out the crew. At 1020 hours the steering and communication systems were destroyed. A hit below the waterline temporarily flooded the torpedo flat, but Emden kept on manoeuvring skilfully on the engines in the hope of delivering an effective torpedo. Another Australian broadside brought down the German foremast; the funnels were gone; scores of dead, dying and wounded lay among the wreckage. With guns and torpedoes inoperable Miiller decided to run his ship aground. Shortly after 1100 hours she shuddered on to the coral reefs south of North Keeling Island. Throughout the heat of the day the Germans suffered considerably from heat and thirst; several were killed attempting to swim through the surf. The Sydney had raced off to capture the Buresk, and when she returned Captain Glossop reopened fire on the wreck of the Emden because the
German
battle colours
still
flew.
Miiller
them with a white flag and firing immediately ceased. The Sydney now rereplaced
leased one of the Buresk' s boats which she had in tow and Leutnant Fikentscher, who had been with the prize crew aboard the collier,
crossed
handful of
men
to
the
to give
Emden
with
a
what aid he
The Sydney turned and headed
could. for Direc-
tion Island, intending to capture Miicke's raiding party. It was nearly 24 hours before the Australians returned to the wreck and took off Emden's survivors. Miiller was the last man to leave. Of his ship's
company 141 were dead and 65 more were wounded. Only 117 men remained unhurt. Miiller and Emden seemed to be strangely chivalrous, anachronistic survivals in a world sliding rapidly into the new ruthless realities of total war; their adventure ended in grim and bloody tragedy. But what had been achieved? In their three-month cruise of 30,000 miles the men of the Emden had sunk or captured 23 merchant ships, disposed of a cruiser and destroyer, inflicted £15,000,000 worth of damage on their enemies and occupied the attention of a combined Allied naval search force involving nearly 80 vessels at one time or another.
romantic,
Further Reading Hoehling, A. A., Lonely Command (Cassell & Co, 1957) Hough, R., The Pursuit of Admiral von Spee (Allen and Unwin, 1969) Hoyt, E. P., The Last Cruise of the Emden (Andre Deutsch, 1966) Mucke, Kapitanleutnant H. von, The Emden (Ritter&Co, 1917) Raeder, E., Der Krieg zur See, Vol. 2 (Mittler
& Sohn, Berlin, 1923) Thomas, Lowell, Lauterbach
of the China
Sea
(Hutchinson, 1939) Witthoeft, R., Unsere Berlin, 1926)
Emden (Reimar Hobbing,
[For Lionel Fanthorpe's
page
169.
]
biography,
see
the unknown quantity 'Magnificently placed astride three continents', Turkey was an ally to be courted in 1914. But on the whole, she was reluctant to join a war from which she might profit little. The Balkan Wars had left her drained of money, manpower and material and popular opinion protested against her further involvement. Even after her entry into the war enthusiasm was lacking and the demands of the war machine led to hardship and financial loss. Lieutenant-Colonel A.J. Barker were promised territorial aggrandisement at the expense of Russia in the Caucasus and of Persia in Azerbaijan. A restoration of Turkey's sovereignty over Egypt was taken for granted — although it is unlikely that Germany would have permitted the real control to revert to Turkey if an invasion of Egypt had ever been successful. Germany must certainly have persuaded Enver, Talaat and Jemal that Germany
Turkey's strategic position is such as to make her a valuable ally in any global war. Germany had appreciated this, and Turkey — unaware perhaps of the Kaiser's golden visions of the whole of Asia Minor under his flag — had seen material advantage in an association of the two nations. Yet — however confident of the result Germany may have appeared — the diplomatic history of August to October 1914 shows that Turkey was not easily persuaded to join in the First World War. To ensure that she did so, Germany probably found herself obliged to involve her reluctant ally those definite acts of hostility which eventually precipitated the crisis. At the same time, from the perspective of history, it seems improbable that Turkey could have remained neutral throughout the First World War, as she did in the Second. Securely astride the most important icefree sea access of Russia to Europe and her allies, Turkey's geographical position was such that she could also threaten
was going
main
line of
communication with
India and Australia. Although it was not known to the governments of Britain, France and Russia at the time, Turkey had bound herself to Germany before the first shot was fired in Europe, and her three months of nominal neutrality between August and November 1914 were spent in preparation for the moment when her ally should give the signal for action. The exact stage at which Germany decided to do this is not clear. But the battle of the Marne, the Russian successes against Austria, the Balkan situation, the slowness of Turkish mobilisation and the reluctance of the Turkish cabinet — voicing general Turkish sentiment—to go to war against the Allies were all contributory factors. Mutual hatreds continued to flourish, but after their experience with Bulgaria and Serbia in 1912 few Turks wanted any more wars. They had seen Serbia, Greece and Montenegro profit politically at Turkey's expense and Rumania add to what she believed to be her prestige. But the Balkan Wars had drained Turkey's resources of money, manpower and material, and for the time being she was content to stay in the small corner of Europe into which she had been forced by the Balkan Wars. Nor for that matter was Britain anxious to provoke a war with Turkey. Not only
win,
Turkey's
otherwise
was suicidally Wars Germany
had been quick to appreciate that Turkey's depleted army was left with little else but obsolescent weapons and in a poor state of maintenance. This was an ideal oppor-
in
Britain's
to
policy in joining the war rash. But after the Balkan
tunity.
Although
his
prestige
had been
somewhat lowered by events in the Balkan Wars, the Turk had proved himself to be courageous, enduring and obedient. As such he made an excellent private soldier. All that was needed was to organise
Mehmed
V,
Sultan of Turkey
in
1914
might a belligerent Turkey imperil the passage of Indian troops through the Suez Canal, she might also upset her Empire's Moslem population, and this could be much more serious. For this reason, great indulgence was shown to Turkish breaches of neutrality (particularly in harbouring the Goeben and Breslau) and everything was done to pacify her and detach her from her German allegiance. The Military Correspondent of The Times wrote: For Germany the Turkish alliance was an excellent trouvaille. Magnificently placed astride three continents, inveterately hostile to Russia whose overwhelming numbers lay upon the soul of the German strategist like a nightmare, embittered with England on account of the atrocity campaigns and the loss of Cyprus and of Egypt, and capable of serving as a weapon against Russia, Austria or England at will, the warlike Empire of Ottoman appealed with irresistible force not only to the soldier- breast of a military state, but to the commonsense of German statesmen and to the pocket of the German merchant. The two principal advantages which the Germans hoped to gain from the alliance were the closing of the Dardanelles be-
tween Russia and her allies, and by the declared hostility of the head of Islam, the disaffection of the large Moslem population of the British Empire. In return the Turks
Turkey's ragged legions on German lines and Germany's ally would be able to field a formidable force of real military worth. Thus the Turkish army became dependent on Germany for money and munitions, whose price Turkey paid by submitting to a German dictatorship of her strategy and to a large
ment and
measure of control
in the direction of her troops.
manage-
Compulsory military service In effect, the Germans had been concerned with the organisation of the Turkish army since 1882. In 1911 Turkey, excluding her Red Sea provinces and Tripoli in North Africa, was divided into four Ordus (army inspections) subdivided into territorial army corps, and a new recruitment policy was introduced. In the past, liability to compulsory service had been limited to certain classes of Moslems — a policy which had invested Turkey's war againsl Christian nations with a religious character. By the new law national service was extended to include Christians and Jews as well as Moslems, and it aroused considerable controversy. Not only was it a departure from custom — sufficient reason in any oriental country to invoke distrust and obstruction — but the government also appeared to be interfering with the liberty of some of the semi -independent races nominallx under
Turkish domination. For obvious reasons Christians and Jews disliked it. and their
425
I
Turkey — the reluctant Below: On camels and horses, men and munitions journey to the Eastern Front. For Turkish aid Germany promised Russian land
ally
"
on-
ig tea
M 'iv 10
Jin ,4
ng Ha\ Ya* an* Jai tlv
En th.
he
Above: A troop of Turkish cavalry. Mounted on undersized and undertrained horses, Turkish horsemen in 1914 were even less effective than their British and French counterparts lack of enthusiasm
Moslems who had
was reciprocated by the respect for them as
little
soldiers.
The Sultan was the army's supreme commander, while its administrative chief— nominally controlled by the parliament — was the Minister for War. He was assisted by a Superior Military Council with consultative and advisory duties. In 1914 the vice-president of this body was Feldmarschall von der Goltz. From 1913 a
A Turkish Infantryman The design of Turkish uniforms was strongly
military
influenced by German advisers. This soldier wears the traditional Kabalash hat, a khaki tunic with flap-down collar, khaki trousers and puttees wound from the boots uo. His
officers,
equipment
German
is also of pattern
L>
428
t!
mission of about 70 German under General Liman von Sanders,
was responsible for training. Divided into the active army (Nizam), reserve army (Ihtiyat) and territorial army (Mustahfiz) there were 38 divisions composing 13 army corps in August 1914. These divisions were numbered 1 to 40; the 19th and 20th Divisions did not exist at the time. Few of the divisions were up to peace establishment and after the war the total number of combatants in the Turkish army in
W**l
August 1914 was stated by the Turkish general staff to be about 150,000. From the date of mobilisation up to the signing of the Armistice, 2,700,000 men were called up and 34 more divisions were formed. The total number of men of military age available in the Turkish Empire at the beginning of the war was said to be something under 4,500,000. As a large proportion of these were Arabs, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, Jews and Circassians — men of races who did not have much, if any, interest in a Turkish victory in the war — the Turkish effort, judged by these figures only, appears to have been good. However, desertion was rife, and assumed proportions that could not have existed
among European
nations. In
large
undeveloped
tracts
of
Turkey were and wild
country in which the deserters could live without fear of apprehension and at one period there were about 400,000 of them. The normal composition of a cavalry brigade was 10 to 15 squadrons (1,400 to 2,000 sabres), 12 machine guns, and eight horse artillery guns. An infantry division consisted of three regiments each of three battalions, a
machine gun company, a vary-
number of field or mountain batteries and the usual ancillaries such as sappers and medical personnel. The nominal avering
age strength of a division was 8,000 to 9,000 rifles, 12 machine guns and 24 to 36 guns. Cavalry regiments in peacetime were organised into five squadrons, one of which formed a reinforcement depot for the other four squadrons in the field on mobilisation. With a nominal strength of 647 all ranks (472 sabres) each squadron was armed with Mauser carbines and swords; each man carried 60 rounds of ammunition for his carbine and — for the most part — was mounted on an undersized horse of doubtful worth. Trained mainly for patrol and piquet duties, neither the Turkish horsemen nor their mounts were suited to the shock tactics beloved by European cavalry. Most of the Kurdish and Arab cavalry which had existed as militia had been disbanded by 1914, but some of them were reenrolled and at times large groups of Arab horsemen were used against the British. The artillery was organised into regiments, each infantry division being allotted nominally one field gun regiment of two
or three battalions, each of three 4-gun
Each corps' cavalry brigade should have had a battalion of two 4-gun horse artillery batteries, and each corps should have had two mountain battalions, each of three 4-gun batteries and one howitzer battalion of three 6-gun butteries of field and heavy howitzers. But in October 1914 there were insufficient guns in the country to equip an establishment of this order and some of the corps were very short batteries.
of artillery. The Turks had lost many of their guns in the Balkan Wars and had only been able to replace a few of them.
Under strength and
inefficient
Infantry battalions consisted of four companies, each with a nominal war strength
266
and men. Equipped on and armed with Mauser rifles, the infantrymen were clothed in khaki like the rest of the Turkish army. In
of
modern
officers lines,
1914 there was a shortage of rifles hut this was made up by Germany. L50 rounds were carried by each man and an additional 100 rounds per man were carried in firsl line pack transports, with a further reserve of 400 rounds per rifle in carts or park trans-
129
assemble outside the Sultan's palace in Constantinople. The Turkish infantryman was a formidable adversary. He had an instinctive eye for ground and always held his position with cool stubbornness. Bottom left: A wooden model of an Austrian howitzer in Constantinople. It was designed to raise money for the war fund: with each contribution a nail was hammered into it. Above: Turkish infantry receive sound basic training. Poorly fed and equipped, they nevertheless won renown for their remarkable endurance. Above right: Enver Pasha (wearing sword) inspects an Austrian howitzer. In return for money and munitions, Turkey submitted to the dictatorship of her strategy by her allies. Right: Soldiers of the Turkish Camel Corps rest at an oasis. Far right: Feldmarschall von der Goltz, the German VicePresident of the Turkish Military Council. Below right: A Turkish eeaplane— built in Germany. Below: Turkish dignitaries and the diplomatic corps in Constantinople just before the war Left: Turkish infantry
port. The machine gun companies were armed with Hotchkiss or Maxim guns and
consisted of L20 to 160 all ranks. When the Turkish army was reorganised it had been planned that there should be an engineer pontoon section and a field battalion and telegraph company attached to each army corps. But in 1914 these existed onlj in cadre form and the Turks went to war with only one company of
engineers with each corps. By 1913 some officers had learned to fly and the Germans had provided a few aircraft, but there was no Turkish air force to speak of in 1914. On paper the medical organisation was complete, in effect it was really very much under strength and inefficient. Similarly, while the supply and transport arrangements were fairly well organised in and around Constantinople, they were generally indifferent elsewhere and much depended on local improvisation. Some factories capable of turning out guns and ammunition existed in the Constantinople area but their output was so limited that throughout the war the Turks depended on the Germans for most of their equipment.
Turkish
the Turkish gunner handled his artillery well and shot accurately. Only the poorly mounted cavalry were seldom effective. What value is to be assigned to the Turk as a fighting man depends largely on the worth of the tactical lessons to be drawn from the campaigns in which he was involved. He had not the military qualities of the German, but he must certainly rank high on any list of the martial nations of the world. Wretchedly fed and ill-equipped,
was to continue doggedly resisting month after month and year after year in conditions which many Allied troops would rarely have tolerated. The initial keystones of the TurcoGerman war plan for the Middle East were an advance across the Caucasus into Russia and an invasion of Egypt. In he
November 1914 the Turkish First Army army corps was concentrated five
of
Many
schools and colleges existed in the military education of young men training to be officers and for the staff. Indeed in 1908 the military correspondent of The Times described the Turkish system of military instruction as being 'very complete", and observed that the number of school-trained officers in the army had risen to 50 9c. But after that date the standard dropped, owing to the number of expeditions and campaigns in which the Turkish army became involved. In the Balkan Wars the reserve system of the Turkish army had broken down completely and it was not until 1914 that a new scheme was introduced. When general mobilisation began at the beginning of August most of the younger reservists — men of 23 to 30 years of age — were drafted into active units, while the older reservists — from 30 to 38 years old — were sent to depots for training. Some men' in the Mustohfiz category (38 to 40 years of age) were enrolled for a few weeks' rudimentary training and then sent home with instructions to be ready to rejoin at 24 hours' notice while others were sent to garrisons or pioneer units. Considerable numbers, especially among the non-
Turkey
for
Moslems, obtained exemption by paying an exoneration tax. Nevertheless, on the whole the new mobilisation arrangements ran smoothly. But there was little enthusiasm for the war and the drastic system of requisitioning that accompanied the call-up of the men upset Turkey's
economy for
in a fashion that led to starvation
hundreds of thousands and the financial
ruin of
many
of the country's merchants.
Something must now be said about the quality
of
the
individual
as
a
for in spite of all the defects of his
soldier,
army's
organisation the Turk has never been an enemy to be despised. The backbone of the Turkish army, the Anatolian Turk, was a hard, tough fighting man who could exist without so many of the comforts which were already becoming the way of life of European armies. On the defensive, the Turkish infantryman's eye for ground, his skill at digging-in and his stubbornness in holding the position he had taken up made him a formidable adversary. In an offensive he would attack with great gallantry though often without much skill. Similarly,
432
was difficult even before they embarked on it. To defend the Suez Canal the British had to guard its whole length and bar the road to Egypt. To do this properly required many more troops than were available when Turkey ended her months of spurious neutrality.
Nevertheless
Britain
could
muster more men than the Turks could raise for an invasion. British and French warships anchored in the Bitter Lakes could provide powerful supporting artillery and the availability of a detachment of the Royal Flying Corps and some French seaplanes would enable the defenders to be kept informed of the progress of an invading force. To get to the Canal the Turks had to face a terrible advance across that desert renowned in Biblical history as the wilderness through which Moses had led the children of Israel. And to be successful they had to seize Ismailia in the centre of the Canal. Once in control there they could cut off the water supply to Port Said and Suez and so render untenable the position of the defending troops north and south of Ismailia. Capturing Suez or Port Said would bring little advantage since the Turks would still be separated by many miles of salt lake or barren desert from the inhabited delta and they too would be deprived of water when the British closed the sluices at Ismailia. Possibly those who planned the projected operation appreciated the difficulties the Turks would have to face. But doubtless the expectation that Egypt would rise in revolt against the British as soon as the Turks approached the Canal was a factor that carried more weight than it merited.
The Kaiser's 'Holy War' The Turks had not planned operations on a large scale or of decisive importance
Mesopotamia in 1914. The modern Iraq most direct avenue of approach from Europe to south-west Asia, a route to Persia and the Persian Gulf and a means of getting round the Caucasus and into Afghanistan. But from the Turco-German viewpoint there were many drawbacks to military operations in Mesopotamia. The in
affords the
The German general. Liman von Sanders
around Constantinople in European Turkey; the Second Army of two army corps was in Asia Minor not far from Constantinople; the Third Army of three army corps was deployed near the Caucasus; the Yemen Army Corps and the As/rand Hejaz Divisions were in Arabia and of the bulk of the XII and VIII Army Corps normally in Mesopotamia had been sent to Syria and Erzerum. As devised by the German military mission to Turkey, the plan to invade Russia was a simple one From its base at Erzurum the Third Army would advance across the Caucasus while two corps would move round to envelop and destroy the Russian troops defending the bleak mountain passes. Its success depended on the Turks capturing the mountain passes and being able to supply their forward troops through the Black Sea by way of Trebizond and Erzurum. As the fortified towns of Turkey-in-Asia lav in a region to which it was extremely difficult to get the troops overland the plan was fundamentally sound. Under the guns of the Goeben and Breslau it could be expected that the Turks would be able to land reinforcements and stores at Trebizond and from there it was only a short journey along a good road which had been made for the purpose. Against Egypt the Turks set themselves a task which they must have appreciated
country's climatic extremes, its indifferent land communications over great distances, the lack of local food produce, the problem of navigating the Tigris and Euphrates and the vulnerability of Basra from the sea were but a few. It was soon to become clear, however, that the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. By compelling Britain to divert troops to Mesopotamia, her war effort elsewhere would be diminished. The great distances involved would operate more to Britain's disadvantage than that of Turkey; navigation downstream was easier than navigation upstream, and — in the absence of good land communications — traffic of any volume was limited to the waterways; the inhabitants were Moslems and so it could be expected that their religious susceptibilities could be turned against the infidel invaders, the lack of communications, the shortage of local supplies, the climatic difficulties would all tend to restrict British troops operating in the area and it was likely that these could be met and countered by comparatively small Turkish forces. Another important consideration was that Baghdad, through which passed most routes to the East, formed an ideal centre for German propaganda in Persia and Afghanistan, a tender point with the Indian government.
A Turkish Cavalryman The uniform
of the Turkish cavalry was
similar to that worn by the infantry. The main differences were the single large box pouch worn on either side of the belt instead of the three small box pouches, and the knee-high boots which were usually black. The cavalry carried 7.65Turkish Mauser rifles
mm
Since August 1914, German and Turkish agents throughout the Middle East had been intriguing against Britain. Rumours were rife of agents slipping secretly into Egypt in disguise, and in Cairo the British ambassador is said to have reported that he was concerned about such individuals causing mischief by impersonating Indian soldiers. 'In substantiation of this,' he wrote, 'I have to state that his Majesty's Consul at Aleppo has learned that a tailor in that town has been commissioned to make a variety of Indian costumes and head-dresses on designs and measurements supplied by German officers there.' This rumour was never substantiated, but there was no doubt that the German propaganda machine was enthusiastically developing the theme of a Holy War. To what lengths
mendacity they went may be judged from the fact that a report was even circulated to the effect that the Kaiser had embraced Islam. Hadji Mohammed Guilliano, as he now called himself— Hadji being the term applied only to those who had been to Mecca — was intent on restoring Islam to its proud position of 1,000 years before. Apparently the German Emperor had seen the light when he had visited Mecca. There, while he lay three days and nights seeking God's will before the great shrine, a voice from heaven had come to him as the saviour of Islam and the sword of the Lord telling him to 'Arise and Fight'. At the same time, supporting rumours were assiduously circulated to strengthen the suggestion that only the Turks and the Germans were concerned with preserving of
the faith. Britain's main object in waging war against the Turks and their subject peoples, the faithful were told in November 1914, was to rifle the tomb of the Prophet Mohammed and add his bones to the collection of those of the Pharaohs and other ancients in the British Museum. Meanwhile, a new family tree was found for the Hohenzollerns. The whole family
was descended from Mohammed's sister, the word went out, and it was the sacred duty of all Mohammedans therefore to rally round the Turks and Germans. Even more incredible was the story that Germany had a giant aircraft with an all-powerful magnet. The aeroplane had visited Petrograd, Paris and London to suck up — in turn — the Tsar of all the Russias, the French president, and his most gracious
433
4
Above: The Sheikh-ul-lslam proclaims a Holy War. The
and unwilling Majesty King George V, and all three had been taken to Berlin as prisoners. In this day and age such blatant falsehoods would seem to be not merely that
puerile but utterly ridiculous; nevertheless they had a far reaching and dangerous effect upon some of the ignorant people of the Moslem Middle East. Calling for a Holy War had a measure of success amongst the Arab tribes of the Middle East but fortunately there was one fault in the propaganda. And it was because of this that the Turks and Germans preached largely to deaf ears among the Moslems under British rule. Turkish claims of leadership of Islam were disputable, since the Sultan was not of the true blood of the Prophet and on hearing the news of Turkey's alliance with Germany, the Aga Khan spoke up for the vast numbers of Moslems who looked to him as their spiritual head in India. 'Turkey,' he declared, 'has lost the position of trustee of Islam and evil will overtake h< r. Nothing that the Turks or their German masters can do will ever weaken the loyalty of the Moslem Indian, based as it is on the consciousness that their most cherished interests, religious as well as civil, were guaranteed to them by British rule.' He concluded a speech in London by saying
434
Kaiser,
'All
who had been
Indians
know
to
that
Mecca, ensured that German propaganda developed the theme
if
Britain was ever
weakened, India's aspirations — India's whole future — would go to pieces.' To the British — more especially those in India — this declaration of loyalty was very welcome. Britain was apprehensive of the effect of the German-inspired, Turkish-led propaganda on Moslem opinion. One final factor relevant to Turkey's war plans and linked with the campaign in Mesopotamia was the growing dependence of the Royal Navy's oil-fired warships on the oil piped across 140 miles of desert from fields in southern Persia to the refinery at Abadan. Neither the oilfields nor the refinery were in Turkish territory and it was primarily to safeguard the oil supply that it was decided to send an AngloIndian expeditionary force to 'demonstrate' at the head of the Gulf in November 1914. Such were the factors behind the Turks' subsequent attempts to embarrass Britain at minimum cost in manpower to themselves. The 'national' movement in India, the constant unrest on the North-West Frontier, the natural tendency of Persians, Afghans and Arabs to intrigue were all to be exploited for this purpose. A large proportion of the populations concerned were Moslems and the religious factor was expected to exert considerable influence.
Further Reading Barker, A. J., The Neglected War: Mesopotamia 1914-1918 (Faber & Faber 1967) Barker, A. J., Townshend of Kut (Cassell 1967) in Mesopotamia (HMSO 1927) Candler, E., The Long Road to Baghdad (Cassell 1919) Wavell, F.-M. Earl, The Palestine Campaigns (Constable 1954)
Campaign
LIEUTENANT-COLONEL
A.
J.
BARKER
served
for
22 years as a regular officer in the British army. As an infantryman he campaigned in East Africa and Burma during the Second World War, and afterwards in the Middle East and Malaya. A graduate of the Staff College and the Royal Military College of Science, Colonel Barker also saw service as a staff officer in India, Europe, Egypt, Malaya and Singapore. Apart from several essays on military subjects and three books on infantry weapons he has written six books on military history: The March on Delhi, Suez: The Seven Day War, Eritrea 1941, The Neglected War: The Mesopotamia Campaign, Townshend of Kut and The Civilising Mission. After retiring from active service, Colonel Barker was employed by the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority until he was awarded a NATO Research Fellowship and resigned from the UKAE A to become a full-time writer.
After Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and her territorial agreement with Britain in 1907, her threat to India from the north had been removed. Britain had long regarded the defence of India as of great importance and in 1914 the most professional part of the British Army was there. Increased German influence over Turkish affairs posed a new threat to Britain's communications with her Empire. John Stephenson
Abba Hilmi, Khedive of Egypt. Britain's occupation of Egypt gave her command of Suez
Lord Curzon, ex-Viceroy of India. He constantly emphasised the importance of India's defence
1914 Britain had enjoyed no position in India she would have had no position in the Middle East. She might equally have had no position in Malta, Aden, Socotra, Mauritius, Ceylon, Malaya, Singapore or Hong Kong. She would not have worked so consistently to preserve the existence of
resources, the 'Route' scarcely less so. One commentator has said: No pre-1914 British
If in
the Ottoman Empire, opposed French interests in Syria, or developed treaty relations with Persia and with the various sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf. Above all, she would not have found herself committed to a defence policy based on Indian needs which neglected the rest of the 1914 Empire, kept the best of her army in the East, and very nearly caught her unprepared to face the war of 1914 in Europe. The ability to send expeditions from India to Egypt, Mesopotamia and East Africa would have been poor compensation had France been defeated, as she nearly was, in the first months of the war. In a word, India was greedy with British strategic
Government would have dreamt of letting its armed forces become inadequate for the defence of Hong Kong or Capetown, let alone Bombay; but pre-1914 British Governments hardly gave a thought to the military
requirements of a war in Europe, the one where a great war could actually happen. Not until Haldane, in 1907, was anything done to provide for this contingency; and even he provided no more than an expeditionary force of 167,000 men when continental armies were measured in
place
millions.
There
is
of India,
ample evidence that the defence
especially of its north-western approaches, was ranked first in importance until a very few years before 1914. Speaking in the Budget Debate of 1903 in the Indian Legislative Council, Lord Curzon drew attention to the world changes that were affecting Asia and which would, as
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi-the Messiah of Indian liberation
he
said, 'have an effect on India that is at present but dimly discerned. The geographical position of India will more and more push her into the forefront of international politics. She will more and more become the strategical frontier of the British Empire.'
Two years later, the erstwhile Military Member of the Viceroy's Council was to write: In all the discussions which have taken place since the war in South Africa upon the vital subject of the defence of the Empire, at least three main points stand out, and the fact that the defence of the land frontier of the Empire means the defence of the land frontier of India. It is true enough that the defence of India has long been recognised as the essential military problem of our times. It is fortunate that the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom has proclaimed more than once, in clear and unmistakable language, that the problem of the British Army is the
problem of the defence of Afghanistan — inother words, of the defence of India. As late as 1906 Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of The Times, could write a long article assessing the Russian threat to India, undoubtedly the most serious problem that has ever been incurred by the British Army — this primary military problem of our day', examining in great detail the forces, methods and resources of the Russians. He assessed closely the capacities for traffic of the newly built railways on the Afghan border, the probable positions of bases and magazines, the potentialities of local transport, roads, passes and railway extensions. He did the same thing for the Indian potential, which he rated poorly — at least as regards
communications, and made recommendations as to the forces needed in the area. 'This estimate is based not on thoughts of conquest or ideas of expansion, but on the need for holding our own. It is an estimate for defence and security, not for aggression.' And it entailed, he explained, placing 50,000 men in Kabul in six weeks and 250,000 men on the Helmund within eight months, increased to 500,000 within eighteen months, together with 100,000 men on the lines of communication. Thus did British experts regard the defence of India, 'the brightest jewel in the Empire's crown', within a few years of the outbreak of the First World War, the war in which India's boundaries were to remain unthreatened.
Russian threat removed But the background of the problem was already in a state of change caused by three events of the utmost importance. Firstly, in 1902, Britain made an end to her dangerous political isolation by concluding an alliance with Japan, the fast rising power in the Far East, the treaty being renewed and extended to ten years on August 12, 1905. The treaty was purely defensive and brought both powers into line only if the interests
it
was designed
were attacked by another power. It covered not only the Far East but the whole area from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean. Secondly, Russia suffered an overwhelming defeat in her war with Japan in 1904/5. This defeat, at any rate for a time, removed the threat of a major aggressive war by Russia in Afghanistan or anywhere to protect
else. It also frustrated for
many
years the
methods and purpose of her public policy from Persia to Korea towards the goal which some of her most influential spokesmen had repeatedly proclaimed — namely that of exclusive domination in Asia, which
was held
to
be her appointed destiny or
mission.
These two events alone might reasonably have been expected to cause a reappraisal of Empire defence policy. But the third event was even more convincing. In 1907 a combination thought by the Germans to be utterly impossible became fact. By means of a convention, Britain and Russia, the two rival oriental imperialists, adjusted their respective spheres of interest, primarily in Q ersia, but extending also to the Middle L st and Afghanistan, which Russia agreed be definitely outside her field of influei j The Emir Habibullah of Afghanistan ind he could no longer play off one pov rful neighbour against another, and for a rime relations with him were less than cord, il. But Russia stood by her agreement and thus Berlin i
.
436
regarded it as an additional indication of the Machiavellian design to encircle Germany with a ring of enemies. Thus by a combination of force and negotiation the major threat both to India and to the route to India had been removed. There were other dangers remaining and new ones would arise, but the 19th Century bogey of a Russian descent from the north was not to haunt Indian dreams for many years to come. At least one expert on India, and probably many more, realised the change. Colonel Sir Thomas Holdich, who was well acquainted with all parts of Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the North- West Frontier wrote in an article in 1905: It surprises me that there should still be men of light and leading who are actually afraid of Russia — afraid that, with her vast resources of men and money, and with the development of her railway system to the borders of Afghanistan, she could really peril our security in India by an advance in force from the Oxus. We will for a moment set aside the fact that she has been disastrously beaten by a comparatively small Asiatic power, and is in no position to risk another failure in the Asiatic field. He concludes: If Japan has not, however, settled the Frontier Question for us, she has at .
.
.
spiritual influence from the SultanCaliph at Constantinople. And Britain had probably administered a coup de grace to Turkish friendship by her entente with Russia - the perennial enemy of the Ottoto
man
regime.
Without
this preliminary survey of British policy with regard to India and the route to India the immediate problems of the areas concerned, as we approach August 1914, have little meaning. In India the movement for independence from British rule, though it had not yet attained the organisation, speed and force of the lurid postwar years, had been growing steadily almost since the Mutiny of 1857. The first session of the Indian National Congress had been held in 1885. Starting as a body of moderates, it rapidly
became the leading
aiming
force
for
com-
By the early years of the 20th Century a number of influences combined to make anti-British sentiments plete independence.
Many more students had Europe and the United States, where they had not only seen liberalism in action, but had learned how much can be attained by agitation and even sedition. more
vocal.
visited
They learned
in defensive tactics, it is beyond belief that she should contemplate aggres-
also of the lowly status of Indians abroad and experienced what today is called racialism. They observed the rise of Japan and held that country in great esteem, not for its military achievement but for the way a backward Far Eastern agricultural country had by its own volition become a highly organised
sive action against another host which, we may confidently predict, would be her equal
to
least deferred its practical solution by force of arms sine die. Russia has not gone completely mad. With her huge army badly
beaten
in numbers, and her superior in national cohesion, if not in scientific resource. Nevertheless, there was no deep rethinking of the problem to match this tremendous change. Perhaps the convention with Russia was distrusted, the Japanese alliance considered temporary, perhaps the formation of the six-division
Expeditionary Force took up the whole energies of the General Staff of the War Office; perhaps the intensive re-examination by Lord Kitchener of the Indian Army
had indicated that India was
still
too
weak
war to consider contributions to. a conflict outside her own borders. We shall study the Indian problem in more detail later, but the problem of the route to India, that is of passage through the Mediterranean and Middle East, deserves an introduction at this point because its background too had suffered a change no less important than the one in all the resources of
we have been
considering with regard to the defence of India. The Russian threat to the sea and land routes through the Middle East was of long standing and had influenced British policy towards the Ottoman Empire throughout the 19th Century. But whereas the 1907 convention with Russia had removed the threat to India, the threat to the route continued in other hands, those of Germany, in a somewhat forced collusion with
Turkey, which had been influential enough since the 1880's but was becoming still stronger with the assumption of power by the Young Turks in 1908. In place of a veiled threat from Russia, covered by a generally friendly Turkey, Britain now had a direct threat to her communications with India, by sea in the Mediterranean, by land through Syria and Mesopotamia, and through Persia to India herself— all Moslem lands and all liable in some degree
modern
industrial state. They were led believe that Britain had become industrially decadent and was dragging India down with her, while the economic leadership of the world passed to America
and Germany. Much had been hoped from the arrival of a Liberal government in London, but when the Minto-Morley reforms came it
was a matter
of
'too
little,
too
late'.
major reforms, including those connected with defence, had to go through the mill of the British Parliament. Not only
All
was there the inevitable delay of procedure and debate, but Indian questions raised little enthusiasm in the Commons, and much bitter opposition in the Lords. During the delay, agitation and discontent had steadily built up so that when the new measures were announced they were found behind the enthusiasms of the reformers, and consequently in the nature of a damp squib. There was some terrorism — two British magistrates were shot in to be far
Bengal
and some secret
societies
were
formed. The viceroy was driven to resort to deportation without trial, this being one degree less drastic than proclaiming martial law, but when trials were ordered nebulous charges were the rule, 'exciting hatred and contempt of Government', or 'taking part in a conspiracy to deprive the King-Emperor of his sovereignty in British India' — accusations which could almost have been applied to the most moderate member of Congress who had voted for independence. The sensational press was expanding and reaching the villages. But none of the individual murders or bomb outrages constituted rebellion; the inspired leadership which was to come was then lacking. Nevertheless when the one real specific grievance, Curzon's partition of Bengal, was repealed, many agitators became sensible of the connection between
'bombs and boons'.
Moslem discontent was of great imThe Moslem community had
The economy of India was so poor and financial crises so frequent that annual
become very aware of the defeat and
expenditure on defence was the natural target of politicians. At a time when all European powers had increased, or were increasing, their military expenditure in order to equip their armies with the latest scientific and mechanical inventions, India was falling behind. As the Official History of the War comments: Economy had become a tradition, and the inherent military risks attaching to such a policy had also become a tradition; risks, moreover, which were undertaken successfully and generally which, amid general plaudits, had built up the British Empire; and consequently British officers have always been found ready to take the risks, whose dangers as professional soldiers they thoroughly under-
portance.
absorption of several Moslem countries by Christian ones and was highly critical of Britain when it considered her either privy to the affair or failing in protest even when not directly concerned. Morocco had been absorbed by France, Persia had been divided into Russian and British zones of influence, Tripoli had been lost to unprovoked attack by the Italians, and the two Balkan wars of 1912/13, when Turkey was virtually expelled from Europe, were regarded as nothing but an attack on Islam. Feeling was particularly strong in Afghanistan and among the border tribes, where respect for the Sultan-Caliph was greater than elsewhere.
Above: The
1st
Herts
Yeomanry disembark
at
and every part of the
army were submitted to exhaustive examination. A vast amount of information was collected in readiness for the arrival of the new commander-in-chief and an outline of reorganisation had been framed for his approval. His first year, November
1902 to November 1903, was taken up with internal reorganisation and the renumbering of units to eliminate the last vestiges of the localised Presidency Armies. But the functional proposals of November 1903 were of fundamental importance. Four great principles were enunciated: • The main function of the army was to defend the North-West Frontier against an aggressive enemy; • The army in peace should be organised, distributed and trained in units of com-
Alexandria on September 20, 1914. Britain's concern for India dominated her policy
Finally to be considered is the growing indignation felt for the treatment of Indian immigrants abroad, especially in South Africa. In all, these immigrants numbered some 2,500,000, half being in Ceylon and Malaya, the remainder in British Guiana, Fiji, Mauritius, Natal, the Transvaal and East Africa. They were mainly low-caste men, usually manual workers and small traders; they were regarded as slaves and when they stayed on after their period of indenture was completed their continued presence was bitterly opposed. Some measures had been taken; emigration to the Transvaal was banned in 1907 and that to Natal in 1910. Active in defence of these down-trodden men was a lawyer, by then well known in South Africa but not so well in India. His name was Mohandas
Karamchand Gandhi.
of military policy
in the firm belief that it was a necessary part of their British birthright. We must now turn to the defence potentialities of India. Here we can only examine broadly what military contribution India could make if the Empire became involved in a great war, and how that contribution evolved from the defence policy behind it. stood,
Four new principles Though the Indian Army
of 1914 showed the imprint of the reforms introduced in 1903 by Lord Kitchener, a great deal had been done as the result of the inadequacies highlighted by the Second Afghan War of 1878-9. The old Presidency Armies had been abolished and the unity of the Indian Army had been recognised. Frontier policy had been reoriented by Lord Curzon, and during the years 1900-1903 every branch
in
Egypt
mand
similar to those in which it would field in war; • The maintenance of internal security was a means to an end, namely, to set free the field army to carry out its functions; • All fighting units, in their several spheres, should be equally capable of carrying out all the roles of an army in the field, and that they should be given equal chances, in experience and training, of bearing these roles. The scheme, and the concomitant setting up of nine divisional areas iplus one in Burma) was a great advance, but the concentration of troops towards the frontier to meet aggression, and elsewhere in India to secure training in tactical formations, necessitated the abandonment of 34 garrisons, the movement of a large number of troops, and the building of new quarters
take the
437
Above: Soldiers of the Indian Army. From left to right: A sepoy of the 2nd Gurkha Rifles, a
sepoy of the 4th Gurkha kit, a sowar (Sikh) of the
The British mountain gun This 10-pounder, 2.75-inch gun was the standard equipment of the Indian Army on the North West frontier of India. It was ideally suited to the conditions of frontier warfare as it could be dismantled and broken down into mule loads for ease of transport in rugged mountain conditions. Its usefulness in the flat deserts of Mesopotamia is more questionable, but it remained a sturdy and reliable weapon
438
wearing service Bengal
Rifles, 1
1th
Lancers, a sepoy of the 15th Ludhiana Sikhs, a sepoy of the 26th Punjabis (Pathan)
for them elsewhere. All this was very expensive, and the scheme was never comAs we have seen, the Anglopleted. Japanese alliance, the Russo-Japanese War and the Anglo-Russian convention altered the whole situation, and Kitchener himself, before he left India, acquiesced in, if he did not initiate, a considerable reduction in military expenditure and a relinquishment of part of the increases and additions he had advocated in men, buildings, munitions
and
stores.
Of these reductions those concerning equipment and munitions in all their forms were the most important.
A British-Indian
division, with operations North-West Frontier in
on or beyond the view was on a
much lower
scale as regards supporting arms, artillery, engineers and signals than
European divisions; divisional transport was on a pack or mule-cart basis; medical resources were far below European standards. Such divisions, however admirably led and however magnificent in fighting
fluence of the two rivers stretching from Al Qurnah to Al Faw, should fall into British control for piloting and buoying. Two new factors of potential or actual importance had recently emerged. The first was the projected Baghdad Railway whose threat to Britain's eastern interests was obvious. Though unable to prevent its construction as far as Baghdad or even Basra, Britain could have a big say in any
extension to the Persian Gulf and the location of the terminus. A satisfactory agreement on this and many other points was proposed in July 1912 by Britain and was on the point of ratification when the war came. But the threat of the railway was not immediate. The tunnels in the Taurus and Amanus ranges in Anatolia were far from completion, and the gap entailed a long haul by waggon, pack mule or motor lorry. Railhead, even then, was BLACK SEA
spirit, were severely handicapped if placed beside divisions organised, equipped and trained as were those of the Expeditionary
Force in Britain. The Indian Army in general lacked even in 1914 the backing of almost all the industrial organisation and factories necessary to maintain an army in the field. It lacked mechanical transport,
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aeroplanes, wireless, sufficient field telephones and above all, a modern medical system. By 1914, from a strength of 76,000 British and 159,000 Indian troops, it was found possible to equip, on Indian standards, six infantry divisions and six cavalry brigades. Shortly before war broke out the government of India had been approached with regard to the extent to which India would 'be prepared to co-operate with the Imperial Forces by the despatch and maintenance of reinforcements in the event of serious war breaking out in Europe in which Great Britain may be involved'. After long consideration a reply was sent saying that under normal conditions the Army Council could rely on getting two divisions and one cavalry brigade from India, which might be increased under abnormal conditions and at some risk to India by another division, but that such increase could not
be counted on with any degree of certainty. This reply was not received in London until after the outbreak of war. Such was the attitude of the government of India towards the military help which could be given in a war stemming from Europe, having regard to internal security and to the defence of her own frontiers. In the circumstances it was not an unreasonable position to hold.
The great new need — oil Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf went back to the 17th Century, if not earlier, both for reasons of trade and because of the importance of Mesopotamia as a route to the East. The inevitable threat to India forced Britain to win control of the Persian Gulf with her naval strength and to come to terms with the local rulers. This control also removed the scourge of piracy, slave trading to some extent, and put a check on the internecine wars of the Arab chiefs. For many years Britain had enjoyed navigation rights on the Tigris and Euphrates for commercial vessels, and it was unavoidable that control of the Shatt al Arab, the broad conBritain's interest in
/
7*
* V
in
1882
was
still
under Turkish
suzerainty, though Mohammed Ali, at the beginning of the 18th Century, had won a large measure of independence which was recognised during the reigns of his successors. But a combination of the heavy debts incurred by her rulers and the construction of the Suez Canal had attracted European attention to such an extent that Egyptian finances had virtually come under European control. A nationalist revolt under the leadership of Colonel Arabi was swiftly
put down by a smart campaign under Lord Wolseley, and Cairo was duly occupied. In this affair Britain had acted alone. There is not the slightest doubt that Britain intended to get out as soon as a stable
government had been restored, and peated assurances were
But Egypt was
so far
made
re-
to this effect.
gone into chaos, and
her peasantry so abject and miserable, that Britain was forced to stay, thus guarding that section of the route, but having to pay heavily in various compensatory concessions to Germany, France and even Russia. Egypt, except for her position on the route to India, was a millstone round Britain's neck, but the proposition enunciated by an ex-viceroy of India, Lord Ripon, was judged unanswerable: 'As long as India remains under British rule, the interests of England and of India go far beyond the traffic of the Canal, for they demand that no other nation should be allowed to
dominate Egypt.' /ERITREA
_J
British administered
-HAOHRAMAUT Bound by treaty
e, ,J
and
FR SOIrt
N
Aden
to Britain
\BR SrW;
-
.'
ABYSSINIA
Above: A map
ITALIAN
S0MAULAND
illustrating the
BOO MILES
800
KMS
importance of
Mesopotamia to Great Britain at the outbreak of war. Once the Royal Navy had begun to rely on oil, this whole area became vital for Britain's defence and also for her commerce still 200 miles west of Mosul and the vast distances to the south and east precluded any large-scale offensive by the Ottomans in that direction. But the second factor was of actual and immediate importance. Increasingly, vessels of the Royal Navy were passing from coal to oil fuel and the safety of the wells in Persia and the refinery at Mohammerah had to be ensured. This was recognised by the government of India and had been considered, but no plans had been made. India still looked in a north-westerly
The external defence
of
Egypt was not
thought to present any great problem. Invasion by sea could be ruled out in practical terms, even though in 1912, in order to complete naval superiority in the North Sea, Britain virtually handed over the Mediterranean to French naval protection. From the western landward side, Italy's recent occupation of Tripoli as yet presented no threat, though tribal disturbances in the western desert were possible. On the eastern flank the Sinai desert had been crossed and recrossed by
armies moving in both directions. But to launch an invasion by way of Syria would
tremendous administrative difficulmodern army. To be successful, such an invasion would probably need a rising in Egypt to welcome it. Pan-Islamism was indeed a threat to Egypt but the internal security problem was not conentail
ties for a
sidered outside the capacity of the existing garrison, or of the reinforcements which would certainly arrive in the event of war.
direction.
Aden, a considerable fortified harbour and coaling station, administered by the
Bombay
Presidency, with its companions, Perim Island and Socotra, was maintained as an essential protection to the shortest route to India, Australasia and farther East. Admittedly it was on the mainland of Asia and was contiguous with what was
nominally Turkish territory. But it was not expected that the local Arab tribes, even if reinforced by the infrequent attention of the Turkish government, would be likely to cause any but passing trouble. This attitude was perhaps complacent; Turkey maintained a garrison in the Yemen, used principally as a place of exile officers who had incurred the displeasure of the central government. How Britain came to occupy Egypt in 1882 is one of the most striking illustrations of her concern for her communications with India. Egypt was a Turkish province,
for
Further Reading
Cemal, P., Memories of a Turkish statesman, 1913-1919 (New York: Arno 1973) Churchill, Sir Winston, The World Crisis (Four Square) Imperial Strategy (by the Military Correspondent of The Times) (Murray 1906) Kedourie, E., England and the Middle East 19141921 (Bowes & Bowes 1956) Lloyd, Lord, Egypt since Cromer (Macmillan 1933) The Army in India and its Evolution (Govern-
ment
of India 1924)
The Empire and the Century (various authors) (Murray 1905) Thompson, E., and Garratt, G. T., The Rise and Fulfilment of British Rule in India (Macmillan 1934) Zinkin,
and Zinkin, T., Britain and India: Empire (Chatto & Windus 1964)
M.,
Requiem
for
[For Brigadier Stephenson's biography, see
page
401.
]
439
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Baghdad Railway:
e
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*^*
A German
enterprise in Turkey that threatened most vital interests
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MESOPOTAMIA THE ADVANCE TDBASRA The deterioration
in Britain's relations with Turkey and Germany's thrust to the east put Britain's interests in Persia in jeopardy. As the prospect of Turkey's involvement in the war grew more certain, the Admiralty appealed to the India Office for troops to defend the Persian Gulf. On September 16 Odin, with British and Indian troops aboard, entered the Shatt al Arab. Two months later they were ordered to commence hostilities against the Turks. Gregory Blaxland oil
HMS
1908 an Englishman named G. B. Reynolds made an important discovery. He struck oil in southern Persia, seven years after the search had started and a few days after a telegram had reached
their preparations were complete, Turks announced that they were merely taking precautionary measures.
In
until
the
For the blockade of Abadan they relied, in typically optimistic fashion, on a single gunboat and a few soldiers on the Turkish
him calling off further attempts. A pipeline was laid 140 miles southwards to Abadan, whence ships could take the oil down the River Shatt al Arab and on through the
bank of the Shatt. Their main ambition eastwards was to spread Jehad, or Holy War, as far as India in the name of the Caliph of Islam, Sultan of Turkey, and although the attempt had to contend with a deep schism within the faith, it touched
Persian Gulf to the world beyond. The Royal Navy had no great need of oil until Winston Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911. He conceived a new division of battleships which, being oil-fuelled, would have greater speed, range and gunpower than any possessed by the Germans. While he devoted his great energy to gaining the approval of a Cabinet much concerned about naval expenditure, an admiral was sent off to examine means of supply. The result was the AngloPersian Oil Convention, signed near the end of 1913. Abadan became prominent in British strategic planning. It
lay in the
Sheikhdom
of Mohammerah.
which was under the suzerainty of Persia. The opposite bank of the Shatt, half a mile away, was Turkish territory, as was the whole of Mesopotamia, 'the Land of the Two Rivers', Tigris and Euphrates, whose junction 100 miles inland forms the source of the Shatt. Forming a lone breach through deserts and mountain ranges, the rivers provided what was once the main trading route between Europe and India, and consequently the British had long been active in this area, although without maintaining a military presence. They had gained navigation rights for their steamers on the Shatt and treaties of allegiance from the sheikhs whose territories flanked the Persian Gulf, in exchange for stamping out piracy. The deterioration in Britain's relationship with Turkey, coupled with Ger-
many's vaunted Drang nach Osten (the Thrust to the Easti put British interests in jeopardy, and there was much concern in particular about the concession granted
Germany for the construction of a railway linking Constan nople with Baghdad
to
and onwards
to the Pei
ian Gulf.
However,
the Balkan War of 1912-13, which German aid could not avert, led to a slight improvement in Turkey's relationship with Britain, and an agreement was prepared confirming the latter's rights of navigation and giving
Turkey's humiliation
442
in
the British at a sensitive spot. Militarily, Mesopotamia was regarded by the Turks merely as a recruiting base, and three regular divisions were removed for the invasion of Egypt, leaving only one in occupation, weak in numbers, ill-equipped and reinforced by mutinous conscripts. There were also some battalions of gendarmerie and various tribal levies whose
Above: Viscount Hardinge, Viceroy of India in 1914. A professional diplomat, he was known for his sound understanding of Indian affairs. Right: British officers and Indian troops cross a backwater of the Euphrates in Mesopotamia
her
representation on the board of the
Baghdad Railway Company. for ratification
It was ready by the end of July 1914.
The railway line meanwhile had made slow progress. There were gaps between Konia and Baghdad amounting to 500 miles, and eastwards of Baghdad construction had not been started. Troop movement could achieve little more than its primeval speed, which was that of a raft along an ever-winding river. If the Royal Navy needed oil it also hungered for ships, and as if reckless of the risk to the oil the First Lord ordered the seizure of two battleships being built for Turkey in British dockyards, as part of his moves anticipating war in late July 1914. The crew of one had already arrived to take over and felt a bitterness that sped to Constantinople. On August 2, Germany, already at war with Russia, made a secret pact with Turkey. Not being able to conceal the sprawling process of mobilisation and anxious not to become involved in war
loyalty was governed by self-interest, which in turn depended on which was the winning side. There was no thought of deploying this force to meet a British invasion, and although troops were moved to Basra, 70 miles from the mouth of the Shatt and 400 by river from Baghdad, their function appears to have been to preserve order during the rounding up of ruffian
The
according to a investigated the lack of preparation, was: 'How could England, with its little army, add aggressive action against the Turks to her contest with the German millions?' This of course was a product of German wooing.
conscripts.
Turkish
attitude,
staff officer
who
Acts of hostility Britain similarly had no plans ready for the protection of Abadan, although the matter had been discussed at military level. However, the danger of war with Turkey soon became apparent from consular reports of troop movements and acts of against British subjects and hostility property. The first request for the despatch of troops to Abadan came from the Admiralty on August 25, and because the Persian Gulf came under the political tutelage of India, it was made to the India Office, the department of the home government responsible for Indian affairs. Its Secretary of State, the Earl of Crewe, was a member of Asquith's cabinet, and the Viceroy at Delhi awaiting his orders was Viscount Hardinge, a professional diplomat
m
.;••'»
Far left, top: Indian troops on the march — to the accompaniment of bagpipes and drum. Far left, bottom: Three Sikh soldiers pose beside a mule supply train in Mesopotamia. Top left: British troops construct a military observation tower out of sandbags. Bottom left: LieutenantGeneral Sir Arthur Barrett (seated centre), divisional commander of the first British expedition to Mesopotamia
who was eager to improve the lot of his people and who was sensitive to their aspirations.
The Indian Army consisted of 76,000 British and 159,000 Indian troops, all regulars voluntarily enlisted, backed by a puny reserve. They were there for the defence of India against external and internal threat, and there had long been strong resistance to any suggestion that plans should be prepared for the use of any of the troops elsewhere. However, an improved relationship with Russia much reduced the external threat, and with the prospect of war in Europe growing blacker, the government of India at length relented and agreed to make two infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade available for despatch to Europe. In the event, this force was increased to one cavalry and three infantry divisions, the first of whom left India on August 24, leaving the remainder to march and countermarch around their training areas until the return of the ships. An additional mixed brigade was at the same time mobilised for an expedition against German East Africa. The viceroy was well aware of the risk to the security of India and accepted it. Another risk, for which he was partly responsible, should have been less acceptable. India needed money for many projects, and since the detente with Russia, military expenditure had been reduced to the minimum to provide it. Operational divisions were cut from nine to seven, with administrative units sufficient only for fighting a frontier campaign from established bases. There was no motor transport and no aeroplane unit. Worst of all, the medical service was sadly depleted. There was a deficiency of 300 — 400 medical officers and 200 assistant surgeons, and the Army Bearer Corps was 1,850 men short of the 4,500 to which it had belatedly been decided to raise it.
The gulf undefended The Admiralty's plea for troops to protect the Abadan oil refinery had a sympathetic hearing at the India Office, where there was concern about the political consequences of 'leaving the head of the Persian Gulf derelict' and the sheikhdoms of Mohammerah and Kuwait to the mercy of the Turks. But other factors carried weight in the cabinet, among them the need to concentrate all on the campaign in Europe. Indeed, Churchill accepted the paramount claim of this need. 'Indian forces must be used at the decisive point,' he replied on September 1 to a submission from his Admiralty staff. 'We shall have to buy our oil from elsewhere.' Others were worried about the danger of provocative action at a time when Turkey was merely making threatening noises and might welcome cause to send charges of British ag-
gression ringing round the
Moslem
world.
Consequently many words were passed by mouth, minute and telegraph, and the only thing done was to send a second sloop to join the one already patrolling the head
of the Persian Gulf, On September l<> the Odin, entered the Shatt al first sloop. Arab, churning up the mud as at high tide she scraped the alluvial bar that had formed across the one and a half miles of
HMS
its mouth. She was of elegant line, mounting six 4-inch guns and four 3-pounders, and was thought capable of sinking the Turks" one gunboat and of protecting Ahadan against ground attack. After reporting fresh earthworks on the Turkish side of the river, the Odin put in at Mohammerah, home port of the friendly sheikh, which was just inside the River Karun and some ten miles upriver from Abadan. The Turks vainly tried to remove her by protesting against the violation of neutrality. Meanwhile signs of Turkey's belligerent
intent were accumulating, and from India's point of. view the most worrying of these were the activities of agents bent on winning over the Arabs as a preliminary to the proclamation of the Jehad. This led the military secretary at the India Office,
Major-General Barrow,
to
submit an appre-
ciation advocating an immediate landing at Abadan 'ostensibly to protect the oil installation, but in reality to notify to the Turks that we meant business and to the Arabs that we were ready to support them. So startling and unexpected a sign of our power to strike would at once determine the attitude of the sheikhs.'
This document, coupled with the easing of the battle crisis in France, which made Turkish troops leave their trenches to launch an attack across muddy plains near Basra
the need for troops less pressing, set the British intervention in motion. On the day of its issue, September 26, the viceroy was warned to be ready to divert the third of his infantry divisions earmarked for Europe for an expedition to the Persian
On
October 2 warning was converted to definite instruction: a brigade group was to be despatched, with a sealed order to be opened at sea notifying its destination as Abadan. Having passed on instructions for this move, the viceroy pondered on its consequences and sent a telegram beginning with the words, 'I suppose it has occurred Gulf.
to you,'
and pointing
to the risk of protest
from the Persian government at this landing on their territory and to its likely effect on Moslem Indians. This had not been fully appreciated at home. The outcome, strained out of continual exchanges between London and Delhi over a further eight days, was that the destination of the brigade group was altered to Bahrain, an island 300 miles from the head of the Persian Gulf on which British troops had the right to land by treaty. They would be in position here to fortify the morale of the sheikhs and to intervene in defence of the Abadan refinery if war with Turkey broke out. The brigade selected was the 16th Infantry Brigade of the 6th (Poona) Division, and its commander,
Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, had instructions brought to him by a staff officer from GHQ, Simla, where the
Commander-in-Chief, General Sir BeauDuff, had just had the management of the expedition added to the many other
champ
responsibilities he bore in his dual capacity as soldier and administrator, as Comman-
der-in-Chief and Military Member of the Viceroy's Council. Delamain's instructions contained three 'plans of operation' he was to be ready to execute, with suggestions, but no more, as to his best course of action. It was rare for a brigadier to have such latitude. The brigade consisted of the mixture that became standard after the Mutiny of 1857, one British battalion (2nd Battalion the Dorsetshire Regiment) and three Indian ones (20th Punjabis, 104th Rifles and 117th Mahrattas) in which British officers held the more senior and technical appointments and Indian officers the remainder. All were over 800 strong, and with two batteries of Indian Mountain Artillery (each with six 10-pounder guns), a company of Indian Sappers and Miners and various ancillaries added, the force had over 5,000 officers and men and 1,290 chargers and pack mules, the latter being the only form of transport. All were embarked at Bombay or Karachi by the evening of October 15, after some muddles in transit and delay caused by the belated realisation that for entry into the Shatt ships of shallow draught were needed, the procuring of which set the whole of Bombay buzzing with news of the destination. They sailed next day tight packed in five transports,
which were part of a large convoy of ships, some bound for Europe and some for East Africa in a great sprouting forth of the Indian Army. Not until their ships parted company with the others were the men told their destination. The remainder of the 6th Division was meanwhile held in readiness to follow, but officially
without knowing where, except by enquiry at the bazaar.
'Commence
hostilities' escort,
on the watch for the German cruiser SMS Emden, the transports reached Bahrain on the 23rd. There were orders here, emanating from the Admiralty, that the troops were to stay on board, and the only release from close
With battleship
confinement which was made grim by heat and a shortage of water, came in practising landing drills in rowing boats.
stifling
On
the 31st, following the bombardment of Odessa by the Turks, the Admiralty signalled, 'Commence hostilities against Turkey,' and next day Delamain received the order: 'Clear Turks out of the Shatt and its vicinity as far as Shamshamiya if possible' (just beyond Mohammerah). Action
was assured at last. The first essential was to wipe out the Turkish fort at Al Faw, which stood on the tip of the tongue of land forming one side of the Shatt's mouth. major^f the Dorsets
A
was sent
to
could about
Kuwait its
what he meanwhile
to find out
defences, and
the transports sailed to the head of the gulf with their naval escort, from which pre-dreadnought battleship, the Ocean, had to drop out as the water level subsided. Minesweeping at the mouth of the Shatt began on the evening of November 3, and on the 5th, which was the day of Britain's formal declaration of war against Turkey, the Dorset major returned with the news that the fort of Al Faw was in ruins but was thought to be held by 400 troops with seven or eight guns. At dawn next morning the sloop Odin, which had been relieved at Mohammerah by a sister sloop, HMS Espiegle, sailed up the river with two little minesweepers,
HMS
meeting a stream of fishing dhows coming downriver. Battle began at 1000 hours, when some shells whistled in from the hazy outline of palms and fort on the distant
downstream located the
man
shore. The Odin closed, enemy guns, which were Ger-
guns numbering only four, and after 40 minutes' pounding with her 4-inch guns, suffering only two hits in exchange. Closer inshore the Odin encountered the crackle of rifle fire from trenches by the river bank. Her gunners turned to shrapnel, which from 500 yards barked above the trenches with deadly effect, sending their occupants scuttling and flopping among the palm trees. Forty miles upstream the Espiegle accorded similar treatment to some Turks enfield
silenced
them
trenched opposite the Abadan refinery.
In the early afternoon two of the transports and a naval launch sailed upriver with 17 boats in tow, containing Royal Marines and Dorsets wearing pith helmets,
turbaned Punjabis and Mahrattas. They passed the old fort and trenches without
drawing a shot and sailed a further four miles. The boats then cast off and made for shore in line, on gaining which the men clambered out and struggled through soft sand to the palm belt, groggy on their feet after three weeks in cramped quarters on board ship. They found the Turks had gone, leaving among their dead the garrison commander, who had only just arrived from Basra. The Odin had gained the victory on her own. It was a dramatic start. Despite the haphazard conception of the operation, Britain had invaded enemy territory on the morrow of declaring war. The troops had their first taste that night of the torment 'Mespot' could inflict. It had been hot, very hot, when they landed, and now it was desperately cold and a wind howled from the river, against which cotton khaki drill and other items of the Indian winter scale of clothing provided feeble protection. Having thrown the Turks' guns into the river, the troops re-embarked next day, and on the 8th landed unopposed at the village of Sanniya, two miles beyond Abadan. The whole brigade disembarked here, an extremely laborious business lasting over two days, for the banks were high, the current strong, and the only craft able
to bring the mules ashore were eight lifeboats specially made by the sappers. Delamain's task was almost accomplished, without a shot being fired on land. He now heard that an attack was going to be made on his camp at dawn on the 11th. It duly came in, made by 300 Turks, and was comfortably halted by the Mahrattas and repulsed by the Punjabis, who charged through the date palms. The Indians had ten casualties and were left with 37 of the enemy, dead and prisoner. Hearing that a much larger Turkish force was assembling and being cut off from India by wireless failure, Delamain decided to stand his ground for the time being, and the rain that now descended turned the ground to such a quagmire that it would have been impossible to do anything else. On the 13th news arrived that his
divisional commander, Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett, was at the bar of the river. He was unaware of the situation and had no definite instructions other than that
he was to assume command. With him were a second infantry brigade, three batteries of field artillery, two squadrons of cavalry
and
various ancillary units, including 1,200 camels, the whole filling 18 transports, two of which were too heavily laden to cross the bar. Disembarkation at Sanniya was spread out ovt four days, during the course of which at nal arrived for Barrett: 'Your objective Basra.' This port of legendary fame wa; a further 32 miles upriver. Although usei as a base, he defence its capture was not essential foi of Abadan, and it appears that t. e viceroy, who himself issued the order, wa. lured on '
I
448 .
to impress the Arabs and likewise his people in India. At dawn on the 15th, Delamain's brigade set off on a reconnaissance in force, led by the Dorsets fanned out across the squelchy plain with the riverside belt of palm trees, in places a mile wide, on the right. Over 2,000 Turkish infantry — dark men in coarse khaki uniforms — were in position among the palms, around the village of Saihan, with 800 levies and eight guns, and after some tough fighting they were driven out by the professionals from India with expert aid from the mountain batteries. The Turks left 160 dead and 25 prisoners, against nine killed and 53 wounded, mostly Dorsets. By mid-day Delamain had brought his men back to camp.
by the need
Close-quarter fighting Heartened by this success and urged
to
boldness by his political officer for its effect on the Sheikh of Mohammerah, Barrett set his whole force in motion on the 17th, leaving one battery of guns to follow when disembarked. The cavalry reported that an old mud fort beyond a bend in the river named Sahil was held by the Turks. The newly arrived 18th Brigade, forming the advanced guard, had meanwhile begun a wide turning movement across the plain, intended to envelop the right of any enemy position and drive its defenders to the riverbanks, where they could be shot up by the sloops. With this object in view, the brigade was now directed on a mosque that could be seen in front of the palms three miles to the left of the fort. The 7th Rajputs led, with the 2nd Battalion
the Norfolk Regiment coming up on their right. Some shrapnel shells burst on ground impact among them without doing much harm, and then came a furious rain shower. With 200 rounds of -303 and the day's ration to carry — and in the case of the more weather-conscious 16th Brigade a great coat as well — desperate exertion was needed to keep moving through the mire. The 16th Brigade was brought up on the right to attack the fort, while the 18th flopped down in the mud to await its alignment. Mules, horses and gun teams tugged and heaved to get the mountain and field guns in position between the two widespread arrays of rain-soaked men, who soon began to steam in the sunlight. As the advance was resumed another furious shower produced mist which in turn was dissolved by the broiling sun and replaced by another speciality of the region, a mirage. Palm trees looked like charging elephants and the mosque a wobbling mountain, and it was impossible for the
gunners to direct their fire. Ankle-deep in clinging mud but with improving, the Dorsets led 16th Brigade against the fort. They came under wild rifle fire from their left, where black visibility
puffs of
smoke revealed Arabs
tinuous trench
line,
in a con-
and soon afterwards
much harder to better directed fire, observe, hit them from their right, revealing Turks in a position on the near side of the fort. Bringing their two machine guns into action, the Dorsets struggled to face this unexpected threat, while the Sappers and Miners, Mahrattas and Rifles came round their right to attack through the
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left: British soldiers find relief from the fierce heat of the Land of the Two Rivers' Above: Captivity -one of the realities of war Below: The British landings in Mesopotamia and the taking of Basra. During the action the Turks lost 1,500 men and 150 prisoners, against a British loss of 489 men
* Basra*
NOV
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merah
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Forts
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gale now sprang up to complicate the task of collecting the wounded and deprive the troops of the food and clothing that should have been landed for them.
The Turkish command panicked at news and pulled out of Basra with
of the defeat
*
or wounded and 150 prisoners, against a British loss of 489, 170 of them Dorsets.
Pipeline 10
20Miles
h 15
Bubiyan Island
Persian
Gu ,f
30Kms.
such speed that three battalions were left to follow by instinct. Word of the departure reached General Barrett on November 20, and next day the sloops Odin and Espiegle berthed in the evening at the town's decrepit harbour, having with difficulty squeezed a passage through a block island.
gans who had just set light to the customs house. Sailors went ashore to begin the task of pacification and next day Indian troops, brought by steamer, completed it. The main body arrived around noon on the 23rd, having toiled across countless irrigation ditches in a 28-mile march began at 2000 hours the previous evening. On the 24th they made a ceremonial entry the picturesque yet squalid town, heard a proclamation read promising the people liberty and justice, and gave three cheers for the King. They then began clearing the filth from their allotted camping areas and rounding up villains for hanging in the square. It was a squeeze to fit the division into the few patches of land not subject to tidal flooding, and it was a complicated task to draw sufficient water from the centre of the river, where alone it was fit for drinking. Cases of dysentery were soon reported. into
After some tense close-quarter a rush by the Dorsets brought the British into the plantation by the fort, whereupon brown and white clad figures erupted from the entire enemy line and made off northwards through the palms. They were saved from annihilation by the tenacity of their gunners, the slow progress made on the British left, the bad visibility and the mud, through which the cavalry could scarcely trot. Nevertheless the Turks had lost over 1,500 killed
palms.
fighting,
ships sunk off Shamshamiya The town was in the grip of hooli-
of
Meanwhile Barrett was wondering what he might be required to do next. There was no doubt in the mind of his political officer, Sir Percy Cox. 'Effect of the recent defeat has been very great,' he advised the viceroy, 'and if advance is made before it wears off
Baghdad
will in all probability fall into
our hands very easily.' Enver Pasha, Turkey's dynamic war minister, was equally aware of the need for prompt action.
Further Reading Atkinson, C. T., The Dorsetshire Regiment 1914-
1918 Barker, A. J., The Neglected War (Faber & Faber 1967) Churchill, Sir Winston, The World Crisis (Four
Square) Dane, E., British Campaigns
in the Near East (Hodder & Stoughton 1919) Kearsey, A., A Study of the Mesopotamia Campaign (Gale & Polden 1934)
Moberly,
Brig-Gen.
F.
J.,
The Campaign
in
Mesopotamia (HMSO Petre,
F.
L.,
1923) History of the Norfolk
Regiment
1914-1918
GREGORY BLAXLAND was born
in 1918 in Norwich and entered the army through Sandhurst. During the Second World War he served with The Buffs in Flanders, Tunisia, Sicily and Italy, and in the Far East just after the end of the war. After staff experience as a brigade major, he rejoined The Buffs in Kenya in 1954, only to be laid low by polio. Since this he has been writing, starting as a sporting journalist, but turning to weightier subjects with J. H. Thomas: A Life for Unity. He has also written Objective: Egypt, Amiens 1918 and The Farewell Years The Buffs.
1948-67.
449
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General Nixon- -the next Commander-in-Chief General Sir John Eccles Nixon was 57 when, in April 1915, he took over command of the Mesopotamia Expeditionary Force. A dedicated man, he had grown grey in the service of the Queen. Educated at Wellington and commissioned into the 18th Bengal Lancers in 1878, Nixon fought in Afghanistan, on the Northwest Frontier, and in South Africa. Like his controversial subordinate in Mesopotamia, Townshend, Nixon owed his advancement primarily to Kitchener, who had been impressed by the combination of professionalism and dash which Nixon had shown — first as a cavalry brigade commander during the Boer War, later as Inspector General of the Cavalry in India, and
an infantry divisional commander. In his turn, Nixon had been similarly impressed by the selfsame qualities in Townshend. In 1895, as an Intelligence staff officer with the force sent to relieve Chitral, Nixon first learned of Townshend's epic defence of the Chitral Fort. Twenty years later, when Nixon was commander of the S«,thern Army in India, Townshend was one of his brigaq|fers, and it was he who recommended that Townshend should be given a division. Nixon was outspoken and honesf-'-and was always popular among soldiers, especially Indian soldiers whose languages he finally as
spoke fluently. Ever an optimist, he was not a man with the 'Nelson touch'. Yet for six months, when no other British commander could say the same, Nixon's operations in Mesopotamia were a series of unbroken successes for which he was congratulated by King George V and thanked both by the British and the Indian Government. At that time his lack of vision, his incapacity to see beyond the immediate field, his rash impetuosity and confident optimism were considered to be qualities which made for a great commander. In reality, Nixon was not a great commander, but he was always prepared to take a risk, and no general ever achieved great military success without taking risks or committing errors. In November 1915, it was known that the Mesopotamian expeditionary force might have to advance as far as Amara and Nasiriyeh. Nixon's predecessor, General Barrett, was well aware of this and if he knew it, the Force's headquarters must have known it. Yet they did nothing about procuring the all-important river transport so necessary for an advance. Faced with inefficiency at this level, Nixon lacked the streak of ruthlessness necessary to handle it. And it was at this point in his career that his luck appeared to turn
Major-General To wnshend — Nixon's senior commander Charles Vere Ferrers Townshend was born on February 21, 1861. Until 1917 he was the heir presumptive of the 5th Marquis Townshend of Raynham, and for many years was greatly preoccupied with the glories, prerogatives and vicissitudes of the Townshend family and estates. (It was to his great regret that he never succeeded to the title.) Excessively ambitious, Townshend was a restless character and an incessant string-puller. No sooner had he obtained one appointment than he was thirsting for change and pestering his influential friends for help towards another step on the ladder of success. Never a modest man, he contrived by influence and self advertisement to figure in several late Victorian campaigns. In India the importuning of senior officers led to his receiving a direct rebuke from the Commanderin-Chief, who told him that it was not 'desirable' for officers to
urge their own advancement.
But Townshend was an able soldier and his first real opportunity to show his ability came in 1895, when four Europeans and 300 Indian troops were besieged by tribesmen in Chitral Fort in the far north of India. Until a relief force arrived, 'Chitral Charlie', as Townshend was to become known,
undertook the defence of the fort and showed himself to be both courageous and a good leader. At the end of the siege he was rewarded with honours and promotion and there is little doubt that his six weeks in Chitral had an enormous influence on his future military thinking. After Chitral, Townshend joined the Egyptian Army and fought in the battles of Atbara and Omdurman where his professional dedication first came to the notice of Kitchener. Promoted to major-general in 1911, he commanded a territorial division for two years before being given command of a regular
When war broke out he was penning asking for a command in France. Fond of all the good things of life, Townshend was a noted ladies' man, entertainer and raconteur. He was an ardent admirer of Napoleon, a keen student of military history and his ideas on training troops were in advance of the times. (He was one of the first generals to take senior NCO's into his confidence and have them attend military conferences.) In 1915 Townshend's early successes as commander of the 6th (Poona) Division in Mesopotamia added to his reputation and infantry brigade in India.
letters to friends
inspired in the
Turks a marked respect
for his capabilities
he Anglo-Persian Oil Company at Abadan, Persia, in 1914; a Company anker moored alongside the quay. At the end of 1914, when Turkey joined the Central Powers, British presence in the Middle East consisted of just one Indian brigade on Abadan Island.
'•
^/*m^.n<
THE SECOND BATTLE OF
WARSAW As the Russians prepared
Command
to
push forward
into
Germany
in the
autumn
German High and advance on Warsaw
of 1914, the
conceived a plan to forestall the Russians by a flank attack from the north-west. The first few days of the attack went well, but then the distances involved and the poor conditions prevailing restored the stalemate. Norman Stone explains the plans and details the slowly stagnating action. Above: A German reconnaissance patrol watches for any sign of Russian opposition to the swiftly advancing German advance guards
mm
At the end of October 1914, the situation on the Eastern Front became more than usually difficult for the Germans and their Ludendorff 's offensive in October had proved a failure: his army and those of ally.
Austria-Hungary were in
full retreat, in-
dulging as they did so in futile recrimination. It looked as if the Russians were about to invade Germany with nearly twice the number of troops available to the Central Powers in the East. Certainly, the Russian High Command — Stavka — had about 2,000,000 men in the bend of the Vistula ready to achieve 'the goal to which all our efforts must be directed: the invasion of Germany'. Commander-in-Chief, Russian The
Grand Duke Nicholas, told his French allies that he had won a great victory; and English newspapers began to talk exultantly of 'the Russian steamroller'. They forgot that steamrollers are ineffective if there are no roads and this was the case in Russian Poland. As soon as the Russians advanced beyond their rail-heads they ran into supply difficulties, and the further they went, the more difficult it became to transfer reserves from one part of the front to another. As a result, their planned invasion of Germany did not get under way
immediately. At the beginning of November, the Russians looked forward eagerly to the collapse of the enemy front. The Grand Duke had massed four armies in the bend of the Vistula, from north to south Second, Fifth, Fourth and Ninth. He intended to set these marching towards Germany. Their flanks would be protected in the north, along the East Prussian border and the Vistula below Warsaw by Tenth and First Armies, and in the south, in Galicia and along the Carpathians, by Third, Eleventh and Eighth Armies. The plan was above all to destroy the German army and thus show the French that they had not wasted their money in investing in Russia. If the Germans could be defeated in the East, they would have to suspend their operations in the West and rush reinforcements to the East, and this was what the Grand Duke
hoped
for.
'Alarming shortage of officers' His plan met strong objections from the commander of the south-western front, Ivanov, who preferred to stand on the defensive against the Germans, and concentrate instead against Austria-Hungary. Ivanov's Chief-of- Staff, Alexeyev, pointed in a memorandum to the weakness of the south-western group, where casualties had been high and where lack of officers 'has
taken alarming proportions'. According to Alexeyev, the Austro-Hungarian army was far from beaten and against it the Russians would need everything they could spare.
Alexeyev really wanted Fourth Army to turn south-west on Krakow, while Ninth and Third Armies advanced on both banks of
the
Vistula
defeat the stricken Austro-Hungarian First Army. Stavka, on the other hand, regarded the defeat of Austria-Hungary as comparatively unimportant, and Danilov, of Stavka, told Ivanov that the invasion of Germany was 'the essential goal of the war'. Stavka wanted a quite different course of action from Ivanov's front: Fourth and Ninth Armies were to march due west, against the Germans, and were to leave the defence of the front north-east of Krakow and to
QMG
Grand Duke ordered on the 12th that the offensive should begin on November 14. As the Germans fell back on Czestochowa and Kalisz early in the month, they had little idea what to do next. They appealed to Falkenhayn for reinforcements, and stated that Germany was in terrible dan-
The fate of Austria will
be decided on the Seine, not on the Bug'
Ludendorff travelled to Berlin late in October to plead with Falkenhayn for
ger.
He was told that the Germans in the West had their hands full, that they were
help.
along the San to Third Army. In the upshot, a blundering compromise was reached. Ivanov was allowed to keep Third Army on the San; and the defence of the front north-east
of
Krakow was
allotted
to
Ninth Army, which thus fell out of the 'steamroller'. Fourth Army, none the less, would march west against the Germans, parallel with Second and Fifth Armies. In this way, the Russians fell between two stools. The 'steamroller', without Ninth Army, was too weak for its task and the front against Austria-Hungary, without Fourth Army, was not capable of serious activity. Still,
Stavka went ahead with
its
plans
for the invasion. In the conviction that the
Germans had been
decisively beaten and were retreating in disorder on Kalisz, Wieleri and Czestochowa, the armies of the North- Western Front, under Ruzsky, were prepared for a massive pursuit. In the north, Tenth Army (Sievers) would invade East Prussia with a strong force of 20 divisions to offset what Danilov called 'a superstitious fear of the area'. First
Army (Rennenkampf would advance along )
the Vistula below Warsaw, with a strong group — V Siberian Corps (Sidorin) and some cavalry — at Wloclawek. Further south, facing west, came the armies of the steamroller — Scheidemann's Second Army, centring on Leczyca with ten divisions, Plehve's Fifth Army, between Piotr-
kow and Przedborz with
six divisions,
and
Evert's Fourth with ten infantry divisions between Przedborz and Miechow. South of Fourth Army opposite Krakow stood Lechitsky's Ninth Army, while on the south bank of the Vistula, Third, Eighth
and Eleventh Armies were operating against Austria-Hungary. The Russians' task was to push forward Fourth Army against the Germans in Silesia, capture the rich industrial regions there, and pin down the German Ninth Army (Mackensen).
While Fourth
Army made
this frontal
attack on the Silesian border, Second and Fifth Armies were to move forward over the Warta on the flank of the German position between Kalisz and Czestochowa. Preparations for all this took time. The Germans had retreated a long way, right back to the border, and the Russians had to follow them. In retreating, the Germans destroyed railways and roads as much as possible: they blew up the tunnel at Miechow and all the curved rails for a mile on it. The Russians ran into terrible difficulties of supply as they advanced: a Guards division of Fourth
either side of
Army was
supplied only by horse and cart along 120 miles of indifferent road in bad weather, and Fourth Army command announced that it could not begin its attack on the Germans until it had received 25 tons of biscuit. In the end, these had to be brought up by commandeered automobiles driven by staff officers. As a result, the Russians took a fortnight to advance over the area left to them by the Germans. The
about to turn the Anglo-French flank at Ypres and that they could send nothing much to the East until the middle of the month, perhaps later. At bottom, Falkenhayn believed that the Eastern Front did not greatly matter. As Schlieffen had said, 'the fate of Austria will be decided on the Seine, not on the Bug'. He cared little for the East, so long as things did not go too badly, and also disliked sending reinforceto Hindenburg and Ludendorff, could easily replace him and who already enjoyed great popularity. As a sop,
ments
who
and maybe to raise his position vis-a-vis the Austro-Hungarian army, Hindenburg was given on November 1, the title Oberbefehlshaber der deutschen Streitkrafte im Osten, shortened to Oberost, signifying his command over Ninth Army (Mackensen) at Czestochowa and Eighth Army in East Prussia. Hindenburg and his staff were clear that, without reinforcements, they stood little chance of warding off the Russian invasion of Silesia. They also had little faith in the powers of resistance of the AustroHungarian First Army (Dankl) on their right. Mackensen, in charge of Ninth
Army, felt much the same: 'We must find some means or other of attacking.' No attack could be more effective in preventing the Russian invasion from getting under a stroke from Thorn up the Vistula, straight into the flank of the steamroller armies, and the Germans learnt that their enemy would remain inactive for the next few days. They had cracked the Russian code, and were therefore able to listen into the Russian radio which, in view of the. poorness of communications between Warsaw and the army headquarters, provided the Russians with their only means of command. From this source, the Germans knew of the Russians' movements in detail and their official historian rightly says, 'seldom has any commander in a war of movement had such a sure basis for his decisions as Hindenburg on the 3rd of November, 1914'. Hindenburg decided to transfer most of his Ninth Army from Czestochowa to the north, by Thorn. He had two large railway lines at his disposal, running all round the front — one from Rzeszow and Tarnow in Galicia to Kattowice in Silesia and thence to Thorn and East Prussia, the other from Sanok in Galicia to Oderberg in Silesia and thence to Poznan. The Russians, by contrast, had only one such line, WarsawIvangorod-Radom, for four times as many troops. Hindenburg decided to transport his troops along these lines, and by November 10 the German Ninth Army had been, as one authority says, 'spirited away'. It was, even with the remarkably good state of the German railways, quite a feal to send over 250,000 men in live days from one part of Poland to another, and the Russians were utterly taken by surprise. Ninth Army was to plunge forward into the Russian flank, between the Russian First
way than
455
The
fear
now
info
nagging the Russians
— the possibility of
T the :tf
Gu
another Tannenberg
am til
ha
Krupp 120-mm howitzer, in use with the Russians. Weight 26 cwt. Crew: 5-6. Rate of fire: 4-5 rounds-per-minute. Range: 7,400 yards. Weight of shell: 46 pounds. Below: The Second Battle of Warsaw. The German plan Left:
ali
:
was
to thwart the intended Russian invasion of the eastern areas of Germany. And though
the short-term aim, the capture of Warsaw, was not attained, the Russians were taken completely by surprise and prevented from invading the German Reich
NINTH (
ARMY
XXVR CORPS IR CORPS
Mackensen )
XX CORPS XVII
CORPS
Strzelno*
Warsaw
456 it
th mi on
and Second Armies, and the expected reinforcements would exploit the success.
Germans attempted a cavalry feint from Thorn. From a strategic point of view, these
left the previous front of virtually uncovered -only two corps, Woyrsch's Landwehr and Gallwitz' Guards, now stood between the steamroller and Silesia. This was a risk that had to be taken if Mackensen's flank attack were to have enough force behind it. There was also some advantage, inasmuch as the fur-
dispositions were very dangerous: Second and Fifth Armies were moving west, and had organised themselves in order to do so,
This operation
the
army
ther the Russians advanced, the more vulnerable they would then be to a stroke on their flank. At all events, the Germans had to prepare for the invasion of their country. The population of Breslau began to trek out to the west, remembering what had happened to their countrymen in East Prussia when the Russians invaded in August. 60,000 young men who were oniy just under military age were taken off to central Germany; the pithead coal of the Silesian mines was carted off, and arrangements were made to blow up the mines if However the the Russians appeared.
Austro-Hungarian High
Command
offered
defend Silesia for the Germans, and proposed on November 7 that their Second Army (Bohm-Ermolli) should be sent to Silesia with five divisions. Conrad did this purely out of generosity, as Hoffmann, Ludendorff's GSO 1 wrote, This man of genius at once saw how right it was to to
attack from Thorn'. Conrad was willing an absolute defeat of his armies in the Carpathians — much weakened by the
to risk
withdrawal of his Second Army — if this would save Silesia and contribute to a great victory in Poland. At all events, Silesia was relatively safe, and the rear of Ninth Army was protected. By November 10, Ninth Army was drawn up in its new positions, with little interference from the Russians. Behind a cavalry screen, of Frommel's cavalry corps, stood XI Corps at Jarotschin, XVII at Wreschen and XX at Hohensalza. From East Prussia came / Reserve Corps to Thorn, with XXV Reserve Corps north-east of it. On the 12th there arrived in Thorn the 3rd Guard Division taken from Gallwitz' Corps in the south. Mackensen's Chief-ofStaff, Griinert, called
the corps chiefs-of-
and instructed them to begin their advance on the 11th. First, I Reserve Corps and XX Corps were to move on Wioclawek and destroy the Russian V Siberian Corps standing isolated there. Then the other corps would engage the Russian Second Army by marching southeast, on the important town of Lodz. Noone had a very clear idea of what would then happen, but the invading Russian armies would be thrown into such confusion
staff together
that they could scarcely recover.
and Second was in fact struck from the north by greatly superior forces. Tactically as well, the Russian dispositions were disastrous to them, for their armies and corps lay separated by wide distances. V Siberian Corps was isolated at Wioclawek and the neighbouring VI Siberian Corps was on the other side of the Vistula, and the only crossing in the region was at Wyszogrod, 30 miles up-river. Between V Siberian Corps and the nearest elements of Second Army to the south there was another gap of several miles: and Second Army was itself spread over 55 miles — II Corps north-west of Leczyca, XXIII at Chelmo and Dabie on the lower Ner, IV to the south of XXIII and at Piotrkow, with a cavalry corps (Novikov) on the Warta at Sieradz. To the south came Fifth Army's three corps — I Siberian, XIX and on a front of 30 miles between Piotrkow and Przedborz. Second Army's corps were too far strung out to help each other very much, let alone help V Siberian Corps, and Fifth Army's corps could not move fast to the help of Second Army, although as events turned out they moved with a quite remarkable speed. In these circumstances, the German thrust achieved extraordinary success in the initial stages. On the 11th, without a special order, the German Ninth Army began its advance. The two left-hand corps—/ Reserve and were expected to destroy V Siberian Corps at Wioclawek: / Reserve Corps Corps would move up the Vistula, would go forward on his right, turn V Siberian Corps' flank and fall on its rear. Meanwhile, the two regular corps on Corps' right would advance south-east over territory known to be empty of Russians until they hit the Russian line. Reserve Corps would follow in I Reserve Corps' tracks, and 3rd Guard Division would prepare to advance after it arrived in Thorn. On the 1 1th and 12th came the engagement at Wioclawek. The German corps attacked two divisions from V Siberian Corps frontally at Wioclawek and Brzesko, while Corps tackled the other one by Lubraniec and Izbica, hoping to sweep up V Siberian Corps' left. In fact I Reserve Corps' attack was too resolute, and it pushed the RusCorps' sians so far back that the effect of flank-attack was not felt. Corps was too far away on / Reserve Corps' right for it to intervene in time. As a result, V Siberian Corps escaped up the Vistula in the direction of Plock. It was badly shaken, and, as events proved, scarcely capable of I
V—
XX—
XX
XX
XXV
XX
XX
XX
action, but
Rapid German success When the Germans struck, they achieved
sen of the
a
very rapid success largely because the Russian armies were arranged to fight a different battle altogether. Ruszky, the Russian commander of the north-west group of armies, supposed that the main German force was still between Kalisz and Czestochowa waiting to be attacked. He ordered Fourth Army to move forward in a frontal attack on these lines, and expected Fifth and Second Armies to march westward over the Warta to grip the northern flank of the Germans at Kalisz, while First Army did little more than police the right bank of the Vistula, with V Siberian Corps to guard its left, at Wioclawek, in case the
it
had been kept
intact.
Macken-
German Ninth Army
recognised this, announcing in an order that the Wioclawek attack 'has not entirely come up to expectations'. Just the same, his army could now move south against the Russian Second Army in the certainty that its left was secure. On November 13, there was no fighting of any importance, as the two sides shaped up to the new situation. Only on the 14th, when the German corps had come up against the Russian line, did events begin to move again, with the battle of Kutno, lasting until
November
16.
The Russians were still not aware of the danger to them. Ruzsky reported to Stavka on the 14th that the Germans' forces were much as before — four corps retreating on
Czestochowa, one on Kalisz, two at Wieluri.
At Thorn there were only two divisions, he thought, and Second Army need not worry about his flank. Ruzsky's Deputy Chief-ofBonch-Bruyevitch, spoke to Danilov by Hughes apparatus and said that the events at Wioclawek could be explained only by the incredible incompetence of V Staff,
Siberian
Corps'
divisional
commanders.
The Grand Duke's Chief-of-Staff, Yanushkevitch, made the celebrated reply: 'to make a whole army corps retreat before that bunch of clods that calls itself XXV Reserve Corps is too like the Manchurian war to be true'. The Russian headquarters had no idea of the dangerous situation and the most that Ruzsky would do to help was under First Army the right-hand corps of Second Army, II Corps, west of Leczyca. Ruzsky then made the situation much worse by ordering Fifth and Second Armies forward, while First Army's group on the left bank would be reinforced by VI Siberian Corps coming over the river at Plock. II Corps was to advance against the two German divisions supposed to be at Wioclawek. Ruzsky refused to let Fifth Army throw any of its weight to the north. As a result, Second Army had to swing its weight somewhat to the south, and XXIII Corps, instead of co-operating with II Corps on its right, instead made for Dabie and Uniejow, to the west, while the other three corps of Second Army, to the south of XXIII Corps, lurched irrelevantly forward. The gap between II Corps and the rest of Second Army was thereby increased to 30 miles, and there was a further gap between II Corps and V Siberian Corps. As a result of these weird — though, given the premises, comprehensible — decisions, two and a half to put
Russian corps, in an inconvenient and isolated position, were left to face the assault of five
German ones.
A
brilliantly commanded force In consequence, the Germans in the battle of Kutno secured a very great success. Mackensen had, apart from his highly
favourable situation, many advantages. He knew more or less exactly what the Russians were doing, from their radio communications, and his infantry units had in many cases twice the number of guns of their Russian equivalents. He knew that V Siberian Corps was in a bad way, and though parts of VI Siberian Corps were being ferried over against him at Plock as the bridge had been destroyed, the only possible way over the river for the greater part of First Army was at Wyszogrod, upstream. The German Ninth Army could therefore safely pursue V Siberian Corps only with / Reserve Corps, and concentrate on the other Russian corps — XXIII at Dabie, on the Ner, and II, isolated at l^anieta. On the 13th, Ninth Army's troops were ready for their advance. / Reserve Corps — a brilliantly
commanded
force —
would con-
tain the Russians by Plock while XI,
XVII
and XX Corps struck forward between Kolo and Lubieri towards Leczyca, against the Russian XXIII Corps at the confluence of the Ner and the Warta and II before Leczyca. On the right were Frommel's cavalry and some Landsturm. As a reserve, behind XX Corps, came XXV Reserve Corps and 3rd Guards Division. Between / Reserve Corps and XX Corps, a cavalry corps, under Richthofen. With Frommel's cavalry covering their right wing, the three infantry corps in the
457
plunged
southwards. XI Corps at Chefanno and Dabie, encountering strong resistance from Will Corps, but the Russian line was an uneven one, and was taken by surprise-, so that one of XI Corps' brigades broke through to the Ner at Grabow by the evening of the 14th. The entire Russian resistance collapsed and Will Corps retreated in confusion behind the Ner. This left the Russian II Corps isolated in the middle of the battlefield, and against it concentrated XVII and Corps, double its strength in numbers and five or six tunes in artillery. XVII Corps struggled forward along bad roads in the general centre
moved on the Ner
XX
direction of Leczyca. Its left-hand division was held up at Chodow, on the KlodawaKrosniewice road, by the left of the Russian II Corps, but his right-hand division had practically no obstacles before it except bad roads, and struggled forward to Leczyca, right in the centre of the Russian position, on the Bzura river. If the town fell, then the Russian position w^ould become untenable,
and II Corps would be pushed over the Bzura eastwards, away from the rest of Second Army. XVII Corps' divisions had already marched 25 miles that day, but Mackensen set them forward at 2200 hours telling XVII Corps: The situation demands the utmost from the men and their com-
manders, and you must forget about their
XVII Corps' 36th Division moved on Leczyca in the night, and took it at 0530 hours, forcing back the left of II Corps opposite XVII Corps' other division. Meanwhile Corps, on XVII Corps' left, kept pace on the 14th, coming up against the right of II Corps at Lanieta, while / Reserve Corps pressed forward on Gostynin against the V Siberian Corps. tiredness.' Accordingly,
XX
On the 15th the Russian front began to crumble. With XVII Corps on its left flank, crossing the Bzura, the rest of II Corps had to withdraw from Krosniewice, leaving 2.000 to 3,000 prisoners, and pulling back its right towards Kutno. XX Corps — whose men had been marching steadily for five days — was not in much condition to follow the Russians beyond Lanieta, and Mackensen ordered XXV Reserve Corps to move into the front line on XX Corps' left. / Reserve Corps went on mopping up V Siberian Corps by Gostynin, and in all the army was able to take close on 15,000 prisoners as V Siberian Corps and II Corps fell back. That day, XI Corps and Frommel did little but ward off the feeble counterattacks coming from XXIII Corps on the other side of the Ner. As a result of the fighting of the 14th and 15th, the Germans had opened a gap of nearly 20 miles in the Russian front between XXIII Corps and II Corps. Their task was now to complete the ruin of II Corps by delivering a blow from their left — XX Corps, Richthofen's cavalry and XXV Reserve Corps — towards Kutno, to
match the blow of XI and XVII Corps. The situation was complicated, as usual,
by the failure of the Russians to understand what was happening to them. Second Army
had begun
to reorganise its corps to face the obvious danger in the north, but still believed that it faced not more than three German corps, on the Vistula and the Ner. Like the commander of II Corps, Second Army supposed that the main thrust was XI and XVII Corps on the Ner and at ieczyca, and he had no idea that XX, Reserve Corps, Richthofen's cavalry and, later, 3rd Guards Division were on the Russian II Corps' right opposite Kutno. II 1
458
XXV
Corps, with Second Army's assent, therefore threw in its reserves towards Leczyca to hold the Bzura position, and rather neglected its right. As a result, a brigade or so, with some cavalry units, was left to face the enemy before Kutno. On the 16th, therefore, there was a Reserve and Russian disaster as
Army was ready. The Russian movements continued on the 17th. Second Army's corps had to carry out a long flank march from the Warta positions to north of Lodz. Ruzsky expected them to do this in 36 hours, but there was little hope of this in bad weather, and along bad roads. The four army corps could
Corps moved forward towards Kutno. They were preceded in the early hours of the morning by one of Richthofens cavalry divisions, which, at 0300 hours in the middle of a snow-storm, entered Kutno —
not cover 70 miles in such a short time. None the less, they did much better than could be expected, particularly Fifth
XXV
XX
much to the surprise of the inhabitants. II and Reserve Corps, pursued by Corps, fell back on and over the Bzura, and by mid-day the German reserves, Reserve Corps, reached Piatek virtually without fighting. Richthofen's cavalry, probing towards Lowicz, made an unexpected capture, Baron KorfF, Governor of Warsaw, who was driving towards Kutno to inspect the defences. / Reserve Corps in the north drove V Siberian Corps beyond Gabin, hearing from that corps' reports by wireless that it was 'in complete disarray'. This brought the battle of Kutno to an end. The Germans had had 60 battalions with 400 guns against II Corps' 32 battalions and 100 guns. On the flank of II Corps at Leczyca they had had, unopposed, six battalions with 33 guns. Not surprisingly, II Corps, in a state of great confusion, fell back partly on Lodz, partly on Lowicz, and a gap of 40 miles, between the Vistula and the Ner, was opened between First and Second Armies, with three German infantry and one cavalry corps, ready to exploit it by moving due south on Lodz.
XX
XXV
XXV
Rennenkampf, the commander of the Russian Army, lost the chance of encircling the Sermans by his dilatory and feeble moves to the north of the main battle area. Above: Litzmann, >p:
First
he able but short-sighted commander of the 3rd Guards Division. Below: Germans skin a lamb. As ie Germans advanced, the poor communications available in the centre of Poland made it imperative that the troops live off the land as much as they could, so that the railways :ould be used for munitions and reinforcements
Helpless bewilderment Ruzsky, commanding the north-western front, was taken utterly by surprise. He had intended to begin his invasion of Germany on the 14th, and the armies in the south had begun their advance. But the Russian Fifth Army, and still more Second Army, could not risk advancing against the Germans with a large force in their flank and rear. They therefore swung round to the north. Second Army's westward movement was brought to an end on the 15th, some of its brigades were withdrawn to the east, and others swung north to help XXIII Corps on the Ner. Neither Stavka nor Ruzsky had much idea what to do. Stavka in particular was mesmerised by the Germans' progress and watched the wheels running round with helpless bewilderment. The only sensible decision on the Russian side had been early on the 16th, when Second Army withdrew II Corps from the Bzura to escape the pincer-movement of XX Corps in the north and XVII Corps in the west. Far from recognising the sense in this decision, Ruzsky told Grand Duke Nicholas, 'Everything has followed from this error. I don't want to go any further into this subject, the details of the operation are even more depressing.' The most that Ruzsky could now do was to instruct Second Army to transfer its corps to the north-east, building a defensive wall before Lodz on a line Konstantinow — Zgierz — Strykow. The Siberian Corps and II Corps would retire up the Vistula until they could be reinforced by the rest of First Army. Fifth Army would fall back to the east towards Piotrkow. Ruzsky now hoped that the Germans would pour into the area between Second and First Armies and could eventually be crushed between them when
First
Army's corps, with their commander — wizened, stubborn old man with a notorious temper — riding all round the lines spurring them on. From the morning of November 18, the seven corps of Second and Fifth Armies were moving into position. II SiCorps to Strykow, IV Corps to Zgierz, XXIII Corps to Alexandrow, with I Corps marching south of them, through berian
Lodz to Andrespol, east of Strykow. Plehve's Siberian Corps and, on its left, XIX Corps, fell into line by Pabjanice and Laskowice, his other corps — V — pushing forward to Piotrkow, as general reserve. This flankmarch, carried out within two and a half days, was certainly among the most notable feats of the Russian army in this war. I Corps, for instance, managed to cover 70 miles on November 16 and 17, reaching Andrespol at dawn on the 18th with 50' of their effectives, having marched without interruption for 48 hours. While this went on, the Germans were not seriously opposed as they marched south, except by retreating elements of II Corps. Mackensen ordered Ninth Army forward on Lodz, which he did not expect to hold out. He was more concerned to prevent Second Army from escaping east to the Vistula, and never imagined that the Grand Duke intended to stand at Lodz. He ordered Frommel's cavalry and XI Corps to take the offensive up the Ner to prevent XXIII Corps from slipping away. Meanwhile XX and XVII Corps, with XXV Reserve Corps following, were to advance on Lodz. XX Corps on Strykow. In the north, / Reserve Corps was to continue its advance up the Vistula, to dissolve V Siberian Corps and the units brought to reinforce it from VI Siberian Corps, and generally to prevent First Army from interfering with the fate of Second Army. / Reserve Corps had 25 I
I
battalions and 100 guns against 100 battalions (V and VI Siberian Corps, II Corps) and 250 guns, but the Russian troops had
been very badly shaken, and were prepared back on Lowicz if pressed. / Reserve Corps' advance on Gabin on 17th was attended by thousands of prisoners. On the 17th the Germans north of Lodz stormed forward, conscious that another Tannenberg was possible. XVII Corps reached Zgierz via Ozerkeu as XX Corps, with XXV Reserve Corps on its left and Litzmann following, arrived at Strykow and Brzeziny, straight into the gap between the Russian Second and First Armies As the vanguard of the Russian Corps arto fall
I
rived in the area, there was sporadic fight ing, but the troops on both sides were too exhausted for anything serious To the west, Frommel and XI Corps advanced up the Ner against a retreating Will Corps.
reaching Szadek, Alexandrow and Podde bice. The great question now was could Second and Fifth Armies resist encircle-
ment
and could First arrive in time to save them? The question was answered, with a painful and costly affirmative, by the battle of od/ for sufficiently long,
Army
I
159
Key to the Polish Campaign
At Lodz the German drive on Warsaw was finally halted, but only at great cost in men and effort. The fighting was marked by extreme savagery, and the German breakout from Brzeziny, which marked the end of this battle, was a classic of heroism and endurance. Norman Stone relates the complex and ill-organised actions which made up the Battle of Lodz. Above: A machine gun post on the perimeter of the
German positions
On November
18,
the
Germans were poised
encircle Lodz, with 250,000 men on three sides of it. In the west was a mixed force — two Landsturm corps on the extreme right south of Szadek; a cavalry corps (Frommel) in this town; and a regular infantry corps XI (under Pliiskow), north of
to
Szadek, advancing on Pabjanice. On the northern side were two corps — XVII (Pan(Scholtz) at Strynewitz) at Zgierz, and kow; on the north-eastern side were Reserve Corps (Scheffer) and 3rd Guards Infantry Division (Litzmann), poised to cut off the city in the east. The left of the whole army was covered by / Reserve Corps (Morgen) north-west of Lowicz, whose task was to prevent the Russian First Army (Rennenkampf) from aiding Second Army (Scheidemann). The Russians, meanwhile, made superhuman exertions to save their line. They had hurried up divisions by forced marches to the Lodz front, and by the evening of November 18 they had managed to save the town from immediate danger; after an extraordinary effort, their troops held a strongly fortified line along the western and northern approaches, from Laskowice in the west to Strykow to the north-east. Their various corps had been flung into this
XX
XXV
line helter-skelter: some of them had been marching for over two days over nearly 80
and were down
50%
of their effective strength as a result of the loss of poured they Exhausted, stragglers. through Lodz into the small manufacturing towns round the city: two corps of Plehve's Fifth Army — I Siberian and XIX Corps — stood at Pabjanice and Laskowice guarding the western side against the attacks of two German corps, Frommel's cavalry corps and Pliiskow's XI Infantry Corps. On their miles,
to
left was Novikov's cavalry corps, with three divisions of Cossacks, protecting the flank of the army. On the northern front were the various corps of Scheidemann's Second Army, just falling into position — XXIII by Alexsandrow opposite Pannewitz' XVII Corps, IV at Zgierz, II Siberianonly a division strong — and I Corps at Strykow, and an infantry detachment
C0RPS P0SEN t BRESLA CORPS
y£
IstKbDiv
Krause on their right, towards The transfer of such enormous numbers of men — almost 500,000 — within three days along bad roads was a triumph of determination, but the troops were exhausted, and were by no means out of the German trap. Everything depended on under
Brzeziny.
being relieved: the Russian First
their
Army, under the lackadaisical command of Rennenkampf, must come to their help from the north, and at the moment this army was being easily contained by Morgen's / Reserve Corps, between Lowicz and Gabin. In the end, Rennenkampf 's inaction very nearly did for Scheidemann what it had done for Samsonov's army at Tannenberg. All in all, the German position was not propitious as it seemed — there was always a danger that, far from trapping
as
Russian Second Army, Ninth Army would itself be smashed between the Russian First and Second Armies and a more able commander than Rennenkampf would probably have managed this. But the Germans — both Mackensen, the army commander, and the supreme commanders in the East (Hindenburg and Ludendorff) — were confident that all they had to do was to chase the Russians from Lodz, and trap them against the Austro-Hungarian the
The Russians opposite / Reserve seemed incapable of energetic action and those in Lodz were thought to be in panic striken retreat. But confidence among the Germans based in reality on a promise from Falkenhayn of reinforcements. Falkenhayn had, early in Novfront.
Corps
ember, sent Colonel Hentsch, one of his favourites among the Great General Staff in Mezieres, to tell Conrad and Ludendorff that reinforcements would arrive by about November 24, once the Ypres salient had been overrun. At this time, Falkenhayn was reckoning that he could defeat the British and French in Flanders, even though afterwards 'we cannot reckon on success'. He
wanted to secure a limited success in the West, and then to send reinforcements to the East, where the danger was greater.
By November 18, however, his plans had gone wrong. The Ypres offensive had been a bloody failure: Bethmann-Hollweg, the Reich Chancellor, telephoned to express his horror at 'the enormous losses at Ypres'; Plessen, the Kaiser's GeneralAdjutant, described Ypres as 'a first-class moral defeat'. By contrast, the danger in the East had been largely dissipated by Ninth Army's victory at Kutno. Falkenhayn therefore decided that he must keep his reinforcements in the West to save the situation, the more so as they would now be irrelevant to any strictly defensive operation in the East. To Conrad, who was
pleading that immediate reinforcements in the East could have a decisive effect, Falkenhayn replied that the reinforcements must be held up in the West, and 'it is of course quite impossible for reinforcements to arrive in time to affect the decisions now taking place in the East'. To Hindenburg, who had really begun
the whole operation on the expectation of reinforcements, Falkenhayn had to explain himself: in a letter of November 18, he told Hindenburg that the reinforcements had already been made superfluous because of Ninth Army's success in its purely defensive task. There was, he went on, no point in pushing the Russians back, as they could always retire to a defensive front along the Vistula, and nothing would be changed; besides, there was no point in winning victories against Russia, 'for our most dangerous enemy is not the one in the East, but rather England, with whom the conspiracy against Germany stands or falls'. Germany could not run the risk of another battle of the Marne, 'which must, in the main, be explained by the weakening of the western army to strengthen the eastern one'. Falkenhayn was not at all interested in Hindenburg's Drang iiach Osten, which he regarded as detrimental to Germany's position in the West, and certainly detrimental to his own prestige. Indeed, at this time he was urging Bethmann-Hollweg to make a separate peace with Russia, perhaps at Austria-Hungary's expense. Whatever the long-term im-
N0V22J¥0v/ f
German advance Russian advance
Railway
\ The
Battle of
Lodz- its fighting
10
20 20
halted the main Russian invasion
40
An heroic view
of a
German
cavalry charge
461
plications of this, Falkenhayn was deternot to send reinforcements to the
mined
East until he could properly spare them from the Wesl
A great chance missed This left Hindenburg
and
Mackensen They were
largely to their own devices. confident enough that Ninth Army could defeat the Russians, hut felt that a great chance had been missed — as was maybe the case On the 19th, the German corps round Lodz opened their offensive west, north and east of the town. They were expecting that the town would give in virtually at once, and pressed hard, particularly on the western side, in the hope that their hope would he fulfilled. For their part, the Russians also miscalculated: they supposed that the Germans were in overwhelming strength west and north of the city, but not on the east side. On the 19th, Mackensen pushed forward A7 Corps and Frommel's cavalry, together with Koch's Landsturm. These forces had had a relatively easy time on the 17th and 18th, pursuing XXIII Corps up the* Ner.
They expected to take Pabjanice with some ease, and advanced confidently. However, they found in their way the two corps of Plehve's Russian Fifth Army that had been swung forward over the last two days, well dug in, supported on their right by
elements of Scheidemann's XXIII Corps and on their left by Novikov's Cossacks. XI Corps' supply-lines had been entangled during the advance, and as a result the corps' four heavy batteries, so urgently needed for the storming of Fifth Army line, had only 70 rounds left. In consequence, its attacks were a complete and bloody failure. Elsewhere on the Lodz front much the same happened as the Germans tried to throw Second Army back. There were now four corps along the northern sector, but the country was broken, with small woods, hillocks and burnt-out factories offering excellent cover for the defence. As well, the weather turned to snow and frost, with cutting winds driving in the Germans' faces as they
struggled forward. Pannewitz and Scholtz struggled forward against this strong Russian position. Pannewitz' right took Aleksandrow before XXIII Corps opposite it had been able to settle down from its long march from the lower Ner, and thus re-established contact with Pliiskow on his right. But the rest of Pannewitz' corps could do nothing. Similarly, Scholtz' Corps, south of Strykow at Nowosolna, moved scarcely half a mile forward with high losses. His task had been to break the Lodz-Nowosolna road, the artery of the defence: he failed utterly to do this. Besides this he was expected to capture the Wionczyn wood, on his left. This was the strongpoint of the defence east of the town, and it had to be taken if XX Corps were to remain in contact with Scheffer's group (XXV Reserve Corps, Richthofen's cavalry and Litzmann's Guard Division) on his left. In fact, the defence of the Russian I Corps was particularly dogged, and resisted all of Scholtz' efforts on the wood. For the Germans the fate of the battle in effect depended on the progress made by Scheffer and Litzmann on their left. If these two — together with Richthofen's cavalry — could advance on Lodz from the south-east, then Scheidemann must surrender. For the moment, Mackensen did not think that Scheffer's corps would
XX
have any more important effect than mopping up single Russian units as they sought to escape from Lodz. Scheffer, meantime, moved forward from Brzeziny, confident that he had little to worry about. On the Litzmann's division crossed the 19th, Miazga, a frozen stream flowing east of Lodz from Nowosolna to Bedkow, and reached Wola Rakowa. Scheffer's two divisions pressed on to the south in compliance with Mackensen's order 'to have a lasting flanking effect'. 49th Reserve Division got to Bedkow without serious resistance, and from there to Tuszyn; 50th Reserve Division (Goltz) followed it to Bedkow. Richthofen's cavalry divisions — 6th and 9th — probed forward as far as Piotrkow and even to Skierniewice, the castle of which was occupied, as head-
quarters, by the Grand Duke Nicholas. On the 20th the general pattern of the battle was repeated. Pliiskow and Frommel
were
urged
effective
on,
with
Koch's
not
very
Landsturm, and once more dashed
themselves in vain against the Russian positions
before
Mackensen that
Pabjanice: Koch told his orders could not be
carried out. In the same way Pannewitz and Scholtz south of Zgierz and Strykow could manage nothing since once again the forces in the Wionczyn wood held out, and Scholtz could establish no continuous front with Litzmann and Scheffer. The fate of the battle, as before, depended on Litzmann's and Scheffer's turning to the west, and cutting off the main Russian positions: they ought to have done this on the 19th, but failed to do it because they thought the Russians were abandoning Lodz and could be caught further south. It was not until the 20th that Scheffer curtailed his by now irrelevant movement to the south and swung to the west, confident of meeting up with Frommel's cavalry at Pabjanice. Litzmann, with only some shattered battalions in his path, entered the important town of Rzgow, while 49th Reserve Division followed to Tuszyn, and
50th to Goszimowice, where it met up with elements of Plehve's V Corps hurrying up from Piotrkow. There were now only 12 miles free to the Russians south of Lodz, and a desperate note was heard from the city. Communications between Scheidemann and Stavka thus became increasingly precarious, messages being carried by motor-car and, as often as not, captured by the Germans. The high commands, Ruzsky and Stavka, were in a state of helpless confusion: they
knew that Rennenkampf must somehow be brought to bear, and watched with increasing resentment as this court favourite made blunder upon, blunder, falling back before an enemy half his size, and generally displaying his Tannenberg form. Still, something was done: troops drawn from Warsaw, from the garrison of Nowogeorgiewsk, and from various units designed for Tenth Army in the north were A Russian heavy mortar. Above right: An Austrian patrol moves across the open, cold and wintry wastes of the central Polish plain
Below:
*I**K3* *
#
.#w Rt.hpr and set marching westpatched together wards from Skierniewice in order to threaten the rear of Scholtz and Scheffer as they advanced to the south-east of Lodz. Scheidemann sent desperate appeals to Rennenkampf by wireless: 'I am in great danger from the rear: the situation is critical: every minute is dear: help me!' These appeals reached Mackensen, not Rennenkampf, who was too far away. On Mackensen's side, there was nothing he could do but set his teeth and order his men onward, wherever they were. Gradually on the 20th he had come to recognise that the Russians were not retreating from Lodz; he knew that his fate now depended on Scheffer, with whom contact was increasingly difficult; he also knew that the Russians were quite likely to fall on Scheffer's and Scholtz' rear, if they could liberate themselves from Morgen's pressure north of Lowicz. Obviously he could not afford to continue unless Morgen gave an assurance that all was well. On the 19th
and 20th, Morgen's reports were jubilant.
He had been pursuing two beaten corps — those of Sidorin and Churin — up the Visand the reinforcements brought to of little value. He was capturing thousands of prisoners and many guns as he moved forward, mopping up a demoralised enemy, taking Mock and Gostynin. He gave an absolute assurance that there was nothing to fear in the north, and so Mackensen did not halt Scheffer as, with hindsight, he ought to have done. Even so, he told Morgen to swing south, towards the town of Lowicz, where he could more effectively prevent the Russians from tula,
them had proved
interfering with the operation of Scholtz and Scheffer, and on the 20th, therefore, Morgen's divisions swung towards the town. On the 21st the German offensive continued much as before — there were counterattacks all along the western and northern side, which were thrown back as all the German attacks had been. Morgen appro-
ached Lowicz and there hit upon unexpected resistance — some troops from First Army in the north had been thrown in there to stop Morgen. Three Russian divisions and some Cossacks also began to move on Scholtz' rear: they even took Brzeziny for a time, before being expelled by a wounded officer in command of the
walking
wounded
from
Scholtz'
front.
Hell, Scholtz' chief-of- staff, expressed confidence to Mackensen: 'we do not rate very highly the threat from the enemy advancing on Strykow, as they are apparently devoid of active leadership.' In consequence, Scheffer's corps, on Scholtz' left, went forward east of Lodz, with very great success. Against Litzmann and Scheffer the Russians could only seize battalions from
virtually all their divisions and send them in any order to the eastern side; part of
Novikov's cavalry was sent from the front opposite Frommel towards Rzgow. These troops were flung in throughout the 21st, and by the end of the day had succeeded in bringing Litzmann and Scheffer to a halt. Early in the day, one of Litzmann's brigades swung west, south of the Wionczyn wood, crossed the Choiny, a stream running south of Lodz, and entered Dabrowa, a suburb of the city. The brig-
-mr-
from the ade's guns eruns were only a mile from centre of the city, and fired into its congested streets, before the brigade was forced back by pressure on its flank from the south. But this was the only real success that Scheffer's group had: 49th Reserve Division, moving north from Rzgow, struck a solid resistance and failed to move forward: 50th Reserve Division, south-east of it was obliged by elements of V Corps to fall back on the Miazga and form a defensive front, together with one of Richthofen's divisions. But to Mackensen,
that Morgen was too much for him. The three divisions sent from Skierniewice towards Strykow on the 20th displayed an incredible dilatoriness — Oranovsky complained that they had made only nine miles in 24 hours. Rennenkampf made things worse by proposing an entirely unsuitable commander: he replaced Slussarenko, the existing one, by Shuvalov.
seemed well: Morgen had continued his advance on Lowicz, and reported new
Strykow on the 22nd was therefore hesitant: Oranovsky grumbled to Stavka: 'Our troop commanders, though spurred on all
all
captures that brought his totals to 15,000 prisoners, 31 guns and 40 machine guns. Despite the obvious danger to the rear of Scholtz at Strykow, Mackensen would not give in: and his confidence can be measured by an order to Pannewitz that he must avoid street-fighting in Lodz. He ordered the eastern group 'to annihilate the enemy east of the city'. Hope of this had to be abandoned in the course of the 22nd, and for the next two days it seemed as if Scheffer himself would be surrounded and annihilated. Only a near-miracle saved him. In the morning of the 22nd he set his troops forward — Litzmann and one of Richthofen's divisions on a front between Andrespol and Olechow. This attack came to nothing, for a new Russian force, 1st Siberian Division, checked it at once. 49th Reserve Division was involved in heavy fighting west of Rzgow, counterattacked by fresh Russian forces, and had to appeal to 50th Reserve Division on its left for help. This division in its turn had to swing back to Modliczka. against a new Russian force from Piotrkow. By early afternoon, the whole group had turned out to be in a very dangerous position, being attacked from all points of the compass save the north. Soon, Russian troops began to appear from this direction also, and Scheffer was given up for lost
by Hindenburg and his staff. Elsethis day the German attacks were
where on
In the west, Frommel and Pluskow were too exhausted for any more than feeble demonstrations. Pannewitz and Scholtz had more fight left in them, but it was rapidly exhausted against the stout frustrated.
resistance north of the city, as before. Finally, a report from Morgen arrived that he had encountered strong resistance at Lowicz— Churin 's II Corps, now reinforced — and 'can no longer absolutely guarantee that my objectives will be reached'. Meanwhile, Scholtz reported that, from the church-tower at Dobra, he could see long columns of Russian infantry moving
towards Strykow and Glowno. He had to swing one of his divisions, the 41st, on his left, to defend his rear, and thus lost all contact with Litzmann to the south-east.
was now quite cut off, and his depended now on what the Russians did. If they closed directly on his rear, he was more or less lost. However, the usual bewilderment by all Russian commands prevailed. Ruzsky and Ivanov busied themselves in futile rivalry: at one point, Oranovsky, Ruzsky's chief-of-staff, demanded the dismissal of Alexeyev. Ruzsky went on wringing his hands at the inertia of Rennenkampf, who kept complaining Scheffer
fate
an aristocratic and inadequate staff officer, who was himself replaced, on Nicholas' insistence, by Vassiliev — all in 36 hours.
The progress
of these three divisions on
the time, are incapable of energetic action." On top of this, the higher commands were all behaving like weathercocks. So far, Ruzsky had been determined to stand: now
he suggested retreat. Scheidemann in Lodz had been crying for help: on the 22nd he recovered his nerve and announced that he could hold out for ever, the morale of his men being excellent. Stavka itself, dependent on the bewilderingly contradictory reports of these commanders did nothing but repeat, in Pavlovian fashion, contempt for the troop commanders and a wish that they should attack. In this way, Scheffer and Litzmann had a better chance of getting away. Scheffer and Litzmann were on their own. Frommel, Pluskow and Pannewitz were exhausted; Scholtz had sent his available forces to his own rear, to defend himself against the Russians stirring there. One division was moving from Brzeziny to the south, and the rest of Vassiliev's group had now advanced over Strykow: Scholtz now had 25 battalions in his rear against 15, and needed everything for himself. On the 22nd, and over the next two days. Scholtz could just about hold his own, but no more. Meanwhile, Morgen's corps opposite Lowicz began at last to tire out, and remained where they were. Oberost (the Eastern High Command was in despair; they heard that the Russians had ordered empty trains to come up to SkierI
niewice in preparation for the transport of the thousands of German prisoners they expected. Hoffman, on his own initiative, went round the various corps' chiefs-ofstaff to suggest the idea of a retreat — an idea roundly denounced by Mackensen, who was convinced, against all the evidence, that Scheffer would somehow escape from a situation worse than that of Sam-
sonov at Tannenberg. In what was perhaps the greatest single epic in the whole of the First World War,
and Litzmann managed to get away, in the course of 60 hours' fighting between November 22 to 25. Late on the 22nd, cut off from the troops of Scholtz. Scheffer decided to cut his way through to
Scheffer
the north-east. No other way was open: in the west lay Lodz, to the south an army corps of Plehve's army together with Novikov's Cossacks. In the oast he could see no way out, but yet in the north there were four divisions under Vassiliev. The
i
|
'1'
German official history rightly says, any human reckoning, the fate of Scheffer' group was sealed; the Russians can hardly be blamed for behaving precipitately ordering up empty trains for the prisoners
*
it
463
i
the) expected to take.' Bui Scheffer plunged on: his confidence was strangely high, and it was this above all that carried him through, tor he was not really aware of the full desperateness of Ins position until after he had escaped. As it was. he had to cover
20
null's
and
more
through
superior
in order to escape. issued orders to his scattered troops on the 22nd. The two cavalry divisions under Kichthol'en were to cover the eastern and southern Hanks, the infantry divisions were to cross the Miazga and then pass on to the north and north-east: 49th Reserve Division would pass along the Rzgow — Karpm road, cross the Miazga at Karpin
Russian forces
He
move north on Borowo; 50th Reserve Division on its right was also to cross at Karpin, coming from Wola Rakowa, and was then to advance on Lasnowska Wola. Litzmann's division of Guards was to retreat gradually, protecting the northand then
western (lank, moving hack on Bedon and Bukowiec. The group had 2,000 wounded
and 10,000 prisoners: these were to follow 49th Reserve. At first the withdrawal was easy, and even passed unnoticed by the Russians. The force at Lodz was of course exhausted, capable of defensive action only, and with losses running to 70'/r Novikov's group in the south was not much better. There were few Russians to the east, because their command had made a mistake, transferring the bulk of their reinforcements to the Strykow front against Scholtz, instead of trying to capture Scheffer. As a result there were only two divisions and some cavalry in front of Scheffer as he retreated; and the Germans also had larger calibre and more effective artillery. Even so it was a great achievement for Scheffer to escape, for his men were very weary, and the weather was demoralising in the extreme: even the water for the machine guns froze. Scheffer's troops were over the Miazga by dawn on the 23rd. The operation had been very difficult, as both of the Reserve divisions had to use the same crossing at Karpin, and there were traffic snarls that only Scheffer's personal direction could ,
!
Having
crossed, the two divisions then made for their objectives. 50th Reserve (von der Goltz) was to go right on Koliuszki, where it met a Caucasian cavalry division; 49th Reserve (Waencker)
clear up.
was to go towards Borowo, which was defended by 6th Siberian Division. Here the Russians enjoyed an excellent defensive position, a long
embankment
of the
Lodz — Skierniewice railway, by the village of Galkow. Throughout the day, Waencker's division struggled against this
bankment,
em-
and
repeatedly failed to capture it: yet capture it they must if Scheffer's group were to escape to Brzeziny. The divisions' attacks on the 23rd were in fact ill-managed affairs, inevitably so as their units came up only one by one to the front line from Karpin. Much depended on what Litzmann could do, and it was from here that relief came. Litzmann had been able to withdraw without trouble, as the Russians who ought
have been opposing him were in fact attacking Scholtz; his men, after a long march through the woods to the west of
to
Galkow, emerged from them at midnight and, with their guns firing as they advanced, they stormed a battalion of sleeping Russians by Galkow at 0300 hours and pushed forward to Brzeziny. It seems that Litzmann was only trying to save his own division at the expense of Scheffer's troops; at all events, his action turned out to be though selfish. His forward decisive. <
brigade captured
<¥ jK
ijfcr
t
Brzeziny
in
the early
hours of the morning of the 24th, nearly capturing the commander of 6th Siberian Division as it did so. The rest of Litzmann's troops then arrived. They were now safe, for the gap between them and Scholtz was
notimore than a few miles. As a gesture,
Litzmann sent a bicycle patrol to find out what had happened to Scheffer, now to the south. This patrol rode unwittingly through a gap in the Russian lines, and arrived at Scheffer's headquarters in Chrusty-Stare. Scheffer, surrounded by many now useless guns, by his wounded and his thousands of prisoners, had just ordered 49th Reserve Division to make a last attempt on the embankment; his relief at hearing Litzmann's news can be imagined. Even so, his position was still difficult. If the Russians to the south made a serious move in his rear, he was probably lost. Two things saved him. In the first place, the Russian
commanders mistook the 10,000 prisoners marching behind Waencker's division for German infantry, and therefore hesitated to attack as they ought; and finally 50th Reserve Division broke through at Koliuszki after an artillery barrage had broken the Russians' nerve. The Caucasian cavalry opposite Goltz fell back in disorder; Goltz took up a position on the flank of 6th Siberian Division on the embankment; his artillery then shot up the Russians from their flank. The Russians fell back in disarray, leaving another few thousand prisoners to 49th Reserve Division as it stormed forward. By 1600 hours Scheffer's group had entered Brzeziny, and the next day, November 25, was able to swing into place on Scholtz' left, having forced Vassiliev to retire from Strykow. The whole group had suffered losses of 50% of its total, but brought in 16,000 prisoners and 64 guns. With this breakout, the battle of Lodz came to an end. The Germans were clearly victorious, though only after a very great effort. The Russian invasion of Germany had been utterly frustrated and they decided, after a staff conference at Siedlce, to withdraw their line almost to the Vistula,
and to concentrate instead on defeating the Austro-Hungarian army, as maybe they should have done all along. The centre of gravity now shifted to the Carpathians. Further Reading Cruttwell, C. R. M. F., The Great War (OUP 1934) Danilov, Y. N., La Russie dans la Grande Guerre (Paris 1927) Der Weltkrieg 1914-1918 Volume 6
(Reichsarchiv) Golovin, N. N., The Russian War (London 1928)
Army in
the World
Goodspeed, D. J., Ludendorff (Hart-Davis 1966) La Grande Guerre: relation de I'Etat Major russe 1 aout-24 novembre 1914 (Paris 1926) Ludendorff, General E. von, My War Memories (Hutchinson)
Mackensen, General A. von, Briefe und Aufzeichnungen (Leipzig 1938)
NORMAN STONE was was educated
at
born in Glasgow in 1941 and Glasgow Academy and at Gonville
and Caius College, Cambridge.
After taking a First 1962, he was awarded a Research Fellowship at Christ's College, Cambridge and spent two years in Vienna doing research into the last years of the Habsburg monarchy. In 1 965 he became Research Fellow at Gonville and Caius College, and in 1967 an Assistant Lecturer in the in
the History Tripos
in
Cambridge, specialising in Russian several articles and a book on the Eastern Front of the First World War. University of history.
He has written
Left: Typical of the war in Poland -a German skirmishing line in the Lodz area. Above: Polish peasants bow to their new masters as
an advance guard moves
£
into a village
465
p
rudder
aft
hydroplanes
engine cooling water circulating
pump
oil
tank
bilge
16 cylinder
motors
600
NK
engine
B. HP. at
400
R. P.
'J/&
submarine B11, which penetrated the Narrows at Gallipoli and sank the Turkish vessel Messudieh. Displacement: 280/313 tons. Length: 135 feet. Beam: 13% feet. Power/speed: 600/190 hp and 12/7 knots. Armament: Two 18-inch torpedo tubes. Crew: 16. For the superb feat of torpedoing the Messudieh, the
Submarines —
now beginning to make the menace
British
B11's commander, Lieutenant Holbrook, was awarded the VC, while all the other members of his crew were also decorated. During this trip, Holbrook showed that small submarines could penetrate heavily defended waters and cause considerable damage
itselffeltatsea
rudder
aft
hydroplane
coupled diesel engines
/
hydropi
control clinom;
horizontal petrol
Above: The
pump
mam engine
compressors
1
.
periscope air
vent for surface special anti-sub' net cutter.
"engine running
sharp steel blade strengthened and supported by two wooden planks bolted on either side torpedo loading hatch
torpedo
firing
compressed
airtank
bow doors opening handles torpedo tubes
guide cables
bow doors
steering position
petrol
torpedo tube blowing tanks
compensating main
Kingston valve
ballast
tanks
tank blowing
operating
bottles
control
reload'
air
(P&S)
torpedo
periscope shaft
and
well
Below: The German submarine U-9, which sank the three British armoured cruisers Hogue, Aboukir and Cressy. Displacement: 493/61 tons. Length: 188 feet, Beam: 19% feet. Power/ speed: 1,050/1,160 hp and 14/8 knots. Armament: Four 17.7-inch torpedo tubes and one 2-inch gun. For his feat in sinking the three British cruisers, the U-9's commander, Otto Weddigen, was awarded the Iron Cross (First Class) by the delighted Kaiser. The sinking proved that submarines operating on their own could successfully deal with much larger and more powerful ships in the open sea, even allowing for their tactical misuse
Two old and small submarines — but powerful auguries for the future __
s_h
periscopes
capstan forward
searchlight
forward torpedo loading hatch
escape hatch
CZZ
».
.
i*
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r
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spare torpedo
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forward hydroplane galley
radio
forward torpedo door
WAR in the
Mediterranean Turkey's entry into the war found Britain and France woefully unprepared for action in the eastern Mediterranean. All that was available was a mixed force under a poor admiral. The only feat of note was the sinking of a Turkish battleship. Peter Kemp narrates the course of events in the area. Below: Submarine Bll, which went
I
HM
up the Narrows and sank Messudieh Left:
two
HMS Indefatigable,
one of the British battle-cruisers in the
Mediterranean. Below left: Lieutenant Holbrook, who won the VC for his daring attack on the Messudieh. Above right: HMS Indomitable, the second of the two British battle-cruisers. Right: The French predreadnought battleship Suffren. Below right: The Turkish Messudieh was built in 1874 and had long been out of date. Below: The B11
-
>a
f '
W
>u i»jd '
*"&
I—fcilMI
mma
H~
consequences of the escape of the Goeben and Breslau in the Mediterranean
The
full
at first realised in Britain, and it was only gradually that it became apparent how great a disaster it had been. The Navy
were not
knew — 'To think that wrote Admiral Beatty, and only instance of
me full
sick!'
— but
political
the Navy', provide the first
is to
it
'to
failure.
God,
it
makes
was only
later that the implications of the failure it
struck the Cabinet. Writing now with hindsight, one can see that the arrival of these two ships at Constantinople was the overriding factor in deciding Turkey to enter the war on the German side. A long diplomatic rearguard action was fought in Constantinople which had the effect of delaying a Turkish declaration of war, and for a time it looked like succeeding. In the end it was a German trick which put the final spoke in the Allied wheel. Admiral Souchon, without the knowledge of the Turkish Grand Vizier or of Jemal Pasha, the Minister of Marine, took the Goeben and Breslau, with the Turkish cruiser Hamidieh, into the Black Sea at the end of October and bombarded the Russian ports of Sebastopol, Odessa, and Novorossiysk. Even then, the vote in the Turkish Cabinet was in favour of continued neutrality. But a Russian declaration of war forced the issue, and on November 1
Vice-Admiral Carden, who was commanding a British blockading force in the eastern Mediterranean, was ordered by the Admiralty to commence hostilities against Turkey, though war was not formally declared until November 5. Sackville Hamilton Carden was a naval officer
with few recommendations for active
command. He had been Admiral Superintendent of Malta Dockyard, and as a contemporary opinion had it, he was 'very second-rate; no "go" in him, or ideas, or
The reason had been odd, to say the initiative.'
choice to
command
for
his selection
least.
The obvious had been
then turned for home. His difficulties began with the loss of his compass. In the B-class submarines, as in most others, the steering compass was fixed outside the pressure hull to prevent it being unduly affected by the boat's residual magnetism, and an image of the compass card was reflected to the helmsman through lenses and prisms. At this crucial moment the lenses fogged over with excessive condensation and the image of the card was lost. There was nothing for it but to steer blind, and hope to reach the open sea to the south-
ways, for these B-class submarines were small coastal boats and not designed for long periods submerged. Bll had remained under water for nine hours, a period much longer than had ever been thought possible, had negotiated a minefield twice in extremely difficult waters and had successfully attacked an enemy warship and sunk her. And on her return trip she had navigated the Dardanelles blind without a compass. The Admiralty sent a signal to Carden expressing their warm appreciation of Holbrook's feat a,nd recommended the award of the Victoria Cross. Bll's first lieutenant was awarded the DSO, and every other member of her crew received either the DSC or the DSM according to rank. The importance of Holbrook's success lay not so much in the sinking of a Turkish battleship as in its vivid demonstration of the capabilities of submarines when used in a strategic role. They had originally been designed and developed for tactical use, mainly in a defensive role, but the possibility of a much wider role was now opened up. Where Bll could go, others could follow, and a logical conclusion of Holbrook's feat was that a longer-range boat could penetrate the Straits and operate in the Sea of Marmara against Turkish supply lines to her army in Gallipoli. Already there was much discussion in London and Paris on the need to open a new campaign in order to bypass the stalemate on the Western Front, and the only obvious choice was one directed against Turkey in an attempt to knock her out of the war. Bll's successful penetration of the minefield brought into the field of reality a submarine campaign in the Sea of Marmara that could possibly have a decisive effect on a new campaign against Turkey, and Holbrook's exploit carried a good deal of weight in the London and
eastward.
Paris discussions.
Indomitable, one of the battle-cruisers, and six of the destroyers; these were however replaced by some of the older French six French destroyers, and three French submarines. For some weeks the six submarines, three British and three French, had been pressing for a more active role in the block-
battleships,
The way was opened when Captain commanding the destroyer flotilla, Pownall, and Lieutenant-Commander ade.
Coode,
senior officer of the three British submarines, devised a system of mine guards which, it was thought, might enable a
submarine to push her way through moored mines without being damaged or sunk. The guards were fitted to the British submarine Bll, and on December 13 Lieutenant Norman Holbrook took her up the Straits in search of a ship to torpedo. It was known that the entrance to the Narrows in the Dardanelles was guarded by five lines of moored mines, and in spite of the strong adverse current, Bll forced her way through successfully. Above Canakkale, but uncertain of his exact position, Holbrook sighted a Turkish battleship, which was guarding the Dardanelles minefield. She was the Messudieh, and closing submerged to a range of 80 yards, Holbrook torpedoed her. Through his periscope he watched her sink, and
in this area
Vice-Admiral Arthur Limpus, a brilliant officer who had been Head of the British Naval Mission in Constantinople until September 1914 and who knew the Turkish capabilities and Turkish waters intimately. He had been turned down as it was thought that his appointment to command in these waters might offend the Turks. Carden's force in the eastern Mediterranean, which was watching the Dardanelles in case the Goeben and Breslau should come out, consisted of the British battle-cruisers Indomitable and Indefatigable, the French battleships Verite and Suffren, two light cruisers, 12 destroyers, and three submarines. On November 3, on instructions from the Admiralty, the combined force bombarded the Turkish forts
Kum
at Seddiilbahir and Kale, an operation which will be discussed later in its implications on the future Dardanelles operations. Nevertheless, the naval war in the eastern Mediterranean never became entirely static. Most of the major activity, it is true, took place in the Black Sea with a number of clashes between Russian squadrons and the combined Turkish and Ger-
man ships, while Carden's fleet maintained its watch on the Dardanelles and its blockade of Smyrna and the Bulgarian port of Dedeagach. Suspected damage to the Goeben following an action with a Russian force in the Black Sea gave the British Admiralty the excuse of withdrawing the
By guess and by God Holbrook's last look through the periscope had shown him that Bll appeared completely landlocked, which made him think that the submarine must be in Sari Sighlar Bay. On this assumption he dived deep and proceeded 'by guess and by God' towards the entrance of the Straits. The submarine was bumping badly along the bottom, but that was a risk which had to be taken. After a few minutes of this, Bll grounded heavily on a sandbar, her conning tower awash and the target for Turkish shore guns. Holbrook ordered the maximum power on the electric motors and they were just able to force her over the bar and into deeper waters. There were still the five lines of mines ahead, but having successfully negotiated them on the way up, there was no reason why they should not equally successfully be penetrated on the way down. No one
on board, in fact, knew when Bll went through the minefield, and it was not until half an hour later, when the submarine was brought to periscope depth and Holbrook could check his position, that it became apparent that the mines were safely
astern.
On
hand was the open
Holbrook's
starboard
and Bll was clear An hour later the submarine sea,
of the Straits. surfaced and made contact with the destroyers which were waiting to escort her
back It
to Mitilini.
was a remarkable achievement
in all
While Admiral Carden maintained his watch on the Dardanelles, operations farther south were directed against the expected attack by Turkey on the Suez Canal. Vice-Admiral Richard Pierse, commanding the East Indies station, had been ordered to move his headquarters from Bombay to Suez and to absorb responsibility for the Levant coast into his command. He was told to watch the Syrian ports of Alexandretta, Beirut, and Haifa. and to stop all supplies coming down for the support of Turkish forces by the Hejaz railway. The main Turkish force earmarked for the attack on the Canal was still at Damascus, and as yet showed no signs of moving. The cutting of the railway, with the consequent effect on supplies, could delay its movement still further.
Bombardment and demolition Pierse had two battleships, the Siciftstirr and Ocean, and three light cruisers, the Minerva, Doris and the Russian Askold, under his command, together with the French coast defence ship Requin. He sen( the Doris north along the Syrian coast as far as Alexandretta to do what mischief she could, and Captain Larken made the most of his few opportunities for offensive action, both by bombardment and demoli tion, in destroying rail and telegraph communications. But it was only when the Doris reached Alexandretta that anything much more than a pinprick he-
came
possible.
469
North of Alexandretta the Hejaz railway runs close to the coast, and on the night of December 18 a small parly from the Doris landed, destroyed the telegraph lines, and loosened a couple of rails on the track. Early next morning the inevitable
nam
came puffing along and was derailed. A second tram, stopped by the wreckage of the first, was shelled hut managed to hack into safety as the British shells were not powerful enough to bring down a bridge behind it. Following this small success. Captain l.arken sent ashore an ultimatum to the Turkish governor of the town demanding the surrender of all military stores and rolling stock under threat of bombardment. The ultimatum was rejected with a threat that British residents would be executed if Turkish inhabitants were killed in the bombardment. A reply by Larken that the Minister of Marine and his staff would be handed over to the British authorities alter the war for punishment brought a reconsideration of the Turkish reply, and the ultimatum was accepted. By this time most of the military stores had been removed, hut two locomotives remained. The Turks agreed to destroy them, but asked for dynamite from the Dons to carrv out their task. The Doris,
W
having no dynamite, offered guncotton in its place, but the Turks had no experience of the use of this explosive, and their national pride could not stomach the operation being performed by a foreigner. The difficulty was finally solved by making the torpedo lieutenant of the Doris a Turkish naval officer for the rest of the day. Such were the niceties of war in 1914! Early in the new year. Admiral Pierse reported to the Admiralty that signs of a Turkish advance against the Suez Canal were increasing. There were thoughts in London of an amphibious operation to capture and hold Alexandretta, from which port both the Hejaz and Baghdad railways could be cut but the proposal was shelved. Instead, the Doris was sent back to Alexandretta to cause as much more embarrass-
ment
to
Turkish lines of communication as
she could. About
all
that she could achieve
was to bombard the cliffs north of the town and bring them, together with the coast road above them, tumbling into the sea. Originally, the plan for dealing with the Turkish attack on the canal had centred upon an amphibious landing at Gaza, which would have provided an opportunity to cut the whole Turkish supply line and roll up the attacking force at leisure. But in the dilatory fashion in which the war in the Mediterranean was being conducted at this stage, nothing was done to put the plan into operation, and the great advantages in a war of movement which the flexibility of sea power can provide were allowed to dissolve in apparent lassitude. Further Reading
Britons as
temporary members of the Turkish
armed forces
Churchill, W.
S., The World Crisis (Thornton Butterworth 1923-9) Corbett, Julian S., Naval Operations Vol 2
(Longmans, Green & Co 1921) J., From The Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol. 3 (OUP 1965) PRO, Admiralty Secretary In-Letters, Reports of Rear-Admiral Limpus and Rear-Admiral Marder, A.
CT
™
Pierse
>
Turkey's
first
blow
bombardment
of
in
the war — the
Novorossiysk
[For Lieutenant-Commander Peter biography, see page 52. ]
Kemp's
5 5
the dissident minorities
s
3k
r-
*
%^»
A
Austria-Hungary and Russia both had strong and vociferous nationalist minorities among their populations. Would these minorities now support their rulers, or would they try to take advantage of the situation to establish nations of their own in place of the heterogeneous empires of prewar days? Otto Pick. Above: Men of the Polish Legion.
()
v li
he d V
*tf 1^
Eduard Benes. Masaryk's right-hand man Czech Realist' Party
in
Thomas Masaryk,
university professor
and
the
creator of the 'Realist' Party
The shots fired at Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, killed more than the heir to the Habsburg throne. The assassination ushered in the destruction of the dual monarchy itself by
the Poles, Czechs and Slovaks were specific to each of these nationalities and very few parallels can usefully be drawn between them. The Poles and Czechs were 'historic' nations, since in the past they had had states of their own. While the Kingdom of Bohemia still existed in theory, that of Poland had been wiped off the map by the partitions at the end of the 18th Century and by the settlement of 1815. A hundred years later the Poles were still partitioned among Russia, Germany and Austria.
providing an immediate casus
belli
which
that unstable state could not withstand. The nationalism of the various races which inhabited Austria-Hungary, was, of course, a major cause of this instability. The precise political, social and economic factors which affected the attitudes of
One
472
of the greatest
problems of the Dual Monarchy: the large number
of intensely nationalistic races,
Joseph Pilsudski, commander of the Polish Legion, saw the chance of a unified Poland
Their urge for self-determination was thus directed both against the Germans and against their fellow Slavs — the Russians. Furthermore, in Austrian Poland they themselves lorded it over another Slav nationality — the Ruthenes. The Habsburg share of Poland was the province of Galicia, and there was constrife between the Polish landowners and the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) peasantry. At times most of the Slav nationalities living in Austria-Hungary
tinual
most speaking a separate language
the pull of Russian-inspired PanSlavism and looked to St Petersburg for support. Russia tried to use this ideological appeal to further her own national interest, but she was compromised by the autocratic nature of her own internal regime and by the treatment handed out to both Poles and Ukrainians under her rule. The Galician Poles were thus largely immune to Pan-Slavism, despite a shortlived belief after the 1905 Revolution that a change could follow the introduction of felt
constitutional government in Russia. The party of the Polish middle-class in Galicia — the National Democrats — did not quite abandon its hopes of a Polish-Russian reconciliation. The ambiguity of Russian
which repressed both Polish and Ukrainian nationalism within the Tsar's dominions, but encouraged the Ruthenians (who were after all Ukrainians by another name) against the Poles in Galicia, ranged the Galician landowners firmly on the side of the Habsburg Emperor. The Germans and the Magyars in AustriaHungary regarded the Poles as a companion Herrenvolk and there was a particular affinity between the Polish nobles and their fellow aristocrats in Austria and Hungary. Vienna consistently supported the Poles at the expense of the Ruthenians in Galicia. To the Habsburgs the Polish nobles were natural allies in support of the imperial policy of maintaining the status quo, and accordingly they were given a free hand in Galicia. The Ruthenians had no influence in Vienna, and were woefully policy,
Polish allegiance — to
Germany,
Russia, Austria, or only Poland herself? The Russians
also tried to cash in on nationalism. The proclamation Polish issued by the Russian Commander-inChief, Grand Duke Nicholas, on August 1914, made a considerable impres17, sion throughout Poland. The proclamation promised the Poles the unification of all Polish territories, including Prussian Poland and Austrian Galicia, under Russian suzerainty, of course, but with a great deal of autonomy. The Germans, however, had a rival programme for the Poles. Even Bismarck had envisioned the recreation of an autonomous Poland under German suzerainty in the event of a Russo-German war, and the proposal gained new life during the Russian Revolution of 1905/6. The weakness of the proposal lay in the fact that the Galician Poles would be excluded, as the Habsburgs wanted no part in encouraging in Central and Eastern Europe which would threaten the very existence of the Austro-Hungarian state. The satisfaction of the Galician Poles under
nationalism
Austrian rule lent credence
to the concept
if Russian Poland were to be detached from the Romanovs it could be added to Galicia rather than be made into an adjunct of the Berlin government. This implicit rivalry between Germany and Austria over Russian Poland dampened the enthusiasm of Germany for the project. Nevertheless, when war broke out in 1914 Germany decided that Russian Poland should be incited to revolt and eventually be restored as a quasi-independent state. On August 5, the Wilhelmstrasse decided to secure the consent of the Vatican to have the Polish clergy use their influence on the population of Russian Poland. The request was cloaked in the garment of a liberating crusade for Catholicism against Russian Orthodoxy, which the Germans claimed
that
was violating the rights of the Catholic Church in Poland. This attempt, however, proved ineffectual. Mass support for the German proposal was not forthcoming, and eventually the presence of about 1.000.000 Russian troops in Poland put any Polish rising against Russia out of the question. In Galicia there had been enough antiRussian feeling to admit the formation of Joseph Pilsudski's Polish Legion which, in collaboration with an underground Polish 'government' in Warsaw, put forward political demands for a future Polish state. For that reason Pilsudski's Legion was incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian army so that it could still lend military assistance to the cause of the Central
under-represented in the Reichsrat. Consequently it was thought in St Petersburg that Ruthenian discontent could easily be fanned by Pan-Slav propaganda. The Galician Russian Society, led by Count Vladimir Bobrinskij, was founded for this purpose in 1907. Subversive material imported from Russia was circulated throughout Galicia right up to the outbreak of war and Russian subsidies were made available to support Ruthenian self-help organisations and to finance pilgrimages to Kiev. Determined efforts were made by the Russian Orthodox Church to proselytise the Ruthenians. After the failure of the Galician harvest in 1913, large shipments of grain arrived from Russia to succour the underprivileged Ruthenian peasantry. However, as far as the Poles were concerned, they were reasonably content with their position in Galicia, particularly in contrast to the rigorous anti-Polish policies
pursued in German and Russian Poland at that time. The outbreak of war found the Austrian Poles therefore in an ambivalent position; their nationalism was directed primarily against Russia. The Poles living in Germany and Russia, however, were not nearly so satisfied as the privi' >ged Austrian Poles of Galicia. Germany deluded herself into thinking that the hostility of Russian Poles toward St Petersburg implied that they were longing to be liberated by Germany when the time was ripe. In fact, few of the Poles living under the Tsar were prepared to
exchange Russian
for Prussian rule, paras there was a fairly strong social revolutionary undercurrent in the Polish independence movement at this time. Russian industrialisation had succeeded in tying important economic circles in Poland, especially in the textile industry, to the enormous Russian market.
ticularly
Top: Although on the whole Poland remained loyal to Russia, many Poles joined the armies of Pilsudski reviews men of his Polish Legion, which fought fortheAustrians. Above: Polish troops in action on the Eastern Front in late 1914
Germany and Austria-Hungary. Here
47:i
being at the same time choked Attempts at raising a Polish Legion in Germany wore fruitless. Polish 'Sharp-shooter' organisations under German tutelage were incorporated under Austro-Hungarian military command. By the end of 1914 Germany's flirtation with while
rowers
politically
nationalism was virtually over. The other major Slav nationality in Cis-
Polish
presented a very different The Czechs were both socially and economically on a much more complex level o( development. By 1914, the Czech Leithania
picture.
aristocracy had certainly lost its political influence among its own people. Middleclass virtues and middle-class feelings
dominant political and The setting up of a Czech University in Prague in 1882 (the ancient university of Prague, founded in 1348, had represented social
the
ethos.
to teaching in German under Habsburg rule — a cause of much discontent
turned
among
the Czechs) served to accelerate the
growth of a Czech professional class., and indeed by 1914 Czech officials had proliferated to a remarkable extent throughout the middle ranks of the Imperial bureaucracy in Cis-Leithania. Bohemia was the industrial heartland of the monarchy. Its rich coal and lignite deposits had led to the development of foundries and engineering industries and there was a well-organised and politically conscious Czech working class. Bohemia, its resources and its Czech population, played a central role in the monarchy. Its position could not be compared with that of Galicia, which was essentially a province on the periphery of the Empire. The Habsburgs could have managed without Austrian Poland; they could not survive the loss of Bohemia. The racial question in the Czech lands was particularly complicated by the presence there of a considerable German population — originally the descendants of
and craftsmen brought in by Czech kings from the 13th Century onwards. The Czechs thus had to contend with the German base of the Empire in Austria proper, and with large numbers of Germans in their own country who had been accustomed to a privileged position, both in political and social terms. During the last two decades of the 19th Century and subsequently, the Bohemian Germans found themselves increasingly on the defensive. Their monopoly of the professions was being diluted. Industrialisation was bringing Czech peasants from the countryside into the towns, most of which had hitherto been German strongholds. In Prague, for example, the Germans had been reduced from 18.5% of the city's population in 1880 settlers
8.5% in 1910. The new industries were also bringing Czechs to work in hitherto exclusively German-speaking areas. A to
Banka —
bank— Ziunostenskd supported Czech economic enterprise, and much was also done to raise the level of the peasantry by encouraging various forms of great Czech
agricultural co-operation.
Austria's most dangerous enemy A new political party was founded in 1890 by Thomas Masaryk, a Professor of Philosophy at the Czech U diversity in Prague. He called it the Realis. ^arty, because he and his friends rejected w at they regarded oreoccupation as the Czechs' unrealisti with their 'historic' state ri, ts. Masaryk preferred to look for a moder* federal and democratic Austria, where all i, >tionalities
474
would be able
to enjoy their natural rights. In retrospect this blueprint seems hardly
more realistic than the mirages pursued by Masaryk's opponents. Yet, despite his small following, Masaryk was a man to be reckoned with mainly because he was the first Czech politician of real international stature. He possessed great moral courage and integrity. To the disgust of Czech chauvinists he had exposed as forgeries allegedly mediaeval documents purporting to provide evidence of the past greatness of the Czech nation. He also acquired an international reputation by his defence of a Jew accused of ritual murder. His influence among the other Slavs of Austria-Hungary was considerable: students from all parts of the monarchy came to attend his lectures in Prague. In the event, Masaryk proved to be the Habsburgs' most dangerous enemy. When the war did break out in July 1914, however, the Czech lands were quiescent, although the Czechs were perturbed by the prospect of having to fight against Slav Russia. Masaryk was the first to grasp the wider implications and to seize the opportunity. He quickly came to the conclusion that the decrepit Empire could not survive a major war and in December 1914 he went abroad to enlist Allied support for the certain
Czech cause.
As a 'Realist', Masaryk soon realised that a Slav state in Central Europe, consisting
of
Bohemia and Moravia, would
viable and he consequently combined the causes of Czech and Slovak nationalism to form a new 'Czechoslovak' concept. This had some limited support
hardly
be
among Slovak intellectuals as a revival of the more romantic ideals of 1848. More significantly, it had some appeal among the numerous citizens of Slovak descent in the United States. The disparity between the historical and social background of the Czechs and Slovaks was considerable. The Slovaks were conquered by the Magyars in the 10th Century and the Habsburgs acquired them with the Hungarian Crown. As Slovakia had always been part of the inner Magyardominated core of the Kingdom of Hungary, and the Slovaks had never had a 'historic' state of their own, their political movements had to exist in the much more difficult conditions of the Hungarian half of the
dual monarchy. For centuries they had been exposed to the harsh pressures of Magyarisation. Yet for ten centuries they had succeeded in preserving their language and their national identity. During the 19th Century, the fever of nationalism had gripped Slovakia, but at no stage were the Magyars prepared to make any concessions or even to accept the existence of a Slovak nation. The process of Magyarisation was relentlessly pursued right to the very end. There were no Slovak institutions of higher education. And in 1874 the three existing Slovak secondary schools (serving almost 2,000,000 people) were closed. The activities of the Slovak educational self-help organisation—the Slovenskd Matica — were progressively curtailed until its dissolution in 1875 for allegedly promoting Pan-Slav tendencies. By comparison, the lot of the Czechs in Cis-Leithania was indeed en-
The Cis-Leithanian electoral reform of 1907 had no counterpart in the Hungarian kingdom; Slovak representation in the Budapest Parliament remained low (2 deputies in 1905, 7 in 1906 viable.
and only 3 in 1910). Emigration to America was understandably much higher than from any other region of Austria-Hungary. The Slovaks sometimes looked to Vienna but the terms of the 1867 really precluded any assistance from that quarter. Nevertheless, when Franz Josef found himself at odds with his Hungarian subjects over their contribution to the common AustroHungarian army in 1905/6, he threatened to broaden the franchise in Hungary. As this would have increased the representation of the Slav minorities, it was a potent argument. But for Franz Josef this notion was no more than a bargaining counter, to be abandoned when it had served its purpose. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir apparent, loathed the Magyar challenge to the dynastic position of the Habsburgs, but this did not mean that he had any special sympathies for the Slavs and, had he lived, it is by no means certain that he would have supported the Slovaks and other Slavs. Slovak nationalism was really kept alive by a small self-sustaining intellectual elite. In comparison with Bohemia, Slovakia was economically underdeveloped. Most Slovaks were peasants, there was no Slovak middle class and Slovaks even found it impossible to obtain more than a primary education in their own language. Religion played a much more direct part in politics than in Bohemia, simply because the Catholic Church and the small Protestant community in Central Slovakia were the only institutions not entirely submerged by the tide of Magyarisation. Austria-Hungary, then, had acute probfor
support,
Compromise
lems of nationality and language to face. But Germany and Russia also had large Polish minorities, and both powers optimistically hoped that the Poles in their opponent's territory would welcome them as liberators. The Poles in Austria-Hungary were comparatively well off, and prepared to support the Dual Monarchy, but rivalries between the various nationalities were to problems for Austriaendless Hungary, particularly in her armed forces.
cause
Further Reading Macartney, C. A., The Habsburg Empire, 1790-
1918 (London 1968) Macartney, C. A., Hung-
(OUP
y and
her Successors
1965)
Macartney, C. A., and Palmer, A. W., Independent Eastern Europe (Macmillan 1967) May, A. J., The Passing of the Habsburg Monarchy (OUP 1966) Seton-Watson, R. W., Racial Problems in
Hungary (London 1908) Seton-Watson, R. W., A History of the Czechs and Slovaks (OUP 1943) Taylor, A. J. P., The Habsburg Monarchy
(OUP 1948) Thomson, S. Harrison, Czechoslovakia in European History (Cass 1966) Wiskemann, E., Czechs and Germans (Macmillan 1967)
Zeman, Z. A. B., The Break-up of the Habsburg Empire (OUP 1961)
OTTO PICK was
born in Prague and educated at the Prague and Oxford. He has lectured at universities in Britain, Canada, the USA and Germany and is currently Reader in International Relations at the University of Surrey. He has published many articles on East European affairs and a book on Czechoslovakia. Universities of
GERMANY: 4 NKW STRATEGY The
Schlieffen Plan
and the
had
man charged
was unable
failed,
with
than a
be turned into concrete strategic plans remained to be seen. In fact Falkenhayn
sure that the German army could destroy French fighting power with one gigantic blow and overrun France: the western Allies would be forced to sue for peace, and the enemy in the East would either follow suit immediately or be defeated with little difficulty. Indeed, their confidence had been so great that they had failed to work out an alternative strategy to meet the needs of a protracted war; they had even omitted to seize the practically undefended Channel Ports when they could have done, during the retreat of the French and British forces. The setback came as a profound shock, even to the few Germans who had felt misgivings for some time. One of the immediate effects was that Moltke suffered a severe breakdown in health and morale. It was obvious that he would have to be replaced. The appointment of his successor took place at the Kaiser's headquarters in Luxembourg on the evening of September 14. The War Minister, Lieutenant -General Erich von Falkenhayn, was entrusted with the full powers of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army in the Field, although the change in command
was not made
public for the time being. It was feared that Moltke's would be correctly interpreted as an admission of failure, and this would encourage the enemy, dismay the German people, and make a bad impression on those neutrals whose confidence both sides in the war were strenuously attempting to gain. Moltke was ordered to remain at Supreme Command headquarters,
dismissal
but not to interfere with the conduct of operations. To Falkenhayn himself his appointment did not come as a surprise. As early as August 10, General von Lyncker, Chief of the Military Cabinet, had asked Falkenhayn whether he was prepared to take over if Moltke should show himself unequal to the task, and Falkenhayn had eagerly affirmed that he was. In the army at large, however, the choice of Falkenhayn as supreme commander was as unexpected as it was unpopular. For one thing, at 53 he was younger than any of the army and corps commanders under him, with the exception of the Crown Prince. Worse than
Here Leo Kahn
Moltke's plans had achieved — deadlock. German troops on the Eastern Front look out at the same barbed wire and machine guns that were to bedevil Falkenhayn's own planning. His preference for the west led him to ignore the favourable situation in the east.
ideas,
felt
little.
describes the transference of power and the problems faced by the new man. Left: All that
but whether or not these could
Germany's hopes of a speedy and decisive victory in the west had faded with the battle of the Marne and the withdrawal of her armies on the right wing. Clearly, the German soldier would not be 'home before Christmas'. It is doubtful whether such high expectations could have been fulfilled even if the Schlieffen Plan, or the modified version of it that Moltke put into operation, had fully succeeded; but speculations of this kind are futile. The important point is that the German military and political leaders had staked all on the success of the Schlieffen strategy. They had
make any radical
alterations, and the situation dictated his strategy. Thus Falkenhayn was unable to alter his predecessor's plans more
its
execution did not long remain in favour. He also suffered a severe breakdown in health and morale. It was not long therefore before Moltke was replaced by Erich von Falkenhayn, the Prussian Minister for War, and on September 14 Falkenhayn took on the responsibilities of the Chief of the General Staff of the Army in the Field.
The new man had new
to
that, his training at the General Staff had been comparatively and he did not share in the prestige of those who had sat
short,
at the feet of the great Schlieffen. The Kaiser's preference smacked of favouritism. What kind of a man was Falkenhayn? He came from an old and noble Prussian family with strong military traditions. At the age he entered cadet school and later attended the War Acadeim of where he was counted among the outstanding students. He served for a little over three years in the General Staff under Count Waldersee, who also thought highly of his abilities. From 1896 to 1902 he was in China, first as a military instructor, then as a 1
1
.
German Expeditionary Corps at the time of the Boxer Rebellion. The experience helped him to acquire a wider mental horizon than that of the average Prussian officer, and it sharpened his interest in international politics. After his return to Germany, the progress of his career was fairly quick, though not spectacular. By 1912, at the age of 50, he was Chief-of-Staff of IV Corps with the rank of Major-General. A post of this nature no longer satisfied his growing ambitions and he fell discontented and restless. Only a year later, however, the Kaiser made him Minister of War. How this sudden elevation to one of the highest and most important offices of state came about remains something of a staff officer in the
mystery. It lends colour to the allegation, voiced bj many of Ins contemporaries, that Falkenhayn, who usually made no effort to win the affection of colleagues and subordinates, could he very adroit in courting the goodwill of those who could further his career. However that may bo, he proved himself to he a gifted administrator, who dealt very efficiently with the problems arising from the vast increases in the personnel and equipment of the armed forces. His performance in parliamentary debates was also creditable. Although he was a staunch conservative and rather narrow-minded nationalist facing a more liberal majority in the Reichstag, he displayed enough restraint and formal courtesj to avoid violent clashes on most occasions. He represented the interests of his department forcefully, yet was careful not to press extreme demands, as the diehards ol the military establish
menl urged him to do. Altogether, he showed an inclination to compromise or hide his time rather than risk defeat: an attitude which makes for success in politics, hut can he fatal in he e. induct t
of
mi itan operat 1
On August joined
ion-.
Hi, Falkenhayn and his mobile staff left Berlin and Moltke's wartime headquarters at Koblenz, where the
1, 3
d
V 1,
me
informed and make his influence felt, hut in this he was disappointed. Moltke and his staff, understandably, resented his presence and co-operated as little as they could. Moreover, it soon turned out that the information which Moltke himself received from his army commanders left much to be desired As soon as things began to go wrong, news from the battlefronts became inadequate and misleading. Even so, Falkenhayn assessed the developing situation more soberly than the General Staff and the generals in the field, and was not carried away by the unbounded optimism which was prevalent among the Germans up to he disaster of the Marne. He recognised many of the mistakes that were committed and the flaws in the victories which were achieved. He pointed out that it was vitally important to occupy the Channel coast while there was time, and he warned against the premature crossing of the Marne. He realised, even though not to its fullest extent, the danger which threatened the German armies from the direction of Paris. He was aware that Moltke's strategy was but a travesty of Schlieffen's ideas, which it was supposed to follow. The Schlieffen Plan,' he said on September 1. has not even started yet." There has been considerable argument whether Falkenhayn had ever been a true adherent of the Schlieffen school of thought. This was certainly the case inasmuch as he had been as convinced as everybody else in Germany that quick victory in the W est was the obvious aim, which could be achieved by a wide, enveloping sweep of the German right wing. But it was also true that he had altogether little faith in strategic theory. His approach was essentially pragmatic. A military leader, he believed, should meet any situation as it arose and not try to impose his will on events in accordance with preconceived ideas. He had not made a very thorough study of Schlieffen's strategy, and did not understand all its implications; when it failed, he was unable to draw
keep himself
fully
t
the logical conclusions.
We may now sum up the basic qualities of the man who took command at the first great turning point of the war. There is no doubt that he was a thoroughly competent professional soldier. His grasp of factual elements was quick and sure, but he had little imagination, and his ideas were conventional. He was a good administrator, though rather shy of radical reforms. (It is significant that he made no changes in the OHL operational staff, of which he had been severely critical.) His capacity for hard work was outstanding. He had complete confidence in the superiority of his own judgement, without the gift of inspiring confidence in
The Schlieffen Plan has not even started yet' Casualties among men and animals as a result of the conditions were very substantial on the Eastern Front, creating a great drain on the resources of the already over-extended combatants
mm
uuiera. nt; wtih uiimiuuuh, out ne iacK.eu trie ooiuness, conviction that luck was with him, which marks the great leader. The doubts which others felt about Falkenhayn's ability to make the resolute and imaginative decisions which the hour demanded were soon justified. In his war memoirs, Falkenhayn tries to convey the impression that the situation which confronted him in the middle of September was one of acute danger, requiring quick, temporary remedies and leaving no room for a fundamental recasting of overall strategy. As an objective assessment this cannot be accepted without great reservations.
'Hanging in the air' Let us examine the situation in broad outlines. On the Western Front, the German retreat had come to a halt, and in some places lost ground had been regained. The German armies had reestablished cohesion all along the line. The dangerous gap between First and Second Armies had been effectively sealed up on the very day that Falkenhayn succeeded to the supreme command. The engagements which followed the battle of the Marne had revealed that on the whole tactical conditions favoured the defence, even against superior numbers. It had certainly been a weakness in the German position that the Belgian army still held Antwerp, but one can hardly agree with Falkenhayn that this constituted a serious threat to the rear of the German army. There was only one real danger-point: The western wing of the
German army was 'hanging in the air' and obviously exposed to an outflanking movement by the enemy, and the Germans knew moving strong forces westwards. Here quick countermeasures were indeed urgently demanded, and in this connection we must mention another factor which rightly that the French were
had a decisive place
in Falkenhayn's deliberations. During their retreat the Belgians and the French had destroyed a large part of the railway installations, so that the movement of troops and supplies behind the German front was greatly hampered. The only supply line fully intact was that leading from Brussels via Mons and Cambrai to St Quentin. Altogether, then, it may be said that the situation on the
Western Front presented some clear-cut, immediate problems and was fraught with uncertainty from a long-term point of view. As far as the near future was concerned, the position was not really critical.
On the other hand, a truly alarming situation had developed in the Eastern theatre of war, though not in the German sector. The Austrian armv had suffered a heavv defeat in Galicia at
AFalkenhayn faced the problem of trying to reconcile the conflicting requirements of all the areas in which German troops were fighting
A Hindenburg and Ludendorff had their attenon the area which was their consider the Western Front
tion too firmly fixed
special concern to
V The stabilisation of the front
in
boded no good -all Falkenhayn could expect was a series of Allied offensives the west
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Maine, but it was still in full retreat and there was no telling when and where the retreat would come to an end. All seemed to depend on the question whether or not the Russians would forcefully press their advantage. If they did, the consequences were incalculable. Upper Silesia with its indispensable wealth of mining and industrial resources would be in danger of being overrun. Further Russian successes on a large scale would destroy any hope o\' bringing Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Powers and of closing the Dardanelles to the sea traffic of the Entente. They could also very well lead to a rapid disintegration of the shaky internal structure of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which, would then cease to be an effective military power. All questions of loyalty apart, it was clearly in Germany's vital interest to come to the aid of her ally as strongly and as soon* as possible. By contrast, the situation in the German sector was not only stable, at least for the time being, but held the distinct promise o( future victories, provided the necessary reinforcements were made available. The German army led by Hindenburg and LudendorfF, the victors of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes,
uciU'Uiivcu Liic iiivduiug lvussicui .niiiii^ iiuiii i\;isi riussia anu pushed them beyond the River Niemen. German generalship had proved itself superior to the Russian, the German war machine was infinitely more efficient, and it was supported by an excellent system of railway communications. Only lack of sufficient manpower, combined with the bad news from the Galician front, was preventing the German forces from pursuing the Russian Niemen Army and possibly striking another crippling blow. It follows from this summary of the war situation as it presented itself to German eyes in mid-September that it was not only possible for Falkenhayn, but actually imperative, to formulate a new general strategy and convey his ideas to all the military and political leaders. He himself was under no illusion that it was still possible to fall back on original aims of the Schlieffen Plan. In his words, 'the intention of forcing a speedy decision which had hitherto been the foundation of the German plan had come to nought. A very much longer duration of the war than was generally assumed was certainly to be reckoned with.' Such a radical change in the whole character of the war obviously called for a new plan, but instead of this Falkenhayn merely made a succession of isolated and often inconsistent decisions.
The Austrian monster in action. The Powers was superior in all respects
Right:
Below: Guns largest
gun
in
artillery of
the Central
the East. The Austrian 30.5-cm howitzer theatre of the war
was the
in this
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The first, fundamental question to be answered was this: should the order of the two-front war now be reversed, that is to say, should the Germans go on the defensive in the West until the Russians were defeated, and, in order to achieve this, transfer the main weight of their forces to the East? As we have seen, the misfortunes of the Austrian armies had made it in any case impossible for Germany to maintain a passive role with weak forces on the Russian front; and the German successes, though as yet far from decisive, seemed to indicate that a fairly quick defeat of the Russian colossus was quite feasible. Half-hearted strategy Falkenhayn rejected the idea out of hand
for various reasons. In the first place, the notion that a decision must first be sought in the West was too deeply ingrained in him to be abandoned as long as there was any choice. Also, he did not credit the possibility of an early Russian collapse, and he was less impressed with the victories in East Prussia than most people. He still took it for granted that the Russians would make use of -their vast territory to avoid decisive battles and thus give the Germans no chance of an early victory. A more telling reason was probably the realisation that a shift of the major war effort to the East would necessarily involve, on the Western Front, a large-scale withdrawal to shortened lines and easily defensible positions. This would have meant giving up large tracts of economically and strategically valuable territory in Northern France and Belgium. It would also have meant leaving the initiative to the Allies, and this for a length of time which one could not assess. He shared with practically all his fellow generals an excessive fear of the effects of withdrawal on morale, as well as an implicit faith in the superior merit of offensive action at all times. 'But to a German leader it was quite beyond doubt that the securing of the Western Front had to be attempted by means of an offensive, so long as such a
thing seemed at
To conquer
came back
to it. It seems that he was not yet thinking in purely strategic terms; he was still reacting to the shock of the German retreat. He saw the vital importance of the Race to the Sea', but he also wanted to show the enemy at once that the defeat of the Marne had not robbed the German army of its power to hit back.
He immediately
West continued, therefore, to be the guiding principle, and the immediate aim was the thorough consolidation of the German position on the Western Front. But did Falkenhayn, in those early days of his command, have any clear conception of how it was to be achieved? If he did, then only in general outline, too sketchy to be called a plan. The Germans would check the Allies' outflanking attempts and counter with an enveloping movement of their own: the German right wing would be firmly established on the sea; possession of the Channel coast would be secured. There was no longer any hope that even the complete success of such operations would bring the war to
along the front.
While the fighting of the preceding weeks had not prevented the Allies from building up their left wing, the Germans had succeeded in repulsing all their attempts to turn the German Hank. Falkenhayn now saw his opportunity which he hoped would turn the tide once again in Germany's favour. He formed a new army for this purpose from four recently raised army corps, strengthened by the forces which had besieged Antwerp. His decision to use raw and hastily trained troops in a decisive battle on difficult terrain is usually accounted as one of Falkenhayn's major blunders, especially as experienced troops were available. The only excuse is that by that time, partly through his own mistakes, Falkenhayn was under pressure of time.
The perennial problem — to give
of all in the
an end in 1914, it would at least place the German forces in a dominating position for future far-reaching operations. The general intention was sound and, once the alternative of a temporary withdrawal had been rejected, probably the only one with which the Germans might be able to avoid a fatal deadlock. Falkenhayn could not yet tell exactly when and where he would start the envisaged enveloping offensive, but one thing was obvious even then: it was essential to build up the strength of the right wing at all costs, even at the risk of weakening parts of the rest of the front. Falkenhayn did something towards this end, but he was half-hearted about it. True, large-scale troop movements from one sector to another were difficult owing to the bad state of the railways, but they were not impossible. General Groener, the expert on rail transport on Falkenhayn's staff, had produced a workable plan, which he submitted to Falkenhayn on September 15, but Falkenhayn did not accept it then and never
all
intact.
all possible.'
first
ordered counterattacks
was a decision which even the stoutest defenders of Falkenhayn find difficult to explain. If the purpose had partly been to slow down the westward movement of French troops, it became soon evident that Falkenhayn had miscalculated; yet he persisted in the attacks. The heavy losses in officers and men which the German armies had suffered was already making itself felt, and ammunition was beginning to run short. The Germans could ill afford to squander fighting strength in fierce battles which had little chance of affecting the main issue. Only one of the attacks made sense and brought results: Antwerp was reduced on October 9. By then, the other battles had ceased. The Belgian army which had defended Antwerp escaped It
first priority to
the West or to the East? Falkenhayn's first plan to envelop the Allies by a wide sweep up to the Channel coast and then southwards had not taken sufficient account of the Allies' own aggressive intentions and proved
to be impracticable. Subsequently, a well-designed trap because the Allied command called off an offensive which had obviously intended. The time for subtle and imaginative
failed it
was past. clear that the main battleground had shifted from France to Flanders, where a strong British force was concentrated at Ypres, covered on both flanks by Franch and Belgian forces. An enemy offensive from Ypres towards Bruges was imminent. Falkenhayn forestalled it, by the narrowest margin of time, by starting his own offensive at Ypres on October '20. The complete confidence in victory which Falkenhayn seems to have felt at the beginning of the Ypres offensive was certainly misplaced. He greatly underrated the quality of the British regular army and the physical difficulties which the muddy soil of Flanders presented to the impetus of attack. The last desstrategy It
was
179
r>o:}
potato German effort to force a decision in the West before the winter set in was foiled, but it so nearly succeeded that it must be considered a justified attempt. 11 wrong decisions had been made, thej had been made earlier.
Complete victory possible the meantime, the situation in tho Eastern theatre of war had improved considerably. The Russians had stopped their pursuit of the Austrian army under the throat of an attack by the German Ninth Army in Silesia, which actually pushed deeply into Poland during tho first days of October. The German operations undertaken to relieve the pressure on the Austrian ally exposed East Prussia to renewed Russian offensives, but for once Ealkcnhayn was willing to accept a risk of this kind. Tho Russians wore showing no signs of relying on an evasive strategy; on the contrary the\ were preparing for massive assaults on Poson and Silesia, and Ludendorff was planning a sharp, decisive blow against the right flanks of the expected Russian advance. In view of these facts Falkenhayn changed his former views completely: he also was now convinced that full victory over Russia could be achieved fairly quickly. Again the question arose whether the time had come to transfer troops on a large scale from the home reserves and the quiet sectors of the Western Front to the East. Conrad, the Chief of the Austrian General Staff, and Ludendorff urged Falkenhayn with increasing vigour to do this. Falkenhayn, however, still hesitated. His support for the German army in the East remained, for the time being, tardy and inadequate. As a result, when Ludendorff caught and defeated the Russians at Lodz he was unable to complete the encirclement which he had planned. Lodz was another brilliant victory which missed being decisive. With the battles of Ypres and Lodz the first phase of the war was over. On both the Western and Eastern Fronts the fighting had ended in deadlock. Ever since the battle of the Marne Falkenhayn had wavered between the realisation that a long, uncertain war was lying ahead and the tenacious hope that a speedy, decisive lii
victory over the enemy in the West could still be achieved; 'First Ypres' had settled the question; nor could there be any doubt now that for a long time to come major operations on land would be confined to the East. The so far vaguely perceived danger of the British blockade was now recognised by Falkenhayn as the most important factor in the war situation. Beyond this, he did not, and Falkenhayn's inheritance, the result of Moltke's strategy -trenches right up to the North Sea
perhaps could not, form a clear plan of the means by which the war might be brought to a victorious, or at least tolerable, finish. In the preparation for a drawn-out struggle Falkenhayn did the things which obviously had to be done, and did them extremely well. Under his direction the technique of trench warfare was developed to a high pitch of perfection, and it was largely due to his initiative that in Germany a superb system of war economy and war production was brought into being. Falkenhayn's reputation as a supreme commander is low; lower, perhaps, than he deserves. He inherited a more than difficult situation, which nobody in Germany had foreseen and planned for. Many of his errors of judgement were due to an attitude of mind which he shared with most military men of his time. Given the blunders committed by the Allies after their victory on the Marne, a great leader might still have prevented a fatal war of attrition. But Falkenhayn was not a great man, and if one were asked to sum up German post-Marne strategy in one sentence, one could only say: strictly speaking, there was no strategy.
Further Reading Blebruck, Hans, Ludendorff,
Tirpitz,
Falkenhayn
(Berlin: Carl Curtuis,
1920)
Falkenhayn, Erich von, General Headquarters 1914-1916 and its Critical Decisions (Hutchinson) Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, A History of the World War 1914-1918 (Faber & Faber, 1934)
Moser, Otto von, Kurzer strategischer Uberblick uber den Weltkrieg 1914-1918 (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn) Zwehl. H. von. Erich von Falkenhayn, eine biographische Studie (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1920)
LEO KAHN was
born in Germany in 1909 and studied law and history at the Cologne and Berlin where he obtained the degree of a German doctor of law. He emigrated to England in 1937. After the war he worked as Reader and Editor for London publishers and published the novel Obliging Fellow in 1946 He joined the staff of the Weiner Library in 1956 as head of the Historical Manuscripts Section and has been Principal Archivist and head of the universities of
Foreign Documents Centre of the Imperial
War Museum.
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At the beginning of September 1914 both Austria and Serbia were poised to launch offensives. Serbia struck first, and Austria a day later. Both efforts failed and had little effect on the course of the war, yet losses exceeded those in the First Serbian Campaign. Leo Kahn. Above: Serbian irregulars watch for invaders
Id
Alter their first, disastrous attempt to crush Serbia it might have been expected that the Austrians would reverl to the
a place called Kupmski Kut, situated about midway bet ween Macva and Belgrade, where a loop of thi' river formed a narrow tongue of land belonging to Austria, but completely dominated on three sides by Serbian artillery. It was an ideal place for the enterprise. The crossing was effected without great difficulty and a strong bridgehead was soon established. In the following two days the First Army succeeded in enlarging the bridgehead and began its advance towards the north and north-west. at
German General Stall had urged upon them even before host ties had started: that of using no more than the necessary minimum offerees in a defensive war against Serbia and throwing every available unit against the Russians into the vital Galician sector. At that time, the Austrian High Command had sent about strategy which the
i
1
i
two-fifths of their mobilized forces to the south-eastern war theatre, in the lingering hope that Russia, despite her threats, would not enter the war, or at least not at once; when that hope had faded it had been considered too late to interfere with a deployment already in full swing. The events of August had shown only too clearly that Austria-Hungary lacked the strength to force decisions in her favour on two fronts at the same time, but General Potiorek, smarting from his defeat, wa. determined to renew the offensive against Serbia as soon as possible. This time he planned to concentrate his forces for a massive offensive on one broad front along the river Drina. The Army High Command hesitated for a short time. They thought
Extreme lack of prudence In the meant line, things had been going badly with the Serbs on a secondary, though by no means unimportant, invasion
front.
that there was still a chance that Bulgaria would declare war on Serbia and take part in the operations. When this did not
happen, General Potiorek was given a free hand, with one emphatic reservation: on no account must he 'risk anything that
might lead
was uppermost
Entrenched Austrian inrantry wan and invade Serbia
to
go over
to trie
offensive
exhaustion had prevented the Serbs from pursuing the beaten enemy across the border, but after a week's respite they felt strong
enough
Austrian
to carry territory. The
the
war
into
General Staff, therefore, elaborated a plan for what is
commonly known
as 'the expedition in the conquest of the district of Syrmia was intended to be, not a mere expedition, but the first essential phase of a general invasion of Bosnia. The plan was duly communicated to Serbia's allies, who offered their strong moral encouragement, though no material help. Thus, in the beginning of September, each side was poised to launch an ambitious offensive, and in both plans sentiment played a more decisive part than a sober assessment of the chances of success. The Serbs struck first: their invasion of Syrmia started in the early hours of September 6. Field-Marshal Putnik had prepared the offensive in the greatest secrecy — not even his own generals were informed of his intentions until the very last moment — but the surprise which he achieved was only a tactical one without much significance. On the Austrian side. General Potiorek had foreseen the possibility of a Serbian move into Syrmia. He did not, however, regard the contingency as a serious threat that would compel him to reconsider his own invasion plans. The Serbs, he predicted correctly, would not be able to penetrate far beyond the frontier. The Serbian First Army crossed the Sava
Syrmia'. In
Timok
1.
3th Regiment, was immediately pushed forward between these two towns. By 1700 hours of September 6 it was outside the town of Shashinski, while other units were still struggling to complete the crossing of the Save. The inevitable result followed. The exposed column was attacked from two sides, and it was only by miracles of individual bravery that a considerable body of men managed to extricate themselves from a hopeless light and regained the Serbian banks of the river. The defeat of the Timok I Division did not amount to an immediate danger to the main Serbian force, but it compelled the First Army to advance with more caution than would have been required if the planned-for support on the left flank had been forthcoming. Various units fought a 1
in
The Serbs, on their part, were becoming over-confident, partly as a natural result of their own success, partly because the news of Russian victories in Galicia helped to create an exaggerated impression of Austria-Hungary's military weakness. After the battle of the Jadar valley, shortage of supplies and sheer physical
of their divisions, the
stead, half of the division's strength, the
to a further fiasco'. Clearly, the
question of prestige everybody's mind.
One
had been ordered to cross over at points near Yasenova Grada, on a stretch of river between the Austrian towns of Mitrovitz and Yarak. Its objective was to gain a firm foothold in the Mitrovitz district and subsequently to render support to the main invasion force on the left flank. The crossings were strongly contested and could be accomplished only with some delay and in successive stages. In their eagerness to make up for lost time the Serbs then proceeded with an extreme lack of prudence. They omitted to fortify a bridgehead, and they made no attempt to take either Mitrovitz or Yarak, which were both held by comparatively feeble Austrian forces. In-
fact,
number
of
successful
engagements and
occupied several towns, Yarak among them. However, five days after the start of the expedition the Serbs were still far from their first objective of any real importance—the possession of the summits of the Frushkagora mountain range, which would be the key to success in the intended invasion of Bosnia. By that time, the Austrians had mounted their offensive across the Drina, and the Serbian forces
Syrmia had to be recalled. They were now urgently needed in the defence of in
own country. The Austrian offensive opened in considerable strength -six army corps were engaged — during the night of September 7/8. The Austrians attacked along the their
King Peter of Serbia: he described himself as an old broken man on the edge of the grave
482
MHM ^HBl
whole stretch of the Drina lying between Ratcha in the north and Lyubovna in the south. The Serbian army, equally deployed in a long continuous line on the river bank, was under orders to defend every square inch of Serbian territory. Throughout the second Austrian invasion there was little room for imaginative strategy and tactical finesse. It was a matter of straightforward, frontal assaults, stubborn defence, and im-
mediate counter-thrusts. The campaign, as we shall see, had hardly any effect on the course of the war, hut it contained some of the most ferocious fighting of the war, and the losses in men and material exceeded those of the First Serbian Campaign. For the purpose of summarising the course of operations, two sectors with sharply contrasting geographical features may he distinguished: a northern sector in the
flat,
fertile
lands of the
Macva
recently reinforced Austrian mount;. in corps were extremely well trained and equipped for this kind of warfare. In the event, the outnumbered and outgunned Serbs could offer but feeble resistance in the first stages of the attack. They could not prevent the Austrians from overrunning the strip of land between river and mountains and penetrating into the mountain regions themselves. Putnik's m'sjudgment of the enemy's strength does not altogether explain the
dis-
and another sector in the mountain country stretching southward from the town of Loznica. trict,
In the
northern sector, the Austrians
first
the river and establish a hridgehead at Limanska Ada, in the central part of the sector. The attack, although tenaciously pressed and supported by heavy artillery fire, was repulsed three times and finally abandoned. But the Austrians were successful at a point further north where a tongue of land, the Parashnitza (resembling the Kupinski Kut mentioned in connection with the Syrmian expedition), offered an invading force the same favourable conditions. The establishment of the Parashnitza bridgehead was to remain the only real success which the Austrians achieved in the northern sector. Their attack never gained momentum. There followed a series of bloody skirmishes which yielded no decisive advantage to either side. After five days the fighting died down, and the opposing forces dug themselves in on the lines which they were holding. The offensive developed with much greater force in the southern sector, and this had not been expected by Marshal Putnik. He tried
riddle of his tactical dispositions.
to cross
had weakened his front by withdrawing troops from it for the Syrmian campaign, for he had not believed that the Austrians would be inclined to risk a major effort in difficult mountain terrain. However, the
He had
reckoned with the possibility of an Austrian attack in this sector, even if he had underrated the weight with which it might be carried out. Why, then, had he left his troops in exposed positions on the river bank? Why had he not entrenched them firmly in the natural strategic positions presented by the Yagodnya — Boranya--Guchevo mountain range and, to the north, by the Iverak and Cer mountains? No rational answer has been suggested by anybody. In all probability the ensuing, punishing battles for the possession of single summits and other vantage points could have been avoided, and it is very doubtful that the Austrians could even have held on to their bridgeheads if the Serbs had been in strongly fortified mountain positions not far distant.
The Austrian army maintained the offenSeptember 28. The actions which
sive until
were fought during that time, with alternating success, were individually not significant enough to merit detailed des-
Two
the struggle indicate the nature of this part of the campaign. In the case of the Gucevo summit, ten days of continuous and bitter fighting resulted in a situation where the mountain ridges were divided between the two sides, so that neither had obtained the advantage cription. for
instances
in
commanding heights may
for
which
instance
it
had striven
was
The other Matchko Kamen
so hard.
that of the
mountains, which was taken and retaken eight times. One of the Serbian regiments taking part lost no less than two-thirds of its officer strength in these engagements. In the end the Austrians prevailed, hut were too exhausted to reap the tactical benefits of their victory. Clearly, this kind of fighting could not continue indefinitely. It was. no doubt. mainly the extreme fatigue of the troops, and tbe fact that no decisive success was in sight, that induced the Austrian Command to call a halt to the offensive. There may, however, have been an additional consideration. The Serbian Uzice Army, in
combination with Montenegrin forces, had made an impressive advance into southern Bosnia. This theatre of operations, up to then regarded as fairly safe and unimportant, suddenly seemed to require increased attention. The Austrians had failed in their second invasion attempt almost as completely, if less dramatically, as they had in the first. Their big effort had yielded them nothing but some tiny territorial gains of virtually no strategic value: a tract of marshy plain north of the Macva, a triangular piece of rugged mountain territory in the southern sector, and the isolated Parashnitza bridgehead. Austria's military prestige had suffered a further blow.
The
fortified front lines
which had been
established did not remain quiet for long. Through the whole of October there developed a stubbornly conducted trench .warfare, costly and essentially futile at the same time. It was an unmistakable sign that the Austrians had no intention of disengaging themselves on the Serbian front as much as possible, hut, on the contrary, were resolved to resume the offensive in the near future.
.1
e i
•
l. \ -%
\.
d c h e
d
Serbian refugees: sights
like this
had a demoralising
effect
on retreating Serbian troops, some
of
whom
deserted to help their families
183
and
had suffered an unexpected and humiliating defeat by the Serbian army in the Jadar vallej A minor second Austrian offensive began on September 7, and led to some very bitter lighting with heavy losses on both sides. Little territory changed hands, and the Austrians finally withdrew Meanwhile. Serbian and Montenegrin troops entered Bosnia from the south, and even threatened Sarajevo. The Austrian commander, General Potiorek, had to divert forces to deal with this threat, but by the end of October Bosnia had been cleared of Serbian forces. Potiorek had been the military governor of Sarajevo, and he had been responsible for security arrangements on the day of Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination. Consequently, defeat of the Serbs was a matter of personal vindication for him, as well as a military objective. After the continued lighting of October, Potiorek now possessed some strong bridgeheads over the River Drina, but Belgrade was still in Serbian hands. The position was galling for the armies of the Dual Monarchy. The despised Serbian state was still checking them after three months of war. Originally the Chief of the Austrian Staff, General
S3 \h THE SECOND ONSLAUGHT Austria's second major offensive against Serbia began so well that it seemed as though Serbia must be subjugated. But Austria's advance slowed as her supply lines became overextended. Serbia had time for a desperate counteroffensive, surprising the Austrians and causing them to retreat again. Josephine Newcombe. Below: Serbian infantry on the attack
Conrad von Hbtzendorff, had forecast that Serbia would be destroyed in 14 days, and he had hoped to inflict the decisive blow before the Russians mobilised, and thus be in a position to transfer troops north to meet the Russian threat.
w
The Austrian Second Army had been removed from Serbia after the August campaign, to fight in Galicia, for Conrad considered this front to be of greater strategic importance. This left Potiorek with the Sixth Army under his command, and the Fifth
Army, commanded by General Frank.
In October, Potiorek sent a complaint to
Vienna, direct to the Emperor, by-passing the army GHQ, saying that he was being deprived of munitions, which were being sent to the Galician front instead. There
was
certainly a reluctance in Vienna to let the Serbian victory stand, so, to the annoyance of Conrad, Potiorek was given a free hand in Serbia and could now act independently of the Austrian GHQ. It seemed important to him to carry on the offensive and to launch a third invasion, despite the fact that it was now the end of October, bad weather had set in, rain was flooding the plains and snow was falling in the mountains. Roads in Serbia were generally poor, and were now badly churned up by the traffic of the armies. Yet Serbia for the past decade had been a
thorn in the Austrian flesh. Austria's war aims were vague, but in the years before the war, as A. J. P. Taylor comments, 'the defeat of the "South-Slav conspiracy" became the solution for all the difficulties of the Habsburg monarchy'. Bosnia and Herzegovina had been annexed in 1908, and now Serbia was to be broken. Serbia also blocked the single north-south route down the Balkan peninsula connecting the Hungarian plain with Salonika and Constantinople. Turkey entered the war on October 29, and this had extended the area covered by general operations, but by the
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enu ui nuveinuci uic amcs ui nciiuci aiuc had given any support to the combatants. Britain, France and Russia had not yet given Serbia practical help, nor had Bulgaria come into the war as expected to assist Austria.
Difficult
mountain terrain
The theatre of operations for the battles of November and December 1914 included some ground fought over in the earlier Austrian offensives — but it was to extend
much
further east this time into the mountains of Serbia. The Sava and Drina rivers formed natural barriers to the north and west of Serbia. To the north the Serbs
held the Macva plain. This was rich land, and the Serbs were reluctant to relinquish it, but the defenders were in range of Austrian river monitors on the Sava, and the constant bombardments from these craft forced the Serbs to abandon the
Macva on November
1. It had also begun and the riverside trenches had become untenable. To the south of the Macva is the ridge of the Cer hills, a spur of the main mountain range running
to flood,
roughly south-east across Serbia. Much of the campaign was to be fought over this difficult mountain territory to the south of the River Jadar, and on the watershed of the Kolubara river, which lent its name to the main battle of the campaign. After the siege warfare of October, when the positions of the armies had not altered in the north and west, the Serbian* army was becoming exhausted. Its line was very extended in proportion to the size of the army, and there was little rest for the troops. They had to remain for days without relief in the sector of muddy earth-
works allotted to them. Austrian superiority in guns and ammunition was increasing, and at the end of October the Serbian line was subjected to an intense bombardment. The Serbian Second Army retired from the Macva plain to the foothills of the Cer range on November 1, but the
uuiuuarumttiiLS sun iiiui easeu in iurtc. o^y their strategic retreat to the Cer hills, the Serbians hoped to gain vantage points on heights to compensate for the inferiority of their artillery. During the first few days of November the Austrians established a salient in the Macva, and reorganised their forces, which
had been diverted by the Serbian invasion of Bosnia. On the night of November 5/6 the Austrian bombardment was particularly vigorous to the south of the Jadar, across the Drina to the Gueevo range. On November 6, General Potiorek, freed from the orders of his GHQ, gave the order to his armies to retake the general offensive. For their third invasion the Austrians still kept their general strategy of striking across the Drina from Bosnia, but now their principal forces were concentrated in the southern sector of the theatre. Between Loznica and Ljubovija 110 Austrian battalions faced 72 Serbian ones. Potiorek had selected the most difficult terrain on the whole frontier for attack, evidently relying on his superiority in artillery. Once again the town of Valjevo was an initial objective. This was a railhead, and a junction of routes, and was the fist step in realising the ultimate aim of the capture of the Serbian arsenal at Kragujevac. The thickly wooded mountainous country across which the Austrians would advance was not suited for defensive operations. The Serbs were ill-equipped for mountain warfare, and their infantry had not had the same opportunity for rest as the Austrians. From the point of view of numbers and supplies Potiorek had every chance of success in the campaign.
A patriotic peasant army The two armies were disposed in the following order on November 6. Serbia had some independent units in four detachments defending Belgrade. These were troops of the third Ban, or line (composed of older men and untrained soldiers). The Serbian right
wing,
lu
(.lie
nui
l
ii,
wa.3
iui
aicu uy
Army was the main left wing, and was based further south from Kostajnik to the River Uzovnica. The Uzice Army (recruited round the town of Uzice) formed First
left flank along the Drina to the River Lim. Beyond the Uzice Army was a small detachment of Montenegrins. In all the Serbian army consisted of 204 battalions of infantry (including 25 battalions of third Ban troops. There were 41 squadrons of cavalry, 101 artillery batteries and 150 machine guns.. The Serbian troops had been recruited on a territorial basis, men of the same company often being from the same village. The men were mainly peasants, fiercely patriotic, but depressed by retreats, particularly when they had to abandon their own land to the enemy. Ox transport was generally used because of the very rough country. The infantry of the first and second Ban were armed for the most part with Mauser rifles. Austria had two armies, the Fifth and Sixth posted along the Sava and Drina rivers at the start of the campaign. The Fifth was to the north, and the Sixth concentrated on the Drina along the sector Loznica to Ljubovija. The strength of the Austrian force was about 265 battalions of infantry vith a full complement of field, siege and mountain artillery, a total well in excess of that possessed by the Serbians. Of particular advantage to Potiorek were his superbly equipped XV and XVI Mountain Corps. The Habsburg army, in complete contrast to the Serbian, was composed of an extraordinary mixture of races. It has been calculated that of every 100 men called up in 1914, only 25 spoke
the
German
as their mother tongue.
'*
^^^
*%$£&.,/ ,*'*"
.
<<4F^lt;-
^r<
'JtyLJt
The
rest
spoke nine languages between them and would have a varying knowledge of Ger-
•V* mm
nci
Second Army. This army was concentrated round the town of Sabac and to the south towards the Jadar. The Third Army composed the centre, and was based from the Jadar to Kostajnik, a 2,500-foot peak. The
man. some knowing little more than the commands. As the Austnans had penetrated into
drill
the first
Macva
plain without opposition, the shock of battle came in the southern
sector. On November 7. after an intensive artillery preparation, the Austrian army
attacked across the Drina. The Fifth Army attacked in the sector from Sabac to Lesnica. and the Sixth along a front from Loznica to Mount Rozanj. Despite heroic resistance, the defenders had to fall back. The whole of the Serbian Third Army was forced to withdraw to defend the Jadar road in the direction of Zavlaka, blocking he route to Valjevo. Further south the First Army, despite reinforcement, also gave way. Part of the Uzice Army held its ground and prevented the Austrians from crossing the Drina, but one section was forced back four miles. On November 8 the Austrians approached the positions of the Serbian Second Army, now entrenched on the foothills of the Cer range, apart from a salient protecting Sabac. Shortage of ammunition forced the Serbs to offer only a feeble resistance, whereas the Austrians had supporting artillery fire from heavy gun batteries and their river monitors. They advanced without difficulty along the front to within a mile of the Serbian positions, and dug themselves in. In the Sabac sector, 400 yards of water separated the combatants, and here the Austrian attempts to cross were repulsed. Marshal Stepanovic, commander of the Second Army, was ordered to stand fast, but if necessary to retire to the right bank of the i
Dobrava and swing
his line backwards,
protecting the approach to Valjevo from the Macva district. Further south the situation was grave for the Serbians. The Third Army was cut off from the first when the Austrians took Kostajnik, and another retirement was necessary. As the invasion developed, Marshal Putnik, the Serbian commander-in-chief, had to take the decision to retreat again to positions more favourable for defence. This would draw the Austrians further from their bases and the Serbs would approach nearer to their own railheads at Valjevo and Uzice. The condition of the roads would no doubt make it difficult for the Austrians to bring up supplies and ammunition. Putnik ordered a general retirement eastward from the Jadar, the main armies protecting the approaches to Valjevo, and the Uzice Army retiring to a new line to defend the town of Uzice. The Valjevo line possessed advantages for the defence, and the importance of holding the town was apparent to all the men of the Serbian army. However, no sooner were the troops entrenched on the newly fortified positions than it became obvious that hopes of determined resistance must be abandoned. The Austrians had succeeded in transporting guns over the muddy roads, and were inflicting heavy losses on the Serbian ranks. The Serbian armies which had retired to the Valjevo line were tired and dispirited. They had been exposed to the bad weather without sufficient clothing or camp equipment, but more important was the effect on morale of the retreat itself. Masses of refugees were moving back along the same roads as the army, many in a miserable state. This particularly affected the soldiers who had been recruited locally and some deserted their units to help their families. New recruits for the Serbian forces, drafted
486
German cartoon
of a
Montenegrin infantryman: Montenegro sided with Serbia when war broke out
An Austrian cavalryman on the advance through Moravian
territory
near Kraljevo
into Valjevo, were untrained and badly equipped, and did not raise morale. Probably a vigorous Serbian offensive could have restored the spirits of the army, but this was impossible without more artillery ammunition. Valjevo was hurriedly evacuated, and Putnik ordered the army back to positions on the River Kolubara.
Well-timed retreat
3 m e
%
s I"
| General Misic,
commander of the Serbian
First
Army
15 the Austrians entered the news reached Vienna there was general rejoicing, and Potiorek was decorated with a new order, specially created for him. The spirits of the Austrian army were high. Victory was the best way of uniting its varied elements. However, the Austrian staff seemed at this time to underestimate the difficulties they faced opposing the Serbian army, hardened by the Balkan wars of 1912 and 1913, and fighting for the very existence of its own country. At the same time the difficulties of transport were increasing as winter advanced, and the roads became a major obstacle. Putnik timed his retreats well, whenever possible saving his troops from the losses of prolonged pitched battles and putting every obstacle he could in the path of the advancing enemy.
The Kolubara
line
had been entrenched
since the beginning of the war, and even before the capitulation of Valjevo it had been understood that the supreme effort to arrest the progress of the enemy would be made from these fortifications. The river itself was not a formidable obstacle to an
Marshal Putnik, the Serbian commander-in-chief
advancing enemy, but its approaches were devoid of cover, and at other points they were commanded by formidable mountain heights, so that the advantage could lie with the defence. The new front was formed in the north by the lower reaches of the Kolubara, up to its confluence with the Sava. To the south-west of Lazarevac it adopted the watershed of the River Ljig, and entered country of a very rugged nature. From the source of the Ljig the §
was worse than usual, and heavy rain and snow had made all the roads into quagmires. The Serbian withdrawal was not easy, as the soldiers marched back, sometimes knee-deep in mud, accompanied by increasing numbers of refugees. However,
E
|
| 5
| | £
| <8
|
General Potiorek, the Austrian
commander
in
Serbia
during the retreat the Serbians continued to make the path of the Austrian advance more difficult by systematically destroying bridges and telephone lines behind them. When the Serbian army reached the Kolubara line it was exhausted, and had even been forced to abandon some valuable equipment along the route. Rearguard actions against the Austrians had also caused losses, and the morale of the men had suffered. The Kolubara-Ljig positions were reached on November 16. The line was adequately fortified, and the Serbian staff might well have been confident in offering resistance,
was trying with
the
to hold a very comparatively
his disposal. The first came on November 17 against certain sectors of the new line. The Serbian Third Army was able to conits position, but the Austrians advanced in strength against the Second Army. The battle of the Kolubara,
tinue consolidating
was called, was to last until November Rain and snow were falling more or less continuously during the battle, and thick morning fogs were to give some advantage to the attackers. Both armies had many men suffering from frostbite. The Austrians first tried to take Lazarevac, which was an important vantage as
On November Valjevo. When
J,
although Putnik extended front small forces at Austrian attack
it
22.
point.
The Austrian
staff appreciated the
weakness of the Serbian centre, and planned to work along the Lazarevac Mladenovac railway and perform a flanking movement. However, General Potiorek's tactics against the First Army in the south were not so good. The Austrians decided to attack the right wing of the First Army rather than the left of the Serbs. On the left they could have exploited the gap between the First Army
and the Uzice Army, and might have been able to get through to the Western Morava river. The Serbs gained time, and were able to strengthen their left. On the night of November 18 both combatants were established on their respective lines, ready to give battle. The Austrians had brought up their main forces, and the Serbs had fortified themselves more or less solidly on the Kolubara positions, and southwards to the heights of Suvobor and Ovcar protecting the entrance to the Western Morava valley. The Austrians were now ready to make a final thrust to take the area of central Serbia. The Austrian offensive had as its main objective the breaking down of the opposition of the Second Army in the Lazarevac sector, and the driving of the First Army towards Gornji Milanovac. Two heights near Lazarevac, Covka and Vrace Brdo, were menacing the Austrian advance, so Potiorek launched an onslaught on these positions. Advance in this sector was essential to the Austrians, as the Kolubara had flooded. On November 19 the Austrians attacked and by the end of the day had secured a foothold on the western slopes of Vrace Brdo, and had taken the hill Milovac further to the south. The Serbian First Army meanwhile had been persistently driven back despite the strength of its positions, and the Austrians occupied a strong salient on the principal routes to
Kragujevac. Potiorek decided to press on in this direction, although there was the risk that Putnik might lure the Austrians on further in the centre, and then by throwing his two wings against their Hanks transform the situation. However, although the Serbs considered this plan, they were not strong enough to carry it out. The Austrians could justifiably rely on the fatigue and demoralisation of the Serbian
army and
their
own
men and make more
r ft.
i.
superiority in
material. They also began to use of their and XVI Mountain Corps, which were far better equipped for lighting over the terrain than any units possessed by the Serbs. On November 21 the Austrians renewed the attack against the Serbian First Arm> The day saw prolonged fierce fighting, hut finally the Serbs were forced to give way. For the next three days the Austrians
XV
•1ST
.I
v h
Zemun*
Serbian Lines Serbian Counterattack 1
Austro-Hungarian
i-
Railways
F
—
^
I
|
5
Land over 1600 feet
The Second Serbian Campaign:
Austria,
slowed by overextended supply
fought to gain control of the positions on Mount Maljen held by the Serbian First Army. Potiorek achieved his object by November 24, when the positions were evacuated, but then did not continue the attack, giving the Serbs a valuable respite. The Austrians, however, had also been disorganised and depleted by the long marches over almost impassable routes, and the incessant fighting which followed. The Serbian Second and Third Armies were clinging tenaciously to their positions, and the Austrian staff decided to draft reinforcements to intensify the attack on Lazarevac. The Austrian centre was to press on to Kragujevac, and their right down the Western Morava valley. To the Austrians the Serbian army seemed nearly broken, and they hoped to close the pincers around Kragujevac, and round up the whole of the Serb forces plus their arsenal. The offensive against the Serbian First and Uzice Armies wa continued more slowly, while forces were concentrated against the Second and 1 rd Armies. The Austrians were attemptin, to envelop the Serb positions from the rr;rth and this
488
lines,
was taken by
15 Miles
10
~?5
25
25Kms
surprise by a vigorous Serbian offensive
would involve piercing the Serbian line between Lazarevac and Belgrade. As a result of this new manoeuvre, the Lazarevac salient was the scene of a fierce struggle which continued without interruption until the end of November, the Serbs offering a most heroic defence in view of their ammunition shortages. By November 28 Marshal Stepanovic had asked for permission to send munitionless cannon to the rear, as their inactive presence was demoralising the men. However, he was told to keep them, and assured that a small convoy of shells from Russia arriving via the Danube would soon put the weapons
back in action.
During the offensive the heights of Covka and Vrace Brdo were singled out by the enemy as key points, and a fierce Austrian
bombardment forced the Serbs to retire. On November 26 the Austrians attempted a further crossing of the Sava near its junction with the Kolubara. They threw across an advance company under the protection of a heavy artillery bombardment in which they employed three river monitors. The Serbs had been forced inlarid
river, but were able to ambush the first group of invaders, and wiped out half the contingent, halting the Austrian advance. However, exploits like this, and the retaking of Covka by the Serbs on November 27, while demonstrating the continued fighting spirit of the defenders, could not prevent a further retreat by the Serbian armies. Putnik was now fighting parallel to his lines of communication, and risked being driven off them if he retreated further. But on the other hand he was approaching the railway which supported him, while the Austrians were leaving their supply lines further behind. Putnik now took the bold decision of another retreat, although that would involve the surrender of Belgrade. It was essential to shorten the Serbian line, although the decision to abandon the capital was not easy. The issue was resolved on November 27/28 when the Austrian Sixth Army made alarming progress. The order for the evacuation of Belgrade was given on November 28, and was carried out during the night of November 29/30. On December 1, Austro-Hun-
from the
garian troops marched into the city unopposed, and again the news was received with rejoicing in Vienna. It was assumed that the campaign was ending. Meanwhile in the southern sector the Austrians continued their offensive. The loss of the Maljen positions (November 24) had been a catastrophe for the Serbs. Further withdrawals had to be made by the Serbian First Army each day, and the Austrians crossed to the right bank of the Ljig. On November 29 the Serbian left flank had taken up positions astride the Western Morava, but the Austrians were moving in force against them trying to outflank the whole positions by a penetration down the valley to Cacak.
Miraculous change of fortune The end of November marked a very critical stage in the history of
the battle.
appeared that the Austrians would soon complete the destruction of the weary defenders. On November 30 Potiorek issued an order to his Sixth Army to stand fast It
3, and to the Fifth Army position east of the Valjevo railway to secure the vital supply route. The Serbian right and centre had retreated,
until
to
December
improve
its
leaving the Austrian advance to Belgrade by units of the Fifth Army unopposed. Potiorek ordered this army to advance to a line from Popovic to Grocka on the Danube. This increased the frontage of the army, but brought the Austrian left well behind the enemy flank. The Fifth Army could now be based on Belgrade for supplies, and leave the Valjevo railway for the Sixth. Potiorek was now attempting to envelop both instead of one of his enemy's flanks. But Serbian military experts realised that the Austrian army was suffering serious transport difficulties. From November 30 there was a four-day pause in the Austrian offensive, and it was precisely at this point that the apparently miraculous change in the Serb fortunes happened. At last small quantities of ammunition from Britain, France and Russia had arrived, despite some Bulgarian attempts at sabotage. This crucial because it made possible some offensive action. Morale in the Serbian army seemed at a very low ebb, but there
was
was the chance that a vigorous counteroffensive might restore it. The Serbian staff organised a last bold bid for victory.
On December 2 Putnik gave the order that on the following day all the Serbian armies were to attack along the entire front 'in order to restore the morale of our soldiers'. King Peter of Serbia, now very old, suddenly appeared from retirement, and entered the trenches with a rifle and 50 rounds of ammunition. He spoke to many of the soldiers and aroused their enthusiasm for a final effort to save their country.
The suddenness and vigour
of the offensive took the Austrians entirely by surprise.
Their line was now extended to
include Belgrade, and while their left was being strengthened and moved to the right bank of the Kolubara, Putnik launched his attack. The Serbian plan was to pierce the enemy's centre and then take on the separate parts of the Austrian army. The
Serbian Second and Third Armies, because of the ground before them, were in a comparatively favourable position. The task of the First and Uzice Armies was much
more
difficult.
The
the flank of the First
latter
had
to protect
Army and prevent the
Austrians from obtaining control of the
Western Morava valley. Massing of hostile mountain troops had continued here without interruption, and it was obvious that an Austrian attack was imminent. The whole Serbian counterattack depended on the First Army reaching the main watershed of the Kolubara and the Western Morava. The commander of the First Army, General Misic, was an able and popular officer. His troops had led the retreat, but now the order was reversed and they took the lead in the Serbian advance. In place of the demoralisation and sense of failure of the end of November, the Serbs felt a new enthusiasm. The four-day pause in the Austrian offensive had given them a vital rest. The Austrians had evidently never considered a counterattack, and had neglected security. On December 3, the day of the Serbian advance, they had left their heavy artillery in the rear, and Misic caught them in valleys and dales, dangerously vulnerable to attack from the heights above. It was some time before the Austrians could organise any resistance, and by nightfall the First Army had advanced a few miles, inflicted heavy casualties and taken about 1,500 prisoners. The Uzice Army met strong opposition, but pushed forward on the left. Both the Second and Third Armies made progress and recaptured some important heights. After the weeks of discouragement the successes of the first day's offensive restored
Serbian
spirits.
Relentless pursuit
The next few days saw an increasing momentum of the advance. On December 4 Misic's army attacked over mountainous terrain, where success had to be backed up by relentless pursuit. The Austrians did not have time to recover from the surprise of the first day's drive. Potiorek had a last card to play, however, in the Belgrade sector. The left flank of the Austrian Fifth Army was well behind the Serbian right flank, and had made progress south-eastwards from Belgrade. On December 5 Potiorek ordered them to press the attack to the south, and engage the Serbian right.
Meanwhile the Serbian movement
to the
Kolubara was continued almost without interruption. The progress of the Serbs north of Arantelovac brought the Austrian attackers within danger of being cut off from the main body by a Serbian breakthrough in the centre. By December 6 there was no doubt of the defeat of the Austrian invasion. Their centre and right
were completely broken, and they were retreating rapidly everywhere except in the north. Conditions for the retreat were no easier than for the advance, and the Austrians abandoned weapons and equipment in vast quantities, hampered by the morass of mud on the roads. On December 8 the pursuing armies arrived before Uzice and Valjevo, where it was expected that the Austrians would make a stand. There had been ample time for the Austrian garrisons to prepare additional defensive works. But Uzice fell after a brief spell of resistance, and Valjevo was taken by surprise. The approaches to Valjevo had been entrenched and the guns were in position, but the First Army were deployed round the hills and outwitted the defenders. By December 10 the Uzice Army reached the Drina, and three days later the First Army reoccupied the lower reaches of the
Drina and Sava from Loznica to Sabac. On the western front the battle was by now virtually over. All Austrians who were not casualties had retired across the Drina and Sava. From December 6 military interest was centred in the north, where Austrian troops had been trying to outflank the Serbian offensive. In this theatre the Austrians were still well supplied, for they had the routes to Belgrade behind them. Commanded by General Frank, they tried to make a desperate bid for victory by at least retaining Belgrade, and the area to the south. On December 6 they began to attack the Serbian extreme right, and after severe fighting gained some ground in the course of December 7. The next day the Austrians seemed in a strong position, but timely reinforcements arrived to help the Serbs. Now that the Austrians were in headlong retreat in all other sectors, troops could be spared by the Serbs to deal with General Frank's attack. December 9 was a crucial day in the fighting as both sides realised it was the final issue in the third invasion. Eventually the Austrians began to give way. They retired to Belgrade, where they could make use of their river monitors, but on December 13 General Frank informed Potiorek that he could not hold out in Belgrade, and on the 14th and 15th the Austrians crossed back over the Sava, covered by their monitors. On the 15th Serbian troops re-entered the capital. In the western theatre it had taken the Austrians four weeks to advance from the Drina to the line of the Serbian counterattack, but Marshal Putnik took only ten days to retrace his steps. Throughout the campaign the Austrian supremacy in men and weapons had increased, as reserves were drafted in to make good losses, while the Serbs had no such help. Marshal Putnik's achievement was remarkable and the Austrian defeat was without doubt
The losses of men, killed, wounded and missing, 227,088, numbered more than half the total of troops brought catastrophic.
Serbia since the beginning of the Back in Vienna General Potiorek was removed from command, ostensibly for reasons of ill health. The Serbs were jubilant, but victory for them had been hard won. They were almost as exhausted as their enemies, and their losses since the beginning of the war were estimated at 170,000 men. Vienna said that difficulties of provisioning had necessitated the withdrawal of their forces in the Balkans, but the reason for the Austrian defeat lay both in tactical errors and in a fundamental failure to recognise that the Serbs were a real fighting force. into
war
in August.
.1
e
Further Reading Clissold, S., A Short History of Yugoslavia
i-
(CUP 1966) Desmazes and Naoumovich, Les
i,
y
victoires
Serbes en 1914 (Paris 1928) Gordon-Smith, G., Through the Serbian
Campaign
s, i;
(1916)
d
Macedonia (HMSO) Serbia's Part in the War (1918)
Military Operations:
Price,
C
JOSEPHINE
M.
NEWUUMBL
is
now
a lecturer
e in
Language and Literature at Bristol She served for some time in the Women's Royal Army Corps, and qualified as a military
Russian
University.
interpreter
in
Russian
At
Oxford University she
studied Russian and later studied Serbo-Croat and Polish. She has travelled widely in the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries.
489
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NOVEMBER CALHIA
With Russians only 15 miles from Krakow, Austria attempted a counteroffensive to the north of the city which had to succeed within approximately ten days or her southern flank would be seriously compromised. By the end of the month the offensive had ground to a halt and the Russians were clearing the Austrian southern flank away from the Carpatjlians — but Krakow had been saved before winter slowed operations. Norman Stone. Above: Russian soldiers on the Carpathian front where casualties of 50% were*the rule
m
mm
J
In the first few days of November the Austro-Hungarian position was highly precarious. Four armies were strung out along a gigantic front, from the centre of Russian Poland to the river San, and thence along the Carpathians into Bukovina and towards the Rumanian frontier. The position in Poland down to the Vistula — from Kielce to Sandomierz — was occupied by the five corps of the First Army (Dankl); from the Vistula along the line of the San, and defending the great fortress of Przemysl, was the Fourth Army (Archduke Josef Ferdinand) with three corps and some extra divisions; along the Carpathians were two armies — the Third (Boroevic) with four corps, and the Second (Bohm-Ermolli) with three. Bukovina was defended with startling ability by a group under Pflanzer-Baltin. All of these armies were holding their positions well enough, except for the First. This had advanced deep into Russian Poland in October, and had tried to capture the important town of Ivangorod on the Vistula in concert with the Germans. It had failed — against in-
creasing odds — to take the town, and, having incurred high losses, now had to counter a Russian offensive developing north of the Vistula. South of the river the Russians did not attack seriously, but the three Austro-Hungarian armies there had to retreat, as they were continually outflanked on their left while Dankl's
army withdrew — first from Ivangorod
to
Sandomierz and Tarnobrzeg, then to the and then direct on Krakow. Archduke Josef Ferdinand on his right had to keep pace all the way along, so that in the upshot he too had to fall back on Krakow from the east. This was what happened during the early part of November. Early in the month, the situation of the Central Powers in Poland offered little comfort. The German Ninth Army on Dankl's left faced the onrush of two Russian armies on the northern flank, Second (Scheidemann) and Fifth (Plehve); Dankl had to contend with attacks by two other armies — Fourth (Evert) and Ninth (Lechitsky); south of the Vistula were two others, Eleventh (Selivanov) and Eighth river Nida,
(Brusilov), with a 'Dniestr-Group' opposite Pflanzer-Baltin in Bukovina. Dankl pulled back from Ivangorod to the Kielce-Sandomierz position by November 2, and the Russians followed. They intended to push him back to Krakow, and then to proceed with their plan to invade Germany; the offensive of Evert and Lechitsky was therefore unrelenting. Dankl's army was in no state to resist. His losses in battle Lad
been high — he reported that they had run to 40,000-50,000 among his / and V Corps alone; his munitions were running short; and a deadly epidemic of cholera had broken out which immobilised whole brigades -in quarantine. Fortunately the army's medical services were good, and the crisis passed over, but for the first two weeks of the month Dankl's army was severely hampered. He fell back from the Kielce-Sandomierz position towards the Nida, a marshy region that Conrad expected to hold out. If it did not, then the left of Fourth Army would be affected, and the Archduke would have to give up the line of the San, including Przemysl. Conrad therefore hoped that Dankl would stand on the Nida. Dankl knew better: he said that, unless the Germans
on his
left
were prepared
to attack,
he
On November 5, losing position after position, he reported that he must retreat. 'If the First Army is to be kept in existence,' he went on, 'we must draw the consequences, from the superiority of 300 battalions that the Russians could not hold on.
enjoy against us and the Germans. We must fall back until the Russians have so much difficulty with supplies that their
must come to an end of itself.' Conrad wanted to get out of this problem by urging Mackensen's army to attack the offensive
left of Evert's army: but the Germans refused — it made no sense to them to expose themselves to Plehve on their left by attacking Evert on tneir right, and besides this they thought nothing at all of Dankl's army. The reports of their liaison officers were very pessimistic; so for that matter were the reports of Conrad's liaison officer, Fleischmann. They did not believe 'that First Army will be capable of effective resistance even in the chosen position on the Nida', and were in a hurry only to get away. They wanted Dankl to retreat to the south, so as to draw the Russian armies after him and give the Germans a breathing-space, and they were doubly annoyed with Conrad when he said Dankl would retreat in conjunction with Ninth Army towards the south-east.
The Austrians By November
back
fall
front on the his five corps undertook a disorderly retreat on Krakow. The other armies had to fall back as well. They did so in good order— Fourth Army reached the line of the Dunajec on the 8th, and Boroevic on its right accordingly reformed his line. The great fortress of 6,
Dankl's
Nida had crumbled and
Przemysl on the San was
left to its
devices, with a garrison of 100,000
under
a
resourceful
commander,
own men Kus-
manek von Burgneustadten. Conrad told him that he expected the fortress 'not only to ward off all attacks, but to bind down considerable enemy forces'. With this retreat, the whole Austro-Hungarian position from Krakow to the frontier with
Rumania became
difficult, and was covered only thinly: in consequence Conrad had to move his own headquarters further back, moving from Nowy Sacz on the upper San to the Silesian town of Teschen (Tesin) on November 8/9. This place had excellent connections with Germany; it was included in one of Archduke Frederick's titles, and Archduke Frederick owned much of it — he is said to have made a great deal of money out of the move; and finally, in Conrad's words, it possessed 'a very loyal, mainly
German
population'.
Conrad's task was somehow to bring support to the stricken First Army — he had to move troops from the south to the north bank of the Vistula. He knew by now that the Germans were intending a great stroke into the northern flank of the Russian armies; he recognised that this was strategically correct, and wished to do all he could to help. The next 'decision' would unquestionably come in the bend of the Vistula, not south of the river. BohmErmolli,
commanding
the Second
Army,
suggested that from five to seven divisions, mainly taken from his army, should be transported from the Carpathians to Prussian Silesia, since 'even fortunate operations in Galicia can only slightly affect the situation as a whole'. Conrad reacted favourably to this suggestion, and
ordered that Bohm-Ermolli 's headquarters and two corps (TV and XII) should be moved as early as possible. The move lasted from November 10 to 23. Boroevic would now have to take over this part of the front, and had as a result the most difficult task of all. Meanwhile, Fourth Army fell back in good order on Krakow, thus opening up a further gap on Boroevie's left, which parts of Lechitsky's army began to exploit. Between the 6th and 10th Dankl continued his retreat, all the time being badly mauled by Evert and losing thousands of prisoners. On the 8th, Dankl came to see Conrad, and explained that his army would melt away if it had to face a really serious offensive. By the 10th, however, it was in an entrenched position north-west and north of Krakow, from Skala to Zarki; here it began to receive reinforcements, and the fortress garrison of Krakow rushed out its guns to help. Archduke Josef Ferdinand's army began to arrive east of the town, and transferred reinforcements to the other side of the river, using the excellent crossings at Krakow. Dankl could now consider himself relatively safe. But much depended on the Russians — if they concentrated on Krakow, Dankl's army would have to fall back again, into Moravia. In fact the Russians missed their chance, much to Ivanov's annoyance. The Russian High Command (Stavka) wanted to invade Germany with the four armies in the bend of the Vistula, while First and Tenth Armies covered the north, and Third, Eleventh and Eighth the south. At the beginning of November, the Russian line was considerably disorganised — the armies were not ready for a full-scale offensive, standing in Poland on a line from Uniejow — Piotrkow — Kielce to the Opatowka (against Dankl) and up to the San. Parts of Lechitsky's army were in fact on the wrong side of the Vistula, and had to be brought over the river in order to take part in the planned invasion of Germany. In the same way Third Army was concentrated on the south side of the Vistula, whereas in the event of an invasion of Germany it would have to be largely on the north side, to cover the flank there. On top of this came very great transport difficulties, as Dankl
had foreseen. The Germans in retreating had destroyed most of the routes with great thoroughness, mining all the railway tunnels and carting off the rails. By November 10, as Evert's army came up against Dankl's line north of Krakow, the difficulsupply became almost insuperable corps of his army had to be sent 1,500 horses in three days; for lack of fodder, some of these horses died in harness. ties of
— one
Far from beaten If the Russians' transport difficulties contributed a great deal to Dankl's survival. Russian planning did the rest. The Grand
Duke Nicholas and his staff wanted above invade Germany and help the French
all to
in
West.
the
They
therefore
regarded
Austria-Hungary as a secondary matter, and instructed all the armies in the bend of the Vistula to
Third
move
against
Germany;
Army (Radko-Dmitriev)
with ten north and east, while Eleventh (Selivanov) with five divisions covered Przemysl and the San, and Eighth (Brusilov' with ton divisions and some cavalry protected the Carpathians. By this moans the Germans
divisions
was
to
cover
Krakow
ui the
491
Left to right: General
Bohm-Ermolli commanded the Austrian Second Army, General Conrad, Austrian Chief-of-Staff General Dankl commanded commanded the Russian Eighth Army; General Mackensen commanded the German Ninth Army ;
the Austrian First Army; General Brusilov
would have concentrated against them over 30 divisions between Uniejow and Czestochowa. Ivanov, commanding the south-western front, strongly objected to this; his chief-of-staff, Alexeyev, sent a memorandum dated November 5/6 to the Grand Duke in an effort to persuade him to concentrate instead against AustriaHungary. He pointed out that the AustroHungarian armies were far from beaten, and that to achieve their destruction would mean a full Russian concentration against them, for the Russian army was not strong enough to achieve 'two ends alike of the greatest importance, that is, a decisive attack in the direction of Berlin and operations no less decisive in Galicia, to destroy the Austrian army there'. Alexeyev said that the Austro-Hungarian army was still far from harmless: their retreat on the San had been 'prepared with the greatest care, and executed in the best order, without our being left a single trophy' Alexeyev and Ivanov wanted the Grand Duke to set up a different plan — instead of having Evert and Lechitsky take part in the invasion of Germany, they were to concentrate on Krakow from both sides, while Radko-Dmitriev advanced over the Dunajec to take the defem rs of Krakow in their southern flank, and usilov went forward in the Carpathians. the end, a bad compromise was reached, t >rt was to ichowa, go on against the Germans at Cz^. but Lechitsky was to go against lakow, '
while Radko-Dmitriev stayed mainly on the south bank, though sending some of his troops to help Lechitsky along the Szreniawa river. Of course in view of the Russians' transport difficulties it would have been difficult to do anything else: but the results of these instructions were unfortunate for the Russians. Without Ninth Army's full co-operation in the west, Fourth Army must get bogged
down; and without Third Army's
full co-
operation north of the Vistula, Lechitsky too must get bogged down north-east of Krakow. This was what happened. At the same time, if Ivanov's idea had been followed, the two Austro-Hungarian armies
mistaken in their prescriptions. Conrad had expected the Russians to push forward in great strength into Silesia, and the population of Breslau had panicked. Conrad expected the Russian Fourth and Ninth Armies to move westward, leaving Third to cover Krakow, and nothing very serious to cross the Dunajec. As things turned out, his plans were all wrong. Only Evert was moving west: Lechitsky was covering the front north of Krakow, and Radko-Dmitriev was advancing on the south bank of the Vistula. As a result, the front against Evert was actually stronger utterly
would have had
than the supposed invasion force, while Fourth Army, which Conrad expected to be much stronger than the Russians
30 Russian divisions against them. As it was, Evert was too weak to force a passage north-west of Krakow; Lechitsky could not do much more than hold his own northeast of the town; and Radko-Dmitriev was hanging in the air south of the Vistula, unable to bring his strength to bear until a week had elapsed. In these circumstances, the Austro-Hungarian High Command-was able to withdraw Fourth Army to Krakow, reinforce Dankl, and transport Bohm-
it, and indeed to find their flank, advanced straight onto the front of Lechitsky's army and was soon itself outflanked by Radko-Dmitriev south of the Vistula. Conrad had expected Ivanov to concentrate his troops in the west. In fact Ivanov had spread them out fairly evenly along the whole front — partly because supply difficulties made it almost impossible for him to do otherwise and partly because he had no stomach for the invasion of
Ermolli's force to Silesia. Conrad was also able to plan an offensive that threw Ivanov's front into turmoil.
Germany. As it was, the Russian front opposite Bohm-Ermolli, Woyrsch and Dankl's left —
at
Krakow
(17 divisions)
opposite
about 13 divisions — consisted of army, with ten divisions: from north (westofNovoradomsk) to south (northwest of Krakow) — the Grenadier Corps, in
Conrad plans wrongly
all
Evert's
The
battle that followed had a peculiar aspect. Both sides had, in effect, been
492
-
November
in
Galicia: Austria's offensive north of the Vistula drew resources from her southern flank as the offensive dwindled, Russia to move troops back to save Krakow at the battle of Limanowa ;
pushed strongly from the south, and Austria had
XVI, XVII and III Caucasian Corps; here the Russians were surprisingly weak. Opposite Dankl's right at Skala and the front of Fourth Army north and northeast of Krakow (12 divisions) were an almost equal number of Russian divisions, those of Ninth Army — XIV Corps and Guard Corps against Dankl, XVIII and XXV Corps against Archduke Josef Ferdinand, with a further group of three divisions under Krusenstern arriving from Ivangorod to strengthen Lechitsky's left. Conrad was therefore due for a surprise
when he opened his offensive. By November 12 the Germans were advancing into the rear of the Russian armies west of the Vistula; Conrad decided to do the same from his end. The three right-hand corps of Dankl's army north-west of Krakow — /,
V and X— between Skala and Zarki, were
prepared for attack; the main blow was to be delivered by Archduke Josef Ferdinand north-east of Krakow with VI Corps (Arz) on the left, adjoining Dankl's right, XIV (Roth) in the centre, by Niepolomice, and XVII (Kritek) on the right, along the Raba. There were a further two divisions (15th Infantry and 13th Rifle) in reserve at Wieliczka, and two cavalry divisions as a screen at Bochnia. The rest of the AustroHungarian dispositions were being carried through. Bohm-Ermolli's five divisions were being transported by a remarkable feat of improvisation along the poor railways leading out of the Carpathians to-
wards Oderberg on the Austro-German frontier and thence to their stations north of Woyrsch's corps: to carry them, the railall over Hungary were used to the with one train leaving the main railhead in the Carpathian foothills — Miskolc — every 45 minutes for a fortnight. The divisions arrived by November 23. The pattern that Conrad expected was for Bohm-Ermolli, Woyrsch and Dankl to parry the Russian invasion of Silesia, while Archduke Josef Ferdinand drove into the Russian flank north-east of Krakow: the Archduke was ordered to advance so that his army 'can intervene in the expected battle from the flank, from which flank attack the decision of the battle is expected'. This movement was to begin on November 16, when all was ready and the troops had been rested.
ways full,
Only ten days This concentration north of the Vistula had been achieved at the expense of baring the front south of the Vistula and along the Carpathians. The withdrawal of the Archduke's army to the enceinte of Krakow left a wide gap between him and Boroevic, in the Carpathians; and the withdrawal of Bohm-Ermolli from the eastern Carpathians exposed Boroevic's right wing in a highly dangerous fashion. The events of November showed to the full how dangerous Conrad's dispositions had been — whatever their theoretical advantages. The
to Conrad's offensive north of the river was therefore an increasingly menacing situation south of it, while Boroevic with four corps sought to oppose the Russian Eighth Army, under Brusilov, with nearly double his strength, while the other Russian army, the Third, advanced on Krakow from the east and threatened to cut Boroevic entirely off from Archduke Josef Ferdinand. However, this situation took time to emerge, as Boroevic could retreat into the Carpathians against Brusilov, and Radko-Dmitriev found it difficult to advance at any speed over the Dunajec from the San. Conrad had in effect ten days to win a victory north of the river. He had a bare superiority north of the river, bought at the expense of severe inferiority south of it. To be fair, the offensive that followed was, like the offensive of August 1914 that ended in the battle of Lemberg, founded on a promise of German reinforcements. Falkenhayn, in response to repeated admonitions from both Conrad and Ludendorff early in November, agreed to send these before the end of the month — the date given by his envoy from Mezieres, Colonel Hentsch, was November 24. On this basis Conrad and Ludendorff went ahead, feeling rightly that they could not afford to delay their plans. In the end, no such reinforcements arrived until early December — Falkenhayn wanted them to restore the position in Flanders, where he had suffered at
background
493
.e
l,
id
te
d
s.
17
Far left: An Austrian tunnelling machine in action on the Galician Front. Right: A Krupp-made Russian 15-cm howitzer, Model 1880. Little is known about this gun except that had a crew of 5 and a rate of fire of 3 rounds-per-minute. Centre left: An Austrian 22.5-cm mortar in it
travelling position. Little this
gun also except
and a
is
known about
had a crew of 4 rate of fire of 2 rounds-per-minute. that
it
Centre right: A Russian 25-cm coastal gun. Little is known about this gun too except that it had a crew of 22 and a rate of fire of 1 round every five minutes. Bottom left: An Austrian 10-cm light field howitzer, Model 1899. Weight: 2,250 lb. Range: 6,015 yards, flare of fire: 5 roundsper-minute. Crew: 6. Bottom right: A German 25-cm heavy minenwerfer. Weight: 1,362 lb. Range: 992 yards
v
i;
d h
e ,1
495
An Austrian machine gun post near Sosnow-'both armies were adequate
for the defensive: offensives
Ypres 'a first-class moral defeat'. He told Conrad that 'there is no possibility of these
strove to turn the enemy left north-east of Krakow, along the Szreniawa river,
reinforcements arriving to take part in the present operations', and Conrad felt with justice that he had been let down. On
while Dankl, Woyrsch and Bbhm-Ermolli sought to pin the Russians down on their front by minor attacks between Krakow and Kalisz. The decisive theatre was the Szreniawa one, until such time as RadkoDmitriev could bring pressure to bear against Krakow from the south bank. It took him ten days to do this, and this was the time available for Conrad to win the smashing victory he so greatly needed. At midday on the 16th Fourth Army's
November
he complained to Bolfras, head of the Emperor's military chancellery: 19,
'The German High Command is shortsighted in not seeing that the decision lies here [in the East], and it is, quite faithless as well, ruthlessly operating at our expense when we, with our none too powerful muscles, have been holding the door against half Asia. I suppose we've got to
swallow all this of the Germans.'
.
.
.
but I've had
my
fill
At the outset, however, Conrad was reckoning on German help. His armies began their advance on November 16, and the battle soon divided fairly easily into two parts. South of the Vistula the situation became ever more menacing until Conrad had to call off his action north of the river; north of the Vistula, between
November 16 and 25, Conrad was engaged in an offensive parallel to the German one in the north — Archduke Josef Ferdinand
Typhus cases
496
in
troops attacked, having moved Kritek's corps to the left bank, on their extreme right. On the left VI Corps (Arz) advanced on Slomniki against Krusenstern; in the centre XIV Corps (Roth) attacked towards Proszowice, with Kf itek on their right with XVII Corps. The flank of the army south of the river was covered by no more than some territorial brigades and two cavalry divisions under Feldmarschalleutnant (Lieutenant-General) Nikic. The whole army faced at the outset forces not significantly inferior -XVIII and Corps, with Krusenstern's other divisions arriving. On the
XXV
were
in
general a blunder'
left of Lechitsky's army the Russians were comparatively weak, however, and it was here that Conrad was able to spy an illusory hope. On the 16th also, the right of Dankl's army—/, V and Corps — was expected to join in the attacks of the Archduke's group. Conrad had issued his orders with confidence, knowing that Mackensen in the north had won a solid success at Kutno. On the 16th and 17th, the AustroHungarian attack got under way; but
X
everywhere
it
met
solid resistance,
'decision' would come in this area, and the Archduke transferred his reserves to Roth and Kfitek. Elsewhere, these two days
an Austrian isolation hospital besides typhus there was a serious cholera epidemic which immobilised whole brigades :
much
Conrad's surprise. Dankl's corps, Arz's VI Corps and most of Roth's XIV Corps found themselves frontally attacking solid defensive positions. Losses were high, gains small. Only on the right did the weakness of the Russian front tell — Roth's righthand divisions at Glew, and Kfitek at Igolomice, managed to get forward against XXV Corps' divisions, and began to threaten the left of Lechitsky's army. South of the river, Nikic met no resistance as he made for the town of Bochnia. Obviously the to
were confused. Against Woyrsch and BdhmErmolli the Russians had been ordered to advance so as to take some of the pressure from Scheidemann and Plehve by Lodz. There was confused fighting along Dankl's left, Woyrsch's front and Bohm-Ermolli's front at Cykarzew and Prusiecko on the middle Warta. At this stage, Conrad was not disheartened: in the first place, he thought Falkenhayn would send him reinforcements, and in the second he was sure that the Russians were intending to retreat after the blow they had suffered at Kutno. Mackensen felt the same, and both he and the Austro-Hungarians regarded their task as being to prevent the escape of the Russian armies to the Vistula. In these circumstances, Conrad told his generals on the 17th: 'The result of tomorrow's attacks will be of decisive importance for the fate
The enemy
not superior in numbers, and he lacks supplies and munitions; he is exhausted.' On the 18th a hard battle began between the eastern side of Krakow and Czestochowa. On the extreme right Kfitek and
of the war.
Austrian infantry wait
in
is
XIV Corps
to retire.
However these were purely local successes, and Conrad learnt from intercepted Russian radio messages that the Russians did not consider themselves in serious danger, and that they were prepared to take the offensive north of Pilica against Woyrsch if need be — their front there having been reinforced by two cavalry corps, under Prince Tumanov and Count Guillenstern, as well as the Grenadier Corps. Besides, the four corps of Third Army were crossing the Dunajec, and Brusilov was advancing in the south.
These advances were undermining Conwhole position. However he set his and continued: born in 1852 he had had de I'audace dinned into him from an early age, with all its Napoleonic connotations. He had not much chance of success. His army's losses had been huge -845,000 of the 900,000 men who had originally been on the pay-roll in August rad's teeth
an ambush position -Conrad (the Austrian commander) complained
Roth did well, advancing towards Proszowice on the Szreniawa. The Russian XXV Corps began to crumble, and one of Krusenstern's divisions was rushed up to its support. Radko-Dmitriev south of the river
was ordered
the Grenadier Corps, had been turned north to meet Bbhm-Ermolli. They captured a few thousand prisoners and forced
to speed up his slow advance towards the Dunajec: he was still considerably in the rear with XXI, IX, XI and X Corps and part of VII Corps, and he was not sure whether to support Brusilov by attacking Boroevic, or to support Lechitsky by attacking the Archduke. Eventually he decided to support both, and as a result he was ineffective for another few days. Even so, Conrad's offensive stuck: with one of Krusenstern's divisions now reinforcing Lechitsky's left, Kritek could not break through, and the Szreniawa front witnessed a series of indecisive frontal attacks. Only on the left of the AustroHungarian forces — by Pilica and Rzedkowice- were there any successes. Dankl's northern corps, // and the group of Tschurtschenthaler, advanced there and discovered that the Russian XIV Corps opposite them was isolated, since its left-hand neighbour,
two corps stormed Russian positions at Mykanow and Klekoty, but were held up by Fourth Army long before they could reach the important town of Novoradomsk. Elsewhere on the 19th and 20th nothing decisive occurred. Kritek loyally did his best to carry out the Archduke's orders, taking Nowe-Brzesko and reaching the Szreniawa line by the 20th. Meanwhile the danger south of the Vistula became clearer than ever, as AustroHungarian airmen reported the arrival of
Radko-Dmitriev's troops. These had been very dilatory in making their presence felt. They had not immediately followed Fourth Army as it retreated from the San, because they needed to make up their losses before moving on, and because the great fortress of Przemysl had to be contained. By mid-November, the five divisions of Eleventh Army (Selivanov) had been assembled for this task, and Third Army was free to move on. Four and a half infantry and two cavalry corps were set in motion between the Vistula and east of Nowy Sacz, with the cavalry concentrated
we have been
1914 were no longer on it by the end of November; they had been replaced by about 500,000 men who had had little serious training; there was a lack of heavy artillery, and of ammunition. The Russians' state was perhaps worse — losses of at least 50^ were the rule, and munitions were sinking fast, so that Fourth Army had only 50 rounds per gun. Both armies were
adequate
for the defensive, if carefully used: offensives, though no doubt theoretically sound by the standards of the time, were in general a blunder. Even so, it is difficult to see what else Conrad could have done, given the all-round unwilling-
ness to come to terms.
Senseless attacks On November 19, with the Germans doing astoundingly well at Lodz, Conrad's men ground forward. On Dankl's left, // Corps and Tschurtschenthaler once more gained ground; Woyrsch got stuck almost at once; on his left, Bohm-Ermolli, south of the Warta, attempted to roll up the Russian line from the north, without success. His
holding the door against half Asia
in the south. Against this stood pathetically little — between Gdow and Niepolomice
only Nikir's three infantry brigades and two cavalry divisions. Reinforcements were called from everywhere in order to save Kritek's flank— XI Corps (Ljubicict was summoned to Bochnia from Boroovic's front, while a mixed group was concentrated on the Raba west of Novvv Sacz under Feldmarschalleutnant Nagy — cavalry division, some supply-line battalions, and the Polish Legion under Pilsudski. This group, united under Fourth Army, was given the almost impossible' task of protecting its right (lank. The group was ordered to move offensively, concentrating round Bochnia to attack the Russian XXI Corps, which was thought to be isolated on Radko-Dmitriev's right wing. west of the lower Dunajec. This attack made no sense at all: Nikic. who was in charge of it, got stuck at once and withdrew, while the right wing of the group was pushed in by cavalry raiding Nowy Sacz, and pressing on to Rajbrot and even Limanowa. By November 24, the position
497
on the right of Archduke Josef Ferdinand's army was poor. Kritek was stuck on the
his front.
At the same time, the southern Hank was quite open, with only Nagy's tiny
western
niawa by Proszowice; Ljubicic was faced between Zakliczyn and Szczurowa by the Russian XI and X Corps; the Russian XXI Corps was transferred to the northern bank to attack Kfitek and IX Corps, with three cavalry divisions, pushed against the tiny force o( N'agy on the Raba. In the circumstances, Conrad could do nothing but suspend his offensive north of the river; by the 25th the fighting there was effectively over. This was a great surprise both to Conrad and to the army commanders. While the danger in the south was slowly becoming more apparent, Dankl and the Archduke w^ere pursuing their costly successes: on the 21st and 22nd, Arz
force in the path of three Russian infantry divisions. Elsewhere the front was in disorder; in the Carpathians the Russian
risk of exposing his Carpathian front in order to send enough forces north of the river; and his army commander in the Carpathians, Boroevic, had the almost impossible task of containing maybe three times his numbers of Russians. This was the first of the terrible Carpathian campaigns, and it ended in a sharp Austro-
and Kritek ground against the Russian positions on the Szreniawa, but were held up by XXI Corps, elements of which had crossed the Vistula to assist XXV Corps. Further north, Dankl and his neighbours were involved in the usual confused engagements. The success on the 19th and 20th of Tschurtschenthaler and II Corps had forced Evert to detach one corps from the south and put it into line opposite II Corps. Attacks at Pilica stuck therefore, while the three southern corps of Dankl's
army made
better, though limited, sucwith an advance between Skala and Jangrot. Woyrsch and Bohm-Ermolli continued their advance, but Bohm-Ermolli failed to reach Novoradomsk because Tumanov's cavalry took his northern flank. On the 22nd, Conrad was still confident that the Russians were really seeking to retire from the Polish salient altogether; the Archduke even set 'objectives for pursuit' for his army. These objectives were cesses,
The officers and men of the AustroHungarian units were exhausted by almost
fantasy.
uninterrupted fighting over the previous
month: Kritek's men failed to move, and the others were not much better off. By the 25th Fourth Army had to abandon its offensive altogether: it had reached a line Skala — Slomniki — Szreniawa river, had taken 9,000 prisoners but had lost 25,000 men. In much the same way, Dankl's attacks in the end, despite some local successes against the exhausted Russian XIV Corps at Wolbrom. Once the Archduke's progress had slowed down, the Russian Ninth Army was able to help Evert, and this brought Dankl's successes to an end. He had lost 30,000 men, but captured 17,000 prisoners and some guns. In much the same way, Bohm-Ermolli and Woyrsch became involved only in a series of futile exchanges. By the 25th, the Russian position at Lodz and Lowicz had improved, and Plehve's army could concentrate on its southern wing. As a result Bohm-Ermolli's northern flank was turned and forced back on the Sosnia river. After this, neither side wished to commit itself. The real decision must now come not north, but south of the Vistula river. The situation was becoming highly critical: Ljubicic, hard-hit by Radko-Dmitriev's corps, was told to fall back on the lower Raba to a prepared position from Niepoiomice to Dobczyce, while the Archduke's army was to stay put on the Szreniawa. By the 25th this had become impossible. The
failed
whole of Radko-Dmitriev's XXI Corps had now been taken across the river, and had begun to push against Kritek's right wing; and Nikic's force was in no condition to hold out against the two Russian corps on 498
Army was almost through to the Hungarian plain. Conrad's greatest weakness had been his own obstinacy; but there were times when that obstinacy was an advantage. He refused to give up the battle as lost and by the 25th had elaborated a new plan — the Archduke's army would swing south and attack Radko-Dmitriev Eighth
Russian left flank; he busied himwith preparations for this, and asked Falkenhayn for help. This time, the Gerin the
self
mans
agreed, having earmarked four corps the East, and Conrad was given a division, 47th Reserve (Besser), which was to arrive in Oderberg as from the 27th. In the meantime, Conrad's men would have to fall back: Fourth Army was to withdraw to Krakow, letting the Russians run up against the defences, and Ljubicic was to retreat to a line Wieliczka — Dobczyce. for
Great losses and retreat
On the 26th the retreat was carried out — in good order from the Szreniawa, in bad order from the Raba — and the Archduke's army now occupied a front line along the border to the north of Krakow. In the east, Ljubicic
had
more
trouble,
abandoned
Bochnia, and was ordered if necessary to fall back on the eastern defences. Nagy in the south was not capable of seriously resisting the Russians opposite him, who were able to occupy Lapanow and probe his front at Limanowa. This position became increasingly menacing over the next few days, as Ljubicic, who had sustained great losses, fell back successively to Wieliczka, a few miles east of Krakow, by the 28th. Krakow might well have fallen if the Russian Third Army had not sent a good part of its effectives to the north bank. As it was, Conrad was able to restore his line. The whole of Fourth Army was to be transported through Krakow to the south bank; five brigades under Feldmarschalleutenant Smekal defended the northern approaches of the city and were put under Dankl's orders. Kritek's XVII Corps went to help Ljubicic, Arz' VI Corps went to Krzeszowice as reserve, while Roth's group, with the newly-arrived German division, went some way south of Krakow to Chabowka and Jordanow. Roth's was now the main role, as Conrad ordered: 'the plan now is to take three divisions from the forces of Fourth Army gradually withdrawing into Krakow, send them south rapidly and by surprise, and attack the enemy in his southern flank.' The engage-
ment that followed, by which Krakow was saved, was the battle of Limanowa, justly celebrated as an Austro-Hungarian success. By the end of November the two forces were in equal strength facing each other from Krakow into the Beskidy Zachodnie mountains. In this way, the centre of the action switched from north of the Vistula to south of
Krakow. The result of the actions
in the
east, along the Carpathians, was likewise to switch the important theatre to the Krakow region, and in the coming battle
Limanowa these two came together. During November, the Austro-Hungarian position in the Carpathians had gone from bad to worse: by the end of the month things there had reached a crisis on the of
side,
in
the
Beskids.
Early in
November Conrad had taken the deliberate
Hungarian reverse. It is often wondered the Austro-Hungarian armies did so badly here. The area was perhaps the poorest in Europe, and contained very few railways, none of any importance. Besides they did not run all the way along the line, but from north to south to rneet up only in Budapest. As a result, Boroevic could not shuttle reserves from one part of the
why
another. Again, despite the the rest of the terrain, there were five good crossing-points in the Carpathians—from east to west the Uzsok Pass, the Baligrod — Cisna road, the Lupkow Pass in the Beskids, the depression at Dukla and the saddle of Konieczna. All that Boroevic could reasonably do was to string out his corps — eleven divisions in all — and hope they could hold out. By contrast, the Russian Eighth Army, under Brusilov, had all the advantages. They had only to concentrate their superiority of numbers at one point to force the isolated troops against them into retreat. In the first ten days of November, Boroevic was pushed back into the main chain of the Carpathians; by mid-month his forces stood along the five passes. Thereafter Brusilov pressed forward with his left — XXIV Corps (Tsurikov) and Eck's Group, five divisions in all — towards the Uzsok Pass, driving back the few brigades of Krautwald and Karg. By the 20th, the Austro-Hungarian right had had to fall back to Czirpkaofalu and Telepocz, the centre — VII Corps — abandoning Lupkow Pass, and falling back to Mezolaborcz. By the 25th, Boroevic had to send his reserve to the right flank, and staged a successful counterattack there, ultimately recapturing the Uzsok Pass; but this action bared the centre and left of Boroevic's army, and Brusilov struck forward here with three strong corps — VIII (Orlov), XII (Lyesh) and VII (Shcherbachev). The Austro-Hungarian front was thrown into turmoil; Boroevic had to abandon Mezolaborcz and then Bartfa; his headquarters were moved to Kassa (Kosice); preparations were put under way for the defence of 'the bridgehead Budapest', and by .the 29th the three left-hand corps of Boroevic's army stood on the Tapoly, prepared to abandon even Eperjes as the Russians advanced. However, the danger passed over. By the end of the month, the 'decision' for the whole front would obviously be made around Krakow; Brusilov was told by Ivanov, much to his disgust, that: 'The decision as to the fate of the present operation will occur on the banks of the Vistula, and to achieve success we must direct there the full strength of the armies of the southwestern front.' As a result, Brusilov had to break off his offensive on the Tapoly and much of his strength towards direct Krakow. The great question, both for Poland and the Carpathian front, would be decided south of Krakow. front
to
difficulties of
[For Further Reading and biography, see page 465. ]
Norman
Stone's
*****
*
/
E Si
3
5 5 ra
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THE CAMPAIGN IN ARMENIA Turkish morale was high alter having soundly defeated a Russian offensive in November 1914. Enver Pasha decided to utilise this spirit in a great winter push. As his grandiose plan moved into operation in December, the Russians retreated and the Turks advanced through he snows and frosts of the Caucasian mountains, enduring terrible hardships in the process. Enver's offensive, which he had started with some 95,000 men, ended in complete catastrophe. Turkish losses were appalling — about 75,000 men and the whole of the artillery. Russian losses were also formidable — 16,000 killed out of 65,000 men. Eugene Hinterhoff. Above: Turkish troops in the Caucasian mountains — in this campaign biting frost proved nearly as fatal to the Turks as Russian resistance t
.»
499
Hon Turkey entered the war on October the mobilisation and deployment of her forces were almost complete. By the middle of September the Turks had 36 divisions on a war footing, at about full \\
29,
The European
strength, organised into three armies.
First Army was concentrated in Turkey for the defence of the Straits; the Second Army was based on the Anatolian shores of the Sea of Marmara; and the Third Army, under the command of General Hasan Izzet Pasha, was deployed along the
frontier with Russia. This army consisted o( IX. and A7 Army Corps. Of these three was placed in an area bearmy corps,
X
X
tween Sivas and the Black Sea, with the rest of the army's forces concentrated in the Erzurum area, which the commander rightly considered to be the strategic key to the whole deployment area. He regarded his forces as inadequate for any serious offensive purposes, but at the same time he did net expect, in view of the rather moderate Russian strength, any serious threat from them. The Russian Caucasian Army consisted of two army corps: the I Caucasian Army Corps consisted of two infantry divisions, two Cossack rifle brigades and the 1st Caucasian Cossack Division, and the II Turkistan Army Corps consisted of four brigades. The total strength of the Caucasian
Army was
sotnis
(each
100 battalions, 117 equivalent to a cavalry squadron) and 256 guns, amounting to about 100,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry and 256 guns. The viceroy of the area, Count
Vorontsov-Dashkov, was nominally commander-in-chief of the Caucasian Army; in fact it was commanded by his deputy, General Myshlaevsky, a former professor of military history but totally unsuitable for his task. Fortunately the Russians had as chief-of-staff for the Caucasian Army a brilliant man, General Yudenich. The Russians evaluated the strength of the enemy correctly and came to the conclusion that the Turks would require at least a further four weeks from the beginning of November to prepare for a largescale offensive, and meanwhile the weather was likely to make operations on a large scale impossible. In other words, both sides were bent on adopting the defensive, and at the same time were not expecting any major move by the enemy. The initiative was taken by a Russian general, Bergmann, commander of I Army Corps. His forces crossed the frontier on November 2 in the general direction of Kbpriikoy. On his right flank General Istomin's brigade moved from Oltu on Id; on his left flank General Baratov's Cossack Division, having crossed the River Aras, moved into Eleskirt valley, in the direction offensive met and on November 6 he ordered an attack on Kbpriikoy. Hasan Izzet Pasha was not taken by surprise, however, and ordered a general coun-
of Yuzveran. Bergmann's with light resistance only,
ter-offensive with the well-deployed forces of his IX and XI Army Corps. Contact was established between both sides on November 6 along the bank of the River Aras,
but during the next fe days Bergmann's forces themsei s found dangerously threatened by the envek ing movement of the Turks, who were occi ving the commanding mountain heights i \d beginning to encircle both Russian flanky On November 11 Hasan Izzet's troops went into action. Two divisions of XI Corps marched
500
along the River Aras towards Kbpriikoy, threatening the Russian left flank; at the same time two divisions of the IX Corps attacked to the north-east of Kbpriikoy, in an effort to turn the Russian right flank in the area of Siligul mountain. With the greatest difficulty and with considerable losses, Bergmann succeeded on November 12 in withdrawing to the line Sanamer — Ardos — Horsan, which he occupied on November 4. He was not out of danger yet, however, because on the 14th the Turks were threatening to cut both his lines of retreat towards Zivin and Mecinkirt. Bergmann was saved from complete encirclement and annihilation by the hasty arrival of Russian reinforcements, which counterattacked and partially retrieved the situation. After two more days, the fighting died away. Bergmann, who had only himself to blame, had received up to 40% losses, and the morale of his Russian troops was considerably shaken. At the same time the morale of the Turks, although deprived of a complete victory, was very high. They were elated with the success and Enver decided to utilise this spirit in a great offensive. Encouraged by the results of recent fighting, which contributed to greater selfconfidence among the commanders on all levels, Enver decided to put into effect his grandiose plan, which was designed to outflank the Russian forces deployed along the frontier, cut their lines of communication with the main base in Kars and retrieve the territories ceded to Russia in 1878. The occupation of Kars, Ardahan and Batum would facilitate the planned revolt by Caucasian Moslems against Russia, and open the route to Tbilisi and beyond. Enver's ambitious plans found a sympathetic response from German officials — with the exception perhaps of the cautious Liman von Sanders. In any case, among German military advisers there was a general consensus that the Turkish offensive, even should it end in failure, would do Germany no harm. On the other hand, if successful, it could draw considerable Russian forces from the European theatre of war.
Enver's plan opposed Enver's plan in theory looked promising feasible, despite its boldness; the main justification for it was Enver's knowledge of the Russians' sensitivity to an outflanking manoeuvre, especially after their
and
recent defeat at Tannenburg, as well as information that the Russians happen-
ed to be very
weak
in
Sarikamis, which
as the main target for a frontal attack during the first phase of the offensive. Yet his plan met with strong opposition from the senior Turkish commanders on the spot. To begin with, the commander of the Third Army, Hasan Izzet Pasha, who only recently had won a resounding victory over the Russians, found fault with the plan and was now forced to resign; equally the commander of the IX Corps, Achmed Fevzi Pasha, expressed an opinion that such an operation was possible and feasible, but only after the most careful preparations and, above all, after the issue to the troops of warm clothing and the organisation of advance supply depots. All these objections, put
was intended
forward by experienced commanders, were brushed off by the impetuous, 33-year-old Enver, who dismissed several senior
and after arriving in Erzurum on December 6, on the 19th issued an order for a general offensive which was to begin
officers
on the 22nd.
The gist of his operational plan, approved by the German chief-of-staff of the Turkish army, Generalleutnant Bronsart von Schellendorf, consisted in the first phase of an outflanking manoeuvre, to be conducted by IX and XI Army Corps, co-ordinated with a frontal attack by X Corps, in general direction of Sarikamis, with the cavalry division causing a diversion along the right bank of the River Aras. The outflanking manoeuvre in the general direction of Oltu was to be made along the crest of a mountain
ridge
suitable,
especially
in
winter conditions, to infantry and to pack animals only, as it is a barren plateau, swept in winter by biting gales. Two divisions of IX Corps (17th and 19th) began their long and arduous trek without any warm clothing, being issued only with very limited rations (dry bread and olives) and having no field kitchens. The Turkish move did not escape the attention of General Istomin, whose brigade was deployed in the Oltu area. His report, however, was not taken seriously by his superior, General Bergmann, who was still smarting after his recent defeat at Kbpriikoy. On the 23rd, after heavy fighting, Istomin was forced to evacuate Oltu, withdrawing in the general direction of Ardahan. The next day, a heavy fall of snow increased the difficulties of IX and XI Corps; the 17th Division, which was trapped in a blizzard, lost about 40% of its men. Enver, who was riding with the division, and who saw for himself the conditions, disregarded the wise advice which General Bronsart von Schellendorf was trying to give him, namely to concentrate all the dispersed divisions of IX Corps and only after that to continue the advance. The main reason for Enver's objections to halting the momentum of his offensive was fear of losing the impact of surprise. Meanwhile, however, Enver's offensive became seriously weakened as a result of an excessive initiative of the commander of Corps, Hafiz Hakki Pasha, former Turkish attache in Vienna, who, without asking Enver's permission, sent two divisions of his corps in the general direction of Ardahan, in pursuit of Istomin's retreating forces. Yet, in spite of the Turkish outflanking Bergmann still attached movement, only a local significance to it, and suggested to General Myshlaevsky, who came with
X
Tbilisi, an attack in the direction of Kbpriikoy. Yet, only a few hours later, Myshlaevsky rescinded his order after having been sniped at by a Turkish patrol while making his way from Sari-
Yudenich from
kamis to Mecinkirt, and more properly when reports about the appearance of Turkish forces in Bardiz reached him.
When
at last
he reached Bergmann's HQ in Mecinkirt, almost in a state of panic, he signed a new order not for an offensive, but for a general retreat to start on the night of December 25/26. He thus accepted a defeat without even the slightest attempt to fight a defensive battle.
Sarikamis, meanwhile, evacuated by the and left with two sotnis and about 1,000 railway men only, was preparing to defend itself against an imminent attack by overwhelming Turkish forces. Yudenich, who had taken command of II Turkistan troops,
Corps, decided, in spite of a numerically superior enemy, to put up an organised resistance. He thought rightly that the Turkish attack, as a result of very severe winter conditions, must slowly be losing its
momentum. At dawn on December 26, the Turkish 29th Division of IX Corps began its march from Bardiz on Sarikami§, and by midday was involved in fighting with Russian patrols; the commander of the Turkish division, unaware of the Russian weakness, instead of pressing the withdrawing Rus-
sians, decided to break off the battle and to bivouac on the spot, in the open in the temperature -20°C (-36°F). The next morning, several hundred Turkish soldiers
were lying frozen to death, and many more had deserted to seek refuge in a few scattered hamlets; the strength of the division fallen from 8,000 to 4,000, a loss of 50% of its effective strength. On that day, Enver could still, if not actually retrieve the situation, then at least avoid the coming disaster. He found himself in a position similar to the one in
had
which Napoleon, waiting
for
Grouchy, saw
instead the arrival of Blucher's column, which was to decide the fate of the battle of Waterloo. In the same way, Enver was waiting for his Corps to arrive, but the Russian reinforcements began to arrive in Sarikami§ instead, which otherwise could have been an easy prey for the Turks. It was only on the 26th, when Enver's categorical order reached him, that Hafiz Hakki abandoned his ambitious drive to-
X
wards Ardahan, and undertook with his troops a desperately dangerous march
Feasible only in theory, the offensive proved catastrophic in Constantinople are, left to right, Wilhelm II, Enver Pasha — the influential German military mission Turkey was sympathetic to Enver's ambitious plans
Riding
in this
carriage
Mohammed V and in
*
% WP —*^
i 4^1
*
across the high Allahuekber massif at an altitude 01 nearly 10.000 feet, losing one-third of his force after a murderous
BLACK
SEA
^^
Batum.
19-hour march
Meanwhile, Russian reinforcements were in Sarikami§, and its defences wore growing stronger every day. Yet in arriving
TURKEY^
spite of that, great anxiety still prevailed in Russian HQ, especially after the capture of the chief-of-staff of the Turkish 28th
Division together with Enver's original order, outlining his grandiose plan for the annihilation of the Russian forces. General
Mvshlaevsky. used to conducting war more on a map than on a battlefield, was highly impressed by Enver's order and found the Russian situation desperate. He immediately issued an order for general retreat: he was especially worried by the reports about the movement of Turkish troops towards Ardahan, from where they could cut the Russian lines of retreat from Sarikami§. It was only as a result of heated arguments with Yudenich, who understood that the difficulties in which Enver's troops found themselves were growing, that Myshlaevsky's order
was
deferred.
The
situation
which only a few days ago was almost hopeless, began improving day by day, from this time on, especially after the arrival on the 27th of General Przevalsky's brigade from the right bank of the in Sarikami§,
River Aras.
Plan for annihilation The 28th passed quietly because Hafiz Hakki persuaded Enver to give a brief rest to his 30th and 31st Divisions, exhausted after their march across the mountains: unfortunately, due to the lack of warm clothing, one more night in the frozen Turnagel woods to the north-west of Sarikami§ reduced the strength of Corps to barely 6,000 men. The next day was the day of the decisive battle for Sarikamis. Both IX and Corps, totalling some 12,000 men, reached the positions north-east and south-east of Sarikami§. The 31st Division kept the railway to Kars under fire from the slopes of Turnagel, and the 30th Division took Alisofu. Sarikamis was encircled in this way on both flanks and virtually cut off from Kars. Theoretically, Enver's plan seemed to be near realisation. General Przevalsky decided on an active defence, attacking the encircling Turkish
X
X
During some savage bayonet fighting the Turks succeeded in penetrating into Sarikamis, but eventually they were driven off, losing many dead and prisoners. As a forces.
result of their terrible losses, the strength of the Turkish corps fell to some 3,000 men each; even Enver saw that it was useless to insist on further fruitless attacks. And yet, in spite of the fact that the scales of the battle were shifting definitely in favour of the Russians, General Bergmann was still insisting on a general retreat; fortunately for the Russians, Yudenich, after a quarrel with Bergmann, taking advantage of his position as chiefof-staff of the Caucasian Army, took over command of his forces, fter a reappraisal of the situation, he wire, a Tbilisi that, in the Turks was his opinion, the situation uld be comdesperate and that they for the impletely annihilated. He ask mediate despatch of all avail le reserves. IX Corps On the 31st the chief-of-sta reported to Enver that the ren its of his corps, huddled in Turnagel w s, were s and about 2,500 strong, with 14 '
502
15Miles
10
25Kms
The Armenian Campaign at first the Russians retreated before the Turkish offensive, but ultimately it was the Turks who failed miserably in the high, barren and bitter country :
machine guns; the corps was cut off from Bardiz by the Russians, who were threatening its left flank. On January 1, 1915, Abdul Kerim, commander of XI Corps, decided to press a frontal attack on Sarikamis through Karaurgan. The battle, in which both sides suffered heavy casualties, lasted four days, and slowly the Turkish pressure began losing its momentum. On January 2, Enver left Turnagel woods, passing the whole of the next day with X Corps, which was also in a serious predicament, being involved in heavy fighting with the Russians, who were enveloping its left flank. In view of the threat of a complete encirclement, Hafiz Hakki ordered a withdrawal. Meanwhile
Enver, on his way from Bardiz to Erzurum, narrowly escaped capture by a Russian patrol at Kizilkilise. The complete encirclement of Turnagel woods began on January 2, and after two days of bitter fighting the remnants of IX Corps, including its commander and 1,000 of his men, were taken prisoners. The liquidation of Corps, as a result of mistakes committed by Bergmann who, being senior to Przevalsky, took over the command of forces in Sarikamis, proved to be more difficult, and the remnants of the two Turkish divisions managed to escape. At the same time, the Russians were mopping up the whole Turkish division which was sent by Hafiz Hakki towards Ardahan. The battle for Sarikamis came to an end on January 15-17, with the capture of a few thousand Turks who, although dispersed and disorganised, were still putting up a desperate resistance in Turnagel woods. Enver's offensive, which he had started
X
with some 95,000 men — against 65,000 on the Russian side — ended in complete catastrophe. Turkish losses were appalling — about 75,000 men and the whole of the artillery. Russian losses were also formidable- 16,000 killed and 12,000 sick, mostly
from
frostbite.
Further Reading
W. E. D. and Muratoff, P., Caucasian Battlefields (CUP 1953) Churchill, W. S., World Crisis (Four Square)
Allen,
Guse,
F.,
Die Kaukasusfront im Weltkrieg
(Leipzig: Koehler
& Amelang)
Korganoff, Gen. G., La participation des Armeniens a la guerre mondiale sur le front du Caucase (Paris 1927) Hovanisian, R. G., Armenia on the Road to
Independence (University of California 1967) Pomianowski, J., Die Zusammenbruch der Ottomanischen Reiches (Vienna 1928)
EUGENE HINTERHOFF was
born in Korea, as a Russian subject. After serving with the Russian forces in the First World War, he joined the Polish army after the outbreak of the Russian Revolution. He served in the Polish army up to 1933 and took part in the Polish-Bolshevik War, being awarded the Polish equivalent of the Victoria Cross. After leaving the army he became a journalist, working for a Polish agency in Vienna and Prague. During the Second World War he served with the Polish troops
VM, the
under Britain
British
command, and afterwards he settled
and became a
British subject.
As a
in
result of
number of articles on military history he produced for papers all over the world he was awarded a NATO Research Fellowship in 1962. In 1967 he was made a Member of the Order of the British Empire
the increasing
Liman von Sanders, German military adviser Turkey, favoured advance into the Ukraine
in
Enver Pasha: his plan met with strong opposition locally from senior Turkish commanders, but impetuous 33-year-old brushed off all objections and dismissed several senior officers
Russian trenches-when frost and snow had slowed the Turks' impetus, the Russians ceased retreating and took a stand
this
at Sarikamis,
503
ECONOMIC RIVALRIES A.S.Milward In the years before the war Germany beat Britain into second place in European trade and then began to challenge her overseas. Such economic rivalry crushed Britain's confidence in her economic supremacy, and psychologically prepared both countries
for
war
In 1870 Britain dominated the commercial and industrial world to an extent never previously achieved by any nation in modern history. Many of the more far-sighted realised that the enormous size of the United States and her vast potential resources meant that she would eventually rival Britain's position, but as far as Europe was concerned there existed only one other industrial power of any significance, France, and from 1815 onwards Britain seemed to have held off the French challenge with little trouble. The outward and visible sign of British strength was the disproportionately huge size of her foreign trade compared to that of other nations. As the world's most important exporter of manufactured goods and importer of foodstuffs and raw materials, Britain stood at the centre of the world's trading network, the link which bound together the whole complicated construction. Her trade was carried in the world's biggest merchant navy, which
504
also carried a significant portion of the trade of all other countries (a third of the shipping entering and leaving German ports in 1873/74 was British) and that merchant navy was protected by
the world's biggest naval force, maintained at a level sufficient to equal that of any other two navies combined. In the same city from which the government of the world's largest empire was carried on was the centre of the world's shipping insurance market and the greatest money market controlling, in most years, the pattern and size of international investment, with only the Paris money market as its rival. All this was the result of the industrial growth of Britain which took place from the late 18th Century onwards, and the relative absence of these developments elsewhere. Only in Belgium and in France had there been similar developments on such a scale. Belgium was too small a country to affect the British
and France remained much less industrialised than However, in the 1850s the industrial revolution spread to Germany and in the following 20 years Germany built up the economic power which culminated in her victory over France in the Franco-Prussian War. By 1870 these developments had had little impact on people in Britain, but nevertheless, the industrial revolution which took place in Germany at this time was the basis of the later Anglo-German commercial rivalry which was to trouble the whole world before the First World War. For Germany was as populous and well-endowed with resources as Britain and had, also, the advantage of a later start in industrialisation, so that her factories and equipment were often more modern and more productive than those in Britain. Between 1870 and 1914 Germany became a more important industrial power than Britain and this fact, together with the continued growth of the United States, changed Britain's whole economic position in the world, breaking down one by one the props on which the Empire and British commercial superiority had rested. Although, with the help of hindsight, we can see that the advantages of the British position were being diminished even in position, Britain.
the mid- 19th Century, in 1880 there seemed small likelihood that British industrial production would be overhauled by that of any other European power. In that year the value of British exports of iron and steel was three times the value of those of the rapidly developing German iron and steel industry. The value of British exports of machinery was four-and-a-half times that of Germany, and the value of the export of manufactured cotton goods 20 times that of the German industry. The German merchant marine was barely one-sixth the size of that of Britain. In the subsequent decade, the power, of German industry first made itself felt on international markets. Within an astonishingly short period of time British traders found that the conditions under which they operated had been changed for ever. Jealousy and fear of Germany became a prevalent factor in industrial and trade circles, and Germany came to be seen as a dangerous threat to Britain's place in the world — a potential enemy with whom ultimate conflict was all too likely. Since Germany's international economic activities and ambitions were the expression of her rapidly growing domestic economy the only possible British position appeared to be a defensive one, to hold the advantages she already had against encroachment. Thus Germany was seen as an economic aggressor, the disturber of an international trading
system which had appeared synonymous with peace. In the early 1870s over 11^ of Britain's exports went
many
herself, after the
to Ger-
USA
Britain's biggest customer. By the of British exports went to Germany and
end of the 1880's only 7 c/< their total value had declined from £26,000,000 to £16,000,000, while Britain's imports from Germany had greatly increased.
German
exports to Britain consisted increasingly of manufactured goods, and for all the soothing articles in the Manchester Guardian, the idea that 'the workshop of the world' was buying machinery from her most dangerous rival gave rise to a considerable amount of popular unease, exploited in papers such as the Daily Mail. The unease also contributed to the passing of the Merchandise Marks Act of 1887, which instituted for the first time
the practice of clearly labelling the country of origin on goods imported into Britain by British importers. It was in the 1880s that German exports to a number of European countries first became more important than British exports. Germany had of course numerous commercial advantages in Europe of which the most important was the possibility of using through railway transport from the manufacturer to the buyer. By 1890 Germany had become the chief supplier of Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Switzerland, Rumania and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In every case it was Britain which was ousted from first place. Although the total volume of British trade in all those countries remained high, the significant fact was that Germany's share of new trade there grew rapidly against that of Britain. 'The Germans,' said a leader in The Times in 1886, 'are beginning to beat us in many of the qualities which are the factors of commercial success. They are content with smaller profits; the clerks work for lower salaries; they speak all languages; they are bound
by no hard and
fast traditions.'
In fact, after 1885
Germany's gains
at Britain's expense in slowed down considerably. After 1895, however, Germany again forged ahead, this time more spectacularly, and by 1900 had become overwhelmingly the most important commercial country on the continent. Only in peripheral countries such as Greece, Portugal, Spain and Norway did Britain retain her position. These developments were directly related to industrial developments in Germany. The first German breakthrough had been based on the development of the iron, steel and engineering industries. After 1895 the growth of German exports was more related to the astounding developments in the chemical industry there. Eor until 1914 Germany had almost a world monopoly in dyestuffs, pharmaceuticals, photographical supplies, plastics and artificial fibres. At the same time her electrical industries and her motor car industry began to supply markets throughout Central Europe. The consequence of these events was to divert British trade
continental
markets
Left: Anglo-German trade rivalry — in links Britain's island location was an
an age of rapid and cheap rail economic liability visa vis European trade. Below: The Baghdad Railway- when Germany was awarded the concession to build in 1899 dawned upon Britain that Germany had become a world power it
it
~ '
A
1 '
J*
'
•
increasingly to the Empire, where German rivalry was much less intense. Even German exports to Britain, however, increased rapidly in the Late L890s. The value of German iron and steel manufactures exported to Britain in 1902 was four times that of 1890. The existence of a carefully graded tariff in Germany meant thai British exports to that country showed an increasing proportion of semi-manufactured goods and raw materials — the flourishing German dyestuffs industry was based partly on coaltar imported from Britain, where it was a waste product. The new direction of British trade, which increasing German domination in European markets was causing, was often thought by British observers to be responsible for the failure of the new and more scientifically based industries to develop. One reason, for example, that cotton goods continued as the staple British export right up to 1914 was the increasing volume of trade with India. Soft Empire markets did not require goods based on the chemical industry or electrical machinery. The development of these industries in Germany and their failure to take root in Britain was the origin of the present day idea that the Germans are more 'efficient' economically. At the start of the 1880s the level of British exports to Italy was five times that of German exports, but Germany closed the gap slightly in the 1890s. After 1898 the British lead disappeared so that by 1907 Germany had become Italy's leading supplier. In fact Britain's position there was much weaker than even this suggests, for the bulk of British exports to Italy was coal whereas the bulk of German exports was manufactured goods. Thus in the late 1890s young Italians began to go to Germany rather than Britain for their technical education and business training. When they came back they naturally tended to strengthen the ties between their country and Germany.
British or
German predominance?
The same
story is true for the Balkan countries. The building of railways there in the 1890s was usually financed by German capital and the railways were directly beneficial to German exporters. Only in Greece, where sea transport remained important, was Britain able to retain her position. In Serbia, Rumania and Bulgaria the British predominance of the 1880s was exchanged in the last decade before the war for German
predominance. In Russia, Germany's trading position had always been slightly better than that of Britain. Most British firms were utterly ignorant of the Russian market and indeed of the country as a whole. Germans visited the country more and knew it better. Thus Germany was able to strengthen her hold on the Russian market in the 1890s so that in spite of the heavy French capital investments in that country Germany was the dominant supplier by 1904. The knowledge that this trade expansion was a reflection of developments inside Germany and thus not a temporary pheno-
menon
increased the prevalent unease and defensiveness in British economic circles. The response to the German challenge in Europe was a number of schemes for strengthening the commercial ties between the members of the British Empire. These
varied from projects for full-scale political and economic integration to plans for tariff preferences between Empire countries. It was becoming more widely felt in Britain that to persist in a policy of free trade which gave to Britain and Germany the same trading facilities in British colonies when Germany herself practised discriminatory tariffs, was folly. The fears that these plans and projects aroused in German economic circles was intense, for it was generally felt there that the maintenance of free trade by the British had been the cornerstone of the 19th Century international trading system which had so benefited Europe.
Both British and German fears were symptomatic of one thing, the knowledge that the commercial and economic rivalry between the two countries could not be confined to Europe. In the Turkish Empire, in China, and in Africa there were also serious clashes of
economic
interest.
Between 1840 and 1880 Turkey had been more or less a financial subsidiary of Britain, the corrupt and inefficient Turkish government being sustained by British economic and naval power as a strategic counterweight to the Russian Empire. The economic penetration of Germany :nto south-eastern Europe was bound to bring German economic expansion in the end into Turkey. As the railways through the Balkans reached Constantinople British fears increased, for the Ottoman Empire guarded not only the Straits but also the Persian Gulf and thus lay near British trade routes to India. The question of i railway through Asia Minor to the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates and the headwaters of the Persian Gulf was one that Britain could scarcely ignore, and
506
there seemed no reason why German capital should halt at Constantinople. In 1888 a Turkish government loan of £1,500,000 was placed in Germany and in the same year the Deutsche Bank took over the financing of the Anatolian Railway Company which was to construct a line from the Asiatic side of the Straits through Asia Minor. In the following year the Hamburg-Levant shipping line began to offer through freight tariffs from Hamburg to places in Asia Minor via the new Turkish railway system, thus undercutting British exporters. British policy was to delay the building of this railway system for as long as possible, a policy which did little to increase British popularity in Turkey. Meanwhile an interminable set of manoeuvres went on at the Sultan's court to obtain concessions for the next stage of the railway to Baghdad. When that concession was awarded to Germany in 1899 it became clear in Britain that Germany, economically, had become a world power. The concession was followed by the beginning of direct German steamer services into the Persian Gulf. In the early years of this century, the Persian Gulf was coming to have a wholly new significance for Britain after the discovery of oil in the region. The Royal Navy was beginning to adopt the new oil-fired boilers in preference to the older coal-fired type. The motor car industry was also beginning to grow rapidly and soon the aircraft industry was to expand into a major oil-consuming factor. For a long time the British had been established at Basra at the head of the Gulf and it was hoped from there to extend control over the new oil discoveries in Mosul and Kuwait. The threat of a German controlled railway at Baghdad seemed to aim at the whole British economic domination of Mesopotamia. Britain therefore refused to permit any increase in the Turkish customs in order to facilitate financial provision for the new railway. Finally in 1913 she permitted German construction of the railway to go ahead to Baghdad but only in return for a sweeping set of concessions. These were that the line could not go to the headwaters of the Gulf of Persia itself; that the traffic on the Mesopotamian rivers would be exclusively controlled by a British shipping company; and that southern Mesopotamia and central and southern Persia would be the exclusive preserve of the AngloPersian Oil Company, controlled by the British government, and the Turkish Petroleum Company, in which one half of the shares were owned by the National Bank of Turkey controlled by a leading British banker and the chairman of the Peninsula and Orient Shipping Company. Britain's price for the Baghdad railway was very high, but the strength of Germany's challenge can be measured from the desperate conditions which the British government imposed. in China In China the real threat from German trade was much less. In the 1890s Britain supplied over half the total imports into both China and Japan. Hong Kong and Shanghai became the two great outposts of western capitalism in China, particularly Shanghai. One was a British colony and the other was dominated by British shipping companies and import agencies. Nevertheless even here the breath of German economic competition was felt. The German government offered a subsidy to the North German Lloyd shipping company in 1886 to operate a direct service from Germany to Hong Kong. In 1897 a German economic mission visited China, but British worries about its activities were soon eclipsed by more serious events in the same year. For in that year the German government forced the Chinese government to cede to it the port of Tsingtao in the northern province of Shantung. The German move was in one sense the result of British commercial opposition in the previous decade. At that time Germany had aimed her thrust at the very heart of British economic power in China, the valley of the Yangtze river, and had attempted to take over the Chu Shan islands and to establish a commercial base there rather like that which Britain had in Hong Kong. Although Tsingtao was in northern China and therefore further removed from British power, the ultimate implication was that German economic influence might spread to the whole of Shantung province. This proved to be the case, for it was soon revealed that Germany had obtained from the Chinese government exclusive
Germany's foothold
mining concessions and the sole right to build railways in that province. It has to be said that in spite of this activity German trade and German capital were able to make scarcely any encroachment at all on the British position in China before 1914. In Africa commercial rivalry between the two countries was closely bound up with the political disaster of the Boer War, and it is difficult to sort out whether British fears of Germany in that
Above: Hong Kong — one of Britain's Far Eastern trading centres. Below: A Berlin iron works: in 1893 Germany's steel production overtook Britain's, and by 1914 it was double — Krupp steel led the world
%
-H (,
}
1~
*<
jF».
.-•At-'*.
•»«*».
*f „.
continent wort more economic or political. In the long-run, however, the lesson for Britain was the same as elsewhere. The enormous growth lit' the German economy had produced a power which could scarcely, in its own economic interest, stand idly by while Britain continued to exercise the world dominance that she had exercised since 1815. The Cheat Trek of the Boer farmers had taken them northward out oi' British South Africa to found their independent republics. But both the Orange Free State and the Transvaal were weak countries, bound by many ties of commerce and sympathy to Germany Not the least of these ties of sympathy was that Germany was increasingly seen as the rival of their great enemy, Britain. Meanwhile. German firms had been constantly increasing their commercial activities in the weakly governed Portuguese colonies in Africa. It was generally supposed that the Portuguese empire in Africa was on the point of collapse. It was also realised that if it did collapse German commercial interest there would be in a strong position to press German claims in the event of a partition. Ultimately that might mean that the Transvaal would also join with Germany for protection against the British. The main trading outlet of the Transvaal was through the Portuguese controlled port of Lourenco Marques, where German traders were particularly prominent. In 1895 the railway line from Pretoria, the capital of the Transvaal, to Lourengo Marques was completed and its completion was celebrated by a visit from a delegation of German naval officers. The building of the railway produced an immediate rise in German trade with the Transvaal and of German investment in that country. At the turn of the century it would have been safe to conclude that whereas the growth of German trade had quite changed the British economic position in Europe, outside that continent British trade was little affected. But British statesmen taking a long-term view could be by no means certain that that state of affairs would endure. In 1895 a leader in The Times again voiced the statesmen's fear. 'Germany is by far the most dangerous of our industrial competitors at the present moment all the world over, and one cannot but regret that the influence of German competition upon British industry has not yet received the full amount of official attention which the magnitude of the interests at stake deserves.' Or, to put it in other words, if the German economy continued to perform better than the British economy, Britain's position even in South Africa or China could not long remain safe. 1
'Unfair' subsidies In fact, after 1890 the German merchant marine began to grow in size very rapidly. British businessmen attributed this growth to the 'unfair' subsidies provided by the German government, but subsequent studies have shown that these subsidies were too small
have made any real difference to German businessmen's decisions to build ships. The growth of the German merchant navy was simply a reflection of the growth of German industry at home and its relentless search for export markets. Between 1899 and 1902 a number of old-established British shipping companies, including part of the Holt Line, were bought out by German companies, again giving rise to a national outcry in Britain. In
to
1897 the Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse was launched, and it was not long before she secured the coveted Blue Riband for the fastest Atlantic crossing. Her sister ship, the Deutschland, launched in 1900, was even faster and won the same trophy. Even so, on the eve of the First World War the total tonnage of the British merchant marine was still four times greater than that of Germany. But whereas in 1880 the British merchant marine had been also much more modern than the German, having, for example, a much higher proportion of steamships, in 1914 this was no longer the case. German ship owners converted their ships to oil-firing much more readily than their more conservative British counterparts.
was not only in shipbuilding that Germany was more efficient. It was also true in industries where Britain had long been dominant. A deputation of British employers and workmen visited German iron and steel works in 1895. Their report, published in 1896, demonstrated the immense technical advances made in Germany. Not the least of these advantages appeared to be the higher level of education of the German workmen. They underIt
stood far better the nature of the technical processes they were performing and be< ause their level of education was higher their chances of promotion were also far higher. This factor counted for a great deal in the gr wth of the new German industries. From the development of synthetic aniline dyes in Germany, sprang almost the wht of the modern chemical industry including the first large drug firms and plastics firms. Their activities were based on a constant stream of scientific research. They were
508
the forerunners of modern companies in their search for a 'new product' and a new method of marketing it. The greater number of universities in Germany, their far higher quality, their widespread availability and their cheapness contrasted sharply with the universities in Britain. From German universities a steady flow of science students poured into the laboratories of German chemical firms to create a series of great industries which barely existed at all in Britain. The development of the German economy was based both on the development of these new industries and on the continued growth of the more traditional 19th Century industries. Germany had produced about 2,000,000 tons of pig-iron in 1875, much less than Britain; by 1913 she was producing over 19,000,000 tons per year, a far higher quantity than in Britain. In 1887 she mined 60,000,000 tons of coal; by 1913 her coal output stood at 190,000,000 tons. In 1893 she became the biggest steel producer in the world; by 1914 she produced twice as much steel as Britain. But it was the development of the newer industries that took hold of the imagination more. Aniline dyes were first mass-produced in the 1870s. Explosives of a quite new type were produced in the same decade. The first antiseptics and anaesthetics were produced before 1890, and between 1900 and 1910 appeared the first plastics, artificial fibres and insecticides, as well as mass-produced photographic equipment. It was also in these years that Germany took the lead in the production of scientific instruments, of precision gauges, and of many important machine tools. When war eventually broke out Britain was to discover that some indispensable items of machinery and equipment could not be produced in Britain because there was neither the technical knowledge nor the necessary skills, as British users had relied on German imports. Such was the case, for example, with optical glass for sights and binoculars. The idea that logically there must be an ultimate showdown with Germany was born in Britain before 1900 as a result of these commercial and industrial rivalries. In Germany an equally dangerous idea was born, that Britain would ultimately launch a preventive war to stamp out German trade rivalry. Indeed, when the war did come, many Germans argued that it had been caused by Britain precisely for that reason. After 1900 the fear was never absent in Britain that Germany's economic domination of Holland and Belgium would go so far that she would take over those small countries which were so strategically important to British interests. At the same time the building of German warships directly threatened the British strategy of keeping the navy at such a level as to match that of any other two powers combined. The growth of the British navy had in many respects been a function of Britain's enormous overseas trade and it was hardly surprising that in these years the German navy should also increase in size. It was on these growing fears that E. E. Williams capitalised in his Made in Germany. What he wrote there in 1896 stayed in peoples' minds through the subsequent years: Roam the house over and the fateful mark will greet you at every turn, from the piano in the drawing-room to the mug on your kitchen dresser. Descend to your domestic depths, and you will find the very drain pipes German made. You pick out of the grate the paper wrappings from a book consignment, and they are also 'made in Germany'
You stuff them into the fire and reflect that the poker in your hand was forged in Germany. As you rise from your hearthrug you knock over an ornament on your mantelpiece; picking up the pieces you read, on that bit that formed the base, 'manufactured Germany'. And you jot your reflections down with a pencil that was made in Germany. There were, indeed, many reminders that Europe now contained not one great industrial power but two. 'Rightly or wrongly,' said Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign Secretary, in 1908, 'a great part of the world has come of late years to concentrate upon the relations between England and Germany, to look to them for the chief indication of whether the peace of the world in
is
likely to be disturbed
'
Further Reading Feis, H., Europe, The World's Banker (New York 1965) Hoffman, R. J. S., Great Britain and The German Trade Rivalry 1875-1914 (New York 1964) Saul, S. B Studies in British Overseas Trade 1870-1914 (Liverpool 1960) ,
MILWARD
has taught and lectured at a variety of Universities, both in and the United States including the University of East Anglia, Stanford University in California and the University of Edinburgh, Scotland. He is author of The German Economy at War and numerous articles on related subjects.
A. S.
Britain
THE BATTLE OF CORONEL
A >i
±
At the outbreak of war German possessions in the Pacific were many and They included the Marianas, far-flung. Marshall Islands, Carolines, the the Bougainville in the Solomons. German New Guinea and the islands now known as New Ireland and New Britain which lie off that coast, and Samoa. Perhaps most important of all. there was the young and vigorous German colony in the Kiao-chow territory up in the Yellow Sea, grouped about its capital, the naval base of Tsingtao. From this base operated the ships of the German East Asiatic Squadron. !
The composition of* this squadron was well-known, and so was its reputation. In Whitehall it was recognised as a naval unit of compact strength, excellent morale and high efficiency, officered and led by sailors of character and experience. The information about it which Whitehall lacked, however, was in some ways the most important -the location of its principal ships and the intentions of the officer all — and these vital were to remain largely matters of constant and rather harassed speculation in the minds of a number of important people, for the best part of three months. One of the light cruisers of the squadron
who commanded them facts
— SMS Emden — did in fact reveal her posimuch earlier than did the others, for
tion
she suddenly appeared in the Bay of Bengal
upon a commerce-raiding cruise which
paralysed trade in the area, thoroughly frightened business interests from Singapore to Ceylon, and compelled the admira-
Tahiti, they vanished again long before British or Allied naval forces in the area could concentrate and bring them to action. Then in the middle of October they arrived at Easter Island, and when the reports reached Whitehall the conclusion hardened that they were heading for South America and the co-operation of the German interests in Chile. This could hardly have come as much of a surprise to the Admiralty, for the alternative courses of action which faced the Commander-inChief of the East Asiatic Squadron, once Japan had entered the war on the Allied side, were not very attractive. Whether it was a surprise or not, the fact remained that by the beginning of November a German force of considerable strength would be off' the west coast of South America, and might shortly afterwards come around the Horn to the east coast. it could then cause among the trade lanes bearing vital supplies of foodstuffs and war materials from the Plate might be so serious as to be fatal, for it was realised that England could be brought to the point of starvation and collapse in six weeks if her overseas trade was brought to a standstill. All the might of the Grand Fleet would be unable to save her in these circumstances. At all costs, the ships of the German East Asiatic Squadron must be found and annihilated before they could bring about such a perilous situation.
The damage
But how — and by whom? For British were very inadequate.
forces in the area
whose pockets, lives or sentiments were not immediately threatened by
A
her activities.
As
tion of all
But it was quickly evident that she was operating alone. The other ships of the squadron — SMS Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Niirnberg and Leipzig— vanished into the limitless expanse of the Pacific, and although at intervals news would arrive of their sudden appearance at such places as
Fanning and Christmas and later off the French
Islands, at Samoa port of Papeete at
single British cruiser the harsh afternoon glare softened into twilight on Saturday October 31, 1914, the slim, low-built shape of a British light cruiser slipped into Coronel Bay and anchored. Her sides were streaked with salt and rust; her boats, though seaworthy, showed signs of rough handling, and the bareness of her upperworks was not en-
due to war conditions. HMS Glasgow had come round the Horn from the Falktirely
lands in weather which lived well up to reputation, and had since been battling up and down the Chilean coast in gales which tossed her about like a piece of cork and swept away all fittings not voluntarily removed three months before. She had been hard worked since summer, and now she was battered — but her engines were still sound and her crew alert. A boat sped away from her side and from the bridge Captain John Luce watched her go, reckoned the odds against them all once again and hoped that Lieutenant Hirst, the Fleet Intelligence Officer, who sat in the boat's sternsheets, would quickly send and collect his telegrams and return on board. Down in the wireless room, as Captain Luce well knew, his telegraphists were listening to the almost continuous, high-singing Telefunken signals which indicated the presence in the immediate vicinity of enemy ships, one call-sign in particular so dominant that he almost expected to see its user, SMS Leipzig, sliding into the bay alongside him. And if the situation to seaward was ominous, it was not improved by conditions ashore. The strong German and proGerman element along the Chilean coast had already proved actively hostile and there was little doubt that someone in Coronel was at that very moment sending out the news that the Glasgow was in the bay. Thus if the efforts of Vice-Admiral Graf von Spee, Commander-in-Chief of the German East Asiatic Squadron, were directed towards cutting off the Glasgow from the other ships of her squadron, then his task was being greatly facilitated. Altogether, Glasgow was in a tricky situation and Captain Luce was not the only one on board to appreciate it. In the wardroom there was speculation on the chances of getting to sea before the trap was sprung and — less immediately — cool consideration of the chances of battle even if they did manage to regain the Flag and join company with the armoured cruisers Monmouth and Good Hope and the armed merits
chant cruiser Otronto which together formed the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock. Given half a chance, Cradock would fight -that was the general opinion, and despite the almost overwhelming power and efficiency of the enemy squadron, no one doubted that Cradock's course would be the correct one. From a purely practical point of view one telling hit on one of Spee's ships could wreck the squadron. There was no German base available for repairs, and a neutral port could only offer shelter for 24 hours, after which internment for ship and crew were automatic — leaving the rest
weak and unbalanced to run the gauntlet home. About the ship the Glasgow's men worked steadily, making good gale damage, cleaning and re-oiling the guns, checking ammunition and trimming the coal bunkers, while all the time the Telefunken signals
of the squadron
whined in the ears of the wireless telegraphists. Ashore Lieutenant Hirst talked long and urgently to official and unofficial members of the British service, and it was daylight before he completed his business and returned to the Glqpgou\ still with hours of work ahead of him. As he reached his cabin the anchor cable was already coming in, the little cruiser swinging free. As they cleared the bay there was as yet no immediate sign of the enemy — not that the men aboard Glasgow need be unduly worried if it was to be a meeting with the Leipzig only, for, on paper at least, there was an exciting equality of strength between them. The Glasgow and Leipzig were light cruisers manned by long-service officers and men; they had been in commission for over two years and were thus
presumably efficient in neajmanship and gunnery, and both were ed with ten 4-inch guns. The Ge g|ms were in fact 41 -inch, and som §d Glasgow were aware of the these guns compared very favOurabl ith the older guns. Ho' this, Glasgow herself moi British
6-inch
ver,
to
ted two
offset
more
modern 6-inch guns which were reputed to have the range of the old 9-inch batteries. Should the Glasgow and Leipzig meet then, there appeared the possibility of a single-ship action — but reflection revealed Unless the the possibility as slight. Leipzig actually forced an action, the
Glasgow must first attend to other work and responsibilities -for her primary duty was to return to the Flag and deliver the telegrams and information. Quite possibly, in company with the armoured cruisers and the Otranto, a search might then be made for the Leipzig which, if successful, would undoubtedly be of fundamental importance, for every chance must be taken to reduce the strength of Admiral von Spee's command before the British and German squadrons met.
The
Glasgow
and
Leipzig
might
be
as equals, but the combined British ships in the locality were certainly no match for the crack squadron of the
reckoned
Imperial German Navy. The two German armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau by themselves would constitute an enormous menace to the heterogeneous collection of ships which composed the
exact position was by no means certain — and perhaps with the help of her 12-inch guns the German cruisers could be fought off. But even this was a slim chance, for the guns aboard Canopus were as old as herself, and although she had now been for some weeks under Admiral Cradock's command, he had been able to hold only one hurried conference with her commander, for the Canopus had arrived at the Falklands on the morning of the day the rest of the squadron must leave. That conference, however, had been enough to convince Cradock that the Canopus's engines were in such a state of disrepair that the voyage down from the Mediterranean had practically crippled them, and that a hasty overhaul at Port Stanley would be essential in order to get the battleship around the Horn. But if Cradock couldn't wait for the Canopus perhaps the battle would -should Fate prove kind. It was at least arguable that Spee would keep his distance if her four 12-inch guns were present in the British battle-line. However, if the Glasgow, Monmouth and Good Hope could catch isolated units of
British squadron, for the German ships held superiority in speed and also in broadside weight and range. Add to them the light cruiser Leipzig and her two sister
Spee's command and thus deal with it piecemeal, then the whole strategic situation in the Southern Seas might be
and Dresden, and the squadron under Admiral Graf von Spee's command became an admirably balanced — and modern — fighting force.
But it seemed rather a lot to hope for. At sea again, the Glasgow steered first north and then Captain Luce took his ship around to the south-west, plunging ahead into wind and a rising sea as fast as the engines would take her, in order to deliver the telegrams and naval intelligence into Cradock's hands without breaking wireless silence. Seas swept the foredeck and the wind sang in the signal halliards. Four hours later the Glasgow rejoined the Flag some 40 miles west of Coronel Bay. The Good Hope and Monmouth were there, rolling like barrels in the heavy seas, and the Otrantn developed a list whenever she came broadside to the wind. There was no sign of the ( 'anopus.
ships, the Niirnberg
Only one hope force, the British had two armoured cruisers (one of which had already been condemned as unfit for further service), one fairly modern light cruiser, and a converted merchantman. One hope — and one hope only — seemed
Against this
elderly
to
exist
even an avoidance of overdefeat, should the ships of the
for
whelming
Royal Navy meet the East Asiatic Squadron in force. Somewhere to the south was the old battleship HMS Canopus— her
successfully dealt with.
Below: The German light cruiser. SMS NurnIn a state of sad disrepair, she nevertheless played an important part in the battle
berg.
K.*-
—
Above: The German
light cruiser.
SMS
Dresden. She had steamed
The seas were far too heavy for boatwork, Glasgow towed a cask containing the vital papers across the Good Hope's bows — so the
and in the ruling weather conditions she was both extremely lucky and extremely adept, for the manoeuvre was immediately successful. It was also to some effect, for by two o'clock a string of signals was fluttering from the Good Hope's halliards and Captain Luce's appreciation of the situation was confirmed. The squadron were to form line abreast, about 15 miles apart, with the Good Hope to the west and the Glasgow to the east of the line, and sweep north-west by north at ten knots. The signals preceded by the Leipzig's call-sign bleated loud through the dull-grey afternoon, and Cradock had decided that she was to be found and annihilated before the heavy might of the German armoured cruisers could come to her protection. For this task the guns of the Canopus would not be necessary. The squadron spread out — cold, wet, and pitching now on the steep following sea. The Good Hope, carrying the Admiral aboard, treasuring the honour and reputation of the Royal Navy above all else; the Monmouth, with her crew of Scottish fishermen and coastguards, her 12 young naval cadets fresh from Dartmouth, and her outdated engines kept going only by the super-
human
efforts
Wilshin and his
of
Enginoer-Commander
the Otranto looming tumbled seas; the Glasgow plunging on, grim and hardbitten. Officers and men with enough experience to cause
out
LZ
of
the
staff;
down
the Atlantic to join Spee
them misgivings kept them to themselves. It was part of the pattern of that day that the Glasgow should see the smoke first. She reported it to the Flag and moved off starboard to investigate, with the Otranto still in company (for the sweep line had not yet formed) and the Monmouth only four miles astern. The cloud grew wider as it came up over the horizon, and as the Glasgow approached it, it was seen to have three stems. By 1625 hours the to
Seharnhorst and Gneisenau were recognisable, and astern of the armoured cruisers came the Leipzig whose signals had baited the trap. The Glasgow steamed nearer to establish the course, while, incredibly, the enemy squadron remained apparently unaware of her presence. Then at 1630 hours black smoke belched from the German funnels as Spee ordered full steam for a chase, and the Glasgow turned to race back towards the Flag. Immediately she turned, her telegraphists were deafened by the scream in their earphones as German keyboards jammed her signals — but by 1645 hours Cradock knew that the meeting he had long anticipated was at hand, and he also knew the strength of the enemy force in sight and their course. He ordered concentration on the Glasgow and formation of the battle-line, and at 1710 hours on that grey, squall-swept Sunday afternoon the British ships were together and turning. At this moment the armoured strength of the opposing force was nearly 15 miles away, and the German squadron had yet
more units detached. For the British ships
— even against such preponderant strength — it might still be possible to attain some success
if
conditions of wind and sea could
be used to advantage, and with this in mind the British line was formed by 1730 hours and was driving south-east across the rising sea — the Good Hope leading, then the Monmouth, Glasgow and the huge, lumbering, thin-skinned Otranto— in an secure the inshore position. Once there the wind would blow the British smoke clear of the guns while at the same time it would blanket the Scharnhorst's black pall across the German gun-sights. effort to
The race
is lost
There was even a chance that if the British could win .through to this position, they might, whilst doing so, execute the classic naval manoeuvre of crossing the enemy's T, and at the moment of passing thus bring their whole broadside weight to bear upon the Seharnhorst at a time when she could only reply with her foredeck guns and be masking those of her consort. But by 1745 hours the hopes were falling. The gap between the squadrons had narrowed — and Spee's ships were working up to 20 knots whilst Otranto was holding the British back to 15; she was almost as much of a drag as the Canopus would have been, without the possible compensation of 12inch guns.
By 1750 hours was lost.
it
was evident
that the
race
At 1800 hours Admiral Cradock ordered
Above: The
a turn
British
away
armoured
to the south
cruiser,
HMS Good Hope,
— they were then
four points to starboard of an enemy who obviously had both the intention and speed to keep them there; for the Germans a battle in line, broadside pounding against broadside, held every advantage. But there were still some benefits to be obtained from factors of light and wind. The clouds were broken and the sun was sinking. If the British could close the range with the setting sun behind them, it would serve to blind the German gunlayers whilst at the same time lighting up the German ships into perfect targets. Somehow Cradock must close until the Monmouth's old 6-inch guns — and perhaps even Glasgow's puny 4-inch armament — could inflict damage, for at long range there were only the Good Hope's two 9-2-inch guns to battle it out with twelve 8-2-inch guns which the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau could bring to bear — although possibly the Glasgow's modern 6-inch guns might be able to play some part. At 1804 hours then, the admiral ordered each of his ships to turn four points towards the enemy, and in line abreast they
steamed towards them. Spee turned his squadron away and kept his distance. to action yet.
He was
not ready to come
Thwarted, and to ease the labours of his battling squadron, Cradock turned back to a southerly course, reformed his battleline and grimly watched the strength arraying itself against him. The Leipzig had closed up and the Dresden was now
flagship of Admiral Cradock's squadron
racing in over the horizon only a mile astern of her; doubtless the Niirnberg would soon arrive. The two lines were separated by 18,000 yards of water. To the west the British line still rolled until their
maindeck guns were awash and
spray drenched telescopes and gunsights, encrusting them with salt: the Good Hope, Monmouth, Glasgow, Otranto — for what use a merchantman would be in a naval battle. To the east steamed the Germans: the Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, Dresden. Their guns were high above the waterline,
equipment was dry. The scene was set, but hardly for a battle. Only a miracle could avert a massacre. Two old armoured cruisers, one light cruiser and one armed merchantman were pitted against two modern armoured cruisers with two, and perhaps three, light cruisers. Two British 9-2-inch guns and two 6-inch guns had to answer at long range twelve 8-2-inch guns. Even at short range their
the odds were not appreciably less, for the Germans fired a broadside of 3,812 pounds against the British 2,815.
Most significant of all — and most tragic — against some 2,200 fully trained, longservice German sailors who were reckoned among the most efficient in the Imperial German Navy, were to fight a similar
number
of Britons the vast majority of been happily pursuing civilian vocations less than six months before, and who now had little more than their pride and their courage to give them confidence. But they had their admiral — and whether
whom had
he was brave or quixotic, resolute or reckless, impelled by honourable motives pr by incredible stupidity, it seems that Sir Christopher Cradock had their hearts. When at 1818 hours he wirelessed to the Canopus, still trudging up through the seas over two hundred and fifty miles away to the south 'I am going to attack the enemy now!' they cheered him as their forefathers at Trafalgar had cheered 109 years before, drifting down on to the FrancoSpanish crescent. From the Good Hope's masthead fluttered the battle-ensign, and from her halliards the signal in 'Follow the admiral's wake'. Carefully, imperceptibly, the British line edged in towards the enemy, striving for a converging course, hoping to close the range. Five minutes later, the Scharnhorst led the German line away one point to the eastward and the lines were parallel again. From the British decks men watched across the grey waste in silence and grim resolve. The scene was now one of ominous clarity The Scharnhorst and Gneisenau rode powerfully over the seas, the details of their heavy armament picked out by the sun, the seas racing along the towering sides and occasionally sweeping the foredecks. Behind the armoured ships came the light cruisers, crashing through the seas with only their upper-deck guns workable: it was some slight consolation to the British to know that at least the weaker units of the enemy force suffered the same discomforts as themselves 1
5
1
I
THE BATTLE OFCORONEL On November
1902
armoured cruisers, a light cruiser and a converted merchantman met Admiral von Spee's well balanced and modern fighting force in the Pacific. Against Monmouth, Good Hope and Glasgow (the Otranto's part in the action was negligible) Germany had Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Leipzig, Dresden and Nurnberg 1
1914,
two
British
1902: The 8-2-inch guns of the East Asiatic Squadron open fire on the British ships. The shells fall short at first, then the Good Hope and the Monmouth receive direct hits on their foredecks
2000: The combined weight of the guns of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau have started fires in the Good Hope, and as they reach the main magazine an explosion engulfs the Good Hope in flames and smoke. The first German victory of the battle has been achieved 2125: The Glasgow has steamed off to the west and escaped in the darkness, leaving the stricken Monmouth to limp to safety. But the Nurnberg's searchlight finds her and her decks are ripped apart as the firing starts. Her end is now only thirty minutes away
Main
Maximum Broadside Speed
Armament
Range [yards]
[pounds]
Armoured Cruisers 8.2"[5]
13.600
6"
11.200
[6]
German
Weight [knots] ~
Scharnhorst/Gneisenau
^^ii^ 1
5
9.2"
[2]
12.000
Good Hope 6"
[16]
11.200
Monmouth 6"
[14]
11.200
.
1560
23
900
24
3 Glasgow
[2]
11.200
4"
[10]
3.800
4.1" [10]
10.500
-
2125
155
Leipzig/Niirnberg/Dresden
Glasgow escapes
_-v
v
**&t
Light Cruisers
6"
-
•*'"."
-
•»
*" #
Ai^Ji A .
-
7
•
«
•
For another half-hour the two battleplunged southwards in parallel lines at about 16 knots — the highest speed of which the Otranto was capable. Then, behind the British, the sun's rim touched lines
the horizon, and as it slid down to become first a semi-circle and then a gradually diminishing segment the light conditions
straddled by three shells from the Gneisenau, whose marksmanship was upholding her claim to the Kaiser's Gold Cup for gunnery. One of the minor miracles of the day was the Otranto's unscathed departure from the line. Now the action was at its thickest. With the early loss of the Good Hope's fore 9-2inch gun the British chances of harming the enemy at anything but short range had been halved — and with no alternative, Cradock led across the shell -torn seas to bring the 6-inch guns of the flagship and
began to change. Evening crept over the sea from the east and touched the German battle-line, greying it into the sea and the sky beyond. As twilight thickened, the moon came up behind heavy clouds to show fleetingly through them, briefly outlining the German ships — and now it seemed that the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were closing in. Spee was edging forward. To the west, the afterglow of the sun made a fiery, yellow-shot tapestry of the windswept sky against which the British ships stood out in black, hard-edged relief; nothing would help them tonight but their courage and
them and still flame scoured the decks. Then both the Good Hope and Monmouth
pride in the long tradition of the
turned broadside to their antagonists and
their
Monmouth into action. The after 9-2-inch still fired — once a minute — but its noise and flame were lost amid the holocaust which raged around it, for ammunition blazed fiercely and fire was already spreading through the flagship's decks below. Still they plunged across towards the
German
line, still
the shells crashed into
Royal Navy.
Outranged and outgunned At 1902 hours on Sunday November 1, the 8-2-inch guns of the German East
— then
shell splinters
whined
irritating
whine
of splinters.
The Good
away in order to avoid masking her stilldefiant, though now sporadic fire; in order, too, to avoid entering the zone of fire still laid down by the indefatigable German gunners. Again the shells found the Monmouth. Flames burst out on her quarterdeck, she listed heavily to port, her head was lower and her fire slackened. Heavy seas flooded through gaping bows and dragged her away from the line — but she was not yet beaten, and to those on board the Glasgow who could spare her a glance it looked at this time as though she was having some success in overcoming the fires within, which now sulked dully. But she never rejoined the line, and as time passed her guns lapsed into silence. All that could now be seen of the enemy were the repeated flashes from their
Not so the Good Hope. She flared like a beacon. Since action had commenced the British flagship had received the undivided attention of the gunners aboard Scharnhorst who had first hit her with their third salvo, and who since then had been firing at her, coolly and extremely competently, at a rate of nearly four salvoes every minute. By 1923 hours the range was down to 6,600 yards.
Burning but defiant
On through
the raging and shell-torn sea, Cradock held the converging course — so steadily, in fact, that Spee began to suspect a torpedo attack and edged off another point to eastward. Still the shells crashed into
shrilly over-
Hope's deck amidships threw up a fan of sparks, her upper bridge, masthead and foretop glowed redly as high-explosive shell from the Scharnhorst burst against them, then the glow died as cordite flared on the deck below, and ammunition exploded whitely along the gun-deck. Alongside the looming Otranto, water spouted up to reach her deck level. She drew out of line on the Glasgow's port quarter, and as her huge bulk made an excellent ranging device for the enemy her captain took her away to the westward -though not before she had been neatly
sag away to starboard, losing speed as she did so until the Glasgow, still punching up through the seas astern of her, had to drop
batteries.
Asiatic Squadron at last opened fire upon the British ships, at a range of 12,000 yards. From the bridge of the Glasgow were seen two orange flashes from the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, and as the thunder of Good Hope's 9- 2s answered, grey- white mushrooms blossomed from the sea five hundred yards short of the British flagship, beautifully aimed, beautifully grouped. The Glasgow's pair of modern 6-inch guns fired experimentally into the darkness, but even while the gunnery-control officer was vainly searching the east for some sign of fall of shot, the orange lines sparkled again and then again — and the lines were lengthened now as the Leipzig and Dresden also opened fire. For a few more brief seconds, only the crash of the seas and the sounds of their own movements were heard by the Glasgow's crew
head, the seas erupted around them, the Monmouth ahead steamed through a forest of water, and the Good Hope's foredeck exploded in a sheet of flame, which twisted the fore 9-2-inch gun into a hopeless, useless knot of steel protruding from a turret like a blazing cauldron. Before the mind could react, the next salvo arrived. The Monmouth's foredeck flared up in hard-edged flame and black smoke billowed from sudden, sharp fires along her port side. As she rolled, her gun-crews fought with their guns -still hopelessly outranged by the German guns which now straddled the British line along its length, filling the night with screaming shells and the vicious
black, and twisting, tortured debris cartwheeled away into the night. As though beaten out of line by sheer weight of metal, the Monmouth began to
Above: Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, 'treasuring the honour of the Royal Navy' Left: The British armoured cruiser, HMS
Monmouth, manned by
reservists recruited Scottish fishermen and coastguards
the Good Hope, ripping away her decks and bulkheads, bursting in the crowded flats, spreading fire and chaos through her riven hull: still, stubbornly, she pushed on through the waves, her port 6-inch battery defiant, but firing slowly and spasmodically now as gun-crews perished in the consuming flames or were cut down by flying steel. At 1940 hours she seemed to slow and stagger under the rain of blows; yet another fire blazed up on her foredeck,
Then, ominously, the Monmouth's ports glowed redly in the gathering darkness as burning cordite turned the narrow confines of her mess decks into a choking hell. Still the Gneisenau's shells crashed through her decks and exploded with sickening violence amid the shambles below. An armourpiercing shell came through the body of the ship and exploded among ammunition
and the clouds of steam and smoke which billowed around her glowed sullenly in its light — but she still was moving towards the enemy. A sheet of flame played continuously along her sides upon which the seas had no effect. She might roll until her casemates were awash but as she heaved herself up again the flames flickered weirdly between the waterline and the deckrail. At 1942 hours the Good Hope seemed to gather up all her remaining strength, turn directly towards her tormentors and charge them. Firing as she went, she heaved her stricken weight over the mounting seas trailing flame and wreathing clouds behind her — and as Spee ordered Ins ships out of her course there was for a lew brief moments a pause in her agony. Then abruptly both the Scharnhorst and Gneis enau opened (ire upon her with full broad sides. Blanketed under a dreadful fire, she was at last brought to a halt with her upper deck a sea of flame, and her last desperate
stacked for the starboard battery, a curtain upwards along the starboard side, outlining the upperworks in
throw defeated. As though stunned, she drifted down silently between the lines.
among
the port 6-inch batteries burst into action. Hope and feverish activity galvanized the gun-crews; salvo after salvo thundered from the gun-decks. Abruptly, the Gneisenau's guns shortened range, one of her high-explosive shells hit the Monmouth's fore-turret, blew off the roof and burnt out the housing. As flames licked up out of the steel shell, a violent explosion shattered the forecastle and when its anger died no sign of gun or turret remained.
of flame spread
517
* £
Then the
tires reached a main magazine 1953 hours — 50 minutes after the first salvo had been tired at her— the Good Hope was shattered by an explosion which lived tor years in the memories of those who witnessed it. A broad column of flame rose upwards from between her main and aftermost funnel until it towered two hundred feet above her decks, and in its awful light jagged and incongruous shapes soared up and away into the darkness,
and
at
twisting and weaving in the blast, tumbling in the sudden vacuums. Then the column of fire broke, flooding outwards at its base to wash along the decks and fill the gutted hull with lazy waves of fire. Debris crashed down into the sea. the whole mass of the forepart of the ship silently detached itself and slid down into oblivion, and, incredibly, two 6-inch guns of the port aft battery each fired twice into the darkness. Then the waves took the blazing hulk further off into the darkness, the flames sulked, the pall above glowed luridly, and all that remained of Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock and his men drifted out of the battle. And, for the moment, the battle was done. The Glasgow had borne a charmed life. Circumstances had also added a most bizarre note to the atmosphere in which she played her part in the battle, for at the outbreak of war her commission on the South American station had been almost
complete and many of her complement had acquired parrots to take home to England.
When action became inevitable, these birds — some 60 of them — were released from their cages and given a chance to escape to the mainland. They rose in a cloud of brilliant blues and greens and oranges, then, unwilling to risk the rising power of the gale, they all settled back on the Glasgow's upperworks and remained there despite all attempts to scare them away. When the first salvoes thundered out, they rose again, cawing and screaming, but as the battle wore on they gradually ceased their protests and returned to the ship, clinging drunkenly to stays and yards
movement
hausted itself on the journey and failed to explode on arrival. But with the Good Hope and Monmouth out of the fight, every time the Glasgow fired the whole enemy line answered and she steamed through chaos.
At 2030 hours, with the Good Hope gone and the enemy invisible, Captain Luce ordered cease fire, and then took his ship around to the west to find, and offer succour the Monmouth. When he found her, the badly battered cruiser was listing and her head was still down, but her upper decks were no longer aflame and only the portholes below the quarterdeck still glowed. The tragedy, however, was not yet ended. As the Glasgow bore up to render what assistance she could, the moon made one of its rare appearances to light up a tumultuous sea, the two ships — and four enemy ships sweeping in search of them. If the Monmouth could turn her stern to sea she might last, and if she could hold the northwest course she might, by the grace of God, keep clear of the German line — and perhaps even limp as far as the Chilean coast; but the Glasgow must leave her or perish. She signalled to the Monmouth twice, passed close under her stern, and, with misery aboard at the thought of the compulsory desertion, steamed west and away into the darkness. The Glasgow, alone among the British squadron, had speed, and it was soon evident that she must have shaken off any pursuit and was free to turn south to race after the Otranto for the Magellan Straits, her wireless at last clear of the enemy attempts to jam it and able to tell the dreadful story to the Canopus, still labouring up miles to the south. to,
A column of smoke For a time there was hope that the Monmouth had eluded the enemy and was limping towards some sort of safety. But at 2100 hours firing broke out again to the north, and with ice in their hearts the men aboard Glasgow counted, the gun-flashes and watched a searchlight stretch its pallid fingers over the horizon. berg had found her.
The
Nurn-
Captain von Schonberg had known from
or their own failing strength loosened" their hold. As the action progressed so their numbers fell, and only ten were eventually recovered. Incredibly, this loss of the parrots was almost the heaviest casualty sustained by
the moment he received the first signal ordering formation of the battle-line that his chances of getting Niirnberg into position were extremely remote. Her boilers were in sad need of repair, her engines of replacement, and her port propeller of two new blades - so, despite the eagerness with
the cruiser. It was afterwards estimated that some 600 shells were fired at the Glasgow, but some protecting fate guarded her from all except five, of which three lodged harmlessly in her coal bunkers, one entered and broke up against a conningtower support without exploding (though it wrecked the captain's pantry), and another burst aft, just above the port outer propeller, and tore an irregular hole in the ship's side just as though she had been rammed. It flooded one compartment but did nothing to affect the Glasgow's steam-
which he and his
until
either violent
ing abilities.
Fury and desperation In return, the Glasgow hi engaged both the Leipzig and the Dresden for the major part of the battle and at the >nd, in fury and desperation, she had taken on the 1
Gneisenau and Scharnhorst and even hit the latter ship with one of her puny 4-inch shells, which, however, apparently ex-
518
officers
might stare into
growling darkness ahead, he knew that their hopes of adding to the tumult were small. The wind from the south howled through the stays, the seas swept the forecastle and flooded the conning-tower — and the Niirnberg piledrove through them in an effort to reach the
torn,
the battle.
Then came the explosion — and apparently the end — and although much relief was felt when wireless signals indicated the highly satisfactory result, there was some disappointment and dissatisfaction at the role of spectator which the Niirnberg had played. Then at 2035 hours the look-out reported a column of smoke on the starboard bow, for which Schonberg at once steered. Apparently the smoke must have been made by the Glasgow, for although no mention made of the Niirnberg in Captain is Luce's report, Schonberg chased the British
ship until she disappeared from sight, her speed taking her rapidly over the horizon. As the Niirnberg turned back towards the ships of her squadron, Schonberg saw the Monmouth against the light of the moon. The armoured cruiser was listing, but she was undoubtedly under way. At first Schonberg thought that he had come across one of the ships of his own squadron, so he bore down on her from the south-west, making the agreed recognition signal and passing close to port. There was no reply, but not wishing to harm a friend, he closed in and switched on his searchlight. It picked out first the white ensign — still flying — then the details of the torn and shattered hull, then the working-parties scurrying about the decks. Foam threshed under her stern; the Mon-
mouth was making progress. In fairness to Schonberg it must be stated
Monmouth every chance to down her flag. He waited some
that he gave the
haul
minutes before opening fire, his searchlight still pointedly illuminating the white ensign from some 600 yards away. His first salvoes were from 4-inch guns aimed high, and although, when this brought about no lowering of the flag, he fired a torpedo at the Monmouth, he was not upset when it failed to explode on the hull, having possibly passed underneath the rolling ship.
He then ceased fire and waited for Monmouth's next move. It was not long in coming. She seemed to gather speed and begin to turn — and two of Schonberg's officers on deck heard instructions shouted from the Monmouth's bridge ordering the men back to the guns from their tasks about the ship. Either the intention was to ram Niirnberg, or turn to bring the starboard guns to bear on her. There is no need to doubt the regret with which Schonberg states he then acted, but unless the Monmouth hauled down her flag, his course — his duty — was obvious. As the Monmouth circled, so did the Niirnberg — at twice the speed — and as the German light cruiser came round close under the Monmouth's stern, she opened fire on the unprotected part of her hull, tearing it open and ripping the decks apart. Under the onslaught, the Monmouth shuddered and listed over further and further. The seas washed up to the port deck-rail, then across to flood around the funnels. Slowly, still under a hail of shell, Monmouth leaned completely over and capsized. At 2158 hours the waters closed above her stern — from which her flag had flown until the end. Further Reading Churchill, W. C, The World Crisis (Odhams Press) Corbett, Sir Julian, Naval Operations of the Great War, Vol 1 (Longmans Green) Cradock, Sir Christopher, Whispers from the
Fleet
Coronet and After (Peter Davies) Coronet and the Falklands (A. M.
Hirst, Lloyd,
Irving,
J.,
Philpot)
Pochlammer, Hans, Before Jutland (Jarrolds) Raeder, Erich, Der Krieg zur See (E. S. Mittler and Sons) Spencer-Cooper, H., The Battle of the Falkland Isles (Cassell)
Verner, Rudolph, The Battle-Cruisers at the Action of the Falklands (John Bale and Sons and Danielsson)
[For Barrie Pitt's biography, see page 32. ]
CONVERGING OF THE FLEETS David Mason: Less than two weeks after the Battle of Coronel, a squadron of British ships set sail for South America. This time, the Admiralty were sending battle-cruisers and on December 8 they caught their first glimpse of their enemy off the Falkland Islands. Below: HMS Inflexible, one of the two battle-cruisers which left the Grand Fleet to sail south
On
the morning of November 4. Winston Churchill opened the telegram which conveyed the news of the defeat at Coronel, and one can imagine with what heavy heartedness he pondered the significance of such a defeat in the first major challenge to the Royal Navy's supremacy at sea since the Napoleonic Wars. Within an hour of reading the news, he had enumerated his potential response, and the staff of the Admiralty were seeking out the answers to questions which in their very breadth and urgenc) boded ill for Graf von Spee, fresh from his victory on the other side of the world: How far is it. and how long would it take Dartmouth and Weymouth to reach Punta Arenas. Rio, or Abrolhos respectively, if they started this afternoon? How long would it take (a) Kent to h Rio and Abrolhos? (b) Australia (i) without and
Montcalm to reach Galapagos via Makada Islands, and also Id/umo and Newcastle to reach them? (c) The Japanese 2nd Southern Squadron to rep/ace Australia at Fiji? Defence, Carnarvon and Cornwall respectively to reach Punta Arenas?
HMS
HMS
HMS
avenge Good Hope and Monmouth. Inflexible was to join the Invincible. Both were to leave the Grand Fleet for foreign service. Both were ordered to coal at once and steam south to Devonport for dockyard repairs. They arrived there on November 8, and on November 9, after preliminary inspection, the dockyard authoriAdmiralty that the ships could not be completed before midnight on November 13. It looked as if Saturday November 14 would be the earliest day they could sail, but the
ties signalled to the
telegram from the docks was read by Churchill and Fisher
to-
was perfunctory: 'Ships are to sail Wednesday 1 They are needed for war service and dockyard arrangements must be made to conform. If necessary dockyard men should be sent away in the ships to return as opportunity may offer. You gether. Their reply 1
are held responsible for the speedy dispatch of these ships in a thoroughly efficient condition. Acknowledge.' The telegram was drafted in the handwriting of Winston Churchill, and bore his initials, but it was clearly a joint effort, and it was to prove fortunate for Britain and the Royal Navy that their business was now conducted by two figures of such bustling energy. They were not to be thwarted, and at 6.15 pm on Wednesday November 11 the two ships set sail, with Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee, until then Chief-of-Staff at the Admiralty, flying his flag in the Invincible. They had orders to rendezvous off South America with Rear-Admiral Archibald Stoddart, on whom responsibility for the area had temporarily devolved. The Admiralty was adding big names to the big ships it was sending against Spee. Nevertheless, the choice of Sturdee to lead the squadron was a curious one, and several diverging interpretations have been placed on it. Churchill himself claimed that Sturdee was a skilful seaman, but adds significantly that he would not have been able to work satisfactorily with Lord Fisher. He had indeed been associated in his early career with one of Fisher's most bitter enemies, Lord Charles Beresford, and it is hard to see how the two men could have worked together as First Sea Lord and Chief-ofStaff. Why then was he not simply sacked? Perhaps, as far as Churchill was concerned, sacking him immediately after the loss of Cradock would have reflected too badly on the previous handling of the Royal Navy's affairs, in which Churchill himself had played a part. Whether or not Churchill thought of this is not recorded, but promoting him was a clever move. If Sturdee found and annihilated Spee's squadron, no harm would have been done.
Below SMS Gneisenau and SMS Scharnhorst (four funnels) and SMS Nurnberg (right, in background) with vessels of the Chilean Navy at
Valparaiso after their action at Coronel
_
_ ._,^jMn^JLJL«JL k
flHtfttHML^^hiL.
"!J
I
i
If he failed, with the powerful fleet placed at his disposal, he could be got rid of with no complications. Even as his voyage began, Sturdee was showing little of the fire and competence which wins praise (and battles) for a seagoing admiral. Churchill and Fisher had sent two of their fastest ships, and had hustled them on their way with no delays. Yet Sturdee's ships, capable of a sustained 25 knots, proceeded in the interests of fuel economy at a leisurely ten knots, stopping occasionally to examine neutral merchant ships for contraband, pausing for gunnery practice, and all the time talking liberally over the wireless, which did little to enhance security. It was hardly the reaction Fisher and Churchill had tried to engender. While these measures were being taken against him in England, Spee himself, at the opposite corner of the globe, was facing more difficulties and problems than one would normally expect of a triumphant admiral. On the day after the battle, he wrote a long letter to his superiors in Germany which began: 'Yesterday was All Saints' Day and a lucky day for us.' It went on to explain in detail the course of the battle, and ended with the words: 'You can hardly imagine the joy which reigns among us. We have at last contributed something to the glory of our arms — although it might not mean much on the whole and in view of the enormous number of the English ships.' And with the enormous number of the English ships growing steadily, he set off with his squadron for Valparaiso, where he arrived during the morning of November 3. The strong and enthusiastic German population in Chile greeted Spee and the news of his victory with delight and enthusiasm, and even half a century ago, as Spee noted, he was inflicted with the celebrity's plague of clicking cameras. He tried to avoid festivities, but the one celebration he could not escape was a dinner at the German club, where he was kept, almost interned, for an hour and a half. As the proceedings reached a climax of alcoholic euphoria, one individual staggered to his feet, hoisted his glass high, and
the damnation of the British Navy'. Spee himbut not to that toast. Instead he proposed another one, which showed him to be a man of a greater calibre, who respected the memory of the admiral who in peace-keeping missions before the war had been his friend and colleague: 'I drink to the memory of a gallant and honourable foe.' Having spoken thus he downed the drink and strode out. As he walked back to the ship there was one other indication of the burden he knew he carried, when a woman stepped forward and presented him with a bouquet of arum lilies. 'Thank you,' he said to her, 'they will do nicely for my grave.' The German admiral remained aboard his flagship that night, and on November 4 the squadron set out for Mas Afuera, where they arrived on November 6 and stayed until the 15th. There, at that remote and quiet base, Spee could complete coaling from his fleet of colliers and work out where to go next, and while he wrestled in his own mind with the seemingly endless permutations of possible answers to that question his new opponent, Sturdee, was faced with the equally formidable task of anticipating Spee's moves, of finding him and bringing him to account in the vast areas of those southern waters. To Sturdee as to Spee, the alternatives offered seemed almost infinite in their variety. The German might turn round and retrace the route which had brought him to the coast of Chile, and disappear again into the enormity of the Pacific Ocean. He might choose to round the Horn and make due east across the Atlantic toward the Cape of Good Hope and South Africa, where his assistance might be warmly welcomed in the Boer rebellion which had recently been reported. He might, on the other hand, break for home waters, either by steaming northwards and through the Panama Canal, or by rounding the Horn and sailing up the centre of the South Atlantic. Sturdee had the problem of outwitting him, but even if he did so, he still had to catch him, and while the strength and speed of the force he was gathering
proposed a toast self
was the
'to
last to rise,
V
Above: The German armoured cruiser, SMS Scharnhorst. Flying Spee's flag, she fought mainly against the Good Hope at Coronel; but she survived the battle only to face a more powerful opponent a month later. Displacement: 1 1,600 tons. Length: 450 feet.
522
Beam:
Power/Speed: 21 knots. Armament: Eight 8-2-inch guns, guns, 20 24-pounder guns. Armour: Belt 6 inches, turrets 6% inches. Crew: 765 men Below: The British battle-cruiser HMS Invincible. After Coronel, 71 feet.
six 6-inch
the need to send a more powerful squadron against Spee in the Pacific dictated the Admiralty's decision to withdraw her and her sister ship, HMS Inflexible from the Grand Fleet and prepare them hurriedly for the journey to South America. During the Battle of the Falkland Islands
hits which caused only slight damage. Displacement: 17,250 tons. Length: 562 feet. Beam: 78 1/2 feet. Power/Speed: 28-6 knots. Armament: Eight 12-inch and 16 4-inch guns. Armour: Belt 7 inches, turrets 10 inches. Crew: 750 men
she received 23
*
523
rolhos
Rocks 17 November: Stoddart arrives
26 November: Ma's
Sturdee
Afuera
arrives
6-15 November
9 November:
Canopus arrives 7 December: Sturdee & Stoddart arrive
Saint Quenti
Falkland Islands 8 December: Von Spee arrives
19-21 November
Magellan Straits
26-29 November
i
Picton Island
3 December
Cape Horn 1 December
GERMAN EAST
ASIATIC
SQUADRON
BRITISH FLEET
Above: Prelude to the next battle: the British and German fleets converge on December 8 at the Falkland Islands off South America
Above: The German admiral, Spee: a highly respected opponent. He foresaw the retribution that would follow Coronel
were adequate to ensure the destruction of the East Asiatic Squadron, there remained the question of retaining the necessary
his fleet the cruiser Kent. He already commanded the cruisers Carnarvon and Cornwall, and the armed merchant cruisers Orama and Otranto, and by the time Sturdee reached him at that rendezvous on November 26, he had also been joined once again by the light cruisers Bristol and Glasgow, of which the latter had been accommodated by the Brazilians at Rio for extensive dockyard repairs. The Defence was dispatched to join the Cape squadron, and the Otranto to Sierra Leone for boiler examination, which left Sturdee with a formidable fleet of two battle-cruisers, three cruisers, two light cruisers and an armed merchant cruiser. Sturdee also found new orders waiting for him. Despite the absence in those days of the kind of world-wide communications networks which facilitate the transfer of information in a more modern world, the (by modern standards) cumbersome techniques of Intelligence gathering were even then of paramount importance. In Valparaiso on November 22 the British Consul General received and passed on the names of all the German ships that had been at Mas Afuera on November 15. On November 23, the Admiralty received further information to the effect that the German squadron was then in the St Quentin Bay in the Gulf of Pehas, and it was deduced therefore that Spee was still on the Chilean coast. When Sturdee arrived at the Abrolhos Rocks on November 26, he intended to spend three days there, but Luce, the captain of the Glasgow, had the moral courage to persuade him to sail at once, and so the subsequent Admiralty order to the same effect was lent even more force. Sturdee's problems, which until that time had constituted a complicated set of theories, now began to take on the concrete shape of a practical difficulty as he sailed down the coast of Brazil, past Uruguay, and south past the Argentine, veering further from the coast of the continent as he neared the Falkland Islands. There was a growing possibility that Spee might slip past him along the edge of land, meet a collier and break for home. In fact, one report received en route indicated that the German squadron
HMS
fuel for the chase.
There, the critical word was one which reverberated in the nightmares of seagoing commanders in those distant waters — coal! In its long years of sea supremacy the British Empire's strength and foresight had ensured a world-wide network of coaling stations where her ships could call to replenish their necessary fuel stocks, and there was also a number of seagoing colliers steaming their steady, comfortable pace across the oceans to rendezvous points with their glamorous sisters, the fighting ships. But they were prey to the enemy as prize vessels, and if encountered were promptly boarded and relieved of their valuable cargoes. Land stations were open to attack by the German navy. There were plans at Falkland to fire the coal stocks should the Germans arrive there with no British ships in the vicinity to put up an effective defence. When, on November 9, information was received which indicated that Spee was still on the west coast of South America, and would have to be sought out there, the southern coaling base at Port Stanley in the Falkland Islands became vital, and thus entered the picture for the first time. To provide some degree of protection, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, in the Canopus, was ordered by Stoddart to go there, moor his ship to command the harbour entrance, and co-operate with the governor in the defence of the base. Grant tried to hold his ship in position by moorings, but when these proved unsteady, he ran his vessel aground in the mud overlooking the narrow neck of land to the southeast, close to the most vulnerable point on the base, the radio station. Hastily the crew and civilian population worked to set up three of the Canopus' 12-pounder guns on emplacements on shore They built a land observation station in constant telephone ich with the ship, and daubed the ship's superstructure in a ariety of garish colours to break up the outline. It was some Section for the base, but if the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau ed, it would hardly be enough. Meanwhile, further to t north, Admiral Stoddart's ships were concentrating, while Admi Sturdee's were still moving south to meet them. On Novembt 17 Stoddart put into the base at Abrolhos Rocks off Brazil in HMS Defence, where he absorbed into t
].
am
I
524
HMS
HMS
HMS
was already only 400 miles from Montevideo, and Sturdee immediately turned to starboard to make in the direction of that But on December 1 one of his reconnaissance vessels came back from Rio with news that the report was false, and Sturdee
city.
turned once again to make directly for the Falklands. In the hope of covering as wide a track as possible, he spaced his ships out at extreme intervals, covering a belt 50 miles wide. A glance at any atlas will show, however, just how small a proportion of the possible sailing routes can be covered by cutting a corridor 50 miles wide across the southern Atlantic Ocean. On the afternoon of December 7, after an uneventful voyage, Sturdee sailed his ships into the Falkland Islands, intent on leaving again two days later, fully coaled and provisioned, to continue the search for his enemy. The coaling was to begin at once, but that apparently simple operation was fraught with complications. In the first place the squadron's own colliers, sent on ahead from the Abrolhos Rocks, had still not arrived, and as there were only three colliers in the harbour, not all the ships could carry out the operation at the same time. The Carnarvon, Bristol and Glasgow were told off to coal first, with the Inflexible and Invincible next. As protection, the Macedonia, another armed merchantman which had joined them on their way south, took up station ten miles from the harbour entrance, and the remaining ships anchored in Port William, the outer harbour of the Falklands, except for the Glasgow and the Bristol, which joined the Canopus in the inner Stanley Harbour. All the ships were guarded by a line of improvised mines which the crew of the Canopus had laid down. By 0600 hours the next morning (December 8) Carnarvon and Glasgow had finished the task, but the Bristol had got nowhere, owing to the deterioration of coal in one of the colliers. However, one of the squadron's own colliers had by now arrived, and at 0630 hours the Inflexible began coaling.
Break
for
home
Long before the British had reached Falkland the East Asiatic Squadron had left the base at Mas Afuera and worked up steam to sail south. Spee had virtually made up his mind now which course he was going to take, and on November 19 the naval staff received a telegram from him confirming his decision: 'The cruiser squadron intends to break through for home.' On the day after he. sent that telegram,
he sent another outlining his require-
La Plata and New York: 'Send steamers, German if possible, to arrive at Port Santa Elena on December 5 with 10,000 tons of coal and provisions for 1,000 men for three months. No oil. Intelligence reports particularly desirable.' And this was ments
to
followed by a telegram direct to the naval staff stating that New York and La Plata were to arrange for the dispatch of 20,000 tons, with provisions at New York for 2,000 men for three months. On November 21, as the weather deteriorated with their progress southwards, the squadron put into the anchorage at St Quentin Sound (in neutral Chilean water, though at that stage delicate matters of international law were the least of Spee's worries) where they were replenished from three supply ships with which they made a rendezvous, the Seydlitz, Ramses and Memphis, which helped to solve his problem with a supply of 6,910 tons of coal. They stayed there for five days, during which time Spee suffered further intractable difficulties in trying to estimate the position and strength of the British who might have been sent against him. In fact during this period, on November 23, the German consulate at Valparaiso received a message from the Naval Staff which might have thrown enough light on the situation to relieve Spee of all doubts, if not of all apprehension: 'According to the press, a British squadron consisting of ten ships has been sighted 300 miles from Montevideo. Take all possible steps to warn cruiser squadron. Inform Punta Arenas.' Unfortunately, it appears that the message was never conveyed to Spee, and he remained in ignorance of the powerful fleet that was sailing down the South Atlantic to meet him. Indeed, on the following day, he allowed his realistic pessimism to be tempered slightly, and asked an officer of the collier Amasis to check the truth of a message he had received indicating that the British had abandoned the Falkland Islands altogether. It is hardly likely that the admiral, knowing well the British navy and nation, would have regarded the report with anything but the greatest scepticism. On November 26, the very day, coincidentally, when Sturdee left Abrolhos for the Falklands, Spee put to sea again, and sailed southwards. But that evening a storm began to rise, and for several days the fleet was subjected to the furious vindictiveness of nature that has made that remote corner of the world the most hated region that mariners know. At night the ships were scattered; during the day they tried to come together, not least to keep the colliers in touch. Wave after wave pounded at the ships, sending them tossing off the crest of one into the trough and back on to the crest of the next, washing the invaluable cargo of coal off the decks, and making life impossible
below. It was weather to make even the hardiest of seamen dream of a still life on land, and in the Gneisenau, the terror of the passage showed through even the clipped laconic style affected by diarists, official or private, the world over: Nov 29. Wind 8. Sea 12. Scharnhorst partly not visible as the waves appear to be over 95 feet high. Impossible to lay the tables. Broken-up furniture thrown overboard. All crockery was smashed. In the ship and in the mess there were water leaks everywhere. Impossible to be on deck. Necessary to secure oneself with ropes. We are about off the entrance to the Magellan Straits. Dec 2. Sighted two icebergs, appear to be 155 feet high. At the same time sighted a sailing ship. Leipzig detached to investigate. Weather much improving. Sailing-ship turned out to be English sailing-vessel Drummuir with 2,800 tons of Cardiff coal. Position 30 miles of State n Island. And here, as the weather abated, the crews could take stock
SW
and rest after five days of hardly knowing whether they would survive or not. On December 3, at the eastern end of the Beagle Channel, the squadron dropped anchor close to Picton Island, and there they spent three days, while they coaled from the colliers and also emptied the additional stocks of fuel captured in the Drummuir. The operation thus lopped a further three days off their sailing schedule, and gave the British fleet time to reach the Falkland Islands and settle in the harbour there. On the morning of December 6, shortly before they sailed, the admiral called his captains to a council on board the Scharnhorst to discuss a plan he had conceived. He intended, he told them, to attack the Falkland Islands, destroy the wireless station and the arsenal, and take the governor prisoner as a measure of retaliation for the recent imprisonment and inconsiderate treatment of the German governor of Samoa. There was considerable disagreement among the captains as to the advisability of this course, and some suggested a wide sweep round to the east of the Falklands, and a visit to Port Santa Elena to pick up the latest Intelligence, rather than this foolhardy charge against an unknown enemy. As far as Spee was concerned, however, the enemy was by no means unknown. The crew of a captured British steamer had reported that the harbour was undefended, and the wireless station at Punta Arenas had passed on to Spee this priceless item of Intelligence (which was perfectly true, when the British steamer had left). Spee made his decision. The Falkland Islands were their next target, and with the wholehearted agreement of his Chief-of-Staff Captain Fielitz and of Schonberg of the Niirnberg, he instructed Captain Maerker of the Gneisenau to draw up plans for the attack by his ship and the Nurnberg. They sailed on the final leg of their journey at noon on December 6, and any doubts Spee nurtured of the wisdom of his decision were dispelled that night when the Amasis re-entered the picture and transmitted a message stating that the reports of the British abandonment of the islands were almost certainly true. The Falklands were undefended, and the coal-stocks were intact. Maerker's plan was simple. If the harbour was clear of enemy ships, the Nurnberg was to reconnoitre to the north, and the Gneisenau to lower boats to clear the entrance of mines. The remainder was brief and to the point: 'the Nurnberg will then proceed in as far as Port Stanley in rear of boats, and will embark stores and do destruction. The Gneisenau will follow as far as the channel connecting Port William and Port Stanley. She will anchor there and send armed cutters to the townside under command of Lieutenant Kotthaus, who is to deliver an ultimatum to the governor and try to bring him back to the ship. The cutters will be covered by the Nurnberg. The two ships will rejoin the squadron not later than 1900 hours.' At 0530 hours on December
8, Spee ordered a signal hoisted on his flagship to the Nurnberg and the Gneisenau— 'Detach'. With the land mass of the Falkland Islands to the north, they gathered speed and were soon heading for the start point for their attack off Cape Pembroke. They were due there at 0830 hours, but it soon appeared that they were at least one hour behind schedule, though by that time they could at least make out the target, lie wireless masts on the mainland. Nor was that all. Smoke was seen — obviously the coal stocks being fired on their approach, some officers said. One observer, however, was sceptical. It was from a battle-cruiser, he claimed in astonishment. Then his view t
through binoculars appeared to confirm it. He had seen the tripod masts of a battle-cruiser. He looked again to check, and fancied he saw the masts of a second battle-cruiser, but the smoke- obscured 1
the mast.
They
sailed on, confused.
Hut this was only the start of their confusion, and even at thai early hour it was nothing to the confusion thai their own presence, already spotted, had set raging among the British Meet at anchor and still coaling in Port Stanley.
,
o
£
BATTLE OF TH squadron in Port Stanley, the strategic situation in the South Atlantic was reversed. But the British Commander-in-Chief, Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee, still faced a difficult problem: where was Admiral von Spee? At dawn on December 8 he was informed by a lookout \\
ith the arrival of the British
li was 0735 hours on the morning of Tuesday December 8, 1914, when the lookout on Sapper Hill, the best vantage point in the Falkland Islands, first noticed the smudge of smoke on the horizon which heralded the approach of German warships. No doubt he was desperately pleased that after the fear of waiting through the previous three weeks, during which the islands' population had been defended only by the old battleship Canopus, there now lay at anchor in the two harbours behind him a force of British ships big enough, fast enough and sufficiently powerfully gunned to take on all the naval might that
the Imperial German Navy could conceivably send against them in those waters. Although a Scandinavian, and therefore strictly an impartial neutral, the lookout must surely have felt a certain inner satisBelow: The battle-cruiser HMS Invincible flying Admiral Sturdee s flag off the Falkland Islands
faction as he picked up the telephone to set into action the defence of his temporary
homeland, by reporting to the Canopus: 'A four funnel and a two funnel man-of-war in sight steering northwards.' But as far as the British squadron
was
concerned the Germans could hardly have arrived at a more inconvenient time. Having sailed his ships into the harbour on only the previous day, Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Doveton Sturdee was not planning to put to sea again until that evening, and his ships were in various stages of preparation for what he thought would be an extended chase. The only
under way was the tiny armed merchantman Macedonia, patrolling off vessel
the islands in course of relief by the cruiser Kent. Of the others, the two battlecruisers, Invincible and Inflexible, were in
the early stages of coaling, and in addition having taken on only 400 tons each: both would take some two hours to cast off the colliers and work up steam to leave the harbour. The light cruiser Glasgow had in fact finished coaling, but as she was in the middle of repairing machinery, she also would require at least two hours to raise steam. The month-long voyage from Europe Had also impaired the efficiency of the light cruiser Bristol, and to give the engineers ample opportunity to effect repairs, she had both her engines opened up and would not be fit to sail for some three and a half hours. Of the three armoured cruisers, Cornwall and Kent had not even begun coaling, whereas the Carnarvon, ironically enough, was if anything over-ready. Having finished the necessary fuelling, her decks were covered in stacked coal for an to
FALKLANDS
E
that two German warships had been sighted. Luck as well as careful planning had brought the two great forces together. Admiral Sturdee received the message calmly and only after he had made sure that his men had breakfasted gave the order for 'Action' David Mason extended cruise, and
enemy
action,
dangerous
this, in
could
the event of
prove
extremely
to the ship's personnel.
Nor was the mechanical condition
of the ships the only indication of their state of preparedness. From where the Canopus lay in her mud berth, it was impossible to communicate directly with the flagship Invincible, coaling in the outer Port William harbour, and the officers on the Canopus therefore passed the message on to the Glasgow, which was conveniently placed in visual contact with both the Invincible and the Canopus. But the Glasgow's signalling lamp was either not noticed or not read through the cloud of coal dust rising from the Invincible, and for five minutes there was no acknowledge-
ment. Five minutes was long enough for the
German
ships, sailing at their best
speed, to be two miles closer to the base than when first spotted. Finally it was the captain of the Glasgow, John Luce, who applied his wits to the problem and ordered
a gun to be fired. The report of the Glasgow's 3-pounder attracted attention on the Invincible and the flag lieutenant raced down to the admiral's cabin. It was already 0800 hours.
Various minor legends have grown up around the situation in that cabin — that Sturdee was in his bath; or shaving; or still in his pyjamas; that he remarked with a calm imperturbability in the true Drake tradition 'Then send the men to breakfast'. In fact, this order carried less of the aristocratic disdain of imminent danger than is at first apparent. For excepting the stokers and engineers, who were concerned in raising steam, the crew were
better employed in filling their stomachs in getting to battle stations too early and sitting around becoming progressively more tense while waiting for the action to start. At any rate, all ships were ordered to prepare to weigh anchor, and at 0830 hours the order 'Action' was at last given.
than
Inevitable confusion
was a pity, for the Germans that they could not know, or did not guess, the true state of readiness of the British squadron. With gunnery of the high standard displayed at the Battle of Coronel, and with a measure of determination, Spee's best course might well have been to attack before the enemy ships could gain room to manoeuvre on the open sea, cause as much damage as he could in the shortest possible time, and make off, It
leaving the British to sort out the inevitable confusion before they could give chase. But that would be presuming clairvoyaiu'v on the part o\' the Germans. The course they in fact adopted was the natural reaction to the situation as they saw it. Shortly after 0800 hours the two ships concerned in the first phase of the attack on the Palklands, the Gneisenau and the Nurnberg, came within sight of land. \ty the far distance, and well out of gunnery range, the crews could see the tall masts of the wireless station. It was a clear, calm morning, with exceptional visibility, and only the slightest rustle of a breeze on the surface of the sea. Soon the long, low promontory of land came into view, stretching out to the east and masking the harbour. Then other, unexpected features appeared. First, from the end of that promontory, near the Cape Pembroke lighthouse, a tall column of smoke rose up, moving from right to left as they approached it, that is from east to west, and in the direction of the harbour. It was 0840 hours. Then from the control top of the Gneisenau 's foremast the
to close with the rest of the fleet, and turned once more to the south-east, away from Cape Pembroke. The Germans were on the run.
Brisk and efficient Within a few more minutes, at 0940 hours, the British ships began to move out of the harbour. The armoured cruiser Kent had already been ordered out to replace the armed merchantman Macedonia, which was in fact the vessel whose smoke the Germans had first noted. The Glasgow, a brisk and efficient light cruiser, was next to leave, and set off in pursuit of Spee's squadron right away, with the task of keeping in touch and reporting back enemy movements, until the more powerful ships had caught up. At 0950 hours the big ships began to leave the harbour, first the Carnarvon, followed by the Inflexible, Invincible and Cornwall in that order. The Macedonia was to remain behind. By 1030
gunnery officer, Lieutenant-Commander Johann Busche, fancied he saw through his binoculars
the
large
A
masts of a
tripod
It must have been a devastating moment. As he peered for confirmation, the masts were obscured by a vast cloud of smoke. Was it the English burning their coal stocks? Or was it, perhaps, the smoke from a ship using oil fuel to work up a head of steam in a hurry? Shortly, the masts became visible again. At ten miles, it was
battle-cruiser.
battle-cruiser!
what they were, but as the moments progressed the evidence began to accumulate, and in Busche's mind the
difficult to tell
truth gradually began to dawn. First there were two masts, then six, then another two. And the biggest of them were very big, tall tripod masts, four of them, and that could only mean two battleships or battlecruisers, either of which would be an
insuperable foe for the German squadron. When Busche transmitted the news down to the bridge, he was told rather impatiently
by
commander, Captain there were no battle-
his
Maerker, that " cruisers nearer than the Mediterranean. Even so, as the Gneisenau and the Niirnberg steamed steadily towards Cape Pembroke, the news that there were warships
in the harbour, as yet unidentified, was tapped out by wireless to Spee in the Scharnhorst, lurking over the horizon. For the moment, Spee did nothing, and for a few still, almost ephemeral minutes the status quo was maintained. It changed suddenly at 0920 hours when the Gneisenau was subjected to the first shot of the day. It landed short, but Maerker wasted no time in turning through 90 degrees to evade the next salvo, and making off to the south-east. In fact the old battleship Canopus had enjoyed the distinction of firing the first shells. Two of its initial salvo of four were practice shells, loaded the night before by a keen gun-crew for a practice shoot planned for 0900 hours that morning, and it wa one of these which ricocheted off the wa r and hit the base of the Gneisenau s funi causing Maerker
change his mind aboi 'he attack. After ten minutes of flight U the south-east,
to
Maerker turned
his
two
Si
s
again on to
a north-easterly course, but er steaming for seven minutes in that rection he received orders from Spee ai 937 hours
528
Above: Vice-Admiral Sturdee. Fisher
was
Sir Frederick Doveton his foremost critic
had threaded its down by Canopus, and all were straining to comply with the exciting signal flown from the Inhours the
last of the line
way through the mines
laid
vincible— 'General Chase'. The pursuit was on. Among the most disappointed men that morning were surely the stokers of the Canopus herself. When the enemy appeared, they had climbed into the rigging of their ship, anticipating a spectacular view of their colleagues annihilating the enemy. And what a sight they were promised. As Englishmen, they surely revelled in the prospect of a quick and convincing victory, before going down to lunch secure in the knowledge that those southern seas were rid for ever of the threat from the East Asiatic Squadron. On paper, their original optimism was fully justified, as an examination of the number, size and strength of ships shows. It is evident that not only were all the British ships able to outpace the German ships so long as the latter stayed together but even if the slower Leipzig were detached the British could still catch and fight the two German armoured cruisers with at least their two battle-cruisers and the light cruiser Glasgow, while the re-
mainder dealt with the Leipzig. In whatever permutation Spee combined or detached his ships, the British still had ample strength and speed to overwhelm him. Most important, the power of the gunnery was tipped heavily in the Royal Navy's favour. It
was
perhaps
superiority of numbers
overwhelming and armament that
this
dissuaded Sturdee from being hasty. For a time, he pressed on at 26 knots, and rapidly gained on the Germans, who had by this time joined forces again and were steaming due east, but between 1048 and 1115 hours he ordered two reductions of speed, to give his slower ships time to catch
up and to clear the cloud of smoke that hampered his gunnery controller's vision. By now the Germans had been able to evaluate the strength of their pursuers, and see and confirm that these were battlecruisers, stronger and faster by far than their own vessels. If they were to have any chance of escape that day, it would be into the mists and fogs and storm haze that appear so frequently and with so little warning in that corner of the South Atlantic. Already nearly three hours had passed since they first realised that they were opposed. At the moment the skies were still clear and visibility was good — damnably good: but how long would that last? If the normal course of a day's weather were a true guide, their chances of escaping to safety increased with every minute in which the British stayed out of gunnery range. At 1122 hours Spee decided that he had gone for long enough to the east, turned a few points to starboard, and steamed off to the south-east. The British followed suit, and both squadrons were again on parallel course. Another hour passed, during which Sturdee, held back to 18 knots by the speed of his slower ships, failed to gain on the Germans. At last, however, with half the day gone, and half a day gained by the Germans in their effort to play for time, Sturdee reverted to his former policy, to the relief of his fellow officers, and ordered the two battle-cruisers to put on speed to 26 knots. For the time being, they would have to work without the armoured cruisers Carnarvon, Kent and Cornwall, but they still had the little light cruiser Glasgow three miles ahead.
A
tactical advantage Shortly after 1230 hours Spee made another turn slightly to starboard, and further to the south, and as the two fleets veered more and more in the direction of the wind, it became more and more depressingly apparent to the British that Spee was building up a tactical advantage, as the breeze blew the smoke from the British vessels downwind directly in front of their bows, and promised to obscure their vision for sighting and spotting when the gunnery duel eventually began. Was Sturdee being outwitted, his overwhelming despite superiority of strength and speed? The gunnery duel in fact began at 1250 hours, when Sturdee ordered his ships to engage the enemy and the Inflexible fired off her first pair of shots. The distance was still some 16,000 to 16,500 yards, or over nine miles, and within range of 12inch guns of the mighty battle-cruisers, although they had never before fired at more than 12,000 yards. The shells fell short. The Invincible then joined in but her shots also fell short, at least of the
J
J K Above: A German naval rating, wearing the traditional winter uniform of the First World War. The sailors of the Gneisenau and the Scharnhorst were the foremost gunnery experts of the German Navy
Above: A
British naval rating, wearing familiar bellbottoms. Although his gunnery technique was inferior to that of his German counterpart, the morale of the British sailor was high
529
THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND
British
Main
Maximum Broadside Speed
Armament
Range [yards]
[pounds]
Battle Cruisers
jjiL 1
f&
12"
[j[
4"
[16]
German
Weight [knots]
§
16.400
5350
28
lnflexible73lnvTncibl
^m
ISLANDS
Armoured Cruisers
8.2"
[8]
13.600
25
6"
[6]
11.200
21
6"
[14]
11.200
W
12.000
[6]
11.200
A month
after her defeat at the Battle of Coronel, Britain sought revenge for her lost ships in a major battle off the Falkland Islands in the South Atlantic.
The key shows the superior force Britain sent against the Germans, headed by the two battle-cruisers Invincible and Inflexible and comprising three armoured cruisers and one light cruiser. The Germans had no battle-cruisers; Spee's force was limited to two armoured cruisers and three light cruisers. Lasting for many hours, the battle divided into three stages: the pursuit of the German squadron, beginning at 1 030 hours, and the sinking of the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau; the pursuit and sinking of the Nurnberg; and the pursuit and sinking of the Leipzig. Of the five ships sent against the British, only one, the Dresden, escaped
;
I
900
24
Hi.
5 Cornwall/7 Kent
L "" l 9 Carnarvon
75 " 6"
22
Light Cruisers
""• 11 Glasgow
6"
[2]
H-200
4"
[10]
3.800
325
L illlf. I
4.1" [10] 10.500
155
™
-i»
»
•
-
J ill
Leipzig/ Nurnberg/ Dresden
6 Indicates battle action and broadsides
8
10
The large map takes up the pursuit
of the Gercruisers at noon. Just after 1300 hours, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau part company from the German light cruisers and turn to port, pursued by Invincible, Inflexible and Carnarvon. A broadside action follows, with the British guns making their superiority felt. Just after 1300 hours, Spee in Scharnhorst orders a turn to the south, forcing Sturdee to make a cumbersome turn in pursuit. By 1500 hours, all chances of escape have been abandoned by the Ger-
man
mans. At 1510 hours, Sturdee turns the British ships away to clear their smoke and the forces realign themselves, the Inflexible now exchanging fire with the Scharnhorst which sinks at 1617 hours. The Gneisenau then comes under fire from all three British ships and goes down at 1802 hours. Meanwhile, the Dresden has led away the Nurnberg and Leipzig, but they are quickly pursued by Glasgow, Kent and Cornwall. Just after 1500 hours the second stage in the fighting
commences.
1405 1400
1412
1408 1436
1405
1449'
1527
1435
1340
1333
1550
1500 1448 1600
1453 1300
1557
1315
<] At 1700 hours the Nurnberg opens fire on the Kent, and at 1735 hours her speed drops when two of her boilers burst, leaving her captain no alternative but to turn and fight. At 1802
hours the Nurnberg turns towards the enemy to fire her starboard battery. The Kent then crosses the Nurnberg's and fires a fatal broadside. At 1927 hours the Nurnberg rolls over and sinks
1445 1426
T
1445
<3 At
1832 hours Cornwall and Kent are
exchanging cruiser
fire
still
The light away to pursue the
with the Leipzig.
Glasgow has
fallen
Nurnberg. At 1857 hours the
last
shot
is
1501
/
1445 1502
fired
and the German captain, refusing to surrender, scuttles his ship. The British ships turn away and then return to pick up survivors. At 2123 hours the Leipzig finally sinks
1527
at the Leipzig
1509
< c OT
1510
d)
Q
cruisers. The only vessel endangered by this expenditure of ammunition was the light cruiser Leipzig, limping along at the back o( the German squadron, but she escaped with no more than a splashing. By 1315 hours the shots were beginning to fall more accurately, though still so wide that the crew of the Glasgow, which still had the best view ahead of the battle-cruisers, were thrown into despair over the lamentable inaccuracy of the British gunnery. At 1320 hours Spee took the inevitable decision. Already the light cruisers Dresden. Niirnberg and Leipzig were falling behind, and he faced the choice of either having his squadron attacked by the main part of the British squadron, or of splitting up his ships and allowing them to run on their own. He therefore gave the signal
'Part
company. Try
to escape',
and as the
three light cruisers turned away to starboard the two armoured cruisers turned to port, to close with the approaching enemy on a north-easterly course.
The battle thus divided into two distinct engagements, both weighted heavily in the Royal Navy's favour — the action between the two pairs of battle and armoured cruisers; and the chase of the light cruisers, with Glasgow, Kent and Cornwall chasing the Dresden, Leipzig and Niirnberg. Carnarvon was still some ten miles astern and trying to catch up with the battle-cruisers. When the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turned to port, the Inflexible and Invincible made a similar turn and, from being in line behind the German ships, came on to an almost parallel course. It was the ideal situation for a broadside action, and at about 1330 hours both sides opened up. The range was down to 14,500 yards, the wind blowing almost directly from the British ships to the
German
ships and the
weight of the British broadside almost three times that of the German. Because of their respective positions in the line, when the firing began in earnest,
was matched against the
the Invincible
Gneisenau, the Inflexible against the Scharnhorst. And it soon became obvious
whose gunnery was the
better.
Below: Survivors of the Gneisenau flounder in icy waters off the Falkland Islands. Some were picked up by the Inflexible (in background) and the Carnarvon, but many drowned
*H*
00
M
ft
*&&*m"
m
<**>* -•
It
was
Fisher himself who told the Royal Navy in unforgettable words that 'Gunnery! Gunnery! Gunnery!' would win battles at sea. But it seemed that the Germans had taken the better note of his dictum. Their broadsides were most impressive. With perfect timing, tidy ripples of fire ran along the side of both ships, with brown puffs of cordite smoke circling vivid flashes of flame as each gun fired. Moreover, the aim of the Germans was accurate, and within 15 minutes the Scharnhorst, which had overtaken its sister ship, hit the Invincible. Sturdee's reaction was to turn a couple of points to port, to move to the advantageous position where he was outside the range of the German ships, but still had them in his own range. From here he managed three hits, one on the Scharnhorst and two on the Gneisenau, but no serious damage was done. However, the smoke frqatahis own
i
***' .
-
v*mwllJw2mp^4< *»
*.
guns blinded his view of the enemy, and he was forced, soon after 1400 hours, to turn four points towards the enemy to clear his vision.
when the smoke away on the breeze, it was the German ships had abruptly
Nevertheless,
finally drifted
seen that turned off to the south again, and the range had lengthened to 17,000 yards. Sturdee had been outwitted and had to make another cumbersome turn in pursuit. But again, through superior material rather than superior skill, he began to regain the advantage. His margin of speed brought the range down to 15,000 yards, and at 1448 hours the British were able to fire on the Germans again, without themselves being fired on. It was a situation which Spee could not allow to continue. Rather than prolong the agony, he decided on direct action, and at 1455 hours, as the near misses from the British ships grew ever nearer and began to strike home, he turned hard to p£rt in
an attempt
to cross his
enemy's
1
that his full battery and secondary armament, 5-9-inch guns, could be brought into action while the British were only able to bring their forward turrets to bear. Both sides were scoring hits, and the flash of explosive shell on the British armour punctuated the fountains of spray as other shells fell short, wide of, or over the target. Sturdee responded to Spee's move by turning his own ships to port, which brought the adversaries back on to almost parallel courses, and allowed both to bring their broadsides again into play. Now it was no longer a question of manoeuvre or tactics. By 1500 hours all considerations of escape or chase had been banished. It was a matter entirely of gunnery aneV at the range of only 12,500 yards, strength of armour.
Salvo after salvo For a seemingly endless time, the two pairs of ships fired off salvo after salvo at each other. For almost all the British sailors this was their first experience of battle,
and the continuous thunder of the guns, the scream of the shells, the hiss of water from missed shots, and the fury and blast of explosions around them made the sight a stunning experience. Even for the Germans, who had fought at Coronel, this was first experience of gunfire of this magnitude. For minutes on end the crews raced to wheel the ammunition on the noisy trolleys from magazine to gun position, load the gun, wait while the gunnery officers gave out details of range, elevation and aim, and then the order to fire, then begin the whole racing drill again, exactly as in the 1,000 practice shoots they had
their
carried out, only different, vastly different, this time. This time they were filing for their lives. Then, at the very height of battle, a beautiful, full-rigged sailing ship came into sight on the eastern horizon, and sailed towards the thunder and fire and smoke of the battle. It later transpired that she was a French vessel, which, having
V
#
"» Mr
V
Above: After the left
battle:
members
Europe four months
of Kent's
earlier,
crew pose on her damaged upper deck
remained
ignorance of the outbreak of war. She was soon gone, as the captain in
blissful
hoisted his colours and fled. The battle went on, with hits being scored on all ships, and with the Germans, despite excellent gunnery, suffering far the
worse damage. Their own shells failed to penetrate the British ships' armour, and although they exploded against the superstructure, they did little to impair British gunnery or injure British sailors. The British, by contrast, were using new shells filled with lyddite, an explosive based on picric acid and named after the town of Lydd in Kent where they were first tested
some twenty-five years before this battle. With their terrible explosive effects they penetrated the armour of the German ships and burst in fragments. Splinters of jagged steel wrecked the ships' machinery, and tore into the gentle flesh and brittle bone men. There were many that day who learned that although serving one's country had a great appeal in those patriotic days, there was nothing glamorous about the naval battle itself. Quite simply, in the German ships men were dying. Below decks, fires raged ind water flooded in, and those who had n been killed outright in the explosions w being burned or v bodies without drowned. Everywhere limbs, limbs without dies. All were thrust aside by those w still survived, to be accorded later the ity of being covered with a flag. fter 1500 In the Scharnhorst, soo hours, the fires were gaining unbreakable hold. Her upperworks, mangled of the
534
web
'Try to escape
to
He then made
of twisted steel, bore.no resemblance the designer's intentions; her three funnels were all blown away, and she was developing a list. The Gneisenau was also listing, from the flooding of water through a hole in her side made by an underwater Other hits, from the increasingly hit. accurate British gunnery, caused devastation in the starboard engine room, and smashed one of the boilers, which caused her speed to fall. At about 1510 hours, Sturdee turned the British ships away from the Germans to port, to clear their smoke, and as they came round on to the opposite course Spee ordered his ships correspondingly to turn to starboard, to prevent the British gaining the leeward position. By 1527 hours this manoeuvring had put the ships on approximately south-
westerly courses, again parallel, but now with their opposite broadsides firing, and they had again changed targets, with the Inflexible exchanging fire with the Scharnhorst. Then the Gneisenau became veiled from the British ships by the smoke from the Scharnhorst, and this latter ship had the fire of both battle-cruisers turned on her. Despite this, her crew for long minutes
managed
maintain their rate of firing, until at last, at 1537 hours, they could do no more. It was astonishing that she had been able to keep up the fight for so long. Her upper decks were wrecked, her lower decks an inferno of roaring flame and billowing smoke. to
Decks awash Spee clearly knew that his ship was near its end, and signalled to the Gneisenau
if
your engines are
intact.'
gallant, defiant gesture, turning to starboard to close with the two British ships and attack with torpedoes and to give the Gneisenau a chance to get clear. But he never got within range. With his decks awash, his speed slackening, and his ship listing heavily, Spee bowed out of the battle. The Scharnhorst turned over on her side, her propellers churning helplessly out of the water, and after seven minutes sank with the admiral on board. his
last
The Gneisenau now came under
fire
from
both British ships, and with her speed reduced to 16 knots had no chance of obeying the admiral's order to escape. Maerker, like his admiral, prepared for a fighting end, and ordered several of his engine-room personnel to help man the guns. They would certainly not be needed at their usual posts, since the starboard engine room, one boiler room and one
dynamo room were wrecked and
filling
with water. British gunnery was improving all the time, and the situation below deck on the Gneisenau deteriorating as it did
As shell after shell struck home, fires broke out, raged, were extinguished, only to start again when the job became too so.
for the fire parties to tackle. The starboard forced draught intake fans were smashed and the pressure cut. The foremost funnel was finally blown away, and a shot fell into the dressing station, where men, who had already been badly wounded and waited for medical attention, were put out of their agony. The guns themselves received hits, and one by one the 8-2-inch
enormous
and then the 5-9-inch casemates, were blown away and their crews killed. This loss of so many guns coincided with a failure in the ammunition service, and the Gneisenau's fire ceased for some minutes. Since she could no longer fly any colours from her twisted masts, the British believed she had surrendered, and held their fire. But the Germans, like the British at Coronel, had no such thoughts. For them proverbial discretion held no appeal over sacrificial valour, and when the ammunition service was restored by the repair of a hoist, the Gneisenau fired off one single, futile shot, and promptly brought down on herself once again a deluge of devastating fire not only from the battle-cruisers, but also from Admiral Stoddart's ship Carnarvon, which had by now caught up with the fighting. The three turrets,
British ships ceased fire once again when the Gneisenau failed to reply further. Gneisenau's reaction was the same — another valiant and futile effort, but this time it became possible to fire when the steering gear jammed and the ship involuntarily turned to starboard, bringing the port guns into operation. Again the British loaded and fired in reply, and within five minutes, at 1720 hours, Gneisenau had come to a complete halt, listing badly, and obviously on the point of sinking. Then astonishingly, as the British crews ceased fire and relaxed to await the end of their shell was found in loaded into the stillturret, and incredibly,
enemy, another single the Gneisenau, functioning fore suicidally, fired
off. It
missed the
Inflexible,
and the crews of all three British ships prepared to open fire again. It was a tribute to the skill of her builders that the Gneisenau still failed to sink, and Captain Maerker refused to allow her to fall into enemy hands. Everybody now prepared to abandon ship, grabbing hammocks, planks of wood, anything that would float. The boats were no use — they had been reduced to a splintered shambles in the explosions. Then two officers went below, and put into effect plans for just such a contingency which had been built into the ship by her designers. Explosive charges were carried between the twin skins of the Gneisenau's hull, and the ship seemed to shudder as they were fired. At 1802 hours the Gneisenau sank, with the sound of three cheers for the. Kaiser to mark her end, and with the crew's patriotic singing growing ever fainter as men drowned or perished in the freezing water.
From
this ship, unlike the Scharnhorst,
several survivors were picked up, including one who shivered in the Carnarvon, sipped hot cocoa, and announced cheerily: T believe I have a cousin in one of the British ships. His name is Stoddart.' Among those who did not survive was one of Admiral von Spee's sons, Heinrich.
The chase begins During the four hours in which the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had fought the British ships on their own, the three German light cruisers had been trying to make their escape, with two British armoured cruisers and a light cruiser in pursuit. When the chase began, the two small squadrons each formed a triangle. The Dresden led the fleeing Germans, followed by the Niirnberg to port and the Leipzig to starboard. Behind them came the Glasgow, with the Kent and Cornwall working
up astern of
her.
From
the
first
it
was
obvious that the Dresden, which had only recently joined the squadron, was in excellent mechanical condition and might well outrun the British fleet. At first the bestplaced British ship, the Glasgow, set off in hot pursuit, and it seemed that the other two pairs would ultimately come to battle. But the two slower German ships were masking the Dresden, and Captain Luce in the Glasgow had to choose his best course. Since he would have to detour widely round the other two to come up with the Dresden, and since it would be well past 1700 hours before he could possibly close, he elected to let her go, and the Dresden sped off towards the southern Antarctic mists. This left the Glasgow in close contact with the German ships. Soon after 1500 hours Luce opened fire on the Leipzig to make her alter course to starboard in order to return the fire and thus lose some of her lead. When the Leipzig found the range, Luce turned away and the Leipzig resumed her southerly course, having lost about one and a half miles. Luce at once closed the range again to repeat the tactic and the Leipzig lost another one and a half miles of her lead. It was these tactics which allowed the Cornwall to catch up and get within range. Meanwhile, although the Glasgow was not damaged, one hit was scored on the Leipzig. It started a fire in the clothes store. At first this had little effect and it was not noticed until it had spread through the compartments below
deck and gained an unbreakable hold. While this fire raged, the two other British ships were gradually catching the Leipzig
and Niirnberg. It would have seemed that the weak link in the British chain was the Kent, an old ship of long service which on paper had not the speed to keep up with the 23 to 24 knots of the German ships. But the crew of the Kent were equal to the unprecedented situation. They had the advantage of a light ship, not having had a chance to coal at the Falkland Islands, and to compensate for their lack of fuel every available piece of wood, from the chaplain's lectern to the decks themselves, was broken up and thrown into the furnaces to keep up the pressure. The result was a strain on the boilers which it seemed impossible for the old machinery to bear, but it did so. By 1617 hours the Kent and Cornwall were within range of the Leipzig and opened fire. The Leipzig was now faced with three separate opponents, but she gained some temporary respite when the Niirnberg turned off to eastwards, and the Kent swung away to follow, while at almost the same time the Glasgow fell away in pursuit of her original tactics. It was obvious now that the fate of the Leipzig would depend on the Cornwall. But the Cornwall' s 6-inch guns were outranged by the Leipzig's 4-1-inch guns, and the Cornwall therefore took the only course open, and moved up to close range, through the hail of accurate rapid fire which the Leipzig could still produce. Ten shells hit the Cornwall, but did no significant damage. Meanwhile, 50 shells had hit the Leipzig and by about 1830 hours the fire had become so strong that the ship became almost unworkable and began to slow down. Almost all her ammunition had gone. Ellerton in the Cornwall kept closing on the Leipzig, firing with his forward guns and then turning away to bring his broad-
side to bear, but thus opening the ran^
—
a manoeuvre he repeated over and over again, while Glasgow hammered away all the time. With these tactics Ellerton kept the range between 7,000 and 10,000 yards. At last the German vessel ceased fire altogether, and the Cornwall flew out the signal 'Am anxious to save life. Do you surrender?' The reply was a final broadside from the Leipzig, whose captain took the same view of surrender as the captain of the Gneisenau had done, and as Cradock had done at Coronel, and as no doubt most other captains would do of those two seafaring nations. Cornwall and Glasgow both therefore opened fire once again, using the devastating lyddite shell, and at such range, with no reply from the Leipzig, the effect was as might be expected. It was summed up by a survivor, who told an officer of the Glasgow, Lloyd Hirst: 'The lyddite would burst in the middle of a group and strip them of arms and legs — men would rush about with exposed bones, crazy from the effects of the shell — each explosion would account for about 40 men.' But the captain still refused the offer of surrender, and instead, like the Gneisenau's captain, scuttled his ship. The underwater torpedo tubes and seacocks were opened, and as the fire continued to ravage the upperworks, and the men began leaping into the sea, the commander, Captain Haun, at last told his crew that anybody who could reach the flag could haul it down. The fire was such that nobody could do so, and because it still flew, the Glasgow and Cornwall opened fire again with lyddite, and killed many of the men waiting on deck to go into the sea. The fire, the explosive lyddite, and the shock of the icy water killed almost all the Leipzig's crew. The ship was still floating on her port side when the British boats picked up the last of only 18 survivors, and she eventually sank at 2123 hours.
Luck runs out When the Kent the Niirnberg, was still clear hours a mist drizzle in the ill
turned away in pursuit of at 1615 hours, the weather and visibility good. By 1700
had appeared, there was and it seemed that the
air
weather and obscure conditions that the
Germans had prayed for might save them yet. The Kent was still out of range, so far as her officers could tell without the benefit of accuracy in their range-finding gear, rattling and shaking as the ship bore on at her unaccustomed pace. The Germans had no such disability, and at 1700 hours they opened fire "with their stern 4-1-inch guns, which continued to pour shells, mostly near misses, at the British. The British replied but their shots fell short
and wide, and
for a time it looked as if the Niirnberg would hold them off until the mist, thickening by the minute, saved them altogether. But her luck ran out. At 1735 hours two boilers burst almost simultaneously, and her speed dropped to only 19 knots. Her captain, Schbnberg, had no alternative but to turn and fight, and as the Kent raced up, closing the range to only 6,000 yards and firing her starboard batteries, the Niirnberg replied with all her port guns. For a few minutes, the l\rv was about even, and the Niirnberg almost destroyed the Kent with a single shot. It happened when the Niirnberg scored a hit on a casemate on the Kent, killed several
535
Ik-
men and sent a flash of flame down the ammunition passage, and ignited some empty shell hags It could easily have reached the shell room, in which case the danger to the Niirnberg would have been the tall of debris from what remained o( the Kent. But a Royal Marine sergeant with great presence of mind slammed shut the access door in the hoist to isolate the shell room, and smothered the burning charge with shell bags until a tire party arrived with hoses to extinguish the fire and flood the compartment. Thus the action of one man saved the Kent, hut sealed the fate of the Niirnberg. Shortly after this incident the Kent changed from orthodox shells to lyddite, again with the dreadful results that had decimated the Leipzig. Xiirn berg's top mast, funnels, guns were shot away in turn, and although she poured incessant fire into the Kent for some 20 minutes, at 1802 hours some other course of action was vital if she were to avoid simply being pounded to destruction. The course her captain chose was to turn in towards the enemy to fire his starboard battery — and it was fatal. The result was that the Kent 'crossed the T' of the Niirnberg, and was able to give the ship a full lyddite broadside while the Niirnberg could fire only from its two forward guns which were immediately shot away. greatest
A
short,
macabre ceremony
By 1825 hours the Niirnberg had slowed almost to a halt, and the rest of the battle was startlingly similar to the others that day.
At 1836 hours the Niirnberg could fire no more, and the Kent withdrew to await a surrender. None came, so the Kent, after 15 minutes, opened fire again, and this
German ship hauled down There was the short, macabre, but almost traditional ceremony as the captain fell in with his few remaining men, thanked them for fighting the ship so bravely, and ordered the one serviceable time at last a its colours.
boat to be lowered.
and
It
was not serviceable
sank on reaching the water. The captain remained with his ship, and at 1927 hours the Niirnberg turned on to her starboard side and quietly sank. At this moment the Kent lowered two boats, which searched for survivors until darkness fell at 2100 hours. Perhaps the most after
all,
in fact
bizarre aspect of all the day's fighting came during the search for survivors. With men w allowing about in the water, clinging to spars and hammocks, and any other piece of wood that might offer support in the increasingly choppy and freezing sea, large numbers of albatrosses appeared and swooped down in savage attacks on the survivors. Several men met their end pecked by the bills of these gigantic southern birds of prey. Only 12 men were picked up by the Kent, and of these only seven survived. Spee's elder son, Otto, was one of those killed. The Dresden had escaped: the other four ships concerned in the battle were sunk: there remained only the small supply ships, the Seydlitz, Santr Isabel and Baden. When the time came for he attack on Port Stanley, these three sh, s were ordered to wait off Port Pleasant, l ne 30 miles to the south, and they woi have been entirely safe there but for ti determination and courage of the onl, inhabitant within sight, a Mrs Felton. In ue adventure story tradition, she wej to the r
nearest high ground, and organised her
536
maid and a small boy
into a miniature network. She observed the movements of the ships, and sent the boy off as runner to the maid, who stayed by the telephone and reported Mrs Felton's messages to Port Stanley. When the first message was transmitted to Sturdee, at 1 127 hours, he directed the Bristol and the Macedonia to 'destroy the transports'. By the time the order was received, the Bristol had worked up steam and was racing to join the big ships, but she immediately turned back to assist the Macedonia. The Seydlitz, by far the fastest of the three auxiliaries, made off at the first sign of trouble, but the Baden and Santa Isabel, still observed by Mrs Felton, were too slow to escape and the Bristol was quickly up with them. The Bristol's captain ordered a shot fired across their bows, and both ships surrendered, whereupon the two English ships took off their crews and sank the ships by gunfire, rather stupidly, as it turned out, since they also sank valuable tons of coal and supplies. In mitigation it must be pointed out, however, that the naval battle was still undecided, and the transports were thought to be an invasion force — so Captain Fanshawe, acting on Sturdee's
Intelligence
orders,
had
option.
The
Seydlitz raced off eastwards, but found herself running into the battle area of the bigger ships. She changed course several times, and, sailing in wide evading sweeps, managed to get away. She eventually arrived at San Antonio on December 18, and was interned there. For the British, there was one redeeming feature of her escape; she carried the crew of the captured British supply vessel Drummuir, who were thus spared a possible death by gunfire from their own countrymen. The Dresden itself had a far longer little
extension to her freedom, but this will be described in another article. On December 16 Sturdee had sailed in the Invincible for home waters. Three days later
Inflexible
followed,
and
Admiral
Stoddart resumed command of the area. From the moment news arrived in London giving the details of the battle, arguments began to rage as to the merits of his victory. Lord Fisher himself was one of his greatest detractors, and on December 11 he announced that Sturdee would have to transfer his flag to the old armoured cruiser Carnarvon, send the battle-cruisers home, and stay down there until the Dres-
den had been tracked down. Churchill refused to countenance the idea. On De-
cember 10 Fisher had already warned Churchill against over-enthusiasm: 'let us be self- restrained — not too exultant! — till
we know
details! Perhaps their guns never reached us! It may have been like shooting pheasants: the pheasants not shooting back! Not too much glory for us, only great satisfaction.' When he did hear that the Dresden had got away, Fisher sent a string of telegrams to Sturdee demanding an explanation: 'Report fully reason for the
course which you have followed since the action.' Sturdee ultimately replied: 'I submit that my being called upon in three separate telegrams to give reasons for my subsequent action was unexpected.' But not even Fisher could prevent Sturdee receiving a hero's welcome in London when he arrived home, and King George followed this with the award of a baronetcy, a grant of £10,000, and, after Fisher's death, the rank of Admiral of the Fleet.
How
well had Sturdee fought in the of the Falkland Islands? To his credit, he had sunk four of the five main ships he was sent against, and the German admiral and 2,200 of his men had been
Battle
was a severe blow
to the German cleared for good the threat to British trade in remote waters. Winston Churchill later expounded the implications of Sturdee's victory: 'Within twentyfour hours orders were sent to a score of British ships to return to Home Waters. For the first time we saw ourselves possessed of immense surpluses of ships of certain classes, of trained men and of naval supplies of all kinds, and were in a position to use them to the best advantage.' killed. It
navy, and
it
Sturdee had also achieved his victory with only minimal damage to his ships, and with few losses (six killed, 19 wounded) among his men. The Invincible received 23 hits, but damage was confined to two flooded bunkers, a wrecked piano, and a burst money chest which spread gold sovereigns over a wide area. The Inflexible was hardly touched and the Carnarvon not at all. The Cornwall was hit 18 times, the Glasgow six, and the Kent 37, but no serious damage was done. There was a good reason for this, and one which perhaps mitigated all criticism of Sturdee. The principal charge against him was that he took all day to finish off 80% of a vastly inferior force, and expended nearly 1,000,000 pounds of ammunition, almost emptying his magazines. But he had fought the battle at long range, and had thereby saved casualties. Had he raced in to close quarters he would perhaps have finished the task far more quickly, but the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau would also have been able to fire more effectively. As it was, their shells were fired off at full range and high trajectory, and those that were on target came down on the British ships from a high angle and failed to pierce the armour plating. The upperworks were this was not too serious. Where Sturdee can validly be criticised
damaged, but is
in failing to secure a better position.
Spee constantly succeeded in keeping him to windward, and had the benefit of a clear target, while Sturdee's gun-layers were continually hampered by smoke from their own guns. Sturdee also had two enormous slices of luck on the first morning, when the
The
Germans first was
it not been decisiveness
sailed right into his hands. in being there at all, and had for Fisher's and Churchill's
the Falkland Islands base would have been destroyed while Sturdee was still cruising southwards at his own comfortable pace. The second was that Spee turned away on sighting the British ships in harbour. Sturdee was at that hour of the morning ill-prepared for action, and had Spee pressed home his attack, he might have done inestimable damage. Further Reading Churchill, Sir Winston, The World Crisis
(Four Square)
Volume 1 (Longmans) Hirst, L, Coronet and After (Davies) Hough, R., The Pursuit of Admiral von Spee (Allen & Unwin) Irving, J., Coronet and the Falklands (Philpot) Pitt, B., Revenge at Sea (Tandem Books) Spencer-Cooper, H., The Battle of the Falkland Corbett, Sir Julian, Naval Operations
Islands (Cassell)
[For 296.)
David Mason's biography,
see
page
^
THE AIR WAR In 1914 the tactics of air warfare had not even been thought of, and the pilots of both sides had to learn their lessons the hard way. Even the problem of arming aircraft had not been thought of seriously and many of the ideas on this subject were more eccentric than effective. D. B. Tubbs. Above: An early victim of air fighting. For one aircraft to shoot another down was more the exception than the rule in 1914
When war
brol e out between Britain, France and Germany in August 1914 t' e art and science of air warfare were not merely new. thej ve non-existent It was only 11 years since the Wright brothers' first successful aeroplane flight at Kitty Hawk, and a hare five since Louis Blenofs crossing of the English Channel had destroyed the United Kingdom's island status, although the airships with which both France and Germany had been experimenting since the turn of the century had long been '
capable of making a return trip. Prophets and scaremongers had long foreseen a 'Zeppelin menace' Aeroplanes were taken less seriously. Although there had been many experimenters with heavier-than-air craft it was not until the arrival of Wilbur Wright at Le Mans in 1908 that European sportsmen — for flying was primarily a sport in those days - learned to make and fly properly controllable aeroplanes. The French learned fast, and although their experiments led at first in many directions it was not long before two main types of aeroplane became dominant: the 'tractor' which had a fuselage of more or less modern appearance, with the engine in front of the pilot and driving a propeller in the nose; and the 'pusher', in which the airscrew was mounted behind a bath-like nacelle for pilot and passenger, and the tail was carried on outrigger booms. Both types found a use in warfare; the pusher because pilot and observer, seated in the nose, had an excellent view of the ground, the tractor because its cleaner aerodynamic shape provided a better performance. Types were made in monoplane and biplane form, the former having the advantage of speed and the latter of structural strength.
The French army, although possessing a few airships, at once saw the value of aeroplanes for reconnaissance and built up a sizeable fleet. This frightened the Germans (hitherto secure in their superiority in airships) into emulation, and soon their
machines, both in number and performance, Had overtaken the French. By 1914 the German and Austro-Hungarian empires had many aeroplane factories and two main types had been more or less standardised: monoplanes known, from their back-swept wings and spreading tail, as Tauben (doves) and a biplane series also notable for a back-swept trailing edge k^nown, for this reason,
as
The wing plan in each case was based on the work and Wels in Austria, who had discovered that such a
arrows'.
of Etrich
wing form produced inherent stability, providing a steady platform for aerial observation. The need for rapid manoeuvring in aerial combat had not been foreseen. The Germans had only one 'pusher' type in service, the Otto biplane. They did, however, possess many excellent aero-engines, based on motor-racing engines. The Kaiscrpreis race of 1907 for the Emperor's Cup, and the series of ostensibly sporting trials during 1909, 1910 and 1911 sponsored by Prince Henry, the Kaiser's brother, produced motorcars powered by remarkably efficient engines, made by Mercedes, Benz, Opel and AustroDaimler. Water-cooled engines, on the motorcar principle, were popular because it was realised that a big, powerful engine could support a large airframe, thus fulfilling two of the army's demands: a high ceiling and long range. By the outbreak of war Germany held the altitude record at 27,500 feet, and the endurance record at 24 hours.
French approach was directly German. The French had been the first Europeans to fly, and because at first the problem had been to rise from the ground at all, they evolved relatively flimsy aeroplanes and the lightest possible engines. At the outbreak of war they had only one make of water-cooled engine, the Canton-Unne (Salmson) radial, but they had two kinds of air-cooled engine, based on the now forgotten rotary principle: the Gnome and the Le Rhone. The rotary layout appears so improbable at this range in time that a short explanation is due. The crankshaft was held stationary and the rest of the engine — crank-case and radially disposed In aeronautics, as elsewhere, the
opposed
to the
cylinders — revolved round
The 80 hp Gnome was
it,
carrying the airscrew with them.
and temperamental, but it was the lightest of all for its power, and extremely compact. It was to make possible the first single-seater fighters — although anything frail
so specialised as a fighter lies outside the period of this article. In 1914 all aeroplanes, of whatever type were used primarily for scouting. Britain began late, and in a very small way. The authorities had always adopted a repressive and suspicious attitude to flying,
and, just as motor racing was forbidden on the roads (in sharp contrast with France, Germany and Italy) so pioneer aviators were 'warned off', A. V. Roe being threatened with prosecution if he persisted in trying to fly from Hackney Marshes. Enthusiasts like the Hon C. S. Rolls and J. T. C. Moore-Brabazon learned their flying in France, and until the government-owned Aircraft Factory at Farnborough undertook the design and development of aeroplanes, such few machines as the Royal Flying Corps possessed were French. The Royal Navy, too, took an interest in flying, but the Navy, in contrast to the army, who patronised the Factory, encouraged private constructors such as Avro, Sopwith and Short Brothers. The British authorities had done little to foster the design of indigenous engines, and apart from a Factory copy of the Renault which began to emerge by the end of 1914, most service engines were French. The Belgian air force, too, relied entirely on France for both airframes and engines. Only Russia cast her net wide, to include machines from France, Britain, Germany, Austria and the United States.
Airmen distrusted Aerial reconnaissance flights could, with advantage, have begun before the war. France's Lebaudy airships could have discovered German mobilisation plans and troop concentrations. The air was a new dimension, however, and as events were quickly to show, senior officers on each side proved more ready to believe their own preconceptions than the reports of their aerial observers. It was, however, purely as long-range scouts that aeroplanes were regarded, a means of 'seeing over the hill'. This does not mean that the air arm was universally accepted. Cavalrymen thought it might frighten their horses, gunners resented the need for increased camouflage, soldiers of the old school distrusted airmen on principle and the infantry fired at everything that flew. Nor were airmen regarded as heroes; they were more often suspected of 'dodging the column'. However, in the early months of the war German machines flew 200-mile reconnaissance flights over the French positions daily, bringing back valuable information to corps headquarters, as the Germans, unlike the French and the British, had aircraft
The first
aerial clashes were rarely fought to a conclusion, but they were, the result could be grisly in the extreme
when
*«.
from the start, landing with their messages beside this they were wise; but in their handling of lighterthan-air craft they made serious mistakes in the first few days of the war. They should have kept their Zeppelins for high-level reconnaissance and long-range strategic bombing. Instead they squandered them on low-level missions. Zeppelin L VI was one of at corps level
corps'
HQs. In
bombing Liege VII and L VIII were employed on the tactical mission of surveying the extent of Joffre's counterattack in the Argonne, when aeroplanes would have done the job better. L VII was claimed by French gunners (and also by a French airman, Caporal Finck) on August 16 in the Argonne, and L VIII was mistaken for French and brought down by German troops at Badonvillers on August 23. Similarly a French Lebaudy airship was brought down at Rheims in August, amid great enthusiasm, by French troops. Airship crews may well have prayed 'Heaven preserve us from our friends'. The French air force had been slow to mobilise, but by this time it was in action, having bombed the German airship sheds at Metz on August 14. The British Royal Flying Corps, meanwhile, had arrived at Amiens, and by the 17th its four squadrons were installed alongside General French's HQ at Maubeuge, a dozen miles south-west of Mons. Their aeroplanes were supposedly unarmed. Officially they were regarded purely as scouts, although it was suggested that should enemy aircraft be encountered it might be possible to drop hand-grenades upon them from above, or possible flechettes, pointed steel darts which had been issued for anti-personnel bombing. Nobody took these weapons seriously, although a senior German officer, General von Meyer, was to be fatally wounded by flechettes from a French aeroplane on December 6. Far more effective were the weapons which pilots and observers improvised. Some carried service revolvers, some carbines, some the standard Lee Enfield rifle. Very pistols were also employed, and sporting-guns firing chain-shot. A German aero-: plane flew over Maubeuge on August 22, and amongst the machines unsuccessful in intercepting it was an Henri Farman of 5 Squadron in which Lieutenants L. A. Strange and Penn-Gaskell had rigged a Lewis machine gun on an improvised mounting, the first machine the
first
aerial casualties of the war, lost after
on August
6.
L
,
s
gun in the RFC. The same day the British army suffered its first casualty of the war. when an observer in 2 Squadron, SergeantMajor JillingS, was wounded.
Riddled with bullets 'On the 23rd August,' wrote Major McCudden, VC, who at that tune was an air mechanic, things began to hum.' It was the Hal tic of Mons. Continuous sorties were flown, and aeroplanes returned riddled with bullets, for everyone shot at anything that tlew. friend or foe, and it was not until November, when the RFC adopted tricolour roundels like the French (but with colours reversed), that identification was more certain. It is thought that Bleriots of 3 Squadron brought news of the German attempt to outflank the British army, which made possible the successful retreat from Mons. Infantry fire was the worst danger at this period, although the Germans already had effective 65-mm,
The light-hearted clublike atmosphere which united all ranks in the RFC was notably lacking in the French Aviation Militaire. Aerial reconnaissance was regarded as an Intelligence matter, and observers were therefore staff officers, billeted at army HQ, and having no social contact with the squadrons. Many non-commissioned pilots were used, by France and also by Germany. These were at a disadvantage vis a vis their observers and, indeed, their maintenance crews. It was hard for pilots holding the rank of private to reason with a technical NCO. In some units observers regarded the pilot as a mere chauffeur, and this was especially true in the German air force, as Manfred von Richthofen recorded in his memoirs The Red Air Fighter, indeed, a ludicrous incident took place during the first Battle of Ypres when the officer observer of a German two-seater driven down by the RFC, whose life had been saved by a brilliant forced landing, was seen to belabour his pilot for his
incompetence!
70-mm, 75-mm and 105-mm
anti-aircraft guns on mobile mountings. Allied pilots returning from patrol made an easy mark when flying against the prevailing west wind; the maximum speed of a Farman or Bleriot was barely 65 mph, so that ground speed against the wind could be very low indeed. During the -etreat RFC ground staffs managed every day to keep ahead of the Germans, although pilots sometimes returned to find the aerodrome from which they had taken off hands. Air mechanics flew on with their pilots, servicing engine and aircraft before sleeping under a wing; McCudden and one other fitter kept four machines in the air, using only the tools carried on board. At this time the armament of the singleseater Bleriot Parasol flown by Captain Conran, a pilot of McCudden's squadron, was made up as follows: 16 hand grenades, two shrapnel bombs, each in a rack outside the fuselage, to be throwm by hand, and a 26-pound Melinite bomb (made from a French shell) tied to an upper fuselage longeron, to be dropped by cutting the string. 'Pilots landed,' wrote Maurice Baring,
from patrol in
German
General Henderson's Intelligence officer at RFC HQ, 'with their maps showing long black lines of German troops on every road.' Message-dropping was tried but landing was better. In addition, wireless was being developed and was to prove very useful for directing artillery fire once the lines became stabilised. It was used, sparingly, at the Battle of the Marne but increasingly at that of the Aisne and during the First Battle of Ypres, when the RFC advanced once more to take up permanent quarters at Saint-Omer. Much had been learned during the first three months. Reconnaissance machines, competing with the enemy in the same air space, had to fight for their information, and here the 'pusher' machines had the advantage because the observer had a clear field of fire forward, unmasked by the propeller. Until 1915 neither side developed a means of firing a machine gun forwards through the propeller-disc and aiming the machine as a whole. The nearest they came to it was rigging carbines on a Bristol Scout to fire obliquely forwards at 45 degrees, missing the propeller. This did not make an effective fighter but it was the best the RFC had, as the Bristol, with its 80 hp Gnome, was one of the fastest machines in France, with a maximum speed of over 90 mph. The Vickers FB 5 'Gun Bus', the first ad hoc fighter aeroplane, was not operational before 1915.
The first few weeks did indeed provide a war of movement. Apart from incessant scouting, pilots evolved incendiary bombs made from streamlined petrol tins, 5 Squadron's Lewis Gun was used for effective 'ground strafing', and ordinary hand-grenades caused havoc amongst cavalry. Several German machines were 'driven down' by unarmed combat — that is to say RFC pilots harried them with aggressive tactics until they preferred to land. Economically, too, life was unconventional: Maurice Baring and the CO of 3 Squadron drove to Paris on August 25 to purchase a new Bleriot and Gnome engine; Baring had stayed awake all the previous night guarding a suitcase full of gold. Between August 16 and the final halt at Melun on September 4, the RFC occupied ten separate aerodromes, most of them improvised. Machines were pegged out in the open, and when stormy weather blew up. at Fere-en-Tardenois on the Aisne, after the return northward had begun, McCudden recalls seeing a Bleriot 'absolutely stand v tically on its tail, poise for a second and then ith a resounding crash'. An Henri Farman fall over on its back also blew over, and Squadron had four Farmans completely wrecked. From Fere-er 'denois the RFC moved north, with the
BEF,
what Raleigh, Channe permanent quarters on Oct
their 'natural' at St Omer, where they took up er 12, in time for the First Battle of Ypres, in which the Belgian air force, after escaping the German invaders, played a useful part. to
i
position near the
official historian, calls :rts,
Prying airmen In the French service
all aerial reconnaissance reports were forwarded by army HQs to the Deuxieme Bureau for analysis; this was a clumsy arrangement. Sometimes observers' reports were disbelieved, and sometimes they were simply pigeon-holed. This also happened to a German dispatch reporting the presence of the BEF at Mons; but coups there were in plenty, both tactical and strategic. It was an aerial report that told the size of the German forces massing against Belgium, and which pointed the gap between the armies of Generals von Biilow and Kluck at the Marne. Ground forces, especially the gunners, learned to mislead the prying airman. False tracks were laid and imitation guns put out, with fireworks to add verisimilitude. This confused the other side and gave friendly aircraft an opportunity to plot enemy batteries
when the latter fired on supposed positions. Some excellent bombing was done by the French, as, for example, when the destruction of a railway tunnel at Soissons kept an ammunition train from the front and thus halted a barrage; the same pilot and observer, Roeckel and Chatelain, in the course of ten hours' artillery spotting near Vaubecourt on September 8, silenced half the artillery of the German XVI Corps during the First Battle of the Marne. By the end of the year the French, like the British, were using wireless-equipped aeroplanes, and had inspired the British to follow their lead in aerial photography. Both sides were using observation balloons, and the French had a section of man-carrying kites under Captain Saconney, which made a notable five-hour artillery observation on December 1. It was not until October 5, however, that the French claimed their first victim in aerial combat, an Aviatik biplane brought down by Sergeant Frantz and his mechanic in a Voisin pusher. They used a Hotchkiss mitrailleuse as their offensive weapon. The German air force, meanwhile, found respite from unrelieved corps duties in sporadic propaganda raids. Single aeroplanes overflew the 'Entrenched Camp' of Paris, defended only by a few school aeroplanes and pilots under training. On September 1 a Taube dropped bombs on Montmartre and near the Gare Saint-Lazare, killing four civilians. Next day propaganda leaflets were dropped urging the French to give in. On October 11 two bombs fell on the cathedral of Notre Dame, and next day the target was the Gare du Nord. Paper streamers were also released over Nancy: Nantzig, ville a bientot allemande (Nancy, soon to be German). More effective were French raids during December on Metz, Mulhouse and Freiburg-im-Breisgau. The earliest examples of true 'strategic bombing' were carried out by the Royal Naval Air Service. Regarding the Zeppelin as its most important naval target, the RNAS sent four machines from Antwerp to bomb the airship sheds at Diisseldorf and Cologne on October 8. Balked by thick mist, they returned, and only two tiny Sopwith Tabloid single-seater biplanes with 80 hp Gnomes got out of Antwerp as the city was being evacuated. Squadron Commander Spenser Grey failed to find the Cologne sheds, but bombed the central station instead; Flight Lieutenant Marix did find the Diisseldorf hangar and scored a direct hit, subsequent flames showing that a Zeppelin had been inside. Two other raids were flown by the RNAS. Having convinced the French that Zeppelin's were the Royal Navy's legitimate prey, they were granted permission to operate from Belfort, in the Vosges, only five miles from the German frontier. Their target was the Zeppelin factory at Friedrichshafen, on Lake Constance. Three Avro biplanes took off carrying four 20-pound Melinite bombs apiece, and, flying across the Black Forest and avoiding (in theory) the Swiss town of Schaffhausen, they covered the 125 miles in two hours. Two bombs hit the main hangar, damaging an airship and the gas-generating plant. One pilot was taken prisoner and the other two returned.
540
—
rs
The fourth raid was a seaborne operation. Working closely with Short Brothers, manufacturers of balloons and seaplanes, the RNAS had developed sea-going biplanes with a three-float undercarriage and (in two cases) folding wings, for stowage aboard seaplane-carriers. Escorted by two light cruisers, eight destroyers, and with a further two destroyers and ten submarines in attendance, the three seaplane-carriers, each with three Short biplanes powered by Canton-Unne engines, set sail for Heligoland Bight. The purpose of the raid was to bomb the Zeppelin sheds at Cuxhaven and report if possible on the German warships at Wilhelmshaven, in the Schillig Roads and at the mouth of the Elbe. Seven seaplanes took off after being hoisted overboard, and although the airship sheds were not found, an immensely valuable survey was made of the German naval bases, and bombs were dropped on the dockyard. Three seaplanes returned safely and were hoisted aboard; the other four pilots came down in the sea but were picked up, one by a Dutch trawler, the rest by one of the waiting British submarines. While the Royal Navy was cruising in German waters two Zeppelins and several seaplanes came to investigate. A salvo of 6-inch shells fired at full elevation from a range of 1 1 ,000 yards discouraged the airships, and it was realised that Zeppelins were less of a menace to the Fleet than had been thought. The very same day a Zeppelin raided Nancy, dropping 14 bombs. The date was December 25. arguing that all was not fraternisation on the first Christmas Day of the war. Two solitary German aeroplanes visited England at the same season, one on December 24, the other on December 27. No harm was done. There was no organised air warfare in the Mediterranean between August and December 1914. Austrian aeroplanes and seaplanes, however, made regular reconnaissance flights over Allied shipping blockading the Dalmatian coast. A few bombs were dropped but no damage was done.
Ramshackle equipment Imperial Russia cannot be said to have taken aviation very seriBy 1913 she is said to have purchased about 250 miscellaneous aeroplanes, of which 150 were still optimistically described as modern. They included aircraft of the following makes: Albatros, Aviatik, Bristol, Curtiss, Deperdussin, Farman. Nieuport and Rumpler. To these in 1914 were added a few experimental machines by Sikorsky. Flying schools existed at Moscow, Odessa. Omsk and Tashkent, but when the Russian armies advanced upon East Prussia almost simultaneously with the German invasion of Belgium, she could muster only 72 military pilots, plus a reserve of 36 qualified civilians. Bad roads and overloaded railways made support an almost impossible task. ously.
A German
observation 'sausage balloon' and France
artillery
equipment,
in
its
On
the
flights, as
side aeroplanes made valuable reconnaissance they were doing on the Western Front, and there were
German
casualties. Russian gun-fire brought down a German machine during the Battle of Lemberg on September 5. while on the following day the Germans made the mistake they had already made twice in the West: they employed a Zeppelin on low-level tactical work. Airship L V was brought down and captured, complete with its crew of 30. During the same fighting the Russians lost their most brilliant and picturesque pilot. Nesterov. the first man to loop the loop. This feat Nesterov achieved while the better known Pegoud was still nerving himself for the attempt: he was courtmartialled for hazarding military property and sentenced to the equivalent of a month's confinement to barracks. His death was heroic but unnecessary. Encountering a German aeroplane and having no guns, he deliberately rammed the enemy and brought
some
down in flames. Some Russian units remained operational, for they were bombing German trains at Rava in December 1914. German bombing was quite widely used, and the Austrians made a leaflet raid on
both machines
Belgrade. At the end of 1914 air warfare was
1914
bear
to
*
*
Further Reading Baring, M.. R.F.C. H.Q. (Blackwood 1968) Cole. C McCudden, VC (Kimber 1967) .
R The Air Weapon, 1914-1916 (Harnsburg: Military Service Publishing Company. 1947) L'Aeronautique Pendant la Guerre Mondiale (Paris: De Brunoff, 1919) Lafon, C Les Armees Aenennes Modernes (Pans: Lavauzelle. 1916) Lafon, C La France Ailee en Guerre (Pans: Lavauzelle) McCudden, J T. B Five Years in the RFC (Hamilton 1930) Mortane. J.. Histoire de la Guerre Aenenne (Pans: ("Edition Francaise
Cuneo.
J.
.
.
,
,
lllustree)
Raleigh, Sir Walter. 7he War in the Air Volume I (OUP 1922) Strange. L A Recollections of an Airman (Hamilton) ,
D B. TUBBS was born in London's Chelsea He had his first flight in a Le Rhoneengined Avro 504K as a small boy and has been interested in that sort of flying ever since. His interests are vintage and Edwardian motoring, horology, pistol shooting, antique firearms and wine. His is married and has three small daughters.
launching
I '
.
f
''
the 'experimental'
fruit.
A
.
still at
The initiative in making developments in tactics was still in the hands of the individual pilots. During the bad weather of the winter months there was bound to be a certain slackening of air activity, and not until the spring of 1915 were the lessons of stage.
,:
*""''»
\»Vln>tt
,
f^"-
-'f ...,.,
Vi"i/*33r,
Voisin 13.50 metre
Engine: Salmson water cooled radial, 150 hp. Armament: one Hotch-
machine gun and bombs. Speed: 65 mph at sea kiss
10 lbs of
1
level. Ceiling:
11,480 Duration: 3.5 hours. Span: 48 feet 4% inches. Length: 31 feet3 /4 inches. feet.
1
BleriotXI
Engine: Gnome rotary. 70 hp. Speed: 66 mph at sea level. Duration: 3.5 hours. Span. 33 feet 1 1 inches. Length: 27 feet 10 inches. Weight empty/loaded: 770/1.838 lbs.
Great Britain
Aeroplanes
Airships
and dirigibles
542
T 7
7
7
7
I
I
7 .7
France
I
-i-^.-i-_^-i.-i.-;
;
y
j
7
1
7
Germany
Belgium
Russia 7. .7. 7_ 7
.
!
..T..t
7
7.
J
.
I 7 7
.7
7
7
7
Austria-Hungary
• Rouen
left: The aerial balance of forces at the beginning of the war. In many cases, for example Russia, a seemingly large air force lacked adequate backing and was composed of obsolete aircraft. Left: The movements of the
Far
IM
—— MOVEMENTS OF ROYAL FLYIMG CORPS HQ MOVEMENTS PRIOR TO
1
MILES,
1
25
HOSTILITIES ,50
RFC up
to the
end
of 19 14.
Above: An
improvised high angle mounting for a German machine gun in use as a primitive form of anti-aircraft defence.
543
M BU *
I
A
I The Battle of LimanowaLapanow is today virtually unknown. This is surprising,
armies were decisively on the for
despite the fact that the Austrian battles on the southern sector of the Eastern Front are not among the best known battles of the First World War, this battle is of great importance in the final outcome of the war in this area. At the time of the battle, the Russian
offensive, and little stood in the way of their proposed
advance on Buda-Pest. The
loss
of this city would have taken away half of Austria-Hungary's
The Austrians, however, mounted an ambitious
war
effort.
counterattack in this southern sector and managed to inflict a serious — if not decisive —
reverse on the Russians.
The
u
fighting was severe and somewhat confused, but did succeed in halting the advance of the Russian armies. Norman Stone describes the battle which changed the course of the war on the Eastern Front. Above: Thrown back on the defensive,
the Austrians were at first unable to take the initiative and force the Russians back in the area of Krakow
''
«*
'
'
^
SbHRhB
3fX
A
9
c
A
The battle of Limanowa-Lapanow, which was fought in the early days of December 1914, was one of the few successes won by the Austro-Hungarian army on the Eastern Historians have tended to gloss over this battle, but it was in fact a genuine success for Austria-Hungary. Early in the month, the Russians were in an extremely threatening position: their armies in Poland were still dangerously near the Front.
German border, and were advancing to the gates of Krakow; a group of corps was advancing south of Krakow, expecting the Austro-Hungarian defenders to fall back into Moravia; and a further group, Brusilov's Eighth Army, had penetrated
A
A
Carpathians and was preparing to sweep on to Buda-Pest, which the AustroHungarian general staff was expecting to
the
By the middle of the month, this position had changed: the Russians were thrown back from Krakow use as a bridgehead.
and out
of the Carpathians, their
new
line
running along the River Dunajec and the northern edge of the Carpathians. This
was a considerable defensive victory for Austria-Hungary, and was a tribute to the agility of Conrad von Hotzendorf, the Austro-Hungarian commander, who had not lost his nerve in the crisis at the beginning of the month. The outcome of the fighting in November
SO onM
c
A
had been a surprise to both sides. Conrad, in concert with Ludendorff, had expected to force the Russians to retreat with heavy losses to the Vistula. The two allies had set their armies in motion -the Germans, beginning on November 11, struck south towards Lodz, while the Austro-Hungarians, beginning a week later, moved out of Krakow. The Germans had come within sight of a great success, but were „ held up at Lodz; the Austro-Hungarian § forces were rapidly stopped, and became > involved in heavy but indecisive fighting I as Conrad obstinately sought to make the Russians retreat. He had moved the bulk g of his forces to the front at Krakow, and £ ft
1
^VLZrA
%
'<'X **?
t^+y.
*N
>
v v
>
j
m
*\fi
cl<
^
X **
3L »
had
leftf -Hefence
this
town
m. The reso-
of the line south
weak force, inlhe wollld come in the area,
to a relatively
hope that victory round Krakow before the Russians had time to roll up his line in the south-east. His calculations proved wrong. He had only 11 divisions to hold the front from Krakow along the Carpathians and into the Bukovina- grouped together as Third Army, under Boroevic*-and these were assailed by the Russian Eighth Army, under Brusilov, and pushed almost to the southern edge of the Carpathian chain. There was a still more threatening Russian advance, to the south-east of Krakow. In order to pursue his battle north of Krakow, Conrad had deiibei ately neglected the front south of the city; he had there only a few divisions
v
a*.
hurriedly
.-craped
together.
Against these came a whole Russian Army. Radko-Dimitriev's Third. Conrad's immediate task at the beginning of December was therefore to restore the position south of Krakow, to move his troops to this area and thus to break off
lution he displayed here eventually
him the
On
*„
won
battle.
the Russian side, matters were com-
plicated by the extreme degree of confusion that generally afflicted the staffs of t^ie Tsar's armies. Their commander. Grand Duke Nicholas, remained at v his hea<|quarters in Siedlce, maintaining contact with his men only by means of the Hughes apparatus, a kind of primitive teletyping machine. The effective decisions on operations were made by the two army group
commanders — Ruzsky,
who commanded
North-Western Front, against "the Germans, and Ivanov, who commanded the South-Western Front, against the Austro-Hungarians. Strategic decisions were supposed to be left to the Grand Duke, but in practice the two front commanders behaved independently. The High Command, or Stavka, was in effect merely an institution for distributing supplies, and the whole machinery of command was difficult to maintain. At the end of Novemthe
4
•?
m mJ *J^ifc
i
%
*
%
4 Russian dead. The Austrian attack took the Russians completely by surprise
W0, Stavka was in This Grand Ddke summoned Ruzsky and Ivanov to Siedlce to discuss the situation
in November 29/30, and heard what they had to say. As usual, they disagreed. Ruz&ky had been severely mauled in the course of the fighting at Lodz, and wanted to withdraw his line virtually to the Vistula. His losses had been high, in some divisions nearly 75^; his supply difficulties became greater and greater as
winter set
in;
and he suspected that the
Hermans intended
to attack
him
as soon
#s they received reinforcements.
'The way to Berlin' Ivanov, on the other hand, was confident that he could defeat Austria-Hungary; he ignantly rejected any idea that he lild retreat. He told the Grand Duke at he must leave his armies where they ere, for 'the way to Berlin lies through Austria-Hungary'; besides, the AustroHungarian army was in poor condition — Radko-Dimitriev, commander of Third
Army, had reported
'that
from numerous
indications it appears that the Austrian forces before me are demoralised to a high degree and give no signs of active defence. In the latest battles they gave up thousands of prisoners, who bore witness to the profound moral confusion of their armies.' Ivanov wanted his group to attack, and thus make up for the partial defeat on the North-Western Front. The Grand Duke un willingly agreed to this, and Ivanov prepared to order his armies into action,
expecting to take Krakow. Ninth Army (Lechitsky), with four infantry corps, would advance on Krakow from the north; Third Army, with four infantry corps and strong cavalry, would continue its advance from the east. Brusilov, with Eighth Army (four infantry corps), would send the mass of his forces YI11 Corps (Orlov) and XXIV Corps (Tsurikov) — from the Catpat hums to the west. These plans were made unworkable by the action of the A list ro Inngariau armies. 1
By
the
end of November, Conrad
had
5
1
stopped his offensive north-west and north-
Conrad
Krakow, and swung some of his troops south. He had two armies in Russian Poland— Second (Bbhm-Ermolli) co-opera-
to
east
o\'
ting with the
Germans south-west
of Lodz,
for reinforcements,
which were not
be had.
Conrad had other worries. Above all, he want to lose touch with the Germans, so if he retreated it would have to
did not
and First (Dankl) on its right, with four Strong corps. Around Krakow was Fourth Archduke Josef Ferdinand) enArmy
be towards the western half of the Habsburg Empire, if necessary at the cost of
trusted with the defence of the city, with four corps north-east, east and south-east of the city. On the right o\' this army, with a large gap by the upper Dunajec at Nowy was Boroevic's Third Army, with 11 divisions covering the line of the Carpathians. At the beginning of the month these troops were in terrible danger, for, south oi the River Vistula, the Russian army outnumbered them two to one. In the Carpathians, particularly, this disparity had been disastrous — Boroevic had, in November, been pushed back through the Carpathian passes almost to the Hungarian plain; his army had lost thousands of prisoners, there had been open treason from certain Slav units in IX Corps, and the loss of guns and rifles had been such that, at the end of the year, one of the few Russian munitions factories was put to turning out Austrian cartridges for the captured rifles. Boroevic himself fully expected the Russians to push straight into northern Hungary, past the important towns of Eperjes iPresov) and Ka§sa (Kosice); he appealed constantly to
a stand round Krakow. also seemed desperate.
.
Hungary. He determined therefore to make Here the situation The Russians had been rather dilatory in bringing their superiority to bear east of Krakow, but by the end of November their weight began to
The
four corps of Radko-Dimitriev's to push back the feeble screen of troops east of Krakow, and Radko-Dimitriev announced to Ivanov that he was confident of taking Krakow. Conrad therefore had two tasks: he must defeat the Russians before Krakow, and also save the situation in the Carpathians. He decided to transport a part of his Fourth Army well to the south of Krakow, and, from there, launch an attack on the southern flank of the Russians advancing on the city. The battle that followed began with an Austro-Hungarian success here; then parts of the Russian Carpathian army
tell.
Third
Army began
came west and threatened the AustroHungarian flank; and finally, by the middle of the month, Boroevic in his turn attacked the open Russian flank in the Carpathians. As a result, the Russian armies were forced to retire from the Carpathians and
Krakow front. The fate of the
the »
much by thing
battle was decided as material conditions as by any-
else.
beyond
its
When either side went too far railheads, it could not be easily all manThe Russian armies on
supplied and hence encountered r of difficulties.
uth-western front were supplied from and the Austro-Hungarian Lemberg, armies from Krakow. The more either advanced, the further their supply-lines were extended, and the more they experiAustrian signallers on the northern side of he Carpathians in the winter of 1914
enced trouble with food-supplies and ammunition. Brusilov in November had been able to push Boroevic out of the Carpathians; but once he reached the southern foothills,
his supply-lines
became
so en-
tangled that his troops had to be withdrawn. Moreover, the battle of LimanowaLapanow was fought between exhausted opponents. The Austro-Hungarian Fourth Army had fought hard in the two previous months; as a result, its divisions, instead of comprising 10,000 men each, as they were supposed to, contained 3,000 only, and in some cases only 2,000. Reinforcements were slow in arriving, because the recruits, hurriedly conscripted, had not
been trained. On the Russian side conditions were not much better — Brusilov himself records
memoirs that the Tsarist army had, December 1914, become a kind of militia. Its losses in officers had been high,
in his
by
because of the peculiar devotion displayed by the old officers; and the newly-trained young officers emerging from the officerschools were insufficient in number and inadequate in quality to lead their men
The Russian army was also suffering from a severe crisis of munitions, which set in from the beginning of December. The reserves accumulated before the war had all been used up, the Director of Artillery in Petrograd had, with extraordinary but typical lack of foresight, announced at the outset that all was well. But Russian munitions-production did not go up until the following year. Besides, Russia was effectively cut off from the outside world once winter set in. The Baltic effectively.
and the Black Sea were unusable for the transport of munitions from Allied countries, because they were controlled by the German and Turkish fleets; the ports of the White Sea froze up, and thus could not admit British shipping; and the TransSiberian railway, which could have brought Japanese material to the front, was already overloaded. All in all, the Russian gunners found themselves in the sorry predicament of being rationed to ten rounds a day. Austria-Hungary
still
had
sufficient
re-
serves to meet the crisis, and the Austro-
Hungarian
artillery
somewhat was not
was
superior as a result — though there
much
in
it.
The December
ire therefore
battles in Galicia 1
l§Kgelva clash between two | 1,500,000 | L
under
1,000,000 on the Austro-Hungarian side. By the beginning of the month, the Russians were concentrating for their attack on Krakow. Brusilov in the Carpathians had been ordered to swing two of his corps to the west, and had issued the necessary instructions to his VIII and XXIV Corps to swing towards Nowy Sacz, south-east of Krakow. At the same time, two corps of Radko-Dimitriev's army advanced direct on Krakow; two other corps, XXI and X, went to the north bank of the Vistula, where Ivanov mistakenly supposed the decision would come. North of the river were two other Russian armies, Ninth (Lechitsky), due north of Krakow, and Fourth (Evert), involved in heavy, though indecisive, fighting with other AustroHungarian units north-west of Krakow, on the Silesian border. Both Lechitsky and his Austro-Hungarian opponent, Dankl's First Army, were quite exhausted by the previous month's fighting, and were not capable of taking much part in the action that was to come. The main action on the Austro-Hungarian side had been that of Fourth Army (Archduke Josef Ferdinand), which must prevent Radko-Dimitriev from seizing Krakow. Conrad planned to deliver a sharp blow at the left flank of the Russian Third Army.
Vital
German support
By December
1 his forces were nearly ready. Archduke Josef Ferdinand's XIV Corps, an excellent force recruited largely in the Tyrol, and commanded by a resolute general, Roth, was assembled by rail south of Krakow, at Chabowka and Mszana
Dolna; it was supported by a German force, 47th Reserve Division, under Besser. This force was important, for it contained 12,000 men and heavy artillery, whereas the Austro-Hungarian divisions were all much weaker in men and guns. Fourth Army command had ordered Roth, who took charge of the whole group, to advance from his area of concentration south of Krakow towards Bochnia, to the northeast; this movement would take RadkoDimitriev's troops — five infantry and three cavalry divisions — in the flank as they advanced over the River Raba towards
Krakow. The front east of Krakow was meanwhile held by XI Corps (Feldmarschalleutnant Ljubicic), and the right flank of Roth's group, which was quite open, was protected by three cavalry divisions, 6th, 10th and 11th Honved (Hungarian
established his German force at Rzegocina, thus moving far into Radko-Dimitriev's flank; the three Austro-Hungarian units also pushed forward towards the Stradomka river and beyond Tymbark. The cavalry divisions moved forward, one of them taking Limanowa, another Rajbrot. The resistance of the Russian IX Corps here was thin, for its flank had been turned. The Russian commander had unaccountably failed to react to this threat, in an embarrassing posiThis progress continued on December 5, though the Russians — operating on interior lines — were able to switch their reserves from the north and thus caused increasing difficulty for Roth's group. Thus Roth's progress was uneven. On the extreme right, Besser met little resistance, and moved easily towards the Kobyla heights, a vital part of the front, north of Limanowa. However, the two divisions of XIV Corps on its left— 3rd and 8th — were held up on the heights north of the Stradomka as increasing Russian strength gathered there. Besides, on their left, 13th Rifle Division, north of Lapanow, came up against the main Russian line and suffered accordingly, taking only with difficulty and at a high cost the heights on the right bank of the Stradomka. In effect, the outcome of the whole battle now depended on whether the offensive force of XIV Corps and 47th Reserve Division could continue the enveloping movement. They could expect no help from the rest of the front of Fourth Army. The two corps east of the Krakow defences — LjubiclCs XI Corps and Kfitek's XVIIwere already pinned down with two, and perhaps more, Russian corps against them. North of Krakow, also belonging to Fourth Army, was Arz' VI Corps; the Russian Ninth Army, opposite it, was absolutely passive, and thus Arz was able to send units south to help Roth when the time came. However, for the moment Roth was on his own, obliged to make the best possible use of his limited resources. He was threatened in effect from two sides. Radko-Dimitriev might be able to bring down from the north two further corps to threaten Roth's front and flank — by December 5, parts of X Corps had in fact been brought across the Vistula for this purpose. Besides this, and more dangerously, the Russian Eighth Army in the Carpathians was in a position to send
and was thereby tion.
Roth's right flank. This, in tried to do — he sent VIII Corps towards Nowy Sacz and
troops effect,
into
was what Brusilov
XXIV
Corps towards Gorlice. Roth was aware of the danger here, but decided to ignore it, hoping to achieve a success in time. He therefore pushed ahead, hoping that the weak cavalry detachments on his right would suffice to hold off Brusilov's troops. Roth pursued this idea up to December 9. By December 6, Radko-Dimitriev had seen the difficulty of his position. He denot to press on with the attack directly on Krakow, but to wait until Brusilov could come to his aid. During the night of December 5/6, therefore, the cided
Russian XI Corps, advancing on Krakow, retreated to the River Raba; the other elements operating against Ljubicic and the inner wing of Roth's group, 13th Rifle Division, withdrew beyond the Stradomka. Meanwhile, IX Corps, opposite the AustroHungarian XIV Corps, was instructed to put up stubborn resistance to enable the withdrawal to take place in good order: and elements of the two corps of Third Army north of the Vistula — X and XXIjoined IX Corps to assist its defence. If Roth had been able to move fast enough, he might have surrounded these troops before they could retire: in practice, as always in this theatre of war, the defenders could move faster than the attackers unless the attackers had a good railway system — which Roth did not have. Roth still tried to break through against the stiffening Russian resistance. On December 6, Ljubicic and the 13th Rifle Division occupied the ground aban-
doned by the Russians and moved over the Stradomka, while Kfitek to the north followed XI Corps to the Raba. But the flanking movement ran into difficulties — 3rd Division, on the right of 13th Rifle Division, reached the river, but neither 8th, on 3rd's right, nor 47th Reserve, on 8th' right, could make any headway: they were pinned down along the road from Leszczyna to Rajbrot, and could not penetrate the Russian front. On the 7th, the pattern was the same — Kfitek and Ljubicic were able to advance, though merely occupying empty territory voluntarily abandoned by the Russians. On Roth's front, however, Russian resistance was powerful: IX Corps now occupied a strong defensive position along the River Stradomka, and was being
territorials).
The first phase of the battle began on December 3, when Roth began his advance, between the towns of Lapanow and Limanowa. He took the town of Dobra, and pushed on towards Tymbark, on the Lososina river, because he required use of the road leading to it. Against him he had only some cavalry brigades, with weak artillery, and he was able to take Tymbark without great difficulty; now he stood across the flank of the Russian IX Corps, and might well be in a position to surround a part of it at Lapanow if things went well. On the 4th, Roth ordered that his force should swing north, to envelop the Russian corps. Roth had, apart from his cavalry, four infantry divisions at this stage, 13th Schiitzen (Rifle) Division adjoining Ljubidic's corps, 3rd and 8th on its right, and, on the extreme right of Roth's group, the strong German division. On the 4th all these units struggled forward. Besser
at last! One ot the bugbears for the Russian torces was the perpetual shortage of ammunition. Here Russians draw some of the meagre ration allowed even at the best of tirnps
Ammunition
549
reinforced— Austro-Hungafian aeroplanes reported a stream of reinforcements crossing the Vistula and passing through Bochnia towards this front. As a result. Roth's attacks failed, although he sent the two divisions ofXTV Corps to help 47th Reserve south ofRajbrot. steadily
¥
Russian plan abandoned Neither side had. at the outset, recognised the importance ol' the move that Roth had made: Roth's initial plan had not been any more ambitious than a simple disorganisation o\' the Russian flank. In practice he had probed a gap between the Russian Third and Eighth Armies, and forced the Russians to abandon their plan of seeking a decision north of the Vistula. They had been obliged to send all available troops to the area south-east of Krakow. By the morning of December 8 these troops were beginning to gather in strength, parts of X and XXI Corps to the front against Roth and the whole of VIII Corps, with three divisions, towards Roth's open flank. Be-
XXIV Corps was preparing to reinforce the front of VIII Corps. All in all, the position of Roth's group was becoming sides.
more dangerous. Roth reacted by strengthening his whole line, and Archduke Josef Ferdinand sent him all the troops he could spare. There was a one-track railway leading south of Krakow, and this was exploited to the full. Troops were sent to strengthen both Roth's front and the all-important flank by Limanowa, where the Russian VIII Corps had begun to exert pressure. Moreover, the advance of the two corps east of Krakow had led to a general shortening of the front, which up till then had formed an angle. In consequence some elements of Ljubicic's corps became free for use elsewhere. Between December 6 and 8, Roth therefore acquired a great deal more weight. VI Corps (Arz) was pulled out of the line north of Krakow, and sent by rail guard the flank of Roth's group at it was joined there by a motley collection of cavalry, territorial units and regular infantry brigades, together with Pilsudski's Polish Legion. Thus, by the morning of December 8, Roth's line had been reorganised, and he was able to renew his offensive, still hoping to turn to
Above
left: The Cossacks formed the
Limanowa;
Radko-Dimitriev's flank along the Stradomka before his own flank was turned near Limanowa by Orlov's VIII Corps. For December 8, Roth ordered his group — from left to right, 30th, 8th, 3rd Infantry Divisions, with 13th Rifle Division in reserve, and a further brigade due to arrive — to advance on the road leading from Muchowka to Bochnia. The right of this group was formed by 47th Reserve Division, which was ordered to prevent any interference from the flank by the Russians. The front of this group ran from north of Lapanow to north of Rajbrot, where 47th Reserve Division was to hold on, while the various units making up Arz' group arrived north and south of Limanowa.
On December
8,
greater part of Russia's effective cavalry forces. Born horsemen, they were formidable adver-
They were renowned rifle shots,
saries.
into
their
they
(Dankl)
charged with their sabres. Tough, hardy men, they were capable of living off the country.
The uniform was based on the traditional Cossack clothing. Right: A soldier of the German Landsturm. (Josef
These third line troops were in the process of being re-equipped, so it is virtually impossible to describe a standard uniform. Nearly all photographic evidence indicates that they
wore a mixture of old and new equipment. The shako is similar to
Roth won some successes
along the Stradomka, and forced the Russian IX Corps to retreat well beyond Lapanow, but there was not now any chance of seriously outflanking the ussians here. The great danger to the \ustro-Hunalong the garian army came from the e River Dunajec. Two division, of Orlov's pushing corps had now arrived, and we, along the valley of the Lososina towards
came own when
but really FIRST
the Jager one, but taller and with the
AUSTRIANS XIV 47 4 R
RUSSIANS
61Q 11,C
LOW GROUND
Honved
*
,
30
Miles
THIRD, (Bo roe vie)
Kms.
40
550
'JM-
.»»>'
Landsturm badge on its The battle of Limanowa-Lapanow. This battle ended Russia's hopes of knocking Austria out of the war front. Left:
—
s. *
Rajbrot; a further division of this corps
reasonable speed, perhaps something posi-
had advanced from Nowy Sacz along the valley of the Poprad. Worse still, from
tive
Roth's point of view, the Russian XXIV Corps (Tsurikov) had reached the town of Gromnik, on the River Biala, and was thus only two days' march away from Roth's front. Nearly five corps had massed, and were almost ready to intervene in the
most dangerous direction. The position of
German division was very important; had to hold the flank of Roth's group, and was unfavourably placed to fulfil this
the it
— east of it lay the On December 9,
vital heights of Besser and some Austro-Hungarian brigades were able to take these heights after persistent attacks. Elsewhere, however, Roth's group made
role
Kobyla.
headway.
little
On December
10 there was a general
and this day was regarded by Conrad von Hdtzendorf as one of the most testing he had to pass through. Apart from the threat in the east, he now had to contend with the increasing strength of the Russian front against Roth. Early in the day, two Russian divisions attacked the position of 3rd Division on the Stradomka, crisis,
division was thrown back on in confusion, losing hundreds of prisoners. The line could be reformed only by using all available reserves, and by using the remaining stocks of munitions. At all events, Roth was now unable to con-
and
this
Lapanow
tinue his attack. On his right, the Russian pressure mounted, Brusilov ordering his subordinates to 'exert all possible strength in order to seize during this day the road from Rzegocina to Limanowa'. All along this part of the front, from the Kobyla heights in the north to Rzegocina in the south, the various troops under Arz had to sustain furious attacks.
The tables turned The measures taken a few days before, however, began to take effect. Arz now had a substantial force under him, four infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions; and the Austro-Hungarian position at Limanowa could hold out. Besides this, Arz sent two of his cavalry divisions and one infantry division further south, due west of Nowy Sacz, under Feldmarschalleutnant Hadfy, with orders to attack the open southern flank of the Russian VIII Corps. The position of the battle was now reversed: against the former attacking force under Roth, Radko-Dimitriev had mustered enough strength to prevent it from advancing; and on the right of this
towards Limanowa and Nowy Sacz, where the Russians had been in a commanding position, the situation had now turned to the advantage of the AustroHungarian forces. Despite the disaster of the 10th at Lapanow, the Austro-Hungarian position was thus relatively secure. There remained the possibility that the force,
other Russian corps in the vicinity, Tsurikov's, would intervene against Besser's division. To prevent this, Roth — who was now in command of the whole front south of Krakow — could do nothing. He therefore expected the Austro-Hungarian Third Army, in the Carpathians, to undertake an offensive through the mountains to help him. In particular, he wanted the three £ divisions on the left of this army to ad< vance towards Nowy Sacz and into the £ flank of VIII Corps. If Boroevic had been ' able to push through the mountains with
might have been achieved. However. Third Army was not in any state to fight an important engagement. In November it had suffered considerably; its commander, one of the best generals on the AustroHungarian side, was seriously considering a retreat to Kassa and beyond. He was saved only because Brusilov had to withdraw two corps in order to help RadkoDimitriev: this withdrawal left in the western Carpathians only Lyesh's XII Corps, which Brusilov hoped would contain any counteroffensive from the AustroHungarian side. In effect, Boroevic was quite unable to move until after the first week of December, and thus allowed the two Russian corps to withdraw undisturbed to the west. On December 8 Boroevic sent his divisions forward. Their morale had
improved, as they had received supplies and reinforcements; in particular, they
had received some batteries of mountain artillery, whereas the Russians had almost none. The divisions of Third Army pushed slowly forward, encountering the usual difficulties of mountain warfare — mixed force made for Nowy Sacz under Feldmarschalleutnant Szurmay, while IX Corps advanced on Gorlice, the other corps moving towards the all-important passes — Dukla, Lupkow-Beskids and Uzhok, which they captured without difficulty. The Russian commander, Lyesh, was at his wits' end, and constantly withdrew. He reported: 'The position of XII Corps is steadily worsening, as the Austrians, having superior numbers before each single group, and making full use of their heavy and mountain artillery, combine frontal attacks with deep thrusts into both flanks of each group.' Lyesh suggested that he withdraw to the plain north of the Carpathians, where he could use his field guns to greater effect. Brusilov agreed with this, and authorised a full-scale retreat towards the plains. Thus, when Roth's front was menaced on the 10th, the Russian Eighth Army was in full retreat and incapable of sustaining the pressure of Third Army on Roth. In these circumstances, Szurmay's group was able to reach Nowy Sacz; the Russian XXIV Corps, instead of joining battle against Roth, had to turn to face Szurmay and IX Corps, as it pushed through the mountains towards the Gorlice-Ropa road. Szurmay was in fact held up at Nowy Sacz for a day or two, but the position of the Russian divisions there was made untenable when Hadfy moved forward south of Limanowa. To avoid being trapped, the Russian Ylll Corps was obliged to fall back, abandoning Nowy Sacz on December 12. lvanov at once saw that the whole position could not now be held: Third Army was told to withdraw from its forward positions, and fell back on the Dunajec by the 15th; and Eighth Army, its units reduced by over 70%, was obliged to take up a position along the northern foothills of the Car pathians, ceding the passes to the Austrians. With this, the Russian attempt to knock out Austria-Hungary came to an end. Krakow had been saved, and the Russian invasion of Hungary thwarted. However, the Germans alone could have exploited this success, but their hands were full on the Western Front. The results of the battle therefore remained negative.
[For Further Reading and biography, see page 465.
Norman
Stone's
]
55
THE CHRISTMAS TRUCE Christmas 1914 witnessed a remarkable triumph for civilisation — in many places on both Eastern and Western Fronts, the troops stopped fighting and fraternised. Henry Williamson describes the scene near Ypres. Below: Organised carol singing on the Eastern Front
f&m
W^
m
*f.\
•"V * ^fC*^ * 4
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$tt
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First Battle of Ypres was over. The deluge in the second week of November 1914 decided that. Our battalion of the London Regiment (Territorials) was out at rest, leaving a memory of dead soldiers in fcld grau (field grey) and khaki lying in
The
attitudes between the German and British lines. 'Rest' meant no more fatigues or carrying parties; it meant letters from home, parcels, hazy nights in the estaminets of Hazebrouck with cafe-rhum and weak beer, clouds of smoke and noisy laughter. After 48 hours clear, a daily route march, leading to nowhere and back again, with new faces of the drafts which had come up from the base. The war was now a mere rumour from afar: a low-flashing, dull booming beyond an eastern horizon of flat, still
tree-lined and arable fields gleaming with water in cart-rut and along each furrow. In the first week of December 1914 the King Emperor George V arrived at St Omer in northern France, headquarters of the British Expeditionary Force. Orders
were given immediately
at
all
units to
prepare for a royal inspection. The King in the service uniform of a field-marshal, brown-booted with gold spurs, brown-bearded, prominent pouches under his blue eyes, passed with FieldMarshal Sir John French and various general staff officers down the ranks of silent, staring-ahead, depersonalised faces thinking that the gruff tones in which the King spoke to the commander-in-chief were of that other world infinitely remote from what really happened. Behind the King walked the Prince of Wales, seeming somehow detached from
Unsmiling and wary British
(of
the massive power of red and gold, the big moustaches and faces and belts and boots and spurs all so shining and immaculate between the open ranks of the troops standing rigidly at attention. The slim figure of the Prince, in the uniform of a Grenadier, appeared to be looking for something far beyond the immediate scene — a slight, white-faced boy in the shadow of Father. The next afternoon the platoon sergeant walked from billet to billet, with orders that we were going into the line that evening. A waning moon rode the sky, memento of estaminet nights, moon-silvered cobble stones, colour-washed house-fronts of the Grande Place. The decaying orb was ringed by scudding vapour; a wet wind flapped the edges of rubber groundsheets fastened over packs and shoulders of the marching men. A wind from the south-west brought rain to the brown, the flat, the treelined plain of Flanders. Going back was by now a prospect of stoical acceptance, since marching in the rain absorbed nearly all personal memory, leaving little for coherent thought beyond the moment. We marched along a road lined with poplars towards the familiar hazy pallor thrown on low clouds by the ringed lights around Ypres — called 'Ypriss' by the old sweats who had been out since Mons. As we came nearer, the sky was tremulous with flashes: the night burdened by reverberation of cannon heard with the lisp of rainy wind in the bare branches of trees above our heads.
At were
possible repercussions),
and German troops get together
we halted, and welcome news The company was in reserve. We be billeted for the night in some
last
arrived. to
sheds, and thatched lofts around a farm. Speculation ceased when the platoon commander said that we were taking over part of the line the following evening. The Germans, he said, had attacked down south: the battalion was to remain in brigade reserve. It was a quiet part of the line. There was to be diversionary fire from the trenches, to relieve the pressure. 'Cushy,' we said among ourselves as we entered our cottage, to sleep upon the floor. There was a large stove, radiating heat. Bon for the troops! The damp December dusk of next evening was closing down as No 1 Company approached the dark mass of leafless trees at the edge of a wood. Through the trees lay a novel kind of track, firm but knobbly to the feet, but so welcome after the mud of field. It was like walking on an uneven and wide ladder. Rough rungs. laid close together, were made of little
the preceding
sawn-off branches, nailed to laid trunks of oak trees. As we came near to the greenishwhite German flares, bullets began to crack. The men of the new draft ducked at each overhead crack; but the survivors of the original battalion walked on upright, sometimes muttering, 'Don't get the windup, chum,' as the old sweats had said to them when first they had gone into the line, many weeks before. We came to a cross-ride in the wood, and waited there, while a cock-pheasant crowed as it flew past us. Dimly seen were some bunkers, in which braziers glowed brightly. The sight was homely, and cheering Figures in balaclava woollen helmets stood about.
What's it like, mate?' came the inevitable question. 'Cushy, came the reply, asa trette brightened. These were regulars, the newcomers felt happj again. Braziers, lovely crackling coke Haines' The relief company tiled on down the path, and came to the luminous edge of the wood, beyond which the German parachute 1
flares were oloat' and height, like lilies. The trench was just inside the wood. There was no water in it. thank God! One saw sandbag-dugouts behind the occupants standing r the relief It was indeed cushy! Thus began a period or cycle of eight days tor No Compam two in the front line followed by two days hack in battalion reserve in billets, two in support within the wood and two more again in the front line. It was not unenjoyable: danger was negligible— a whizz-bang arriving now and 1
again — object more of curiosity than of fear— news of someone getting sniped; work in the trench, digging by day, revet-
•
ting the parapet, and fatigues in the wood by night: for the weather remained fine. One trench had a well-made parapet with steel loopholes built in the sandbags, and paved along a length of 50 yards entirely by unopened tins of bully-beef taken from some of the hundreds of boxes lying about in the wood. These boxes had been chucked
4
4
away by former carrying parties, in the days before 'corduroy' paths. The trench had been built by the regulars, now no longer bearded, though some of their toes showed through their boots". It was said that a cigarette end, dropped somewhere along it, was a 'crime' heavily punished.
Water to the waist All form, and shape even, of the carefullymade trenches disappeared under rains falling upon the yellow clay which retained them. One was soaked all day and all night. The weight of a greatcoat was doubled by clay and water. 'We volunteered for
this!'
was an
ironic
comment among
those in water sometimes to the waist. After the rains, mist lay over a country-
which had no soul, with its broken farmhouse roofs, dead cattle in no man's land, its daylight nihilism beyond the side
parapet with never a movement of life, never glimpse of the Alleyman (Allemand — German) — except those who were dead, and lying motionless in varying attitudes of stillness day after day upon the level brown field extending to the yellow subsoil thrown up from the enemy trench, beyond its barbed wire obstacles. At night mist blurred the brightness of the light-balls, the Very lights or flares as they were now generally called. The mists, hanging heavier in the wood, settled to hoar, which rimed trees, corduroy paths, shed and barn; and clarified into keener air in sunlight. Frost formed floating films of ice upon the clay-blue water in shellholes, which tipped when mess-tins were dipped for brewing tea; the daily ration of tea being mixed in sandbags with sugar. It was pleasant in the wood, squatting by a fire. Movement was, however, now upon the paths not yet laid
little stick
laborious
with corduroy by the sappers. Boots became pattened with yellow clay. Still, we said, it might be worse — for memory of the tempest that had fallen on the last day of the battle for Ypres, of the misery of cold
and wet, the dereliction of that time, was still
in the forefront of our
One
afternoon,
minds. towards Christmas,
a
harder field.
frost settled
upon the vacant
By midnight
trees,
battle-
bunkers, paths,
and greatcoat shoulders became stiff, thickly rimed. From some of the new draft came suppressed whimpering sounds. Only those old soldiers who sentries' balaclavas
had scrounged sandbags and straw from Iniskilling Farm at one edge of the wood, and put their boots inside, lay still and sleeping. Lying with unprotected boots outside the open end of a bunker, one endured pain in one's feet until the final agony, when one got up and hobbled outside, seeing bright stars above the treetops. The thing to do was to make a fire, and boil some water in a mess-tin for some Nestle's cafe-au-lait.
There
wore
many
shell-
fractured oak-branches lying about. They were heavy with sap, but no matter. One passed painful hours of sleeplessness in blowing and fanning weak embers amid a hiss of bubbling branch-ends.
The winter agony As soon as I sat still, or stood up to beat my arms like a cabby on a hansom cab, the weak glow of the fire went dull. My eyes smarted with smoke, there was no flame unless I fanned all the time. My arms were heavy in the frozen greatcoat sleeves, mudslabbed and hard as drainpipes; while the skirts of the coat were like boards. I went back to sleep, but pain kept me awake; so I crawled out again and was once more in frozen air, bullets smacking through trees glistening with frost. I was thirsty, but the water-bottle was solid. Later, when it was thawed out over a brazier, it leaked.
being split, but there were many lying about in the wood, with rifles and other equipment. We were issued with shaggy goatskin jerkins. Did it mean that the battalion was intended to be an Officers' Training Corps? That there would be no more attacks until the spring? The jerkins had broad tapes which cross-bound the white and yellow hairy skins against the chest. Officers and men now looked alike, except for the expression of an officer's face, and the fact that one appeared to stand more upright: an effect given, perhaps, by the shoulderhigh thumbsticks of ash many of them walked about with. Senior officers also wore Norwegian type knee-b(Sot>. laced to the knee and then treble-strapped. I thought of asking my father to send me a pair, but a thaw came at the beginning of the third week of December, and the misery of mud returned. And then, with a jump of concealed fear, orders were read out for an attack across no man's land to the German lines. It was two days after the new moon. We were in support. The company lay out on the edge of the wood, shivering and beating hands and feet, in support of a regular battalion of the Rifle Brigade. The objectives were a cottage in no man's land called Sniper's House, and thence forward to a section of the enemy front line that enfiladed our dangerous T-trench. The assault of muttering and tensefaced bearded men took place under a serried rank of bursting red stars of 18pounder shrapnel shells, and supporting
554 I
/.
Armentieres,
German
officers together in
among
the coal-mines and
slags of Artois, across the chalk uplands of Picardy, and the plains of the rivers. The wind of fear rushed on, to die out, expended, beyond the dark forest of the Argonne, beyond the fears of massed men, where snow-field, ravine, torrent and crag ended before the peaks in silence under the constellation of Orion, shaking gem-like above all human hope. It was still freezing hard on Christmas Eve. We had been detailed for what seemed to be a perilous fatigue in no man's land —
Fraternisation was not restricted to the noncommissioned ranks only. British and
no man's land
going out between the lines to knock in posts in a zigzag line towards the German front line. Around the posts wire was to be wound. On this wire, hurdles taken from a shed were to be laid. Then drying tobacco leaves, hung on the hurdles (as the leaves had been in the shed), would give cover from view should it be neces-
an attack, to reinforce the front line. idea, I thought. It would draw machine gun fire. It was about as sensible as the brigade commander's idea for the December 19 attack across no man's land, for some men to carry straw palliasses, to lean against the German wire and enable sary, in
What an
men
to cross over the entanglements. As the knocking-in of posts into frozen ground, that was utterly wrong! And in bright moonlight, 40 yards away from the for
Alleyman!
Stab of fear
gun
floundering
feel
across a root-field in no man's land, with its sad decaying lumps of dead cows and men. Hoarse yells of fear became simulated rage; while short of, into and beyond the British front line dropped shell upon shell to burst with acrid yellow fumes of lyddite from the British Long-toms of the South African war of 1902, with their
was
machine
fire.
worn rifling. The order came
Figures
for the
company
to carry
on the attack. Survivors, coming back through the wood, wet through and covered with mud, uniforms ripped by barbed wire, were stumbling as they passed through us. When they had gone away — away from the line, death behind them — clear baritone voice floated back through the trees, singing Oh, for the wings, for the wings of a dove — far away, far away would I roam. They were wonderful, remarked a sergeant, a rugger-playing Old Blue in peacetime. Yes, because they were going out, I thought; they were euphoric, hurrying to warmth and sleep, sleep, sleep. This local attack failed on the uncut German wire; but Sniper's House was taken. Our colonel, one heard later, had protested against the carrying on of the attack by our company. Later, it was reported in 'Comic Cuts', or Corps Intelligence sheets, that the attack had been ordered to aid the Russians hard pressed on the Eastern Front. We laughed sceptically at that; a beginning of disillusion with 'the well-fed Staff. I had no fear at night, and used to wander about in no man's land by myself, to
some
sort of freedom. sitting down by the when a flare hissed out just
One night I German wire
by my face, it seemed, followed by another, and another, while machine guns opened up with loud directness, accompanied by the cracking air-shear of bullets passing only a few inches, it seemed, above my neck. Then up and down the line arose the swishing stalks of white lights, all from the German lines, by which one knew that they were not going to attack, but feared an assault from our lines. This was remote comfort, as I felt myself to be large and visible, sweating with fear of sorts, while bullets from our lines thudded and whanged away upwards in ricochet. The sky above me appeared to be lit by the beautiful white lilies of the dead, as I thought of them. This was an occasion of that phenomenon known as wind-up. As before a wind, fire swept with bright yellow-red stabs of thorn-flame up the line towards the lightringed salient around Ypres: bullets in flight, hissing, clacking or whining, crossed the lines of the hosts of the unburied dead slowly being absorbed into Flanders field.
The wind
of fear, the nightly wind of the battlefield of Western Europe, from the cold North Sea to the great barrier of the
Alps — a fire travelling faster than any wind, was speckling the ridges above the drained marsh that surrounded Ypres, stabbing in wandering aimless design the darkness on the slopes of the Commines canal, running in thin crenellations upon the plateau of Wytschaete and Messines, sweeping thence down to the plain of
After our platoon commander, a courteous man in his early 20s and fresh from Cambridge, had outlined the plan quietly, he asked for questions. I dared to say that the noise of knocking in posts would be heard. There was silence; then we were told that implicit directions had come from brigade, and must be carried out. We debouched from the wood, and were exposed. After an initial stab of fear, I was not afraid. Everything was so still, so quiet in the line. No flares, no crack of the rifle. No gun firing. Soon we were used to the open moonlight in which all life and movement seemed unreal. Men were fetching and laying down posts, arranging themselves in couples, one to hold, the other to knock. Others prepared to unwind barbed wire previously rolled on staves. I was one who followed the platoon commander and three men to a tarred wooden shed, to fetch
sniper's
hurdles hung with long dry tobacco leaves, which we brought out and laid on the site of the reinforcement fence. And not a shot was fired from the German trench. The unbelievable had soon become the ordinary, so that we talked as we worked, without caution, while the night passed as in a dream. The moon moved down to the treetops behind us. Always, it seemed, had we been moving bodilessly, each with his shadow. After a timeless dream I saw what looked like a large white light on top of a pole put up in the German lines. It was a strange sort of light. It burned almost white, and was absolutely steady. What sort of lantern was it? I did not think much about it; it was part of the strange unreality of the silent night, of the silence of the moon, now turning a brownish yellow, was warm of the silence of the frost mist. with the work, all my body was in glow. not with warmth but with happiness. Suddenly there was a short quick cheer from the German iines—Hoch! Hoch! I
555
Hoch! With others I flinched and crouched, ready to fling myself flat, pass the leather thong of my rifle over my head and aim to tire; but no other sound came from the
German
We stood up. talking about it, in little groups. For other cheers were coming across the black spaces of no man's land. \\ e saw dim figures on the enemy parapet, about more lights; and with amazement saw that a Christmas tree was being set there,
and around
it
Germans were
talk-
ing and laughing together. Hoch! Hoch! Hoch!, followed by cheering. Our platoon commander, who had gone from group to group during the making of the fence, looked at his watch and told us that it was eleven o'clock. One more hour, he said, and then we would go back. 'By Berlin time it is midnight. A Merry Christmas to you all! I say, that's rather fine, isn't it?', for from the German parapet a rich baritone voice had begun to sing a song I remembered from my nurse Minne singing it to me after my evening tub before bed. She had been maid to my German grandmother, one of the Lune family of Hildesheim. Stille Nacht! Heilige Nacht! Tranquil Night! Holy Night! The grave and tender voice rose out of the frozen mist; it was all so strange; it was like being in another world, to which one had come through a nightmare: a world finer than the one I had left behind in England, except for beautiful things like music, and springtime on my bicycle in the country of Kent and Bedfordshire. And back again in the wood it seemed so strange that we had not been fired upon; wonderful that the mud had gone; wonderful to walk easily on the paths; to he dry; to be able to sleep again. The wonder remained in the low golden light of a white-rimed Christmas morning. I could hardly realise it; but my chronic, hopeless longing to be home was gone. The post arrived while I was frying my breakfast bacon, beside a twig fire where stood my canteen full of hot sugary tea. I sat on an unopened 28-lb box of 2-ounce
Capstan tobacco: one of scores thrown down in the wood, with large bright metal containers of army biscuits, of the shape and size and taste of dog biscuits. The tobacco issue per day was reckoned to be 5,000 cigarettes at this time, or 24 lbs of tobacco. This was not the 'issue' ration, but from the many 'Comforts for the Troops' appeals in newspapers, all tobacco being duty free to our benefactors at home. There was a Gift Package to every soldier from the Princess Royal. A brass box
embossed with Princess Mary's profile, containing tobacco and cigarettes. This I
home to my mother, as a souvenir. 'There's bloody hundreds of them out there!' said a kilted soldier to me as I sat there.
decided to send
Face
to face
walked through the tree some splintered and gashed by fragnu its of Jack
I
Johnsons, as we called the Germ 5-9-inch gun, and into no man's land and found myself face to face with living German soldiers, men in grey uniforms and rather knee-boots — a fact which was at the ime ti
me beyond
Moreover the ermans were, some of them, actually smiling
for
belief.
as they talked in English.
556
for Ypres,
the Prussians
lines.
and we'll have peace' Most of them were small men, rather pale of face. Many wore spectacles, and had thin little goatee beards. I did not see one pickelhaube. They were either bareheaded, or had on small grey pork-pie hats, with red bands. Each bore two metal buttons, ringed with white, black and red rather like tiny archery targets: the Imperial
German
colours.
Among these smaller Saxons were tall, sturdy men taking no part in the talking, but regarding the general Scene with detachment. They were red-faced men and their tunics and trousers above the leather knee-boots showed dried mud marks. Some had green cords round a shoulder, and under the shoulder tabs. Looking in the direction of the mass of Germans, I saw, judging by the serried rows of figures standing there, at least three positions or trench lines behind the front trench. They were dug at intervals of about 200 yards. 'It only shows,' said one of our chaps, 'what a lot of men they have, compared to our chaps. We've got only one line, really, the rest are mere scratches.' He said quietly, 'See those green lanyards and tassels on that big fellow's shoulders? They're sniper's cords. They're Prussians. That's what some Saxons told me. They dislike the Prussians. "Kill them all," said one, "and we'll have peace".' 'Yes, my father was always against the Prussians,' I told him. One of the small
Saxons was contentedly standing alone and smoking a new and large meerschaum pipe. He wore spectacles and looked like a comic-paper 'Hun'. The white bowl of the pipe bore the face and high-peaked cap of 'Little Willie' painted on it. The Saxon saw me looking at it and taking pipe from mouth said with quiet satis'Kronprinz! Prdchtiger KerU' faction: before putting back the mouthpiece carefully between his teeth.
Someone told me that Prdchtiger Kerl meant 'Good Chap' or 'Decent Fellow'. Of course, I thought, he is to them as the Prince of Wales is to us.
A mark
of
German
efficiency
during the last phase of the Battle had been made by young volunteers, some arm in arm, singing, with but one rifle to every three. They had been 'flung in' (as the British military term went) after the failure of the Prussian Guard, the elite Corps du Garde, modelled on Napoleon's famous soldiers, to break our line. And here was the surprise: 'You had too many automatische pistolen in your line, Englische friend!' As a fact, we had few if any machine guns left after the battle; the Germans had mistaken their presence for our 'fifteen rounds rapid' fire! Every infantry battalion had been equipped with two machine guns, of the type used in the South African War of 1902; with one exsalient,
'Kill all
I
noted:
two aluminium buttons where we had one brass button on our trousers. Men were digging, to bury stiff corpses. Each feld grau 'stiffy' was covered by a red-blackwhite German flag. When the grave had been filled in an officer read from a prayerbook, while the men in feld grau stood to attention with round grey hats clutched in left hands. I found myself standing to attention, my balaclava in my hand. When the grave was filled, someone wrote, in indelible pencil, these words on the rough cross of ration-box wood: Hier Ruht In Gott Ein Unbekannter Deutscher Held. 'Here rests in God an unknown German hero', I found myself translating: and thinking that it was like the English crosses in the little cemetery in the clearing within the wood. I learned, with surprise, that the German assaults in mass attack through the woods and across the arable fields of the
That was the London Scottish, 14th Battalion of the London Regiment, which had bought, privately before the war, two Vickers guns. These also were lost during the battle. Another illusion of the Germans appeared to be that we had masses of reserve troops behind our front line, most of them in the woods. If only they had known that we had very few reserves, including some of the battalions of an Indian Division, the turbaned soldiers of which suffered greatly from the cold. The truce lasted, in our part of the line (under the Messines Ridge), for several days. On the last day of 1914, one evening, a message came over no man's land, carried by a very polite Saxon corporal. It was that their regimental (equivalent to our brigade, but they had three battalions where we had four) staff officers were going round their line at midnight; and they would have to fire their automatische pistolen, but would aim high, well above our heads. Would we, even so, please keep ception.
the
under cover,
regrettable
'lest
accidents
occur'.
And at 11 o'clock — for they were using Berlin time — we saw the flash of several Spandau machine guns passing well above no man's land. I had taken the addresses of two German soldiers, promising to write to them after the war. And I had, vaguely, a childlike idea that if all those in Germany could know what the soldiers had to suffer, and that both sides believed the same things about the righteousness of the two national causes, it might spread, this truce of Christ on the battlefield, to the minds of all, and give understanding where now there was scorn and hatred. I was still very young. I was under age, having volunteered after the news of the Retreat from Mons had come to us one Sunday in the third week of August 1914. Our colonel had made a speech to the battalion, then in London, declaring that the British Expeditionary Force of the Regular army was very reduced in numbers after the 90-mile retreat which had worn out boots and exhausted so many, and was in dire need of help.
And now
the
New Year had
come, the
was
settling again in little crystals upon posts and on the graves and icy shell holes in no man's land. Once more the light-balls were rising up to hover under frost
little parachutes over no man's land with the blast of machine guns, and the brutal
heavy shells. And upon Flanders while preparations were in hand for
downward droning the field,
rains
of
came, to
the spring offensive.
fall
Germans and Russians pose together on the Eastern Front
•
%*r>
""up-
t
I
Wmm <*0
*i
#^
Above: A German Christmas poster of 1914. Below: A nostalgic reminder of home on the Eastern Front as nurses join Russians and Germans in a Christmas truce. Right: A German infantryman in the winter of 1914/15. The uniform was unchanged from August except that helmet numerals, if retained, were in green rather than red. Officers wore light grey greatcoats and other ranks dark grey. These two shades should not be confused with feld grau. Other comforts, such as knitted gloves and balaclava helmets, had to be supplied by relatives at home
U 558
Above: Princess Mary's Christmas gift to British troops. Below: Highland troops strengthen their barbed wire defences during the Christmas truce. The Germans are only 40 yards away. Left: A Highlander in winter equipment. Arms and equipment were ordinary infantry issue, but in the winter of 1914, Highland units changed from shoes with half gaiters and stockings to boots and half puttees as these were more suitable in the trenches. Most units were also issued with Field Service caps, but the troops preferred balaclava helmets
559
WAR PLANS FOR The beginning of 1915 was marked by a period of retrenchment as the powers licked their wounds and looked for ways of prosecuting the war without
casualties of 1914. New ideas were tried, as Brigadier C. N. Barclay relates, but the
incurring again the vast
available at the time
imagination and
skills to
implement them were not
At the beginning of 1915, all the belligerents had, for the time being, shot their bolts. On both sides there was a feeling of disappointment and frustration. The Germans had failed in their plan for a quick war in the West and, with their badly battered Austrian allies, could see no quick decision on the Eastern Front. The German navy was bottled up in its harbours by a greatly superior British fleet: only in their attacks on Allied and neutral shipping had there been any success. In the Allied camp there was a feeling of relief that the great German war machine had come to a temporary halt, and satisfaction that Austria-Hungary had
In some active formations which were up men, the shortage of rifles permitted only one man in three to be armed, and in many training depots the proportion of rifles to men was as low as
to strength in
one to
officials
and the better informed
members of the public in all countries, it was ac :epted by the end of the year that the wa;- would be a long one. There were, however, few who realised how long it would last, with the possible exception
proved less formidable than might have been expected. Nevertheless, there was depression that a large area of France and almost the whole of Belgium was under
German military occupation. The Russians, following their defeats and heavy losses at the Battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes in the early weeks of the war, had continued to fight stubbornly; but their immense manpower was largely nullified by their lack of essential equipment, the paucity of their communications and the consequent difficulties of supply.
ten.
Among
Above: The
I'miting factor at the beginning of the year — a shortage of trained fighting men. Below: The world situation at the end of 1914, showing the seeds of the new problem posed by positional ratherthan mobile warfare
of Lord Kitchener — who had become Britain's Secretary of State for War soon after the declaration of hostilities and had urged his Cabinet colleagues to prepare for a war of at least three years' duration. The size of the casualty lists had also come as a shock to everyone on both sides. The figures were known only to a few; but they, more than any other factor, indicated the state of exhaustion and alarm which had followed the opening battles. If it was to be a long war, with casualties on the same scale, it would mean the loss of a high proportion of the young manhood of Europe. There were more than 3,500,000 casualties during the first five months of war. A high proportion of these were killed,
Heligoland British battle-cruisers sink
three German cruisers
Aug 29
\«
/Eastern Front
\
Austrian reverses. Russian successes
\ Serbia
Western Front —V^
Austrians pushed over Danube
Trench warfare begins
Turkey
Tsingtao
Caucasian front
Japanese invade
Winter offensive
Mesopotamia British land
and
November
7
Pacific
take Basra
Ocean
German colonies occupied by Australia and Japan
Togo and and Cameroon I
British
A
*
German East Africa
and French invade
British repulsed at I
South West Africa South African forces invade
Germans defeated Coronet German East Asiatic squadron sink
two
British
warships
November
560
1
Falkland Islands Sturdee disperses and defeats
German East December 8
Asiatic squadron
—
L
"^South Africa Rebellion put down
Tanga
hh^b^hhh Still
Britain's
by sea, I
t
_L
*
in all
major hope-the blockade weather conditions
severely wounded and prisoners — who took no further part in the war; it also included the (.ream of the junior leaders. The unexpected development of trench warfare on the Western Front — and a similar trend on the Eastern Front — coupled with the strength conferred on the defence by the machine gun, barbed wire and other devices, had made it apparent that no attack could succeed without massive artillery tire to prepare the way for the infantry assault. All the belligerents were short of guns and shells — particularly Russia. The provision of these, together with the many other items of equipment required in large quantities, created problems never previously experienced. The factories with their machine-tools and trained workers had become as important to the war effort as the armed forces. Without the former the latter could not succeed. In spite of disillusionment, and the gloomy outlook, both sides were convinced of victory in the end. So great was this conviction, and so great the stakes, that no thoughts of abandoning the struggle, or even of making a compromise peace, were entertained at this stage. In the final weeks of 1914 the nations of Europe were licking their wounds and preparing for the campaigns and battles of 1915. With this background information we can examine the plans of the major belligerents for the coming year.
No co-ordination In the opening stages of the First World War no organisation for co-ordinating the various war efforts existed among the Allies. The problem was not an easy one; the British, French and Russians spoke different languages and the first two were separated from the last by several hundred miles of enemy territory. They had different forms of government and different ways of doing things. Wireless communication was in its infancy and there were no long-range aircraft to carry individuals, committees and liaison missions from one country to another in a matter of hours. Such co-ordination as existed was cumbersome in practice and carried out at the higher levels by the peace-time embassies, service ministries and naval and military attaches, with increased establishments, but conforming to the traditional pattern. At lower levels, in the field of military operations, co-ordination was less difficult on the Western Front. Joffre and French met frequently and day-to-day matters were handled by military liaison officers. Military operations in the Western Theatre in 1914 were also greatly simplified by the obvious dominance of the French on land and the British at sea. There was some friction, but it was rarely serious. Among the Russian military commanders, co-operation and liaison were practically non-existent, except in the broadest strategic sense. It must, however, be recorded that in response to French appeals in the early weeks of war, and indeed throughout 1914, the Russians valiantly assumed the offensive even to their own detriment, but to the great benefit of the Western Front where the Germans were compelled to withdraw troops to reinforce their eastern armies. In many ways the Central Powers had a much easier task. They operated on interior lines and were able to communicate easily with each other: moreover the com-
manders spoke the same language and in theory the same military system prevailed in both countries. Germany was very much the senior partner and, within limits, was able to impose her will on her weaker ally. In spite of these apparent advantages there was a great deal of friction between Germany and Austria, mainly because of German exasperation with Austrian inefficiency, particularly the frequent calls for military help when Germany was herself hard pressed on the Western Front and in defending East Prussia. It is true to say that none of the belligerents had foreseen the great part which industry would play, fiance. Germany and to a lesser extent Austria had geared their industries to the requirements of large conscript armies for a short war of movement. In Russia, the supply of men had outrun the capacity of her factories to arm and equip them, a condition which continued for as long as Russia remained a
combatant. Britain's inadequate munitions Of all countries Britain was the most industrialised. Her capacity to build warships was unrivalled; but when war broke out only the government ordnance factories, and seven private armament firms, were capable of producing the weapons and ammunition required by the army. By the end of 1914 the numbers had been vastly increased, but the change from peace to war production, and the organisation to co-ordinate their work, took time to become effective. Moreover, many of the skilled workmen required in the factories had enlisted in the forces in the first rush of patriotic enthusiasm. The shortages of arms, ammunition and other equipment hampered Britain operationally on land, and the training of her New Armies, throughout 1915. The overall picture among the Allies was one of unco-ordinated action. There was no strategic plan for victory and very little pooling of resources, either military or industrial. Each country informed the other of its intentions and sometimes asked for, and received, comment; but few enterprises were planned together from the beginning. It must be said that as a result the year 1915 was a mostly wasted year. Such enterprises as took place were largely
although not labelled as misconceived and most important of all no new ideas, no new failures; others,
failures,
were
methods of warfare, were hatched. The generals fell back on frontal attacks supported by long preliminary bombardments which surrendered surprise, and for which there were insufficient guns and shells to pierce the massive enemy defence systems. If penetration had been achieved neither the means nor the technique to exploit success existed. On the Eastern Front operations remained more fluid than in the West and neither side constructed the elaborate trench systems which developed in France. Russia, with plenty of men, was always short of arms and equipment. Germany and Austria, with less plentiful supplies of
men, were much better off for equipment, and thus able to redress the balance. Owing to the mixing of national forces which existed at the end of 1914, and the lack of an overall strategy by the Allies, the best
1915
is
way
of discussing the plans for
on a geographical basis, in which
it
562
/_
conveniently under four headings:
falls
• The Western Front; • The War at Sea and Combined Operations;
• The Eastern
Front;
•
Other Theatres of Operations (the Middle East, the Near East, and Africa).
To On
liberate French soil the Western Front, General Joffre's
1915 was to free French soil — and whole or part of Belgium — of German troops. As France was the undisputed senior partner on the Western Front at this stage of the war he had a right to expect the whole-hearted support of the British and Belgian armies. His plan to accomplish his aim was an offensive against the two sides of the German salient jutting out into France with its apex some 25 miles west of St Quentin. It was ex-
aim
also
for
the
pected
that
these
attacks,
if
carried
through with success, would so threaten the enemy lines of communication as to force his withdrawal along the whole front. In practice this meant an offensive by French and British troops in Artois in the north from the area between Ypres and Arras, and in the south, in Champagne, a offensive east of Chalons-sur-
French Marne.
easy to criticise this plan in but in 1914 the problem of penetrating a trench system, protected by barbed wire and against resolute German machine gunners, was outside any previous experience. Joffre and French both thought they had the means and a good chance to make a breakthrough, and enough cavalry to exploit success when a hole had been made. They were wrong. Germany's strategic plan, as formulated at the end of 1914, gave first place to the Eastern Front, where East Prussia was still threatened and the Austrians were calling for more help. Nevertheless, some 90 of Germany's 159 divisions were, on average, disposed on the Western Front during 1915. Germany hoped for an early decision against the Russians, or at least It is
retrospect;
a success which would cripple them for some time to come. Until then their efforts in the West were to be confined to limited offensive operations to keep the French and British worried. The Germans, more than any of the combatants, seem to have realised the great weight of artillery fire required for a successful attack in trench warfare, and the difficulties of exploiting success. This was in spite of the fact that they were better provided with guns, particularly heavy guns, and shells than the Allies. It would seem that this appreciation was made as a result of the First Battle of Ypres when the Germans admitted to a loss of 41,000 men in a matter of a few days, against weak British positions. As far as the war at sea and combined operations were concerned, the principal task of the Allied navies — of which tin1
Royal Navy was the predominant partner
— was simple. It was firstly to protect Allied shipping and that of friendly tieu against submarines and armed all parts of the world, but especially in the approaches to Western Europe and in the Mediterranean, and for the Grand Fleet to bring the erman HijJ' Seas Fleet to battle and destroy it. There were, however, other projects inspired mainly by Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty One of these was an advance up the Belgian coast by the
trals
raiders in
563
army with strong naval support, with the object oi seizing the Belgian coast ports at least as far as Zeebrugge, which were being used as bases for German sub-
marines. Tins was favoured by Sir John French, but, after much discussion, it was vetoed by Genera] Joffre, who did not wish the British army to be diverted from cooperation previously described in his strategy oi' forcing a German withdrawal from French territory by attacking the base of the German salient. The plan finally died when most of the additional troops required
were taken
for
another project.
No land flanks had also appreciated that Churchill trench warfare on the Western Front had come to stay, that a deadlock had set in and that it would be impossible to reach a decision there until massive quantities of guns
and ammunition had been
pro-
duced, which would take a long time. As there were no flanks to be attacked on land he sought means by which naval power might be applied to bring the deadlock to an end. The proposals envisaged the use of a number of older warships which were too slow for employment in commerce protection or with the Grand Fleet, but which mounted powerful guns, specially designed ships known as monitors which were impervious to submarine attack, and one or two powerful ships which might be spared from the Grand Fleet. The northern flank in the area of the Baltic was first examined, but soon ruled out as being too hazardous in view of its proximity to German submarine bases and the danger from mines in the narrow waters of the Kattegat. The next project to be examined was to the south and involved entry into the Sea of Marmara and eventually the Black Sea with a view to knocking Turkey out of the war. The proposal had many advantages: in the first instance it might be conducted by fleet action alone and with the co-operation of French warships already in the Mediterranean: it was far removed from Germany's submarine bases and by eliminating Turkey it would relieve all anxiety for the safety of the Suez Canal and the Allies' other interests in the Near and Middle East. If successful it would harden the Balkan States against the Central Powers and might even lead to the establishment of another front to outflank them from the south. The decision was finalised by an urgent request by the Russians to put some pressure on the Turks, in order to get them to withdraw troops from the Caucasus, where the Russians were hard pressed. In this manner the scheme to force the narrows of the Dardanelles was born. The idea was a good one as it was based on obtaining the maximum results by the minimum application of sea power. The Russian fleet, not yet recovered from its losses in the war with Japan in 1904/5, was concentrated in the Gulf of Finland and played no part in Allied naval plans. The German nava plans were simple. They aimed at reducng the Allies' war potential by conducting a submarine and mine-laying campaign igainst the merchant shipping which ca ed their food, raw materials, war mater is and troops. By the same means, and by cutting off isolated detachments and individual warships, they hoped to reduce the strength of the Grand Fleet to a degree v. rich would ;
564
give their High Seas Fleet the chance of a successful fleet action. Against the greatly superior British and French fleets in the Mediterranean, the Austrian navy could make no plans for offensive action, except
by submarine
action.
Inadequate leadership
On
the Eastern Front, following the very
heavy
losses due to their courageous offensive action in East Prussia and against the Austrians and Germans in Poland, the Russians had shot their bolt by the end of 1914. They required a period of rest for reorganisation, to train new officers, among whom casualties had been very heavy, to build up their supply organisation and
rear communications and, above all, to provide their troops with adequate quan-
arms and ammunition. Nevertheless, they posed a serious menace to the Central Powers: they were still a threat to East Prussia and their continued occupa-
tities of
tion of the Carpathians threatened Austria. The Russian plan, at least for the early months of 1915, was to remain on the defensive, pending the arrival of conditions when the offensive could be resumed. On the side of the Central Powers two
plans were proposed for dislodging the Russians from the Carpathians. One was sponsored by Conrad von Hotzendorf, Chief of the Austrian General Staff, and envisaged a break-through on a 25-35-mile front between Gorlice and Tarnow over the foothills, and then to wheel right behind the Russian positions in the Carpathians and cut across their communications. The other plan, advocated by Hindenburg, was to break through from East Prussia in a southeasterly direction across the River Narew. This would enable the Germans to get behind the Russian fortified areas around Warsaw and Ivangorod. It is not difficult to see the reason for Hindenburg's preference for this plan in that it relieved the threat to German territory in East Prussia. It is said that the choice was left to the
Kaiser and that, on Falkenhayn's advice, but without knowing its origin, he chose Conrad's plan, as being the simpler and within the available means. Compared with the other theatres of war, the three areas of contest described above — the Western Front, the War at Sea (including the Dardanelles venture), and the Eastern Front, were the vital issues. At this stage of the war decisive defeat by either side in any one of these three spheres would have almost certainly meant the loss of the war, or at the best an unfavourable patched-up peace. There were, however, other important areas of combat which, although by themselves incapable of producing decisive results, were nevertheless important. The most important of these were the campaigns against the Turks, conducted by the Russians in the Caucasus and the British in the Near and Middle East. The Turkish army was to a very great extent controlled by some 800 attached German officers, acting very often more as executive commanders than advisers which was their nominal assignment. The German plan for the Turkish forces in 1915 was threefold.
• A campaign
against Russia in the Caucasus to secure the Baku oilfields. (This operation had in fact started in November 1914, was extended into 1915 and was part of the plan for that year);
• An
attack Palestine;
on the Suez Canal from
•
Action against the British force in Southern Mesopotamia. Allied plans against the Turks, except for the Dardanelles campaign, were in their first conception defensive — the Russians to protect the Baku oilfields and the British to protect the Suez Canal and the Persian oilfields. But as the last two campaigns developed they became offensive campaigns. The British also planned to finish the campaigns against the German colonies in South, West and East Africa which were still
continuing.
Owing
to the difficulties
of supply and the climate these campaigns, especially that in East Africa where the
German-officered askaris were under command of the resourceful Lieutenant-Colonel von Lettow-Vorbeck, took a long time to complete. None had any vital influence on the war as a whole. It is very easy, more than 50 years after the event, to sit in an armchair and criticise the plans that have been outlined. But before doing so it is as well to reflect on a few points, if a fair judgement is to be made. We must base our criticism on what the individuals being criticised knew at the time, or could reasonably be expected to know; not on what we, with our
much
better facilities,
know
today.
We
must also bear in mind that this war was beyond any previous experience. No statesman had ever directed such vast and complicated affairs; no general or admiral had
commanded such large forces with so much complicated equipment; no indus-
ever
had ever had to convert their peace-time factories at short notice to the production of guns, shells and other war
trialists
material. In these circumstances mistakes were excusable; less so in the case of the Central Powers who had made preparations well in advance; more so with Britain who had never contemplated a large army, and whose industries were not geared to supporting one. Only by considering these matters can a proper assessment be made.
Further Reading Esposito,
War
I
V.,
A Concise
History of World
(New York: Praeger 1964)
Churchill, Sir Winston, The World Crisis
(Four Square)
Edmonds, Sir James, A Short History World War (OUP 1951)
of
I
French, F-M. Viscount, 1914 (Constable 1919) Liddell Hart, Sir Basil, The War in Outline
(London 1936)
BRIGADIER C. N. BARCLAY was commissioned into Tne Cameronians (Scottish Rifles) in May 1915 and served in France and Mesopotamia. He was twice wounded. In 1919 he took part in the Third Afghan War. During the inter-war years he served in China and India and graduated from the Staff College, Camberley. In the Second World War, he comthe Second Battalion of his regiment at Dunkirk and subsequently served as a brigadier in North-West Europe and South-East Asia. He was awarded the DSO in 1940 and the CBE in 1945. On his retirement from the army in 1946 he took up
manded
military writing and became editor of the Army Quarterly (1950-1966) and editor for the army section of Brassey's Annual: The Armed Forces Year Book (1950-1969). He is also the author of a number of books on military subjects
^^
565
Although
The choice example
war there remained a
'silly
in Britain after the outbreak of significant cluster of Socialists. Liberals, and philosophical pacifists unflinchingly committed against
the war. the country, by and large, was united and enthusiastic. F. S. Oliver, a businessman with influential political contacts, reported enthusiastically to his brother in Canada: 'England is already a different place than it has been for years past. 1 had not conceived it possible that a nation could be born again so quickly. The ordinary man's belief is that Germany has made this war to impose a military supremacy over the whole of Western Europe, including Britain, and that it is better to be beaten than to submit.' Unity and enthusiasm were inscribed on one side of the coin. On the other was hatred for the enemy intensified by the spy phobia induced by the torrent of
popular war literature which had poured from the presses in the previous decade. Many people with German names made haste to change them. Sauerkraut and liver sausage in shop-windows were relabelled 'good English viands'. Such changes were not always sufficient to prevent angry mobs attacking certain shops, particularly in the East End of London. Racial hatred was fanned by the popular press, with the Daily Mail giving special prominence to such bold messages as: 'Refuse to be served by an Austrian or German waiter. If your waiter says he is Swiss, ask to see his passport." At the end of October the First Sea Lord, Prince Louis of Battenberg, was forced out of office because of his German origins. In accepting the resignation, Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, described the situation perfectly: 'This is no ordinary war, but a struggle between nations for life and death. It raises passions between nations of the most terrible kind. It effaces the old landmarks and frontiers of our civilization.' The first Aliens Restriction Act was introduced on August 5 and subsequent legislation required that enemy aliens of military age should be interned and others repatriated. From November 28 it was decreed that everyone, British or foreign, must register with the police when moving into hotels or boarding houses. Young men were flocking to the colours, but not fast enough for the old men, often, like the novelist Arnold Bennett, stirred out of the pacifism of a lifetime. 'When one sees young men idling in the lanes on Sunday, one thinks: "Why are they not at
culled from the war's season', however, is the story which began to circulate at the end of August that Russian reinforcements with 'snow on their boots', were passing through Britain on their way to the Western Front. The
rumours were not formally denied till September. 16. Whether they originated from a misunderstood report that a consignment of Russian eggs was on the way, or from the bearded soldier who declared from the window of a train that he came from Ross-shire is immaterial: they emphasise an attitude of mind to be found in the countries now waging war. In France Socialists and trade unionists were even more whole-hearted in swinging behind the war effort than were their counterparts in Great Britain. In prewar days the French government had prepared, in the notorious 'Carnet B' a list of potential left-wing agitators who were to be arrested if war broke out. So strong, however, was the sense of union sacree (sacred unity) that the plan was not proceeded with. Instead Socialists and trade unionists were brought into positions of trust in the Viviani government. While the newspapers bolstered national unity with a great campaign of patriotic bally-hoo, the Parisian crowds showed their hatred of everything German by attacking the shops of the multiple dairy concern, 'Maggi' The very prospect of war seemed to have brought some sort of unity to the Russian Empire. The Union of the Zemstvos (rural councils), which was to play an increasingly important part in organising the home front, was founded on July 30. On August 8 the parallel Union of the Municipalities was founded. One spokesman, with ironic prescience, remarked that: 'The success of the war would not depend on the strength and the organisation of the army alone; it would depend directly upon the efficient organisation of the public forces, on the organisation of the community.' Meantime the opening of hostilities had been greeted with widespread enthusiasm. In the Duma opposition was voiced only by the handful of* left-wing deputies: the Mensheviks, the Bolsheviks and the Trudoviks. At the end of the year the five Bolshevik deputies, who remained obdurate in their opposition, were arrested and exiled to Siberia. For the moment patriotic enthusiasm was triumphant. Children naturally were profoundly affected by prevailing emotions and one mother reported that her small son was building a gallows, 'to hang the all
,
war?" All one's
pacific ideas
have been becoming a militarist.' Nor were women behind in their enthusiasm. T spend my time,' a schoolboy reported to his mother, 'being bandaged and unbandaged by the girls who want to be VADs. If some of them ever
Germans'.
rudely disturbed.
One
In the main Germany joined the other nations in greeting the August days with jubilation and eager expectation, though some contemporary evidence suggests that just below the surface lurked fears that the nightmare of 'encirclement' might now
manage
become
their
rate, there certainly was.
is
to get into a hospital, Heaven help patients.' Before August was out
young women
in Folkestone were handing out white feathers to men still to be found skulking in civilian clothes, and the
custom spread.
Rumours
of atrocities Excitement and enthusiasm for the war bordered on derangement, often with overtly sexual or sadistic overtones. A girl in Dumfriesshire began an atrocity story by forging a letter which purported to describe how her sister, a nurse in Belgium, had had her breasts cut off by the Germans.
566
bitter reality. Social unity, at
any
From August
2 the Burgfrieden (literally, 'fortress truce') came into being. The expression is a medieval one and implied that just as all personal feuds among the defenders in a
beleaguered fortress were suspended till the defeat of the enemy, so now the German employers and trade unions agreed to suspend all labour strife for the duration of the war. By a substantial majority the Socialists decided to ignore their commitment to the anti-war policies of the Socialist International, and to support the voting of war credits. Thus, in accordance with
their strict tradition of party discipline the Socialists voted en bloc for the credits in the Reichstag. As one Socialist deputy, who himself had strong personal reservations about the credits, explained: 'We stand today before the brutal fact of war and the terrible threat of enemy invasion. The decision to be made is not whether to take sides for or against the war but rather on the means necessary for the defence of our country. Our heartiest wishes go out to our brethren, irrespective of party affiliations, who are called to the colours. Much if not all would be lost to our people and its future independence in the event of a victory for Russian despotism.' As in France the general mobilisation plan had called for the arrest of the socialist leaders: as in France there was no need. A preliminary ban on socialist literature in military installations and at railway
stations
was
lifted
on September
2.
'Unprecedented unity' Intellectuals as well as trade unionists and Socialists rallied enthusiastically to the national cause. Max Weber, the great
thought that 'this war with all ghastliness is nevertheless grand and wonderful. It is worth experiencing'. Ninetythree distinguished German intellectuals banded together to issue a justification of the German invasion of Belgium. For the moment there was reality in the Kaiser's emotional utterance of August 4, 'henceforth I know no parties, only Germans'. In December the Chancellor, BethmannHollweg, repeated the sentiment in more elaborate style, referring to 'this wonderful spirit which welds the hearts of the German people into an unprecedented unity'. 'As if by magic,' he continued, 'the barriers have fallen which, through a barren and depressed period, have separated the sectors of the people.' As in other countries there was a rush sociologist, its
to change embarrassing names. The Cafe Piccadilly in Berlin, for instance, became
the Cafe Vaterland. There were the
same
absurd rumours and scares. For example the entirely spurious news that Japan had declared war on Russia was greeted with hysterical cheering. If anything there were more spy-scares in Germany than elsewhere. As one diarist noted sardonically early in August. 'The Gods alone know how many "spies" have been beaten and imprisoned today! The mobilized reserve officers do not get by unmolested. They have in many instances become fat and round during peace-time and perhaps their bad-looking uniforms account for the mistakes in identity. It is commonly believed that spies go around dressed like Prussian officers.' Hatred of the enemy was canalised (not created) by postcards with such slogans as: Jeder Schuss ein Russ (one shot, one Russian); Jeder Stoss ein Fransos (for every blow a Frenchy); Jeder Tritt ein Britt (for every step a Brit); Jeder Klaps ein Japs (for every slap a Jap). And by such songs as Ernst Lissauer's 'Hymn of Hate': 'Hate by water and hate by land; Hate of heart and hate of the hand; We love as one and hate as one; We have but one foe alone — England.'
Emotional
attitudes
were
clear
and
simple in the main national states. But war did not mean quite the same for national minorities forced to fight for their overlords, for Poles, for Czechs, for some of the Irish, for the Danes of Schleswig-
German
casualties
in
early
September 1914 — the German army was
Holstein. The leader of the Danish minority in the Reichstag, Hans Peter Hanssen, described in his diary the reactions of the Danes of Schleswig-Holstein to the mobilisation order of August 1. 'About five o'clock large placards were posted at all street corners: the Kaiser orders the mobilisation of the army! And what no one would have thought possible heretofore — all men between 20 and 45 years of age received orders to assemble under the Prussian colours! People crowded round the placards. I shall never forget the sight — pale, serious men, dully resigned; women dissolved in tears; young couples who, without a thought of those about them, tightly embraced each other; sobbing children — all feeling themselves caught in the inflexible and inevitable grip of fate.'
A stampede
for cash Everywhere in 1914 governments thought of war as a temporary emergency calling for special legislation. The sense of emergency was underlined by the run on the
A school
still
advancing, and the nation was united and enthusiastic for the war
banks which preceded the outbreak of war as Germans, Britons, French and Russians, rushed to lay their hands on solid cash. In London, Bank Rate, which stood at 4 r/t on July 30, had reached 10Vr by August 1. August 3 happened to be the August bank holiday and to take the pressure off the banks the holiday was extended to Thursday, and postal orders were made legal tender. By the Currency and Bank Notes Act of August 6 the Treasury began for the first time to print its own £1 and 10s notes, and the Gold Standard was in effect put into suspension. Over the next few months gold sovereigns steadily disappeared, never to reappear. In Germany the Reichsbank discontinued redemption of notes in gold on July 31, and during the first days of war it became extremely difficult to change large notes as people hoarded the smaller silver coins. Special 'Loan Banks' were established to provide credits for business. French governmental decrees of August 1, 2, 5 and 9 immobilised bank deposits and
east of Brussels serves as a field hospital for the
first
of
France's
wounded during
for the
time being brought
actions to an end.
all credit
The sense
of
trans-
emergency
eased fairly quickly in Britain (the Stock
Exchange remained closed
till
January
1915, thereafter operating under very restricted conditions), and in Germany as it became clear that any fears of direct invasion were unfounded. It lasted longer in France since French territory was in fact invaded. Curiously there was, in most respects, least sense of emergency in Russia since it was believed that her lessdeveloped economic structure would be least disrupted by the emergency of war. On September 2 the French government left Paris for Bordeaux, giving rise to the parody of the Marseillesc: 'Aux gores, citoyens, Montez dans les trains' (to the stations, citizens, Climb into the trains). Or, in a satirical echo of the phrase franctireurs (free shooters) the government were called the franc-fileurs (freeescapers). Only when it was clear that the Western Front had become stabilised (on December 9) did the government return to Paris. Three
the French retreat, August 1914
567
days earlier the Comedie Fran^aise had reopened, though the Opera remained closed nil early 1916. For the rich the gay life soon returned, but to the outsider Pans under blackout presented an unwonted greyness As provided in the Regulation of the Forces \ct of 1871 the British government took over control of the railways the moment war broke out. Potential control of just about everything else was attained by the Defence of the Realm Act of August v Dora' gave the government powers to issue regulations for securing the public ami the defence of the realm". safety France, tor the first months of the war. was virtually ruled by military dictatorship, though the politicians gradually reasserted their influence. General mobilisation in Germany was accompanied by the proclamation, in each of the 24 army corps' districts into which the empire was divided, of the Prussian Law of Siege. The proclamation, followed in traditional style by three trumpet blasts, gave sole responsibility for 'public safety' to the Deputy
Commanding
was in lad denying itself about one-third of its normal revenue. The peasants meantime turned cheerfully to manufacturing their own home brew, so that they now had money in hand with which to buy up scarce food supplies. As a professor reported a year or so later: 'Drunkenness continues, the illicit sale of liquor proceeds undisturbed in the private rooms of luxurious restaurants. The distilleries are unable to satisfy the demand for liquor. Dealers make incredible profits. Chemistry is resorted to in the home to rectify methylated spirit, varnish and eau-de-cologne! Consumption of alcoholicliquor flourishes, especially among the wealthier classes. The State has merely renounced the taxation of alcohol and has not succeeded in suppressing its consumption.' The military authorities in Britain were equally sensitive to the intimate connection between enlistment and heavy drinking and should they seek to avert their eyes there were plenty of nonconformist government
generals in each district.
Propaganda did not, in the first months o\ war. have to be invented by governments as private individuals and groups were only too happy to come forward in justification of their country's cause. But all governments did impose a news censorship, informal but nonetheless very effective in France, more rigid, and in the end least effective, in tiermany. The only official announcement made in Germany about the battle of the Marne, which in fact brought to an end German hopes of a quick knock-out blow in the West was: 'On the Western Front operations regarding which it is not yet possible to publish details have led to a new battle, which is going favourably. All the unfavourable reports being spread by the enemy through various means are false.' A visit to Florence at the end of September enabled the distinguished German economist, Lujo Brentano, to learn the truth about the Marne but in Munich his friends simply treated him as a dupe of the Western Allies. Where government propaganda was necessary was in the more mundane fields of economy, in the purchase of food and extravagance in the purchase of War Bonds. In Britain, furthermore, active promotion of recruitment was necessary. The first 'Your King and Country Need You' appeals appeared on August 7. Towards the end of the year the Parliamentary Recruiting Committee, still very much a do-it-yourself propaganda body, gave commissions for more than a hundred posters, including Alfred Leete's immortal 'Kitchener'.
Home-brewed
liquor Lagging behind in most other respects, Russia did give the lead in one sphere: liquor control. Total prohibition of liquor sales were imposed at the end of July as a temporary measure to cover the period of mobilisation when, it was rightly felt,
the temptation to
down
copious draughts of crude vodka would be more than usually strong. Mystical zealotry and the ingrained autocratic instinct towards social regulation reinforced the desire for military efficiency. By the Imperial Ukase of August 22 prohibition was extended for the entire duration of the war. The results were ironic. Since the sale of liquor had been an extremely profitable state monopoly the
568
A
soldier with no
were reluctant
to
one
to fight 7 Little
be the German'
in
boys war games
zealots to raise the alarm. Defence of the Realm Regulation No 7 of August 12 gave the competent naval or military authority power to require all premises licensed for the sale of intoxicating liquor within or in the neighbourhood of any defended harbour to be closed except during such hours as may be specified'. This was a relatively minor regulation, concerned specifically with soldiers and sailors about to go on board ship. However, as patriotic en-
thusiasm throughout the country developed into what was described by the Brewers' Gazette as 'ribald songs, dancing and quarrelling', the government opened a broader attack on traditional British drinking habits. By the terms of the Intoxicating Liquor (Temporary Restriction) Act of August 31, the Chief Officer of Police in any licensing district, or the licensing justices for any licensing district, acting upon the recommendation of the
Chief Officer of Police, were empowered to impose such restrictions upon the hours of sale of alcohol as might seem desirable for the maintenance of order and the suppression of drunkenness. The Act was to be valid till a month after the end of the war.
Campaign against alcohol By the end
of 1914 nearly one half of the 1,000 licensing authorities in Fngland and Wales had made use of the act to stipulate an opening time of eight or nine am (in place of the five or six am opening time which had permitted the working man liberally to wash down the first dust of morning). In London a new closing hour of 11 pm (formerly half-past midnight) was introduced on September 4. It became 10 pm on October 19. The Brewers' Gazette itself remarked upon the 'transformation of the night scenes of London': 'Great traffic centres like the Elephant and Castle, at which immense crowds usually lounge about until one o'clock in the morning, have suddenly become peaceful and respectable. The police, instead of having to move on numbers of people who have been dislodged from the bars at 12.30 at night, found very little intoxication to deal with, the last hour and a half being responsible for much of the excess of which complaint is made. Many of the public-houses were half empty some time before closing time. This however was not enough for the evangelicals, nor for Lord Kitchener. A powerful campaign continued against drinking generally and in particular against 'treating' — the traditional custom of buying drinks in rounds, aggravated into a clear nuisance when many a man
saw an easy way to doing his duty vicariously by buying drinks for his fellows in uniform. Kitchener, in a 'Message to the Nation' of October 24, 1914, issued through the government press bureau, appealed 'to the public, both men and women, to help the soldiers in their task. He begs everyone to avoid treating the men to drink, and to give them every assistance in resisting the temptations which are often placed before them.' The ground was being prepared for the drastic and permanent changes which were brought about in the licensing system in 1915 and 1916. To the end of December 1914 all that happened was that the November War Budget put the price of a pint of beer up from threepence to fourpence. The French and German governments .had not yet decided to take any action in this sphere. In each of the great continental countries several million men were called out from their civilian occupations in the first days and weeks of war. Naturally the economic and social dislocation which followed was enormous. In Britain society as a whole was less affected by the enlistment, achieved by September 15, of 500,000 volunteers, though there was plenty of local confusion arising from the army's administrative unpreparedness for such vast numbers. Furthermore, for many small communities the loss of a handful of young men could have far-reaching consequences. Many of the close-knit nonconformist mining communities of South Wales, for example, would never be the same again. Russia, in the first days of war, mobilised 5,115,000 men, of whom 4,092,000 were peasants. Actually agricultural production need not have suffered greatly
Bus iness as Usual A Hippodrome Revue In Eight Scenes * * W MARK ,<„1 ALBERT W MARK
F
rut
t.y
Hifi
irrsoxci b>
W Gl 0\
some time lose all its value because there will be no purchaser for it on the domestic market.' Following the same false logic manufacturers cut their own production by anything from 25% to 50%. In France, 2,887,000 reservists were called from their homes between August 1
j
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Above: The
I
DAVIDSON
Scene I--A Harvest Field
in
70
PEOPLE
France
Whitehall " The Nest," Tooting Bee Famous Living Cartoons
•
:•:'
'
,',.i
of this review at the London was Britain's slogan in the early
title
Hippodrome months of the war. Above
will for
for its holder
I
J
agricultural production was deliberately cut back, Prince Shakhovskoy told the influential Moscow Agricultural Society in August of the likelihood that fact
'Wheat
DC COURVII IF
P
since in the past agricultural labour had been chronically underemployed. But in
left:
War enthusiasm
involved all levels of society. Below: A French poster — Peugeot, like many other firms, seized on the war as a selling point
and 15. In agricultural areas this led to feverish efforts to harvest the ripening crops with a seriously depleted work force. In industrial areas it led to high unemployment, since the call-up of one manager, or a few specialist workmen, could result in the complete shut-down of a factory. Throughout August less than half of all the industrial establishments in France remained open. Other factors combined to produce a period of industrial stagnation. First of all the railways were given over entirely to the transportation of troops, so that normal commercial traffic was rendered impossible. Secondly, other means of transport, such as horses, carts and lorries, were directly requisitioned by the government. Thirdly many industries were starved of basic raw, and semi-manufactured materials, particularly coal and other items such as wool, thread and needles formerly produced in the areas invaded by the German armies; imports from Germany of course ceased. Finally
was hit by the sudden disappearance of many export markets. Thus a situation developed whereby despite the influx of men into the army, unemployment rose as high as 40%: but no one saw anything ironic in this as unemployment was an accepted social consequence of war. The final irony was that while there was industry
a great deal of unemployment there was also a desperate shortage of war materials. In an endeavour to increase production, factory inspectors were instructed not to
with the customary and so weekly rest days were suspended and normal hours of work exceeded. Eventually women and children enforce
regulations
strictness
had, in breach of regulations, to be brought in to do certain jobs. However, it is important to note that although in the long term the war was to boost employment opportunities for women, the immediate effect of mobilisation, as with male workers, was to throw large numbers of women out of work. On the eve of the war there were 487,000 women in employment in France. At the end of August 1914 there were less than half that number- 188,107 in all — and the position had scarcely changed by the end of the year. Women were employed extensively in the dress and luxury trades, and it was in these areas that the patriotic rich retrenched heavily on their expenditure France's economic and social problems were exacerbated by the effects of the German invasion of French territory.
Refugees in their hundreds of thousands from the invaded areas swelled the ranks of the unemployed. Eventually the loss of 74% of her coal production, HI' of her pig iron production, and 63'/. of her steel pro duction would force France to develop the <
1
VALENTICNEY-ZW&?
industrial potential of other parts of (he country. Meanwhile, the overwhelming
569
COME LAD ACROSS AND HELP O
SLIP PvJfUSHEOBV THE PARLIAMENTARY RECRUITING
COMM
1914 — young men were flocking to the for the old men. Below left: Cynicism ratherthan enthusiasm from 'the man on the Clapham omnibus'. Below r'ght: Lloyd George, Chancellor of the Exchequer — his first war budget
Above: Recruiting poster, colours, but not fast
late
enough
endorsed the 'Business as Usual' theme. Opposite, top left: Prince Louis of Battenberg, the First Sea Lord, forced out of office because of his German origins. Top right: In this French cartoon the German eagle is symbolicallythrottled. Centre: A wounded soldier is taken to West Ham Hospital, October 1914. Bottom, left to right: Kitchener's appeal to ex-non-commissioned officers, October 1914; the caption on this French 'white feather' cartoon reads Another one that the Prussians won't get'; in this British postcard bayonet target areas are pointed out — a far cry from seaside 'wish you were here' holiday snaps
POST OFF CE lip
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NOTICE
QMHB
URGENTLY WANTED LORD KITCHENER
appeals to ex-nonofficers of any branch of His Majesty's Forces to assist him now by re-enlisting at once for the duration of the War. Such men are chiefly wanted as Instructors for the new units now being formed, and will be promoted immediately after enlistment, ex-Regulars being given the rank they formerly held, and all others the rank of Corporal, with further promotion if found suitable.
commissioned
l «i f
"ItCM DUMMY MUST ( JtOAHOtD At AN A 1 » L ARMID 0*MMM NT "
AGE LIMIT—If accepted as Warrant Officer or as N.C.O. above the rank of Sergeant: SO Years. In other cases:
NOTE— A
45
Years.
r.r»
Pensioner
re-enlisting during the present time of National Emergency will be allowed to draw his pension in addition to his pay. Apply at any Recruiting Office for a Leaflet giving further particulars or for Enlistment.
GOD SAVE THE
KING.
y
Louis Raemakers'
The
Separation'
shows the predicament
was a tragic disruption of French industry and commerce. One final point which highlights the distinction between the immediate (our concern here) and the long-term effects of the war: the complete closure in August of the Renault factory in the Paris suburbs, though in the end the war was to give an immense boost to the industrial development of the internal combustion engine. In the efficiency with which she mobilised her army of 5,250,000 the Germans outpaced all the other nations. And after the immediate period of dislocation, in which general industrial activity dropped by about 30% or 40%, the German economy effect
572
of national minorities: their mobilisation
was often more forced than voluntary
resumed proper functioning much more quickly than the French. In 1913 unemployment had run at 2-9%; in August 1914
organisation. In fact, although Germany never paraded the doctrine of 'Business as Usual' in the way that Britain did, there
rose to 22-4%, but thereafter it fell off rapidly to 15-7% in September, 10-9% in October, and 8-2% in November. On the other hand while France could call upon Britain for supplies of scarce commodities, Germany very quickly found herself facing drastic scarcities. By October all reserves
were many inefficiencies built in to her economic and. political structure, and the government refused to face up to the real needs of a war which resolutely refused to follow the pattern of 1866 and 1870.
it
were used up and Germany became completely dependent on new production. The following month crisis faced both muniand agricultural production. In tions Western, particularly British, eyes Germany loomed as the model of disciplined
'Business as Usual' Although the personal initiative of the Jewish industrialist, Walther Rathenau, secured the establishment of the War Raw Materials Department (KRA), when Rathenau also suggested that the War Ministry should control food supply this was turned
.
down
as beyond the scope of military authority. Food supply was the responsibility of the Imperial State Secretary of
the Interior, Clemens von Delbruck, a taciturn and somewhat indolent character. Because of the tide of enthusiastic propaganda which flooded out in the wake of the first days of food hoarding, the Germans were actually consuming more of certain foodstuffs (particularly cake and sweet things) in late 1914 than before the war. In November, Under-Secretary Goppert of the Prussian Ministry of Commerce appealed to Delbruck to control the distribution of wheat and rye for fodder, to introduce rationing and to institute price ceilings. The appeal was stolidly rejected. Over Christmas accordingly, Goppert turned to Major-General William Groener, Head of the Field Railways Section of the
General Staff. Yet although Groener had shown awareness of the problems of food supply in his mobilisation plans, he rejected the approach on the grounds that there was nothing seriously wrong with the food situation. Actually agricultural production as well as munitions production would almost certainly have come to early disaster but for the mass utilisation by Professor Fritz Haber of his process for fixing nitrogen from the air. The procurement of war goods proceeded in' a most chaotic fashion. Forty procurement agencies, staffed different with untrained personnel, suddenly faced with the need to find massive supplies of war goods, simply flapped about in hopeless fashion. There was ample scope for unscrupulous middle men, as was apparent from an advertisement in a Berlin newspaper: 'Army contracts secured under the most favourable terms by a gentleman who has the best possible connections with the authorities in question.' Some of the results were ludicrous: haute couture firms,
having wangled contracts, turned gaily
to
the production of pistol holders, cartridge cases, knapsacks and the like. In November there came a further example of business and government co-operation, the War Wheat Corporation, which showed commendable concern for long-term war objectives, though little for the immediate well being of the German people. By buying up wheat at the end of the year it deliberately induced scarcity and high prices, hoping thereby to deter consumption till the spring.
'Business as Usual'
was elevated almost
into a moral principle in Britain. As a corrective to the first panic and excitement the idea was a sensible enough one,
soon became a cloak for the failure to face up to the real needs of the war. The phrase originated in a letter sent to the Daily Chronicle on August 11 by H. E. Morgan of W. H. Smith and Son. Two days later Harrods, the top department store of Edwardian England, used the phrase in a display advertisement announcing their policy for the war. Later in the month a crowded meeting of advertisers and businessmen resolved that, bound together in a common purpose, they would fight the war on the slogan 'Business as Usual'. When Winston Churchill gave the phrase the sanction of his rich accents, it became widely used and accepted. Official endorsement of Business as Usual was shown most obviously in the first war budget, introduced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George, on
though
it
16. Income tax was already calculated on an elaborate graduated scale. At the outbreak of war the ordinary wageearner was totally exempt, while salaries between £160 and £500 paid at the rate of 9d in the pound; above £500 the rate was Is 3d, and incomes above £3,000 paid an additional supertax. In doubling the ninepenny rate to Is 6d Lloyd George cast
November
before
him the faintest shadow of things The tea duty was raised from 3d
to come.
per pound to 8d, beer (we have seen) by a penny a pint. And that was about it— no new tax of any sort. All governments, in fact, were still relying, as in the past, upon borrowing as the main means of financing the war. The French, though less inclined to believe in Business as Usual while Germans were on French soil, were rather behind the British in finding an efficient source of war finance. Reform of the totally inadequate income-tax system was being planned just on the eve of the war but now reform was shelved, and, through borrowing the burden was placed on posterity.
Visions of a war 'over by Christmas'
November
and February 1915 the government did directly purchase 3,000,000 quarters of wheat in
theless,
between
1914
USA and the Argentine, but it was so embarrassed by this apparent violation of Business as Usual, that the whole transthe
action was carried out in deepest secrecy. Since governments everywhere were so reluctant to take resolute action in economic matters, it is not surprising that the early stages of the war were accompanied by considerable economic hardship. By the turn of the year prices in Britain had risen markedly, as the following official examples
show: flour by 75%; home meat by 6%; imported meat by 12%; sugar by 72%; coal by 15%. Families whose main wage earner
had enlisted were
in serious straits, particularly since the normal source of female employment in dress-making and the like had dried up. In Berlin, families were being put out on the streets because their
husbands were away from home, perhaps already dead, and they could not meet their rent payments. From October, too, Germans had to put up with the notorious K-bread (war bread) which contained a percentage of ersatz (substitute) material.
At In
this stage it was potatoes, later turnips. November the German Social Democrats
were clearly wrong
began a full-scale campaign against the low quality and high price of essential foods. Early in 1915 the German govern-
The first pieces of emergency legislation had meant that, willy nilly, the British government had become involved in the free working of the economy, but for the remainder of 1914 further interference was sporadic and reluctant. By the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act of November the Admiralty and War Council 27, assumed the right to commandeer the output of all factories engaged in war production, or even to take possession of the factories themselves. Purchase of scarce materials abroad continued to be undertaken by private agencies, though by late September it was apparent to the clear-
ment pointed the way which,
sighted few that the only way of ensuring that British factories got the necessary materials at reasonable prices was for the government to assume responsibility for purchase, supply and distribution. In the case of three classes of overseas purchase — chemicals, sugar and wheat — the government did take action. On the advice of the Committee on Chemicals set up at the beginning of the war it was agreed that the government should float a national joint stock company to manufacture aniline dyes. A somewhat half-
baked compromise between government sponsorship and private shareholding, the scheme very nearly succumbed to the opposition of private manufacturers and just
managed to survive into 1915, to be kept going thereafter by further transfusions of government money. For the purchase and distribution of sugar (two-thirds of which in prewar times had come from German and Austrian beet fields) a special type of Royal Commission with executive powers was established. With regard to wheat (four-fifths of which had been imported before the war) the government was not prepared to go quite so far. As an official of the Board of Agriculture put it in September: 'Having regard to all the circumstances of the case, the Board think that so long as the price of wheat remains moderate it would be unwise to interfere with the free play of competition.' None-
eventually,
after years of fighting, all the belligerents were to follow. On January 25, bread cards were issued. All over Europe mobilisation interrupted the ordinary forms of social provision, national, local and private. Factory inspection, house-building, education, school medical services, all were affected. The
Asquith Liberal government was actually preparing a new, far-reaching education bill when the war brought all such plans to a halt. So too in Russia, as the Ministry of Education declared: 'In view of war conditions, no grants or subsidies, except those already authorised, shall be issued for building purposes to the primary schools. Such institutions as have received only part of their grants must arrange for the completion of their buildings on that basis, without counting on any additional sums, whether in the current year or in 1915. Those towns and Zemstvos whose petitions have not, as yet, been granted, must regard them as refused. In the coming year, 1915, the local bodies must not count on receiving new grants for the purpose of universal education.' Education (and housing) problems in Russia were made worse by the inflow of refugees from the invaded territories. By the end of the year there were serious housing shortages in the towns, while the general price index
had risen by 40 r Yet through the confusion, disruption, and inadequate administrative responses of the first fumbling months of war, hints of some of the longer-term social effects can be discerned. In Russia, peasant com munities which for centuries had known nothing of the outside world were suddenly jerked into an awareness of great events proceeding beyond their limited horizons Newspapers began to reach districts where their existence had hitherto hardly been known and letters from men on service brought families and friends into vivid contact with the wide world of violence and change. Still more significant in the r
573
term was the involvement of the middle classes, formerly practically imlong
potent in autocratic Russia, in certain new organisations which played an increasingly important part in the war effort, and, ultimately, in politics. The Unions of the Zemstvos and of the Municipalities have been mentioned since from the start they played a critical role in the relief of wounded soldiers. They were joined by university students, who after first forming their own organisations subsequently merged into the Unions. In the first weeks of war the students formed groups of 50 or 60 to ascertain the time and place of arrival of hospital trains, so that the wounded could be escorted in trams, cars, or on foot to the various hospitals. At first the unloading of a train containing 800 wounded men took three or four hours. By Christmas 1914, as more and more trains rolled in from the front with their doleful cargo, the unloading would be completed in 20 minutes. Soon, a contemporary noted, it was found that the ordinary stations did not offer sufficient accommodation for the reception of the wounded, and consequently special receiving points were created, connected with the main terminals by special branch lines. Clearing hospitals were founded near these receiving stations and the wounded walked or were carried there direct from the trains. Thence they were distributed among the Moscow hospitals or evacuated to other towns. The students showed considerable energy and resource in improving the reception and evacuation of the wounded. They threw themselves into this work with great patriotic zeal and with all the ardour of youth. Thanks to its wellplanned organisation, Moscow was able to receive daily about 30 hospital trains and to re-evacuate about ten of them on the same day. Agitation by the German Social Demo-
574
crats at the close of the year began to hint at what was to prove the greatest single feature of the social history of the German war effort: a tacit alliance between the workers and the military. In January 1915, in face of Social Democrat claims that profiteering was menacing the Burgfrieden, the first effective price controls were introduced. An even more significant portent was the arrival at the War Ministry of Dr Tibertius, a 26-year-old expert on labour matters from the Society for Social Reform (a prewar liberal-progressive organisation), and a leading advocate of partnership be-
tween employer and employee. Although the Bismarckian social security system had been the most advanced in the world, it made no provision for unemployment. The economic dislocation brought about by mobilisation had forced some municipalidole out relief to their own unemployed. In December the Imperial government assumed the responsibility for providing subsidies for this unemployment relief. These were but small, hesitant steps towards social reorganisation. But they do suggest that the idealistic utterties
to
ances
to
which politicians
were being
moved by the horrors and the heroism of war were not entirely hot air. 'We must,' said Adolf Grober of the Catholic Centre party on December 3, 'enter upon a new Germany,- a greater Germany — greater in righteousness. We must set a good example to the whole world.'
'A new patriotism' There can be no doubt that statements of this sort captured a social mood which was widespread in all the belligerent countries. No one was more sensitive to this mood than the former radical demagogue turned war statesman, Lloyd George, and nowhere did he express it more strikingly than in his speech of September
19, published, significantly,
with the preg-
The Great War. There is something infinitely greater and more enduring which is emerging already out of this great conflict— a new patriotism, richer, nobler, and more exalted than the old. I see amongst all classes, high and low, shedding themselves of selfishness, a new recognition that the honour of this country does not depend merely on the maintenance of its glory in nant
title,
the stricken field, but also in protecting
homes from
distress. It is bringing a
its
new
The great flood of luxury and sloth which had submerged the land is receding, and new Britain is appearing. We can see for the first time the fundamental things that matter in life, and that have been obscured from our vision by the tropical growth ofprosperity. Lloyd George, outlook to all classes.
one contemporary diarist reflected on this speech, 'personifies our War aims'.
Amateur and ad hoc Actually there was probably less solid evidence of this 'new outlook' in Britain than there was in the other major countries. Such central social concerns as the provision of pensions and allowances for the dependants of men on active service continued to be administered in an amateur and ad hoc manner. The only official organisation at the outbreak of war for handling dependants' allowances was the Commissioners of the Royal Hospital for Soldiers at Chelsea, and the actual rates paid had not changed since the Boer War. Any supplementation had to come from the charitable funds channelled through the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association or from the National Relief Fund. It was the executive committee of the latter body which took the decision to raise allowances from lis Id per week, with Is 9d for each child, to 12s 6d with 2s for each child. These rates, with a further slight increase in the
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Opposite: Red Cross nurses
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— as
war had had little effect on the position of women. Above: Punch cartoon, November 1914 — every means were used to persuade young civilians to join up. Right: Patriotic crowds watch wounded arrive from the front in motor ambulances yet the
allowance, were officially adopted by the government on October 1. As it was child's
discovered that in a large number of cases soldiers were not in fact married to the women they had been living with, the Executive Committee decided that 'where there was evidence that a real home had been maintained' allowances should be made to the unmarried mothers and their children. In this way there was, despite many earnest protests about the licensing of sin, admitted into the well-defined regions of 19th-century middle-class morality, a first spy from the earlier realms of working-class mores.
Opportunities for women Even when allowances were established as due, there were often outrageously long delays before payment was made. So great was the outcry against the muddle and mis-
management
that the voluntary societies conduct an investigation into their own affairs, followed by the setting up of the government's own Select Committee. From out of the deliberations of the Committee there ultimately emerged the first real advance towards the acceptance of a proper national responsibility for War Pensions. Because of the serious economic difficulties, aggravated by the influx of refugees, the French government was forced into a more positive attitude towards social questions. (Needless to say the Belgian refugees who arrived in Britain were catered for entirely by private organisations.) From the outbreak of war, subsistence allowances, similar to those given to the wives of the mobilised, were given to those thrown out of work. A circular of August 20 directed that Relief Funds should be established in the towns and, in some cases, in the departments, where unemployment was prevalent. Subsidies
were forced
to
from the state would cover one-third of the disbursements through these funds. Soon the original terms of reference were widened so that, relief was given to those whose need was not necessarily directly related to the war. To the old, the sick and the infirm, and to women (seamstresses, charwomen, artists, teachers) who had fallen into poverty before the war and
were now unable
to retrieve their fortunes.
In the war months of 1914 the French government paid to refugees a total of 30 million francs, and to the unemployed 12
million francs (9,500,000 going to the unemployed of Paris). Prewar France was behind Britain in her system of employment exchanges, though there were a handful of private agencies, municipal exchanges for the most part existed only on paper. In November 1914 a Central Employment Agency for the unemployed and for refugees was established in Paris. But it was not a great success. Between November 5, 1914 and January 5, 1915 it found employment for only 14,850 people. Eventually, however,
system
of
an
departmental exchanges was
effective
employment
evolved out of this early experiment. Thus the immediate social impact of the mobilisation of millions of men was considerable, but only a few of what were to prove the enduring social consequences of total war were apparent in 1914. For instance there was as yet little real change in the position of women. There were some opportunities for nursing, especially in the British Volunteer Aid Detachments — the VADs — but the reaction of the British War Office to Dr Elsie Inglis's proposals to establish an Ambulance Unit was not untypical of the mentality at this time of those in authority throughout Europe: My good lady, go home and sit still.' In most countries women's employment did not recover its prewar level till the spring of
1915. It tunities
was thereafter that wider oppor-
On the eve of clear that visions of a war 'over by Christmas' were wildly wrong. Obviously wrong too were the visions of a war of cavalry charges and 'heroic death the
began
new year
it
to
open up.
was
brought about by heroes on the other side'. Instead, lamented the young Evelyn
Wrench, there came 'atrocities' and 'frightOne would have thought,' the
fulness'.
editor of the Daily Express confided to his diary on October 24, 'before the war began, that the single report of the killing or disablement of any friend or acquaintance would be terribly disconcerting. So it was, at the beginning. The first eight or ten casualties had as much publicity as all the rest put together. People discussed the deaths of young second lieutenants with bated breath. Gradually the familiarity of the thing becomes apparent. You receive the news of the death of your friends as a matter of fact.' Initial excitement was beginning to die away and something of the real nature of the war was coming home, even to the insular British.
Further Reading Feldman, Gerald, Army Industry and Labor in Germany (Princeton UP 1966) Flonnsky, M., The End of the Russian Empire (Carnegie Endowment 1931) Fontaine, Arthur, French Industry during the War (Carnegie Endowment 1926) Marwick, Arthur, The Deluge: British Society and the First World War (Bodley Head 1965)
ARTHUR MARWICK
lectured in History at Edinburgh University for nine years, and has also taught at Aberdeen University and at the State University of New York in Buffalo He is now Professor of History at the
Open
University
Britain in the
in
England His books include
Century of Total War and The Nature of
History
575
I
In retrospect trench warfare appears as the distinguishing characteristic of the First World War, but in 1914 prevailing military opinion held that entrenchment would be a local and temporary expedient. However, by the end of the year, on the Western Front in particular, a system of trenches had extended progressively and was stifling movement across a continental battlefield. Trench warfare had begun, and its attendant miseries of mud and water set in. John Keegan. Right: British officer working a pump in a communication trench
A
was well known to every educated soldier of 1914 that trench systems — or field fortifications as they were more commonly called— had been a factor of cardinal imIt
portance in recent warfare. The last phase of the American Civil War had been spent in siege operations on the Richmondline. The Russo-Turkish War was notable chiefly for the Turks'
Petersburg of 1877
crushing defeat of the Russians before the earthworks of Plevna. The Russo-Japanese War of 1904/5 had resolved itself ultimately into a digging match on a 100-mile front. And in the most recent war, that of 1912-13 in the Balkans, the Turkish lines of Chatalja had proved an insuperable obstacle to the Bulgarians' advance. Special reasons could be found, however, in every one of these cases to argue why none pointed any significant signpost to the future. It was argued, for example, always outConfederates, the that numbered, had taken to the trenches only when overwhelmed in the open field; that Plevna was a local defeat which the Russians, successful everywhere else, might have avoided by refusing battle; that the lines of Chatalja, spanning as they did a narrow isthmus between the Aegean and Black Seas, and having been dug at leisure, were less properly field works, than permanent fortifications, which the Bulgarians were not equipped to attack; and that it was a decisive Japanese victory at inflicted before the Russians could deploy their full strength in Manchuria, rather than the stalemate on land, which had brought them to accept an armistice. All these arguments were true. But it would be to under-rate the intelligence of
sea,
the professional European soldier of 1914 to suggest that they were sufficient to convince him of the improbability of a recurrence of digging on the battlefield. Its desirability was deprecated, of course, particularly in the French army, but its necessity was recognised, provided for and practised. (The preliminary steps necessary for the efficient training of the soldier are: use of rifle, bayonet and spade', Infantry Training, 1914, Section 1. 'An entrenching implement is carried by each private, and NCO up to the rank of sergeant inclusive', Infantry Training, 1914, Section 167.) The circumstances however in which the armies, or portions of armies, would be allowed to entrench were, in theory, to be strictly controlled, it being believed that in practice they could also be unilaterally limited: ('Entrenchments are only used when, owing to further advance being impossible the-efforts of the attacking force must be limited temporarily to holding ground already won. The advance must be resumed at the first possible moment', Infantry Training 1914, Section 121.) The spirit of these instructions, taken though they are from the British training manual, was generally current, and prevailing European military opinion may therefore be summarised as holding that while it might sometimes be unavoidable for infantry to dig themselves in, it was never permissible for them to do so for long or at more than isolated points. Entrenchment was to be a temporary expedient, either to provide shelter for troops outnumbered by the enemy or opportunity to thin out units on an unpromising front and in both cases time for their superiors to
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Local
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forts.
And even
of all
European
were committed. The entrenchments might
the French, least inclined soldiers to wield a spade, dug token positions on the line of the Sambre before the Battle of Charleroi. At both decisive battles of 1914 — the Marne and Tannenberg — Germans, French,
the campaign. The German rearguards opposing the French advance into Lorraine in the third week of August were normally found well dug in. The British entrenched their positions along the Conde Canal on the eve of Mons, a precaution which turned the scale for them. The Belgian infantry at Liege were deployed from the start in trenches dug in the intervals between the
British and Russians alike entrenched portions of their fronts as circumstances and orders dictated. But nowhere did anyone dig anything more than 'shelter trenches', as they were called, or try to establish a continuous line. The typical 'hasty entrenchment' of the opening weeks of warfare was usually a series of individual holes, sited to cover an obstacle if possible and to command a clear field of fire and, if time permitted, connected to form a shallow trench. It would have lacked traverses — those regular kinks which prevent enfilading fire from sweeping its whole length — overhead cover, approach trenches, wire or support lines. It was, in brief, a simple ditch — very often, if the soldiers had found one suitable, no more or less than that — in which to shelter
force
at
re-
which
all
short, did not vitiate inforce the offensive principle to
European notion
armies
point.
was believed and might well
it
in
that local progressively until they stifled movement across a continental battletield was not discussed in professional circles and if raised by outsiders was disregarded or dismissed. Wars, it was considered, would be short. It was therefore quite within the letter and spirit of their training that soldiers o( all sides should have had recourse to entrenchment from the earliest encounters
extend
ot'
Regulation and improvised equipment-the metal plate went inside a despatch runner' wallet, carried over the heart British soldiers bombing a close-by German trench — bombs (and equipment generally) were scarce, leaving much scope for improvisation
from the storm of battle. Pressure of time and the inadequacy of the soldier's entrenching tool — in the British army a miniature pick and shovel combined — precluded the excavation of anything more elaborate.
Had the Marne brought victory to either side, therefore, a wanderer in the battlefields of late 1914 would have found little to mark the ebb and flow of a struggle of titans but such scattered scratchings as the French and the BEF hurried over in pursuit to the Aisne in midtheir September. Nowhere would he have found signs that the Germans had attempted to organise a continuous defensive front and he might well have reflected that the course of the campaign in the west marked an exception to the growing tendency for modern armies to take to the spade when checked in the open field. In his evening report to GQG on September 13, however, General Franchet d'Esperey, directing Fifth Army's advance on Rheims, signalled his discovery of a new
phenomenon: an organised trench system extending beyond both flanks of the city which his advance guards could neither turn nor penetrate. In the four days following, each of the other army commanders transmitted similar intelligence. Manoury, Sixth Army, reported on September 15 that it and the BEF had met stiffening resistance on the line of the Aisne and were preparing to envelop the enemy's right. Fourth Army (De Langle de Cary), advancing across the Champagne east of Rheims, had bumped into powerful rearguards covered by heavy artillery which had brought its progress to a halt. On September 15, Foch (Ninth Army) reported that he had been stopped by an entrenched line stretching east from Fifth
Army's
flank.
On September
16,
it
was reported by Sarrail that Third Army was in continuous contact with the enemy who had already 'surrounded Verdun with a network of trenches' which he could not hope to carry by assault and by Castelnau, commanding Sixth Army on his right, said
that he was faced by a continuous trench line impossible to outflank. On September 17, Dubail (First Army) reported that his front was crossed by a continuous trench line which the Germans had thrown up in haste by impressing local labour. In short the enemy had decided to stand and fight. That decision, as we now know, had been taken as a result of Colonel Hentsch's mission to the armies of the right wing and was promulgated in Moltke's order of September 10 directing those armies to retreat to positions behind the Aisne. 'The positions reached', that order had
concluded 'will be entrenched and held'. The entrenched line was not intended, however, to be held permanently. Moltke
hoped merely to win his soldiers 'about eight days rest, bring up reinforcements and replenish supplies and ammunition'. Meanwhile he began to transfer troops from stabilised sections of the line, parthat in Lorraine, meaning to use them as a mass de manoeuvre on his western flank — still wide open between
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Soissons and the sea -with a view to resuming his envelopment of the French left, a redeployment of force which his successor, Falkenhayn, accelerated. Joffre, only a day or two later, was to recognise the same opportunity, and to initiate a similar redeployment against the German right. Thus it was that the pieces were assembled for the final stage of open warfare in the west, a series of frustrated encircling movements which has come to be known as the Race to the Sea and whose outcome, and undesired, was the unintended establishment of the trench line.
Foretaste of trench warfare A foretaste of what war on that line would entail had already been savoured by the BEF in its first days on the Aisne. Having failed to carry the Aisne heights in its initial assault, it received orders from Field Marshal French on September 16 that the 'line now held should be strongly entrenched' and from that date until midOctober, in constant expectation of promised instructions to resume the advance, it settled down to a round of danger, squalor and frustration which was not to differ in essentials from the daily experience of all armies on the western front during the next four years. The first revelation of that experience, the most important and the most consistently borne out, was that in trench warfare it is artillery which dominates the battlefield. Rifles will kill the unwary, machine guns will slaughter an attacking wave and wire will lassoo the raider in a deadly embrace; but as long as the infantryman keeps to his trench, as at first the Germans and then the British chose to do, he is safe from their touch. Artillery, however, will reach out to find him whereever he is not protected by overhead cover: at the wagon lines 3,000 yards from the line, in the support positions, on the firing step of the front trench. Only in the limestone caves which pit the sides of the Aisne plateau could the infantry find any sure and ready shelter from the constant whip of shrapnel and detonation of high explosive, and then only when relieved from the forward positions. Rearward the vital functions of supply had of course to be carried out in the open, where any observed movement in daylight hours brought down an instant salvo. Under the assault of shellfire the infantryman in static positions has a dual recourse: to hope that his own artillery will find and destroy the enemy's and, meanwhile, to dig deeper. Fortunately the soil of the Aisne heights yields easily to the spade and stands well when dug, so that the deepening trenches needed little revetting — the technical term for lining the sides with those retaining walls of timber so necessary whenever the soil is wet or friable. But the BEF, and for the moment the French too, lacked the hands to elaborate their trenches much beyond digging short traverses and scraping shallow 'funk-holes' into the forward scarp. Many of the trenches, in any case, were badly
having been chosen to command an extensive field of fire, a choice which usually put them in plain view of the enemy gunners. When adjustments .in the line became possible, the infantry presited,
<]
Resting the
French trench
wounded in
in a typically
the Argonne
crude
ferred to settle for better-concealed positions with short fields of fire, flanked by machine guns which could catch in crossfire at close range an enemy assault across no man's land. (In passing, it is worth the mention that this perhaps most famous of
World War expressions was not yet in common use. It had originally and all First
very appropriately belonged to a plot of land under the walls of mediaeval London used for public executions and acquired a military connotation as late as 1908 when Sir Ernest Swinton, an uncannily accurate prophet of the shape of wars to come, used it in his famous story of a siege, 'The Green Curve'. It was only generally adopted by the BEF in 1915.) Assaults across no man's land were launched throughout the Battle of the Aisne, at first by the British and French until they recognised that the position was too strong to be carried head-on, then by the Germans in an effort both to 'fix' their opponents to the spot and attract their reserves, while Falkenhayn concentrated his own on the open flank. All these assaults proved equally costly to both sides. In the day-to-day defence of the trenches however, the British and the French suffered more heavily than the
Germans
positions were more heavy their artillery much weaker and their trench stores almost non-existent. Germany had not, as it happened, prepared for trench warfare but the equipment she had developed for the rapid seizure of the Belgian fortresses — hand grenades, mortars, signal light pistols, periscopes, searchlights — proved instantly adaptable to trench conditions, while their heavy howitzers, in particular the 150-mm (the 5.9 which was to dominate the battlefield at medium
as
continuously
their
overlooked,
ranges throughout the war) and the 210mm, quite outclassed anything the Allies had to hand. Apart from a single battery of 6-inch howitzers and the four 60pounders of the divisional artilleries, the British were without heavy guns, while the French army, in which pre-war prejudice against the heavy calibres had amounted to phobia, could assemble a mere 66 batteries.
The Germans had the pick of the ground on the Western Front' So heavy and accurate were the German bombardments that the cry of 'spy', which had been heard so often during the Great Retreat and had brought death by firing squad to numbers of harmless French country people — said to have communicated Allied positions to the
enemy
in
some
and unexplained fashion — was taken up again. It was as misfounded as before, the Germans owing their better inexplicable,
practice to the possession of observation balloons and more numerous aeroplanes
and
to their skilful infiltration of no man's land, still covered by woodland or standing crops, with observer telephonists. But where the British held the high ground, they had the better of the artillery duel, and
elsewhere the RFC, experimenting with aerial fire control methods, had already begun to redress the balance. Thus, where not engaged offensively, the
Germans were
forced to dig as deep as their enemies. By the middle of October, the Battle of the Aisne had reached stalemate: indeed it
is
closed
conventionally
reckoned
down on September
28.
to
On
have
October
14 the British divisions were progressively withdrawn from the river, their place being taken by French, and transferred to the Northern Front, now open only between the rivers Yser and Lys, to fight in what would be known as the First Battle of Ypres. The front in Picardy had solidi-
September, that in Artois in The Yser front, defended between Nieuport and Dixmude by the Belgians, was first seriously assailed by the Germans on October 18 but, from the 24th when the flood-gates were opened, ceased to be passable. When the embers of the Ypres battle flickered out in mid-November, the last gap on the Western Front had been closed and the trench line ran uninterrupted from the sea to Switzerland. fied in late
early October.
Slight
German advantage
The
front thus established described a shallow, reversed S, 475 miles in length which crossed or enclosed ten French departments, Nord, Pas-de-Calais, Somme, Oise, Aisne, Marne, Ardennes, Meuse,
and Vosges, left a mere fragment of Belgium in Allied hands and only in the extreme south had been pushed into German administered — though Meurthe-et-Moselle
historically
French — territory.
Strategic-
the alignment of the front favoured the Germans on two important counts: it left on their side of it some of the most important French manufacturing centres and mineral deposits which, run as a unit with those in Belgium and their own in the Ruhr, were to allow them to anticipate many of the industrial advantages which west European economic integration has achieved only in the last decade; second, it left them in possession of an excellent lateral strategic railway, running from Metz to Lille, along which they would pass their reserves and counter-attack forces throughout the war, while the French and British, denied the use of the Paris-Verdun and Paris-Hazebrouck double guage tracks by breaks in the line in the Argonne and Artois, found themselves confined to more circuitous routes. Since they, in any case, were operating on exterior lines, this was a double disadvantage Tactically too it is reckoned that the Germans had the pick of the ground on the Western Front, though their advantages ally,
were measured in no more than metres and, revealing though that is of the quality of the trench war, it seems exaggerated in retrospect. On the sea in the north, where the barbed wire entanglements were already reaching out to below high-water mark, and along the Yser, both sides were prisoners of the floods. Between Dixmude and Armentieres it was water again, found almost everywhere at two feet below the surface, which determined the nature of the fighting, forcing both sides to build breastworks in place of trenches and to fear the onset of bad weather almost worse than that of an attack. High ground hereon the German side the imperceptible gradient of the Passchendaele ridge op posite Ypres, on the Allied, the 'Flemish Alps' — Kemmel, Kassel and Mont des Chats — conferred genuine advantages of command and concealment, as a little to the south near Armentieres did the ridges
581
:
o( Messines and Aubers, both long in German hands. South ol' Armentieres, from Givenchj to Lens, stretches a drab, confined region oi' mining villages where beet and potatoes grow between the pitheads, much prized, while they stood, as observa-
tion points.
At Lens, which lay. just in German hands, began the chalk uplands of Artois, open rolling country in which the Germans held several dominating points, in particular that oi' Yimv Ridge which overlooked Arras and shielded the whole of the Douai plain from Allied view. Below Arras
trenches crossed the marshy valley the meandering Somme and south of Lassigny entered a closer and more broken countryside. Here, near Noyon, the line the
oi'
crossed the Oise and turned sharply eastward, to run first along the ridge between the Aisne and Ailette, following in places the trace of the road which Louis XV had built for his daughters (the Chemin des Dames), then along the heights north of Rheims, which lay throughout the war within the range of the German guns. Beyond Rheims, the trenches crossed the Champagne Pouilleuse, in peacetime the French army's training area, a dry and desolate zone, devoid of cover. Near Ste Menehould the line entered the forest of the Argonne, a tangled wilderness of streams, trees and broken hills, in which neither side could attempt major operations but kept up nevertheless a constant and costly bickering for position. Above the
Argonne rise the heights of the Meuse, crowned by the fortified camp of Verdun which the trenches encircled before dropping into the plain of the Woevre. The Woevre was of critical importance to the
Germans
for it stretches uninterrupted to Metz, their principal place a" amies on the west bank of the Rhine, and they had fought hard to drive the French from it. At St Mihiel, in late September, they had succeeded in winning a bridgehead across the Meuse, so that below Verdun the line formed a sharp and, for the French, intensely inconvenient salient. The latter had succeeded, however, in denying Nancy to the Germans, whose positions they dominated from the Ballon d'Alsace, and of keeping the line of the Meurthe in their
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The German trench line was the best equipped and organised. Above: A German delousing
A strong with wattle reinforcements,
station, Eastern Front. Opposite:
German trench Western Front
hands. Below the Meurthe, the front ran Vosges formed by the Donon and thereafter followed the crests, generally on the German side of the 1871 frontier to the Belfort gap. It crossed the gap at Dannemarie and ended on the Swiss frontier near the village of Bonfol. For much of its length, the front was un-
to the shoulder of the
suitable for offensive action. The Vosges was such an area, as both sides accepted, holding it with troops of the lowest quality in an unspoken truce, occasionally broken by the committal of alpinists at commanding points like the Hartmannweilerkopf. Indeed, south of Verdun, neither side was to
make any major
effort
throughout the
war and
this stretch of the front, 160 miles in length, may be regarded as 'inactive'.
The Argonne, though constantly disputed, was not a profitable front, while the Yser was impassable to any but an amphibious force. The Flemish plain — though it was to be the scene of one of the greatest
set-
piece attacks of the war — was scarcely less waterlogged and, under shellfire, quickly returned to quagmire. The heights of the Aisne and of the Meuse — both again to be the scene of protracted fighting on a gigantic scale — conferred such advantages on the defender that in normal circumstances most generals would have hesitated to assail them. Prima facie, therefore, the
only 'battlefields' were the dry chalklands of the Somme and the Champagne. But whether or not the terrain which the trench line traversed was suitable for operations, the fact was that every inch of it had been fought over, and it was for that reason that it existed. Looking beyond the purely tactical level however, it is possible to perceive two principal factors which determined why the troops should have met, fought and entrenched where they did. The first was the German operational plan which, based on Schlieffen's correct
assessment of French deployment plans, succeeded in carrying the German armies
to
the
line
Noyon-Verdun-Belfort
but
as he had also very reluctantly foreseen, to win them victory on the Marne. Defeated there, they took up positions which coincided almost exactly with the last firm 'phase-line', that of the 31st day, which he had drawn on his planning maps. Schlieffen may therefore be regarded not merely as the principal author of the campaign of 1914 but also as architect of the major portion of the Western Front. The second factor — that which determined the course of the front between failed,
Noyon and the sea — was the French railway system, in particular, the NancyParis-Arras
Valenciennes
and
the
lines. It
Metz-Mezieres-
was along these two
systems, the first under French control, the second under German, that each side raced their reserves to outpace each other for advantage on the open flank after the Battle of Aisne. The German railheads were several days further east of the critical zone than the French were to the
west of it but, beginning their transfers correspondingly sooner, they overcame that disadvantage. They could not however reverse it and the 'Race to the Sea' is thus best understood as a series of stalemated collisions along the successive rungs of a ladder whose uprights were formed by those parallel railways. Amiens, Arras and Lille, near which the principal engagements of the 'Race to the Sea' was fought,
vital
are, as a glance at a railway
map shows,
all
located on cross-country lines linking the two north-south trunk routes. If further proof of the decisive importance of the is needed, it may be found in Falkenhayn's unsuccessful attempt in late September to disrupt those in French hands between Arras and Paris by a
railways
gigantic cavalry raid. However established, the trench line was intended by neither side to be held per-
manently. Three factors may be found to explain why, in the short run at least, it was to prove impenetrable. The first is that it suited the strategy of both sides, in the immediate aftermath of the war of move-
ment, to close down activity on the
front
for
shorter or
longer
much
of periods.
This was particularly so of the Germans
although still committed to a 'western' strategy, were forced throughout the winter to transfer a good deal of their strength eastward. From those moments of respite, the local trench garrisons naturally profited to strengthen and deepen their were generally positions — indeed they under orders to do so — and although the object of such work was to improve the local tactical situation, it had the imperceived but decisive effect of bonding the western trench system as a whole. The second factor was that of mutual exhaustion. It is probable, indeed almost certain, that had either side had the numbers and firepower to mount attacks in late 1914 of the scale and intensity achieved in the offensives two, or even one year later, the primitive defences then existing could not have held firm. French, British and Germans alike, however, were short of men in December 1914, short of guns and desperately short of shells. The Germans had exhausted their pre-war stockpile by October and thereafter were dependent on a day-to-day production, which could barely meet minimum tactical requirements and certainly not those of a Largescale offensive. The French and British. whose manufacturing capacity was a good deal lower than the Germans', were in even
who,
worse straits. French needs were estimated at 50,000 rounds of 75-mm ammunition per day; in mid-November, output was only 11,000. The British needed 50 rounds per field gun per day and were receiving six. Both had consumed nearly half their prewar reserve. For most of the winter, therefore, most of the artillery on much of the front had perforce to stand silent.
Leisure to reorganise
The
third
factor
was
mathematical
involving a calculation easy enough for generals of both sides to have made before the war — and has been dubbed by Sir Basil Liddell Hart 'the ratio of force to space' of the calculation were these: the western front was about 175 miles in
The terms
length and the strength deployed along it. counting 12,000 rifles to the division, was about 1,200,000 on the Allien! side and 900,000 on the German, or 2,500 and ,900 1
583
men per mile of front respectively. Allowing for the relative weakness of the garrisons south of Verdun, the densities on the 'active' sector of the front were considerably higher. Now. it was generally calculated before the war that a strength of between two and four thousand rifles per mile of front was sufficient to defend the perimeter o\' a modern fortress — a figure easily achieved by both armies in the
across the Ypres salient in early 1915. Patterns of trench lay-out varied from army to army in the Western Front. The British rapidly adopted a triple system of front, support and reserve trenches, separated by intervals of about 200 and 400 yards, the front line sharply 'traversed', provided with shell-proof dugouts and covered in no man's land with a deep single belt of barbed wire. All three
trenches in France and Belgium and widely surpassed in critical sectors like the
trenches were connected by communication trenches, dug zig-zag, in which the telephone cables to battery and battalion headquarters were laid. This was theory but as late as the spring of 1915, many British battalions, lacking the labour to elaborate their positions, were still defending a single trench, keeping their supports perhaps in an older trench abandoned during the period of fluid fighting and leaving their reserves in farms and villages 1,000 yards or more in rear. Such dug-outs as existed were mere scrapes in the forward scarp of the trench. More might have been done had not so much of the
Ypres salient. Once the front had stabilised, it is evident that it was likely be breached only by the methods of the fortress warfare: sapping, mining, and attack by heavy artillery. And since there was insufficient heavy artillery to concentrate guns effectively on any but the shortest stretches of the front any breach made was likely to be readily contained.
therefore, to
Troops elsewhere would have to reckon only with assault by infantry, supported by their divisional field artillery. Against that, machine guns, barbed wire and their own field artillery were to provide adequate defence. The winter of 1914, therefore, found on the western front a situation which allotted each side manpower enough to defend its front from normal infantry assault, neither side artillery enough to attack the other effectively and both the leisure to organise their positions in depth and strength against future offensives. It was a situation pregnant with the seeds of attrition.
A single continuous trench? would be wrong
to think of the front west as a single continuous trench, though much of it had been brought into being by the piecemeal connection of
It
line
in the
dug in haste and under fire during the 'Race for the Sea' and the Battles of the Yser and Ypres. It was, of course, interrupted by disjointed lengths of trench
several river lines, the Lys, the Somme, the Aisne, while in the Vosges it consisted not of a continuous trench but of mutually supporting strongpoints on the peaks and crest line. Along the Yser, around Ypres and in the valley of the Lys it often took the form not of a trench but of a high, sandbag breastwork, proof enough against rifle fire but leaving its defenders exposed to shells exploding behind it. In general terms, however, the single continuous trench describes accurately enough the defences of the Western Front on both sides in the first weeks after its stabilisation. In places the single trench had to suffice
many months but wherever sufficient hands were found — and it was labour which
for
was the cardinal
factor in establishing the strength of a front in the First World War — the open country behind was soon brought under the spade. The approach to the front line by day, over bullet and shell swept territory, was in particular too hazardous to tolerate for long, and even less as the incessant fire fights removed trees and hedgerows from the fire zone. The digging of 'communication' trenches, which would allow reliefs, messengers and carrying parties to cross the last 400 yards or so under cover (later their length might increase to more than 1,000) was recognised as the priority; after that, the digging of support and reserve trenches; and, in some critical sectors, the construction of an independent second position several miles to the rear, for example the 'GHQ Line' dug
584
British front lain on waterlogged ground which put the trench garrison to an endless labour of pumping and bailing and condemned many to stand knee or even waist deep in water during their tour of duty. It was only as the army expanded, battalions became more experienced in fieldengineering, and a pioneer battalion was added to each division, relieving the overstretched Royal Engineer field com-
that the British trench systems gradually assumed their proper shape. The French, who could call upon more plentiful labour, had already in December 1914 constructed a solid front and were preparing to elaborate it considerably. Their doctrine of trench defence, laid down by Joffre in a letter to the armies of January 1915, called not for a continuous front but for its division into active and passive panies,
closely interspersed. The former consist of strongpoints sited to cover with fire the front and flanks, the latter of heavily wired and beaten zones, to be garrisoned only by lookouts and defended by enfilading fire from the strongpoints. Across the whole front, two belts of wire entanglements were to be raised, 10 or 20 yards apart and each about 10 yards thick; they were to contain gaps for the passage of patrols and raiding parties. Behind the line of strongpoints, a support line was to be built, providing shell-proof shelter for counter-attack companies. A survey of the fronts of the eight French armies in January 1915, revealed that in most the line was organised at least as well as Joffre wished and on some better. He followed his first letter, therefore, with one directing the armies to construct an independent second position, resembling sectors,
were
to
the first but some two miles behind it, against the danger of local penetration of the front — work already done in the
Verdun and Rheims
sectors. Joffre's final
instructions were to economise on manpower by holding the front line as thinly as possible, keeping the bulk of the garrison in the support positions, and to avoid pushing outposts too near the enemy's, in his view a wasteful and fruitless procedure. In general, the French held their fronts with artillery as far as possible, as they had very many more field guns in their corps establishments than the Germans or British. The latter always found, on taking over sections of the line from the French, as
they were progressively to do from the spring of 1915 onwards, that its layout coincided in no way with their own defensive conceptions. The German conception, which as they were to stand on the defensive in the west for most of the war was to be given greater thought than the Allies' and undergo more frequent revision, was different again, and as yet primitive. It laid down that only a single line should be constructed, the existence of a second being held to weaken the resolve of the garrison. Thus the position at Neuve Chapelle, attacked by the British in March 1915, probably exemplifies the state of their front in general at this date. It consisted of a continuous line, here in the watery valley of the Lys a thick breastwork, defended by battalions on a frontage of 800-1,000 yards. Each had two companies up, one in support 2,000 to 3,000 yards behind, and one in reserve about another 2,000 yards away. The only subsidiary defences took the form of a line of concrete machine-gun bunkers about 1,000 yards behind the front and 800 apart. The position was to prove, despite its apparent
weakness, remarkably
resilient.
The backbone of defence The deployment
of the artillery, backbone the Western Front and bludgeon of attack, varied little from army to army, the range of the different natures
of
defence
on
gun determining narrowly where each should be sited. Field guns, which formed the majority of the artilleries, had ranges of no more than 6,000 yards and so had always to be emplaced about 2,000 yards from the front; not nearer, for that would have put them within enemy small arms range, not further if they were to cover targets on his approach routes and reserve of
positions.
Medium
howitzers,
a
much
valued but initially scarce weapon, would be kept a little further back and the heaviest calibres — 8- or 9-inch howitzers and 6-inch guns — further away again. It is perhaps worth emphasising finally that all artillery in trench warfare fired 'indirectly', that is to say, from positions out of sight of their targets, onto which they were ranged by observers telephoning from the front
line.
Once organised the trenches quickly came to impose their own routine on their occupants, a routine which varied all the less because many divisions found themselves holding the same sector of front for months at a time, in the early stages of
the war without any relief. The French 29th Division, for example, held the Malancourt sector of the Somme front from November 1914 to July 1916; the German 13th Division the ridge at Aubers from November 1914 to March 1916; and the British 6th Division a portion of the Ypres salient from June 1915 to July 1916. Its diary records tours on three closely proximate sectors, each about 5,000 to 6,000 yards wide (which was normal on the 'active' half of the front) interrupted by three periods of rest, during which of course it was called upon to provide labour and carrying parties for work in the trenches at night. When in the line, divisions organised an internal rota of trench and reserve duties, regimental (in the British Army, brigade) sectors being held by battalions in turn, those out of it resting in reserve positions three or four miles from the front. And within the battalions, there was a
further rotation of companies during tours of duty, two companies normally holding the front line, one the support line and the fourth remaining in local reserve. They would exchange roles at one, two or three day intervals, reliefs always being effected at night, as were those of the battalions themselves about every week. In the bad winter of 1914, reliefs in the flooded sectors had to be arranged much more frequently, 24 hours in freezing ditch water reducing the garrisons to physical collapse. The round of duty in the front line in spells of quiet was little different on either side of the front. Most of the night would be spent at hard labour, repairing and revetting the trench walls, parapets
A good example
of
trench layout
— part of the Austrian
and parados, mending and laying wire and carrying stores. After the dawn stand-to, when every man lined the firing step against the chance of an early morning attack, the rest of the day would generally be spent in sleep or idleness, interrupted by sentry-go, until stand-to again at dusk. For many men a whole tour of front-line duty might pass without his firing a shot. At other times, a sudden and perhaps baseless night alarm might set off a fusillade which would be taken up by the garrisons to left and right until the whole front from Switzerland to the sea danced with light, to die away as quickly and inexplicably as it had begun. It was alarms like that, however, though sometimes no concrete cause at all, which, bringing down an unheralded salvo of shells, transformed a quiet spell in the line into tragedy, burying comrades beneath falls of earth, sending the stretcher bearers sweating back down the communication trenches and adding a handful of names to the company com-
front in Galicia
mander's
list
of fatalities.
Wounds and death by enemy
action apart, trench life at first proved curiously healthy. The lack of fresh food on tours of duty made lime juice an essential ration
ingredient and wet trenches caused 'trench foot', an affliction which turned the feet green, swollen and painful, but the only disease endemic to the life was the debilitating but not fatal trench fever, transmitted by the lice which infested everyone after a day or two in the line. The first call after a relief was therefore at the delousing station, where shirts and underclothes were swapped for fresh. The second was at the baths, initially set up in abandoned laundries and breweries but later organised by the rear services. Hot food, billets and sleep fulfilled the rest of a soldier's needs in his short spell out of the line. What was left of it would be given over to training, both in the normal round of musketry and platoon tactics and in the new skills of grenade-throwing, light machine gunnery, trench mortaring and raiding.
Raiding was not as yet a common prac and it never became one with the French. The British adopted from the first, however, a policy of 'dominating no man's land', keeping their trench garrisons strong and their line very close to the Germans', sometimes as near as 25 yards (the average distance on the Western Front was 200 to 300 yards between the fronts). Their main reason for doing so was to force the Germans to keep their front fully manned, thus preventing them from creattice
A German trench kitchen -the trenches soon came
to
impose
their
own
routine on their occupants
ing reserves or finding (he Labour to strengthen and deepen their positions. Raiding, at which the British, and even
585
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w
was
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Ypres
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LUXEMBOURG Soissons
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Epinal
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r-> Belfort
British trench. British and Frencn troops — here, with water two feet below th surface, wet weather was as much feared a~ an attack
An advanced French trench - French
policy
•
Altkirch
was
to hold forward trenches only lightly, so there was little incentive to improve them
SWITZERLAND
586
Canadian and Australian divibecome expert in later 1915 and 1916, was one method of doing so. Another, for which the Germans were initially better equipped, was short range trench-to-trench duelling with hand and rifle grenades, medium and light machine guns and trench mortars. The Germans
more
so the
sions,
were
to
to the war with grenades and mortars. The British had to
came ready equipped
improvise; their earliest grenades— jam tin filled with gun cotton and nails — were ineffective and dangerous to the user, their improvised trench mortars — lengths of drainpipes firing jam-tin bombs — very often lethal. The 1st Northants, issued with one of the first mortars, reported that after a few rounds it 'assumed the shape of a soda water bottle', when they wisely left
bombs
it
when
pulled on, was supposed to uproot the stakes. Yet another was an explosive barrow, to be manoeuvred across no man's land by a cable-driven reversing gear.
None
was machine-gun
Concentrated proved partially so but the best effects were achieved by observed fire from the 75-mm field gun, 150 rounds being found to cut a gap three by six yards deep in a thick belt. It was that method which the French decided to settle for — as did both British and Germans. As a result the French discontinued experiments with a method, had they but guessed, which promised best of all: the use of heavy agricultural tractors to crush paths through an entanglement. successful.
fire
Costly, fruitless defensives in the west would be fought out on terms already dictated at the Battle of the Aisne in September, 1914 which consigned the majority of the soldiers to long periods of intensely dangerous idleness, frequently interspersed with murderous contests for minor topographical features of purely local importance — Hill 60, The Bluff, Aubers Ridge, Notre Dame de Lorette, Hartmannweilerkopf— and less frequently by gigantic, unimaginably
Meanwhile the war
alone.
The French experimented widely with trench weapons in the winter of 1914-15. Between September and November 1914, the Second Army in the Argonne suffered over 15,000 casualties to German trench mortar fire and the French high command bent all its efforts to finding an antidote. A Lieutenant Fabre suggested erecting an inclined steel trellis in front of the trenches to deflect the incoming bombs but the idea was, perhaps unsurprisingly, rejected. By January 1915 the means of direct response had been found in a 58-mm trench mortar developed by Commandant Duchene which was gradually taken into use throughout the French army during 1915. But the French high command was in general less interested in trench weapons than in methods of penetrating the enemy's front — an aim which the British army, growing in numbers though it was, could not yet realistically contemplate and the Germans, occupied as they were in the east, could undertake on only a limited scale. The principal obstacle, as the French saw it, was the German barbed wire, to penetrate which a variety of implements and methods were proposed and tested. One of the simplest was a muzzle attachment to the rifle in which strands were trapped, to be cut by firing a round. Another was a cable-rocket, firing a grappling iron which,
costly and always fruitless offensive efforts to wrest free of the trenches and break clear into the open country beyond. This survey of trench warfare has had little to say of the war between the Russians and their German, Austrian and Turkish enemies for that war was never truly confined by trench systems as it was in the west. In December, 1914, it is true that their fronts had come temporarily to rest and that both sides had dug in. But conditions in the line were quite different from those in the west: 'a no man's land 3,000 to 4,000 yards wide, the front held only by outposts, very little wire and no shell-proof
dug-outs', on the German side; and on the Russian also the line was 'an elementary one, a field not a trench-warfare position, the ditches of the trenches being shallow
and the parapets having loopholes
The reason affairs is
do again with 'the ratio of force to space'.
The Russian
front in
in
December
Further Reading Carrington, C, Soldier From the Wars Returning (Hutchinson 1965) Cowper, J. M., The King's Own Vol. 3 (Gale &
Polden 1957)
Edmonds, Sir J. (ed), History of the Great War, France and Belgium (HMSO) Joffre, Marshal, Memoirs Vols. 1 and 3 Johnson, D. W., Battlefields of the World War Reichsarchiv, Der Weltkrieg Vol. 6 Etat-major de I'armee, Les Armies francaises dans la Grande Guerre, Tome 2
in them'.
for this less constricted state of
easy enough to explain, having
to
[For John Keegan 's biography, see page
A German machine gun post, Western Front- its power dominated the front line and made
fire
frontal infantry
Europe
1914, running as it did from the Baltic coast at Memel (now Klaipeda) in a long curve to Polotsk on the Vistula, then due south to Tarnow in northern AustriaHungary and south-east along the crests of the Carpathians as far as Chernovtsy totalled over 600 miles in length. Since the Russians could field just over 100 divisions and the Austro-Germans only 70, neither could concentrate along its front anything like the densities achieved by both sides in the west. There was available, therefore, neither the labour to build the trench systems nor the garrisons to hold them; and the war in Poland and the Ukraine was thus destined to assume a far more fluid and open form than it ever did in France outside the very first and very last months. Very much the same analysis applies to the Russo-Turkish front in the Caucasus, the scene of desperate fighting at the turn of 1914, and of Austria's front on her border with Serbia to which her Balkan army had, in early December, been ingloriously compelled to retreat. The importance of these eastern battlefields is often disregarded; wrongly so. It is, nevertheless, as a trench war that the First World War will be remembered -the image indeed is one which the western folk memory cannot shake off— and the purpose of this survey has been to describe how trench warfare began and to indicate in what directions it would develop.
and cavalry attacks impossible
*
-j
.*-*
-
HP
96.
I
• k
Before the war was many months old there was evident a general sense of stupefaction at the discrepancy between the expectation of a war of movement and the reality of the unexpected conditions of trench warfare. Few of the writers who had helped create in the years before 1914 a unique form of fiction wholly dedicated to the description of future wars, were at all accurate in their forecasts. In fact, most of the prophets simply misunderstood how much military technology had transformed the tactics and strategy of war. /. F. Clarke. Below left: 'War and Cholera' — a German cartoon (1911) showing one of the known horrors of war; the horror of mass-slaughter in the trenches could not then be imagined. Below right: A postcard (1909) advertising du Mauri er's play which warned dramatically of invasion
WYNDHAM'S THEATRE Um*t *
Mtfuc**
-
•
Mr
FRANK
CUKZOff.
V
V11 i
\
im
L^»>
The
Great Invasion Plart
AN ENGLISHMAN'S HONE
The First World War marked the end of a stage in human experience. The entirely unexpected conditions of trench warfare, the immense artillery battles, the use of submarines, poison gas, barbed wire, aeroplanes, tanks and machine guns demonstrated how technology had transformed the conduct of war. The British Commander-in-Chief, French, summed up the general sense of stupefaction at the unprecedented changes in warfare when he complained: 'No previous experience, no conclusion I had been able to draw from the campaigns in which I had taken part, or from a close study of the new conditions in which the war of today is waged, had led me to anticipate a war of positions. All my thoughts, all my prospective plans, all my possible alternatives of action, were concentrated upon a war of movement.' And yet, ironically, during the half-century before 1914 a succession of writers — admirals, generals, infantry and cavalry officers, politicians and journalists — had helped to establish a new form of fiction that was wholly dedicated to the description of future wars. The men who marched away in 1914 took with them an image of charging cavalry and brisk infantry engagements that had been created in the many forecasts of the Zukunftskrieg, Les guerres imaginaires and The Story of the next Great War. In the period from 1871 to 1914 many short stories and books about the probable conduct of future wars had been printed in France, Germany and Britain. Unfortunately out of the many hundreds that sought to predict the pattern of future wars only a minute proportion managed to give a reasonable forecast of what later burst upon the nations. This unique form of predictive fiction originated in the special conditions that prevailed during the last 30 years of the 19th Century. The shaping factors were the German victories in 1870, the new technologies that facilitated the rapid development of armaments, and the spread of adult male suffrage that made it. necessary for propagandists to present their arguments for a bigger navy or for conscription to the whole nation. In the course of this literature — from the beginnings in Chesney's Battle of Dorking in 1871 to Saki's ominous vision of the German occupation of the British Isles in When William Came in 1914 — there was a permanent and close connection between the facts of the contemporary international situation and the fantasies of the imagined conflicts of the future. These stories represented a collective programme for war. With the best of intentions many earnest writers sought to involve their readers in the argument for a French war of reconquest against the Germans, or they presented their visions of a German descent upon the United Kingdom, or they described naval battles fought out with the latest weapons. The art of these stories depended on the techniques of a rapid narrative and realistic detail and this all Europe learnt from the extraordinary success of the Battle ofDorking, an anonymous short story about a German invasion which appeared in the May issue of Blackwood's Magazine in 1871. The author was a colonel of engineers, Sir George Tomkyns Chesney and he had devised his account of a British defeat in order, he said, to demonstrate the necessity of 'securing the defence of the nation by the enforced arming of the people'. Chesney's vivid and forceful story had an unparalleled effect. Before the end of May the seventh edition of Blackwood's Magazine had been published to meet the public demand. In June the story was reprinted as a sixpenny pamphlet and at once it began to sell by tens of thousands. By July special editions were coming off the presses in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States, and before the end of 1871 the story had been translated into Dutch, French, and German. There can be no doubt that the Battle of Dorking had obtained this extraordinary success because Chesney had written the first hot story in an age of universal conscription. It was a soldier's recognition of the military consequences of technological advance and an admission that the war of 1870 had changed the structure of power in Europe. The international notoriety of the Battle ofDorking was decisive in the development of a common pattern for this kind of fiction. Chesney had revealed a medium that was admirably suited to the moods and the methods of the new epoch of belligerent nationalism and general literacy. The frequent changes in weapons — smokeless powder, magazine rifles, machine guns — and the rapid development of naval vessels — ironclads, submarines, dreadnoughts—coincided with a steady increase in the size of electorates and a rapid rise in the level of literacy. By the 1890's, therefore, it had become general practice in the major European countries for writers in the armed forces and for politicians to appeal directly to the nation in order to win support for their causes. Their guiding principle was taxation today but salvation tomorrow. So, Colonel Maurice, who collaborated with Admiral Colomb in writing The Great War of 1892, told the reader in one of his
pamphlets: 'The audience to which I am anxious to appeal are the lawyers, the business men, the doctors, the numbers of intelligent working men whom I know to be interested in the concerns of their country.' A similar intention shaped the
many tales of La Guerre qui Vient that were written under the pseudonym of Capitaine Danrit by the French officer, Commandant Driant, who later died with great heroism in the defence of Verdun. The reasons Driant gave in 1894 for writing his popular trilogy, La Guerre de Demain, explain the appeal of these stories: 'On every side the nations are arming and preparing for war. By writing this book in the form of an imaginary story I have tried to inspire my French readers with confidence in the outcome of the struggle. With this in mind I show them the resources of our country, and I demonstrate the new weapons that will be used in the coming battles: Melinite, the Lebel rifle, the dirigible balloon.' False prophets The intentions of these writers varied from an innocent curiosity about the conduct of the next great war to violent accounts of the destruction of the hated enemy. In 1888, for example, Arnold Forster (later Secretary of State for War) wrote a very popular story, In a Conning Tower, which ran through'eight editions and was translated into five European languages. In a preface he explained that his intention was to give 'a faithful idea of the possible course of an action between two modern ironclads availing themselves of all the weapons of offence and defence which an armoured ship at the present day possesses.' A different and less scrupulous use of the tale of the next war appeared in the episode of The Siege of Portsmouth, when Alfred Harmsworth applied the methods of the popular press for the general election of 1895. In that year Harmsworth stood as one of the Conservative candidates for Portsmouth. In order to further his interests he bought the Portsmouth Mail and arranged for it to carry a horrifying forecast of a French attack on Portsmouth. The story was designed to play upon the anxieties of the day. It began from the fact of British isolation in 1895, when 'the enforced hereditary hatred between France and ourselves was unfortunately coincident with a growing coolness between ourselves and Germany.' A war begins, and after the French troops had done their worst at Eastbourne 'whose streets ran blood and whose walls echoed the shrieks of the dying and defenceless' the story concluded with the case against the Liberals: 'And why had Portsmouth been thus pressed, and England thus imperilled? Because men had not sufficiently remembered that "England's Navy is her All in All". Because, while creating a big fleet, they had been remiss in the equally important matters of manning and organisation. Because, in one word, they were not ready.' From 1880 to 1914 the course of the tale of future warfare records the state of international affairs at the time of writing. Each moment of crisis — the occupation of Egypt in 1882, the French alliance with Russia in 1894, the Fashoda incident of 1898, the Tangier landing in 1905 — was the occasion for outbursts of propaganda stories and admonitory visions of the future. There were, however, marked variations in the use which British, French and German writers found for the stereotype of the imaginary war. In the United Kingdom it was customary to select France — alone or in combination with Russia — as the expected enemy, and this practice can be seen at work in such tales as How John Bull lost London, The Battle of Boulogne, The Great Naval War of 1SS7. The Capture of London, How the Jubilee Fleet escaped destruction. The new Battle of Dorking, The Sack of London in the Great French War of 1901. With the French the practice was different. They divided their attention between two possible wars against the British and against the Germans. Their anti-German stories were usually careful but uninspired accounts from serving officers who wished to prepare their countrymen for the war of reconquest by writing such encouraging forecasts as La Guerre future. La Guerre franco- allemande La Guerre prochame entre la France et I'Allemagne. These stories continued with little change up to 19 11 when one of the last optimistic predictions was Com men t nous torpillerons Berlin, a forecast of the bombing of Berlin in the immediate future. In contrast to these anti-German stories there was a separate series of Les Guerres Imaginaires which were all ferociously anti-British. This stream had begun in 1884 with th<> publication of Les Malheurs de John Bull by Camille Debans. In such tales as Mart aux Anglais and L'Agonie d' Albion the French propagandists described the defeat of the perfidious island race Their accounts of future French victories displayed those elements of violence, hatred of the enemy and a desire for humiliating victories that characterised their English equivalents, especially William Le Queux's notorious account of The Great War in Eng ,
r^.)
land in 1897 and Max Pemberton's revelations in Pro Patria of French plans to invade England by means of a secret tunnel under the Channel And then, quite suddenly, these stories of a future war between British and French came to an end in 1904, when the establishment of the Entente left the two nations united against Germany, the only possible enemy in any forecast of future war.
Propaganda fantasies On the German side the practice was at first quite different since German interests had concentrated exclusively on semi- fictional accounts about the next war. The change came after the naval construction programmes of 1898 and 1900, when the first propaganda fantasies began to appear. An early specimen of the new themes was Wehrlos zur See of 1900 in which the author described the crushing defeat of Germany so that all might realise how 'Germany through the fault of the Reichstag bad fallen inexcusably behind other maritime nations in the expansion of her fleet." Another forecast of 1900, Die Abrechnung mit England, gave a more encouraging account of successful actions by German cruisers in a war tbat ends with the defeat of the United Kingdom. By 1900 the great war between the British and Germans had begun. For the first time in the history of this literature German writers had started to produce such forecasts as Der deutsch-englische Kneg. Mit deutschen Waffen iiber Paris nach Staff
Like the Austro-Prussian War 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War 1870, the Boer War (shown in this painting) was one of movement, and military leaders expected the First World War to repeat the pattern
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London, Die 'Offensiv-Invasion gegen England, Die Engldnder kommen, Englands Feind: der Herr der Luft. Some of the authors employed the Chesney technique of doom and destruction to drive home the lesson of German naval inferiority, but with the majority the common themes were future victory, the expansion of the Reich, and the gratifying conclusion to August Niemann's Der Weltkrieg: 'Tomorrow his Majesty the Emperor will enter London at the head of the allied armies. Peace is assured. God grant that it may be the last war which we shall have to wage for the future happiness of the German nation.'
A
flood of warlike predictions British declaration of war against Germany came in 1903 with the publication of two books, Modern Warfare by Captain Guggisberg and The Riddle of the Sands, Erskine Childer's famous tale of mystery and detection. Although Modern Warfare attracted little attention, it gave an accurate forecast of a German invasion of Belgium. As the Germans prepare for war, the United Kingdom gives notice that any attack on Belgium would be considered as a hostile act. So, when the German armies move into Belgium on July 1, 1905, 'The telegraph lines from London flash the order to "mobilise" to the Army and Navy in all parts of the United Kingdom. Before midday every corner of the Empire knows that Britain and Germany are at war.' That was a soldier's view
The
The naval version came in The Riddle of the Sands the hero investigates the mysterious naval operations off the Frisian Islands. As he watches he realises that he 'was assisting at an experimental rehearsal of a great scene to be enacted, perhaps, in the near future — a scene when multitudes of sea-going lighters, carrying full loads of soldiers, not half loads of coal, should issue simultaneously, in seven ordered fleets, from seven shallow outlets and under escort of the Imperial Navy traverse the North Sea and throw themselves upon English shores.' From 1903 onwards stories of the great war between Britain and Germany came out every year. In 1906, for instance, after the ill feelings caused by the Tangier incident there was a flood of warlike predictions: Hamburg und Bremen in Gefahr. Mene, mene tekel upharsin! Englands Uberwaltigung durch Deutsvhland, V'biker Europas. 1906: der Zusammenbruch der alten Welt, Der deutsch-englisehe Krieg. The Writing on the Wall. The North Sea Bubble, The Shock of Battle, The Enemy in our Midst. The Invasion of 1910. Of these the most notorious, and the most successful, was The Invasion of 1910 which the journalist William Le Queux wrote in collaboration with Field-Marshal Lord Roberts for serialisation in the Daily Mail. This account of a successful German invasion aroused such interest throughout the world that it was translated into 27 languages and sold more than 1.000,000 copies when it appeared in book form. These tales of the next war of the future.
when
Evidence of the possibility of trench warfare in the years before'1914 had been largely ignored. The last phase of the American Civil War (below) had been spent in siege operations, and as defensive fire-power was improved with the introduction of progressively better rifles and machine guns, so trench systems grew pregnant with tactical importance. In the Russo-Turkish War 1877, the Russo-Japanese War 1904-05 and the Balkan Wars 1912-13 trench warfare was of cardinal importance, yet in late 1914 it was universally regarded as an unexpectedly novel phenomenon
could always find a ready sale. They dealt in the major anxieties or hopes of their times. They described what everyone expected: a war that opened with a decisive naval engagement in the North Sea and ended within 12 months after a number of fast-moving battles. Many of these stories were violent, chauvinistic affairs but many were the work of sincere and dedicated writers who had found good reason for anxiety at the state of the nation. On November 23, 1908 Lord Roberts told the House of Lords that conscription was a matter of necessary preparedness for war. Two months later a play on this theme, An Englishman's Home,
underwater troops, the air of cities, chemical warfare and les blockhaus roulants which anticipated Wells's land ironclads by some 20 years. But Robida does not compare with H. G. Wells, who turned out more tales of future warfare than any other writer of his time. From the vision of interplanetary warfare in The War of the Worlds of 1897 to the atomic bombs described in The World Set Free in 1913, Wells's imagination ranged over the consequences of applying technology to war. Some of his most striking forecasts appeared in Anticipations in 1902: centralised commands, special-
at Wyndham's Theatre in London. The author was Guy du Manner, then second-in-command of The Royal Fusiliers, and his dramatic warning about invasion and national preparedness was so much in keeping with the public mood that An Englishman's Home played to packed houses for 18 months. While London audiences were applauding this play, German bookshops were selling large numbers of Rudolf Martin's popular forecast, Der Weltkrieg in den Luften, in which unwise policies bring on the defeat of the United Kingdom. Disaster overtakes the British people
automatic rifle fire, mechanised artillery and armoured fighting vehicles. Wells succeeded in his forecasts because he combined an exceptional imagination with considerable technical knowledge. He could, for example, take the latest ideas in atomic physics and work them into the story of the World Set Free, a book in which he had the doubtful distinction of describing the first
opened
because they 'had entered into increasingly closer relations with France and Russia'. As the Crown Prince explains for the benefit of the German reader: 'This unhappy war, conducted so unwillingly by my father and disliked by all of us, would never have begun if our two countries had entered into an alliance.'
Men of vision Today, with all the advantages of hindsight, it seems strange that so many writers should have been so eager to describe the conduct of the next great war. For most Europeans before 1914, however, war appeared both natural and inevitable. There had always been wars, and there would always be wars. As Sir Henry Newbolt wrote of his generation, 'we spent all our lives among warring nations, and in grave anticipation of the supreme danger which broke upon us at last.' What came was very different from what had been expected. 'It must be remembered,' wrote Herbert Read, 'that in 1914 our conception of war was completely unreal. We had vague, childish memories of the Boer War, and from these and from a general diffusion of Kiplinguesque sentiments, we managed to infuse into war a decided element of adventurous romance. War still appealed to the imagination.' This difference between expectation and reality appears most strikingly in the general failure to anticipate the scale or the duration of the First World War. The majority of these would-be prophets described a very limited kind of warfare which a handful of admirals and generals were more than competent to direct and most of them considered that technological innovations — aeroplanes, dreadnoughts, machine guns — could only have the beneficial result of bringing future wars to a more rapid conclusion than had been possible before. They expected the kind of battle described in Seestern's 1906 where the German First and Second Armies face the French in positions stretching from Arras to Chalons. After four days of heavy fighting the decisive battle proves to be an old-style affair that is over in the space of a few hours: Once more the thunder of the heavy guns boomed forth. The earth trembled, and the air grew black with deadly missiles. Amid the din the sharp rattle and clatter of the infantry fire could be heard, and the clear ring of the machine guns. It was hell let loose. Then bugle notes sounded sharp and clear above the rest, crashing into the uproar of the battle of the peoples. A hundred thousand men started up at the sound. Then, their regimental bands striking up, and the mightily inspiring song of the Hohenfrieders rolling across the vast, steaming battlefield, a dark wave of men and horses surged up from the ravine. The green declivity was scaled in a moment, and the glittering, clanking troops flowed over the gently sloping Now, the plain in a wide stream that swept everything before it. long line of the German cavalry were upon them and broke into the enemy's lines. Flashing sabres, slashing blows, men trampled under foot, rearing horses, a short, hopeless struggle — and the German horse were between the French batteries, flinging everything down before them. The prophets of the next war failed in their forecasts because they were obsessed with the state of the nations. They had neither the time nor the interest to pursue any original independent thoughts about the practical consequences of another European war. In fact, the few accurate forecasts came from writers who were civilians, who did not write in the naval or military interest .
and who had managed
.
bombardment
ist staffs,
imaginary war to be fought with atomic bombs. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle displayed a similar capacity for accurate prediction in Danger, a short story about unrestricted submarine warfare which appeared in the Strand Magazine for July 1914. Doyle wrote the story, he said, 'to direct public attention to the great danger which threatened this country' and in order to hammer home his lesson he showed how a small, imaginary European country was able to defeat the British people by using submarines to sink all ships approaching United Kingdom ports. On the first day of war one submarine alone sank five vessels between Maplin Sands and the Nore. With unhappy accuracy Doyle described what was to take place around the British Isles before 12 months were out: 'We caught her amidships and the explosion was tremendous. She sank almost instantaneously. I am sorry for her people, of whom I hear that more than two hundred, including seventy Lascars and forty passengers, were drowned. Yes, I am sorry for them. But when I think of the huge floating granary that went to the bottom, I rejoice as a man does who has carried out that which he plans.' Feeling that Doyle's story challenged naval doctrine, the editor of the Strand Magazine asked a number of admirals for their views. Admiral Sir Algernon de Horsey dismissed it as 'a fantastic account of an imaginary war' and Admiral William Hannam Henderson denied that 'territorial waters will be violated, or neutral vessels sunk. Such will be absolutely prohibited, and will only recoil on the heads of the perpetrators. No nation would permit it, and the officer who did it would be shot.' Before the August issue of the Strand Magazine had appeared the ultimatum had been sent to Serbia and there followed the first great technological war which most of the prophets of Les guerres imaginaries and the Zukunftskrieg had failed to foresee. There was no great naval battle in the North Sea. and on land the course of action proved to be very different from the calculations of the Schlieffen Plan and Plan 17. And very soon authors of imaginary wars, like Saki and Commandant Driant, were committed to a conflict they had never dreamed of. Saki died with a sniper's bullet in his head, and Commandant Driant was killed in action at Bois des Caures whilst directing the defence against the massed attacks by the German XVIII Corps. The best that can be said for them, and for most of those who wrote about the next great war, is that they stood for worthy patriotic ideals at a time when few had foreseen how technology would transform the conduct of war. They lived in the last age of innocence, before the military technologies of poison gas, machine guns, barbed wire, artillery concentrations and tanks had revealed how science could transform war.
.
modern warfare from the context of national histories and European politics. The earliest vision of a tec nological war appeared in La Guerre au vingtieme siecle of 1883. The authcr was that remarkable Frenchman, Albert Robida, an engraver, lithographer and caricaturist who foresaw so many of the things that appeared 592
later on: mines, torpedoes, submarines,
to separate the possibilities of
Further Reading Angell, N., The Great Illusion (1905)
Modern Weapons and Modern War (1900) George Tomkyns, The Battle of Dorking (1871) Clarke, F., Voices Prophesying War 1763-1984 (OUP 1966) Foch, Marshal, The Principles of War (1918) Goltz, Baron von der, The Nation in Arms (1906) Bloch,
I.
S.,
Chesney,
Sir
I.
Saki (H. H. Monro), When William Came (1914) Wells, H.G., The War in the Air (1908)
F. CLARKE is Head of the Department of English Studies at the University of Strathclyde and was at one time a Fellow of the University of Liverpool. He served throughout the Second World War in North Africa and Italy; firstly as an artillery officer and from 1942 onwards as an intelligence officer. His major research interest is the study of the ways in which science and technology have changed our attitude to nature and time. He has published two books in this field I.
The Tale of the Future (1960) and Voices Prophesying War (1966)
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The Winter Carpathian
Campaign
By January 1915 AustriaHungary was threatened by neighbouring neutral powers, eager to exploit her weakness.
Aware
of his country's failing strength, Conrad centred his hopes on a decisive campaign in
the Carpathian mountains aimed at expelling" the Russians from the Vistula salient the situation in the Carpathian area was complicated, and many factors contributed to both sides' decisions to stage an offensive there. For Conrad von Hotzendorf, several factors counted. In the first place, he had committed the error of making his operations dependent on the fate of a fortress: come what may, he had to relieve Przemysl, and this restricted the range of possibilities open to him. At this time, it was thought that the garrison would last out until the end of February, which gave Conrad a few weeks in which to relieve it. Several other considerations
Strategically,
also from the Vistula salient, then no neu-
power would dare
tral
to intervene against
the Central Towers. Besides, quite apart from the consideration that Przemysl had to be relieved, the Russian front offered interesting possibilities. There was a huge salient in Poland and attacks on the flanks of this salient, in Fast Prussia and the Carpathians, might well force the Russians to abandon it and maybe also large numbers of Russian troops could be trapped in the area before they could escape. Conrad suggested this operation to the Germans early in the year, and they were interested. They knew, too, that the neutral powers must be kept out and so decided to bolster
up Austria-Hungary. On Conrad's prompt-
German commanders
ing, the
in the East,
send two and a half infantry and one cavalry division to the Austro-Hungarian front. This force, joined
agreed
to
divisions
somewhat larger number of AustroHungarian divisions, made up the 'German
to a
South Army', or Deutsche Siidarmee, under an enterprising general, Linsingen. It began to arrive in the Austro-Hungarian rear areas in mid-January. Geographically
Austria-Hungary were knocked out of the war, then Germany would collapse. The Russian High Command, Stavka, for the
moment backed Ruzsky, and made
pre-
parations for an offensive in East Prussia. But Ivanov seems to have ignored what Stavka said, and took more supplies and recruits than he ought to have done. At all events, Ivanov, too, was building up his strength for an attack on Austria-Hungary, and he, too, chose the Carpathian area as the most direct route into Hungary. In this way, the two forces organised offensives in the Carpathians towards the end of January. It would have been almost impossible to find a less suitable place for
an
offensive.
The Carpathian mountains,
stretching all the way from south of Krakow to the Rumanian frontier, resemble in height the Scottish Highlands. In their western half, known as the Beskids, they had been to some extent cleared and cultivated, and there were some tolerable roads. The eastern half, the Waldkarpathen, was covered by forests, with few roads, inhabited by the most povertystricken and backward peasantry in Europe. In winter, these mountains presented extraordinary difficulties to campaigning, and the Austro-Hungarian official history, never inclined to criticise Conrad von Hotzendorf, uses the term grisly folly' in describing the Car'a pathian campaigns. Certainly the Carpathian winter campaign put an incredible strain on the troops of both armies. The few roads were either blocked with snowdrifts or, when the thaw came, impassable as a result of the mud. Guns had to be
dragged painfully, helped along by teams of men with crow-bars. The wounded could not be sent back to the rear at any speed, and thousands of them died from exposure. The attackers could not use their artillery properly, and in any case it was very difficult to bring up munitions. The temperature ran between freezing point and 20 degrees below zero Fahrenheit and sometimes there would be thaw during the day, followed by a freeze-up at night. On
two occasions, whole companies were found
Above: Their guns camouflaged
in
white blankets, soldiers of the Third
intervened. The Habsburg Monarchy was virtually surrounded by hostile powers, all anxious to take part of its territory. Italy and Rumania had begun a discreet black-
mail—unless Austria-Hungary gave them territory, they would intervene. No AustroHungarian statesman or general believed that they could successfully resist these powers: the nominal commander of the army, Archduke Friedrich, expressed the universal view that if Italy intervened, the war was lost. To deter Italy, it was important to secure a success somewhere or other. The Germans would have preferred to see AustriaHungary eliminate Serbia. Conrad replied that an attack on Serbia, and a seeming extension of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in the western Balkans, would be regarded by the Italians as a challenge, and must therefore be avoided. He went on that only a success against the Russians in the Carpathian area would count — if the Russians could be expelled from Galicia, perhaps
594
Army
await a Russian attack
it would have been better to launch the planned offensive further east, in the Bukovina, which lay next to Russian terri-
It was not possible to concentrate here, however, because the railways were very poor — there was only a one-track line running from central Hungary to Korosmezo and the valley of the upper Tisza,
tory.
where the troops would have to be concenand so, with reluctance, Conrad dropped the scheme of a large scale attack
frozen to death, covered by snow. When either side attacked, it was a question of moving up steep slopes in conditions that would have exhausted a trained mountaineer, far less peasants from the plains or urban proletarians. All in all, the Carpathian offensives were a terrible experi-
ence for
who underwent them. They
all
are the greatest blot on Conrad's record: never once did he visit the front to see conditions for himself, and he waved aside the protests that came to him from Third Army — the Chief-of-Staff of this Army came to Teschen to protest against continuing the offensives, and was dismissed a few
days
later, for
having
'lost
his nerve'.
trated,
The Russians on any idea what by
the
their side
to do.
obvious
Hungarian
Fighting in the passes offensives themselves are difficult to describe, owing to the peculiar nature of the terrain. In the Carpathians, it was
The
in this area.
forces.
had scarcely
They were depressed
revival
of
the
They knew
Austro-
also their
almost impossible to stage a wholly defensive operation. Positions could be dug in the
own weaknesses. A prolonged wrangling
mountains
went on between the commanders of the two Russian fronts, the north-western one under Ruzsky, the south-western one under Ivanov. Ruzsky believed that his front was the more important — after all he was facing the main enemy, Germany. Ivanov, on the other hand, argued that if
many an
themselves,
but
there
were
valleys, often obscured by mist, and attacker could always find the enemy
flanks and surround the mountain positions—provided the weather allowed this. The Carpathian fighting was therefore more a set of local attacks and counterattacks than a full scale offensive. As a
rule, the fighting went on around the passes — where there were roads indispensable to supply-carts. To the west these routes were comparatively developed — there were the Dukla and the Lupkow Passes through the Beskids, and, running just south of them, a railway, which at Mezolaborcz crossed with a railway running north to Przemysl through the Lupkow Pass. Thirty miles east of this pass was the Uzsok Pass, at the western edge of the Waldkarpathen: through this a road led to Turka and Chyrow, the shortest route to Przemysl and hence of the utmost importance to the Austro-Hungarian attack. It was in this region that the Austro-Hungarian army staged its first
Carpathian offensive on January 23,
1915.
The
first
offensive
was ambitiously,
in-
deed grandiosely, planned. Twenty AustroHungarian divisions took part in it, with a general attack on the Dukla, Lupkow and Uzsok Passes. East of the Uzsok Pass, the German Siidarmee under Linsingen was to try to take the passes of the Waldkarpathen, the Verecke and Wyszkow Passes. Further east, south of the Prut, an AustroHungarian group of divisions under General von Pflanzer-Baltin was to try to push the Russians back on the Dniestr. The Russians on their side defended the Carpathians with a roughly equal number of divisions loosely grouped under Brusilov, commanding Eighth Army. They were concerned essentially with waiting until Przemysl was starved out, for they lacked the heavy artillery with which it could be bombarded into surrender. Even so, they were themselves prepared for an offensive which they hoped would carry them into Hungary - although characteristically Ivanov concealed his preparations from his
own High Command. The first Carpathian offensive
lasted only
a few days, and made almost no progress. The conditions in the mountains were appalling — guns and supplies stuck two miles to the rear, communications to flank and rear threatened to fold up altogether and the troops came to an end of their ammunition of January 26. On the right of Boroevic's army, a group of divisions under a Hungarian general, Szurmay, took the Uzsok Pass, but became stuck after this. The German Siidarmee did no better, although the Russian troops opposite it were thinly spread. Only Pflanzer-Baltin made any progress, but as a result of the difficulties of supplying him, he lacked the reserves to carry his offensive much further. Thus the offensive in the Carpathians almost immediately lost its impetus. At the end of the month, the Russians attacked in the Dukla-Lupkow area, where they had assembled a good part of their reserves. They had somewhat better supply routes from Galicia than the Austro-
Hungarian armies had from Hungary, and made some headway: by early February they had taken the two passes and were threatening Mezolaborcz, an their attacks
important
rail way -junction in
the Beskids. The left and centre of Boroevic's army were thrown back in confusion, losing thousands of prisoners — since the beginning of the offensive on January 23, this army of over 100,000 men had lost nearly two-thirds of its men through illness, capture or as battle-casualties, and morale was very low. However, as the Russian Eighth Army came through the mountains, it suffered from the same difficulties as the
Austro-Hungarian Third Army, and was held up just south of the passes. Even so, by the middle of the month Mezolaborcz had been taken, and the Austro-Hungarian railway traffic had thus been made very difficult, if not impossible. The Russian commanders might have exploited their
further — certainly
success
Hungarian army was
the
Austro-
in no condition to
very stoutly — but they were worried about the progress made by Pflanzer-Baltin in the east, and also at the appearance of German troops, whom they had learned to resist
dread.
They therefore sent
their reserves
by preference to the front in the Bukovina and the Waldkarpathen, while Stauka, much to Ruzsky's disgust, arranged to send XXII Corps, a Finnish corps well-adapted to fighting in mountainous, wooded country, from East Prussia to the south. Conrad ought to have learned his lesson from the fate of the first Carpathian offensive, and taken on a more limited task. But it was impossible for him to renounce Przemysl. The garrison had rations for another month, largely from killing the cavalry horses — and thus making it virtually impossible for themselves to break out. If the fortress fell, then the effect on the neutrals would be very great, and it was reckoned that Italy and Rumania certainly, and perhaps also Bulgaria, would come in against the Central Powers. Conrad's attention
was therefore firmly
fixed
on Przemysl. There were other considerations. Given that the Third Army had not advanced beyond the Carpathians, it could avoid fighting in the mountains only by retreat.
A
retreat to the
Hungarian
plains,
however, would also be a certain way of bringing Rumania into the war. There was in Conrad's view nothing for it but to launch another offensive in the Carpathians. For this he called many divisions from the fronts of the Dunajec and the Vistula. He recalled from Poland the commander of Second Army, Bohm-Ermolli, whom he trusted not to lose his nerve as Boroevic had done, and he put in charge of the newly-formed attacking group between the Lupkow and the Uzsok Passes a Hungarian corps' commander, Tersztyanszky, Below: Austro-Hungarian troops set up camp in typical snow-covered Carpathian terrain
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ELEVENTH INVESTING
his army would last out, as all reports were depressing. The Danube line from Vienna to Buda-Pest was fortified, arrangements were made to take the governments and their archives to Salzburg and a car was kept waiting in the Emperor's palace to take him there if need be. The Russians made extraordinary efforts, although they too suffered from the continuing winter and from high losses of all types. Finally, during the Easter weekend, two and a
laborcz to Ustrzyki, north of the Uzsok Pass. There was nothing else he could do. He made a last desperate attempt to relieve
22, Przemysl fell, and with over 100,000 men. The detonations with which the garrison destroyed the works were heard 50 miles to the south by Tersztyanszky's troops, and the morale of the Austro-Hungarian army sank to a new low. The Slav troops of the army began to give trouble, and the generals had to cope with a constant trickle of deserters. The sick-lists did not decrease, and although new recruits were fed into the line, no one was confident that they would hold it. Besides, the Russians could now use on their front the divisions that had been besieging Przemysl, and with this accretion of strength Ivanov ordered an 'immediate advance through the Carpathians and into Hungary'. From March 22 to the middle of April the Austro-Hungarian front was in constant
Above: Austro-Hungarian artillerymen on the
crisis.
slopes of the Carpathians. When the snow melted, the movements of the two armies were hampered by mud. Left: The Carpathian battleground-inhospitable mountain terrain over which little movement could be achieved. Exhausted even before the start of the battle, both sides suffered heavy losses
The Russian High Command had now decided to drop their schemes for
attacking East Prussia, and wanted to concentrate instead on Hungary. Italy was clearly on the brink of intervening in the war. In this way, the whole situation in the Balkans would be changed, and the
the line became stabilised by the middle of the month. Hungary had thus been saved, but the Austro-Hungarian army had lost almost all its professional regimental
command
Russian High Command was determined to make an appearance in force in this
Further Reading
who
in
Conrad's view represented
all
that
best in the Austro-Hungarian army. This new force was assembled towards the end of February, and a new offensive got under way on the 27th. Once more there
was
failure. The weather turned very unfavourable—there was no reason to expect anything else — and the story of the January offensive was repeated. The Russians had been expecting this attack, and had carefully husbanded their troops, allowing them to retreat until the AustroHungarian units, exhausted by their advance and out of munitions, had advanced beyond their supply-lines. By early March, Tersztyanszky had only established a salient in the mountains from Mezo-
was
Przemysl towards the middle of the month, but again merely extended his salient, already only barely tenable. Further east, Linsingen and Pflanzer-Baltin continued their attacks, with some success. By midMarch the Russians had been thrown back across the Dniestr. But this success was too remote from the Carpathian battlefields to have much effect, and in any case the Russians brought from Poland their Ninth Army to defend eastern Galicia. They now planned a counteroffensive, to begin by the third week of March.
On March
it,
theatre so as not to be neglected when peace-terms were arranged. Ivanov was therefore given full backing for an offensive in the Carpathians. He struck first at Tersztyanszky in the Lupkow-Uzsok area, and by late March had compelled the Austrian forces to withdraw from the salient there, and indeed withdraw some 30 miles to the south. Then he set his best corps against the Austro-Hungarian Third Army, in the Dukla Pass region, and forced it to retire also. Conrad did not know whether
German
divisions arrived south of the Pass — the Beskidenkorps, under General von der Marwitz. The arrival of fresh German troops, with excellent moun-
half
Dukla
and a sudden improvement weather early in April brought the Russian advance to a halt. The Russian Eighth Army, suffering now from a severe shell shortage, had to stop its attacks, and tain artillery, in the
officers
less a
and NCO's, and was now more or urgently needing German turn it into a proper army.
militia, to
Bonch-Bruyevich, M Potyerya nami Galitsn v 1915 godu (Moscow 1920) Brusilov, A A Soldier's Notebook: Der Welt,
.
krieg
Volume
VII (Reichsarchiv) Hotzendorf, C. von, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit
Volume 5 Jozsef. Archduke. en lattam
A vilaghaboru. amilyennek
A., Strategichesky ocherk voym 1914-1918 (Moscow 1922). Osterreichs-Ungarns Letzer Kneg VolurTies 1 and 2
Neznamov,
[For
Norman
Stone's biography, sec page
466.]
:.»7
The Winter Battle in Masuria At the beginning o. 915 the German High Command faced two choices for action — a co °ntration offerees in the west or a thrust to the east. Their decision >o east was dictated by earlier successes against Russia and by i e need to help Austria. Norman Stone
598
The new year 1915 got off to a bad start in Germany. There was violent quarrelling between the 'easterners' and the 'westerners' about what to do next. Both sides had good arguments. Falkenhayn, Chief-of-Staff of the army and thus virtual Commander-in-Chief, saw the war as a whole; he argued that the war would never be won until the British and French had been defeated, and that any deflection of strength from the west would therefore be an error. Besides, he did not believe that there would be any real victory over the Russians — at best their armies would be thrown back into the interior of Russia,
The advance other
where they could do to the Germans what they had done to Napoleon in 1812. The Germans would outrun their lines of supply, and would have to face the Russian these circumstances, Falkenhayn had good reasons for wanting to concentrate his strength in the west. Indeed he went further, and kept urging the diplomats to make some kind of separate peace with Russia. At the same time, the 'easterners' too had powerful arguments — they had the most powerful of all, success. Hindenburg and Ludendorff no doubt had a limited view of the war, but at the same time they winter.
In
produced success, and were therefore popular among the politicians. They argued that if Russia could be put out of the war, then Germany would be free to concentrate on the West, and also to draw supplies from Russia to do so. There were several other considerations.
Germany had
In
the
first
place,
do something to help her ally, Austria-Hungary, who was in grave trouble. She had to fight Serbia and Russia; she feared that the neutrals, Italy and Rumania, would attack her when the to
snows melted. Her army did not inspire confidence: indeed the reports of FreytagLoringhoven, the
German
liaison officer.
German
to
Masuria-a gamble
that
left
fronts dangerously vulnerable.
were so pessimistic that he was replaced at the turn of the year by a more generous* minded and less alarmist officer, Cramon.
The junior German
officers attached to various Austro-Hungarian units generally reported in gloomy tones, and in some cases made themselves unpopular by their frankness. Unless something could be done to shore up Austria-Hungary she might be forced to make a separate peace, and this would leave Germany on her own. Again, there was serious anxiety about the and Runeutrals, in particular Ital\ mania: If they attacked the Central Powers — and they were expected to do SO
599
in March - then the w it would, in virtually everyone's opinion, be over. As it was, Austro-Hungarian strength only just covered the Carpathian front and if Italy and Rumania came in. clearly she would lose the war at once. In the circumstances. Austria-Hungary badly needed help, a dramatic success in the East would perhaps deter Italy and Rumania from entering the war. The statesmen tended to take the easterners' view o\' things: Jagow, German Foreign Secretary, regarded the war as essentially against Russia, with France an unnecessary complication; Bethmann-Hollweg likewise supported Ludendorff against Falkenhayn. The deciding factor was simple: success. In the west, three months of fighting, with enormous casualty figures, had decided nothing at all, as neither side could break through the trench system. In the east, however, the Germans had done very well — they had twice stopped the
Russians from invading Germany, and had conquered a large part of Russian Poland as well, despite the superiority of numbers that the Russians clearly enjoyed. It was in the east that headlines were made. This was the decisive consideration. Falkenhayn, himself envious of the successes won by Ludendorff, remained impervious to these headlines, and wanted to go on in the west. But the statesmen were not moved by these cold, technical arguments and threw their weight behind the easterners. As a climax to the crisis between the two sides, Bethmann-Hollweg formally demanded from the Kaiser that Falkenhayn be dismissed, and replaced by Hindenburg and Ludendorff. This was refused, but the pressure was enough to force
Falkenhayn
into
compromising with
the easterners. The most pressing problem was that of Austria-Hungary. To deal with this question at all ran against the grain in the Prussian army: Schlieffen had once contemptuously said: 'the fate of Austria will be decided not upon the Bug, but upon the
and this was Falkenhayn's view But something had to be done, now that it was clear that the battlefields in the west were deciding nothing. Political and military considerations ran together to force Falkenhayn to do something to support his ally. At this time the Austro-Hungarian front was being susSeine,' also.
tained only with great difficulty. It ran along the rivers Dunajec and Biala, and thence through the Carpathian mountains to the Rumanian frontier. The, fortress of Przemysl, on the river San, had been left on its own as the front fell back south, and at some point it must come to an end of its supplies. If this happened, and the fortress fell, with its garrison of over 100,000 men, then the neutrals would be greatly tempted to intervene and each take a part of
Austro-Hungarian
territory.
The Austro-Hungarian military were already talking of defending 'the Danube line Vienna to Buda-Pest', and Conrad von Hotzendorf, Austro-Hungarian Chief-ofStaff, kept urging the Germans to come to his aid. On January 1, 1915, there was a conference in Berlin between Falkenhayn and Conrad, with Ludendorff there for some of the time. Conrad urged Falkenhayn to send troops to the east, some of them directly to support the Austro-Hungarian front. For the moment there was no agreement, but a rt w days later Falkenhayn, under
600
pressure from his own closest influences, the Kaiser and Bethmann-Hollweg, gave way. On January 8 he told Conrad that he could have a few German divisions for the Carpathian front — these were to be taken from the German part of the Russian front, and would be formed up with an equal number of Austro-Hungarian divisions as the 'German Southern Army' (Deutsche Sudarmee), under a German general, Linsingen. As a way of getting rid of Ludendorff, and saddling him with an operation
which Falkenhayn had no faith, Falkenhayn arranged for him to be appointed Chief-of-Staff of this new army. The scheme was dropped two weeks later, after Hir denin
burg, at Ludendorff 's dictation, compl; ined that he could not do without Ludendorff's help. At any rate, whoever was the Chnefof-Staff, the German army now had a stake in the Carpathian fighting. The Germans
were now committed
to
an active policy on
the Eastern Front in that they had now made a small investment in the AustroHungarian front, and would have to invest more in order not to lose the initial one. Falkenhayn continually carped at this, but there was nothing he could do.
Grandiose schemes In this roundabout way, Falkenhayn was compelled to sanction further active operations on the German part of the front, and to send there the new troops that were being raised inside Germany, and which Falkenhayn would have preferred to use in the west. These new troops consisted of four Reserve corps, made up of young men
who had been called up and who would finish
in December 1914 their training by force formed the
early February. This general reserve of the army, and naturally both westerners and easterners wanted it for their own purposes. Falkenhayn wanted these corps in the west: he was worried at the prospect of a new AngloFrench offensive there, for contrary to legend, the Anglo-French offensives in the West were seriously worrying to the Germans and prevented their ever sending a truly crushing force to the east. Hindenburg, however, was determined to have the new corps in the east, where he entertained ambitious, not to say grandiose, schemes. The Austro-Hungarian armies in the south would attack north-east with the help of Linsingen's arnry while the Germans in East Prussia seized the other Russian ;
,
flank, and rol'ed it up. In this wa} the Russians would be forced out of the Vistula salient, Przemysl would be relieved and large numbers of Russian
troops could perhaps be pinned down before they could escape. This was a tempting scheme, if only the Germans could find the strength for it. Many voices were raised in favour: even Falkenhayn's deputy, its Generalquartiermeister Wild von Hohenborn, normally a westerner, said: T am convinced that \ve should use the new corps in the east, however much we don't like doing it.' In any case, once the step had been taken of supporting the Austro-Hungarian front, it was indispensable to follow this up. Wild believed that the AustroHungarian Carpathian operation would deflect Russian troops from the German part of the front, and allow the Germans to achieve complete surprise with an attack from East Prussia. On January 12 Falken-
hayn went in
to Hindenburg's headquarters Posen (Poznan) to hear what Hinden-
burg had to say. Hoffmann, operationschief on Hindenburg's staff, sketched for him a plan of attack from East Prussia to
accompany the Austro-Hungarian offensive. Still Falkenhayn would not decide, and only after Bethmann-Hollweg and the easterners had again demanded his dismissal did he give way. 'With a heavy heart' he gave instructions on January 23 that the
new
corps should be sei
t
to the
and thus he was reluctantly dragged into an eastern policy. Hindenburg and his staff now wc"ked out. a precise plan for an attack from East Prussia, there would be a giant } ncer movement from both flanks of the Eastern Front. The new forces were collected to form Tenth Army, under Generaloberst von Eichhorn. He was to have three of the new Reserve corps- XXX VIII, XXXIX and XL; the fourth Reserve corps, XLI, went to 'he west, where it took over from XXI east,
Corps which, being recruited largely in Lorraine and therefore having Frenchspeaking soldiers, was reckoned too unreliable for service against France. It to Eichhorn's army. The exact nature of the operation took some time to fix, as Falkenhayn found objections to every scheme put forward. Hindenburg wanted to push the Russians out of East Prussia, break through towards Bialystok and, in conjunction with the
went instead
Austro-Hungarian Carpathian offensive, compel the Russians to retire from their salient on the Vistula, thus abandoning Warsaw. The political effects of this would be inestimable. Falkenhayn on the other hand did not expect any results of much importance from this grandiose pincer movement, where the pincers were separated by 400 miles of thinly-held front. Given the winter weather and the inner line available to the Russians in Poland, he expected only a partial, tactical success: at the most, the Russians would be expelled from East Prussia, and the situation in the Carpathians made a little easier. But there was not much that Falkenhayn could do, and he watched the operations more or less as a passive spectator. He had been dragged into supporting Austria-Hungary, and the logical consequence of this was an offensive from East Prussia, over which Falkenhayn could have no control. Not for the first or last time, Germany neglected her interests in the west in order to chase illusory gains in the east. Hindenburg and his staff (which Ludendorff soon rejoined after a brief excursion to Munkacs), busied themselves with preparations for the attack from East Prussia. On January 28 they had their plan worked out. The East Prussian forces were arranged, and told to prepare for a pincer movement. Tenth Army, with a strong left wing, was to form the northern pincer and move on the line Tilsit-Wylkowyszki, while Eighth Army, with a strong right wing, was to form the southern pincer, advancing on a front Arys (Orzysz)-Johannisburg (Pisz). If these two pincers operated according to plan, then the Russian forces between them — General Sievers' Tenth Army Right: February 1915: the Russians are pushed out of East Prussia by a massive German attack comprising 250,000 troops. The weight of the Russian Tenth Army was concentrated in the centre and the south, but the shape of the German attack was a wide pincer movement, coming from Tilsit in the north and Johannisburg in the south
I
tween Tenth and Eighth Armies, which also received troops from elsewhere on the Eastern Front. By February 6, the Germans had assembled their forces in East Prussia. The left-hand pincer was formed by Tenth Army: XXI Corps (General der Infanterie Fritz von Below) formed the northern wing, on the line Tilsit — Ragnit — Trapponen. This was to grip the Russians' northern wing, turn it south and push
-would be gripped on its flanks and surrounded before it could retire to the safety of the river Niemen, with its powerful Kovno, Olita (Alitus) and fortresses, Grodno. The Germans also planned to have the inner flanks of Tenth and Eighth Armies attack so as to pin down the Russians in their centre and prevent them from withdrawing. The new Reserve corps were divided be-
forward into the Russian rear -a difficult task, since it involved exposing the corps' left all the way. On the right was XXXVIII Reserve Corps (Lauenstein) north of the river Inster, with XXXIX Reserve Corps (Marwitz) in the centre, north of the Eichwald forest. The rest of Tenth Army
was made up
of auxiliary infantry cavalry, designed to cover the front
The southern
communications.
preserve
and and
The Masurian battles — Hindenburg's bid for winter breakthrough Wemen
; Tilsit
Ragnit
/
<
Kovno
Schillehnen
TENTH (Eichhorn)
XXXIX Res XXXVIII Res
7fi R 78Res
Willuhnen
77 Res
eWladyslawow
76 Res 75 Res
'illkallen*
Schirwindt
76 R
77
Rw
^^yihnfn >** Manyampole .(Alitus)
(
SittiV
i
76 Res 75 Res
Olita
• Lozdzieje
Mb
42
78Rjejny^31 »
Suwatki
Kopciowo
w
akarce Forest of
Augustdw
%» #Au9ustdw
5k> yck
Arys
Spirding
EIGHTH
III
^k*^^ Sib
\V\
• Sopockinie
Rajgrdd
31
#
(Orzysz)
See Drygalle^
80R
79 Res 79 Res
^.^
Johannisburg
80 Res
w
TENTH
A
• Szczuczyn
(Sievers)
Biata
XXVI XX
#
III
Grodno
Sib
XV
Osowiec (Goniadz)t
79 Res
GERMAN EIGHTH
ARMY
RUSSIAN 7
TENTH ARMY
FEBRUARY
TENTH ARMY 10 FEBRUARY
flaw 14 FEBRUARY 18 FEBRUARY
TENTH
«$IF
30
MILES
L
INDICATES
ZZZ
TENTH ARMY
XXXIX Res INDICATES 39th RESERVE CORPS
I
OKMS.
76 Res INDICATES 76th RESERVE DIVISION
pincer was formed by Eighth Army (Otto von Below). On its left, adjoining Tenth Army's right, were some infantry divisions loosely joined with the forces defending l.otzen (Gizycko), under Kosch, commander of this fortress. Further south, covering Arys and Johannisburg, was the pincer itself, a group of three infantry divisions and one cavalry division under Litzmann, commander of XL Reserve Corps. In all, the Germans had gathered for the attack 15 infantry and two cavalry divisions.
German
superiority in guns numbers went, this force was barely adequate. There were no reserves to exploit success. The Russian Tenth Army was if anything slightly larger than the two German armies together — it had 11 infantry and two and a half cavalry
As
far
as
Above: Behind Russian
lines,
peasant
women work
but since a Russian division contained four more battalions than a German one, the Russians had a slight numerical advantage: 192 battalions and 95 cavalry squadrons to the 180? battalions and 98? squadrons of the two German armies. But the Germans had an almost crushing superiority of artillery: they had 154 light, and 48? heavy batteries, each with six guns, whereas the Russians had 77 light and 22 heavy batteries, each usually with four guns. The Germans thus had a considerable superiority in guns: it was to be proved again and again that even the most resourceful and brave soldiers could not stand up to prolonged bombardment, especially by heavy artillery. Besides, the German guns were much better supplied with shells than the Russian ones — indeed there was no divisions,
602
comparison, for each Russian gun had about a third the number of shells in reserve that a German gun had. Things were still further complicated on the Russian side, in so far as the Russian guns were concentrated on the front of the German Eighth Army. On the front of the German Tenth, there were only reserve and cavalry divisions, with about half the number of guns available to regular divisions. This meant that the right flank of the Russian Tenth Army could be bombarded into submission or flight. Strategically, the Germans' greatest problem was how to secure the flanks of the advancing pincers; this was particularly important in the south. The Germans had established a rough balance of numbers on the East Prussian front only by weakening their forces in the Vistula
in
a stubble field
— digging
On
formations, and their commanding officers were very carefully chosen. Even so, it was questionable whether these recruits, trained only for a few weeks, would be able to conduct an offensive on this scale. At any rate, by February 6 everything was ready: 250,000 men were concentrated in East Prussia. Hindenburg moved his headquarters to Insterburg to watch proceedings more closely.
The Russians were taken by
surprise,
trenches for the soldiers
area, where, now, 22 infantry and five and a half cavalry divisions faced almost double this number of Russians. This was difficult enough, and the situation would become more strained as the southern flank of Eighth Army moved forward, extending
the north side, there was a similar danger— XXI Corps, as it advanced, especially in turning south-east with its flank presented to the Niemen, would be menaced from Kovno. To cover this, the Germans could only spare some cavalry and Landwehr. In the south, however, they grouped a force of five divisions under a resourceful commander, Gallwitz, who had orders to conduct an active defence of the area between the Vistula and the Pisseck. Ninth Army, south of the Vistula by Plock, was given the same orders, and throughout the period of the Winter Battle itself.
in Masuria these groups were active in pinning down Russian forces. Even so, concentrating nearly half the German troops in East Prussia was a gamble, since the front elsewhere was dangerously thin. Besides, it was dangerous to use new formations for an operation like this. The new corps had been given a good proportion of veterans, taken from the depot
for they had been concentrating on a different operation altogether, and failed to notice anything remarkable until two or three days before the offensive began.
They could not adapt themselves with any speed to a new situation. In the first place, their railway network was quite inadequate. Their High Command, Stavka, also suffered from the ineradicable sloppiness of mind of the Tsar's army. The Russians, too, suffered from an inability to decide what their main task should be. Their front was divided in two, roughly against Germany and against Austria-Hungary. The North-Western Front, under Ruzsky, wrangled constantly with the SoutbWestern Front, under Ivanov, about priorities, and Stavka could do nothing more positive than preside, helplessly, over the dispute. The Russian army's strategy was
thus at the mercy of the same kind of dispute that racked the German army. The northerners, Ruzsky and his supporters in Stauka, argued that the German front was the more important, and therefore that any deflection of troops to the Austrofront was a waste of effort; Ivanov in reply pointed to the obvious inability of the north-western armies to defeat the Germans, and argued that the south-western ones, given sufficient support, could finish off Austria-Hungary: in
Hungarian
way, the neutrals would intervene at once on Russia's side, Hungary would probably conclude a separate peace, the Germans would then lose their only serious ally and would collapse: 'the way to Berlin lies through Buda-Pest and Vienna'. For the rest of the war, the Russian army suffered from its commanders' inability to make up their minds on this. For the moment, the northerners had the advantage. In mid-January the operations chief of Stauka, Danilov, wrote a memorthis
andum expressing the opinion of Grand Duke Nicholas, the commander-in-chief, that East Prussia ought to be conquered, despite the 'superstitious fear' of the area
by Russian commanders — it had already swallowed two Russian armies. Danilov, probably correctly, believed that the Russian armies on the whole front could make no progress until this province had been taken — East Prussia served as a bastion from which the Germans could at any time emerge to frustrate any ambitious Russian plans for invasion of Germany. Ruzsky entirely agreed with this: indeed, when Stauka had earlier been supporting Ivanov, and demanded that Ruzsky send troops south, Ruzsky had threatened to withdraw over the Vistula to escape the danger from East Prussia. At any rate, Stauka had now accepted Ruzsky's case, and agreed that East Prussia must be cleared. The south-western commanders were annoyed, for it was clear that the Russian army could not undertake two felt
operations at the same time. Ivanov was ordered to go over to the defensive, although the marshalling of German troops in the Carpathian area was enough for him to be sent one corps, the Finnish XXII, whose troops were skilled in fighting decisive
in forest areas.
A misconceived plan The Russian High Command therefore concentrated on a limited objective, clearing East Prussia. They gathered there new divisions, constituted as Twelfth Army, under Plehve, their best 'fighting general'. The new army was to be assembled on the Narew, since it was obvious that the most effective way to attack East Prussia was from the south, thus going round the line of lakes that had held out so well in August 1914. When the German offensive struck, from the eastern frontier of East Prussia, the Russian commanders' attentions were engaged, and their railway network fully occupied, with sending troops to the Narew region. The Russian attack was supposed to begin only on February 23: north of Warsaw there were already over four cavalry divisions and I Turkestan Corps, and these were to be joined by ten infantry and seven cavalry divisions from elsewhere on Ruzsky's front and from Stauka's reserve (IV Siberian Corps, and the newlyreconstituted XV Corps). On account of the sketchiness of the railway network,
and its hair-raisingly bad management, these forces could be assembled only with painful slowness. When the Germans struck in Masuria, therefore, they found an opposition which was not expecting attack, and which was wholly busied with preparations for another attack that could not, at the best of times, become effective before the end of February. Moreover, the Russians had no way of bringing to bear their superiority of numbers in the Vistula salient itself— their artillery was far too weak. Ivanov's front was expected to conduct an active defensive action, paying
due attention to the Bukovina and the area on the right bank of the Dniestr, the Zadnestrouye, as the Russians called it. In fact Ivanov ignored these instructions, and kept trying to mount a full scale According to one authority, offensive. Ruzsky's operationsBonch-Bruyevich, chief, he destroyed the Russian armies' hopes of ultimate victory by pursuing the vain hope of conquering Hungary. In East Prussia, the Russian Tenth Army was expected to keep the Germans busy until the other attacks could get under way. Meanwhile the Russians more or less adhered to their plans, although they were perturbed by the feint attacks made by the German Ninth .Array — in particular that at Bolimow from January 31 onwards, when the Germans used gas for the first time. Stauka built up the front from the Pisseck to the Pilica, south of Warsaw. It rather neglected the area on the eastern frontier of East Prussia, even taking one corps from here to send to the Zadnestrouye. In this way the Russian Tenth Army was left with its 11 infantry and its two cavalry divisions to face a
German
The army was was as there were no reserves, and its tactical layout was unfortunate. Sievers had strengthened his left wing, in the south by Lotzen and Johannisburg, and his centre was also powerful
fully stretched as
offensive. it
relatively strong: he did not fear attacks on his right wing, in the north by the River Memel, as he believed that the Germans would never risk attempting to extend their northern flank when it was already so greatly menaced from the south. Thus the weight of the Russian Tenth Army was placed in the centre and the south. On the Russian right wing, along the River Memel, there were only a reserve division and the cavalry, particularly weak in artillery. Further south, on the
River Pregel, just east of Gumbinnen, there
were the two divisions of III Corps. This group faced the German Tenth Army. The Russian centre was formed of XX Corps, by Goldap, and XXVI Reserve Corps, besieging Lotzen. The army's left was made up of III Siberian Corps, a particularly re-
nowned one, with some auxiliary troops concentrated at Arys, with its left on Johannisburg. The Russian commanders noticed nothing of the German preparations until February 5, when documents were discovered on a dead German officer indicating that the Germans were building up their strength in East Prussia. The Russian commanders paid little attention
they were more concerned with events at Bolimow and with preparations for their own attack. As a precaution, they took their siege artillery away from the Lotzen front, and sent it back to safety in Osowiec. They took no other measures, and Sievers himself seems to have woken up
to this:
to the
danger only on February
9,
two days
after the attack began. Still, if
the Russians had been taken by
was relieved to some extent by the appalling weather that surprise, their situation
prevailed. Conditions during the offensive generally atrocious. At the start there were blizzards. Huge snow-drifts
were
formed, and the temperature sank below 0° Fahrenheit. At times, communications threatened to collapse altogether. Later on, the thaw set in: roads turned into trackless rivers of mud. Napoleon, fighting in Poland, had complained that there were five elements there — air, fire, water, earth and mud, the Germans could repeat this complaint. The troops did have winter clothing, but the stoutest clothing could not resist the extremes of the climate: in the daytime there would be a thaw, which soaked everyone to the skin, often combined with a piercing north-eastern wind from the Russian plains, and at night the temperature again fell well below freezing point, so that the men's clothes froze on them. In the upshot, the German Tenth Army had one-third of its numbers incapacitated through illness. As far as terrain went, it rather favoured the defence: the battle was fought in broken country, punctuated by marshes and lakes, with the great forest of Augustow some 30 miles behind the Russian front at Lotzen to serve as a baffling obstacle to the Germans. Thus despite their great superiority in artillery, the German armies had a difficult time. The Germans planned to trap the Russian Tenth Army between the twin pincers of Tenth Army in the north and Eighth Army in the south, as we have seen.
They began their offensive on February 7, with an attack towards Johannisburg, staged by Litzmann's group, the southern pincer, south of Lake Spirding (Sviardwyh This group had a difficult task: it was to break through the Russian front, and not merely to turn it, as the northern pincer was to do. Besides this, as it advanced, it would have to cover the fortresses of Lomza and Osowiec, on the Narew— Bohr line, from where the Russians might be expected to stage a counterattack. Litzmann's group was to move due east on Augustow. Fortunately for Litzmann, Ins group greatly outnumbered the Russians at the point of attack, by Johannisburg. Ill Siberian Corps lay somewhat to the north, holding Arys, while the Johannisburg region was defended only by a reserve division, the 57th, which, like all reserve divisions, had only two-thirds the guns of a regular division. The vital spot in this area was the town of Lyck (Elk), an important crossroads on which the Russians depended for their supplies. This town was Litzmann's immediate goal. However, his attack got off to a slow start on the 7th — only one of his divisions reached the river Pisseck, on which stood Johannisburg, the others being tied down by the difficulties of the going. However, on the 8th, the other two infant r\ divisions came up, and seized Johannisburg, taking 2,600 prisoners and eight guns. The Russian reserve division was surprised and stood no chance of staging a successful defence, and fell hack in confusion towards Lyck, losing in all nearly 1,000 prisoners and 13 guns, almost half its complement. Ill Siberian Corps hastil\ sent one of its divisions to cover Lyck.
603
Litzmann meanwhile advanced on the town as fast as he could, taking Drygallen and Bialla (Biala Piska) on the way. The left flank of the Russian Tenth Army had mm been turned, and 111 Siberian Corps. save itself from being surrounded, had to tall back from I.ot/.en. It did so in reasonably good order, and fell in around Lyck, which it prepared to defend, so as to permit the corps in the centre of the Russian army to withdraw also. By February 10 Litzmann's group came up against this new position, after his group had advanced some 20 miles in three days, a remarkable teat in view of the weather. However, the advance had not been fast enough for the purposes of the pincer movement intended by Hindenburg.
A second Tannenberg? The northern pincer, the three corps Tenth Army, was to start on February 8.
of It
had been correctly calculated by the Ger-
man commanders
that Litzmann's attack to the south, so that the northern pincer would have a relatively easy passage. A great blow was to be struck at the northern wing of the Russian Tenth Army, towards Eydtkuhnen, and then the German corps would strike south, hoping to trap the Russian centre before it could escape: in other words, an attempt to repeat the Tannenberg manoeuvre. The attack began badly. The Russians were certainly taken by surprise, but the weather prevented any rapid advance. On the right centre of Eichhorn's German Tenth Army, XXXVIII Reserve Corps could not even get beyond its own outposts; XXXIX Reserve Corps on its left — the centre of the pincer — had a hard day, trying to move round a wooded, marshy region, the Schoreller Forst, and only just managed to wade through the snow on either side of this region. XXI Corps, forming the left of the pincer, had the vital task of taking the Russians' flank, but its advance was so slow as almost to paralyse the whole operation. Its two divisions managed to advance only a mile or so and spent the night, utterly exhausted, in the snow. The extreme slowness here did, however, have its advantages. The Russians did not believe they were being attacked by a very serious force, and persisted in imagining that the main attack was coming at Johannisburg and in the south. The Russian commanders did not therefore order the necessary
would draw the Russians' attention
7
retreat.
On February 9 the German attack made better progress as the troops and guns approached the Russian line. At this stage the Russian guns began to run out of ammunition. The Russian centre — and
XX
XXVI
Reserve Corps — were fully engaged by the left of Eighth Army and could offer no help. Ill Corps was pinned down by the guns of the German Reserve corps. The right of the Russian army was composed only of territorials and cavalry, which were quite inadequate to deal with the attack of regular German troops with a full complement of artillery. These troops were broken up under bombardmen pinned down by infantry attack and tht completely shatnent — they fled tered by a further bomba in panic to the east, mos f them being captured. By the evening c v ebruary 9, he German against slackening resistance left Reserve moved forward— XXXV. Corps took Pillkallen, XXXIX ( *ps Wil1
604
luhnen, and
XXI
Corps, already beginning
swing south, Schillehnen. The immediate goal of this group was the towns of Schirwindt and Wladyslawow, where a to
facing south could be established, threatening the Russian rear, while the other pincer — Eighth Army — came up from the south-west towards Augustow. In this way the Russian centre would be trapped in a pocket between Suwalki and Augustow. Meanwhile the German Tenth Army made good progress against the confused and battered Russians of the northern flank. The cavalry and territorials originally defeated had virtually vanished and resistance was being maintained only by the Russian III Corps, as it swung hastily north-east to plug the gap, but it was already overextended, and its commander was largely concerned to extract his corps before it was trapped. In these circumstances, the Germans faced few obstacles other than the weather, and an enterprising divisional commander of XXI Corps sent a detachment to take Wladyslawow, which fell without trouble. There was still stiff fighting on the inner flanks of the two German armies, as the Russian centre fought to disentangle itself; but the Germans were already into the rear of Tenth Army by February 10. That day, and the next, the Germans successfully continued their advance. They aimed generally to reach the railway line from Gumbinnen to Kovno, and thus face south on the Russian right flank. They would also thereby gain a valuable supply route. The Russians were in utter confusion, although in many cases they fought bravely and held the Germans up. Even so, they were thrown back. By the evening of the 10th, the Germans had reached a line from Stallupbnen to Wladyslawow, and since the Russian corps in the centre of Tenth Army were retreating, the Germans' inner flanks also made progress. By February 11, having more or less dissipated the Russian III Corps, Eichhorn's army had reached the Gumbinnen — Kovno line. All in all these results were not unsatisfactory. The German Tenth Army had deployed, swinging east and south, across the northern flank of the Russian Tenth Army; the German Eighth Army had developed into a serious threat to the Russian army on its southern flank at Lyck. However, it was clear that the troops of the Russian centre were withdrawing in reasonably good order, with a rough cordon north and south protecting their withdrawal. The Germans would have to take Suwalki and Lyck quickly if they were to prevent the corps of the Russian centre — XX, XVI Reserve and III Siberian — from escaping to the Niemen and the Bobr fortresses. The Russians' cordon in the south, by Lyck, was particularly strong, and yet it had to be broken if the Germans were to achieve the full success desired by Oberbefehlshaber Ost. But the Germans were unquestionably losing their momentum here: the weather was highly unfavourable, and supply-carts could be brought along the muddy roads only with teams of ten or 12 horses. Eighth Army was hanging back; although Tenth Army still did well, taking Wylkowyszki and moving on Mariyampole on February 11. By this time they were coming east of the Rominte moors, making for Suwalki. The Russian commanders scarcely recovered from their initial surprise. The front
Germans' scheme of launching the attack Army a day before that of Tenth Army had been an excellent one, if anything improved by the initial dilatoriness of Tenth Army, since the Russians concluded that they ought to expect an attack of Eighth
south of Johannisburg, in conjunction with the operations of Ninth Army and Gallwitz' group. Indeed Ruzsky, fearing that the deployment of his new army on the Narew would be interrupted, hastily ordered seven divisions to go there. This included the redoubtable Guard Corps, which went to the Przasnysz area. Tenth Army received only a few battalions, and when the German guns shattered the front line troops, there were no reserves to take their place. If the Germans did not manage to penetrate altogether into the Russian rear at this stage, it was the weather, not Russian resistance, which was responsible. For the moment, Ruzsky and Stavka could do nothing. Ill Corps must do its best to hold the northern flank and allow the corps in the centre to escape. Ruzsky merely sanctioned a proposal to withdraw to a new line from Kovno on the Niemen to Augustow and thence to Osowiec on the Bobr, while III Corps in the north and III Siberian Corps in the south formed a guard for the retreating divisions of the centre, XX and XXVI Reserve Corps.
Shaken and smashed Siberian Corps, holding Lyck, was certainly capable of carrying out this task, and thus allowing the southern corps of the centre, XXVI Reserve, to withdraw from the lakes north of the Lbtzen gap. But III Corps, which was supposed to form a cordon by Suwalki and Sejny, was in highly doubtful condition, and so the escape of Corps, the northern corps of the centre, was in question. In fact on February 12 the flight of III Corps was such that the German Tenth Army had little fighting to do. The Russian commander, Sievers, himself told Ruzsky that III Corps was 'very shaken, part of it altogether smashed and the rest falling back on Kovno and Mariyampole'. That day the Germans arrived on the Szeszupa river, almost on Corps. They were worried to the rear of all the time lest the Russians stage a counterattack from the east, from the Niemen fortresses, and thus encircle a German pincer itself encircling a Russian army — as had happened in the days of Lodz, in November 1914. They crossed their fingers and trusted to luck. In reality, however, the Russians had no troops ready for a counterattack, having sent most of their reserves elsewhere. The two Reserve corps continued south on Suwalki— XXI Corps, on the extreme left, made a difficult turning movement far to the east and south, and on the 13th its advance guards III
XX
XX
reached Sejny and Lozdzieje. By the 14th the Russian III Corps had fled back to the Niemen, with only isolated Eichresistance. offering horn's three corps were now strung out along the flank and to some extent into the rear of the two Russian corps trying to withdraw from the centre, between Suwalki and Augustow. If the Germans could keep up their pace, then these two corps would be surrounded in the Augustow forest — XXI Corps' two divisions were already almost in the north-eastern reaches of the forest. But there were problems. The Germans had rather out-run their supplies and the area
detachments
they
now entered was highly favourable
to the defence, full of little lakes and pine forests. The snow prevented adequate reconnaissance and also masked the effect
of high explosive shells. On the front of Eighth
Army, the Ger-
mans' progress was not impressive. On February 1 1 Litzmann's group stood roughly around Lyck, with a force of cavalry probing towards Rajgrod, east of Lyck, where it found the flank of III Siberian Corps. North of Lyck, by Arys and Lbtzen, the rest of Eighth Army was engaged by XVI Reserve Corps. Litzmann in particular did not enjoy numerical superiority, and after his initial successes by Johannisburg had rather lost momentum. A few days of bitter fighting began around Lyck, which the Siberians defended with great tenacity, enabling XVI Reserve Corps to retire in good order to Augustow. Litzmann drove his troops towards the Russian flank, at Rajgrod, but German commanders were ,
wary
of presenting their flank to fortresses such as those on the Narew, the Battle of the Marne being a constant warning. Litzmann therefore avoided going too deeply into Russian territory for fear of being attacked on the way, and therefore failed to exploit the advantage he had gained. As it was, the Russians were able to retire from Lyck and Rajgrod without too much difficulty, by February 14. The German Eighth Army moved to a position roughly along the East Prussian frontier. The fears of its commander, Otto von Below, that he would have to face an attack from the south, proved groundless. The Russians on the Narew were not ready to attack, and in any case their attentions were wholly engaged by the resourceful Gallwitz, who
had them persuaded that his attack, not Below's, was the main one. Gallwitz intended to set his left—/ Reserve Corps — on the town of Przasnysz on February 17. All in all, the offensive had gone well, though it had not come up to expectations. East Prussia had been cleared of Russians, and the Russian Tenth Army had been badly shaken. But the bulk of this army was escaping just the same, and it was vital, now, to close the pocket now forming between Suwalki and Augustow. The northern pincer must move south beyond the great forest, the southern pincer must move due east to Augustow. On the Russian side, it was a question of withdrawing as fast as possible to the Niemen, along the Augustow — Grodno road. The two corps facing Eighth Army — XVI Reserve and III Siberian — were in condition to do this. The XX Corps, facing Tenth Army, was already pinned down about Suwalki, and was getting no help from the divisions to its right, along the northern edges of the forest. The two reserve divisions and cavalry that had been struck by the initial advance of Eichhorn's army had retired in confusion, losing over 10,000 prisoners and most of their guns. Thus, early on February 15, the Germans occupied a position along a semicircle 100-miles long and 40 miles deep (from Rajgrod to Sejny), along the Augustow woods. In these circumstances it would
have been essential to transfer as much of the weight as possible from the centre to the outer flanks of the semi-circle, and thus enclose the Russians. For many reasons, this was impossible. The roads were hardly passable, the troops were in a state of exhaustion from their initial movements
Below: German soldiers lay a network of telephone cables from the front line to HQ
\
through the snow, and only the very great vitality imparted by their morale kept them going. In any case, Eichhorn and his staff were sure that the bulk of the Russian army was still in Suwalki, whereas in reality it had already begun to march east towards the Niemen, on a line which the Russians could cover more quickly than the Germans could move to oppose them. The most that the two German commanders could now achieve was to send small parts of their troops to the east, to protect their flanks against attack from the Russian river fortresses. In itself, this was a dangerous subtraction from their strength, the more so as there were in reality no impending attacks. At all events, the German pincers were too weak for the task they had been set: at most, only the two tired divisions of XXI Corps were now able to block the Russians' way out of the forest, while the rest of the Germans' forces were being used merely to drive the Russians out of the pocket from the bottom. The Russian Corps was able
XX
them off while XXVI Reserve Corps made its way out.
to
hold
A 'fighting general' This happened on February
15. Eichhorn had set his two reserve corps concentrically on Suwalki, and the left of Eighth Army, under Kosch, co-operated. They found Suwalki itself virtually empty, for the Russian corps had successfully withdrawn to the line of lakes around Augustow. Only XXI Corps achieved anything significant. Its two divisions, despite their relative exhaustion, marched 22 miles along the eastern edges of the forest, fighting some
of the way.
One
of these divisions reached
Sopockinie, the other Kopciowo, and on the way seized an enormous mass of supplies that the Russians were sending back. But the cordon they thus established round the eastern edges oi' the woods was too thin, in effect not much more than a line of sentry-posts; and if the Russians did not panic as they had done at Tannenberg, most of them would no doubt be able to extract themselves. Besides, the Augustow — Grodno road had not been cut, and large numbers of Russians, belonging largely to XXVI Reserve Corps, were able to escape. Eichhorn's attack on Suwatki was thus fatal to the Germans' chances of absolute success: the mass of the Russian Tenth
Army, though badly shaken, was contriving to retreat. Even so, the Germans could achieve an important success, for there were still Russian troops, about 70,000, trapped in the woods. These forces were those of XX Corps, cut off by the collapse of III Corps, and some further battalions that had been cut off from their divisions. They were loosely joined under the commander
XX Corps, a 'fighting general' called Bulgakov, who seems to have inspired a particularly dogged fight. The Germans were not far from surrounding him in the forest, but this took time. The German units were hopelessly entangled after their concentric advance, and a fundamental reordering was necessary. Litzmann's frontal attacks from the Rajgrod position were not very successful, and his attempts on the crossings of the Bobr were a failure. Eichhorn was busily rushing troops round the salient to Sejny as fast as he could. The German XXI Corps on the eastern side of the forest was already badly threatened. The cordon it had established was too thin and part of it, dug in to face west at Makarce on the Augustowski canal, was attacked from the east on the 16th by reserve troops rushed up by Ruzsky from Grodno. The Germans here, a brigade, lost 2,000 men as prisoners and 14 guns. This action opened a gap in the German cordon, and through it some further Russian battalions escaped to the Niemen. Only the arrival of the reinforcements sent by Eichhorn to Sejny restored the position. And on February 17, the two German pincers finally met in the area between Krasnybor and Sopockinie, a day's march west of Grodno. At last Litzmann had been able to advance properly — III Siberian Corps had disengaged itself, with most of XVI Reserve Corps, and fallen back on the Bobr. Now the Russian XX Corps was wholly cut off as it straggled through the forest. Its position ran south of the Augustowski canal, along the river Wolkusz. The now reinforced German XXI Corps lay to the east, the rest of the German Tenth Army to the north and west, with German Eighth Army coming up from the south. of
.
The outer
side of this circle
was protected
by cavalry and Landwehr, and the German commanders were praying that there would be no count ttack from the Russian fortresses of K to, Olita or Osowiec and Lomza. There was not mu that the Russian
commanders could do
e t to fight it out in this 'soldiers' battle the circumstances, they could not j. the offensive from the Narew with Ifth Army, but had in a hurry to dive. much as possible to the Niemen and Bobr to help Tenth Army directly — in t as the
606
Above: After bombardment, a German
railways
permitted
quick
officer surveys the
movement
of
There was general dismay at abandoning East Prussia. In a great hurry, Ruzsky had to bring First Army over the Vistula to face Gallwitz, and transfer four corps of Twelfth Army to the Lomza area. Stavka likewise sent its reserves — III Caucasian Corps to Bialystok, XV Corps to Grodno. This would suffice to hold the Niemen and the Bobr; and perhaps a powertroops.
ful
counteroffensive
could
be
mounted
later on. Yet there was nothing that could be done to save the remnant of Tenth Army cut off in the forests. The losses of Sievers'
Tenth Army had been very high, and the
Germans reported capturing 60,000 men and 65 guns 17,
and was
in the fighting up to February as well as numerous machine guns transports of all kinds. Sievers' army incapable of saving the remnant under
By February 17, the Grand Nicholas, meeting Ruzsky and Ivanov in Siedlce, virtually gave up hope for the divisions shut up in the forest of Augustow. Instead, he planned to marshall seven corps in the Lomza-Osowiec area for a counteroffensive early in March. From February 18 to 21, the fate of the Russians cut off in the forest was sealed. Eichhorn took command of the whole sector, together with some of the troops of Eighth Army. The rest of Eighth Army was given the task of guarding the southern frontier of East Prussia and the southern flank of Eichhorn's group, in case there was a serious Russian counterattack by the Twelfth Army, which was known to be collecting by the Narew fortresses. The Bulgakov.
Duke
damage
to Russian trenches in
Masuria
defence here was to be actively conducted: the German Eighth Army was to move directly in Bialystok, crossing the Bobr and taking the fortress of Osewiec, for Hindenburg had not given up his strategic aim of carrying the offensive so far that the Russians would be forced out of the Polish salient. Meanwhile it was important to finish with the Russian corps cut off in the Augustow woods as soon as possible, so as to free Eichhorn's army for other duties. The troops on the eastern side of the forest, largely XXI Corps, held off all Russian attempts to break out east of the river Wolkusz. The two Reserve corps penned in the Russians from the north and west, and gradually forced their way through the forest, while Litzmann's group closed the southern side, leaving the rest of Otto von Below's army to concentrate on seizing the crossings of the Bobr. But the Russians in the forest did not surrender. They kept all the German troops occupied for a very important few days, and the Russian High Command itself commented most favourably on this performance, so greatly different from the panic-stricken reaction of Tannenberg days. The fiery Bulgakov was severely wounded in trying to hack his way out, and the Grand Duke himself rightly reckoned that Tannenberg would probably never have turned out as it did if the then corps' commanders had behaved in the same way. In these circumstances, most of the German troops, and in particular most of their guns, were tied down in the forest of Augustow. The attack on Osowiec was
a failure in consequence, as the Germans there had not enough heavy artillery to force the Bobr crossings. The Russian reinforcements — the Guard Corps, XV and III Caucasian Corps — arrived in time to hold this line. They could not themselves attack, but just the same the German winter offensive in
Masuria had proved
to
be
a failure: the Russians held on to the Vistula salient, which in turn enabled them to keep their front in Galicia intact.
Bitter hand-to-hand fighting None the less, the offensive in Masuria was tactically a victory. Bulgakov's divisions could not now escape as the pocket along the Augustowski canal and the river Wolkusz was completely covered by German gunfire. The Russians, based on a fortified camp in a large clearing, tried to break out on the 19th to the east, and failed. They collected again in the woods having lost well over half their numbers. There was nothing that Ruzsky could do to help — XV Corps at Grodno had only just ar-
out in the forest of Augustow for a week, and the mass of Eichhorn's army was pinned down there while Ruzsky collected reinforcements along the Niemen and the Bobr. There was not much chance now that the Germans could break through, and so the Russian Vistula salient remained inviolate. The Russians were in much the same case. Their Tenth Army practically valueless, its commander, Sievers, a broken and discredited man. The new reinforcements were up to defensive action, but not to more. Besides this, there was the usual crippling shortage of shells. This was shown immediately after Corps. Ruzsky organthe surrender of ised a counterattack from the Niemen, Corps. This was a comusing troops of plete failure — the new troops attacked clumsily, in parade ground formation, with no idea how to use cover. They were shot down in droves, losing 8,000 men in the attack. Likewise the Russians' new forces
was
XX
XV
on the Bobr and the Narew allowed them only to hold the fortress. The attacks of the
rived,
and it was composed of new recruits whose quality was uncertain. Grodno itself was covered by German cavalry, and the fate of XX Corps was sealed. On the
German Eighth Army on Osowiec were beaten off by the Russian Twelfth Army, but nothing more positive could be achieved, and stalemate reigned on this
20th the corps staged its last great attempt break out, on the southern edges of the forest in the area Mlynek — Lubinowo — Wolkusz. Since their wireless station had been captured by the Germans on February 15, the Russians had no further communications with Ruzsky in Grodno. They made their last attempt without any know-
part of the front. Only on Gallwitz' front did the front show any drastic changes, and even these were of limited effect. Gallwitz scored the last of the tactical successes associated with the Masurian battle. He had been expected to hold off the Russians on the southern frontier of East Prussia, and undertook active operations in order to do so. On the 17th, he set his troops on the fortified town of Przasnysz, defended by I Turkestan Corps. With two corps—/ — he took the Russians by Reserve and surprise, threw part of his force far to the east, and came up behind Przasnysz, which surrendered on the 24th with 10,000 men and 36 guns. However, the immediate counterattack launched by the Russians between Plock and Przasnysz forced him back on the defensive at once, and I and II Siberian Corps were hurried up from Pultusk and Ostrolenka to support I Turkestan Corps. By February 25, the German offensive was obviously beginning to lose its impetus. Reports from the commanders indicated unmistakably that the men were exhausted. Now there were no more than frontal attacks, of little significance. It was clear that nothing more could be expected, the more so as the Austro-Hungarian front in the south had achieved little. Hindenburg wisely reckoned that he must abandon his plans. It was a mark of the good sense prevailing in the headquarters of the German armies in the East that these armies were not driven into defending, with high losses, each square mile of conquered territory solely for the sake of morale, with the same insane obstinacy that marked, among others, Conrad von Hotzendorf in the south and so many commanders in the west. In reality, the situation of Eichhorn's army in particular was now very exposed: its flank at Memel was exposed, the more so as there were constant rumours that the Russian Baltic Fleet was about to make a descent on the Kurisches Haff. Likewise, once Eighth Army had failed to take Osowiec, the right and centre of the Ger-
to
ledge of their true position — much to the
dismay of Eichhorn, who had expected them to surrender — but their attacks were broken up by the guns of XXI Corps, supported by XXXIX Reserve Corps. Just after mid-day on the 21st, the Germans went over to the attack: there was bitter handto-hand fighting, but in the end the weight of German artillery — the Germans had assembled five heavy and six light artillery batteries — forced the Russians to leave their camp in the clearing. They were forced south, into the arms of XXXVIII Reserve Corps by Mlynek. No further resistance was possible, and the Russian
and lacking ammunition, surrender in thousands. In all, by tbe early morning of February 22, the Germans had taken over 30,000 men in the forest; this brought their total captures to nearly 100,000 prisoners, including nine generals, nearly 300 guns, over 170 machine guns and gigantic stocks of materiel. The Russian XX Corps, by Russian account, lost all its guns— 158 — with 1,859 carts and 5,446 horses. German losses had been surprisingly low in the fighting: about 3% of all ranks, including a brigade commander, Estorf, who had been killed in the last, desperate fighting near Wolkusz. But losses from other sources — largely frostbite and lung infections—were over one-third of the strength of riflemen. The German soldiers were now at the end of their resources. The Winter Battle of Masuria thus came to an end with a considerable German success. But the gain was limited. The final defeat of the Russian Tenth Army had come too late: if it had been accomplished a week earlier, then the Germans would no doubt have been able to cross the rivers and expel the Russians from the Vistula salient, before the Russian reinforcements could come up. As it was, the Russians held soldiers, starving
began
to
XX
man
Tenth Army by Augustow and Suwalki were exposed to a Russian counter-
stroke from the south. The Russians, by constant attacks, showed unmistakably that they had recovered from their debacle — all in all the Germans were obviously losing the initiative on the Eastern Front. They lost ground everywhere, and since a balance of force had now been established on the whole front from the river Pilica to the Baltic, Hindenburg telegraphed to the German High Command that he intended to put an end to the offensive. Once more the German armies in the east had made headlines and once more they had not provided results. It was now necessary to withdraw Tenth Army from its exposed
and Gallwitz, too, withdrew from Przasnysz. In the last days of February the Russians attacked in great force from the Niemen at Olita and Grodno and the Narew at Lomza. On March 6, Eichhorn's army was forced to withdraw altogether from the Augustow forests towards the East Prussian frontier: it occupied a line position,
from Augustow and Suwalki to Mariyampole and Szaki, just east of the border. Here the line became static, after local actions of no great importance. To the south, the Russians attacked Gallwitz and recaptured Przasnysz. Stavka, in a grandiose state of mind, revived Ruzsky's plan of attack from the Narew. Twelfth and First armies were to conduct this. The Germans, as a precautionary measure, had withdrawn to the southern frontier of East Prussia. Here, in the first days of March, they faced the new Russian attack, which came to nothing. Morgen, the particularly resourceful commander of / Reserve Corps, delivered a sharp counterattack that drove the Russians back on Przasnysz, but in the end he too had to retire as a result of lack of forces. By the end of March the front here had settled down roughly along the frontier and from the river Szkwa to southeast of Plock, on the Vistula. In the Przasnysz fighting the Russian High Command
had felt itself spectacularly humiliated, as the reports of a French officer attached to Stavka, Commandant Langlois, make clear. Ruzsky was not long afterwards to lose his post. The Germans reported considerable numbers of prisoners in the Przasnysz fighting — Gallwitz reported over 40,000, and the representative of the French General Staff concluded that the Russian army was incapable of sustaining an offensive against the Germans. The Winter Battle had been an ambitious scheme. It was certainly too ambitious for the force concerned, especially in view of the weather. Its tactical success must not obscure its strategic failure. Deadlock threatened to develop, with both sides talking of 'attrition'. The strategic problem remained the same: how to stop the AustroHungarian front in the Carpathians from collapsing. In the upshot it became clear to the Germans that they could stop this* only by sending direct aid to the Austro-
Hungarian
front.
Further Reading Bonch-Bruyevich, M., Potyerya nami Galitsii v 1915 godu (Moscow 1920) Churchill, W. S., The Eastern Front (London 1932)
Der Weltkrieg Volume VII (Reichsarchiv) Litzmann, K., Lebenserrinerungen (Berlin 1927) Ludendorff, E. von, My War Memories (Hutchinson)
Neznamov,
A., Strategichesky ocherk voyni 1914-1918 (Moscow 1922)
607
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V J
BOLIMOW AND THE FIRST GAS
ATTACK
Since the beginning of the war, the idea of using poison gas as a weapon had been regarded with suspicion by soldiers of the front
But Germany's
scientists had nevertheless continued their research into various forms of line.
offensive chemicals and by January 1915 a new gas was
ready for use. Ian Hogg Christmas 1914 found the armies on the Eastern Front locked solidly together, entrenched in the ice, snow and bitter of the Polish winter, as static as the opposing forces on the Western Front. In an endeavour to break this deadlock and gel the German army rolling once more on the road to Warsaw and beyond, Hindenburg planned an attack in the central sector. If it succeeded, the momentum would carry the Germans on to Warsaw; if it failed, at least it would have caused a big enough diversion to occupy large numbers of Russian defenders and keep them occupied while his northern armies deployed from their positions in East Prussia in a flanking attack towards Bialystok. The problem was to overcome the inertia at the beginning of the attack — the same problem which confronted the commanders on both sides in Flanders. Some new approach, some new technique, some new cold
weapon was
called for.
Although the war was only five months old, there had already been talk of poison gas as a weapon. The subject had recently been given a public airing in 1908, when The Panmure Papers were published. These were a volume of reminiscences by Lord Panmure, and revealed in it were copies of letters between Panmure, Palmerston and Admiral Lord Dundonald which showed that the admiral had, during the Crimean War, suggested the use of sulphur fumes to overcome the defenders of Sebastopol. The authorities of the time, while admitting the idea showed promise, turned it down on the grounds that 'no honourable combatant would use such means'. At about the same time as the publication of these papers was causing a mild stir, the French army developed a rifle grenade charged with a small quantity of tear-gas. This was intended for the attack of casemates and fortifications by firing the grenade through the loopholes and so incapacitating the defenders. These grenades were brought into the public view when they were used in 1912 by the military and police authorities when the notorious Bonnot Gang — the Motor Bandits — was trapped in a house at Choisy-le-Roi. After the war had begun, the German army was alert to the possibility of these
grenades being used agamst them, though there appears to be no record of their i^se. Any suspicious smell was treatei with respect; cases of asphyxiation after artillery bombardment were at first thought to be due to the use of gas, and chemists were -sent to make checks in the front line. It was found that the casualties were due to carbon monoxide poisoning, the gas being generated by incomplete detonation of high explosive shells of faulty design in confined spaces such as dug-outs. Then in late September 1914 the Allied press featured stories of a new French shell filled with a mysterious substance called Turpinite, and once more the gas bogey arose in German minds. But Turpinite was no more than a liquid explosive of doubtful efficiency which the French army employed for a short time to overcome shortages of the more usual shell fillings, and which had suffered a change in the over-heated prose of the newspapermen. These incidents, minor in themselves, served to keep the poison gas idea alive in some minds, particularly in German minds. They were ever-alert for signs that gas was being used against them. Towards the end of October 1914, the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for the Advancement of Science, in Berlin, was approached by the German army with an unusual request. Due to the shortage of steel, a number of artillery shells had been made from cast iron; because of the relative weakness of the metal, the shell walls had to be much thicker than those of a steel shell in order to withstand the stress of firing. This meant that the space within the shell for high explosive was so small that the effect of the shell's detonation was merely to split the shell into one or two large chunks, instead of the shower of fine,
The Institute examine these shells and see if it could suggest some form of chemical filling which would give them back their lethal
fragments desired.
was asked
to
lethal effect. After a violent explosion in a laboratory, which killed one professor and severely injured another, this particular investigation was quietly dropped, but
the
'chemical
warfare'
idea
had taken
root in the Institute. The first serious suggestion for using some form of offensive chemical agent
came from a Professor Nernst, who
pro-
posed
placing an irritant substance among the bullets of shrapnel shells. His idea was accepted, and he was given the task of supervising the production of a batch of these shells. In October 1914 some were used at the front, in an attack near Neuve Chapelle. It speaks volumes for their lack of effect that nobody on the Allied side knew that such a weapon had been used, and it was not until after the war that the facts became known. It is said that Professor Nernst's shells were
abandoned after General Falkenhayn's son had won a case of champagne by betting he could remain inside a cloud of this 'irritant substance' for five minutes, unprotected and unharmed.
The next move was by a Dr von Tappen, Wilhelm Institute. His brother was Operations Chief at OHL, and through this convenient channel, Tappen also of the Kaiser
suggested the use of a shell carrying a charge of xylyl bromide; this was a lachrymatory (tear producing) compound which
Tappen had studied extensively
for a re-
search degree. Professor Haber, head of the
also interested himself in this proposal, to such an extent that he eventually became director uf all German chemical warfare research. Tappen's shell was tested on the artillery ranges at Kummersdorf in December 1914 with reasonable success, and opinion began to form that here was the sought-for weapon which Institute,
could break the deadlock on the fronts, flush the e iemy out of his trenches, and get the war mobile and fluid once again. After the triai, General von Tappen was placed in charge of a programme to produce quantities of 15-cm howitzer shells charged with high explosive and xylyl bromide; Haber suggested using powerful mortars to fling large canisters of gas;
and someone, never identified, suggested putting gas in cylinders and simply turning the tap when required, an idea which was seized upon and given to Professor Haber to turn into a workable proposition. It is worth looking closer at Tappen's shell and its contents; this was a pioneering effort, based on nothing but faith and a certain knowledge of chemistry. The shell itself was the standard 15-cm high explosive type, filled from the base — a common German design feature — with TNT. Into a cavity in this TNT was placed a lead canister containing the xylyl bromide, so that when the shell detonated on striking the ground, the blast of the explosion would break open the lead canister and disperse the chemical in a fine mist. It would then vaporise and give rise to severe irritation of the eyes and nose of anyone unfortunate enough to breathe it. Indeed, xylyl bromide — or T-Stoff as it was code-named — could be lethal if inhaled in a heavy enough concentration, but Tappen appreciated that such concentrations were out of the question with artillery shells as the delivery system, and was quite satisfied that the irritant effect would sufficiently incapacitate the Allied troops to allow the German attackers to overrun them. By way of protection, the German troops were to be provided with a simple face mask, a pad of cotton waste tied in front of the nose and mouth with tapes, and moistened with a chemical solution carried in a bottle and reapplied when necessary. In view of the known tearproducing effect of xylyl bromide, such a mask seems a trifle optimistic. While manufacture was getting under way, a more difficult job had to be done — the soldiers had to be persuaded that the proposal was worth consideration. This was to be the first example of a difficulty which was to persist throughout the war in all the armies. While the scientists were full of ideas, particularly in the chemical warfare field, the front-line troops were more than a little opposed to their proposals Very little was known about the effect of chemical agents, while a great deal had been discovered about the effects of shrapnel shells, machine guns, wire and bayonets. Gas was a mystery, and nobody Liked the idea of going forward with nothing but a mystery to sustain him. Eventually Hindenburg was persuaded to use the new T-Stoff shells in Ins forthcoming attack on the Eastern Front, and supplies were shipped to ammunition dumps near Lodz. Some sources aver that large quantities of explosive rifle bullets were also supplied for this attack, but this is open to considerable doubt. After the war, the Germans took great pains to point 609
that the wording of the Hague Convention— d'emp/oyer du poison ou des armes empoisonruies (to use poison or poisoned weapons)— was never intended to apply to war gases; that gas did not cause undue suffering by comparison with other weapons; that their use was not
out
excluded by the cement ion's phrase d'eniployer des armes, des projectiles ou des matieres propres a causer des maux superplus ite use weapons, projectiles and materials likely to cause the utmost injury and that since the T-Stoff shells carried a large charge of TNT they were not contrary to the convention. In view of all this it is difficult to believe that they would deliberately employ explosive small arms bullets whose use was most definitely proscribed by the same convention paragraphs. It seems likely that these reports were simply atrocity propaganda of the type both sides engaged in. By the end of January 1915, Hindenburg's position in the centre of the Eastern Front straddled the road and rail lines from Lodz to Warsaw. Just north of the railway is the village of Bolimow, and the line in this sector rested its left flank on the River Bzura and ran southwards along the line of the Riva Rawka, through forests and 1
;
The opposing Russian line northern flank on the village of Sochaczew and ran south through the villages of Borzymow, Humin and Wolafarmland.
rested
its
to a point on the Rawka where it loops to the east below the railway line.
Szydlow
was here that Hindenburg proposed to demonstrate his new weapon. On the high ground west of the Rawka, Mackensen's army artillery was massed, upwards of 600 guns across the seven-mile front, a gun density of one gun for every 20 yards or so. This was, for January 1915, It
a considerable concentration. of these
The majority
guns were of 7.7-cm and 10-cm,
the usual field pieces for the close support infantry, but there was a considerable leavening of 15-cm heavy howitzers spread across the front, and it was these guns which received the supplies of T-Stoff shells. On Sunday January 3, the bombardment of the Russian positions began with a rain of high explosive and shrapnel shells together with the new threat of
lachrymatory gas. While the bombardment thundered on, seven divisions, almost 100,000 men, were concentrated ready for the attack. Their three main objectives were the Russian positions round the three villages of Borzymow, Humin and Zduriska Wola. One of these three must crack, and the breach thus made would allow the main weight to pour through, turn, and take the remaining defensive positions in the rear. Contemporary newspaper accounts spoke of these troops as 'Divisions of Death', a highlycoloured phrase coined in an attempt to
convey their determination and contempt The seven divisions had been carefully assembled from selected regiments of high morale and proven fighting ability, since a great deal hung on the result of this attack, and the physical for casualties.
condition of the battlefield was sufficient to deter all but the hardiest; waist-deep snow, intense cold in which tree branches snapped like glass and unprotected hands froze to bare metal, harsh east winds and the numbing dry cold of the Polish plains. Early on Monday the attack began, after
an 610
intensified
artillery
bombardment
which included more gas. There are no records of what the climate did to the primitive liquid-soaked respirators of the German troops, if indeed any were worn. In that climate, such a mask would freeze in seconds and effectively suffocate the wearer. In the event, the attackers had no trouble from the after-effects of their own gas bombardment. But having fought across the icy Rawka and through the snow to the Russian defensive line, it seemed to have had no effect on the defenders either.
There were no crowds of weeping
men
beside their arms, no defensive positions in which men were so bemused by tears and sneezing that they were unable to man their weapons. The reception was harsh and deadly, and it was a long and bitter struggle before the Russians yielded their positions, fell back into the forests behind them, and enabled the Germans to take the three villages almost simultaneously. Falling back, the Russian defence was still cohesive and gave the Germans no chance to make the breakthrough their plans had envisaged. But by falling back into the forest, and widening the front, the Russian move caused the German attack to lose formation, and the attacking divisions were split into smaller groups as they took up the pursuit. As the Russians vanished into the forests, they filtered through a mass of field guns and machine guns disposed ready for just this situation, and as the dispersed German groups reached the forest edge, the trap was sprung.
A withering fire of shrapnel and machine gun
bullets tore the heart from the attacking force, and dispersed the groups into smaller and smaller parties, more interested in staying alive than forcing the forest barrier. Rough defensive positions were formed and a new line of battle struck as the German armies regrouped and prepared for a fresh assault. Artillery moved forward, observers were deployed, and a fierce artillery duel now broke out while the infantry slowly hammered their way into the forests. The battle now degenerated into a frozen slogging-match, every yard disputed and every tree a strong-point. On the southern end of the attacking line, the Germans crossed the railway and
managed
to
advance as far as Bednary,
some six miles from the start line, by Wednesday. The remainder of the line barely reached the River Sucha, a matter of three or four miles of ground taken. The Russian resistance was so fierce that no sector could be stripped of troops to reinforce the southern push in the hopes of making a break-through at Bednary, and the advance got no further. On Thursday the issue was still in doubt, but on Friday the doubt was removed by the appearance of reserves of Siberian troops on the Russian side. By this time the Germans were depleted and exhausted, and in no condition to withstand the onslaught of fresh troops, who, moreover, were more accustomed to the climate conditions than were the attackers. With increasing speed, and
Above: The
site of
Hindenburg's demonstration
new weapon — xylyl bromide gas. The German attack on Russian positions near Boli-
of his
mow
on a massive concentration of artillery: 600 guns positioned across a sevenmile front. Left: The system of releasing gas in artillery shells used at Bolimow was not the only method of dispensing it. Here, Austrian soldiers prepare chlorine gas in steel bottles. Below right: A French contemporary cartoon relied
portrait of the pioneers of culture'
depicts a 'true to civilization
and
life
Right: The new German 15-cm T-Stoff gas shell 1
Fuse pocket
2 3 4 5
3-3 lbs explosive Paraffin wax Shell
6 7 8 9
7-0 lbs liquid
Lead container gas
Felt
wad
Copper driving band Lead washer
mounting casualties, the attack was stopped and then rolled back. By Friday the Russian troops had recovered the three villages and had ejected the German ad-
temporary accounts failed to mention it, and it was not until a few months later that it came to light in Western reports.
Even
then, it was credited with being chlorine gas; since this was the cloud gas used in Flanders, it can be accepted that the writers simply assumed that no other war gas had been discovered at that time. If it did nothing else, the employment of gas at Bolimow alerted the Russians and enabled them to begin provision of rudimentary gas-masks before the Germans had perfected the technique. But as far as its tactical effect on the battle is concerned, gas at Bolimow was a failure.
vanced troops in Bednary. By Saturday they had driven the whole German line back across the Rawka to their starting point, and by Sunday both sides were licking their wounds. The battle was over. After six days of intense effort and sacrifice, the Divisions of Death were back where they had started, leaving over 20,000 dead behind them. Hindenburg's long awaited demonstration had failed as an attack, but, at a cost, had succeeded in occupying the defenders while the attack in the north got
underway.
And what of the gas shells? What effect had the new weapon which had promised to flush out the enemy from his defensive positions at In this, their useless.
It
no
the attacker? they were utterly possible to appreciate the cost
to
Further Reading
first battle,
is
desperate attitude which led to their employment on this particular occasion; the Russians were a stubborn enemy, and anything which promised to ease the attackers' task was worth trying. It is also possible that the Eastern Front was used for the first employment of gas so as to preserve some element of surprise for the Western Front and still be able to try the new weapon in combat. But it is impossible to avoid pointing a finger and saying that somewhere, someone did not do his homework. The simple fact which seems to have escaped those responsible for the proposal was that xylyl bromide was unsuited to the climate; the object of the shell was to disperse the liquid in fine droplets by the explosion of the TNT charge, so that it
and West, Chemical Warfare (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1921) Foulkes, C. H., 'Gas!' the Story of the Special Brigade (Blackwood 1934) Hanslian, Der Chemische Krieg (Berlin: Mittler, Fries
;
could evaporate and give rise to the irritant effect. But due to the sub-zero temperature at the time of the battle, the liquid was thick and turgid, failing to break down into
1939) Lefebure, V., The Riddle of the Rhine (New York: Chemical Foundation, 1923) Meyer, J., Der Gaskampf und die Chemischen Kampstoffe (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1926)
fine enough drops, and when distributed, froze instead of evaporating. Indeed, the whole effect could be called negative, since the space in the shells taken up by
enlisted
the gas canisters was wasted, where it might have been used to carry more TNT and thus do more damage in the conventional fashion. It was at least realised by the Russians that gas had been used in the action, contrary to the British experience at Neuve Chapelle. But con-
World War, and retired from the Royal Artillery after 27 years with the rank of Master Gunner He has written a number of books and magazine articles, specialising in ammunition, artillery and small arms He joined the editorial team of Jane's Publishing Company in 1 983 from being Land Warfare Editor of Defence Magazine to replace the late Colonel John Weekes.
IAN
HOGG in
was born the Regular
1926 in Durham City, Army during the Second
in
til
1
THE CAPTURE
OFMEMEL Peter Fiala. In German hands, the port of Memel on the Baltic presented a potential threat to the Russian Army's lines of communication with St Petersburg. In the spring of 1915 a Russian offensive pushed south to try to take the town
Dr
After the winter battle in Masuria with its disastrous results for the Russian Tenth
in driving the Russians out of their positions north of Tilsit on February 14. On
Army. Grand Duke Nicholas tried by means of offensives to hold the Germans on the northern part of the front until his planned massive offensive in the Carpathians had
February 17 Pappritz pushed on towards Taurage with four Landsturm battalions and some infantry. The capture of this town on the following day ended this offensive. The task of Esebeck's brigade was now, on the left of and in co-operation with the 16th Landwehr Division from Schirwindt via Sudgari and Taurage, to
succeeded. The Russians, however, continued to fear that their right wing on the north-west front would be turned. They had been forced still further back, because their outer north flank was unsupported, to occupy the line Riga-Schaulen (Shyaulyay). The shortest road communications to the Imperial capital were thus critically near the front. The Russian leaders also sought to occupy positions north of the Niemen to gain a favourable defensive position.
From take
must also which de-
this point of view one into account the battles
secure the area north of Memel along the Baltic. The whole 97 miles from Georgenburg on the Niemen to the Baltic coast was held only by thin outposts and patrols, and
Memel by two Landsturm battalions. On March 17 the Russians, under General Apuchtins, broke through this defence with the 68th Reserve Division, infantry, marines a.nd border troops, alLeft:
The map shows
movement
of
the.
Russian
forces and the taking of
Memel on March 17. Supported by coastal cruisers which had been hurried up the Baltic from Danzig, Generalleutnant von Pappritz snatched back the town on March 21. The Russian attempts to breakthrough the northern part of East Prussia owed their failure to the Germans' quick response to their first attacks; they were outnumbered by the new
German
divisions
rushed to the scene. Right:
The advance
guard
of
arrives in
Before
Russians Memel.
its
recapture by
German
troops, the Russians burnt the town
veloped in the Tilsit (Sovetsk)-Memel (Klaypeda) theatre in the last weeks of
March
1915. The last battle had taken place in the middle of February. On February 8 Generalmajor Freiherr von Ese-
beck with an Ersatz brigade from I Army Corps took over responsibility for the protection of the Memel sector from the Ger-
man detachment
at Tilsit.
On
the
same
day he learned through an intercepted radio message that the opposing Russian 68th Reserve Division north of Memel was about to take the offensive Consequently r
the commander of the Germa. enth Army ordered this offensive to be orestalled. Under the command of the gove or of the fortress Konigsberg (Kali ngrad), at Generalleutnant Pappritz, they succeeded i
612
together about 20,000 men. The attack took the Germans completely by surprise. The general situation would not permit a counterattack in similar strength because the battles on the East Prussian and south-west fronts were in full swing and no reinforcements were available. He attacked with his ten battalions and 20 pieces of artillery in the general direction
Schaulen-Taurage and Tilsit. One column under Colonel Rebrikov with about 4,000 men and eight pieces of artillery and ten machine guns marched southwards along the road towards the Baltic coast and attacked Memel from the north and east. The German garrison, led by Oberstleutnant Conradi, had to surrender the town in the evening, and then put out into the
of
Kurisches Lagoon in boats. Most of the population followed their example. The Russians plundered Memel and set it on fire. General Ludendorff wrote that the first news he had of these events came through the telephonist Erica Rostel. The telephonist gave the information from the head post office in the town after the Russian troops had already occupied the building. Ludendorff was so impressed by this act that he wished the girl to be awarded the Iron Cross Second Class. Meanwhile General Apuchtins had already taken Taurage and on March 20 he took Laugszargen and began his attack on civilian
The German command feared that more Russian forces were advancing. Since the fighting on the other fronts had Tilsit. still
already absorbed
reserve troops, the very serious. The supreme commander in the east and the commander of the Tenth Army gathered together very hurriedly all the troops who situation
all
appeared
were at all suitable and threw them into the Tilsit-Memel front. These comprised six Ersatz battalions from Konigsberg and Stettin, two and a half batteries of artillery and the best part of the 4th and 6th Cavalry Divisions. Generalleutnant von Pappritz went immediately to the scene of the fighting. Well supported by artillery fire from coastal cruisers which had hurried
up from Danzig and anchored
off
Memel,
the swift German countermeasures snatched the town away from the astounded Russians on March 21. The Russian troops
suffered a very high proportion of losses and in the next few days retreated in the Libau (Liyepaya). Three of direction thousand German troops and deported civilians were freed from Russian captivity. Several artillery pieces and machine guns also fell into the victors' hands. The attempt by strong cavalry forces to hinder and capture the fleeing Russian troops
and the chase was abandoned. was not restored until March 23. The counterattack by Esebeck's brigade threw out the Russians who had been diverted in the direction of Schaulen. On March 29 Taurage was also recaptured. When the fighting was over
failed
At
Tilsit the situation
Esebeck's brigade took over protection of the frontier from Schmalleningen to
Koadjuthen. Co-operating with them on the left was the 6th Cavalry Division up to the Baltic coast north of Memel.
The Russian attempt
to
break through
northern
part of East Prussia had failed. The local outcome of the battle was, as to be expected, without any strategic implications. The Russians however had to take into account the vigilance of the German leadership who, by the diversion of considerable extra numbers of troops from a nearby front, achieved victory in difficult circumstances. German Landsturm and Ersatz troops had also into
the
proved their worth
in
terrible
weather
conditions against superior Russian forces, although poor Russian leadership had made victory easier for them.
613
WINTER FIGHTING a survivor's account Octauian C. Taslduanu was a Rumanian fighting for the Austro-Hungarian Army. He was one of the few who lived through the winter fighting At half-past ten the order to withdraw arrived — two passed through Tarnawa and marched to Serednie, which we reached at six in the morning. This was more than human endurance could stand. We went to pieces, with our Colonel Maetze at the head. The troops got mixed up, and we marched on like sleepwalkers. From one to three am it was torture, and the men slept bolt upright. Some fell flat and slept where they fell. Dead horses and sleep-besotted men shared the ditches. In one wood we found men asleep, upright, against the trees. No caricaturist's fantasy could have invented more grotesque poses. In addition to weariness, the men were a prey to hunger. For three days we had seen no bread and had to subsist on potatoes.
November hours
late.
November
9:
We
The fighting in the Carpathians, because of the the ground and the severity of the season, demanded the greatest effort and suffering of which our army was ever capable. Those who have not taken part in it can have no idea of what a human being is capable. The resources of vital energy accumulated in our organism are simply prodigious. In particular, our Rumanian soldiers compelled the admiration of all by their fortitude. This quality in this country of mountains and winter made them first-rate troops. The great Napoleon said: 'La premiere qualite du soldat est la Constance a supporter la fatigue et la privation. La pauvrete, les privations et la misere sont Vecole du bon soldat.' (The finest quality in a soldier is the strength to bear fatigue and hardship. Poverty, deprivation and misery are the school of the good soldier.) November 17: In the afternoon I took 50 men to hold a slope covered with juniper trees. The men hastily dug trenches, and I manufactured a shelter of boughs and branches. Once more it snowed, and there was no question of making fires. November 18: Everything was wrapped in a mantle of snow, whose virginal whiteness soothed us and made our thoughts turn calmly to death, which we longed for as never before. The men dug coffin-shaped trenches, so that when in the evening I went to inspect them lying in these ditches covered with juniper, they looked to me as if they had been buried alive. November 20: The men, despite the cold, lost no time in undressing to change their linen. I then saw human bodies which were nothing but one great sore from the neck to the waist. They were absolutely eaten up with lice. For the first time I really understood the popular phrase, 'May the lice eat you!' One of the men, when he pulled off his shirt, tore away crusts of dried blood, and the vermin were swarming in filthy layers in the garment. The poor peasant had grown thin on this. His projecting jaws and sunken eyes were the most conspicuous features of him. Even we officers were regular hives. Fothi yesterday counted 50. He pulled them one by one from the folds of his shirt collar. He counted them, threw them in the fire, and while we drank our tea and smoked, we scratched ourselves and laughed. (Later, on the same day, the battalion was attacked by Russians.) I thereupon gave the command, 'Fire!' and held my own rifle at the ready. At this point my calculations broke down. My Rumanians refused to fire, and, what was more, prevented me from firing either. One of them put his hand on my rifle and said: 'Don't fire, sir; if we fire, they will fire too. And why should Rumanians kill Rumanians?' (He was thinking of the Bessarabians, Russians akin to the Rumanians.) 16:
difficulties of
.
614
.
.
accordingly refrained, but, beside myself with rage, tried to my right wing, where incredible things were happening. The schoolmaster Catavei and Cizmas barred my way, exclaiming: 'Stop, don't go and get yourself shot, too!' Our men were advancing towards the Russians, and, with their arms at the slope, were shaking hands with them; and the fraternising business started again. 'Surrender, and we will surrender, too. We're quite ready.' Our men were bringing in Russians, and vice versa. It was a touching sight. I saw one of my Rumanians kiss a Russian and bring him back. Their arms were round each other's necks as though they were brothers. They were old friends, who had been shepherd boys together in Bessarabia. We took 90 Russians as prisoners in this way; whilst they took I
rejoin
30 of our men. nights! We often smoked 100 cigarettes a day and drank as many as 25 cups of tea. It was our only means of distraction. Life in the "trenches, above all, is trying at night on account of the cold; the two hours of duty seem neverending. We light one cigarette from the last, holding them in our hands. As for the unfortunate privates, they have to stay from eight to 12 hours in their dug-outs. And all night long the bullets from the Russian sentinels hail down upon them. We have adopted
November 21: Oh, those days -and
A Austrian troops under
fire
during the battles
in
the Carpathians
their system, which experience has proved to be practical. At first we used to post sentinels beyond the parapet, but stray shots wounded two or three of them. So now they remain in the trench and fire turn and turn, about every half-minute. This keeps the sentinels awake and makes the task of the superior officers easier,
besides disturbing the enemy. November 23: The rifle and the spade are indispensable to the soldier. I would even advise all officers going to the front to sling a spade instead of a sword to their belts; they will certainly find it
more
useful.
One
or two Saxons built a trench, with an oven and a chimney, and covered the whole with planks and branches of juniper. As it appeared to be the best I selected it for my own quarters. One of the men, a well-to-do and intelligent peasant from Cisnadia, was called Deutschlander: the other was a commercial traveller for a
Vienna
firm: the rest were peasants and small tradesmen from the neighbourhood of Sibiiu. I began to doze, and they all talked in whispers in order not to disturb me. I listened to them as if in a dream. They discussed the situation, and appeared to be very much annoyed over our constant retreat. They seemed to have a rather
poor opinion of the Austro-Hungarian army: If we were led by Germans, things would go very differently.' They were of the opinion that it was all up with the Empire. Tf the Russians enter Hungary,' muttered one of them, 'Rumania will join the war too.' o November 24: I had never had such a good view of the Russian method of advancing in skirmishing order. They were now 3,000 yards away. We were only waiting for them to come within range, and the attention with which we watched them may be imagined. The Russian method is as follows: One man from the centre of the line takes a few paces forward, and two others, one from each end of the line, advance on either side of him. The three thus point the front which has to be occupied. The whole front advances in open formation, each man at some distance from his neighbour, and never more than six at a time. They advance in this way by platoons. Sometimes the leaders do not wait for the others to come up, but proceed to a new line. The disadvantage of this manoeuvre — which has now been adopted in the Austro-Hungarian army too — is the slowness of its development; but it has compensating features which far outweigh its disadvantages. In the first place, there are never more than five or six men to be seen standing, and these are so far apart that they make difficult targets. Secondly, the Russians never advance in a straight line. In each group of two men, one is always some paces to the rear of the other, and the front thus presented is irregular. This, I believe, prevents the machine guns from mowing down whole lines at a time. The officers bring up the rear. Experience has shown that it is a mistake to make officers lead, for the officer is able to control and regulate the advance better from behind. At the beginning of the war our officers led at the head of their men, and half-way found themselves practically alone. The men had either hidden themselves or become scattered and mingled with other units. The officer in the rear is less exposed. It has often been said that men lose their heads when they lose their officers. But when the officer is behind his front he remains master of his unit. He has them there under his eyes. I do not want to be misunderstood. The duties of an officer behind the front are no less strenuous than when in the front line, because they do not imply idleness or negligence. As I have said elsewhere, an officer must take an active part in the fighting. November 27: At Polena, a halt. But Austrian bureaucracy could not even leave us alone in the field. We had to get out a return of all the men's belongings which were missing, and ever would be. What was there that our poor fellows did not lack? Everything they had on them was in rags, and filthy beyond words. Lice swarmed over them like bees in a hive. Most of them were barefooted, and had wrapped up their feet in rags tied round their tattered socks. The feet of many were terribly torn and sore, but it was useless for them to go to the doctors. Strict orders had been issued that only those half dead should be admitted to hospital. One of our men remained in action for two weeks with his left arm broken by a piece of shrapnel, so he said. He was actually afraid to go to the doctor. There was, in fact, no question that the bone of his forearm was broken, but no flesh wound was to be seen. Night fighting in forests, where it is almost impossible to see even in daytime, has something quite unreal about it. All is confusion, and fear reigns supreme. Only the flashes can be seen, and it is by them that the enemy, his strength and position, can be seen. Group fights with group. Often enough you come upon your enemy from behind without knowing that it is your enemy. I once met a lieutenant whose cap was cut up at the back. He had got up to the Russians crawling at full length. Bullets had sliced through his clothes. But he had come, dragging himself along from tree to tree. The men passed the night in a wide trench, dug specially for the reserve, and I myself sheltered behind a tree, shivering with cold. The bullets struck the tree-trunks with a sound like the cracking of a whip. We heard that the Russians were using ex plosive bullets. The minute you got up and moved from your protecting tree, you were gambling with your life. It was indeed a night of horror. At two o'clock in the morning certain platoons received an order to fix bayonets and drive the Russians from a trench. They approached, sent out scouts ahead, and found the trench full of the — 24th Territorial^. They were within an ace of executing their orders and killing every single occupant. The colonel's information was defective. The trench had been only partly occupied by the Russians, and was actually hold both by our men and them. In fact they had been having a shooting match down the same communication trench. In tin morning we returned to Havaj. [From With the Austrian Army in Galicia by O. C. Tas/auanu. 1
I
615
Because of the Partitions of Poland of the decades of the 18th Century, Austria had entered into possession of the extensive southern Polish province of Galicia. It must have given some satisfaction to the shades of the Polish nationalist Kosciusko and his follow patriots to see the Austrian and Russian robbers fall out in the 20th Century and break their armies in fighting
last
over the possession of the same province. Austria found herself in the same difficult position as in the old campaigns against Frederick the Great, when she had to send armies across a chain of mountains to maintain the war in an exposed northern province Now the province was Galicia instead of Silesia, and the mountain harrier was formed by the Carpathians. the boundary between Hungary and Poland. In these circumstances the attention of the warring parties inevitably focussed on the area of Przemysl (pronounced 'Pshermishl' or, in the easier Russian version, Peremishl' Considered merely as a centre I.
Przemysl was a deAustrian proprietors. Railways converged on this fortress town from the north, east and south, and the Russians would have to make wide detours tor their road and rail communications if they wished to by-pass the position and advance to the Carpathians. The site of Przemysl was also of importance with regard to physical geography. The Austrians had been hard at work fortifying the place from the 1880s onwards, for they saw that it usefully closed the 25-mile gap which extended between the two chief river defences of southern Galicia, the marshybanked Dniester to the east, and the San (upon which Przemysl was sited) to the
of
communications,
cided
asset
to
its
:
Even if the river lines were lost, Przemysl could still hold out in the enemy rear and delay the invasion of Hungary over the passes of the East Beskids, the narrow saddle between the Slovakian and Ruthenian stretches of the Carpathians. As an offensive base, the fortress was wellsited to become the starting point of an advance calculated to turn the line of the Vistula and unseat the Russian defence of western Poland. For all this, Przemysl would hardly have become the object of six months of campaigning if it had not been endowed with the same kind of semi-mystical value as west.
was attached
to
Richmond
in
of the Austrians, their Staff History observes: 'The fortress gradually became a palladium of the Imperial Army. A relinquishment of Przemysl, except under
the utmost duress, would have undermined the warlike spirit of army and people, and brought about a demoralisation of the kind which enabled the Emperor Napoleon to enter into effortless possession of a series of Prussian fortresses after the action of Jena-Auerstadt.' Perhaps 20th Century commanders have never completely freed impulse of their themselves of the an je mediaeval ancestors to chall enemy to a decisive battle, regai ss of the the greater or lesser strategic value ground of the encounter.
616
fortifications of
Siege and Surrender Przemysl: the key to the domination of Galicia, the symbol of Austrian rule and Russian ambition. But Austrian rule was fast declining and costly offensives failed to save the fortress. C. Duffy
the American
War. A Russian commentator summed up the opinion of the people of Galicia as follows: 'He who has Przemysl, has Galicia; as long as the Russians have not taken Przemysl. their tenure of Galicia will be only temporary.' As for the motives
Civil
The
PRZEMYSL
Przemysl were made
up of an inner town rampart, and of an outer 30-mile perimeter of 19 permanent forts and 23 smaller forts, batteries and fieldworks. The whole constituted a 'modern' ring fortress in the style made fashionable by the Belgian engineer Brialmont. As at Liege and Namur, the forts were triangular or trapezoidal in form, with a surrounding ditch and 'coffers' set in the masonry counterscarp. The first forts were of masonry construction and were built in the 1880s, hut siege artillery made such rapid technical progress that in the 1890s the stoneworks had to be concreted over and supplemented by new forts. The main fortress armament also dated from the 1890s, and consisted chiefly of cupolamounted 7.5-cm and 15-cm guns. Except to the north-east the surrounding terrain was hilly and broken. Before the war the many gardens and small farms on the neighbouring heights had given Przemysl the reputation of a 'garden city', but during this period the area could best be described
and snow, broken only by ravaged and splintered birch-woods. The repulse of the first Austrian offensive of the war left Przemysl exposed to its blockade, which lasted from midfirst September 1914 until the Austrians once more went over to the attack in October. At noon on October 9 the first cavalry patrol of the field army found its way into the fortress without having encountered any Russian opposition. The word 'relief is not altogether a happy one to apply to the operation, for the instrument of salvation, General Boreovic's Third Army, hecame stranded in the bottomless roads of Galicia in the autumn rains, and had to make heavy calls on the magazines of Przemysl. Some time passed before the railway from the Carpathians could be repaired, and the reprovisioning of the fortress was confined to the week from October 28 to November 4, when 128 trainloads of food, ammunition and coal arrived. That was none too much for the support of as a sheet of ice
Concrete and Gravel
Above: Russian soldiers pose with a heavy gun near Przemysl. The fighting here was to be of lasting significance. Above, right: The 7-5-cm Cupola gun. Designed in France, guns of this calibre were used by the Austrians in the defence of Przemysl, together with the monster 30-5-cm Skoda Howitzer which gave them a considerable superiority in weight of fire over the Russians. But shortage of food within the fortress and the failure of the combined AustroHungarian offensives to relieve it left the Austrians with no choice but to surrender. Right: The map shows the Russian attack on Przemysl which resulted in its capture. The fortress had been fought over since the beginning of the war, with determination and courage on both sides. But it was an encounter characterised by the gentlemanly charm of two vanished empires
146,000 soldiers and townspeople. The impetus of the Austrian advance was lost in bloody fighting on the lower San, and early in November the chief of the staff, Conrad, ordered a general retreat. The AOK (Supreme Command of the Army) had rejected Boreovic's suggestion for an evacuation of Przemysl, and on November 11 the Russians began their second blockade of the fortress. As in the first blockade, Przemysl stood under the command of General Hermann von Kismanek, an infantryman who was held in high regard by Emperor Franz Josef. The 127,000 men of his garrison (the 23rd Honved Infantry Division, the 85th Schiitzenbrigade, the Austrian 93rd, 108th and 111th Landsturm Infantry Brigades and the Hungarian 97th Landsturm Infantry Brigade) were adequate in strength for a static defence, although only 87,700 were combatant troops, and 69,000 of these were of the Landsturm regiments and not considered as 'mobile' first-line troops.
Medyka
/
f
^^
*m mm ^1 mf ^m mm *m mm ^*
mkowicB
sm. REINFORCED CONCRETE MODERN FORTS 4K MODERN FORTS Z3k SEMI-PERMANENT INSTALLATIONS <*~± EARTHWORK INSTALLATIONS
XX
BATTERIES
58 Res March 19
• Mizyoiec
RUSSIAN INVESTING FORCES LINE
REACHED BY AUSTRIANS ON MARCH 19
RAILWAYS E
HILLS
MILES
0KMS
25
40
617
An Austrian Artilleryman. There was little standardisation in the uniforms worn by these soldiers: puttees often replaced the Left:
thick, oiled
woollen
socks, the gold stars on the collar were often obscured by a grey handkerchief tied round the neck. Above:
The entrance
to
Przemysl. Russian and Austrian soldiers confront each other as the Austrians surrender. Top: After the battle, a Russian soldier surveys
damaged earthworks
618
There had been so many comings and goings in October and early November that it was a long time before the Austrian commissaries could sort out what stocks the fortress actually held. On January 1, 1915 they issued a frightening report to the effect that food would give out on February 18. After a series of revisions they finally arrived at a correct estimate on March 11, when they calculated that rations would last until the 24th. The earlier, alarmist calculations were nevertheless of some importance, for they helped to precipitate the offensives of the Austrian field army in January and February. The garrison managed to eke out its rations so long only by resorting to the eating of horseflesh, an placed a invariably expedient which
i^fiPw^u^
posedly decadent empires. The Austrian searchlights swept the ground in front of the forts and advanced trenches, and flashed messages to the field army 40 miles distant in the Carpathians. An aerial taxiservice brought news of the outside world, and mail packages of 5,000 sheets at a time: the officers had pages to themselves, but the sheets for the rank-and-file were circulated among the men's native villages, and came to Przemysl with several messages written upon each. One of the aircraft was brought down over the Russian lines, and was found to be carrying 360 pounds of tinned food. Important and between the communications urgent fortress and the Carpathians were frequently transmitted by radio — and were just as frequently overheard and decoded by the Russians. Defenders and besiegers alike used aircraft for reconnaissance and bombing, and the appearance of Russian aircraft over Przemysl was greeted by a hail of shrapnel
from Austrian ters specially
housed in sheladapted for high-angle fire.
field artillery
This siege was also of technical interest in witnessing the probable start of chemical warfare, for the Russians claimed that a number of their men suffered severe facial burns from a squirter which cast concentrated sulphuric acid up to a range of 30 paces: as might have been expected, the apparatus was said to have been invented by the Germans. The Russian Eleventh Army was very thinly stretched indeed, being responsible for holding the Austrians in the Carpathians, as well as containing Przemysl. The Russians also laboured under the considerable disadvantage of having insufficient heavy artillery to make an impression on the Austrian forts and trenches. A period of artillery duels began on November 25, but the superiority in weight of fire was clearly with the Austrians, who could call on their fortress guns and four of the monster 30.5-cm Skoda howitzers. A war artist with the Russians observed that it was 'curious to watch the effect of the shells bursting. The whiteness is sullied and discoloured for some distance by the fumes and smoke. The ground spits up stones and turf amidst the great hunks of snow; but the men are well sheltered, and there are few casualties.' In December the to hold their own
Russians were pressed positions
in
the face
launched by a picked 'expeditionary force' under General Arpad von Tamasy. The first major sortie, on December 9/10, was timed to coincide with a descent of Third Army from the Carof counterattacks
governor in a cruel dilemma in the days before mechanisation: he could certainly feed his men while they stayed in the fortress, but he would have no means of bringing up his guns and transport in case he wished to break through the enemy lines. In the first weeks of the new blockade the mood of the garrison was defiant and jaunty. Large, insulting placards were placed within sight of the Russian lines, and further messages (as well as bombs) were dropped on the Russian trenches from aircraft. The narrow streets of the town tang with music issuing from cafe parties and improvised concerts. Both sides displayed a degree of technical expertise remarkable in the forces of supfortress
On
15th Tamasy made a complete breach in the line of investment with 17 battalions, and marched to effect a junction with Lieutenant-General Krautwald and the advance guard of the Third Army. Two days later the Russians thwarted the operation by defeating Tamasy and Krautwald in separate actions, and driving them hack along their respective lines of communication. The Austrian army then fell hack to the mountain pathians.
the
passes.
emerge on the parapet of one of the principal forts, and soon the strains of a spirited march were wafted to the Russian positions. Then a large group of Austrian officers appeared in front of the fort. The Russians hastened to meet them. Behind the Austrians followed armed orderlies, but when the former saw that the Russians were unescorted they sent the guards back, and the officers of both armies mingled freely. Mutual introductions took place, and the
commandant
of a fort delivered a speech eulogising the Russian army, to which the Russian general replied in the same tone. The Austrians then offered their guests wine and refreshments.' With the coming of the new year the struggle for Przemysl entered on its second stage. The time of the lively sorties was over, for the Russians had strengthened their lines, and the morale of the defenders had been badly shaken by Tamasy's reverse of December 17. Food was requisitioned from the civil population, and grey, unappetising horseflesh appeared more and more prominently in the
diminishing daily rations. Forty or 50 miles away in the Carpathians the Austrian armies steeled themselves for a decisive action for the relief of Przemysl. The was moved partly by the exaggerated reports of Przemysl's imminent starvation, and partly by the general deterioration of the political and military situation. As Archduke Frederick wrote to the Emperor on January 5: 'It is certain that an attack by Italy or Rumania, or even only one of these states, would place the Monarchy in a militarily
AOK
untenable position. This state of
makes
some
affairs
action imperative, namely, the earliest possible winning of a victory over Russia.' German forces from the Western Front were formed into a new South Army under Linsingen, and placed in the Carpathians to the right (east) of the Third Army. Together the two armies formed a force of 175,000 men who were to push down the Carpathian valleys and foothills to the area of Przemysl. So it was that a mass of illclothed conscripts was committed to a frontal offensive across mountain country in the deepest winter. On the far eastern flank the Austrian Army Group Pflanzer Baltin was already advantageously placed
rapid
beyond the Carpathians, and was told to undertake an offensive in support of the main advance. Baron von Rflan/.or-Ralt in was a shrewd and enterprising soldier, and events were to show that the Austrians would probably have been well advised to
make their chief effort on his w ing instead of in the centre. The offensive began on January 23, 191 5, and almost
at
once wide gaps opened along
the front of the Third Army Struggling through the snowdrifts the mfantr> could progress only two or three miles a daj and even then they left the artillery floundering Nun well behind. Colonel Veilh wiole .
dreds froze to death daily. Everj wounded man who could not drag himself along was Whole inevitably condemned to death skirmish hues groaned with miser} and gave themselves up to he enemy, so as to Schiii escape the frightful tormenl regiment 21 put out a skirmish line one evening, and the next morning every single man was found fro/en to death'' By January 26 the 'advance' of the Third Army was at an end. and on its right i
Gentlemanly
conflict Despite the occasional severity of the actions, the siege of Przemysl remained an encounter between two old regimes. 'On Christmas Day the Russians through their glasses noticed a military hand
619
tlank for
Linsingen
began
Army
to
call
urgently
out a
On
the 27th the Third recoiled under the impact of a Rus-
reinforcements.
in
it had lost 89,000 men. mostly through exposure and sickness. Only PflanzerBaltin continued to forge ahead. His 'diversionary' offensive covered 60 miles, culminating in the capture of Czernowitz and us 60,000 defenders on February 17, and the reduction of Stanislav on the 20th. No one could accuse Conrad of failing to adhere to the principle of war that goes by the title of 'the maintenance of the aim'. His response to the disasters of January and early Februaiy was to pile more forces into the same direct push on Przemysl. The waiting troops were strengthened in number, if not in quality, by the introduction of the Austrian Second Army of BohmErmolli between the Third and the South Army. The new offensive was launched on February 27. A week later, at the height of the fighting, the AOK issued a general order: 'In these decisive days ... no sector must confine itself to purely passive conduct.' Unfortunately the Carpathian winter was far from spent; as Colonel Veith
Amy
The waiting Russian batteneo opened fire at once, and on the right flank the 23rd Honved Infantry Division had covered only a few hundred yaids before the Russian
ground was whitened by the snowstorm and completely impassable. We could not dig ourselves in, and the inrecords, 'the icy
was stuck before the enemy
58th Reserve Division erupted fron the south and drove it - ir ollapse unhinged all the forces on 'hen left. P 1400 hours the last broken t'0'.r s had
ob-
stacles, incapable alike of taking cover or of
t
moving.' By the second week of March the 21 divisions of the Third and Second Armies were completely exhausted. The Russian commander, Brusilov, maintained a skilful defence with just 12 divisions, and then on March 11 he made a damaging attack against the left flank of the Second Army at the Lupkow Pass. The XIX Corps was severely mauled, and on March 13 it was broken altogether by a new Russian blow.
back through the 0Dst,ar zone. The wretched garrison v, a-, at once put on its guard against a stornJng attack, and on the next two da\s ir,. Austrian had to fight off determined ar-acKs against and -.stern the north-western, norther fronts. On March 21 ^ counc. of war filtered
Ru jsians
and, where possible, forcing
them
to fall back.'
Meanwhile, at Przemysl tht siege proper had begun with heavy Russian bombardments on Februarv 9 and the following days. The Russians pushed forward their trenches from all sides, and in March they set about winning the advanced Austrian positions in front of the forts. On the night of March 13/14 a surprise attack gave the
Russians possession of the height of N& Gorach, to the north-north-west of the perimeter and within rifle range of the powerful Fort Dunkowice (fort number XI). Kusmanek ordered a counterattack, but it took so long to assemble the forces that the operation had to be called off. The Russians dug trenches and installed batteries on the captured height. Kusmanek now had firm information that his rations must gi\ out on March 24. With the encouragement AOK he thereenterprise of fore resolved on the desper trrison. The breaking out with his entirt main body was to force its w. out on the 19th. leaving a skeleton garn n to carry
620
>
j
.
The Second and Third Armies had to end their offensive and bend their efforts to plug the breach. Altogether in the first fortnight of March the Second Army had lost 51,086 out of its 148,848 effectives. Conrad himself was finally convinced of the lailure of his efforts, and on March 14 he tried to console himself with the thought that the fall of Przemysl 'would not hinder a continuation of operations aiming at frustrating an advance of the
programme of demolitions and follow wake on the 20th. Kusmanek be-
lieved that the southern, or most direct route to the Carpathians was too hilly and too strongly held to offer even a remote prospect of success. Instead he decided to execute a wide circuit to the east, as he thought that the Russians on this side would bt weak and unprepared, and that he would be ablp to plunder the Russian rear supply depots. The Russians, however, were dug in on this sector in several lines, and they had wind of the intended breakout through intercepted radio messages and a letter they found in a captured Austi ian aircraft. On the night of March 18 the garrison swarmed into the area behind the eastern forts. Sleet showers were being swept along by the biting wind, and many of the men were so undernourished that they collapsed on the ground almost as soon as they left then quarters. Several hours more were opent in filing through the passages across tru; zone of obstacles, and at last at O JuO hours on March IV* the attack began on a four-mile front between Chalupki-Med\ckie in the north and Pleszowice in the south.
sian counter-offensive, and by February 6
fantry
its
|
.
decided in favour ol a capitulation, a resolution which was a mere rjrmality now that just three days' rations remained, and 20 r; of the garrison and townspeople were suffering from scurvy. An elaborate process of authorised vandah' :n beg--:.' on June 19 with the burning of p<_per money to the value of 600.000 or 700,000 kroner (about £25,000). With a similar disregard for sentiment the Austrians then slaughtered many of their retraining horses, and wrecked the railway nstallations and rolling stock. On the night of March 2l/22 the artillerymen fired off their last am-
munition in a thunderous cannonade which ga\e way to a series of shredding cracks, as the barrels were burst by finally
demolition cartridges or deliberate overloading. In the words of an observer in the Russian lines: 'Through the night the screech of shells and the hum of bullets was terrible. The flash of the shells illuminated the hillside in patches of blue light, giving the soldiers a ghastly appearance. It looked uncanny — almost like the Last Judgement. The crouching masses among the trenches seemed as if they had risen from their graves. Then suddenly the firing ceased, and there was a temporary wonderment, as if none knew exactly how, and why this thing had happened. It was the moment of victory.' The Austrian gunners had finished their firework display by the time the sun rose over the snowfields on March 22, and the engineers began to detonate enormous charges of explosives under the fortifications. White flags were planted around the
perimeter, and at 0900 hours the first Russian troops penetrated the fortress. 'Now followed extraordinary scenes. Austrian soldiers were seen fighting each other, while the Russians looked on. Amid the chaos a small group of staff officers appeared, casually enough, and announced surrender. Austrians were seen cutting pieces out of slaughtered horses that lay in heaps, and showing an entire indifference to their capture.' The air was still shuddering with the concussion of the demolitions, and General Selivanov, commander of the besieging forces, was so furious at the continuing destruction of his prize that he made the Austrian deputation prisoners of war. On the 23rd he relented, and agreed to take into captivity and protection the garrison of nine generals, 93 staff officers, 2,500
and 117,000 men. One can imagine fates in the First World War than to become a prisoner of the Tsar. The Russians and paroled Austrian officers packed themselves into the one cafe still functioning in Przemysl, and managed to fall the air with tobacco smoke even with cigarettes selling at 3/6d each. As the officers
many worse
Austrian
officers arrived they saluted at then crossed the reeking room to han. their smart peaked caps on the same stands as the Russian fur hats. The Russian capture of Przemysl was ar- episode of the kind that Clausewitz called 'a decision in suspense'. Events proved Lh aten ant-General Bobrinsky wrong in shaking with such satisfaction of " h;it had been achieve- ': 'Przemysl "ame to be taken in Galicia ^s a symbol of the intention and the pow" - *f the Austrians to recapture the province, and while it remained intact ther^ was a strong taction here that was unwilling
the
..oor,
-
-
avow their friendship to us. With of Przemysl the iaac vestige of Austrian prestige has ewporated, and even the small unf. icndiy faction^ that secretly disliked »ur occupation abandoned all hope. GMiuci is now permanently lost
op* iily to
the
to
fall
Austria
Tiie fighting tor Przemysl was nevertheless of lasting significance. Brusilov could write hat after the first three months of the struggle 'the greater part of our legular, professional officers and trained i
men had
vanished, leaving only skeleton to be hastily filled with men wretchedly instructed who were sent to me from the depots; while the strength of the officers was kept up by promoting suki items, who likewise were inadequately trained. From this period onwards the professional character of our forces disappeared, and the army became more and more like a sort of badly-trained forces
which had
militia.'
For the Austrians the costly offensives January, February and March represented their last major effort on the Russian front as an independent power. From now onwards they were in increasing servitude to their bumptious and condescending German allies. of
Further Reading Hotzendort, C. von, Aus meiner Dienstzeit 19061918 (Vienna 1921/5) Osterreich-Ungarns Letzter Krieg 1914-1918 (Vienna: Kriegsarchiv, 1930/1) Regele. O., Feldmarschall Conrad (Vienna 1955)
[For Christopher Duffy's biography,
page
138.
]
see
The
bom bard ment SOUTH
BA.Y,
SCARBOROUGH.
ofthe
EAST COAST The German naval raids on the east coast of Britain had two aims — to tie down units of the Royal Navy and to demoralise civilians. The major effect, though, was to cause annoyance at the Navy's inability to stop the raids. David Chandler. Above: Scarborough — scene ofthe biggest German In 1914, Britain's first line of defence was, as ever, the Royal Navy. The Admiralty considered two areas to be particularly vulnerable to enemy attack — the East Coast and the Channel. Both looked out upon the sea that many atlases still termed 'the German Ocean', and in terms of steaming time less than 24 hours divided the Kaiser's bases at Wilhelmshaven, Heligoland and Kiel from possible targets. Naval precautions were undertaken at three levels. First, to guard against any major expedition by the High Seas Fleet, the massive dreadnoughts and other battlecraft of the Grand Fleet were deployed at Scapa, supported by further battle and battle-cruiser
squadrons at Cromarty, Rosyth and Sheerness. Similar protection was afforded to the Channel by the Third Fleet, operating out of Portsmouth, Plymouth, Milford Haven and Queenstown. Secondly, ready to intercept any hostile raiding forces of small size, forces of light cruisers, destroyers and submarines were deployed in the Forth, Tyne and Humber, and at Harwich and Dover. Thirdly, there was a warning function entrusted to local
effort
defence
flotillas co-ordinated by the 'Admiral of Patrols', Rear-Admiral G. A. Ballard, and stationed at lesser ports such as Yarmouth and Ramsgate. These local patrols were meant to give the alarm and
shadow the enemy, whereupon the cruiser and destroyer flotillas would put to sea to intercept and if possible deflect the raiders, while parts of the Grand Fleet sailed for pre-arranged rendezvous far out in the North Sea ready to repel any large supporting forces and to intercept and destroy the raiding force as it headed for home. Minefields were laid to reduce the number of approaches. While the Royal Navy developed a large field to protect the Thames and English Channel, German mine-layers to some extent assisted by placing three further large fields off East Anglia and Northumbria respectively. South of the Firth of Forth, three main gaps dividing these minefields lay between lines drawn eastwards from Whitby and Flamborough Head, from Mablethorpe and Lowestoft, and from Harwich and Colchester. Owing to their distance from major naval stations on other sectors of
the coastline, the first and second 'gaps' wore considered to give the Germans the greatest opportunities and for attack, efforts were therefore made to extend the German minefield off Plamborough Head northwards to lessen ho 'Whitby Gap'. The second line of defence was made up of batteries manned by the Royal Coast Artillery, oi' forts placed in important estuaries, and of local supporting forces of Yeomanry and Territorial battalions. Coastal protection was organised into ten districts, with special garrisons at key places. At the outbreak o\' war. possibly 315 coastal guns ranging from 9-2-inch to 4-inch in calibre) were in position. About 120 of these were sited between Aberdeen and Dover, another 100 protected the Channel ports, the rest guarded the Bristol Channel, South Irish ports, and the North Channel and Irish Sea. The major estuaries and ports were on the whole adequately protected, but the defences between these focal points were tenuous in the extreme, and even the key naval anchorage of Scapa was not provided with land-based batteries until after the war had started. Behind the coastal crust were the main forces designated for national defence in the unlikely event of an enemy invasion. The Northern Army (comprising two divisions and five brigades) had its headquarters at Colchester. The Southern Army (four divisions and seven brigades) was t
i
commanded from Brentwood. A network
of
radio stations supplemented the normal land lines in linking the various districts and commands of the defence forces. These arrangements, together with certain rudi-
mentary Royal Flying Corps and
anti-
aircraft precautions, constituted the
main
measures taken realm in 1914.
The admirals
man submarine penetrated Scapa Flow and made ineffective attacks on two destroyers before withdrawing. This incident was sufficient to persuade Admiral Sir John Jellicoe to redeploy a number of major units to anchorages off Skye and Mull pending the development of adequate anti-submarine defences at Scapa. Next, on November 3, a substantial German force of some seven cruisers (including three battle-cruisers) and attendant destroyers
appeared off Yarmouth and Gorleston at 0700 hours — probably intending to lay mi nes — and sent a number of salvoes shorewards. These almost all burst on the beaches without inflicting any harm, and the squadron withdrew at 0735 hours. This ineffective raid served, however, to demonstrate the limitations of the countermeasures available to the Royal Navy. Although early notice of the German's approach was signalled by HMS Halcyon soon after dawn, the Yarmouth patrol was only able to shadow the heavy enemy units. Even when three cruisers appeared from Harwich there was no general engagement, and although Vice-Admiral Sir David Beatty sailed promptly from Cromarty with a squadron of battle-cruisers, and the 3rd Battle Squadron was diverted from its Channel-bound course, the Ger-
But to describe Scarborough as a fortified town was ludicrous, for apart from the ruins of a Roman signal station and the remains of the mediaeval castle, the famous Yorkshire holiday resort boasted no defences of any kind. A small wireless station on the outskirts of the town was the only justifiable target. There were no troops stationed in the town, although there were a few cavalry billets in the vicinity. Whitby -also destined to be bombarded—was similarly devoid of military significance except for its lighthouse and radio. Attacks on such places were specifically ruled out in a chapter of Convention Number Nine of the Second Hague Conference which stated that 'the bombardvicinity.
mans eluded all attempts to intercept their homeward voyage. In fact, the only damage to either side was caused by mines; the British submarine D5 sank with almost all hands off Gorleston, while a similar fate befell the German cruiser Yorck the next morning off the Jade minefield as she was preparing to re-enter harbour.
for the protection of the
of the
German High Seas
were well aware of the value of spasmodic attacks against the British coastline. Providing these could be undertaken for minimal losses, the advantages
Fleet
down of disproportionate of British naval shipping in the defensive role, the infliction of physical damage on military targets such as radio stations, port facilities and industrial installations, and, above all, the demonstration of the effectiveness of Germanic warfare to the British civilian population. As included the tying
amounts
Count Reventlow proclaimed in the German press: 'We must see clearly that in order to fight with success we must fight ruthlessly in the proper meaning of the word.' Further advantages from the German point of view included keeping the German navy on its toes by the everpresent prospect of action (on however limited a scale), and demonstrating to the German public that all the money expended on the fleet in recent years was being put to effective use. The Fleet,' ran a Naval Staff Minute of November 1914, 'must be held back and avoid action which might lead to heavy losses. This does not, however, prevent favour able opportunities
being used to damage thi nemy. There is nothing to be said again.^- an attempt by the big cruisers in the Nori -^ea to damage the enemy.' Both the H. Seas Fleet
commander, Admiral von his subordinate, Admiral Hi
enohl, and t
r,
eagerly
seized this opportunity to ext se their squadrons and avoid the tedium ndless weeks at anchor. tarThe earliest German sorties agai I
622
gets on the British coasts were tentative and limited affairs. On October 17 a Ger-
Stung by disaster A month later, the omens seemed propitious for another German foray. Stung by the disaster sustained at the Battle of the Falkland Islands on December 8 and aware that part of the Grand Fleet had been moved from Scapa into the Atlantic, the German Naval High Command issued orders for the High Seas Fleet 'to bombard the fortified coast towns of Scarborough and Hartlepool and to lay mines along the coast.' Accordingly, early on December 15, Admiral Hipper sailed from the Jade
command
of the 1st Scouting Division of Fleet, comprising four battle-cruisers, Seydlitz, Moltke, Von der Tann and Derfflinger, and the heavy cruiser Bliicher, supported by light cruisers and two flotillas of destroyers. In support of this considerable raiding force, Admiral von Ingenohl put to sea with all three battle squadrons at his disposal that same afternoon. This was a liberal interpretation of his instructions from the Naval Staff. in
the
High
Seas
but the admiral was apparently hopeful that Hipper's activities against the coast would provoke a limited response from the Grand Fleet at Scapa of the sort attempted during the Gorleston Raid. This in turn might lead to a naval engagement between capital units on terms numerically very favourable to the Germans. Accordingly, both forces made rendezvous before dusk to the north of Heligoland before steaming westwards into the gathering night. The selection of West Hartlepool as a target was justifiable. It was the base of the 9th Destroyer Flotilla, defended by a battery of three coastal guns, and several factories
were engaged on war work
in its
ment by naval forces of towns, villages, dwellings or buildings
is
forbidden.' On this occasion the Germans did not have the advantage of surprise. British naval Intelligence had issued a warning on
the 15th that something was in the wind, and a state of limited alert was proclaimed along the entire East Coast. Commodore R. Y. Tyrwhitt was ordered to sail from Harwich with three cruisers and a force of destroyers to seek out the enemy and report their position. Admiral Beatty put to sea from Cromarty with the 1st Battle-Cruiser Lion, Princess Squadron consisting of Royal, Queen Mary and New Zealand and the light cruiser Blonde, expecting to be joined by Commodore W. E. Goodenough's five light cruisers from Scapa. The Admiralty also ordered the 2nd Battle Squadron (Vice-Admiral Sir George Warrender) and the Fifth (Vice-Admiral Sir Cecil Burney) to get up steam at Scapa and Sheerness respectively, ready to support Beatty if necessary. All minor patrol and coastal detachments also forces stood by.
HMS
vgmnmmm.
2
The
1-inch guns of the Seydlitz blaze out at a target on the British shoreline 1
r*
623
On Beatty's shoulders lay the burden of deducing the most likely German target and route. He opted for the Humber-Tyne area for the former, and the Whitby Gap for the latter. Accordingly he fixed a rendezvous for before dawn on the 16th at a point (.lose to the south-western edge of the Dogger Bank, about 110 miles from Flamborough Head and 180 from Heligoland and only 50 miles south-east of the German's
pre-attack rendezvous. This accurate reasoning, or simple good luck, was largely cancelled out, however, by the prevalent rough seas and poor visibility, which forced some British light units to return to port (including Goodenough's cruisers), but their place was filled by the 3rd Cruiser Squadron of final
Vice-Admiral W. Pakenham. At about 0500 hours on the 16th, the screen of Beatty's force moving south first encountered German destroyers and then cruisers some 20 miles north-east of the German rendezvous. These formed part of Ingenohl's battle squadron screen (although this was not established by the British at the time). Two hot actions ensued. The German commander-in-chief was soon aware that British battle-cruisers were moving against him, and fearful of torpedo attack he forthwith reversed his earlier resolve and turned for home with all his capital units, leaving Hipper and his raiders to seek their own salvation. Not until after the Armistice did the Admiralty learn how close the Royal Navy had been to a fleet action that morning. By 0730 hours, Beatty and Warrender had reached their rendezvous, to find no sign of the Harwich force. About this time the heavy cruiser Roon appeared fleetingly on the scene, so Beatty turned north in pursuit while the 2nd Battle Squadron sailed eastwards. The raiding force remained undetected and its intentions un-
known. Then, an hour
later, the news intercepted radio message from Patrol off Hartlepool to the Tyne guardship said that she was in action against two battle-cruisers. Warrender immediately swung north-west and headed back for the minefield gap. At 0845 hours Beatty received an Admiralty signal reporting that Scarborough was under Ger-
broke.
An
HMS
man
He, too, immediately swung his squadron westwards. fire.
500 shells in 30 minutes A little under an hour before this the ordeal of the coast ports had begun. At 0755 hours three ships appeared off Scarborough and fired heavily at the Falsgrave suburb and its radio station before turning north off the White Nab to rake the town. As the Derfflinger and Von der Tann closed to a range of between 2,000 and 3,000 yards, the inhabitants slowly awoke
to their situation.
Many
at first thought
was caused by
British warships at gunnery practice, but the bursting of the first salvoes in the streets soon dispelled that illusion. 'There was an entire absence of panic,' noted The Times the next day, 'and the demeanour of the people was everything that could be desired.' The Scarborough Pictorial of December 23 was full of accounts of dramatic escap> tid acts of as quite gallantry. Damage to property serious; a corner of the Royal was blown away, and the seaward fix of the .hell Grand Hotel partly demolished. in also hit the gable-end of a hospi
that the din
1
624
Auborough Street, and several were damaged. Considering that shells were fired into the town in of 30 minutes, the loss of life prisingly
light.
In
all
17
churches
some 500 the space
was
people
sur-
were
including p. baby and two other Several hundred were treated for various injuries Of course the newspapers regaled their readers with detailed stories of near escapes under such headlines as 'Unscathed in a Rain of Bullets', 'An Old Lady's Ordeal' and 'Just in Time'. Special Constable R. Wairi-ier and Coastkilled,
children.
guard Mason found that a shell had demolished the flag staff at the coastguard station on Castle Hill, and promptly secured the Union Jack to a convenient telegraph pole in the midst of the shelling. Having accomplished their task Warriner turned to Mason and asked 'Are we downhearted?' to which Mason heartily replied 'No.' 'Scarborough accepts its risks', wrote
RCA could produce, but during the latter part of the engagement the Bliicher sustained a hit on her forebridge and subsequently had two guns of her secondary armament put out of action by welldirected fire from the Heugh Battery. The Moltke's damage is not known, but a number of hits were observed on her superstructure. The coastal guns fired 123 rounds.
The Germans fired their last round it 0852 hours at a range of 9,200 yards as they commenced their withdrawal As at Scarborough, the raiders had achieved singularly
of military value, but for tried to play down the incident, deliberately minimising the casualties and placing the dead at only 29 in their bulletin of the 17th, but raising the number to 50 the next day By little
some time the British government
a
the 18th The Times reported that at least 90 had been killed at the Hartlepools, and noted that 'much feeling has been aroused by the official attempt to minimise the
amused
bombardment.'
correspondent; 'it is also able to be at the description "fortified town" which the Germans have applied, and a local wag has affixed to the brick wall of his humble dwelling a notice, "Please don't touch the fortifications. Fragile!" West Hartlepool suffered far more severely than Scarborough when it received the attentions of the Seydlitz, Moltke and Bliicher between 0810 and 0852 hours. The casualties were 102 killed (including nine soldiers and seven sailors) and 467 wounded (of whom 424 were civilians). Although damage to military installations was minimal, seven churches, ten public buildings, five hotels and over 300 houses were damaged in varying degrees, while three vessels in the harbour also received hits. The Germans fired 1,150 rounds in all. On this occasion, however, the raiders did not have it all their own way. The three 6-inch guns of the Royal Coast Artillery, two in Heugh Battery and one near the lighthouse — all manned by the Durham RCA (Territorial Forces) under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel L. Robson, former mayor of the town, engaged the enemy. The local naval contribution was rather less successful. The destroyer patrol mounted from the flotilla stationed at the port encountered the Germans shortly after 0800 hours, and alerted the local forces, but the two flotilla leaders, HMS Patrol and Forward (each of some 2,900 tons, armed with nine 4-inch guns apiece and capable of a speed of 25 knots) failed to get clear of the port and into action until after the Germans had withdrawn. The former was put out of action for a while by a hit from the Bliicher, and the submarine C9 went hard aground.
HMS
The German
battle-cruisers at first de-
voted all their attention to the Heugh Battery but failed to put a single gun out of action despite a heavy 1 5 minute bombardment, while Bliicher shelled the port. Later the battle-cruisers turned their guns on the harbour and town for half an hour while the Bliicher engaged the batteries, at a range of some 4,000 yards from ship to shore. Many of the 12-inch and 5.9-inch shells used were armour-piercing with delayed-action fuses, and a large number richocheted into the town before exploding. The fact that the Heugh and Lighthouse Batteries were close together, and that the lighthouse itself blocked the lines of fire (to the south in the case of the former and to the north in that of the latter) somewhat reduced the volume of effective fire the
The Germans had one more blow to deAs the Derfflinger and Von der Tann
liver.
sailed northwards from Scarborough to join their compatriots' withdrawal, they loosed some 50 rounds at Whitby signal station and town between 0900 and 0910 hours, killing two men and wounding as
many
more.
Subsequently
the
RSPCA
awarded a silver medal to James White of Whitby for stopping a runaway horse during the bombardment and the concern of the British public for the fortunes of domestic pets under fire was revealed in the Scarborough Pictorial] 'It may be added,' ran one passage, 'that a dog and a cat and cage birds perished in the explosion at No 2 Wykeham Street.' Total war had arrived with a vengeance.
Confused, contradictory signals The Germans now had only one thought — regain the safety of the Heligoland Bight as soon as possible. The Royal Navy was equally determined to intercept and destroy them. By this time Beatty had ordered up the 3rd Battle Squadron from Rosyth, Tyrwhitt with four light cruisers was off Scarborough, and Warrender had rejoined Beatty's battle-cruisers. Beatty to
had to decide whether the Germans would use the Whitby Gap or sail northwards up the coast. In the end he ordered all units to concentrate on the minefield gap. It seemed that the trap must close around the German raiders, but a series of contradictory reports and misunderstood signals then caused a measure of confusion, which was increased by the rolling mists and rough seas still prevailing. Admiral Hipper was soon aware of the proximity of British ships. HMS Southampton — the extreme port vessel of the cruiser screen — actuary identified and engaged a number of German destroyers and cruisers at 1125 hour.; as they steamed on a southerly course, but then turned away to the west on receipt of a signal from Admiral Beatty which was, in fact, only intended for HMS Nottingham and HMS Falmouth. This error, due to a confusion of signalling, gave the German force the chance to break contact, and soon they were heading eastwards at full steam. An hour later Admiral Warrender's squadron caught a fleeting glimpse of them, and Beatty headed all his ships for the north side of the Whitby Gap. The raiders, however, hugged the southern edge, and when this was reported to Beatty at 1343 hours
he chose for some vital minutes to regard the message as an error. The result was that the Germans slipped away in the dense mist, and eventually made a safe landfall near their
home
port.
The German press were jubilant at this exploit. 'Once more our naval forces, braving the danger of scattered mines in the shelled English fortified places,' proclaimed the Berliner Tagethe Berliner Neuste Nachtichten blatt; spoke of 'further proof of the gallantry of our navy'. A neutral Danish observer reported 'indescribable jubilation in Berlin', and even the New York Tribune spoke highly of the 'brilliant dash on the part of Admiral von Tirpitz's men who have long since established their quality as daring seamen.' On the other hand, a later edition of the Tribune declaimed against 'a Crime Against Civilised Opinion', and even Hearst's American wore the headline 'Audacity without Special Virtue.' In Britain, the public reaction to the raids took two forms. On the one hand there was universal denunciation of the ruthless and unjustified attack on defenceless targets. Winston Churchill denounced 'the baby-killers of Scarborough', and recruiting officers were not slow to make capital out of the mood of shock and horror. 'Avenge Scarborough. Up and at 'em now!' read one poster in Great Scotland Yard. 'The wholesale murder of innocent women and children demands vengeance. Men of England, the innocent victims of German brutality call upon you to avenge them.' A Scarborough Inquest Jury wished to return a verdict of 'Wilful Murder' on the death of some of the victims until dissuaded by the Coroner. German nationals at South Shields and Seaton Carew, among other places, were interned by the police, partly for their own safety, for there was the inevitable cry for reprisals. Some correspondents welcomed the raid: 'Soldiers rejoice that Germany carries the war into England, for it is only on these terms that our people can be thoroughly aroused.' Thus some considered that the ordeal shared by Scarborough, West Hartlepool and Whitby was a necessary evil. But if much space was devoted to denunciation of Germany, many columns of
German Ocean, have
Above: The ruins the
carnage, five members of the family lost their lives.
On
the whole, though, civilian reaction to the German raids
was calm and stoical. Left: The German raids on the east coast. After an exploratory attack on Yarmouth, a
major German was launched
effort
against Scarborough and West Hartlepool Opposition from the Royal Navy was negligible, but the
shore batteries, although outnumbered and outgunned by the German
and editorials were also demanding the reason why the great Royal Navy had allowed the raiders to mount the attack and to escape. Authority got a word in first,
battle-cruisers, put up a spirited defence and scored several hits. This, and the fear of mines and
probably
The Times
DCM
of
of the
Bennett family in Scarborough. In this
letters
anticipating this criticism, in of December 17. 'The Admiralty takes the opportunity of pointing out that demonstrations of this character against unfortified towns or commercial ports, although not difficult to accomplish provided that a certain amount of risk is accepted, are devoid of military significance.' But two days later the First Leader pointed out that 'There is still a great deal of very natural mystification about the German raid of Wednesday morning. The public are not in the least alarmed, but they are puzzled. They cannot understand why a German squadron was able to reach our shores, and they understand still less how it was able to get back.' It was some time before the public came to accept the manifold problems faced by the navy in its coastal protection role. The main effect of the raids, however, was to rally public feeling behind the war effort. Colonel Robson of the Durham RCA was awarded the DSO, and one and
home
torpedoes, caused the
Germans
to
keep on the move, with a consequent slight loss of gunnery accuracy,
which may in turn have saved the lives of
two Military Medals were also bestowed on deserving members of the forces. General Plumer addressed the garrisons of the Tees defences in suitable vein after an inspection. 'Englishmen,' he was reported as saying, 'were unaccustomed to such events, but they had gone through the trying experience of bombardment with great was only a very small part of a very large war, but that was the first time most of them had been under battleship fire, or any fire at all.' One wonders how credit. It
scores of civilians
often the General himself had experienced 'battleship fire'. Further Reading Corbett, Sir
J.,
Official History of the
Great
War- Naval Operations (London
1920) Maurice-Jones, K. The History of the Royal Coastal Artillery in the British Isles Scheer, Admiral, Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War (London 1920)
W
[For 365.
,
David Chandler's biography,
see
page
1
625
•.
DOGGER BANK CLASH OF THE BATTLE CRUISERS Shortly before noon on January 23, 1915, Winston Churchill returned to his room at the Admiralty after a long talk with Admiral Fisher, who was laid up in bed with a cold. Hardly had he sat down, Churchill recounts, when Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson strode hurriedly into the room with a 'glow in his eye' and baldly announced: 'First Lord, those fellows are coming out again.' The fellows referred to were of course the Germans, and the decisions and orders which followed from this announcement were to lead to the greatest clash in the North Sea since the war began. The movements had begun only a short while earlier at 1025 hours that same morning when Rear- Admiral Hipper, resting with his battle-cruisers off Wilhelmshaven, received orders to take them, together with some cruisers and destroyers, and to sweep into the Dogger Bank area that night. The German intentions were not very clear but it was hoped to disrupt the British fishing fleet there and to sink a few of their escorts. Moreover, the report of British scouting operations in that area, brought in by a German seaplane on the 19th, had aroused curiosity at the German admiralty and also the anticipation that some light forces of the the British might be caught unawares by a swift one-day reconnaissance mission from Wilhelmshaven. Such a sweep was in any case well in line with the Kaiser's recent decision that the battlecruisers could sortie to harass the British, although a major fleet action was still considered to be undesirable. It was the efficiency of its Intelligence services which enabled the Royal Navy to learn so very quickly about the planned German operation and to take steps to meet it. The chance recovery by the" Russians in August 1914 of the German navy's cipher signal books and squared reference charts from the wrecked cruiser Magdeburg had been a boon to the British deciphering team, who, from then on, were able to decode the Germans' intercepted wireless messages. In addition, the establishment of radio direction-finder stations along the east coast of England enabled the Admiralty to pinpoint the position of German vessels when they used their radios. Thus Churchill had news of the German plans and the probable size of their forces only one hour and a half after Hipper had received his instructions. Shortly after Hipper's ships slid out of the Jade estuary on the evening of January 23, a variety of British squadrons emerged from harbour and also proceeded towards the Dogger Bank. Rear- Admiral Hipper's force consisted of the 1st and 2nd Scout-
>
ing Groups and two flotillas of destroyers. The 1st Scouting Group had to sail without the Von der Tann, which was in dockyard hands, and therefore was composed of four battle-cruisers, Seydlitz, Hipper's flagship, Moltke, Derfflinger and Bliicher. The first three vessels were similar, each carrying ten 11-inch guns, (the Derfflinger had eight 12-inch guns), adequately armoured and able to steam at about 25/26 knots. The Bliicher however was an older, large armoured cruiser rather than a battle-cruiser. Her armour, main armament and displacement were consequently all much smaller than that of the rest of her squadron. Most important of all, her maximum speed was some 2/3 knots less than theirs and this tended either to slow down the whole squadron when in action or to cause the Bliicher to gradually fall behind. Tactically she was a liability to the squadron. The 2nd Scouting Group consisted of the four light cruisers Stralsund, Rostock, Kolberg, and Graudenz, all of which carried twelve 4.1 -inch guns. These were accompanied by 18 destroyers. In numbers the balance of strength clearly lay with the British, but in gun-power there was less of a discrepancy since the German 11-inch gun was superior to the British 12-inch gun. Hipper's main opponents were to be Vice-Admiral Beatty's powerful battlecruisers Lion, Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand andlndomitable all based on Rosyth. Although the last two ships were smaller and not as well armoured as their German opposite numbers and the Indomitable, constructed in 1908, was slightly slower, they both carried eight 12-inch guns as main armament. Moreover the Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal were faster than Hipper's squadron and each carried the powerful 13.5-inch guns, although the British battle-cruisers carried less armour than Hipper's three big ships. Administrative and tactical reasons had caused the British battle-cruisers to be divided into a fast and a slow division. Thus Beatty directly controlled the 1st Battle-Cruiser Squadron which included the Lion (his flagship), Tiger and Princess Royal, while .Rear- Admiral Moore, his Second-in-Command, directed the newlyformed 2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadron, which consisted of the New Zealand (Moore's flagship) and the Indomitable — though remaining under Beatty's control throughout. These ships were accompanied from Rosyth by Commodore Goodenough's 1st Light Cruiser Squadron, consisting of Southampton, Birmingham, Nottingham and Lowestoft, all carrying eight or nine 6-inch guns.
January
24,
1915 saw the largest naval clash of the war up to that date: four pitted against five British ones.
German battle-cruisers
The conflict was confused, and poor British
signalling was mainly responsible for the major elements of the German squadron slipping away, leaving only the hybrid battle-cruiser Bliicher to be finally crushed by the storm of British fire. In the battle, however, points of enormous importance for future naval operations had become apparent. Signalling had to be improved, gunnery, in the British vessels particularly, needed drastic attention, armour protection for the snips' vitals needed strengthening and a way of stopping flash travelling down to the magazines needed devising. These lessons were apparent to both admiralties, but whether or not the lessons had been learnt fully would have to wait till the next clash. Paul Kennedy analyses the course and lessons of this vital battle. Below: White plumes of spray mark the fall of British shells among the German battle-cruisers. In the foreground, emitting a cloud of black smoke, is the Bliicher, already hit and damaged by British fire. Throughout the action she was a hindrance to the German force, and by abandoning her the rest of the German squadron made their own escape easier Other British forces were also on the move on the evening of the As soon as the Admiralty had received the news of an imminent German sweep, Wilson and Vice- Admiral Oliver (the Chief of Admiralty War Staff) had worked out in Churchill's office the most likely position for an interception. With professional expertise they ordered Beatty to be at a point about 30 miles north of the Dogger Bank at 0700 hours on the 24th and also ordered Commodore Tyrwhitt with his three light cruisers Arethusa (his flagship), Aurora and Undaunted, together with 35 destroyers, out of Harwich, to join Beatty there and provide the escort for the 23rd.
battle-cruisers.
Strict radio silence Although the Admiralty was almost certain that only the German battle-cruisers would come out and that their cartographical calculations were correct, they were still not inclined to take chances. The seven pre-dreadnought battleships of Vice- Admiral Bradford's 3rd Battle Squadron, also based on Rosyth, accompanied
by Rear- Admiral Pakenham's 3rd Cruiser Squadron, were ordered about 40 miles north-west of Beatty, to intercept Hipper if he came by a more northerly route or to support the British battle-cruisers if they got into trouble. Much further south, Commodore Keyes was moving from Harwich to the Heligoland Bight in the hope of intercepting and torpedoing any German vessels with his 'Overseas' squadron of Firedrake, Lurcher and four submarines. Finally, Admiral Jellicoe, resting at Scapa Flow with the main battleship force of the Grand Fleet, cleared harbour at 2100 hours on the 23rd with three battleship squadrons, covered by three cruiser squadrons and 28 destroyers. Further ahead of him ranged Rear-Admiral Napier's 2nd Light Cruiser Squadron. These forces, to a position
while covering the Scottish coast in the early stages of their were to sweep down to the rendezvous with Bradford's vessels by mid-morning. During the night the various squadrons picked their way between the minefields (Beatty's force actually dashing through an area which was reportedly mined) and approached the Dogger Bank from different directions. The British ships kept a strict radio silence while the occasional German wireless traffic intercepted by the D/F stations continued to confirm the Admiralty's belief that something was afoot on the German side. The weather cruise,
was calm and the sea
still. Apart from Tyrwhitt's forces, which were a little delayed by fog at Harwich, all the British ships appeared to be moving according to schedule and Churchill was thrilled with the idea of 'a beast of prey moving stealthily forward hour by hour into the trap'. At 0700 hours on the 24th Beatty, with Goodenough's cruisers steaming parallel on his port beam, reached the rendezvous area. Ten minutes later, with the dawn breaking to give almost perfect visibility, the Arethusa with seven new 'M' class destroyers of the Harwich force were sighted straight ahead. The Aurora, Undaunted and the rest of the destroyers were then some 13 miles
astern, delayed because of the early fog. It was this latter group, still south of the rendezvous point, first clashed with Hipper's forces. The Aurora, leading the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, sighted a three-funnelled cruiser and four destroyers on her starboard bow shortly after 0700 hours and
which
moved
closer to challenge, expecting to meet up with Tyrwhitt's again. The cruiser was, in fact, the Kolberg, which was guarding the port flank of Hipper's battle-cruisers, then steaming around the north side of the Dogger Bank. Opening fire on the Aurora at 0715 hours the Kolberg managed to get in three quick hits although they did little damage. Recovering from this surprise, the Aurora began to return the fire and soon scored a hit on flotilla
the Kolberg's forebridge, which killed two men and forced her to turn away. The Aurora, proceeding north-eastwards again and joined by Undaunted' s flotilla, soon sighted more German warships to starboard and then, at about 0730 hours, saw the Southampton's shape at the head of Goodenough's squadron, looming out of the dusk to the north. Some five miles behind the Southampton steamed Beatty's five battle-cruisers. Confident that he was about to surprise a weaker enemy, Beatty had ordered his battle-cruisers to steer SSE towards the sounds and flashes of the guns and to increase speed to 22 knots, while sending the cruisers on ahead. Hipper, on the other hand, had not expected an immediate encounter and therefore had to act warily in case he came up against the Grand Fleet or a part of it. The engagement with the Aurora to the westward was soon followed by sightings of more destroyers and Goodenough's squadron, and then by the sight of heavy smoke further north. Although not greatly increasing his speed, Hipper therefore ordered an almost complete turn so that his forces were steaming south-eastwards h\
DOGGER BANK CLASH OF THE BATTLE CRUISERS
0700
0715
The biggest naval
battle of the war to date was fought, almost by accident, on January 24, 1915 when the battle-cruiser squadrons of Britain and Germany met at the Dogger Bank. The Germans (shown in grey on the map) had come out to disrupt British fishing on the Bank, but after the screening cruisers had come in sight of each other, the Germans realised that they were about to meet a more formidable foe than they had anticipated and swung round to the south-east and home. The British battlecruisers were slightly faster, however, and began to overhaul the Germans. There ensued a scrappy and inconclusive battle, in which only the Blucher was sunk, and which showed up the inadequacy of British gunnery, signalling and protection against cordite flash in the magazines — all important lessons
0715
0730
/ 0740
0845
0900
(Blucher)
0900 0909
0924
0935
Best
British
Main Armament
German 0939
Speed Guns
Torpedo tubes
[knots]
[submerged]
Lion
Battle-Cruisers
Princess
Royal
Scapa Flow
13-5" [8] 4" [16]
21
29-1
12"
[8]
21" [3]
28
4"
[16]
Tiger
"
[3]
Grand Fleet [JeJIicoe
j
New Zealand Indomitable
^iiUUliB
7
Rosyth
29
11"
[10]
28-4
6"
[12]
•J -'-*-
20" [4]
iii
ali^i
Seydlitz
1st Battle-Cruiser
[Beatty]
2nd Battle-Cruiser Squadron Moored Moltke
1st Light Cruiser i
23
Southampton
12"
[8]
6"
[12]
22'
Derfflinger
[5]
Squadron
GoodenoughJ
3rd Battle Squadron [Bradford^
3rd Cruiser Squadron
82"
[12]
6"
[8]
Blucher
[3]
Light Cruisers 6"
Squadron
[8]
[PakenhanV
Harwich 3rd Light Cruiser Squadron
21" [2]
[Tyrwhitt;
3-pdr [4] Nottingham
6"
[9]
Overseas Squadron [Keyes]
21" [2]
Aurora
3-pdr [4]
Undaunted
IV
[4
[12]
20"
[2]
[12]
18" [2]
6"
[2]
4"
[6]
4-1" 4-1"
Arethusa
5-pdr [4]
628
& 2nd Scouting Groups
1st
Hipper!
Birmingham Lowestoft
Wilhelmshaven
above]
Rostock
Stralsund
Kolberg *
'
Top:
HMS
Lion, Beatty's flagship, took a heavy
pounding during the battle and eventually had to be towed home. Above: SMS Seydlitz, Hipper's powerful flagship at the Dogger Bank
1019
1000 0924
1039
Bliicher
Derfflinger
Moltke
submarines Seydlitz
repotted
1054 Princess Royal
Moltke, unfired upon, concentrates her the Lion, as do Seydlitz and Derfflinger
fire
on
629
Squadron, was ordered fled to the north-east.
to steer
eastwards
to cut off
The German admiralty, which
Hipper first
if
he
received
the news of Seydlitz' s sighting at about 0750 hours, ordered all ships at Wilhelmshaven to get up steam and to assemble in the Schillig Roads, but having left it so late it would be many hours before they could join in the battle.
Closing at 28 knots
0740 hours. By that time the heavy smoke to the north-west had resolved itself into the five British battle-cruisers, which were steadily working themselves up to full speed. Hipper, suddenly aware of his critical position 170 miles from Heligoland without any hope of support from the High Seas Fleet, ordered his destroyers to push on ahead and his main force to increase speed to 23 knots, which was Bliicher's maximum. The German battle-cruiser squadron then steered south-easterly in line ahead formation, led by Seydlitz with Moltke, Derfflinger and Blucher following in that order. Beatty, who had originally hoped to get to the Germans' leeward (the port side, in this instance) before engaging and thus avoid his own smoke as well as eventually cutting off the Germans from their base, was forced by Hipper's manoeuvre to follow on the starboard and fear of mines being dropped from the enemy's stern, and of loss of time, now prevented his battle-cruisers from switching over to port. As the chase developed, the respective admiralties were being acquainted with the situation. Churchill, Fisher, Wilson and Oliver, gathered together in the War Room of the Admiralty, could do nothing but wait and hope as confused messages came flooding in. In the middle of the North Sea and about 140 miles of the action, Jellicoe's great fleet of ships swung slightly more to starboard to intercept if the German battle-cruisers turned north. Further south, Vice-Admiral Bradford's force, cruising north of the Dogger Bank and joined by the 2nd Light Cruiser
NNW
Settling down to a steady pursuit and increasing speed, Beatty sent the fast 'M' class destroyers ahead to report on the exact strength of his opponent. By 0845 hours, despite the shelling which the destroyers encountered as they closed to within 9,000 yards of the Blucher, the composition of the German force was clear. It was also clear by then that Beatty's ships had the edge as regards speed and were gradually closing up to the German battle-cruisers. The British ships reached 25 knots, increased to 26 and then met Beatty's demand for 27 knots, although the Indomitable slowly began to be outpaced. Beatty afterwards stated that at one point his ships had reached the almost incredible speed of 28.5 knots, and indeed even the 'M' class destroyers found it hard work later to move ahead of the battle-cruisers. As a result of these high speeds the Lion drew to within 20,000 yards of the Blucher shortly after 0900 hours and then commenced firing at a range hitherto had been considered impossible; (the experimental maximum in 1914 had been 16,000 yards). Shortly afterwards the Tiger and Princess Royal were also able to open fire on the Blucher, which began to suffer from this concentrated fire. Soon the German battle-cruisers, echeloned to enable all four of them to return the fire from their starboard side, were answering vigorously although greatly inconvenienced by the smoke from the English destroyers to the north-east. Naturally enough the rearmost German and the foremost English vessels attracted the most attention and suffered as a consequence. The Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal, swinging slightly to starboard, brought their after turrets into action and began to damage the Blucher seriously with regular salvoes. At the third salvo the German vessel was hit on the water-line and had her speed reduced; and at the fourth, explosions shattered the after superstructure and two turrets, killing or injuring over 200 sailors. The Lion, being the nearest English ship and the one surrounded by least smoke, also took punishment. At 0928 hours she received a hit on her water-line, which penetrated the bunkers. Hammocks, mess-stools and anything else available were quickly used to make good the damage and the Lion steamed ahead unhindered, but Beatty was getting worried about the Germans' concentration on his ship. At 0935 hours therefore, seeing that the New Zealand had come within range of the Blucher and was
Above: The Blucher steams into her last action. Above right: Mortally hit, Blucher burns and begins to list to port. Below: The end for Germany's first battle-cruiser'. The crew scurries over Blucher's revolving hull as she capsizes prior to sinking, abandoned by her fellows
M
engaging her, Beatty gave the order to fire at opposite numbers. Consequently, while the New Zealand continued to pound away at the Bliicher, the Lion shifted her fire to Hipper's flagship Seydlitz and the third English vessel, Princess Royal, turned upon the third German battle-cruiser, the Derfflinger. However, the commander of the Tiger, Captain Pelly, who had begun to direct his ship's fire upon the Seydlitz a few minutes earlier, continued to shoot at this target in the belief that Indomitable was by then engaging Bliicher. Thinking that the rear three ships of the opposing battle-lines were respectively firing at each other, Pelly felt that his task was to assist the Lion in crippling the German flagship. Though sound enough in theory this idea failed in practice because the Indomitable was still not within reach of the Bliicher. This meant that with the existing dispositions the second German battle-cruiser, Moltke, was able to lob salvo after salvo undisturbed at Lion. Beatty had therefore failed to divert any of the German fire from himself and all three battle-cruisers continued to shoot at his flagship. At first this did not appear to be so serious a matter since it was the English ships who were handing out the punishment. The Lion's salvoes had found Seydlitz almost at once, from a range of some 17,500 yards, and a 13.5-inch shell penetrated the working chamber of the rearmost turret. The flames roared downwards threatening the turret magazine and then along towards the magazine of the adjacent turret. The ammunition in transit exploded and killed 159 men, put both after turrets out of action and sent flames shooting up high above the ship. Only the action of the executive officer, who promptly flooded both magazines, avoided the explosion of the stored ammunition and the probable destruction of the battle-cruiser. Moreover, far at the rear of the German line, Bliicher was also taking a battering and slowly dropping further back. British gunnery hampered Nevertheless, the British gunnery was greatly hampered by smoke drifting from Tyrwhitt's squadron which had moved to the north-east. The Tiger, a newly commissioned ship with an inefficient gunnery officer, spotted Lion's shells as her own in consequence of the smoke and did not realise that she was" in fact firing 3,000 yards over Seydlitz. On the other side, however, the more efficient German gunners were making themselves felt on board the Lion. Shortly before 1000 hours she was hit on the roof of her foremost turret and one of the guns was disabled. A few minutes later an 11-inch shell from the Seydlitz pierced the Lion's armour, flooding the engineer's workshop and putting two dynamos, the after fire control and the secondary armament circuits out of action.
At 1018 hours the Derfflinger, which was on fire herself from one of Princess Royal's shells, managed to land two 12-inch shells on Beatty's flagship. One of these flooded the port bunkers, the other flooded the torpedo flat and adjacent compartment. The Lion, with speed gradually falling, was by then zig-zagging desperately while Beatty still stood on the open bridge with his staff, all drenched by the 'near-misses'. As the German battle-cruisers continued to pour shells at the Lion, the battered Bliicher was burning fiercely and dropping even further behind. At 1048 hours she sheered off to port, apparently out of control, and came under a concentrated fire from the Harwich flotillas and the Indomitable, which had at last caught up with the action. The Bliicher, to all eyes, was obviously finished. Beatty's overriding concern, however, was to catch the rest of Hipper's squadron. The prospects for this looked bright with the slower German battle-cruisers still over 100 miles from Heligoland and many hours of daylight left, but a whole series of incidents altered the course of the battle. The Lion, still under an intense bombardment, was hit at about 1052 hours by a shell which penetrated the boiler-rooms and flooded the feed tank, stopped the port engine and reduced speed to 15 knots. Moreover, as the ship listed 10 degrees to port, the remaining dynamo suddenly failed and cut off lighting and power. Most important of all was the fact that Beatty could henceforward only signal with flags, since the wireless and signal lights were also put out of order. Falling out
of line, Beatty
New Zealand
was forced to watch as the Tiger, Princess Royal and rushed past and Rear-Admiral Moore was left with
command. was at this point that Beatty and others on board the Lion thought they saw submarines on the starboard bow. In fact the the
It
German submarines were many to know that and anticipated
miles away, but Beatty a submarine trap. He therefore signalled for a sharp turn to port, which would take Moore's vessels away from the danger — a manoeuvre which enabled the Indomitable, by cutting the corner, to catch up with the squadron again. Since this new course also took the British battle-cruisers away from Hipper's at almost right angles it meant that they would later have to cross the enemy's wake and run the risk of mines. As it happened the German ships carried no mines on this occasion, but nevertheless Beatty soon changed his mind and modified his ships' course to the north-east. This was not a great modification, however, and it carried Moore's vessels more towards the battered Bliieher than towards the rest of Hipper's battle-cruisers just when they were beginning to turn back in a gesture to help the Bliieher, and their destroyers were rushing ahead to launch torpedo attacks against the British squadron as it made its swing to the north-east. With the distance between the two forces rapidly widening, Hipper seized this chance to extricate the rest of his force and ordered a resumption of the south-easterly course. Since Seydlitz's after turrets were out of action and her ammunition supplies were running short, it would have been an expensive gesture in any case to have tried to recover the shattered wreck of the Bliieher. This temporary breathing-space afforded to the German squadron was now prolonged by confused communications on the British side. Beatty, breathing fire at his ship's disablement, was determined to make it quite clear to Moore that Hipper's main force was to be destroyed and ordered the flag signal 'Attack the rear of the enemy'. In confused circumstances such as these this message was not the clearest expression of the Admiral's intentions, but it was made even less clear when the flags for this signal were hauled down together with those for the previous signal 'Course NE' thus combining two separate messages with one executive order. As a result, the British battle-cruisers read the message as 'Attack the rear of the enemy, bearing NE', which was where the crippled Bliieher lay. Moore, who was unaware of the reported submarine threat and thought that the earlier turns to port had been to get nearer to the Bliieher, became convinced that this was Beatty's intention when he saw the German vessel bearing to the north-east. With no thoughts of questioning such orders, the four battle-cruisers gave up the pursuit of Hipper's force and turned towards the Bliieher. Beatty had indeed tried to make his intentions clearer by later hoisting Nelson's famous signal 'Engage the enemy more closely' and incidentally but perhaps symbolically found that this had been replaced in the signal book by the less inspiring phrase 'Keep nearer to the enemy'. In any case the fast-disappearing British battle-cruisers could no longer read the Lion's signals. Shortly afterwards, being eager to discover what was really happening and having ascertained that immediate repairs to his ship were impossible, Beatty transferred to the nearest destroyer, the Attack, and set off in pursuit. The Lion meanwhile limped slowly away towards the north-west. Over the horizon to the south-east the Bliieher was suffering in isolation as more and more British ships closed in upon her and as the rest of Hipper's force steamed hurriedly towards Wilhelmshaven. Bliieher continued to fight stubbornly against the overwhelming odds. By this time she was on fire in many places and only two of her main guns were in action, trying to keep her enemies at bay. By 1120 hours the Arethusa and her 'M' class destroyers were also in the fray and the Meteor went in close to nearest
was
not
launch torpedoes. She was then suddenly hit by an 8.2-inch shell, in the front boiler-room and put her out of action. Bliieher was still a danger to those impetuous enough to get too
which burst close to her.
three 'M' class destroyers and the Arethusa were by and firing torpedoes. Tyrwhitt steered his cruiser to within 2,500 yards of the Bliieher, blasting away at her continuously with Arethusa's 6-inch guns and finally let fly with two torpedoes, both of which hit. Even now the Bliieher was not only firing her guns at the Arethusa but also launching torpedoes at the British battle-cruisers, which were contributing to the destruction. Overhead the whole scene was being watched by the helpless crew of a Zeppelin, who could do nothing other than chronicle Bliieher' s end. This came shortly after noon, at about 1210 hours. Hit by seven torpedoes and over 70 shells, Bliieher had been a blazing wreck
The other now closing
632
in
long before that and had her last gun put out of order about 1145 hours. Tyrwhitt again ordered the Arethusa to close the German ship but this time only to rescue the survivors, who cheered at her coming. Turning over completely, Bliieher lay bottom upwards for a few minutes while Arethusa's small boats picked up the German
seamen and then suddenly she disappeared. The Arethusa and her destroyers managed to rescue 260 of these gallant men, who had been under more or less continuous fire for three hours, before a German seaplane arrived and unfortunately forced an end to this rescue operation by bombing the small boats. In fact the pilot, an inexperienced flyer, was trying to attack the destroyers, but his action was later criticised by the German admiralty. Moore's battle-cruisers had turned north a short while before. The Rear-Admiral knew that his squadron would probably be in sight of Heligoland before they could catch up with Hipper again and that the risks were therefore too great. Already Keyes had reported that the High Seas Fleet was on the move. Moreover Moore knew nothing about the condition of the Lion after seeing her limp away to the north-west and greatly feared for her safety. At 1220 hours they met the destroyer Attack coming southwards with Beatty on board. Hastily transferring his flag to the Princess Royal, the Admiral rushed aboard the battle-cruiser and learnt for himself the sad news. Bitterly disappointed, he impetuously signalled for an immediate about-turn and set off after Hipper. After further enquiry, however, he also realised that their task was by then impossible. Hipper had slipped out of his net for the second time within six weeks and could not be caught. It was, as his Flag Lieutenant Seymour put it, 'like trying to win the Derby after falling at Tattenham Corner'. The British battlecruisers therefore turned to find the Lion and to escort her home. The Lion had in fact to be towed to Rosyth. By 1530 hours with her speed below 8 knots, she was forced to take a towline from the Indomitable. Surrounded by a large force of destroyers and cruisers, with the battle-cruisers and the Grand Fleet battleships providing a more distant cover in case of a surprise German attack, these two exposed vessels slowly edged their way home all that day and the next. Early on January 26 the Lion, whose engines had by then completely failed, was anchored in the Forth. On the other side of the North Sea, with ideas of surprise attacks on the Grand Fleet very far from their minds, Hipper's very relieved squadron had been met at about 1430 hours on the 24th and escorted back to the Jade estuary. On the face of it, the battle of the Dogger Bank was a clear-cut British victory. They had chased Hipper's squadron from the seas and destroyed one of his larger vessels without losing so much as a destroyer themselves. The Seydlitz had also been seriously damaged, while both the Derfflinger and the Kolberg suffered to some extent. Against this, the Lion was to stay out of action for four months while the Tiger had trifling damages. The destroyer Meteor had been damaged by the Bliieher, and the Aurora only scratched by the Kolberg. The Germans lost almost 1,000 men killed, but fatal casualties on the British side totalled only 15.
Misunderstanding or tragedy? if this victory appeared decisive to the British press, it was not so obvious to the professional critics. Beatty was unanimously praised for his part and Fisher's only quibble with him was that the battle-cruisers had carried enough fuel for 3,000 miles instead of the probable 500 miles, and therefore reduced their speed by a knot or two. The actions of the other officers, however, were not so well received, and with some reason. Keyes was later to admit that 'the spectacle of Moore and Co yapping around the poor tortured Bliieher, with beaten ships in sight to be sunk, is one of the most distressing episodes of the war'. Like everyone else, he saw the lucky escape of the German battle-cruisers, due to a simple misunderstanding, as a tragedy for the Royal Navy. Fisher criticised Moore's decision to give up the chase, calling it 'despicable' and 'absolutely incomprehensible'. While sympathising with Moore's confusion and bewilderment at Beatty's signals from the crippled Lion, one is forced to conclude that he did not show any of the initiative necessary in such tense encounters. Before the Lion was knocked out of the battle, Beatty had clearly shown that his primary concern was to catch the main body of Hipper's force and not just to finish off the already doomed Bliieher. With the advantage in numbers, armament and speed the British had a unique chance to destroy all of the German battle-cruisers, but Moore had let the opportunity slip. Churchill and Fisher shortly sent him away to command a cruiser squadron in the Canary Islands region. Moore's attitude was symptomatic of the rigid adherence to orders which characterised the Royal Navy's outlook at that
But
time. Initiative and independent judgement were not encouraged. Fisher might fume that 'in war the first principle is to disobey orders. Any fool can obey orders!', but he was hardly renowned for his tolerance when subordinates ventured to cross his opinions and commands. There was also a failure on board the Lion to communicate Beatty's wishes exactly. The order to engage the enemy's rear was both unnecessary and confusing, and was in any case mixed up with the flags of his previous direction. Without this ambiguous signal Moore would have continued to fire away at the Seydlitz and Derfflinger, and perhaps this was the reason why Beatty was not very eager to chastise his Second-in-Command afterwards. But it is worth remembering that Seymour, Beatty's Flag Lieutenant, had had no specialist training in signals,
and had sent unclear messages during the Scarborough Raid action.
Probably Captain Pelly of the Tiger was the person who came in for most criticism, especially from Fisher, who thought that his failure to engage the Moltke was 'inexcusable', and that he was a 'poltroon' for not charging after the enemy when the Lion sheered out of line. The first point is worth examining. The official naval historian is to some extent correct in following Fisher and pointing out that 'the master principle was that no ship should be left unfired upon', but there is another side to the matter. Pelly's information regarding the position of the Indomitable in fact incorrect but his tactics were right. After all, the leading three German battle-cruisers continued to concentrate upon the Lion (though the Tiger was also engaged and suffered six hits) and achieved great effect. Crippling the enemy's leading ship had been, and still remained, a major stepping-stone on the path to winning the battle, and the official historian was forced to admit that the German firing policy 'was all that the advocates
was
Survivors from the Blucher dot the surface of the cold North wait to be picked up by British destroyers
Correcting the failures Some, but not all, of the failures on the British side were recognised and attempts were made to correct them. The Tiger and the other battle-cruisers were urged to improve their gunnery, which to Jellicoe had always been suspect, and the Admiralty accelerits
programme of installing director
firing
battle orders were reworded so that Pelly's mistake regarding concentration could be avoided in the future and the signalling system was improved by the installation on each ship of an auxiliary wireless set and by further additions to the signal book which would clarify the sort of instructions which Beatty had so desperately wished to send when his flagship fell out of line. The other innovation which Churchill and Fisher pressed for, the transfer of the battle-cruisers to the Humber and the Grand Fleet battleships to Rosyth, was abandoned after vigorous protests from both Jellicoe and Beatty. For although this move would put both forces in a better intercepting position, these two bases did not compare with Scapa as an anchorage or a practice area, were navigationally unsuitable and could easily be mined. In the field of tactics the British did not seek for, or perhaps did not think of, any answers to the threat posed by German mines and submarines during the action. Yet without such answers and in view of the Grand Fleet's super-sensitiveness to such attacks, their only reply remained that of swinging away, disengaging, temporarily at least, from the battle. Temporary disengagements, however, could swiftly develop into more permanent ones if great care were not taken. Finally, the Dogger Bank action tended to confirm the opinion of Fisher, Beatty and perhaps others that the battle-cruisers themselves 'will finish the job'. This was a rather natural thing to say in view of their performance here and earlier at the Falklands, but in both battles the British warships had possessed a large numerical superiority and the enemy had retreated without engaging in a 'toe-to-toe' boxing match. In other words, although the Lion indeed took some heavy punishment, the British battle-cruisers were not yet proven in full battle, especially in their defence capabilities. In particular the weaknesses of Beatty's ships to plunging shells and to the possibility of the magazines fire
Sea as they
of concentration on the van could* wish'. Finally, and perhaps more important still, the fuss over Pelly's decision tended to obscure the much more vital fact that the British standards of shooting were rather poor. Here indeed could the Tiger feel somewhat ashamed, for despite being the only British battle-cruiser equipped with a director fire-control system she had not registered a single hit. The Southampton, as mentioned earlier, had seen her shots regularly land some 3,000 yards over the German ships. The Tiger was in fact a special case, with a gunnery lieutenant who was 'villainously bad' (Fisher) and a large number of recovered deserters among the crew. Moreover, being a relatively new ship, she had not fired at a moving target! Nevertheless she serves as a symbol for the gunnery standards of the British battle-cruisers, which, even allowing for the vast clouds of smoke often obscuring the view, was very poor when compared with that of their opponents. Apart from the Blucher and the Kolberg, which suffered at the hands of Aurora in the first encounter, the only hits made upon the German ships during the entire battle were the two on Seydlitz and the one on the Derfflinger. In contrast the Lion received 16 hits while the Tiger was hit six times. Had the German shells been more effective, the battle of the Dogger Bank might have had a different ending, but the British also lacked a really good armour-piercing shell.
ated
The
systems
being ignited by flashes in the turrets had not shown itself as it had done in the case of the Seydlitz, where the Germans took the necessary corrective action. The battle of the Dogger Bank had seen the British and German battle-cruisers engage each other and the weaker force once again evade the stronger. In that it revealed where command of the sea lay, the action justified the eulogising of the British press. But it also produced evidence of serious weaknesses on both sides. Whether this would be enough to tilt the balance of power in the North Sea in the future was another question. Further Reading Bennett, Geoffrey, Naval Battles of the First World War (Batsford) Chalmers, Rear-Admiral W.S., The Life and Letters of David, Earl Beatty. Churchill, Sir W.S., The World Crisis. 1911-18 (Four Square) Corbett, J., Naval Operations Vol 1 1 (Official History) (Longmans) Jellicoe, Admiral,
and Work
The Grand Fleet 1914-18:
Its
Creation,
E
Development
(Cassell)
J., From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow Vol II. The War Years: to the Eve of Jutland 1914-16 (Oxford UP. 1965) Scheer, Admiral, Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War (Cassell)
Marder, A.
PAUL KENNEDY was born in 1 945 and was educated at St Cuthbert's Grammar School, Newcastle-upon-Tyne and at the University of Newcastle, where he obtained a first-class honours degree in Modern History in 1 966 He researched his doctorate at St Antony's College, Oxford From 1966 to 1969 he worked as research assistant to Sir Basil Liddell Hart, and contributed articles to Purnell'9 History of the Second World War in the German archives for 1915
As Theodor Heuss Research Fellow he worked
in all ships.
633
I
SMS Blucher- the hybrid offspring of German ambition
and British deceit
HMS Lion - the 'Splendid Cat' severely mauled at the Dogger Bank
Below:
SMS
Blucher was Germany's answer
to
the Invincible class of battle-cruiser. The British had 'leaked' the information that they would be armed with 9.2-inch guns, so the Germans countered with their superior 8.2-inch weapon. The Invincibles did, of course, have 12-inch guns. Displacement: 15,500 tons. Length: 530V2 feet. Beam: 8OV2 feet. Power/ speed: 32,000-44,000 hp/24 /2 knots. Armament: Twelve 8.2-inch, eight 5.9-inch and sixteen 3.4-inch guns. Armour: Belt 6% inches, turrets 6% inches. Crew: 847 1
Below:
HMS
Lion, Beatty's flagship at the
Dogger Bank, was the first of the new class of battle-cruisers armed with 13.5-inch guns. She took a heavy pounding during the battle. Displacement: 29,700 tons. Length: 700 feet. feet. Power/speed: 70,000-80.000 hp/28-32 knots. Armament: Eight 13.5-inch and
Beam: 88V2
sixteen 4-inch guns. Armour: Belt 9 inches, turrets 9 inches.
Crew: 1,061
DOGGER BANK Beside the technical problems of modern sea warfare posed by the Battle of the Dogger Bank, problems of command were also raised. OskarEckert and Paul Kennedy inquire into the
German reaction to this momentous battle
A German View On
the evening of January 15, 1915, Admiral von Pohl, the Chief Staff, surprised the Kaiser and his entourage at in Charleville with the news that their battle-cruisers had successfully clashed with Beatty's forces, destroying a British battle-cruiser but losing the German armoured cruiser Bliicher in the process. Without waiting for confirmation of this news, the Kaiser told the Chief of the Naval Cabinet, Admiral von Muller, that he wished to confer decorations upon the officers and men concerned, on the occasion of his birthday on January 27. Wilhelm's joy at the apparent victory was increased by the fact that it had taken place on the birthday of Frederick the Great. Only on Miiller's remonstrance, that they should await further details before decorating the men concerned, did the Kaiser desist, temporarily, from his scheme. When the Germans learned the real facts about the Dogger Bank battle their reactions and the consequences were somewhat different from those prematurely outlined by Wilhelm. The first obvious result at the end of January was the dismissal of the C-in-C of the High Seas Fleet, Admiral von Ingenohl, for his failure to support Hipper's battle-cruisers. The Navy Secretary, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz, had already been pressing Muller to do this since the Scarborough raid of the previous December, where Ingenohl had again appeared to expose the German battlecruisers and had also ignored the chance of reducing the British superiority in numbers. Now, 'with a heavy heart', Muller agreed to this change and also to the dismissal of Ingenohl's Chief-ofStaff, Rear-Admiral Eckermann, who had originally proposed the Dogger Bank raid. Tirpitz's repeated demands for Hipper's dismissal were refused by Muller, who argued that the commander of the battle-cruisers had acted well in the circumstances. Pohl himself took over Ingenohl's position and was replaced as Chief of Naval Staff by Vice- Admiral Bachmann, the former head of Baltic Naval Command. These changes were to affect the whole German navy, and especially its attitude towards a conflict in the North Sea. Bachmann was a knowledgeable and experienced commander but not a strong personality and could not be expected to represent the Naval Staff's viewpoint to the Kaiser with enough force. He was so conscious of his limitations that on the of
German Naval
GHQ
day of his appointment he attempted to persuade Muller to make Tirpitz head of the entire German navy. Although this would have immediately reformed the existing chaotic command structure, it was declined by Muller. In fact there was little chance that this proposal would be accepted since the Kaiser was unwilling to give up his nominal command of the navy and had moreover lost confidence in Tirpitz's famous 'risk theory', while the Chancellor,
Bethmann-Hollweg, would have resented the Grand Admiral's promotion.
The appointment of Bachmann was a compromise and promised no significant change in policy even though he loyally co-operated with Tirpitz and accepted the latter's wishes for more energetic fleet missions. The decisive appointment was that of Admiral von Pohl to command the High Seas Fleet. A cautious man, who while Chief of Naval Staff had modified the offensive operation plans against Great Britain and had, together with the Kaiser, been responsible for Ingenohl's lack of boldness, Pohl would not be persuaded to undertake vigorous engagements with the Grand Fleet. Moreover, he could not be compelled to do so, as he was directly responsible only to the Kaiser. The inactivity which followed Pohl's appointment benefitted neither the men nor the ships of the High Seas Fleet and contributed to the feeling of depression which had existed in certain German naval circles sine + he beginning of the war and which had grown as a result of the Heligoland and Dogger Bank actions. The reduction of the Royal N, y's superiority in numbers had not materialised and the British h. >hown themselves ready to strike at every opportunity. Tirpitz a Id point in vain to the German superiority in signals and manot >vres, to the better training of
636
the crews and their unquestioned shooting ability, to the stronger armour and superior defensive qualities of the ships and the greater effectiveness of their armour-piercing shells: all this had to be proved in battle before the scepticism would disappear. More important to the German officers and men were the two British advantages of greater speed and heavier guns, which existed in every class of ship. Many of the younger German captains and followers of Tirpitz pressed for action but made no headway with Pohl, whose thoughts dwelt solely upon the possible political and strategic consequences of a decisive naval defeat. In fairness to the C-in-C it must be said that his responsibility was immense, that the Kaiser watched carefully over his precious ships and that such worries existed on the British side as well. In an age when the U-boat and the mine were restricting the movement of the battle fleets and where numbers and technical questions were apparently of greater importance than boldness and strategic imagination, even Nelson might have been cramped. It still remains to be said, however, that the German naval leadership after the Dogger Bank battle was clearly neither bold nor imaginative and that this obviously affected the already drooping morale of the High Seas Fleet. Pohl's inactivity did not prevent great arguments for or against an energetic fleet policy. The debate grew as a result of the Dogger Bank battle. Before the war the German navy, aware of its
inferiority in
numbers, had optimistically planned
to fight
only under the most favourable circumstances. For this reason Tirpitz had concentrated upon the defensive characteristics of the German battleships, which also possessed a small radius of action. The greatest blow to German plans was the Royal Navy's revelation at the outbreak of the war that it had abandoned its traditional close blockade policy in favour of a more distant one based upon the Channel and Scapa Flow. This not only reduced the chances of the Grand Fleet being substantially damaged by mines and U-boats and then fighting under unfavourable conditions near the German harbours, but also showed that the British blockade could cut into the German war economy. All this threw the German planners into some confusion, although one Staff memorandum before the war had attempted to answer this problem and had caused an outburst of various ideas on how to reverse their strategically unfavourable position. Tirpitz and the younger officers continued to press for action in the North Sea but there was little hope of this being accepted. It must also be noted that Tirpitz appears more warlike in his postwar memoirs than he was at the time, and that much of his pugnacity after 1914 was meant to allay political concern about the fading prestige of the navy (which could be damaging to later construction programmes), rather than an expression of his strategical insight and opinions. In any case the aggressive point of view was opposed by Wilhelm, who despite his long interest in naval matters was only now aware of the realities of sea warfare with its attendant losses of ships and men. Moreover, BethmannHollweg and the Foreign Minister, Jagow, still optimistically believed that separate peace negotiations with Britain were possible and that the British war leaders could be persuaded to accept German hegemony on the Continent provided that the British Fleet, and with it the British Empire, was unchallenged. In other words, they saw the High Seas Fleet as a bargaining counter in such talks and feared that a great sea battle, with heavy losses in the Grand Fleet, would stiffen the British resolve and make negotiations impossible. Several of the older admirals were in agreement with this, and did not wish to risk the fleet while the situation along the land fronts was still so unpredictable. The second viewpoint, advocated by another body of opinion in the German navy, was that the centre of operations should be switched from the North Sea to the Baltic. This would correspond to a certain degree with the overall strategic situation in 1915 (with the great German and Austro-Hungarian offensives against Russia) and, if the navy acted as a support wing to the army along the sea coast, it could possibly lead to Russia's defeat. Pohl, admittedly more through fear of a Russian attack upon Memel, proposed to send the modern battleships of the 3rd Battle Squadron to the Baltic and to take command himself. Tirpitz, seeing these ideas as the clearest admission of the failure of his policies, threw all his weight against such a transfer, calling it 'poison for the fleet'. The officer corps of the navy was in general also against the move, since it reduced the fleet to such a modest role, a mere subsidiary of the army. The third viewpoint, and that which carried the day, was Pohl's. He stressed the importance of an intact High Seas Fleet within the framework of Germany's overall strategy. His ships, he claimed, guaranteed to Germany the use of internal lines in this two-fronted war and, by controlling the Baltic, eliminated the
danger of Russian troop landings on the Pomeranian coast with the help of the British Grand Fleet (Fisher's Grand Design) and cut off Russia from the vitally necessary Allied provisions, while guarding the important Swedish mineral supplies and preserving the neutrality of Scandanavia and the Netherlands, which were loopholes in the British blockade for certain strategic goods. On the other hand, the loss of Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands into the Allied camp was feared as a possible consequence of the destruction of the High Seas Fleet. After emphasising the importance of this 'fleet in being' concept, Pohl and his supporters also stressed that they were not against a clash with the Grand Fleet, but they believed that British public opinion and the Royal Navy's tradition of the offensive would force the enemy to seek battle even under the most unfavourable circumstances. Not until all the tactical advantages lay on the German side, in other words, would such a clash occur.
of the key figures in the analysis and reshuffle of the admiralty: from left to right, Tirpitz, Hipper and Pohl
Three
German
The fourth alternative was commerce raiding, although after the seizure of Germany's colonies and the destruction of Spee's squadron in 1914 such a policy on a large scale could hardly be advocated for the main body of the fleet. Instead the U-boat was being put forward as the key offensive weapon of the German navy, for it could cripple Britain's trade without risking the High Seas Fleet and the cost to Germany in men and materials of such a campaign would probably not be very great. Pohl also believed that impressive results from U-boat warfare could in some way force the Grand Fleet to give up distant blockade and come to the German coast in a retaliatory mood to seek a decisive battle. Whatever the various reasons for Germany's tentative decision to concentrate more upon U-boat attacks, the facts remain that the uncertainty amongst her naval leaders and the obvious disadvantages of the three alternative policies were gradually forcing the German navy willy-nilly in this direction, and that the defeat at the Dogger Bank contributed to this movement. On February 4, 1915, after the Kaiser and the Chancellor had agreed to the navy's pleas, Germany made her famous proclamation of a war zone area in the waters around the British Isles, in which all the merchant vessels would be sunk. Ingenohl's failure to support Hipper during the battle was criticised by all, as was the idea of the sortie, which Eckermann and Ingenohl had sprung upon Hipper only shortly after 'expressly' assuring the latter that no offensive operations were contemplated in the near future and after the 1st Battle Squadron had been ordered to execute repairs. Particularly virulent criticisms of Ingenohl were also made by Captain von Egidy of the Seydlitz and Captain Zenker, the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Naval Staff. With Pohl in command, however, there was certainly little chance that such spontaneous and ill-prepared sorties would be repeated. A failure which was not corrected was the German habit of frequent and often unnecessary communication by wireless, which greatly helped the Royal Navy to prepare itself for the German sorties. Hipper had received his orders in such a way even though he was on board his flagship lying off Wilhelmshaven. Although unaware of the existence of Room 40 and the extent to which this Admiralty department had penetrated the German code system, the High Seas Fleet had felt, ever since the interception of their raid on December 16, 1914, that the British had some way of learning about their fleet messages. Despite this, however, the appropriate conclusions were not drawn and the German navy continued to display too little discipline with radio messages. Pohl, who had already earned a name as an excellent tactician, immediately took steps to repair any tactical deficiencies in the High Seas Fleet, which had to some extent suffered from its inactivity. His proposal to move a battle squadron into the Baltic, for example, was also intended to maintain the fighting spirit of his fleet. Moreover, the new C-in-C was also keen to use aircraft and airships for fleet reconnaissance and thus compensate for his
chronic lack of cruisers., although the technical state of these craft only allowed them to operate in good weather. So, besides restricting still further the periods when the High Seas Fleet could be used, this could give the Grand Fleet the opportunity of preparing itself for fine weather and relaxing at other times. It was doubtful, on the other hand, whether these exercises and new scouting methods could compensate for the lack of battle experience and the decline in morale resulting from the inactivity of the fleet. Close attention was also paid to technical developments on board the German ships after the Dogger Bank battle. Tirpitz and the German navy had always been proud of the excellent defensive characteristics of their capital ships, and especially of the superiority of their extensive underwater protection and heavier armour in comparison to the British vessels. Yet even these renowned defences did not prevent that hit 'of most fateful consequences' (German Official History) on board the Seydlitz. The 13-5-inch shell from the Lion had penetrated through a joint in D turret where it exploded, scattering burning fragments into the working chamber and setting alight the cartridges in the hoist. The flames spread to the turntable and to the lift room and then, as the fleeing sailors opened the connecting door, into C turret also, where the disaster repeated itself. Although 13,200 lb of cordite was burnt out, its non-exploding character prevented the ship from being utterly lost. The decisive factor was obviously the heroic action of the First Officer and helpers who succeeded in pushing forward to the flood-gates 'despite poisonous gas and unbearable heat' and opening them, flooding the magazines in the nick of time. Shortly after the battle the First Gunnery Officer, LieutenantCommander Forster, went into the two completely burnt-out and partially flooded turrets in order to investigate the causes of the disaster and to discover improvements which would prevent any repetition of the catastrophe. As a result extensive modifications of the German turret construction and ammunition chambers were recommended. The key factor had been the first fire in the working chamber of D turret, whose open construction had immediately led to the flames shooting above, below and into the adjacent turret. On all new German warships the working chamber was to be modified and separate shell and powder hoists were again to be installed. Moreover, the hoists on all vessels were to be equipped with automatic self-closing doors, which would prevent flames from penetrating downwards to the magazine. In addition only cartridges in flame-proof cases should be used: these were the only ones on board Seydlitz which had not burst into flames. The connecting door between the two turrets was to be locked and could only be opened by the turret officer when all the turret's ammunition had been fired. Not all of the German ships were, modified in time for their next clash with the Grand Fleet, but most of them were and this naturally gave them a distinct advantage over the British, who were unaware of the dangers of inadequate anti-flash precautions in their gun-turrets. A further technical development on the German side was the improvement of the range-finders, which now received direction indicators for long-distance firing. Because Beatty had opened fire at the Dogger Bank at 20,000 yards, Scheer and other Germans feared that in future the British would stay at a great distance and pick off the German warships, who might not be able to retaliate. This modification also required some time, for much shooting practice had to be carried out after installation to test this
new
fire-control.
These modifications, the new training programme and the staff readjustment to the change of command all contributed to the operational inactivity of the High Seas Fleet during the remainder of 1915. But the key factor, it must be stressed, was the natural caution of Pohl. Five small sorties into the North Sea were in fact made by his ships that year but as none of these ventured far past Borkum and Heligoland there was no chance of a conflict with the Grand Fleet, which also emerged on those five occasions Further Reading Pohl, Hugo von, Aus Aufzeichnungen Kriegszeit (Berlin 1920)
und Briefen wahrend der
Scheer, Reinhard, Deutschlands Hochseeflotte im Weltkrieg. Personliche Erinnerungen (Berlin 1920) Tirpitz, Alfred,
Erinnerungen (Berlin 1920)
OSKAR ECKERT was
born in 1933 in G6rkau and studied History and Political Science at the Universities of Frankfurt and Bonn. He has completed a doctorate on German-American relations and has as a subsidiary interest, naval affairs
[For Paul
Kennedy 's biography,
see
page
633.
(VM
*.
fisa
The First eppelin Raids By 1914, Germany had invested huge sums of money in the development of airships, mainly the Zeppelin types. But as yet their use in war was unproved, and the early weeks of the conflict showed the giant airships to be vulnerable in the extreme to anti-aircraft fire while on low level reconnaissance missions. The army airships began to roam further afield, but the losses continued and so the burden of operations fell on the naval airships. These finally reached England, and though the first raids were ineffectual, they were a dreadful portent of what was to follow. John Edgcumbe. Above: The new shape of war in the skies — a German Zeppelin hovers above Mauberge
At the beginning of the war, Germany was unique among the world's great powers in being the one nation that possessed a fleet of long-range aerial craft rigid airships Before the outbreak of war. when aeroplanes rarely made flights of two hours' duration, or distances of more than 100 miles. Zeppelin airships had stayed aloft on long distance reconnaissances for 20 to 30 hours and had covered distances of 900 miles while maintaining, for hours at a time, an altitude of 5,000 feet. Performances as impressive as these were exaggerated by sensational and colourful stories in the popular press and 'revelations' by so-called master spies. This state of affairs was exacerbated when the German army's Zeppelin LZ 4 got lost in fog on April 3, 1913, and landed accidentally at Luneville in France. She was detained for a day (long enough for the French to carry out a thorough examination) before being re1
1
again was a lengthy and often inaccurate
method especially when several commanders were all trying to get bearings at the same time. The army was responsible for the first air raid in history on a fortress town on the night of August 5/6. The LZ 6 (commanded by Oberleutnant Kleinschmidt) flew over Liege in an attempt to bombard the forts with 420 pounds of artillery shells, as no aerial bombs had yet been perfected. Low cloud and lack of ceiling, due to the Zeppelin's poor performance, brought the ship low, within range not only of anti-aircraft guns but also rifle fire from infantry. With leaking gas cells, the captain and crew tried to get the ship back to her base at Cologne, but she was forced to descend into a forest near Bonn, where she was completely wrecked. On the 23rd, the LZ 7 (Oberleutnant Jacobi) was sent on recon-
leased. Rumours in Britain were current, even before the war, of darkened airships hovering over the English coastline and the North Sea. After a long distance scouting flight carried out by the first German naval Zeppelin, the LI, over North Germany on October 13, 1913, many of the residents in Sheerness declared that the airship had flown over their town that
evening. After the war had started and a general spy mania was abroad, report had it that a German airship was sheltering in the Cumberland hills and was operating by night over the Westmorland area. SecondLieutenant Hucks of the RFC was sent in a Bleriot monoplane to patrol the locality and it was not until the negative results of his scouting had completely disproved this far-fetched story that the rumours were dismissed. In August the disposition of the 11 rigid airships, consisting of ten Zeppelins and one Schutte Lanz, was one with the navy, seven with the army (this number including the Schutte Lanz) and three civilian ships serving with DELAG, the German Airship Transportation Company, which had been running pleasure flights during each summer season since 1910. The civilian airships (named Hansa, Viktoria Luise and Sachsen) were transferred to government use as training ships, although the Sachsen was first used for military duties. The number of the army fleet was swiftly reduced by a series of losses within the first few weeks, as a result of faulty tactical use in daylight, the LZ5, LZ6, LZ 7 and LZ S all being destroyed, although with little loss of life, only one crew being lost by becoming prisoners of war. A major difficulty was navigation, which had to be carried out by the use of maps and direct observation of prominent objects such as coast lines, towns, rivers and railway lines, all of which were extremely difficult to identify at night, and thus led to gross errors. Dead reckoning was also used, i.e. adding up the distance run and the bearings of courses taken over a period of time, but this also was very inaccurate, especially as there was no known way to estimate the drift of the ship while in flight. Radio bearings began to be used in April 1915 but in the early war years this was a lengthy and slow business as the procedure could not be carried out from the ship concerned since the equipment had not been developed: bearings were taken on the airship from the bases in Germany and the answer morsed back to her. This
640
being held by searchlights, but her bombs were dropped, all falling on the city streets causing fires and civilian casualties. The Sachsen returned undamaged to Cologne at 2300 hours, having been in flight almost exactly 12 hours. Subsequently, Lehmann's ship was joined by the Z IX (Hauptmann Horn) based at Diisseldorf, and several more reconnaissances and raids were made by both ships. On October 8, however, ZIX's career was terminated by a fine attack by Flight-Lieutenant R. L. G. Marix of the Royal Naval Air Service. After taking off from Antwerp in a Sopwith Tabloid, he flew over the shed at Diisseldorf, bombed it and completely destroyed the Zeppelin in the subsequent blaze. Meanwhile on the Eastern Front, three army airships had been operating against the Russians. The old LZ 4 (Hauptmann Quast) — commissioned on March 14, 1913, and the ship that had made the controversial forced landing at Luneville in France in 1913 — carried out many scouting
and bombing raids on Warsaw and surrounding railway junctions. She was in action until February 1915, but was withdrawn at the end of that month to continue as a trainer. The LZ 5 (Oberleutnant Gruner) operated almost to the end of August reconnoitering over the area around Novogeorgievsk. On August 28, however, when attacking the railway yards at Mlawa, she was fired on by Russian field artillery and crashed behind the lines in Poland. While attempting to burn their ship, the crew were captured, most of them subsequently dying in Siberia. The third ship was the wooden Schutte Lanz SL2 serving in the area of the Austrian armies flights its
The weakness of all Zeppehns-every crash landing meant some measure of major damage naissance over the Alsace border and on emerging from low cloud at about 2,500 feet was at once fired on by French forces which were immediately below. Holed immediately, she had to force land at St Quirin in Lorraine, where she also was wrecked. The same day, the story was repeated with the LZ 8 (Hauptmann Andree). While flying at under 1,000 feet and having already been fired on by German troops, she was pierced by both gun and small arms fire and came down between the rival armies in the woods near Badonvillers. So much gas had been lost that the crew were unable to set fire to their ship to prevent her falling into French hands. After a skirmish with French cavalry and an 11 -hour march, the weary airship crew encountered a German infantry outpost, to whom they reported the position of the nearest French forces, this information being of considerable value to the German armies in the area, as they were completely out of touch with the French.
Bombs over Antwerp The
old civilian ship Sachsen (Oberleutnant zur See Lehmann, now under army orders) had flown to Cologne, as a replacement to the LZ 6. On a moonlit cloudy night, September 2, with 2,000 pounds of bombs on board, the Sachsen approached Antwerp at 5,500 feet, intending to bomb the forts. She was subjected to anti-aircraft fire while
in Galicia. On September 26, she was transferred to the Western Front. The baton now passed, in a modest way, to the Imperial Navy with its two nonrigid airships — the IV (Hauptmann von Jena), an army airship under naval command, which was based at Kiel and used mainly for reconnaissance work over the Baltic and the PL 19 (Oberleutnant zur See Meier), which was based at Konigsberg. On the morning of January 25, the PL 19 departed from her base with orders to bomb the Russian naval port of Libau in the Eastern Baltic. The ship encountered freezing conditions. Pieces of ice were formed on the propeller blades and thrown through the envelope, this causing gradual loss of gas. Descending through cloud at 0845 hours, the PL 19 bombed a factory on the outskirts of Libau. The ship encountered small arms fire at low altitude, but sustained no damage. Passing over the coast, however, both engines failed one after the other. Then, buckling amidships, the PL 19 dropped ignominiously into the sea seven miles offshore. Two Russian minesweepers approached, to which the seven man crew surrendered, leaving their airship blazing on the water from Russian machine gun fire. In March, three Zeppelins were sent to the Eastern Front for use during Hmdenburg's spring and summer offensives. They were the Sachsen (Hauptmann George), the Z XI (Oberleutnant Gaissert) and the LZ 34 (Oberleutnant Gaissert). Reconnaissances and raids were carried out in the areas of Warsaw, Grodno and Kovno, but the Z XI was burnt out accidentally on leaving her shed at Posen on May 20 and the LZ 34 was destroyed the following day in a landing accident in East Prussia after an attack on Kovno. These two losses were
M
replaced by,
Z XII
(Oberleutnant zur See
Lehmann) and LZ 39 (Hauptmann Horn). While all these events were taking place over the battle fronts in the west and east, there existed a constant desire in both the official
and public mind
in
Germany
to
Britain with the airship fleet. The British declaration of war had roused hatred in many sections of the German nation and in the Zeppelins they thought they had a unique weapon of retribution to bring against England. Alongside the notorious Hymn of Hate being sung in the Fatherland during the opening weeks of the war was a second song: attack
Great
Flieg, Zeppelin, Flieg,
Hilf uns im Krieg, Fliege nach England, England wird abgebrannt, Zeppelin flieg.
in its Airship Detachment commander, Korvettenkapitan Peter Strasser, an officer devoted to the airship arm and a fine leader capable of inspiring the devotion of all captains and men under his leadership. The army airships were at the disposal of the German General Staff and did not have the advantage of a forceful, individual leader. The navy had established two bases, one at Nordholz, south of Cuxhaven, and the other at Fuhlsbuttel, north of Hamburg. On the morning of January 19, three naval Zeppelins were marched out of their sheds for a raid on England. The L 3 (Kapitanleutnant Fritz) and L 4 (Kapitanleutnant Graf von Platen-Hallermund) at Fuhlsbuttel and the L 6 (Oberleutnant Freiherr von Buttlar-Brandenfels) with Strasser on board at Nordholz. Halfway across the North Sea, the L6's engine failed and she turned back to her base,
Help us in the war! Fly to England. shall be destroyed by
Zeppelin,
fire.
fly.)
The practical difficulties of bringing this about were beyond the ordinary man in the street's understanding, however, and there were also two quite separate schools of thought in the official world. In September the staffs of both the army and the navy had discussed the bombing of England, but, because of the limited number of airships available and also, in the navy's case, their need for long distance reconnaissance over the North Sea, it was decided to wait until sufficient numbers of ships had been built to provide a reserve for both scouting and raiding tasks. This number was not available until the end of December, and here further difficulties, potential ones, presented themselves. Both the Kaiser and the Chancellor (Bethmann-Hollweg) were reluctant to agree to the bombing of London. The Chief of the Naval Staff (Konteradmiral Paul Behncke), however, was convinced that London was a legitimate target with its military establishments in the Woolwich area and its docks. In a memorandum he wrote: T hold the view that we should leave no means untried to crush England and that successful air raids on London, in view of the already existing nervousness of the people, would prove a valuable means to this end.' Official permission was finally given for air raids on January 9, 1915, but the Kaiser specified that they should be expressly restricted to military shipyards, arsenals, docks and, in general, military establishments, but that London itself was not to be bombed. But late in 1914 a portent of what was to follow had already occurred when, on December 21, a German aeroplane ap-
proached Dover and dropped two bombs in the sea off the Admiralty pier, while on the 24th, a second aeroplane dropped the first bomb to fall on British soil — again at Dover. Christmas Day itself brought a visit from a seaplane which appeared at Sheerness soon after noon, and flew up to Erith, but dropped no bombs. This machine was engaged by anti-aircraft guns and British aeroplanes, but it returned safely.
A
devoted leader was at last ready. The army now had seven rigid airships and the navy six, but the latter had a great advantage In January all
and landed at Fuhlsbuttel at 0945 hours the next day, almost in the wake of the L3. Thus ended the first true air raid on British
The Germans had successfully bombs (if with little military
soil.
dropped
had returned safely and were encouraged to continue their efforts. Mobile armament was developed with its headeffect),
at Newmarket, consisting of machine guns and searchlights on motor cars. A second section formed at Caterham was operated for only a short time. The reaction of the British people was more of irritation and annoyance than fear. After centuries of security and a total belief in the protective power of the Royal Navy, the apparent ease with which German airships had roamed at will over areas
quarters
of Britain with nothing to prevent them dropping their bombs as they wished came as a shock and humiliation. To this was added indignation at the lack of effective action by the anti-aircraft forces, although the public could appreciate neither the difficulties of locating airships at night nor the small means of attacking them. Despite the comparative success of this first German effort, no further raids took place for three months. On February 17,
(Fly, Zeppelin! Fly,
England
existed except in the commander's imagination. The L 4 then continued east, flying over Yarmouth and passing out to sea,
both the
A Dutch caricature— the new Death Butterfly over the skies of Europe
s
Head
while the L 3 and the L 4 continued on their way, the former crossing the Norfolk coast at Ingham at 2005 hours in rainy, foggy weather. At about 2030 hours in Great Yarmouth, a Mr W. J. Sayers and his son were returning home after attending a choir practice, when they heard the sound of aircraft engines above them and perceived a bright light, followed by the noise of an object falling from the sky. The bombs fell behind the pair, hurling them to the ground and slightly injuring the boy's shoulder with a splinter. Thus was arrival of the L3 over Yarmouth announced. After crossing the coast, she passed over the town releasing parachute flares and dropping six 110-pound bombs and incendiaries, flying from north to south. Two persons in all (a man and a woman) were killed and 13 injured. Drawing away from the coast at 2200 hours the L3 landed at Fuhlsbuttel at 0940 hours the next day. The L4 crossed the coast at 2000 hours near Mundesley, dropping two bombs at Sheringham shortly afterwards. She then continued along the coast until the lights of King's Lynn attracted Platen's attention. Turning south, he passed over the town dropping seven high explosive and six incendiary bombs. Several houses suffered damage and a woman and a boy were killed. Platen reported being illuminated by searchlights and being fired on by antiaircraft guns, but neither guns nor lights
the
L3
and
L4
were
lost.
The two
ships had been sent on a scouting mission to the Skagerrak, but a gale springing up from the south prevented them from reaching their base. At 1745 hours, with his engines failing, Fritz force-landed on the Danish island of Fano, his ship being wrecked in the process. After setting her on fire, the captain and crew were interned. Likewise with the L 4 — with only two engines working at 1830 hours, she came down into the surf on the Danish coast at Blaavands Huk. Less fortunate than that of her sister ship, 1 1 of the crew struggled ashore in the icy darkness, but the L4, lightened by the disembarkation of the 11 men, then rose up and disappeared with four of her crew still on board — the first naval airship casualties of the war.
Completely destroyed Rivalry between the army and naval services had arisen over the honour of being the first to raid London. On February 26th, the naval L 8 (Kapitanleutnant Beelitz) left Dusseldorf with orders to raid London, but running into strong winds, she landed at the military base of Gontrode. On March 1, Beelitz was ordered to return to Dusseldorf. Leaving Gontrode on the 4th, he attempted a raid on England, but. by an error of judgement, he flew low over Nieuport where he was riddled by Belgian small arms fire and after turning for home, the L8 dropped amongst trees at Tirlemont where the wind finally completed her destruction. This, for the time being, was the last naval attack against London On the afternoon of April 14, the new L9 (Kapitanleutnant Mathy) based at Hage, was on reconnaissance off Flam borough Head, when her commander asked, by wireless, for permission to raid the Tyne. He made his landfall at 1900 hours at Blyth, dropped bombs at West Sleek burn and other places north of the Tyne and finally reached the Tyne al 2015 hours, where eight of his bombs injured a woman and a child at Wallsend. The L9 left the area at 2100 hours. Another raid followed
(ill
the very next night with Strasser taking part. The Lb (Kapitan der Reserve Bocker) dropped bombs on Lowestoft, Henham Hall and Southwold. Bocker had only taken command the day before. The L6 (Oberleutnant Freiherr von Buttlar) bombed Maldon and Heybridge and on the return
shed at Fuhlsbiittel was found to in the gas cells, plus 17 bullet holes, this damage being caused by small arms tire from troops at Landguard. L 7 (Oberieutnant zur See Peterson) with Strasser on board, encountered head winds and although brushing the coast, dropped no bombs on land. New Zeppelins were coming forward for the army and these were to be based in Belgium for raids on the United Kingdom. On April 13, however, the army service suffered a fresh loss when the LZ 35 Hauptmann Masius) crashed at to his
have eight tears
(
Thielt in Belgium after raiding Poperinge. On April 29, the first of the 1,000,000 cubic feet standard Zeppelins, the army ship LZ 38 (Hauptmann Linnarz) crossed the coast just before midnight at Old Felixstowe and shortly afterwards reached Ipswich. After dropping a few bombs, she continued to Bury St Edmunds where many incendiary bombs were dropped. The LZ 38 then recrossed the coast at Aldeburgh, having caused no casualties. After this, Linnarz carried out three deliberate raids as a preliminary to attacking London. On May 10 the LZ 38 reached Southend at
0245 hours and dropped an incendiary
bomb
close alongside the prisoner of
war
hulk Royal Edward. Carrying on inland, the airship was hit by anti-aircraft fire from Cliffe and was slightly damaged while flying over Canvey Island. Dropping all her bombs on Southend, the LZ 38 returned hurriedly to base. While over England on this raid, Linnarz dropped a piece of cardboard bearing the words 'You English — We have come and will come again — Kill or cure — German.'
The defence now began to play a part in the game. On the 17th the same commander raided Ramsgate and Oxney at Disabled by anti-aircraft fire, a crippled Zeppelin is towed into Ostend harbour
\
On his return journey, just after crossing the lines at Armentieres,
0200 hours.
he was attacked by Flight Sub-Lieutenant R. H. Mulock, but his gun jammed at the critical moment and the LZ38 climbed out of reach. During this flight, the LZ38 was the first airship to be illuminated by a British searchlight, the searchlight crew being awarded a silver replica of the AntiAircraft Corps badge. The same night, LZ 39 (Hauptmann Masius) after passing over Dunkirk, was attacked by three aeroplanes and suffered bomb hits from FlightCommander A. W. Bigsworth, but sustained only slight damage, as the bombs did not detonate. On the 26th, Linnarz carried out his third London approach, raiding Southend for the second time. At 2230 hours the LZ38 approached Clacton and soon after was fired on from Southminster. Turning south she was fired on by a 3-inch gun over Shoeburyness and turning to Southend, she dropped 23 grenades and 47 incendiaries, the result being three killed and three injured. She left the coast shortly before midnight via the mouth of the Blackwater. London defences, at this time, consisted of the dimming of lights, antiaircraft guns extended to a radius of six miles (the centre being Charing Cross, the guns consisting of two 3-inch, four 6pounders and six 1 -pounders) and 12 searchlights and 1,000 men to man them. Three guns from the fleet were added after this raid of the 26th. These were, however, only palliatives to bolster public morale. They could not hope to prevent the menace.
First
bombs on London
his destination London, a full moon on the night of May 31 guided Linnarz over the coast near Margate and helped him make his landfall on Shoeburyness at 2012 hours. Then crossing Essex from east to west, he swung to port and flew over northeast London dropping 30 grenades and 89 incendiary bombs. The first house to be hit in an air raid in London was 16 Alkham Road, Stoke Newington, this being the
With
of Mr and Mrs A. E. Lovell and family. Shortly after 2045 hours, a cry from an upper room aroused Mr Lovell who, on rushing upstairs, found a bedroom ablaze
home
from an incendiary bomb. The house was cleared and the fire brigade dealt with the burning building. Continuing almost due south, the LZ 38 dropped a shower of nearly 20 bombs, one an incendiary falling on 33 Cowper Road, the residence of a couple named Leggett, causing the death of two of their children— Elsie and May Leggett — the first fatal casualties in London. Another bomb falling at 187 Balls Pond Road killed Mr and Mrs Good, who died in the ensuing flames. Two children were killed in Christian Street near the Commercial Road. Total casualties in this, the first air raid on London, were seven killed and 35 wounded, the financial damage being estimated at £18,396. The LZ37 (Oberieutnant von der Hagen) was also up that night and after British aeroplanes had attempted to intercept her over Dunkirk at 2100 hours in the evening, she reached the mouth of the Swale. She turned for home after being fired on by mobile antiaircraft guns.
On the night of June 4, two naval airships from Nordholz were in action. One was the L 10 (Kapitanleutnant Hirsch) and the other a Schutte Lanz ship, the SL3 (Kapitan Bomack), this airship being the largest in the world at that time. About 2100 hours the L10 was over the Isle of Sheppey, then, crossing the mouth of the Swale, she proceeded to Gravesend where bombs were dropped, and then Sittingbourne. A military hospital was hit at Gravesend and, altogether, eight people were injured. The SL 3 dropped two bombs near Great Driffield, with only little
damage
caused.
Meanwhile, what of attacks on Paris, the capital of Germany's other opponent in the west? Only one attack was made on the French capital at this time as the limited number of airships and the fact that Germany's main resentment was
1
,fe£jKv
jn
m
*3!
P^
Above: The German Zeppelin L 3, one of Germany's early military airships. Left: Distinguished passengers in the under-keel gondola of aZeppelin: Count Zeppelin himself (1) and the King of Saxony (2). Right: The officers and crew of a Zeppelin, all newly decorated with the Iron Cross, pose proudly by their ship. Below: A control car for a Zeppelin of the L 3 type. In these early types the gondola was suspended below the keel, and though there was a windscreen, the whole car was very exposed to the elements, and the occupants suffered considerably from the cold at high altitude
W^.
1
Catwalk
2 Radiators (port and starboard) 3 Propeller drive shaft (port and starboard) 4 7-92-mm machine gun (port and starboard) 5 Telephone 6 Control car suspension rods 7 Windscreen 8 Steering wheel
9
Compass
Pneumatic landing bumper Instruments 12 Two 180-hp Maybach engines 13 Ground handling rail 10
1
14 Emergency ballast 15 Exhaust silencer 16 Incendiary bombs
643
Yarmouth»(Jan19 Lowestoft«|April 15 April 15
Southend
May 10 and 26 Ramsgate May 17 lover
Dec 24,1914
Left:
Bomb damage
in
Hull after a raid in
June
1915 Above: Zeppelin raids on East Anglia and the South-East up to the middle of 1915. Below The wreck of the L 3 off the north coast of Denmark, where it had crashed after being blown off course in a storm
A new rain from the and terror on the ground — high explosive and skies
incendiary bombs on the heart of previously unharmed civilian
homelands
England inclined the main be made against Great Britain, so that comparatively few airships were available to use against Paris. The one airship raid against the French capital in 1915 took place when, on the night of March 21, three army airships approached the city, the ZX, LZ35 and the old SL2 (Hauptmann von Wobeser). This latter ship was hit by guns while crossing the lines and she returned to her base at Trier after dropping her bombs near Compiegne. Seven high explosive bombs and 14 incendiaries fell on Paris itself and 31 incendiaries on the suburbs. One person was killed and eight injured in this raid. Of (Hauptmann Horn) the three ships, the Z had also sustained damage from antiaircraft guns, but, in her case, on her return journey. When over Noyon, several gas cells were pierced and she finally came down at St Quentin, where she broke up. Thus this period in the Zeppelin war came to an end with little achieved on the part of the Zeppelins apart from their share in drawing civilians closer to the directed against
effort to
X
feeling of actually having been at
p
m
"
\h
war and
~*J*f
in stoking the fires of hatred for Germany. Zeppelin losses had been heavy in material although light in manpower, but their prowess grew with experience and so the defences could not long remain mere token forces such as they were in mid 1915.
Further Reading Castle, H. G., Fire over England: the German air raids of World War I (Leo Cooper 1982)
Marben, Mingos,
R.,
Zeppelin Adventures
& Lehmann, E., The Zeppelins Morison, F., War on Great Cities Morris, J., The German Air Raids on Great H.
Britain
Robinson,
D. H.,
The Zeppelin
in
Combat
(Foulis 1966)
Snowden-Gamble, C. F., Story of a North Sea Air Station The War in the Air Volume III (OUP)
JOHN CHANDLER EDGCUMBE was
born in 1920 and educated at the University of London. He joined the army in 1942, seeing service in North Africa and the Far East. He left the army in 1947 and worked at The Times bookshop in London for a number of years before leaving to
join
a military antique shop.
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On May
10,
1915 a German
Zeppelin raided the town of Southend on the Thames estuary. This was the most powerful raid so far mounted by the Germans, and to commemorate the event, the
Southend Standard published an Air Raid Supplement. Not only does this give an indication^ the course of events in the bombed ..own, but also describes the emotions of the bombed people
646
BOMBS
Southend-on-Sea
has
melancholy
the
was visited by the most formidable effort yet made from the air upon this country. Sunday was a satisfaction of
knowing that
it
beautiful day, with a strong easterly wind, which would favour a quick passage across the North Sea. The many thousands who thoroughly enjoyed the sunshine little thought as they went to bed what the sleeping hours would bring. In the early
morning the sky was streaked with small with a haziness which made it difficult to detect anything moving in the sky above. It was at such a favourable juncture that the blow was struck and fell upon the unfortified watering place of Southend. The affair occupied so few minutes in its happening that it was not clouds,
easy to judge the route of the aircraft, give number or description, or to say
N SOUTHEND
with certainty what the objective was. Apparently the aircraft stopped short about Bread and Cheese Hill, Thundersley, hurling incendiary bombs on that district and South Benfleet, and then turned back at full speed towards the North Sea, perhaps because the effect of her work at Southend was being quickly observed. Independent accounts all agree that operations began about 2.45 am; the first call being made to
fire brigade at 2.49 am. Mr Flaxman's timber yard and shops were then well alight as the result of an incendiary bomb; another also striking the dwelling house and inflicting considerable damage, -lust
the
previously the first explosion was felt; a sharp, almost, painful detonation sending many thousands of burgesses straight out of their beds and to the windows, where a whirring noise was heard. It was this
which probably struck a house at the Road East, where the occupants (Mr and Mrs Warr) and Cor poral Hanny, of the Border Regiment, and his wife and child, had narrow escapes; a huge hole being made in the hack garden and the rear structure set musk damaged Very shortly afterwards another sharp \ plosion was heard, and innv he that this was the shell which struck the piece of shell
rear of 192, York
<
647
in front of Ambleside Drive, great hole in the ground; the force of the concussion breaking the windows of scores of neighbouring houses. There was a third explosive bomb, which crashed through the wood paving of Victoria Avenue opposite the Technical
waste land
making
a
School and embedded itself in concrete without exploding Another was also thrown at \\ est borough School playground, and passed through the asphalt without bursting. So much for the enemy's effort at destruction of life by explosives. The attempt to destroy property by means of incendiary bombs was much more fruitful of result, although even then the results were puny contrasted with the personal risk and financial outlay involved. Westcliff and Leigh were peppered with them. Benfleet and Thundersley marked the termination of the raid, and on the return journey further fire bombs were dropped. A representative of the Southend Standard saw the collection of bombs at the police station, where they were kept in the safe custody of the police. They were each ticketed with the place where they were found. Each missile weighed about 50 lbs. The incendiary bombs were made of steel, zinc, tow, wire, tar, and filled with petrol and benzine. A channel bored through in several places contained a fuse lighted by a cap fixed in a heavy rounded base. Wound round wire supports was a mass of tow saturated with inflammable liquid. This was inside a zinc case, outside of which was wound more tow covered with moist tar. The explosion in the centre fired the saturated tow, the liquid burst all over the place with the impact, and the whole catching fire, a mass of smoke and flames ensued, igniting everything with
which it came in contact. Messrs C. M. and R. D. Boyce, who carry on the business of motor engineers at their garage at 72, Leigh Road East, Southend, give an interesting account of their happenings on Sunday night, which probably explains the fusillade of bombs on the centre of the town. Mr R. D. Boyce told a Standard pressman: About three o'clock I was aroused from my sleep by the sound of an explosion. I got up, put my head out of the window, and heard the noise of an engine. I woke my brother up, and we went downstairs and stood in the roadway. My brother saw a Zeppelin overhead. He saw it quite distinctly, and it was at a great height. We heard the noise of the engines, and why I know it was a Zeppelin was because the engines were running quite slowly. They were running as slowly as can the engine of an ordinary car. Suddenly the engines were shut off and everything was quiet. There were only two policemen out in the road, and when the engines stopped they said, 'All right; they have sheered off.' The engines were quite quiet for a quarter of an hour, and then we heard them again. Mr Boyce said the first bomb*he saw dropped fell into the front garden of Mr Saudercock's house, on the corner of Richmond Avenue and Leigh Road, setting light to the fence. He and his brother went and put this out. Then in quick succession bombs fell on No 1, Richmond Avenue and also on Mr Pavey's house, which is almost directly opposite Messrs Boyc 's garage. His brother went and assisted at these fires. The three bombs dropping n the same spot go to prove that the aircraft was almost stationary. These bombs created a trei
648
mendous explosion; and in quick succession more bombs fell in St John's Road, Hamlet Court Road, and four in Ceylon Road. 'We were right
in the centre of it all,' added Boyce, 'and the whole place seemed to be ablaze. The bombs lighted when they fell, and seemed to take a zig-zag course. I am certain that the Zeppelin which was over Southend was never fired at. It was 20 minutes after I heard the engines that the Corporation hooter went.' One of the most graphic accounts related in connection with the tactics of the Zeppelin invader is that which Mr William Ledicott, of the Crystal Mineral Water Works, Salisbury Avenue, Southend told. Mr Ledicott is a member of the Special Police Reserve, and he was on duty at Cobweb Corner, which is at the junction of High Street, London Road, Southchurch Road and Victoria Avenue. Told in his
Mr
She then stopped her engines, and the sound ceased. The Zeppelin gradually dropped down and it was then that I had a good view of her. I should then estimate her height at from 580-600 feet. She was most distinct and remained motionless for four minutes — I timed her by my watch. It was a peculiar feeling standing there watching her, wondering what was going to happen. I then walked from the centre of the road to Garon's hoarding, and the first thing I noticed wrong was when a bomb fell. It fell within five yards of the special constables in front of the tramway centre, but fortunately it did not burst. It fell with terrible force and buried itself under the wooden paving. Mr Anderson, of the Special Police, who was on duty for the first time, was knocked over onto the pavement by the force of the concussion, but I did not feel anything. She then started her engines and proceeded straight up the
London Road in the direction of Westcliff. She started dropping bombs all the way. I ran up the road and saw the first incendiary
bomb drop
at the corner of Boston Avenue. onto the pavement. It was very hot, and I got my whistle chain, which has a hook on it, put it round the wire of the bomb and put the bomb in the centre of the road. During this time the Zeppelin which had been going very slowly, started to circle
It fell
round Prittlewell way and gradually worked back from Harcourt Avenue in the direction towards Southchurch Road. By the time she had reached Southchurch Road the intensity of her engines was so great that the noise she was making showed she was putting on more speed. She gradually went out of sight and I lost the sound
Tom Thumb and
the Giant— a reference to the Zeppelin L 79 forced to ditch in the North Sea after raiding over the British Isles
own
words, his narrative is as follows: the one I saw was a huge thing. I was on No 6 beat, and some members of our squad say that they saw as many as four Zeppelins. Mr H. B. Snow is certain that he saw four come over. I went on duty at one o'clock on Monday morning. My beat
Now
lay along London Victoria Avenue. first
round with
the
arrival
Road, North Road, and
Having completed
my colleagues I was
of the
Corner at 2.30
am
the
waiting
at Cobweb At 0240 hours
sergeant
to report.
— to be exact — four of us were standing at the corner with one of the ordinary police force — when we heard a whirring noise. We all went into the middle of the road, and searched the sky, and saw coming from the direction of Hamlet Court Road straight across to the Great Eastern yard, a large dim shape, which, as it came near, we made out to be a huge Zeppelin. Corporal Frost immediately went for the fire brigade, while the policemen on duty went to warn the authorities. I then stood in the middle of the roadway and took out my watch and noticed the Zeppelin's movements and timed them. She came across London Road, cut across Baxter Avenue and circled the Great Eastern Railway Station. Then she turned sharply round and came to a standstill over the middle of the roadway at
Cobweb Corner.
of her engines about nine minutes past three. She appeared to go directly out to sea and would pass in my estimation over Shoebury. I am certain she never came round and went up to Leigh, unless she went out to sea and followed the Thames back. If she did, of course I could not see I am certain of her course because I it. followed every movement. It seemed most curious to me that this airship in making the noise she did in passing over the town, and also going away again, should have no guns brought to bear upon her. I can say that no guns were fired at her while she was over the town. Asked as to the apparent size of the airship, Mr Ledicott replied that he should say she was 300 feet long at least. She was a huge looking thing, and he could see bombs being dropped from each side of her as fast as they could drop them. It was like a shower of bombs over the London Road area. As each bomb came down it was like two streaks of light, and they fell with a great thud. 'In my mind I am sure that one airship could not have done all the damage^ If people saw an airship over Pitsea at three o'clock this could not have been the one. She flew higher as she went away. I do not think this is the same airship as did
damage in the York Road district. These bombs are dreadful things, and no sooner are they in a house than the building is a mass of flames. They are saturated with petrol and throw out huge volumes of smoke. They also smell very strongly of the
One thing that struck me was the cool way in which the people behaved, and the crowd was most orderly when it came spirit.
out.'
[This extract is taken from the Southend Standard of May 13, 1915.}
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